Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wayzata GN | Judge: Sara Sanchez
1
Debt ceiling will be raised without confrontation but lawmakers can shift
Espo 9-18 09/18/2013. DAVID ESPO AP Special Correspondent. “Dodge default, defund Obamacare, GOP leaders say.” http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24119843/ap-sources-revised-gop-attack-obamacare
The RSC claims a membership of 175 members, about three-quarters of the House Republican rank and file. The bill's introduction comes at a time when party leaders have yet to advance any comprehensive alternative to the law Obama signed in 2010, though the GOP House has voted repeatedly to repeal all or part of it. The GOP pledged three years ago to "repeal and replace" the existing law, a promise Obama often notes with disdain. The approach outlined Wednesday by Boehner and the GOP leadership team underscored how quickly tea party lawmakers have shifted their principal focus in the weeks since Cruz and Sen. Mike Lee of Utah as well as the outside groups began stressing the issue in TV ads. The leadership's initial proposal for avoiding a partial government shutdown was to couple funding for federal programs with a requirement for the Senate to cast a vote on defunding the health care program, a requirement that could easily have been evaded. Conservatives quickly rebelled against that approach, forcing Boehner and his lieutenants to regroup. Even as they did, they sought to emphasize their commitment to cutting federal spending and curtailing the debt, two issues that have consistently united the fractious rank and file since Republicans took control of the House nearly three years ago. "Not since the Korean War has the federal government reduced spending two years in a row. We aim to make that happen," said the Republican majority leader, Rep. Eric Cantor of Virginia. Spending would be set at $986.3 billion for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, although that would be further reduced in January by a new round of across-the-board sequester cuts that would trim the level to $967 billion. "There should be no conversation about shutting the government down. That's not the goal here," Boehner said. Republicans paid a heavy political price two decades ago as the result of twin government shutdowns, at a time then-Speaker Newt Gingrich was insisting President Bill Clinton agree to cuts in Medicare, Medicaid and other popular programs. Nor are Republicans eager to shoulder the blame for any market-shaking government default, which would probably occur if the Treasury could not continue to borrow funds to pay debts already incurred. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has estimated that without action by Congress, that default will arrive in mid-
IFF legislation has stalled in Congress and enforcement isn’t happening—lack of political will
Cassara ’13 MARCH 5, 2013. JOHN A. CASSARA, INDUSTRY ADVISER TO SAS FEDERAL LLC. “Our anti-money laundering efforts have failed.” http://www.sas.com/knowledge-exchange/risk/fraud-financial-crimes/our-anti-money-laundering-efforts-have-failed/index.html
The overseas metrics are equally depressing. According to the Department of State, “far too many countries that boast solid anti-money laundering standards and infrastructures do not enforce their laws. This is true in all corners of the world and for both developed and developing countries alike. In many instances, the lack of enforcement is due to lack of capacity, but in some cases it is due to a lack of political will.” Talking aimlessly Some believe that recent eye-catching actions against major banks may create change. For example, HSBC was fined $1.9 billion for failing to pursue anti-money laundering within its branches. However, this is a regulatory action. The $1.9 billion is not going to be taken from drug traffickers but from the shareholders of HSBC. And not one individual will be prosecuted In 2005, I wrote Hide and Seek: Intelligence, Law Enforcement and the Stalled War on Terror Finance. I was very concerned that the US might be moving away from effective anti-money laundering and financial crimes enforcement. I felt our war on terror finance was “stalled.” I suggested that a new emphasis be placed on enforcing the laws, rules and regulations that are already on the books. I urged Congress and regulatory agencies to step up oversight. Most important, I argued that real progress requires a different philosophical and bureaucratic emphasis. Simply put, we have to get back to the basics of enforcement.
Obama’s cooperation is key
Moore 9-10 September 10, 2013. Heidi Moore is Guardian’s US Finance and Economics Editor. “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security.” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester
Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America. There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts. The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short. The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding. Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon. The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem. These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria. More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas. The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect. This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria. Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad. Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told: Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure. Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington. Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time. The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today. It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria. There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.
A drawn out debt ceiling debate crushes US legitimacy
Babones ’13 May 21, 2013. Salvatore Babones is a senior lecturer in sociology and social policy Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. “The Debt Ceiling Debate That Wasn't.” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/16504-the-debt-ceiling-debate-that-wasnt
The debt ceiling has been reached multiple times since the beginning of the global financial crisis, and another debt ceiling crisis is right around the corner. Except that there will be no crisis, because the country is Australia. Just like the United States, Australia has a debt ceiling. Australian borrowing bumps up against this ceiling on a regular basis. And just as in the United States, the debt ceiling is an absolute limit on government spending that cannot be transgressed even if the Australian parliament has passed a bill authorizing additional expenditures. But there the similarity ends. Australia has no debates over default, no dramatic government shutdowns, no sequestration and no fiscal cliffs. When the government reaches the debt ceiling, the ceiling is raised in an orderly manner. No one panics. Everyone gets paid. It used to work that way in the United States, too. The debt ceiling has only come to be politicized in recent years. This situation is ludicrous - and dangerous. Once the government has incurred a legal obligation, we should all expect the government to meet it. America's debt ceiling brinksmanship has made us a global laughingstock. In no other developed country do political parties threaten to push the government into default if they don't get their way. This kind of take-no-prisoners politics is more characteristic of third-world dictatorships than first-world democracies. The United States doesn't have to have a debt ceiling. At the next reauthorization which by most accounts will be the 90th or so Congress could simply abolish the ceiling. But Australia's experience shows this is unnecessary. If America's politicians could be as sober and mature as Australia's, we wouldn't have to worry about it. The Australians I know will be rolling in the aisles to hear their politicians described as "sober and mature." Australian politics is highly partisan, often very personal and nothing if not robust. But it is not self-destructive. America - and America's politicians - could learn some important lessons in democracy from looking overseas. America's own democracy is, perhaps, not the example it once was.
Solves Extinction
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13
(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
2
Mexico should implement customs reform and pursue macroeconomic stability to achieve transparency in financial counts and transaction.
The counterplan solves—Mexico must start by implementing custom reforms itself
Kar ’12 Dev Kar. January 2012. “Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy.” http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/mexico/gfi_mexico_report_english-web.pdf
First, it is clear that almost three-quarters of total illicit flows over the period 1970-2010 were generated through trade mispricing (Appendix Table 6). Moreover, model simulations indicate that increasing trade openness since 1994 when NAFTA was implemented led to more trade mispricing (see Section III, Table 3 on Structural Equation Estimates, and Box 1). This would strongly suggest that policy should be focused on curtailing trade mispricing. We will point out three policy measures that can go a long way in curbing related illicit outflows. As part of customs reform (which is an on-going World Bank project; reference footnote 15), we propose the implementation of a risk-based price profiling system to curtail the risk of export and import transactions being mispriced in order to transfer illicit capital out of the country. Furthermore, to reduce the risk of willful trade mispricing, we propose that all customs invoices be accompanied by a legal undertaking by exporters and importers as to pricing accuracy. Finally, we propose that multinationals be subject to financial and accounting reporting requirements in order to curtail abusive transfer pricing (ATP).
Pursuing macroeconomic stability solves transparency
Kar ’12 Dev Kar. January 2012. “Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy.” http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/mexico/gfi_mexico_report_english-web.pdf
Third, as the automatic exchange of information seeks to stem outflows by plugging gaps in information in the international financial system (which tax cheats may be using to hide taxable income), this calls for Mexican regulatory agencies to commit to a policy of seeking full transparency in all financial accounts and transactions. These measures call for extensive cooperation between the tax authority under the Ministry of Finance, the Mexican equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) which oversees the financial, auditing, and other regulatory aspects of domestic and foreign companies operating in Mexico that are publically owned or listed on the Mexican stock exchange, the central bank Banco de Mexico, and the Mexican Justice Department on domestic laws and penalties that apply to non-compliant transactions carried out by individuals and corporations.
3
Interpretation – economic engagement must be conditional
Shinn 96 James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books
In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.
The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China. The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged. The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8 To footnotes 8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).
Violation – the aff is a unilateral engagement with nothing in return– not a quid pro quo offer
Vote negative – quid pro quo gives competition for conditions cp and say no arguments. Key to fight back against aff bias
4
The affirmative rhetorical silence on whiteness is an active stance that allows white privilege to thrive by masking its existence and treating is as an assumed norm.
DR. CRENSHAW Prof of Speech Comm @ Univ. Ala. 1997
Carrie-PhD. USC; former director of debate @ Univ. of Ala.; WESTERN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION
This analysis of Helms’ opening argument illustrates how the ideology of white privilege operates through rhetorical silence. Helms’ statement was an argument over the meaning of the UDC—its members, its actions, and its insignia. It was an ideological struggle to maintain silence about the members’ whiteness and its implications through a strategic use of gender. Two key issues arise here. First, rhetorical silence about whiteness sustains an ideology of white privilege. Second, intersecting gendered discourses work to preserve this silence. Helms’ silence about whiteness naturalized the taken-for-granted assumptions contained in his framework for understanding who is harmed by this decision. The “colossal unseen dimensions of the silences and denials surrounding” whiteness are key political tools for protecting white privilege and maintaining the myth of meritocracy (McIntosh 35). This silence is rhetorical and has important ideological implications. Scott observes that silence and speaking have symbolic impact and as such are both rhetorical. When considering the dialectic of speaking and silence, he thinks of silence as the absence of speech. Silence is active, not passive; it may be interpreted. Furthermore, silence and speech may be both simultaneous and sequential. The absence of speech about whiteness signifies that it exists in our discursive silences. It may often be intentional; it can be interpreted, and it can occur simultaneously with the spoken word. Whiteness’ silence is ideological because it signifies that to be white is the natural condition, the assumed norm. Scott notes that silences symbolize the nature of things—their substance or natural condition. Silences symbolize “hierarchical structures as surely as does speech” (15). Indeed, the very structure of privilege generates silences, and “ironically, the most powerful rhetoric for maintaining an existing scheme of privilege will be silent” (10). Thus, silent rhetorical constructions of whiteness like Helms’ protect material white privilege because they mask its existence.
Racism must be rejected in EVERY INSTANCE without surcease. It justifies atrocities, creates another and is truly the CAPITAL SIN.
MEMMI Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris 2000, Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which person man is not themself himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
5
Energy reform will pass—Nieto push and Pact for Mexico
Prados 9-3 LUIS PRADOS. 3 SEP 2013.“Mexico’s Peña Nieto pledges to roll on with energy and education reforms.” http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/09/03/inenglish/1378226365_119969.html
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto on Monday reiterated his commitment to introduce sweeping reforms, including his controversial measure to open Mexico’s state-run oil industry to private investment and the restructuring of the country’s income tax brackets. “Mexico’s transformation is possible and is now under way,” Peña Nieto said in a nationwide televised address to mark his first nine months in office. The leader of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) said he was optimistic about his country’s future despite ongoing demonstrations by teachers over his education reforms and threats by Mexico’s leftist parties to call a nationwide protest over his proposal to open the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) to foreign investment. “In the coming months, it will be decided what our history will be for the coming decades,” he said, calling on Mexicans to take advantage of this opportunity to support the changes he proposes. After just one day in office, Peña Nieto last December signed a far-reaching agreement called the Pact for Mexico with the nation’s two largest opposition parties—the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the left-leaning Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) – to introduce sweeping changes in important sectors. “The window for opportunity is opened,” he said. “We trust in our potential and dare to take that leap forward.” In his speech from Los Pinos presidential palace, Peña Nieto said the PRI didn’t come to office “to administer but to transform” Mexican society.
US economic cooperation is viewed as meddling—obstructs reform and turns case
Hakim ’13 May 1, 2013. Peter Hakim holds a master’s degree in Public and International Affairs from Princeton; he is a professor at MIT and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. This was written for Reuters. “Which Mexico for Obama?” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/01/which-mexico-for-obama/
When President Barack Obama meets this week with President Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico, he will be visiting a country that was much maligned throughout his first term. Washington has viewed Mexico largely as a source of problems for the United States in the past six years. Many Mexicans, in a mirror image, consider the United States the origin of their troubles. They blame Mexico’s epidemic of violent crime on an insatiable appetite for drugs and loose control over gun and ammunition sales in the United States. In addition, the U.S. financial crisis left the Mexican economy reeling in 2009. But in the past year, particularly since Peña Nieto’s election in July 2012, Mexico’s standing in the United States and internationally has increased dramatically — along with its national self-esteem. Though organized crime and violence remain key concerns for Mexico, stories of economic and social reform are now among the headlines. A November Economist article about Mexico was titled “From Darkness, Dawn.” And that message has become a standard media refrain. Some in Washington talked about Mexico as a likely failed state, but that has been decisively debunked. Mexico is now viewed as on the rise, though its homicide rate has fallen only slightly and no one is sure that improvements can be sustained. In fact, there are many Mexicos for Obama to deal with — the successful and prospering; the backward, corrupt and stagnant; and everything in between. This mix is not unusual. It is characteristic of most nations, even the United States. Obama needs to bring an optimistic perspective with him to Mexico, reflecting the growing confidence that Mexicans have in their country — and the image they project internationally. In this, Obama has little choice. No country is likely to affect the future of the United States more than Mexico, just as none will affect Mexico’s future more than the United States. No two nations have more to gain from energetically pursuing closer cooperation. Mexico’s reinvigorated economy has proven more resilient and vibrant than anyone expected. It shrank by more than 6 percent in 2009, one year after the Wall Street financial collapse, but economic expansion since has been faster than at any time in the past two decades. Mexico’s growth, while modest by Asian standards, has in the past three years been more robust than that of Brazil, one of the region’s strongest economies. It is also competing successfully with China in U.S. markets. Mexico will displace Canada as the largest U.S. trade partner within roughly six years, according to some economic projections. Close U.S.-Mexico economic ties, once seen as the culprit in our southern neighbor’s sluggish growth and sharp downturn, are now, as the U.S. continues to recover, a prime explanation for Mexico’s rising economic fortunes. The future may be even brighter. Peña Nieto has launched an ambitious reform agenda to overcome the many obstacles to stable, rapid economic growth. He is demonstrating the political talent needed to get his policies approved and put into practice. The Mexican president, for example, managed to negotiate the Pacto por Mexico, an accord among the country’s three major parties that bridged many of their long-held ideological differences and secured their agreement on a broad package of economic changes. Despite suffering some tangles and setbacks in recent weeks, the Pacto continues to provide a path forward to far-reaching reform. Peña Nieto plans to revamp Mexico’s oil industry and open it to foreign investment could reverse the decline in oil production and assure that the country remains a leading exporter. Proposed changes would also pave the way for the systematic exploitation of Mexico’s huge, untapped deposits of shale gas and oil. Other reforms are designed to augment government revenue and improve fiscal management. Peña Nieto wants to increase competition in telecommunications and other critical sectors, and upgrade the country’s mediocre schools and universities to raise productivity and create paths for social mobility. This explosion of reform initiatives has helped change opinion in the United States about Mexico. Less than a year ago, Mexico was widely viewed as an increasingly dangerous neighbor. Today, it is talked about as a promising economic partner. The partnership will be far stronger if — as now appears likely — Congress passes sensible and humane immigration reforms. The Mexican government seems most encouraged by the prospect of U.S. legislation that would include an expanded temporary worker program and would provide immediate legal status and a path to citizenship for most currently undocumented immigrants ? about half of whom are Mexican nationals. These changes could substantially eliminate a persistent tension in U.S.-Mexican relations. Mexicans have long been angered and insulted by U.S. debates on immigration, including insistent demands that the border be walled up; the spread of anti-immigration and often anti-Latino legislation in many states and communities, and absurd and offensive proposals like GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney’s call for migrants to “self-deport.” Equally important, immigration reform will offer an array of economic benefits to both nations. Despite the Peña Nieto administration’s impressive start, however, there is reason for caution in thinking about the future of the country and its relationship with the United States. Mexico clearly looks better than ever, but it was never as seriously endangered as it was reported to be. It was never close to being a failed state. It is true that its homicide rate and violence rose rapidly in the past five years — and the associated brutality was unparalleled. But Mexico’s murders per capita are still far from the highest in Latin America. They regularly trail those of Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, most of Central America and the Caribbean. On the economic side, yes, Mexico has only recently emerged from some 15 years of listless growth. During that period, however, the economy and banking system were well managed. Mexico maintained ample reserves and a low ratio of debt to gross domestic product. Inflation was kept firmly under control. For more than two decades now, Mexico has been building a modern economy with vibrant manufacturing and export sectors well integrated into U.S. supply chains. The Mexican economy was never as troubled as it was portrayed — and now the opportunities for improvement are greater than ever. Still, Mexico is not the sure bet that many believe it to be. It has to demonstrate that it can make its economy grow faster. The past 30 years offer little evidence that Mexico has the potential for sustained, rapid expansion, or for carrying out the reforms that such growth will require. The Mexican economy has long suffered fundamental shortcomings that restrain its productivity, job creation and capacity to compete. The obstacles to change remain formidable. Peña Nieto’s reform initiatives are just getting started. The legislature has already given its initial approval for changes in education, labor laws, telecommunication policy and some other sectors. But in many cases, original proposals have been watered down, additional legislation will also be required in almost every area and effective implementation is still to come. Success will depend heavily on Peña Nieto’s political skills — as well as the technical mastery of his advisers and managers. It will also hinge on whether the fragile inter-party consensus backing the Pacto por Mexico can be sustained and popular support mobilized for change. Crime and violence are likely to remain unrelenting challenges for Peña Nieto. They could even take central stage again. In fact, public security may not improve anytime soon — despite the new government’s multiple initiatives. Peña Nieto’s predecessor, Felipe Calderón, learned how arduous a task it is to reform Mexico’s police and its justice system, and restore public confidence in them. Now, Peña Nieto is making clear his deep dissatisfaction with — and his intention to overhaul — Calderón U.S.-supported approach to security and drug issues. The expected changes will almost surely irritate many in Washington and may even become a new source of friction in the bilateral relationship.
Nieto’s political capital is key to passage—shores up public support
Wilkinson and Fausset ’13 August 13, 2013. Tracy Wilkinson and Richard Fausset—journalists for the LA Times. “Mexico's officials wage PR battle to sell energy reform plan.” http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/13/world/la-fg-mexico-pemex-pr-20130814
Even if energy reform does deliver the advantages that Peña Nieto is promising, those benefits may not materialize for years. And in the interim, Peña Nieto will have expended serious political capital to pass the controversial reform. Although it is expected that Peña Nieto will have the votes he needs in Congress to win approval for the reform, he has a restive and skeptical public to deal with. Some of the ubiquitous government ads on television and radio Tuesday seemed to have borrowed a page right out of the left's rhetoric: "No to privatization!" the voice-over starts. Then it quickly adds, "Yes to energy reform!" Many opponents of the reform are relying heavily on nationalistic imagery and rhetoric in arguing that Peña Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party is selling the country out to foreign interests. Columnist Jesus Silva-Herzog Marquez, writing in the Reforma newspaper, said changing the constitutional provisions on oil and energy was like "putting a miniskirt on the Virgin of Guadalupe," Mexico's most revered Catholic symbol. Especially on the left, where many activists consider themselves the true ideological heir of Cardenas, there was anger over hearing Peña Nieto use the late president's name to sell the proposal. A Twitter fight of sorts raged between "pros" and "cons." "Peña Nieto, do you know who Lazaro Cardenas was?" asked a Twitter user with the moniker Teotihuachango. "Who are they fooling?" asked Claudia Herrera, another Twitter user. Those in favor primarily cited the lift that a more efficient Pemex would provide the Mexican economy. "Reforming Pemex can't wait," wrote Carlos Alberto G. "Mexico needs this to be able to move ahead."
Energy reform solves Mexican manufacturing
Russell ’13 August 30, 2013. K. Alan Russell, President and C.E.O. of the Tecma Group of Companies. “Energy reform is a potential boon to manufacturers in Mexico.” https://exploreb2b.com/articles/energy-reform-is-a-potential-boon-to-manufacturers-in-mexico
In Mexico, schoolchildren are taught to take pride in the state’s ownership of the oil industry, celebrating “Día de la Expropiación Petrolera” on March 18, the day the oil industry was nationalized in 1938. For 75 years, Mexico’s sole oil and gas company, Pemex, has held a state monopoly in this crucial industry, leaving the country with high energy prices and a wariness for foreign involvement in energy resources. In fact, Mexico’s constitution expressly forbids private companies from owning Mexican oil. Any changes made in the industry in the future is a potential gain in competitiveness for manufacturers in Mexico. Change may be on the horizon. This month, the Mexican government announced plans to reform the structure of its energy industry, stopping just short of privatization. Details are still being debated, but it appears that Mexico will soon offer foreign energy companies options to partner with the Mexican government in profit and risk sharing, thus allowing for a dramatic shift in Mexico’s economy some are comparing to the transformation that occurred with the signing of NAFTA. An increase in the production of energy and/or a lowering of prices will, undoubtedly, make manufacturers in Mexico more competitive. The three primary reforms that are being considered include: allowing private companies to explore and extract resources at will with “concessions,” granting private companies production sharing privileges (giving them a portion of oil produced), and allowing them risk-sharing contracts (giving them a share of the profits from resource sales). Foreign Direct Investment stands to increase dramatically if such reforms are implemented. Net annual investments have averaged $20 billion over the last five years. Oil, gas, and power have only received $360 million in the same time period. Economist Nader Nazmi estimates that the ratio of investment to GDP could rise by an additional 2 percentage points from the effects that energy sector reforms could have on public and private investment. An increased energy supply could bolster investment in factories and manufacturers in Mexico, due to the reduced fuel costs producers would face. Some say FDI could hit $50 billion in just the next decade. While a half-hearted effort could wreck expectations and hurt future growth, the push to reform Mexico’s energy sector has the potential to increase the country’s economic growth by 2. In addition to the attractiveness of their low labor costs, Mexico’s dramatically reduced fuel costs could position the country as one of the most cost-effective locations for manufacturing and other business that are energy intensive in nature. As stated by one of the primary architects of the reform proposal, Finance Minister Luis Videgaray, “We have a great opportunity to improve the economy, to generate more jobs and to generate competitiveness for Mexican industry through the energy reform.” Mexico may soon swing open the door to such competition. There are high hopes that economic growth and a new era of energy independence and stability will follow close behind.
Key to US Manufacturing
Wilson ‘12 July 26, 2012. Christopher Wilson is an associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, and the author of the 2011 Wilson Center report Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Christopher Wilson, Issues in Science and Technology, 07-26-12, “U.S. Competitiveness: The Mexican Connection”, http://www.issues.org/28.4/p_wilson.html
Regional integration between the United States and Mexico is already vast and deep. As the United States’ second largest export market and third largest trading partner, Mexico is clearly important to the U.S. economy. Merchandise made has more than quintupled since NAFTA went into effect in 1994, and in 2011, bilateral goods and services trade reached approximately a half-trillion dollars for the first time. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has calculated that the jobs of six million American workers depend on U.S.-Mexico trade. Many of those jobs are in border states, which have especially close ties to Mexico, but Mexico is also the top buyer of exports from states as far away as New Hampshire (mostly computers and electronics). In fact, 20 states, from Michigan to Florida, sell more than a billion dollars’ worth of goods to Mexico each year, and Mexico is the first or second most important export market for 21 states. The United States and Mexico are also major investors in one another. In fact, combined foreign direct investment holdings now total more than $100 billion. According to the most recent count by the Department of Commerce, U.S.-owned companies operating in Mexico created $25 billion in value added and employed nearly a million workers. Mexican investment in the United States is less than U.S. investment in Mexico, but it is has been growing rapidly in recent years. Several of Mexico’s top companies, which are increasingly global operations, have made significant investments in the United States. Mexico’s Cemex, for example, is North America’s largest maker of cement and concrete products. Grupo Bimbo, which owns well-known brands such as Entenmanns’s, Thomas’s English Muffins, and Sara Lee, is the largest baked goods company in the Americas. Even Saks Fifth Avenue and the New York Times Company are supported by significant Mexican investment. The massive volume of commerce and investment is important, but the depth of regional integration is the primary reason why Mexico contributes to U.S. competitiveness. Mexico and the United States do not just trade products, they build them together. In fact, to understand regional trade, it is necessary to view imports and exports in a different light. Whereas imports from most of the world are what they appear to be—foreign products—the same cannot be said of imports from Mexico. During production, materials and parts often cross the southwest border numerous times while U.S. and Mexican factories each perform the parts of the manufacturing process they can do most competitively. Because of the complementary nature of the two economies, close geographic proximity, and NAFTA, which eliminated most tariff barriers to regional trade, the U.S. and Mexican manufacturing sectors are deeply integrated. Demonstrating this integration is the fact that 40 of the value of U.S. imports from Mexico comes from materials and parts produced in the United States. This means that 40 cents of every dollar the United States spends on Mexican goods actually supports U.S. firms. The only other major trading partner that comes close to this amount is Canada, the United States’ other NAFTA partner, with 25 U.S. content. Chinese imports, on the other hand, have an average of only 4 U.S. content, meaning that the purchase of imports from China does not have the same positive impact on U.S. manufacturers. The regional auto industry is a good example of this production-sharing phenomenon. The United States, Mexico, and Canada each produce and assemble auto parts, sending them back and forth as they work together to build cars and trucks. Cars built in North America are said to have their parts cross the United States borders eight times as they are being produced, and between 80 and 90 of the U.S. auto industry trade with its North American partners is intra-industry, both of which signal an extremely high level of vertical specialization. As a result, Detroit exports more goods to Mexico than any other U.S. city, and the North American auto industry has proven much more resilient than many expected. Although several of North America’s largest automakers nearly collapsed during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, a robust recovery is now under way. Mexico and the United States have each experienced the sharpest rise in vehicle production of the world’s top 10 auto producers during the past two years, growing 51 and 72, respectively, between 2009 and 2011.
Manufacturing is key to the Agriculture industry
Lind and Freeman 12 (Michael Lind, policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation, Joshua Freedman, program associate in New America’s Economic Growth Program, “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” New America Foundation, April 2012,http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,20Michael20and20Freedman,20Joshua20-20NAF20-20Value20Added20America27s20Manufacturing20Future.pdf)
Advanced manufacturing is not limited to new, emerging sectors; even manufacturing tied to one of the most “traditional” industries, agriculture, has heavily incorporated technology into its new products. The need for more accurate and efficient farming, as well as the rise of “precision agriculture”—the utilization of technology to accommodate variations within a field—has changed the agricultural manufacturing industry. i Agricultural equipment manufacturers are now creating products that are a far cry from the farm equipment of earlier generations. Replete with LED alerts, touchscreen monitors, and GPS-enabled systems, a modern farm equipment brochure looks like a consumer electronics guide.
Solves extinction
Trewavas, 2k (Anthony, Professor at the Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Edinburgh, “GM IS the Best Option We Have”, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html)
In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our civilisation. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation.
Case
1
Mexican anti-money laundering law solves—provides regulation for illicit funds
Jackson ’12 October 12, 2012. Allison Jackson is a journalist for Global Post. “Mexico passes law to fight money laundering.” http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/121011/mexico-law-money-laundering
Mexican lawmakers have unanimously approved a new federal law restricting cash purchases of real estate, armored cars and jewelry as part of a crack down on money laundering, Milenio reported. The law will require companies to report cash purchases exceeding 500,000 pesos ($16,000) for property and 200,000 pesos ($39,000) for automobiles and jewelry, Reuters reported. According to the Associated Press, experts said the new regulation, which was passed by the Senate on Thursday, would put a dent in the estimated $10 billion in drug-money that is laundered in the country every year. "There is an outcry from society to weaken the financial structures of organized crime and that is what this law is about," Senator Roberto Gil, a member of the ruling conservative National Action Party (PAN), was quoted by Reuters as saying. More from GlobalPost: Drug war ensnares big banks for letting Mexico cartels stash cash President Felipe Calderon, also from the PAN, proposed the law two years ago as part of his aggressive offensive against the country’s powerful drug cartels. More than 60,000 people have died in drug-related violence since December 2006 when Calderon deployed thousands of soliders and federal police to fight organized crime. Calderon will be leave office in December. He will be replaced by the July 1 presidential election winner Enrique Pena Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.
The Law places regulations on financial transactions—limits illicit businesses and reduces the financial incentives for IFF’s
Andersen ’12 October 16, 2012. “Looking At Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Legislation Looking At Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Legislation.” Arya Andersen is a Policy Intern at Global Financial Integrity. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2012/10/16/looking-at-mexicos-new-anti-money-laundering-legislation/
Mexican President Felipe Calderon signed a bill, unanimously passed by the Senate, today aiming to crack down on money laundering that according to experts may account for at least $10 billion every year in Mexico, or as high as $50 billion, according to estimates from Global Financial Integrity. The bill prohibits the giving or accepting of cash payments greater than half a million pesos ($38,750) for real estate purchases, as well as forbidding cash transactions of more than 200,000 pesos ($15,500) for items such as cars, jewelry or lottery tickets. The law also requires brokers and dealers report the forms of payment for any purchases over half a million pesos and for credit card companies to report when monthly balances exceed 50,000 pesos ($3,875). Violators of the law will face up to 20 years in prison, and a specially-designed financial analysis unit has been set up to work under the prosecutor in tandem with the finance ministry. The reasoning behind the law is simple. Financial windfall provides incentives for criminals to continue to break the law, use violence as a means of communication and to generally act with impunity. Closing one very financially beneficial door for organized crime is a logical step in fighting it. “There is no way to go after organized crime, if not to hit their finances,” said Senator Cristina Diaz Salazar, a member of President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party. As long as cartels can legitimize their illegally-obtained billions in real estate, vehicles, lottery tickets and other luxury goods, they’ll be able to continue to fund the violence that has plagued Mexico since it became the main transit point for U.S.-bound South American narcotics in the early 1990s. If implemented correctly and enforced, stronger anti-money laundering rules could not only help Mexico fight its sophisticated organized crime organizations, but also Some in Mexico are opposed to the law. Those in the jewelry and auto industry, specifically, are worried that they will lose business as a result of more strict regulation. This is understandable. However, Alejandro Encinas of the Democratic Revolution Party summed up the reality of the situation in saying “as long as we don’t effectively combat money laundering and dismantle the financial power of organized crime, the problem of violence and drug trafficking won’t disappear from our country.” In the long run, a less violent and more financially transparent system will be more beneficial for all legal businesses. Losing illicit business is a feature, not a bug. Since President Felipe Calderon’s election in 2006, more than 60,000 people have been killed as a result of the violence stemming from turf wars among drug cartels. This law was first introduced in 2010 as part of Calderon’s multi-pronged plan to combat organized crime, proposing to bar all cash real estate purchases as well as cash purchases of cars, planes and other goods for amounts exceeding 100,000 pesos ($7,700). This initial proposal received considerable pushback, likely due to the amount of money at stake and the notorious levels of corruption in the upper echelon of the Mexican political and law enforcement spheres. The official argument against the bill at its inception was that it would inhibit healthy economic growth due to the fact that many small businesses in Mexico still transacted solely in cash. This argument apparently won some legislators over. Sen. Roberto Gil, of Calderon’s conservative National Action Party, said the legislation now going to Calderon for his signature into law “has achieved a healthy and reasonable balance between the need to inhibit the use of cash and the normal development of our country’s economic activity.” The bill now goes to Calderon to be signed, but will not actually go into effect for another nine months, when president-elect Enrique Pena Nieto will be president. The passage of this law is a fantastic example of the very real and tangible intersection of economic regulation and national and international security. Illicit financial flows allow for drug cartels and organized crime to fund the large-scale violence that Mexico has come to know intimately, and less money will invariably mean fewer weapons in the hands of criminals. Though it is a diluted version of its Calderon’s original proposal, this iteration of the law will be a great tool for the Mexican government to lessen the financial incentives of illegal activity while also providing greater insight into the financial behavior of organized crime.
- No impact—
a) No mass economic instability—structural factors make markets resilient
Zakaria, 09 – Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard, Editor of Newsweek (Fareed, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, 12/12/09, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)
Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think.
b) Core drivers of foreign policy are constant—economic decline has minimal effect
Blackwill 2009 – former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf, WEA)
But it is worth asking, as the magisterial American soldier/statesman George Marshall often did, “Why might I be wrong?” If the global economic numbers continue to decline next year and the year after, one must wonder whether any region would remain stable— whether China would maintain internal stability, whether the United States would continue as the pillar of international order, and whether the European Union would hold together. In that same vein, it is unclear today what eff ect, if any, the reckless financial lending and huge public debt that the United States is accumulating, as well as current massive governmental fiscal and monetary intervention in the American economy, will have on U.S. economic dynamism, entrepreneurial creativity, and, consequently, power projection over the very long term. One can only speculate on that issue at present, but it is certainly worth worrying about, and it is the most important “known unknown”27 regarding this subject.28 In addition, perhaps the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on China is more fragile than posited here, and possibly Pakistan and Mexico are much more vulnerable to failed-state outcomes primarily because of the economic downturn than anticipated in this essay. While it seems unlikely that these worst-case scenarios will eventuate as a result of the world recession, they do illustrate again that crucial uncertainties in this analysis are the global downturn’s length and severity and the long-term effects of the Obama Administration’s policies on the U.S. economy. Finally, if not, why not? If the world is in the most severe international economic crisis since the 1930s, why is it not producing structural changes in the global order? A brief answer is that the transcendent geopolitical elements have not altered in substantial ways with regard to individual nations in the two years since the economic crisis began. What are those enduring geopolitical elements? For any given country, they include the following: • Geographic location, topography, and climate. As Robert Kaplan puts it, “to embrace geography is not to accept it as an implacable force against which humankind is powerless. Rather, it serves to qualify human freedom and choice with a modest acceptance of fate.”29 In this connection, see in particular the works of Sir Halford John Mackinder and his The Geographical Pivot of History (1904)30, and Alfred Th ayer Mahan, The Infl uence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890).31 • Demography—the size, birth rate, growth, density, ethnicity, literacy, religions, migration/emigration/ assimilation/absorption, and industriousness of the population. • The histories, foreign and defense policy tendencies, cultural determinants, and domestic politics of individual countries. • The size and strength of the domestic economy. • The quality and pace of technology. • The presence of natural resources. • The character, capabilities, and policies of neighboring states. For the countries that matter most in the global order, perhaps unsurprisingly, none of these decisive variables have changed very much since the global downturn began, except for nations’ weaker economic performances. That single factor is not likely to trump all these other abiding geopolitical determinants and therefore produce international structural change. Moreover, the fundamental power relationships between and among the world’s foremost countries have also not altered, nor have those nations’ perceptions of their vital national interests and how best to promote and defend them. To sum up this pivotal concept, in the absence of war, revolution, or other extreme international or domestic disruptions, for nation-states, the powerful abiding conditions just listed do not evolve much except over the very long term, and thus neither do countries’ strategic intent and core external policies— even, as today, in the face of world economic trials. This point was made earlier about Russia’s enduring national security goals, which go back hundreds of years. Similarly, a Gulf monarch recently advised—with respect to Iran—not to fasten on the views of President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Khamenei. Rather, he counseled that, to best understand contemporary Iranian policy, one should more usefully read the histories, objectives, and strategies of the Persian kings Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes, who successively ruled a vast empire around 500 BC.32 The American filmmaker Orson Welles once opined that “To give an accurate description of what never happened is the proper occupation of the historian.” 33 Perhaps the same is occasionally true of pundits.
Growth does not solve war – history proves
Martin ‘6—prof pol science, U France. Chair in Economics at the Paris School of Economics. Former economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Former assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Visiting researcher at Princeton. PhD from Georgetown. (Phillipe, “Make Trade not War?”, April 12th, 2006. http://www.ecore.be/Papers/1177063947.pdf)
Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows, and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: the main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again1. Figure 1 suggests 2 however that on the 1870-2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the XIXth century, was a period of rising trade openness and of multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.
Poverty is rapidly decreasing
Wolf 3 (Martin, Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator – Financial Times “Are Global Poverty and Inequality Getting Worse?”, Prospect Magazine, March, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?i d=4982)
All data on incomes and income distribution are questionable, above all those generated in developing countries. But, contrary to what you say, World Bank researchers have calculated the numbers in extreme poverty-less than $1 a day-on a consistent basis, in recent studies. The data shows a decline since 1980 of 200m people in the category of the absolutely poor. This is a fall from 31 per cent of the world's population to 20 per cent (not 24 per cent, which is the proportion in developing countries alone). That is a spectacularly rapid fall in poverty by historical standards. It makes a nonsense of the idea that poverty alleviation has been blighted by globalisation. Now turn to the even murkier area of inequality. Here you argue that if we exclude China and India, there is no obvious trend in inequality. But why would one want to exclude two countries that contained about 60 per cent of the world's poorest people two decades ago and still contain almost 40 per cent of the world's population today? To fail to give these giants their due weight in a discussion ofglobal poverty alleviation or income distribution would be Hamlet without the prince. You then write that changes in relative average incomes across countries are not what we are really interested in, "which is the income distribution among all the world's people or households." This is wrong in itself. If a country's average income rises rapidly, it does also possess greater means for improving the lot of the poor. Maybe the government refuses to use the opportunity, but a successor government could. In any case, we do possess data on relative household incomes. In a Foreign Affairs article, David Dollar and Aart Kraay of the World Bank report a big decline in world-wide income inequality since its peak in about 1970. The study builds on work that goes back to 1820. The underlying method is to calculate the percentage gap between a randomly selected individual and the world average. The more unequal the distribution of world income, the bigger that gap becomes. They report that this gap peaked at 88 per cent of world average income in 1970, before falling to 78 per cent in 1995, roughly where it was in 1950. The chief driver of changes in inequality among households is changes between countries, not within them. This was also the finding of Branko Milanovic's study of global household income distribution between 1988 and 1993, which you cite approvingly. You rely on this study to support the thesis of rising household inequality. But it contains at least four defects. First, there are well-known inconsistencies between data on household expenditures and national accounts. Second, the methods used generate no increase in rural real incomes in China, which is inconsistent with most views of what actually happened. Third, the period of five years is very short. Fourth and most important, this was an atypical period, because India had an economic upheaval in 1991, while China's growth was temporarily slowed by the Tiananmen crisis. My conclusion is that the last two decades saw a decline not just in absolute poverty but also in world-wide inequality among households. The chief explanation for this was the fast growth of China and, to a lesser extent, of India. This progress was not offset by rising inequality within them. In the case of India there was no such rise. In China there has been a rise in inequality in the more recent period of its growth, largely because of controls on the movement of people from the hinterland to the coastal regions.
Poverty inevitable – alt causes overwhelm
Baker and Weisbrot 3 (Dean and Mark, Co-Directors – Center for Economic and Policy Research, “False Promises on Trade”, 7-25, http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0725-02.htm)
Similarly, most of sub-Saharan Africa is suffering from an un-payable debt burden. While there has been some limited relief offered in recent years, the remaining debt burden is still more than the debtor countries spend on health care and education. The list of problems imposed on developing countries can be extended at length bans on the industrial policies that led to successful development in the west, the imposition of patents on drugs and copyrights on computer software and recorded material, inappropriate macro-economic policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. All of these factors are likely to have far more severe consequences for the development prospects of low and middle-income countries than the agricultural policies of rich countries.
2
The Mexican economy is resilient – reforms, diversification, low inflation are boosting growth
Jones and Guthrie 13 5/8/13, Kristin Jones and Amy Guthrie are staff writers and analysts @ the Wall Street Journal “Update: Fitch lifts Mexico Rating on Economy, Reforms”, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130508-718436.html
Fitch Ratings upgraded Mexico by a notch Wednesday, citing the country's strong economic fundamentals, stable oil production, progress in addressing drug-related violence and a greater-than-anticipated political commitment to pass structural reforms. The ratings firm put Mexico's long-term foreign currency issuer default rating at triple-B-plus, three rungs into investment grade. The outlook is stable. Fitch noted Mexico's economic resilience despite a sluggish economy in the U.S., Mexico's key trading partner, with three-year growth averaging 4.5 in 2012. The agency also praised Mexico's prudent macro-economic policy, which underpins the country's low inflation. In upgrading Mexico, Fitch jumped ahead of Standard and Poor's, which in March changed Mexico's outlook to positive from stable, citing the reform momentum. SandP and Fitch both cut the country to triple-B from triple-B-plus in late 2009, when the global financial crisis led Mexico's economy to contract 6 and the peso to lose more than a quarter of its value against the U.S. dollar. Moody's Investors Service kept Mexico at Baa1, the equivalent of triple-B-plus and two notches above the minimum investment grade. The government of President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in December, has "reinvigorated" Mexico's reform momentum to pass structural reforms that had languished for many years, Fitch said Wednesday. Cooperation among Mexico's three major political parties in recent months has led to overhauls of labor rules, public education and telecoms. Still pending are more ambitious reworkings of the tax code and a possible opening of foreign investment in the oil sector. Combined, the reforms are seen eventually boosting Mexico's annual economic growth by one percentage point. A recent dispute over government spending ahead of July local elections threatened to derail the reform drive. The political forces behind the reform effort, known as the Pact for Mexico, reconciled their differences on Tuesday. "The pact has achieved a pace that doesn't cease to surprise, and a pace that shouldn't be lost," Cesar Camacho, national president of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, said Wednesday at an event beside other top political leaders, all of whom reiterated their commitment to secure more reforms. Mr. Pena Nieto thanked his colleagues on Wednesday for their "political will" to overcome differences and advance a common agenda to make Mexico more competitive internationally and more fair at home. The Fitch upgrade gave the Mexican peso a boost Wednesday as the currency moved below MXN12 to the U.S. dollar for the first time since August 2011, trading in Mexico City at MXN11.9780, according to Infosel, compared with MXN12.0355 at the close Tuesday. Local government bonds yields were lower on the day, with 10-year bonds due 2022 yielding 4.46, down four basis points from Tuesday's close. Fitch said its previous concerns about oil production and violence had eased, citing the diversification of the oil production base and a decline in the homicide rate in recent months. Sustained high growth and fiscal flexibility would be positive for ratings, while a persistently underperforming economy and destabilizing debt dynamics would be negative, Fitch said.
No bioterror
Keller 3/7 (Rebecca – Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)
It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. As far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward equation to consider. The threat of a terrorist attack using biological weapons is very low. And while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain of virus that could result in an epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more effectively. All of this hinges on the level of preparedness of developed nations and their ability to rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.
Terror threats on the border are exaggerated—suspicious activity has never been detected
Isacson and Meyer ’12 April 2012. Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer are Washington’s Office of Latin American Affairs’ border security and migration experts. “Beyond the Border Buildup: Security and Migrants Along the U.S.-Mexico Border.” http://www.wola.org/files/Beyond_the_Border_Buildup_FINAL.pdf
The New Border Context When U.S. political leaders and opinion makers call for more actions to secure the border with Mexico, the threats they cite most frequently are terrorism, drug trafficking, violent organized crime, and uncontrolled migration. This study does not explore the motives behind these positions, which range from concern about national security to pandering to voters’ fears of a foreign “other.” Of greater interest is the degree to which these threats are actually manifesting themselves, and whether they should be considered “threats” at all. TERRORISM The first threat, the possibility that members of a foreign terrorist organization might attempt to cross the border from Mexico to harm U.S. citizens, leaders, or infrastructure, has underlain a tremendous increase in U.S. border security investment since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Today, “The priority mission of Border Patrol is preventing terrorists and terrorists’ weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States,” reads the first text on the gateway page of the agency’s website.6 To date, however, no member of a group on the Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations has been detected attempting to cross the Mexico-U.S. border with intent to do harm. In December 1999, a “millennium” plot to bomb Los Angeles’ international airport was foiled by customs agents who found a bomb in the car of an Algerian citizen seeking to enter the United States from Canada.7 In October 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that Iranian officials sought help from sources whom they thought were members of Mexico’s Zetas criminal organization in a bizarre plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States.8 Neither of these episodes involved the United States’ southwest border with Mexico. The “terrorist crossing the porous border through Mexico” scenario continues to worry U.S. planners, though, because of the serious consequences that even a very unlikely event might have. Opinions differ on whether a putative terrorist would seek to work within existing drug or migrant trafficking networks. Some officials and analysts contend that criminal organizations would gladly assist a terrorist for the right price. Others hold the view that “the first time a terrorist uses a trafficker’s route is the last time that trafficker will ever get to use” that lucrative route, which is a cost too high to bear.9
Multiple barriers mean bioterror is extremely unlikely
Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire, 1-13-09 (Chris, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090113_7105.php)
Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim, which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen. However, he disputed Mueller's assertion that nations can be trusted to secure their atomic weapons and materials. "I don't think the historical record shows that at all," Walsh said. Black-market networks such as the organization once operated by former top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan remain a problem and should not be assumed to be easily defeated by international intelligence services, Walsh said (see GSN, Jan. 13). It is also reasonable to worry about extremists gaining access to nuclear blueprints or poorly secured stocks of highly enriched uranium, he said. "I worry about al-Qaeda 4.0, kids in Europe who go to good schools 20 years from now. Or types of terrorists we don't even imagine," Walsh said. Greater consideration must be given to exactly how much risk is tolerable and what actions must be taken to reduce the threat, he added. "For all the alarmism, we haven't done that much about the problem," Walsh said. "We've done a lot in the name of nuclear terrorism, the attack on Iraq, these other things, but we have moved ever so modestly to lock down nuclear materials." Biological Terrorism Another two analysts offered a similar debate on the potential for terrorists to carry out an attack using infectious disease material. Milton Leitenberg, a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, played down the threat in comparison to other health risks. Bioterrorism has killed five U.S. citizens in the 21st century -- the victims of the 2001 anthrax attacks, he said. Meanwhile, at least 400,000 deaths are linked each year to obesity in this country. The United States has authorized $57 billion in spending since the anthrax mailings for biological prevention and defense activities, Leitenberg said. Much of the money would have been better used to prepare for pandemic flu, he argued. "Mistaken threat assessments make mistaken policy and make mistaken allocation of financial resources," Leitenberg said. The number of states with offensive biological weapons programs appears to have stabilized at six beginning in the mid-1970s, despite subsequent intelligence estimates that once indicated an increasing number of efforts, Leitenberg said. Caveats in present analyses of those states make it near-impossible to determine the extent to which their activities remain offensive in nature, he added. There has been minimal proliferation of biological expertise or technology to nations of concern in recent decades, Leitenberg said. He identified roughly 12 Russian scientists who ended up in Iran and shipments of technology and pathogen strains to Iraq from France, Germany, the former Soviet Union and the United States between 1980 and 1990. No evidence exists of state assistance to nonstate groups in this sector. Two prominent extremist organizations, al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, failed to produce pathogenic disease strains that could be used in an attack, according to Leitenberg. Terrorists would have to acquire the correct disease strain, handle it safely, correctly reproduce and store the material and then disperse it properly, Leitenberg said. He dismissed their ability to do so. "What we've found so far is that those people have been totally abysmally ignorant of how to read the technical, professional literature," Leitenberg said. "What's on the jihadi Web sites comes from American poisoners' handbooks sold here at gun shows. Which can't make anything and what it would make is just garbage."
Biological weapons won’t be used and won’t cause extinction
Mueller, 2005 (John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University, “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration,” International Studies Perspectives, 6, 208-234)
Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used even though the knowledge about their destructive potential as weapons goes back decades, even centuries in some respects (the English, e.g., made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians in the French and Indian War) (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, and Eitzen, 1997:412). Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason: biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogue states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in technology and knowledge, but the record thus far is unlikely to be very encouraging to them. For example, Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during the Second World War. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese, but they apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have had little military impact.18 In the 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult that had some 300 scientists in its employ and an estimated budget of $1 billion, reportedly tried at least nine times over 5 years to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops, hoping fancifully to ignite an apocalyptic war. These efforts failed to create a single fatality in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place (Broad, 1998; Rapoport, 1999:57). For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very lowaltitude aerosol clouds: aerosols do not appreciably settle, and anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level (Meselson, 1995; Panofsky, 1998; Terry, 1998). Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms. Moreover, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult, and, even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with civil defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict and in combat situationsmay spread back on the attacker (OTA, 1993:48–49, 62; Broad and Miller, 1998; Easterbrook, 2002).
No Solvency: Their author says you have to ban bioweapons to solve – All other options fail
Ochs – Their Author, MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers, 6-9-2 (Richard, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately,” http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html)
There are many people who believe it is their God-given right to do whatever is deemed necessary to secure their homeland, their religion and their birthright. Moslems, Jews, Hindus, ultra-patriots (and fundamentalist Christians who believe that Armageddon is God’s prophesy) all have access to the doomsday vials at Fort Detrick and other labs. Fort Detrick and Dugway employees are US citizens but may also have other loyalties. One or more of them might have sent the anthrax letters to the media and Congress last year. Are we willing to trust our security, NO -- trust human survival to people like this? Human frailty, duplicity, greed, zealotry, insanity, intolerance and ignorance, not to speak of ultra-patriotism, will always be with us. The mere existence of these doomsday weapons is a risk too great for rational people to tolerate. Unless guards do body crevice searches of lab employees every day, smuggling out a few grams will be a piece of cake. Basically, THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY. Humanity is at great risk as we speak. All biological weapons must be destroyed immediately. All genetic engineering of new diseases must be halted. All bioweapons labs must be dismantled. Fort Detrick and Dugway labs must be decommissioned and torn down. Those who continue this research are potential war criminals of the highest order. Secret bioweapons research must be outlawed. The US, as the world’s leading creator of doomsday diseases, must lead the way and show the example. The US must not only obey the Convention Against Biological Weapons, which it has been violating, but it must sign the Biological Weapons Inspection Treaty, which it has been opposing. International delegations must be allowed to inspect and oversee the destruction of these labs and inventories. The doctrine of military deterrence must give way to the logic of human survival. Human survival must come before national sovereignty.
No Bioterror escalation
Easterbrook (Gregg, The New Republic Editor) 2003 Wired, "We're All Gonna Die!" 11/7, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html
3. Germ warfare! Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn't kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today's Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.
Small Risk of Bioterror
Lake (Anthony, G-Town Diplomacy Prof) 2001 The Georgetown Public Policy Review, "Bioterrorism: Interview with Anthony Lake," Spring, LN
It's much harder to develop a biological weapon than a chemical weapon and much, much harder than using computers for terrorist action. So, if you're calculating probabilities, then bioterrorism, probably even more than some forms of nuclear terrorism, is relatively unlikely. I do not walk around everyday worrying that people are dumping microbes in the ventilation ducts of the building I'm in. If we allow ourselves to become scared of this, then in a way, the terrorists have won. If we alter our behavior too much beyond prudent or preventative and preparatory efforts, then the terrorists have won. I don't think the chances are at all high that this will happen; in fact, I think they're very very low. However, the fact is that the Aum Shirinkyo was trying to develop biological weapons and probably used sarin because the Japanese police were closing in on them. (I believe they lost a scientist in the process of trying to develop biological weapons.) We should lament any death, anywhere, but that would be low on the list of lamentations. So while it's very unlikely, it is possible, and in fact we have entered the age in which there have been active efforts to try to develop biological weapons.
Bioweapons can’t be used – too unreliable
Laqueur 99 (Walter, Cochairman, International Research Council, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The New Terrorism, 1999, pg. 69)
The attractions of biological weapons are obvious: easy access, low cost, toxicity, and the panic they can cause. But there are drawbacks of various kinds that explain why almost no successful attacks have occurred. While explosive or nuclear devices or even chemical agents, however horrific, affect a definite space, biological agents are unpredictable: they can easily get out of control, backfire, or have no effect at all. They constitute a high risk to the attackers, although the same, of course, is true of chemical weapons. This consideration may not dissuade people willing to sacrifice their own lives, but the possibility that the attacker may kill himself before being able to launch an attack may make him hesitate to carry it out. Biological agents, with some notable exceptions, are affected by changes in heat or cold, and, like chemical agents, by changes in the direction of the wind. They have a limited life span, and their means of delivery are usually complicated. The process of contaminating water res¬ervoirs or foodstuffs involves serious technical problems. Even if an agent survives the various purification systems in water reservoirs, boiling the water would destroy most germs. Dispersing the agent as a vapor or via an aerosol system within a closed space for instance, through the air conditioning system of a big building or in a subway would ear to offer better chances of success, but it is by no mens foolproof.
Technical barriers prevent bioweapons
Tucker 8-99 (Jonathan, director of the CBW Nonproliferation Project at Center for Nonprolif Studies at Monterey Instit, Amy Sands, assoc director, July/August 1999, http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ja99/ja99tucker.html)
One reason there have been so few successful examples of chemical or biological terrorism is that carrying out an attack requires overcoming a series of major technical hurdles: gaining access to specialized chemical-weapon ingredients or virulent microbial strains; acquiring equipment and know-how for agent production and dispersal; and creating an organizational structure capable of resisting infiltration or early detection by law enforcement. Many of the microorganisms best suited to catastrophic terrorism-virulent strains of anthrax or deadly viruses such as smallpox and Ebola-are difficult to acquire. Further, nearly all viral and rickettsial agents are hard to produce, and bacteria such as plague are difficult to "weaponize" so that they will survive the process of delivery. As former Soviet bioweapons scientist Ken Alibek wrote in his recent memoir, Biohazard, "The most virulent culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents." The capability to disperse microbes and toxins over a wide area as an inhalable aerosol-the form best suited for inflicting mass casualties-requires a delivery system whose development would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorists. Not only is the dissemination process for biological agents inherently complex, requiring specialized equipment and expertise, but effective dispersal is easily disrupted by environmental and meteorological conditions. A large-scale attack with anthrax spores against a city, for example, would require the use of a crop duster with custom-built spray nozzles that could generate a high-concentration aerosol cloud containing particles of agent between one and five microns in size. Particles smaller than one micron would not lodge in the victims' lungs, while particles much larger than five microns would not remain suspended for long in the atmosphere. To generate mass casualties, the anthrax would have to be dried and milled into a fine powder. Yet this type of processing requires complex and costly equipment, as well as systems for high biological containment. Anthrax is simpler to handle in a wet form called a "slurry," but the efficiency of aerosolization is greatly reduced.
US efforts to combat Mexican drug trafficking are counter-productive – new Mexican administration doesn’t want to work with the US
Priest 5/1 May 1, 2013. Dana Priest is a national security reporter whose work focuses on intelligence and counterterrorism. “U.S. role to decrease as Mexico’s drug-war strategy shifts” http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2020902455_mexicoobamaxml.html
The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.-backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels, and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexico’s streets safe and calm, Mexican authorities said. Some U.S. officials fear the coming of an unofficial truce with cartel leaders. The Mexicans see it otherwise. “The objective of fighting organized crime is not in conflict with achieving peace,” said Eduardo Medina-Mora, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States. Two weeks after Peña Nieto assumed office Dec. 1, the new president sent his top five security officials to an unusual meeting at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. The new attorney general and interior minister sat in silence next to the new leaders of the army, navy and Mexican intelligence agency. Also at the Dec. 15 meeting were representatives from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the CIA, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other U.S. agencies charged with helping Mexico destroy the drug cartels that had besieged the country for the past decade. The Mexicans remained stone-faced as they learned how entwined the two countries had become during the battle against narco-traffickers, and how, in the process, the United States had been given near-complete access to Mexico’s territory and the secrets of its citizens, according to several U.S. officials familiar with the meeting. The administration of the previous president, Felipe Calderón, had granted U.S. spy planes access to Mexican airspace to gather intelligence. Unarmed Customs and Border Protection drones had flown from U.S. bases in support of Mexican military and federal police raids against drug targets and to track movements that would establish suspects’ “patterns of life.” The United States had also provided electronic signals technology, ground sensors, voice-recognition gear, cellphone-tracking devices, data-analysis tools, computer hacking kits and airborne cameras that could read license plates from three miles away. Under a classified program code-named SCENIC, the CIA was training Mexicans how to target and vet potential assets for recruitment and how to guard against infiltration by narco-traffickers. In deference to their visitors, the U.S. briefers left out that most of the 25 kingpin taken off the streets in the past five years had been removed because of U.S.-supplied information, according to people familiar with the meeting. Also unremarked upon was the mounting criticism that success against the cartels’ leadership had helped incite more violence than anyone had predicted, more than 60,000 deaths and 25,000 disappearances in the past seven years. Meanwhile, Mexico remains the U.S. market’s largest supplier of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine and the transshipment point for 95 percent of its cocaine. When the Dec. 15 meeting concluded, Mexico’s new security officials remained poker-faced.
Drug violence declining
Bargent 2-7-13 (James, Independent journalism from Colombia and Latin America, “Mexico Drug War Violence Slowing: Report”, Febraury 7th, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-drug-war-violence-slowing-report)
A new report analyzing the data behind Mexico’s drug war shows in 2012 organized crime related killings declined or leveled off while becoming increasingly concentrated in key strategic areas. The report, compiled by the San Diego University’s Trans-Border Institute, analyzed a range of data sources -- both official and independent -- to build a comprehensive picture of the shifting violence patterns in Mexico. The most significant trend identified was the slowing rate of drug war killings. While the conclusions of different data sets varied widely, they agreed that in 2012 the substantial year on year increases Mexico has seen since 2007 came to an end. According to data collated by Mexican newspaper Reforma, organized crime related murders dropped by over 21 percent, falling to 8,989 from 12,284. Projections for the government’s as yet unreleased figures show a 28 drop. However, figures from another media source, Milenio, showed an increase in its crime related murder tallies but by less than 1 percent – far lower than in previous years. The report also highlights how Mexico’s drug war violence is increasingly concentrated. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of municipalities that recorded no murders dropped by 28 percent, while the number of municipalities with 25 or more annual homicides grew from 50 to 240. However, in 2012, (for which, the report points out, the data set is incomplete) the number of municipalities free from violence increased 16 while the number with more than 25 homicides decreased more than 25 to 178. Over half the organized crime linked murders nationwide came from just five states; Sinaloa, Chihuaha, Nuevo Leon, Guerrero and Coahuila (although the order depends of the data set). 2012 also saw Acapulco assume the mantle of Mexico’s most violent city, even though the murder rate leveled off, while the cities of Monterrey, Torreon, and Nuevo Laredo posted the largest increases in crime related killings. InSight Crime While the authorities will probably lay claim to the slowdown in drug violence, it is likely a more influential factor has been changing dynamics in the Mexican underworld, as reflected by the shifting geographical patterns.
1
Debt ceiling will be raised without confrontation but lawmakers can shift
Espo 9-18 09/18/2013. DAVID ESPO AP Special Correspondent. “Dodge default, defund Obamacare, GOP leaders say.” http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24119843/ap-sources-revised-gop-attack-obamacare
The RSC claims a membership of 175 members, about three-quarters of the House Republican rank and file. The bill's introduction comes at a time when party leaders have yet to advance any comprehensive alternative to the law Obama signed in 2010, though the GOP House has voted repeatedly to repeal all or part of it. The GOP pledged three years ago to "repeal and replace" the existing law, a promise Obama often notes with disdain. The approach outlined Wednesday by Boehner and the GOP leadership team underscored how quickly tea party lawmakers have shifted their principal focus in the weeks since Cruz and Sen. Mike Lee of Utah as well as the outside groups began stressing the issue in TV ads. The leadership's initial proposal for avoiding a partial government shutdown was to couple funding for federal programs with a requirement for the Senate to cast a vote on defunding the health care program, a requirement that could easily have been evaded. Conservatives quickly rebelled against that approach, forcing Boehner and his lieutenants to regroup. Even as they did, they sought to emphasize their commitment to cutting federal spending and curtailing the debt, two issues that have consistently united the fractious rank and file since Republicans took control of the House nearly three years ago. "Not since the Korean War has the federal government reduced spending two years in a row. We aim to make that happen," said the Republican majority leader, Rep. Eric Cantor of Virginia. Spending would be set at $986.3 billion for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, although that would be further reduced in January by a new round of across-the-board sequester cuts that would trim the level to $967 billion. "There should be no conversation about shutting the government down. That's not the goal here," Boehner said. Republicans paid a heavy political price two decades ago as the result of twin government shutdowns, at a time then-Speaker Newt Gingrich was insisting President Bill Clinton agree to cuts in Medicare, Medicaid and other popular programs. Nor are Republicans eager to shoulder the blame for any market-shaking government default, which would probably occur if the Treasury could not continue to borrow funds to pay debts already incurred. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has estimated that without action by Congress, that default will arrive in mid-
IFF legislation has stalled in Congress and enforcement isn’t happening—lack of political will
Cassara ’13 MARCH 5, 2013. JOHN A. CASSARA, INDUSTRY ADVISER TO SAS FEDERAL LLC. “Our anti-money laundering efforts have failed.” http://www.sas.com/knowledge-exchange/risk/fraud-financial-crimes/our-anti-money-laundering-efforts-have-failed/index.html
The overseas metrics are equally depressing. According to the Department of State, “far too many countries that boast solid anti-money laundering standards and infrastructures do not enforce their laws. This is true in all corners of the world and for both developed and developing countries alike. In many instances, the lack of enforcement is due to lack of capacity, but in some cases it is due to a lack of political will.” Talking aimlessly Some believe that recent eye-catching actions against major banks may create change. For example, HSBC was fined $1.9 billion for failing to pursue anti-money laundering within its branches. However, this is a regulatory action. The $1.9 billion is not going to be taken from drug traffickers but from the shareholders of HSBC. And not one individual will be prosecuted In 2005, I wrote Hide and Seek: Intelligence, Law Enforcement and the Stalled War on Terror Finance. I was very concerned that the US might be moving away from effective anti-money laundering and financial crimes enforcement. I felt our war on terror finance was “stalled.” I suggested that a new emphasis be placed on enforcing the laws, rules and regulations that are already on the books. I urged Congress and regulatory agencies to step up oversight. Most important, I argued that real progress requires a different philosophical and bureaucratic emphasis. Simply put, we have to get back to the basics of enforcement.
Obama’s cooperation is key
Moore 9-10 September 10, 2013. Heidi Moore is Guardian’s US Finance and Economics Editor. “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security.” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester
Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America. There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts. The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short. The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding. Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon. The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem. These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria. More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas. The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect. This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria. Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad. Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told: Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure. Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington. Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time. The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today. It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria. There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.
A drawn out debt ceiling debate crushes US legitimacy
Babones ’13 May 21, 2013. Salvatore Babones is a senior lecturer in sociology and social policy Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. “The Debt Ceiling Debate That Wasn't.” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/16504-the-debt-ceiling-debate-that-wasnt
The debt ceiling has been reached multiple times since the beginning of the global financial crisis, and another debt ceiling crisis is right around the corner. Except that there will be no crisis, because the country is Australia. Just like the United States, Australia has a debt ceiling. Australian borrowing bumps up against this ceiling on a regular basis. And just as in the United States, the debt ceiling is an absolute limit on government spending that cannot be transgressed even if the Australian parliament has passed a bill authorizing additional expenditures. But there the similarity ends. Australia has no debates over default, no dramatic government shutdowns, no sequestration and no fiscal cliffs. When the government reaches the debt ceiling, the ceiling is raised in an orderly manner. No one panics. Everyone gets paid. It used to work that way in the United States, too. The debt ceiling has only come to be politicized in recent years. This situation is ludicrous - and dangerous. Once the government has incurred a legal obligation, we should all expect the government to meet it. America's debt ceiling brinksmanship has made us a global laughingstock. In no other developed country do political parties threaten to push the government into default if they don't get their way. This kind of take-no-prisoners politics is more characteristic of third-world dictatorships than first-world democracies. The United States doesn't have to have a debt ceiling. At the next reauthorization which by most accounts will be the 90th or so Congress could simply abolish the ceiling. But Australia's experience shows this is unnecessary. If America's politicians could be as sober and mature as Australia's, we wouldn't have to worry about it. The Australians I know will be rolling in the aisles to hear their politicians described as "sober and mature." Australian politics is highly partisan, often very personal and nothing if not robust. But it is not self-destructive. America - and America's politicians - could learn some important lessons in democracy from looking overseas. America's own democracy is, perhaps, not the example it once was.
Solves Extinction
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13
(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
2
Mexico should implement customs reform and pursue macroeconomic stability to achieve transparency in financial counts and transaction.
The counterplan solves—Mexico must start by implementing custom reforms itself
Kar ’12 Dev Kar. January 2012. “Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy.” http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/mexico/gfi_mexico_report_english-web.pdf
First, it is clear that almost three-quarters of total illicit flows over the period 1970-2010 were generated through trade mispricing (Appendix Table 6). Moreover, model simulations indicate that increasing trade openness since 1994 when NAFTA was implemented led to more trade mispricing (see Section III, Table 3 on Structural Equation Estimates, and Box 1). This would strongly suggest that policy should be focused on curtailing trade mispricing. We will point out three policy measures that can go a long way in curbing related illicit outflows. As part of customs reform (which is an on-going World Bank project; reference footnote 15), we propose the implementation of a risk-based price profiling system to curtail the risk of export and import transactions being mispriced in order to transfer illicit capital out of the country. Furthermore, to reduce the risk of willful trade mispricing, we propose that all customs invoices be accompanied by a legal undertaking by exporters and importers as to pricing accuracy. Finally, we propose that multinationals be subject to financial and accounting reporting requirements in order to curtail abusive transfer pricing (ATP).
Pursuing macroeconomic stability solves transparency
Kar ’12 Dev Kar. January 2012. “Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy.” http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/mexico/gfi_mexico_report_english-web.pdf
Third, as the automatic exchange of information seeks to stem outflows by plugging gaps in information in the international financial system (which tax cheats may be using to hide taxable income), this calls for Mexican regulatory agencies to commit to a policy of seeking full transparency in all financial accounts and transactions. These measures call for extensive cooperation between the tax authority under the Ministry of Finance, the Mexican equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) which oversees the financial, auditing, and other regulatory aspects of domestic and foreign companies operating in Mexico that are publically owned or listed on the Mexican stock exchange, the central bank Banco de Mexico, and the Mexican Justice Department on domestic laws and penalties that apply to non-compliant transactions carried out by individuals and corporations.
3
Interpretation – economic engagement must be conditional
Shinn 96 James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books
In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.
The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China. The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged. The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8 To footnotes 8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).
Violation – the aff is a unilateral engagement with nothing in return– not a quid pro quo offer
Vote negative – quid pro quo gives competition for conditions cp and say no arguments. Key to fight back against aff bias
4
The affirmative rhetorical silence on whiteness is an active stance that allows white privilege to thrive by masking its existence and treating is as an assumed norm.
DR. CRENSHAW Prof of Speech Comm @ Univ. Ala. 1997
Carrie-PhD. USC; former director of debate @ Univ. of Ala.; WESTERN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION
This analysis of Helms’ opening argument illustrates how the ideology of white privilege operates through rhetorical silence. Helms’ statement was an argument over the meaning of the UDC—its members, its actions, and its insignia. It was an ideological struggle to maintain silence about the members’ whiteness and its implications through a strategic use of gender. Two key issues arise here. First, rhetorical silence about whiteness sustains an ideology of white privilege. Second, intersecting gendered discourses work to preserve this silence. Helms’ silence about whiteness naturalized the taken-for-granted assumptions contained in his framework for understanding who is harmed by this decision. The “colossal unseen dimensions of the silences and denials surrounding” whiteness are key political tools for protecting white privilege and maintaining the myth of meritocracy (McIntosh 35). This silence is rhetorical and has important ideological implications. Scott observes that silence and speaking have symbolic impact and as such are both rhetorical. When considering the dialectic of speaking and silence, he thinks of silence as the absence of speech. Silence is active, not passive; it may be interpreted. Furthermore, silence and speech may be both simultaneous and sequential. The absence of speech about whiteness signifies that it exists in our discursive silences. It may often be intentional; it can be interpreted, and it can occur simultaneously with the spoken word. Whiteness’ silence is ideological because it signifies that to be white is the natural condition, the assumed norm. Scott notes that silences symbolize the nature of things—their substance or natural condition. Silences symbolize “hierarchical structures as surely as does speech” (15). Indeed, the very structure of privilege generates silences, and “ironically, the most powerful rhetoric for maintaining an existing scheme of privilege will be silent” (10). Thus, silent rhetorical constructions of whiteness like Helms’ protect material white privilege because they mask its existence.
Racism must be rejected in EVERY INSTANCE without surcease. It justifies atrocities, creates another and is truly the CAPITAL SIN.
MEMMI Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris 2000, Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which person man is not themself himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
5
Energy reform will pass—Nieto push and Pact for Mexico
Prados 9-3 LUIS PRADOS. 3 SEP 2013.“Mexico’s Peña Nieto pledges to roll on with energy and education reforms.” http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/09/03/inenglish/1378226365_119969.html
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto on Monday reiterated his commitment to introduce sweeping reforms, including his controversial measure to open Mexico’s state-run oil industry to private investment and the restructuring of the country’s income tax brackets. “Mexico’s transformation is possible and is now under way,” Peña Nieto said in a nationwide televised address to mark his first nine months in office. The leader of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) said he was optimistic about his country’s future despite ongoing demonstrations by teachers over his education reforms and threats by Mexico’s leftist parties to call a nationwide protest over his proposal to open the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) to foreign investment. “In the coming months, it will be decided what our history will be for the coming decades,” he said, calling on Mexicans to take advantage of this opportunity to support the changes he proposes. After just one day in office, Peña Nieto last December signed a far-reaching agreement called the Pact for Mexico with the nation’s two largest opposition parties—the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the left-leaning Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) – to introduce sweeping changes in important sectors. “The window for opportunity is opened,” he said. “We trust in our potential and dare to take that leap forward.” In his speech from Los Pinos presidential palace, Peña Nieto said the PRI didn’t come to office “to administer but to transform” Mexican society.
US economic cooperation is viewed as meddling—obstructs reform and turns case
Hakim ’13 May 1, 2013. Peter Hakim holds a master’s degree in Public and International Affairs from Princeton; he is a professor at MIT and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. This was written for Reuters. “Which Mexico for Obama?” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/01/which-mexico-for-obama/
When President Barack Obama meets this week with President Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico, he will be visiting a country that was much maligned throughout his first term. Washington has viewed Mexico largely as a source of problems for the United States in the past six years. Many Mexicans, in a mirror image, consider the United States the origin of their troubles. They blame Mexico’s epidemic of violent crime on an insatiable appetite for drugs and loose control over gun and ammunition sales in the United States. In addition, the U.S. financial crisis left the Mexican economy reeling in 2009. But in the past year, particularly since Peña Nieto’s election in July 2012, Mexico’s standing in the United States and internationally has increased dramatically — along with its national self-esteem. Though organized crime and violence remain key concerns for Mexico, stories of economic and social reform are now among the headlines. A November Economist article about Mexico was titled “From Darkness, Dawn.” And that message has become a standard media refrain. Some in Washington talked about Mexico as a likely failed state, but that has been decisively debunked. Mexico is now viewed as on the rise, though its homicide rate has fallen only slightly and no one is sure that improvements can be sustained. In fact, there are many Mexicos for Obama to deal with — the successful and prospering; the backward, corrupt and stagnant; and everything in between. This mix is not unusual. It is characteristic of most nations, even the United States. Obama needs to bring an optimistic perspective with him to Mexico, reflecting the growing confidence that Mexicans have in their country — and the image they project internationally. In this, Obama has little choice. No country is likely to affect the future of the United States more than Mexico, just as none will affect Mexico’s future more than the United States. No two nations have more to gain from energetically pursuing closer cooperation. Mexico’s reinvigorated economy has proven more resilient and vibrant than anyone expected. It shrank by more than 6 percent in 2009, one year after the Wall Street financial collapse, but economic expansion since has been faster than at any time in the past two decades. Mexico’s growth, while modest by Asian standards, has in the past three years been more robust than that of Brazil, one of the region’s strongest economies. It is also competing successfully with China in U.S. markets. Mexico will displace Canada as the largest U.S. trade partner within roughly six years, according to some economic projections. Close U.S.-Mexico economic ties, once seen as the culprit in our southern neighbor’s sluggish growth and sharp downturn, are now, as the U.S. continues to recover, a prime explanation for Mexico’s rising economic fortunes. The future may be even brighter. Peña Nieto has launched an ambitious reform agenda to overcome the many obstacles to stable, rapid economic growth. He is demonstrating the political talent needed to get his policies approved and put into practice. The Mexican president, for example, managed to negotiate the Pacto por Mexico, an accord among the country’s three major parties that bridged many of their long-held ideological differences and secured their agreement on a broad package of economic changes. Despite suffering some tangles and setbacks in recent weeks, the Pacto continues to provide a path forward to far-reaching reform. Peña Nieto plans to revamp Mexico’s oil industry and open it to foreign investment could reverse the decline in oil production and assure that the country remains a leading exporter. Proposed changes would also pave the way for the systematic exploitation of Mexico’s huge, untapped deposits of shale gas and oil. Other reforms are designed to augment government revenue and improve fiscal management. Peña Nieto wants to increase competition in telecommunications and other critical sectors, and upgrade the country’s mediocre schools and universities to raise productivity and create paths for social mobility. This explosion of reform initiatives has helped change opinion in the United States about Mexico. Less than a year ago, Mexico was widely viewed as an increasingly dangerous neighbor. Today, it is talked about as a promising economic partner. The partnership will be far stronger if — as now appears likely — Congress passes sensible and humane immigration reforms. The Mexican government seems most encouraged by the prospect of U.S. legislation that would include an expanded temporary worker program and would provide immediate legal status and a path to citizenship for most currently undocumented immigrants ? about half of whom are Mexican nationals. These changes could substantially eliminate a persistent tension in U.S.-Mexican relations. Mexicans have long been angered and insulted by U.S. debates on immigration, including insistent demands that the border be walled up; the spread of anti-immigration and often anti-Latino legislation in many states and communities, and absurd and offensive proposals like GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney’s call for migrants to “self-deport.” Equally important, immigration reform will offer an array of economic benefits to both nations. Despite the Peña Nieto administration’s impressive start, however, there is reason for caution in thinking about the future of the country and its relationship with the United States. Mexico clearly looks better than ever, but it was never as seriously endangered as it was reported to be. It was never close to being a failed state. It is true that its homicide rate and violence rose rapidly in the past five years — and the associated brutality was unparalleled. But Mexico’s murders per capita are still far from the highest in Latin America. They regularly trail those of Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, most of Central America and the Caribbean. On the economic side, yes, Mexico has only recently emerged from some 15 years of listless growth. During that period, however, the economy and banking system were well managed. Mexico maintained ample reserves and a low ratio of debt to gross domestic product. Inflation was kept firmly under control. For more than two decades now, Mexico has been building a modern economy with vibrant manufacturing and export sectors well integrated into U.S. supply chains. The Mexican economy was never as troubled as it was portrayed — and now the opportunities for improvement are greater than ever. Still, Mexico is not the sure bet that many believe it to be. It has to demonstrate that it can make its economy grow faster. The past 30 years offer little evidence that Mexico has the potential for sustained, rapid expansion, or for carrying out the reforms that such growth will require. The Mexican economy has long suffered fundamental shortcomings that restrain its productivity, job creation and capacity to compete. The obstacles to change remain formidable. Peña Nieto’s reform initiatives are just getting started. The legislature has already given its initial approval for changes in education, labor laws, telecommunication policy and some other sectors. But in many cases, original proposals have been watered down, additional legislation will also be required in almost every area and effective implementation is still to come. Success will depend heavily on Peña Nieto’s political skills — as well as the technical mastery of his advisers and managers. It will also hinge on whether the fragile inter-party consensus backing the Pacto por Mexico can be sustained and popular support mobilized for change. Crime and violence are likely to remain unrelenting challenges for Peña Nieto. They could even take central stage again. In fact, public security may not improve anytime soon — despite the new government’s multiple initiatives. Peña Nieto’s predecessor, Felipe Calderón, learned how arduous a task it is to reform Mexico’s police and its justice system, and restore public confidence in them. Now, Peña Nieto is making clear his deep dissatisfaction with — and his intention to overhaul — Calderón U.S.-supported approach to security and drug issues. The expected changes will almost surely irritate many in Washington and may even become a new source of friction in the bilateral relationship.
Nieto’s political capital is key to passage—shores up public support
Wilkinson and Fausset ’13 August 13, 2013. Tracy Wilkinson and Richard Fausset—journalists for the LA Times. “Mexico's officials wage PR battle to sell energy reform plan.” http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/13/world/la-fg-mexico-pemex-pr-20130814
Even if energy reform does deliver the advantages that Peña Nieto is promising, those benefits may not materialize for years. And in the interim, Peña Nieto will have expended serious political capital to pass the controversial reform. Although it is expected that Peña Nieto will have the votes he needs in Congress to win approval for the reform, he has a restive and skeptical public to deal with. Some of the ubiquitous government ads on television and radio Tuesday seemed to have borrowed a page right out of the left's rhetoric: "No to privatization!" the voice-over starts. Then it quickly adds, "Yes to energy reform!" Many opponents of the reform are relying heavily on nationalistic imagery and rhetoric in arguing that Peña Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party is selling the country out to foreign interests. Columnist Jesus Silva-Herzog Marquez, writing in the Reforma newspaper, said changing the constitutional provisions on oil and energy was like "putting a miniskirt on the Virgin of Guadalupe," Mexico's most revered Catholic symbol. Especially on the left, where many activists consider themselves the true ideological heir of Cardenas, there was anger over hearing Peña Nieto use the late president's name to sell the proposal. A Twitter fight of sorts raged between "pros" and "cons." "Peña Nieto, do you know who Lazaro Cardenas was?" asked a Twitter user with the moniker Teotihuachango. "Who are they fooling?" asked Claudia Herrera, another Twitter user. Those in favor primarily cited the lift that a more efficient Pemex would provide the Mexican economy. "Reforming Pemex can't wait," wrote Carlos Alberto G. "Mexico needs this to be able to move ahead."
Energy reform solves Mexican manufacturing
Russell ’13 August 30, 2013. K. Alan Russell, President and C.E.O. of the Tecma Group of Companies. “Energy reform is a potential boon to manufacturers in Mexico.” https://exploreb2b.com/articles/energy-reform-is-a-potential-boon-to-manufacturers-in-mexico
In Mexico, schoolchildren are taught to take pride in the state’s ownership of the oil industry, celebrating “Día de la Expropiación Petrolera” on March 18, the day the oil industry was nationalized in 1938. For 75 years, Mexico’s sole oil and gas company, Pemex, has held a state monopoly in this crucial industry, leaving the country with high energy prices and a wariness for foreign involvement in energy resources. In fact, Mexico’s constitution expressly forbids private companies from owning Mexican oil. Any changes made in the industry in the future is a potential gain in competitiveness for manufacturers in Mexico. Change may be on the horizon. This month, the Mexican government announced plans to reform the structure of its energy industry, stopping just short of privatization. Details are still being debated, but it appears that Mexico will soon offer foreign energy companies options to partner with the Mexican government in profit and risk sharing, thus allowing for a dramatic shift in Mexico’s economy some are comparing to the transformation that occurred with the signing of NAFTA. An increase in the production of energy and/or a lowering of prices will, undoubtedly, make manufacturers in Mexico more competitive. The three primary reforms that are being considered include: allowing private companies to explore and extract resources at will with “concessions,” granting private companies production sharing privileges (giving them a portion of oil produced), and allowing them risk-sharing contracts (giving them a share of the profits from resource sales). Foreign Direct Investment stands to increase dramatically if such reforms are implemented. Net annual investments have averaged $20 billion over the last five years. Oil, gas, and power have only received $360 million in the same time period. Economist Nader Nazmi estimates that the ratio of investment to GDP could rise by an additional 2 percentage points from the effects that energy sector reforms could have on public and private investment. An increased energy supply could bolster investment in factories and manufacturers in Mexico, due to the reduced fuel costs producers would face. Some say FDI could hit $50 billion in just the next decade. While a half-hearted effort could wreck expectations and hurt future growth, the push to reform Mexico’s energy sector has the potential to increase the country’s economic growth by 2. In addition to the attractiveness of their low labor costs, Mexico’s dramatically reduced fuel costs could position the country as one of the most cost-effective locations for manufacturing and other business that are energy intensive in nature. As stated by one of the primary architects of the reform proposal, Finance Minister Luis Videgaray, “We have a great opportunity to improve the economy, to generate more jobs and to generate competitiveness for Mexican industry through the energy reform.” Mexico may soon swing open the door to such competition. There are high hopes that economic growth and a new era of energy independence and stability will follow close behind.
Key to US Manufacturing
Wilson ‘12 July 26, 2012. Christopher Wilson is an associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, and the author of the 2011 Wilson Center report Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Christopher Wilson, Issues in Science and Technology, 07-26-12, “U.S. Competitiveness: The Mexican Connection”, http://www.issues.org/28.4/p_wilson.html
Regional integration between the United States and Mexico is already vast and deep. As the United States’ second largest export market and third largest trading partner, Mexico is clearly important to the U.S. economy. Merchandise made has more than quintupled since NAFTA went into effect in 1994, and in 2011, bilateral goods and services trade reached approximately a half-trillion dollars for the first time. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has calculated that the jobs of six million American workers depend on U.S.-Mexico trade. Many of those jobs are in border states, which have especially close ties to Mexico, but Mexico is also the top buyer of exports from states as far away as New Hampshire (mostly computers and electronics). In fact, 20 states, from Michigan to Florida, sell more than a billion dollars’ worth of goods to Mexico each year, and Mexico is the first or second most important export market for 21 states. The United States and Mexico are also major investors in one another. In fact, combined foreign direct investment holdings now total more than $100 billion. According to the most recent count by the Department of Commerce, U.S.-owned companies operating in Mexico created $25 billion in value added and employed nearly a million workers. Mexican investment in the United States is less than U.S. investment in Mexico, but it is has been growing rapidly in recent years. Several of Mexico’s top companies, which are increasingly global operations, have made significant investments in the United States. Mexico’s Cemex, for example, is North America’s largest maker of cement and concrete products. Grupo Bimbo, which owns well-known brands such as Entenmanns’s, Thomas’s English Muffins, and Sara Lee, is the largest baked goods company in the Americas. Even Saks Fifth Avenue and the New York Times Company are supported by significant Mexican investment. The massive volume of commerce and investment is important, but the depth of regional integration is the primary reason why Mexico contributes to U.S. competitiveness. Mexico and the United States do not just trade products, they build them together. In fact, to understand regional trade, it is necessary to view imports and exports in a different light. Whereas imports from most of the world are what they appear to be—foreign products—the same cannot be said of imports from Mexico. During production, materials and parts often cross the southwest border numerous times while U.S. and Mexican factories each perform the parts of the manufacturing process they can do most competitively. Because of the complementary nature of the two economies, close geographic proximity, and NAFTA, which eliminated most tariff barriers to regional trade, the U.S. and Mexican manufacturing sectors are deeply integrated. Demonstrating this integration is the fact that 40 of the value of U.S. imports from Mexico comes from materials and parts produced in the United States. This means that 40 cents of every dollar the United States spends on Mexican goods actually supports U.S. firms. The only other major trading partner that comes close to this amount is Canada, the United States’ other NAFTA partner, with 25 U.S. content. Chinese imports, on the other hand, have an average of only 4 U.S. content, meaning that the purchase of imports from China does not have the same positive impact on U.S. manufacturers. The regional auto industry is a good example of this production-sharing phenomenon. The United States, Mexico, and Canada each produce and assemble auto parts, sending them back and forth as they work together to build cars and trucks. Cars built in North America are said to have their parts cross the United States borders eight times as they are being produced, and between 80 and 90 of the U.S. auto industry trade with its North American partners is intra-industry, both of which signal an extremely high level of vertical specialization. As a result, Detroit exports more goods to Mexico than any other U.S. city, and the North American auto industry has proven much more resilient than many expected. Although several of North America’s largest automakers nearly collapsed during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, a robust recovery is now under way. Mexico and the United States have each experienced the sharpest rise in vehicle production of the world’s top 10 auto producers during the past two years, growing 51 and 72, respectively, between 2009 and 2011.
Manufacturing is key to the Agriculture industry
Lind and Freeman 12 (Michael Lind, policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation, Joshua Freedman, program associate in New America’s Economic Growth Program, “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” New America Foundation, April 2012,http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,20Michael20and20Freedman,20Joshua20-20NAF20-20Value20Added20America27s20Manufacturing20Future.pdf)
Advanced manufacturing is not limited to new, emerging sectors; even manufacturing tied to one of the most “traditional” industries, agriculture, has heavily incorporated technology into its new products. The need for more accurate and efficient farming, as well as the rise of “precision agriculture”—the utilization of technology to accommodate variations within a field—has changed the agricultural manufacturing industry. i Agricultural equipment manufacturers are now creating products that are a far cry from the farm equipment of earlier generations. Replete with LED alerts, touchscreen monitors, and GPS-enabled systems, a modern farm equipment brochure looks like a consumer electronics guide.
Solves extinction
Trewavas, 2k (Anthony, Professor at the Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Edinburgh, “GM IS the Best Option We Have”, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html)
In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our civilisation. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation.
Case
1
Mexican anti-money laundering law solves—provides regulation for illicit funds
Jackson ’12 October 12, 2012. Allison Jackson is a journalist for Global Post. “Mexico passes law to fight money laundering.” http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/121011/mexico-law-money-laundering
Mexican lawmakers have unanimously approved a new federal law restricting cash purchases of real estate, armored cars and jewelry as part of a crack down on money laundering, Milenio reported. The law will require companies to report cash purchases exceeding 500,000 pesos ($16,000) for property and 200,000 pesos ($39,000) for automobiles and jewelry, Reuters reported. According to the Associated Press, experts said the new regulation, which was passed by the Senate on Thursday, would put a dent in the estimated $10 billion in drug-money that is laundered in the country every year. "There is an outcry from society to weaken the financial structures of organized crime and that is what this law is about," Senator Roberto Gil, a member of the ruling conservative National Action Party (PAN), was quoted by Reuters as saying. More from GlobalPost: Drug war ensnares big banks for letting Mexico cartels stash cash President Felipe Calderon, also from the PAN, proposed the law two years ago as part of his aggressive offensive against the country’s powerful drug cartels. More than 60,000 people have died in drug-related violence since December 2006 when Calderon deployed thousands of soliders and federal police to fight organized crime. Calderon will be leave office in December. He will be replaced by the July 1 presidential election winner Enrique Pena Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.
The Law places regulations on financial transactions—limits illicit businesses and reduces the financial incentives for IFF’s
Andersen ’12 October 16, 2012. “Looking At Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Legislation Looking At Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Legislation.” Arya Andersen is a Policy Intern at Global Financial Integrity. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2012/10/16/looking-at-mexicos-new-anti-money-laundering-legislation/
Mexican President Felipe Calderon signed a bill, unanimously passed by the Senate, today aiming to crack down on money laundering that according to experts may account for at least $10 billion every year in Mexico, or as high as $50 billion, according to estimates from Global Financial Integrity. The bill prohibits the giving or accepting of cash payments greater than half a million pesos ($38,750) for real estate purchases, as well as forbidding cash transactions of more than 200,000 pesos ($15,500) for items such as cars, jewelry or lottery tickets. The law also requires brokers and dealers report the forms of payment for any purchases over half a million pesos and for credit card companies to report when monthly balances exceed 50,000 pesos ($3,875). Violators of the law will face up to 20 years in prison, and a specially-designed financial analysis unit has been set up to work under the prosecutor in tandem with the finance ministry. The reasoning behind the law is simple. Financial windfall provides incentives for criminals to continue to break the law, use violence as a means of communication and to generally act with impunity. Closing one very financially beneficial door for organized crime is a logical step in fighting it. “There is no way to go after organized crime, if not to hit their finances,” said Senator Cristina Diaz Salazar, a member of President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party. As long as cartels can legitimize their illegally-obtained billions in real estate, vehicles, lottery tickets and other luxury goods, they’ll be able to continue to fund the violence that has plagued Mexico since it became the main transit point for U.S.-bound South American narcotics in the early 1990s. If implemented correctly and enforced, stronger anti-money laundering rules could not only help Mexico fight its sophisticated organized crime organizations, but also Some in Mexico are opposed to the law. Those in the jewelry and auto industry, specifically, are worried that they will lose business as a result of more strict regulation. This is understandable. However, Alejandro Encinas of the Democratic Revolution Party summed up the reality of the situation in saying “as long as we don’t effectively combat money laundering and dismantle the financial power of organized crime, the problem of violence and drug trafficking won’t disappear from our country.” In the long run, a less violent and more financially transparent system will be more beneficial for all legal businesses. Losing illicit business is a feature, not a bug. Since President Felipe Calderon’s election in 2006, more than 60,000 people have been killed as a result of the violence stemming from turf wars among drug cartels. This law was first introduced in 2010 as part of Calderon’s multi-pronged plan to combat organized crime, proposing to bar all cash real estate purchases as well as cash purchases of cars, planes and other goods for amounts exceeding 100,000 pesos ($7,700). This initial proposal received considerable pushback, likely due to the amount of money at stake and the notorious levels of corruption in the upper echelon of the Mexican political and law enforcement spheres. The official argument against the bill at its inception was that it would inhibit healthy economic growth due to the fact that many small businesses in Mexico still transacted solely in cash. This argument apparently won some legislators over. Sen. Roberto Gil, of Calderon’s conservative National Action Party, said the legislation now going to Calderon for his signature into law “has achieved a healthy and reasonable balance between the need to inhibit the use of cash and the normal development of our country’s economic activity.” The bill now goes to Calderon to be signed, but will not actually go into effect for another nine months, when president-elect Enrique Pena Nieto will be president. The passage of this law is a fantastic example of the very real and tangible intersection of economic regulation and national and international security. Illicit financial flows allow for drug cartels and organized crime to fund the large-scale violence that Mexico has come to know intimately, and less money will invariably mean fewer weapons in the hands of criminals. Though it is a diluted version of its Calderon’s original proposal, this iteration of the law will be a great tool for the Mexican government to lessen the financial incentives of illegal activity while also providing greater insight into the financial behavior of organized crime.
- No impact—
a) No mass economic instability—structural factors make markets resilient
Zakaria, 09 – Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard, Editor of Newsweek (Fareed, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, 12/12/09, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)
Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think.
b) Core drivers of foreign policy are constant—economic decline has minimal effect
Blackwill 2009 – former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf, WEA)
But it is worth asking, as the magisterial American soldier/statesman George Marshall often did, “Why might I be wrong?” If the global economic numbers continue to decline next year and the year after, one must wonder whether any region would remain stable— whether China would maintain internal stability, whether the United States would continue as the pillar of international order, and whether the European Union would hold together. In that same vein, it is unclear today what eff ect, if any, the reckless financial lending and huge public debt that the United States is accumulating, as well as current massive governmental fiscal and monetary intervention in the American economy, will have on U.S. economic dynamism, entrepreneurial creativity, and, consequently, power projection over the very long term. One can only speculate on that issue at present, but it is certainly worth worrying about, and it is the most important “known unknown”27 regarding this subject.28 In addition, perhaps the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on China is more fragile than posited here, and possibly Pakistan and Mexico are much more vulnerable to failed-state outcomes primarily because of the economic downturn than anticipated in this essay. While it seems unlikely that these worst-case scenarios will eventuate as a result of the world recession, they do illustrate again that crucial uncertainties in this analysis are the global downturn’s length and severity and the long-term effects of the Obama Administration’s policies on the U.S. economy. Finally, if not, why not? If the world is in the most severe international economic crisis since the 1930s, why is it not producing structural changes in the global order? A brief answer is that the transcendent geopolitical elements have not altered in substantial ways with regard to individual nations in the two years since the economic crisis began. What are those enduring geopolitical elements? For any given country, they include the following: • Geographic location, topography, and climate. As Robert Kaplan puts it, “to embrace geography is not to accept it as an implacable force against which humankind is powerless. Rather, it serves to qualify human freedom and choice with a modest acceptance of fate.”29 In this connection, see in particular the works of Sir Halford John Mackinder and his The Geographical Pivot of History (1904)30, and Alfred Th ayer Mahan, The Infl uence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890).31 • Demography—the size, birth rate, growth, density, ethnicity, literacy, religions, migration/emigration/ assimilation/absorption, and industriousness of the population. • The histories, foreign and defense policy tendencies, cultural determinants, and domestic politics of individual countries. • The size and strength of the domestic economy. • The quality and pace of technology. • The presence of natural resources. • The character, capabilities, and policies of neighboring states. For the countries that matter most in the global order, perhaps unsurprisingly, none of these decisive variables have changed very much since the global downturn began, except for nations’ weaker economic performances. That single factor is not likely to trump all these other abiding geopolitical determinants and therefore produce international structural change. Moreover, the fundamental power relationships between and among the world’s foremost countries have also not altered, nor have those nations’ perceptions of their vital national interests and how best to promote and defend them. To sum up this pivotal concept, in the absence of war, revolution, or other extreme international or domestic disruptions, for nation-states, the powerful abiding conditions just listed do not evolve much except over the very long term, and thus neither do countries’ strategic intent and core external policies— even, as today, in the face of world economic trials. This point was made earlier about Russia’s enduring national security goals, which go back hundreds of years. Similarly, a Gulf monarch recently advised—with respect to Iran—not to fasten on the views of President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Khamenei. Rather, he counseled that, to best understand contemporary Iranian policy, one should more usefully read the histories, objectives, and strategies of the Persian kings Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes, who successively ruled a vast empire around 500 BC.32 The American filmmaker Orson Welles once opined that “To give an accurate description of what never happened is the proper occupation of the historian.” 33 Perhaps the same is occasionally true of pundits.
Growth does not solve war – history proves
Martin ‘6—prof pol science, U France. Chair in Economics at the Paris School of Economics. Former economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Former assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Visiting researcher at Princeton. PhD from Georgetown. (Phillipe, “Make Trade not War?”, April 12th, 2006. http://www.ecore.be/Papers/1177063947.pdf)
Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows, and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: the main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again1. Figure 1 suggests 2 however that on the 1870-2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the XIXth century, was a period of rising trade openness and of multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.
Poverty is rapidly decreasing
Wolf 3 (Martin, Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator – Financial Times “Are Global Poverty and Inequality Getting Worse?”, Prospect Magazine, March, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?i d=4982)
All data on incomes and income distribution are questionable, above all those generated in developing countries. But, contrary to what you say, World Bank researchers have calculated the numbers in extreme poverty-less than $1 a day-on a consistent basis, in recent studies. The data shows a decline since 1980 of 200m people in the category of the absolutely poor. This is a fall from 31 per cent of the world's population to 20 per cent (not 24 per cent, which is the proportion in developing countries alone). That is a spectacularly rapid fall in poverty by historical standards. It makes a nonsense of the idea that poverty alleviation has been blighted by globalisation. Now turn to the even murkier area of inequality. Here you argue that if we exclude China and India, there is no obvious trend in inequality. But why would one want to exclude two countries that contained about 60 per cent of the world's poorest people two decades ago and still contain almost 40 per cent of the world's population today? To fail to give these giants their due weight in a discussion ofglobal poverty alleviation or income distribution would be Hamlet without the prince. You then write that changes in relative average incomes across countries are not what we are really interested in, "which is the income distribution among all the world's people or households." This is wrong in itself. If a country's average income rises rapidly, it does also possess greater means for improving the lot of the poor. Maybe the government refuses to use the opportunity, but a successor government could. In any case, we do possess data on relative household incomes. In a Foreign Affairs article, David Dollar and Aart Kraay of the World Bank report a big decline in world-wide income inequality since its peak in about 1970. The study builds on work that goes back to 1820. The underlying method is to calculate the percentage gap between a randomly selected individual and the world average. The more unequal the distribution of world income, the bigger that gap becomes. They report that this gap peaked at 88 per cent of world average income in 1970, before falling to 78 per cent in 1995, roughly where it was in 1950. The chief driver of changes in inequality among households is changes between countries, not within them. This was also the finding of Branko Milanovic's study of global household income distribution between 1988 and 1993, which you cite approvingly. You rely on this study to support the thesis of rising household inequality. But it contains at least four defects. First, there are well-known inconsistencies between data on household expenditures and national accounts. Second, the methods used generate no increase in rural real incomes in China, which is inconsistent with most views of what actually happened. Third, the period of five years is very short. Fourth and most important, this was an atypical period, because India had an economic upheaval in 1991, while China's growth was temporarily slowed by the Tiananmen crisis. My conclusion is that the last two decades saw a decline not just in absolute poverty but also in world-wide inequality among households. The chief explanation for this was the fast growth of China and, to a lesser extent, of India. This progress was not offset by rising inequality within them. In the case of India there was no such rise. In China there has been a rise in inequality in the more recent period of its growth, largely because of controls on the movement of people from the hinterland to the coastal regions.
Poverty inevitable – alt causes overwhelm
Baker and Weisbrot 3 (Dean and Mark, Co-Directors – Center for Economic and Policy Research, “False Promises on Trade”, 7-25, http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0725-02.htm)
Similarly, most of sub-Saharan Africa is suffering from an un-payable debt burden. While there has been some limited relief offered in recent years, the remaining debt burden is still more than the debtor countries spend on health care and education. The list of problems imposed on developing countries can be extended at length bans on the industrial policies that led to successful development in the west, the imposition of patents on drugs and copyrights on computer software and recorded material, inappropriate macro-economic policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. All of these factors are likely to have far more severe consequences for the development prospects of low and middle-income countries than the agricultural policies of rich countries.
2
The Mexican economy is resilient – reforms, diversification, low inflation are boosting growth
Jones and Guthrie 13 5/8/13, Kristin Jones and Amy Guthrie are staff writers and analysts @ the Wall Street Journal “Update: Fitch lifts Mexico Rating on Economy, Reforms”, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130508-718436.html
Fitch Ratings upgraded Mexico by a notch Wednesday, citing the country's strong economic fundamentals, stable oil production, progress in addressing drug-related violence and a greater-than-anticipated political commitment to pass structural reforms. The ratings firm put Mexico's long-term foreign currency issuer default rating at triple-B-plus, three rungs into investment grade. The outlook is stable. Fitch noted Mexico's economic resilience despite a sluggish economy in the U.S., Mexico's key trading partner, with three-year growth averaging 4.5 in 2012. The agency also praised Mexico's prudent macro-economic policy, which underpins the country's low inflation. In upgrading Mexico, Fitch jumped ahead of Standard and Poor's, which in March changed Mexico's outlook to positive from stable, citing the reform momentum. SandP and Fitch both cut the country to triple-B from triple-B-plus in late 2009, when the global financial crisis led Mexico's economy to contract 6 and the peso to lose more than a quarter of its value against the U.S. dollar. Moody's Investors Service kept Mexico at Baa1, the equivalent of triple-B-plus and two notches above the minimum investment grade. The government of President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in December, has "reinvigorated" Mexico's reform momentum to pass structural reforms that had languished for many years, Fitch said Wednesday. Cooperation among Mexico's three major political parties in recent months has led to overhauls of labor rules, public education and telecoms. Still pending are more ambitious reworkings of the tax code and a possible opening of foreign investment in the oil sector. Combined, the reforms are seen eventually boosting Mexico's annual economic growth by one percentage point. A recent dispute over government spending ahead of July local elections threatened to derail the reform drive. The political forces behind the reform effort, known as the Pact for Mexico, reconciled their differences on Tuesday. "The pact has achieved a pace that doesn't cease to surprise, and a pace that shouldn't be lost," Cesar Camacho, national president of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, said Wednesday at an event beside other top political leaders, all of whom reiterated their commitment to secure more reforms. Mr. Pena Nieto thanked his colleagues on Wednesday for their "political will" to overcome differences and advance a common agenda to make Mexico more competitive internationally and more fair at home. The Fitch upgrade gave the Mexican peso a boost Wednesday as the currency moved below MXN12 to the U.S. dollar for the first time since August 2011, trading in Mexico City at MXN11.9780, according to Infosel, compared with MXN12.0355 at the close Tuesday. Local government bonds yields were lower on the day, with 10-year bonds due 2022 yielding 4.46, down four basis points from Tuesday's close. Fitch said its previous concerns about oil production and violence had eased, citing the diversification of the oil production base and a decline in the homicide rate in recent months. Sustained high growth and fiscal flexibility would be positive for ratings, while a persistently underperforming economy and destabilizing debt dynamics would be negative, Fitch said.
No bioterror
Keller 3/7 (Rebecca – Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)
It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. As far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward equation to consider. The threat of a terrorist attack using biological weapons is very low. And while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain of virus that could result in an epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more effectively. All of this hinges on the level of preparedness of developed nations and their ability to rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.
Terror threats on the border are exaggerated—suspicious activity has never been detected
Isacson and Meyer ’12 April 2012. Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer are Washington’s Office of Latin American Affairs’ border security and migration experts. “Beyond the Border Buildup: Security and Migrants Along the U.S.-Mexico Border.” http://www.wola.org/files/Beyond_the_Border_Buildup_FINAL.pdf
The New Border Context When U.S. political leaders and opinion makers call for more actions to secure the border with Mexico, the threats they cite most frequently are terrorism, drug trafficking, violent organized crime, and uncontrolled migration. This study does not explore the motives behind these positions, which range from concern about national security to pandering to voters’ fears of a foreign “other.” Of greater interest is the degree to which these threats are actually manifesting themselves, and whether they should be considered “threats” at all. TERRORISM The first threat, the possibility that members of a foreign terrorist organization might attempt to cross the border from Mexico to harm U.S. citizens, leaders, or infrastructure, has underlain a tremendous increase in U.S. border security investment since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Today, “The priority mission of Border Patrol is preventing terrorists and terrorists’ weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States,” reads the first text on the gateway page of the agency’s website.6 To date, however, no member of a group on the Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations has been detected attempting to cross the Mexico-U.S. border with intent to do harm. In December 1999, a “millennium” plot to bomb Los Angeles’ international airport was foiled by customs agents who found a bomb in the car of an Algerian citizen seeking to enter the United States from Canada.7 In October 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that Iranian officials sought help from sources whom they thought were members of Mexico’s Zetas criminal organization in a bizarre plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States.8 Neither of these episodes involved the United States’ southwest border with Mexico. The “terrorist crossing the porous border through Mexico” scenario continues to worry U.S. planners, though, because of the serious consequences that even a very unlikely event might have. Opinions differ on whether a putative terrorist would seek to work within existing drug or migrant trafficking networks. Some officials and analysts contend that criminal organizations would gladly assist a terrorist for the right price. Others hold the view that “the first time a terrorist uses a trafficker’s route is the last time that trafficker will ever get to use” that lucrative route, which is a cost too high to bear.9
Multiple barriers mean bioterror is extremely unlikely
Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire, 1-13-09 (Chris, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090113_7105.php)
Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim, which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen. However, he disputed Mueller's assertion that nations can be trusted to secure their atomic weapons and materials. "I don't think the historical record shows that at all," Walsh said. Black-market networks such as the organization once operated by former top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan remain a problem and should not be assumed to be easily defeated by international intelligence services, Walsh said (see GSN, Jan. 13). It is also reasonable to worry about extremists gaining access to nuclear blueprints or poorly secured stocks of highly enriched uranium, he said. "I worry about al-Qaeda 4.0, kids in Europe who go to good schools 20 years from now. Or types of terrorists we don't even imagine," Walsh said. Greater consideration must be given to exactly how much risk is tolerable and what actions must be taken to reduce the threat, he added. "For all the alarmism, we haven't done that much about the problem," Walsh said. "We've done a lot in the name of nuclear terrorism, the attack on Iraq, these other things, but we have moved ever so modestly to lock down nuclear materials." Biological Terrorism Another two analysts offered a similar debate on the potential for terrorists to carry out an attack using infectious disease material. Milton Leitenberg, a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, played down the threat in comparison to other health risks. Bioterrorism has killed five U.S. citizens in the 21st century -- the victims of the 2001 anthrax attacks, he said. Meanwhile, at least 400,000 deaths are linked each year to obesity in this country. The United States has authorized $57 billion in spending since the anthrax mailings for biological prevention and defense activities, Leitenberg said. Much of the money would have been better used to prepare for pandemic flu, he argued. "Mistaken threat assessments make mistaken policy and make mistaken allocation of financial resources," Leitenberg said. The number of states with offensive biological weapons programs appears to have stabilized at six beginning in the mid-1970s, despite subsequent intelligence estimates that once indicated an increasing number of efforts, Leitenberg said. Caveats in present analyses of those states make it near-impossible to determine the extent to which their activities remain offensive in nature, he added. There has been minimal proliferation of biological expertise or technology to nations of concern in recent decades, Leitenberg said. He identified roughly 12 Russian scientists who ended up in Iran and shipments of technology and pathogen strains to Iraq from France, Germany, the former Soviet Union and the United States between 1980 and 1990. No evidence exists of state assistance to nonstate groups in this sector. Two prominent extremist organizations, al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, failed to produce pathogenic disease strains that could be used in an attack, according to Leitenberg. Terrorists would have to acquire the correct disease strain, handle it safely, correctly reproduce and store the material and then disperse it properly, Leitenberg said. He dismissed their ability to do so. "What we've found so far is that those people have been totally abysmally ignorant of how to read the technical, professional literature," Leitenberg said. "What's on the jihadi Web sites comes from American poisoners' handbooks sold here at gun shows. Which can't make anything and what it would make is just garbage."
Biological weapons won’t be used and won’t cause extinction
Mueller, 2005 (John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University, “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration,” International Studies Perspectives, 6, 208-234)
Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used even though the knowledge about their destructive potential as weapons goes back decades, even centuries in some respects (the English, e.g., made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians in the French and Indian War) (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, and Eitzen, 1997:412). Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason: biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogue states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in technology and knowledge, but the record thus far is unlikely to be very encouraging to them. For example, Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during the Second World War. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese, but they apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have had little military impact.18 In the 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult that had some 300 scientists in its employ and an estimated budget of $1 billion, reportedly tried at least nine times over 5 years to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops, hoping fancifully to ignite an apocalyptic war. These efforts failed to create a single fatality in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place (Broad, 1998; Rapoport, 1999:57). For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very lowaltitude aerosol clouds: aerosols do not appreciably settle, and anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level (Meselson, 1995; Panofsky, 1998; Terry, 1998). Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms. Moreover, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult, and, even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with civil defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict and in combat situationsmay spread back on the attacker (OTA, 1993:48–49, 62; Broad and Miller, 1998; Easterbrook, 2002).
No Solvency: Their author says you have to ban bioweapons to solve – All other options fail
Ochs – Their Author, MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers, 6-9-2 (Richard, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately,” http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html)
There are many people who believe it is their God-given right to do whatever is deemed necessary to secure their homeland, their religion and their birthright. Moslems, Jews, Hindus, ultra-patriots (and fundamentalist Christians who believe that Armageddon is God’s prophesy) all have access to the doomsday vials at Fort Detrick and other labs. Fort Detrick and Dugway employees are US citizens but may also have other loyalties. One or more of them might have sent the anthrax letters to the media and Congress last year. Are we willing to trust our security, NO -- trust human survival to people like this? Human frailty, duplicity, greed, zealotry, insanity, intolerance and ignorance, not to speak of ultra-patriotism, will always be with us. The mere existence of these doomsday weapons is a risk too great for rational people to tolerate. Unless guards do body crevice searches of lab employees every day, smuggling out a few grams will be a piece of cake. Basically, THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY. Humanity is at great risk as we speak. All biological weapons must be destroyed immediately. All genetic engineering of new diseases must be halted. All bioweapons labs must be dismantled. Fort Detrick and Dugway labs must be decommissioned and torn down. Those who continue this research are potential war criminals of the highest order. Secret bioweapons research must be outlawed. The US, as the world’s leading creator of doomsday diseases, must lead the way and show the example. The US must not only obey the Convention Against Biological Weapons, which it has been violating, but it must sign the Biological Weapons Inspection Treaty, which it has been opposing. International delegations must be allowed to inspect and oversee the destruction of these labs and inventories. The doctrine of military deterrence must give way to the logic of human survival. Human survival must come before national sovereignty.
No Bioterror escalation
Easterbrook (Gregg, The New Republic Editor) 2003 Wired, "We're All Gonna Die!" 11/7, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html
3. Germ warfare! Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn't kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today's Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.
Small Risk of Bioterror
Lake (Anthony, G-Town Diplomacy Prof) 2001 The Georgetown Public Policy Review, "Bioterrorism: Interview with Anthony Lake," Spring, LN
It's much harder to develop a biological weapon than a chemical weapon and much, much harder than using computers for terrorist action. So, if you're calculating probabilities, then bioterrorism, probably even more than some forms of nuclear terrorism, is relatively unlikely. I do not walk around everyday worrying that people are dumping microbes in the ventilation ducts of the building I'm in. If we allow ourselves to become scared of this, then in a way, the terrorists have won. If we alter our behavior too much beyond prudent or preventative and preparatory efforts, then the terrorists have won. I don't think the chances are at all high that this will happen; in fact, I think they're very very low. However, the fact is that the Aum Shirinkyo was trying to develop biological weapons and probably used sarin because the Japanese police were closing in on them. (I believe they lost a scientist in the process of trying to develop biological weapons.) We should lament any death, anywhere, but that would be low on the list of lamentations. So while it's very unlikely, it is possible, and in fact we have entered the age in which there have been active efforts to try to develop biological weapons.
Bioweapons can’t be used – too unreliable
Laqueur 99 (Walter, Cochairman, International Research Council, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The New Terrorism, 1999, pg. 69)
The attractions of biological weapons are obvious: easy access, low cost, toxicity, and the panic they can cause. But there are drawbacks of various kinds that explain why almost no successful attacks have occurred. While explosive or nuclear devices or even chemical agents, however horrific, affect a definite space, biological agents are unpredictable: they can easily get out of control, backfire, or have no effect at all. They constitute a high risk to the attackers, although the same, of course, is true of chemical weapons. This consideration may not dissuade people willing to sacrifice their own lives, but the possibility that the attacker may kill himself before being able to launch an attack may make him hesitate to carry it out. Biological agents, with some notable exceptions, are affected by changes in heat or cold, and, like chemical agents, by changes in the direction of the wind. They have a limited life span, and their means of delivery are usually complicated. The process of contaminating water res¬ervoirs or foodstuffs involves serious technical problems. Even if an agent survives the various purification systems in water reservoirs, boiling the water would destroy most germs. Dispersing the agent as a vapor or via an aerosol system within a closed space for instance, through the air conditioning system of a big building or in a subway would ear to offer better chances of success, but it is by no mens foolproof.
Technical barriers prevent bioweapons
Tucker 8-99 (Jonathan, director of the CBW Nonproliferation Project at Center for Nonprolif Studies at Monterey Instit, Amy Sands, assoc director, July/August 1999, http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ja99/ja99tucker.html)
One reason there have been so few successful examples of chemical or biological terrorism is that carrying out an attack requires overcoming a series of major technical hurdles: gaining access to specialized chemical-weapon ingredients or virulent microbial strains; acquiring equipment and know-how for agent production and dispersal; and creating an organizational structure capable of resisting infiltration or early detection by law enforcement. Many of the microorganisms best suited to catastrophic terrorism-virulent strains of anthrax or deadly viruses such as smallpox and Ebola-are difficult to acquire. Further, nearly all viral and rickettsial agents are hard to produce, and bacteria such as plague are difficult to "weaponize" so that they will survive the process of delivery. As former Soviet bioweapons scientist Ken Alibek wrote in his recent memoir, Biohazard, "The most virulent culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents." The capability to disperse microbes and toxins over a wide area as an inhalable aerosol-the form best suited for inflicting mass casualties-requires a delivery system whose development would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorists. Not only is the dissemination process for biological agents inherently complex, requiring specialized equipment and expertise, but effective dispersal is easily disrupted by environmental and meteorological conditions. A large-scale attack with anthrax spores against a city, for example, would require the use of a crop duster with custom-built spray nozzles that could generate a high-concentration aerosol cloud containing particles of agent between one and five microns in size. Particles smaller than one micron would not lodge in the victims' lungs, while particles much larger than five microns would not remain suspended for long in the atmosphere. To generate mass casualties, the anthrax would have to be dried and milled into a fine powder. Yet this type of processing requires complex and costly equipment, as well as systems for high biological containment. Anthrax is simpler to handle in a wet form called a "slurry," but the efficiency of aerosolization is greatly reduced.
US efforts to combat Mexican drug trafficking are counter-productive – new Mexican administration doesn’t want to work with the US
Priest 5/1 May 1, 2013. Dana Priest is a national security reporter whose work focuses on intelligence and counterterrorism. “U.S. role to decrease as Mexico’s drug-war strategy shifts” http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2020902455_mexicoobamaxml.html
The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.-backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels, and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexico’s streets safe and calm, Mexican authorities said. Some U.S. officials fear the coming of an unofficial truce with cartel leaders. The Mexicans see it otherwise. “The objective of fighting organized crime is not in conflict with achieving peace,” said Eduardo Medina-Mora, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States. Two weeks after Peña Nieto assumed office Dec. 1, the new president sent his top five security officials to an unusual meeting at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. The new attorney general and interior minister sat in silence next to the new leaders of the army, navy and Mexican intelligence agency. Also at the Dec. 15 meeting were representatives from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the CIA, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other U.S. agencies charged with helping Mexico destroy the drug cartels that had besieged the country for the past decade. The Mexicans remained stone-faced as they learned how entwined the two countries had become during the battle against narco-traffickers, and how, in the process, the United States had been given near-complete access to Mexico’s territory and the secrets of its citizens, according to several U.S. officials familiar with the meeting. The administration of the previous president, Felipe Calderón, had granted U.S. spy planes access to Mexican airspace to gather intelligence. Unarmed Customs and Border Protection drones had flown from U.S. bases in support of Mexican military and federal police raids against drug targets and to track movements that would establish suspects’ “patterns of life.” The United States had also provided electronic signals technology, ground sensors, voice-recognition gear, cellphone-tracking devices, data-analysis tools, computer hacking kits and airborne cameras that could read license plates from three miles away. Under a classified program code-named SCENIC, the CIA was training Mexicans how to target and vet potential assets for recruitment and how to guard against infiltration by narco-traffickers. In deference to their visitors, the U.S. briefers left out that most of the 25 kingpin taken off the streets in the past five years had been removed because of U.S.-supplied information, according to people familiar with the meeting. Also unremarked upon was the mounting criticism that success against the cartels’ leadership had helped incite more violence than anyone had predicted, more than 60,000 deaths and 25,000 disappearances in the past seven years. Meanwhile, Mexico remains the U.S. market’s largest supplier of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine and the transshipment point for 95 percent of its cocaine. When the Dec. 15 meeting concluded, Mexico’s new security officials remained poker-faced.
Drug violence declining
Bargent 2-7-13 (James, Independent journalism from Colombia and Latin America, “Mexico Drug War Violence Slowing: Report”, Febraury 7th, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-drug-war-violence-slowing-report)
A new report analyzing the data behind Mexico’s drug war shows in 2012 organized crime related killings declined or leveled off while becoming increasingly concentrated in key strategic areas. The report, compiled by the San Diego University’s Trans-Border Institute, analyzed a range of data sources -- both official and independent -- to build a comprehensive picture of the shifting violence patterns in Mexico. The most significant trend identified was the slowing rate of drug war killings. While the conclusions of different data sets varied widely, they agreed that in 2012 the substantial year on year increases Mexico has seen since 2007 came to an end. According to data collated by Mexican newspaper Reforma, organized crime related murders dropped by over 21 percent, falling to 8,989 from 12,284. Projections for the government’s as yet unreleased figures show a 28 drop. However, figures from another media source, Milenio, showed an increase in its crime related murder tallies but by less than 1 percent – far lower than in previous years. The report also highlights how Mexico’s drug war violence is increasingly concentrated. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of municipalities that recorded no murders dropped by 28 percent, while the number of municipalities with 25 or more annual homicides grew from 50 to 240. However, in 2012, (for which, the report points out, the data set is incomplete) the number of municipalities free from violence increased 16 while the number with more than 25 homicides decreased more than 25 to 178. Over half the organized crime linked murders nationwide came from just five states; Sinaloa, Chihuaha, Nuevo Leon, Guerrero and Coahuila (although the order depends of the data set). 2012 also saw Acapulco assume the mantle of Mexico’s most violent city, even though the murder rate leveled off, while the cities of Monterrey, Torreon, and Nuevo Laredo posted the largest increases in crime related killings. InSight Crime While the authorities will probably lay claim to the slowdown in drug violence, it is likely a more influential factor has been changing dynamics in the Mexican underworld, as reflected by the shifting geographical patterns.