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1AC Sugar Ethanol CubaTournament: St Marks | Round: 1 | Opponent: Hendrickson | Judge: The United States federal government should authorize the licensing of American companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s sugar ethanol industry and allow Cuban sugar ethanol imports. Contention 1: Sugar Ethanol Shift IV. Environmental Effects of Ethanol¶ ¶ Assuming that Cuba is able to meet all the challenges standing in the way of creating a sugarcane-based ethanol industry, including the removal of U.S. legal barriers, and it begins importing ethanol to the United States, the United States would benefit environmentally in two ways. First, Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would directly benefit the United States by reducing the negative environmental effects of corn-based ethanol production, to the extent to which it replaced domestically produced corn-based ethanol. n55 Second, by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would indirectly benefit the United States as well as the rest of the world by reducing the speed of global climate change. n56¶ A. Environmental Effects of Corn-Based Ethanol¶ ¶ A chief argument in favor of the domestic corn-based ethanol industry is that it is environmentally beneficial because it reduces greenhouse gas emissions. n57 Scientists, industry advocates, and critics hotly contest the degree to which greenhouse gas emissions are reduced by replacing a percentage of U.S. gasoline consumption with domestically-produced corn-based ethanol. It is beyond the scope of this Article to weigh in on which evaluation is correct. n58 *182 Nonetheless, the factors that go into these scientific evaluations, are important for understanding the larger picture of the ethanol issue, and thus will be discussed.¶ Using any form of ethanol as a transportation fuel combats climate change because the carbon released when ethanol is burned was captured out of the atmosphere by the plants used to make the ethanol. Contrastingly, the carbon released when gasoline is burned had been stored in the earth for millennia in the form of crude oil. n59 This simple fact is complicated by the reality that the entire process of getting ethanol into the fuel tanks of drivers - from growing crops, to creating a refined product, to delivering blended ethanol to gas stations - is reliant on fossil fuels. According to one report, "If corn growth required only photosynthesis, if ethanol were produced using solar power, if corn were instantly transported to ethanol plants, and if no land use changes were needed to grow the corn, then displacing a gallon of gasoline with ethanol would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by approximately the equivalent of 11.2 kilograms of carbon dioxide. However, fossil fuels are used to grow corn and produce ethanol." n60¶ The debit side of the domestic ethanol industry's climate-change ledger begins to subtract from the credit side before the corn it uses is even planted. "America's corn crop might look like a sustainable, solar-powered system for producing food, but it is actually a huge, inefficient, polluting machine that guzzles fossil fuel." n61 While advocates for corn production would dispute this characterization of the industry as "inefficient" and "polluting," it is undeniable that conventional corn production techniques use large amounts of climate change-exacerbating fossil fuels. Conventional (non-organic) corn production techniques involve annual applications of fertilizers and pesticides, both largely derived from fossil fuels. n62¶ The process by which incentives for ethanol production change land use patterns and thereby impact climate change, known as indirect land use change (ILUC), happens roughly as follows. n63 By increasing demand for corn, corn-based ethanol production drives up the price of corn. As the price of corn *183 increases, farmers want to grow more of it. By making corn more appealing to farmers to grow than other crops, and thereby increasing national levels of corn-production, the corn-based ethanol industry makes the negative environmental effects of corn production more widespread. Conventional corn-growing techniques involve applying more pesticides and fertilizers to corn than is usually applied to other row crops such as soybeans. n64 This effect is exacerbated when high corn prices disincentivize crop rotation. n65 A common technique in American agriculture today is rotating corn and soybeans. n66 Because soybeans are a nitrogen-fixing crop (that is, they take nitrogen out of the atmosphere and release it into the soil), corn grown on land that was used to grow soybeans the year before requires a lesser input of nitrogen fertilizer.¶ By boosting the price of corn relative to other crops like soybeans, however, the domestic ethanol industry encourages farmers to use the same piece of land to grow corn year after year. Growing corn on the same land in successive years rather than rotating it with soybeans significantly increases the climate change effects of corn production because "nitrogen fertilizer applications are typically fifty pounds per acre higher for corn planted after corn" and "nitrous oxide has a global warming potential more than 300 times that of carbon dioxide." n67 Additionally, the application of fossil fuel-derived nitrogen fertilizer has other environmental impacts beyond exacerbating climate change. The collective nitrogen runoff of the Mississippi River basin has caused a process called hypoxia, which kills off most marine life, in a region of the Gulf of Mexico. Scientists have linked the so-called Dead Zone to corn production and, thus, to the domestic ethanol industry. n68 Scenario 1: Dead Zones As the fresh, nutrient-enriched water from the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers spread across the Gulf waters, favorable conditions are created for the production of massive phytoplankton blooms. A bloom is defined as an “increased abundance of a species above background numbers in a specific geographic region”. Incoming nutrients stimulate growth of phytoplankton at the surface, providing food for unicellular animals. Planktonic remains and fecal matter from these organisms fall to the ocean floor, where they are eaten by bacteria, which consume excessive amounts of oxygen, creating eutrophic conditions. Hypoxic waters appear normal on the surface, but on the bottom, they are covered with dead and distressed animal, and in extreme cases, layers of stinking, sulfur-oxidizing bacteria, which cause the sediment in these areas to turn black. These hypoxic conditions cause food chain alterations, loss of biodiversity, and high aquatic species mortality. Ensures planetary extinction Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in¶ political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and¶ dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. 856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function¶ that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. 857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements¶ that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less¶ abundant but necessary elements." 858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in¶ the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." 859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their¶ biodiversity. *265 Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine¶ environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on¶ sustaining the rest of the reef system. 860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they¶ provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. 861 Similar calculations could¶ derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean¶ ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." 862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the¶ actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the¶ oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef¶ ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness¶ whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about¶ the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost¶ dead, 863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the¶ web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of Scenario 2: Monoculture Incentivizing farmers to grow consecutive corn crops instead of alternating with soybean crops is only the least damaging of the environmentally detrimental land use changes that the domestic ethanol industry encourages. Land is primarily converted to corn production in one of three ways: land that is already used to grow another crop is converted to corn production, land that is used for pasture or is enrolled in a program like the Conservation Reserve Program n69 is converted to cropland, or native habitat is plowed and converted to *184 cropland. n70 Each of these has varying levels of negative environmental effects. All three types of land use conversions are underway in the Great Plains states, which have ramped up corn production in response to demand from the ethanol industry. n71 While it is not the only reason corn production is increasing in these states, n72 the corn-based ethanol industry and thus the governmental policies encouraging it are clearly factors driving land use conversion. "While many factors influence land-use changes, the relationship between ethanol incentives and habitat destruction is fairly clear. Ethanol incentives increase demand for corn, which in turn increases corn prices. Increased corn prices lead to land being converted from other uses to corn production." n73¶ Converting pasture or Conservation Reserve Program Land to cropland causes more damage than changing crop rotation patterns in already cropped land. n74 Yet, the most environmentally damaging way of converting land to crop production is to plow native habitat and plant it with row crops. n75 This process is underway now in the Great Plains, with devastating environmental effects. Although the most recent data is from 2007, the USDA's census of agriculture (published every five years) provides a clear picture of the trend lines of U.S. agricultural production. This picture is one of greatly increased corn production in the Great Plains states. According to the Census of Agriculture, the number of acres of corn production in North Dakota has increased from 592,078 acres in 1997 to 991,390 acres in 2002 n76 to 2,348,171 acres in 2007, n77 representing more *185 than a doubling over five years and close to a quadrupling over ten years. Similarly, in South Dakota, the number of acres in corn grew from 3,165,190 in 2002 to 4,455,368 in 2007, n78 an increase of forty-one percent over five years. In Nebraska, the number of acres in corn (for grain) increased from 7,344,715 in 2002 to 9,192,656 in 2007, n79 a more modest but still significant increase of twenty-five percent over five years.¶ While a major portion of this increase in corn production in the Great Plain states is attributable to farmers converting land already used to grow other crops or pasture to corn production, n80 much of it also derives from plowing native habitat. "Recent dramatic increases in corn plantings have been heavily concentrated in the Prairie Pothole Region, displacing other crops as well as sensitive prairie pothole habitat." n81 The trend of replacing native habitat with fields of corn is an extremely worrying development, and is arguably the strongest reason for displacing at least some domestic corn-based ethanol with Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol. Therefore, this trend will be discussed in some depth.¶ Increased corn production is degrading two environmentally significant habitats in the Great Plains, grasslands and wetlands. According to The Nature Conservancy, "grasslands and prairies are the world's most imperiled ecosystem." n82 While grasslands once stretched across the entire central portion of the United States, it has lost between eighty-three and ninety-nine percent of its original tall grass prairie habitat. n83 U.S. grasslands are the native habitat of a number of threatened and endangered species, such as the greater prairie *186 chicken, n84 which cannot live in cornfields. n85 In addition to reducing the overall amount of habitat available to native species, the process of plowing grassland to grow crops fragments habitat by splitting it into disconnected segments. n86 The negative effects on wildlife of converting grasslands to corn fields, and thereby also fragmenting what habitat remains, are well-documented. "In counties with high corn production increases, the average number of grassland bird species was found to decline significantly from 2005 to 2008." n87¶ Furthermore, in addition to providing habitat for wildlife, grasslands act as a carbon sink, keeping centuries' worth of accumulated atmospheric carbon in underground root systems. n88 When native grassland is plowed to grow crops like corn, the carbon stored in its soil is released into the atmosphere, further exacerbating climate change and counterbalancing the greenhouse gas benefits of replacing fossil fuel-based gasoline with corn-based ethanol. n89 Taken together, the environmental costs of increasing domestic corn-based ethanol production by plowing native grasslands in the Great Plains starkly outweigh their benefits. "Plowing up our nation's last remnants of native grasslands to grow more corn for ethanol is like burning the Mona Lisa for firewood." n90¶ Along with grasslands, wetlands are the other major habitat type in the Great Plains that are being damaged by the domestic corn-based ethanol industry. The draining of wetlands to convert them to agricultural production is a practice in American agriculture that predates the domestic ethanol industry. n91 This trend has been exacerbated by a number of legal and policy factors unrelated to ethanol production (including a 2001 Supreme Court decision interpreting the *187 Clean Water Act). n92 To the extent that it increases demand for corn and thus the price of corn, however, the domestic ethanol industry is clearly a factor driving the conversion of wetlands to corn production. This conversion process is a land use change with wide-ranging environmental consequences. The Prairie Pothole region of the Dakotas and surrounding states - which is composed of a mixture of grasslands and wetlands - is a habitat of international significance. n93 Nearly forty percent of all species of migratory birds in North America - over 300 species - utilize this habitat at some point in their life cycles or yearly migrations. n94 The region is where "millions of ducks and geese are born each year." n95 The two greatest threats to North American ducks are the destruction of wetlands and the degradation of prairies, both of which are being driven by the expansion of U.S. corn production. n96 In addition to providing habitat for wildlife, both grasslands and wetlands help to clean up pollution and prevent flooding. n97 "Those areas with native vegetation, and the soils beneath their surface, also retain the water longer throughout the season and use up the water through evapotranspiration." n98 Thus, converting grasslands and wetlands to cropland for corn increases the risk of flooding. n99¶ Taken together, the consequences of converting grasslands and wetlands in the Great Plains to increase corn production for the domestic ethanol industry are devastating.¶ If we proceed along the current trajectory without changing federal policies including those promoting corn-based ethanol, the prairie pothole ecosystem may be further degraded and fragmented, and the many services it provides will be impossible to restore. The region will no longer be able to support the waterfowl cherished by hunters and wildlife enthusiasts across the country. Grassland bird populations, already declining, will be unable to rebound as *188 nesting sites are turned into row crops. Water will become increasingly polluted and costly to clean as the grasslands and wetlands that once filtered contaminants disappear. n100 "If all agricultural lands adopt the industrial, monocultural model, there will be enormous impacts on water and other essential services provided by diverse ecosystems," Jackson told IPS.¶ Societies need to recognize the value of ecosystem services and encourage farmers to use methods that benefit biodiversity, she says.¶ Biodiversity refers to the amazing variety of living things that make up the biosphere, the thin skin of life that covers the Earth and is, as far as we know, unique in the universe. The trees, plants, insects, bacteria, birds and animals that make up forest ecosystems produce oxygen, clean water, prevent erosion and flooding, and capture excess carbon dioxide, among other things.¶ "There is an unbreakable link between human health and well being and ecosystems," Walter Reid, director of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) and a professor with the Institute for the Environment at Stanford University, told IPS last year.¶ The MA is a 22-million-dollar, four-year global research initiative commissioned by the United Nations, and carried out by 1,360 experts from 95 countries. Its mission has been to examine ways to slow or reverse the degradation of the Earth's ecosystems, including a look at what the future may be like in 2050.¶ The more species and diversity there are in an ecosystem, the more robust it is. Remove some species and it will continue to function. However, like a complex house of cards, removing key cards or too many cards results in a collapse.¶ For many ecosystems such as oceans, scientists do not know what the key cards are or how many lost species is too many. CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC, the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice. CO2 is the primary driver of climate change – outweighs all alt causes Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions account for about 60 of the effect from anthropogenic greenhouse gases on the earth’s energy balance over the past 250 years. These global CO2 emissions are mostly from fossil fuels (more than 85), land use change, mainly associated with tropical deforestation (less than 10), and cement production and other industrial processes (about 4). Australia contributes about 1.3 of the global CO2 emissions. Energy generation continues to climb and is dominated by fossil fuels – suggesting emissions will grow for some time yet. CO2 levels are rising in the atmosphere and ocean. About 50 of the amount of CO2 emitted from fossil fuels, industry, and changes in land-use, stays in the atmosphere. The remainder is taken up by the ocean and land vegetation, in roughly equal parts. The extra carbon dioxide absorbed by the oceans is estimated to have caused about a 30 increase in the level of ocean acidity since pre-industrial times. The sources of the CO2 increase in the atmosphere can be identified from studies of the isotopic composition of atmospheric CO2 and from oxygen (O2) concentration trends in the atmosphere. The observed trends in the isotopic (13C, 14C) composition of CO2 in the atmosphere and the decrease in the concentration of atmospheric O2 confirm that the dominant cause of the observed CO2 increase is the combustion of fossil fuels. Global warming makes global agricultural production impossible – resulting in mass starvation The overall conclusions of IPCC AR4 concerning food production and agriculture included the following: • Crop productivity is projected to increase slightly at mid- to high latitudes for local mean temperature increases of up to 1 to 3°C depending on the crop, and then decrease beyond that in some regions (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, SPM}. • At lower latitudes, especially in seasonally dry and tropical regions, crop productivity is projected to decrease for even small local temperature increases (1 to 2°C) which would increase the risk of hunger (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, SPM}. • Globally, the potential for food production is projected to increase with increases in local average temperature over a range of 1 to 3°C, but above this it is projected to decrease (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, 5.5, SPM}. These findings clearly indicate a growing risk for low-latitude regions at quite low levels of temperature increase and a growing risk for systemic global problems above a warming of a few degrees Celsius. While a comprehensive review of literature is forthcoming in the IPCC AR5, the snapshot overview of recent scientific literature provided here illustrates that the concerns identified in the AR4 are confirmed by recent literature and in important cases extended. In particular, impacts of extreme heat waves deserve mention here for observed agricultural impacts (see also Chapter 2). This chapter will focus on the latest findings regarding possible limits and risks to large-scale agriculture production because of climate change, summarizing recent studies relevant to this risk assessment, including at high levels of global warming approaching 4°C. In particular, it will deliberately highlight important findings that point to the risks of assuming a forward projection of historical trends. Projections for food and agriculture over the 21st century indicate substantial challenges irrespective of climate change. As early as 2050, the world’s population is expected to reach about 9 billion people (Lutz and Samir 2010) and demand for food is expected to increase accordingly. Based on the observed relationship between per capita GDP and per capita demand for crop calories (human consumption, feed crops, fish production and losses during food production), Tilman et al. (2011) project a global increase in the demand for crops by about 100 percent from 2005 to 2050. Other estimates for the same period project a 70 percent increase of demand (Alexandratos 2009). Several projections suggest that global cereal and livestock production may need to increase by between 60 and 100 percent to 2050, depending on the warming scenario (Thornton et al. 2011). The historical context can on the one hand provide reassurance that despite growing population, food production has been able to increase to keep pace with demand and that despite occasional fluctuations, food prices generally stabilize or decrease in real terms (Godfray, Crute, et al. 2010). Increases in food production have mainly been driven by more efficient use of land, rather than by the extension of arable land, with the former more widespread in rich countries and the latter tending to be practiced in poor countries (Tilman et al. 2011). While grain production has more than doubled, the area of land used for arable agriculture has only increased by approximately 9 percent (Godfray, Beddington, et al. 2010). However, although the expansion of agricultural production has proved possible through technological innovation and improved water-use efficiency, observation and analysis point to a significant level of vulnerability of food production and prices to the consequences of climate change, extreme weather, and underlying social and economic development trends. There are some indications that climate change may reduce arable land in low-latitude regions, with reductions most pronounced in Africa, Latin America, and India (Zhang and Cai 2011). For example, flooding of agricultural land is also expected to severely impact crop yields in the future: 10.7 percent of South Asia´s agricultural land is projected to be exposed to inundation, accompanied by a 10 percent intensification of storm surges, with 1 m sea-level rise (Lange et al. 2010). Given the competition for land that may be used for other human activities (for example, urbanization and biofuel production), which can be expected to increase as climate change places pressure on scarce resources, it is likely that the main increase in production will have to be managed by an intensification of agriculture on the same—or possibly even reduced—amount of land (Godfray, Beddington et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2010). Declines in nutrient availability (for example, phosphorus), as well as the spread in pests and weeds, could further limit the increase of agricultural productivity. Geographical shifts in production patterns resulting from the effects of global warming could further escalate distributional issues in the future. While this will not be taken into consideration here, it illustrates the plethora of factors to take into account when thinking of challenges to promoting food security in a warming world. New results published since 2007 point to a more rapidly escalating risk of crop yield reductions associated with warming than previously predicted (Schlenker and Lobell 2010; Schlenker and Roberts 2009). In the period since 1980, patterns of global crop production have presented significant indications of an adverse effect resulting from climate trends and variability, with maize declining by 3.8 percent and wheat production by 5.5 percent compared to a case without climate trends. A significant portion of increases in crop yields from technology, CO2 fertilization, and other changes may have been offset by climate trends in some countries (Lobell et al. 2011). This indication alone casts some doubt on future projections based on earlier crop models. In relation to the projected effects of climate change three interrelated factors are important: temperature-induced effect, precipitation-induced effect, and the CO2 -fertilization effect. The following discussion will focus only on these biophysical factors. Other factors that can damage crops, for example, the elevated levels of tropospheric ozone (van Groenigen et al. 2012), fall outside the scope of this report and will not be addressed. Largely beyond the scope of this report are the far-reaching and uneven adverse implications for poverty in many regions arising from the macroeconomic consequences of shocks to global agricultural production from climate change. It is necessary to stress here that even where overall food production is not reduced or is even increased with low levels of warming, distributional issues mean that food security will remain a precarious matter or worsen as different regions are impacted differently and food security is further challenged by a multitude of nonclimatic factors. 4 degrees of warming make sustaining biodiversity impossible – the impact is extinction Ecosystems and their species provide a range of important goods and services for human society. These include water, food, cultural and other values. In the AR4 an assessment of climate change effects on ecosystems and their services found the following: • If greenhouse gas emissions and other stresses continue at or above current rates, the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded by an unprecedented combination of change in climate, associated disturbances (for example, flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification) and other stressors (global change drivers) including land use change, pollution and over-exploitation of resources. • Approximately 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction, if increases in global average temperature exceed of 2–3° above preindustrial levels. • For increases in global average temperature exceeding 2 to 3° above preindustrial levels and in concomitant atmospheric CO2 concentrations, major changes are projected in ecosystem structure and function, species’ ecological interactions and shifts in species’ geographical ranges, with predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem goods and services, such as water and food supply. It is known that past large-scale losses of global ecosystems and species extinctions have been associated with rapid climate change combined with other ecological stressors. Loss and/or degradation of ecosystems, and rates of extinction because of human pressures over the last century or more, which have intensified in recent decades, have contributed to a very high rate of extinction by geological standards. It is well established that loss or degradation of ecosystem services occurs as a consequence of species extinctions, declining species abundance, or widespread shifts in species and biome distributions (Leadley et al. 2010). Climate change is projected to exacerbate the situation. This section outlines the likely consequences for some key ecosystems and for biodiversity. The literature tends to confirm the conclusions from the AR4 outlined above. Despite the existence of detailed and highly informative case studies, upon which this section will draw, it is also important to recall that there remain many uncertainties (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). However, threshold behavior is known to occur in biological systems (Barnosky et al. 2012) and most model projections agree on major adverse consequences for biodiversity in a 4°C world (Bellard et al., 2012). With high levels of warming, coalescing human induced stresses on ecosystems have the potential to trigger large-scale ecosystem collapse (Barnosky et al. 2012). Furthermore, while uncertainty remains in the projections, there is a risk not only of major loss of valuable ecosystem services, particularly to the poor and the most vulnerable who depend on them, but also of feedbacks being initiated that would result in ever higher CO2 emissions and thus rates of global warming. Significant effects of climate change are already expected for warming well below 4°C. In a scenario of 2.5°C warming, severe ecosystem change, based on absolute and relative changes in carbon and water fluxes and stores, cannot be ruled out on any continent (Heyder, Schaphoff, Gerten, and Lucht, 2011). If warming is limited to less than 2°C, with constant or slightly declining precipitation, small biome shifts are projected, and then only in temperate and tropical regions. Considerable change is projected for cold and tropical climates already at 3°C of warming. At greater than 4°C of warming, biomes in temperate zones will also be substantially affected. These changes would impact not only the human and animal communities that directly rely on the ecosystems, but would also exact a cost (economic and otherwise) on society as a whole, ranging from extensive loss of biodiversity and diminished land cover, through to loss of ecosystems services such as fisheries and forestry (de Groot et al., 2012; Farley et al., 2012). Ecosystems have been found to be particularly sensitive to geographical patterns of climate change (Gonzalez, Neilson, Lenihan, and Drapek, 2010). Moreover, ecosystems are affected not only by local changes in the mean temperature and precipitation, along with changes in the variability of these quantities and changes by the occurrence of extreme events. These climatic variables are thus decisive factors in determining plant structure and ecosystem composition (Reu et al., 2011). Increasing vulnerability to heat and drought stress will likely lead to increased mortality and species extinction. For example, temperature extremes have already been held responsible for mortality in Australian flying-fox species (Welbergen, Klose, Markus, and Eby 2008), and interactions between phenological changes driven by gradual climate changes and extreme events can lead to reduced fecundity (Campbell et al. 2009; Inouye, 2008). Climate change also has the potential to facilitate the spread and establishment of invasive species (pests and weeds) (Hellmann, Byers, Bierwagen, and Dukes, 2008; Rahel and Olden, 2008) with often detrimental implications for ecosystem services and biodiversity. Human land-use changes are expected to further exacerbate climate change driven ecosystem changes, particularly in the tropics, where rising temperatures and reduced precipitation are expected to have major impacts (Campbell et al., 2009; Lee and Jetz, 2008). Ecosystems will be affected by the increased occurrence of extremes such as forest loss resulting from droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion (Fischlin et al., 2007). Climate change also has the potential to catalyze rapid shifts in ecosystems such as sudden forest loss or regional loss of agricultural productivity resulting from desertification (Barnosky et al., 2012). The predicted increase in extreme climate events would also drive dramatic ecosystem changes (Thibault and Brown 2008; Wernberg, Smale, and Thomsen 2012). One such extreme event that is expected to have immediate impacts on ecosystems is the increased rate of wildfire occurrence. Climate change induced shifts in the fire regime are therefore in turn powerful drivers of biome shifts, potentially resulting in considerable changes in carbon fluxes over large areas (Heyder et al., 2011; Lavorel et al., 2006) It is anticipated that global warming will lead to global biome shifts (Barnosky et al. 2012). Based on 20th century observations and 21st century projections, poleward latitudinal biome shifts of up to 400 km are possible in a 4° C world (Gonzalez et al., 2010). In the case of mountaintop ecosystems, for example, such a shift is not necessarily possible, putting them at particular risk of extinction (La Sorte and Jetz, 2010). Species that dwell at the upper edge of continents or on islands would face a similar impediment to adaptation, since migration into adjacent ecosystems is not possible (Campbell, et al. 2009; Hof, Levinsky, Araújo, and Rahbek 2011). The consequences of such geographical shifts, driven by climatic changes as well as rising CO2 concentrations, would be found in both reduced species richness and species turnover (for example, Phillips et al., 2008; White and Beissinger 2008). A study by (Midgley and Thuiller, 2011) found that, of 5,197 African plant species studied, 25–42 percent could lose all suitable range by 2085. It should be emphasized that competition for space with human agriculture over the coming century is likely to prevent vegetation expansion in most cases (Zelazowski et al., 2011) Species composition changes can lead to structural changes of the entire ecosystem, such as the increase in lianas in tropical and temperate forests (Phillips et al., 2008), and the encroachment of woody plants in temperate grasslands (Bloor et al., 2008, Ratajczak et al., 2012), putting grass-eating herbivores at risk of extinction because of a lack of food available—this is just one example of the sensitive intricacies of ecosystem responses to external perturbations. There is also an increased risk of extinction for herbivores in regions of drought-induced tree dieback, owing to their inability to digest the newly resident C4 grasses (Morgan et al., 2008). The following provides some examples of ecosystems that have been identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change. The discussion is restricted to ecosystems themselves, rather than the important and often extensive impacts on ecosystems services. Boreal-temperate ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to climate change, although there are large differences in projections, depending on the future climate model and emission pathway studied. Nevertheless there is a clear risk of large-scale forest dieback in the boreal-temperate system because of heat and drought (Heyder et al., 2011). Heat and drought related die-back has already been observed in substantial areas of North American boreal forests (Allen et al., 2010), characteristic of vulnerability to heat and drought stress leading to increased mortality at the trailing edge of boreal forests. The vulnerability of transition zones between boreal and temperate forests, as well as between boreal forests and polar/tundra biomes, is corroborated by studies of changes in plant functional richness with climate change (Reu et al., 2011), as well as analyses using multiple dynamic global vegetation models (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Subtle changes within forest types also pose a great risk to biodiversity as different plant types gain dominance (Scholze et al., 2006). Humid tropical forests also show increasing risk of major climate induced losses. At 4°C warming above pre-industrial levels, the land extent of humid tropical forest, characterized by tree species diversity and biomass density, is expected to contract to approximately 25 percent of its original size see Figure 3 in (Zelazowski et al., 2011), while at 2°C warming, more than 75 percent of the original land can likely be preserved. For these ecosystems, water availability is the dominant determinant of climate suitability (Zelazowski et al., 2011). In general, Asia is substantially less at risk of forest loss than the tropical Americas. However, even at 2°C, the forest in the Indochina peninsula will be at risk of die-back. At 4°C, the area of concern grows to include central Sumatra, Sulawesi, India and the Philippines, where up to 30 percent of the total humid tropical forest niche could be threatened by forest retreat (Zelazowski et al., 2011). There has been substantial scientific debate over the risk of a rapid and abrupt change to a much drier savanna or grassland ecosystem under global warming. This risk has been identified as a possible planetary tipping point at around a warming of 3.5–4.5°C, which, if crossed, would result in a major loss of biodiversity, ecosystem services and the loss of a major terrestrial carbon sink, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Lenton et al., 2008)(Cox, et al., 2004) (Kriegler, Hall, Held, Dawson, and Schellnhuber, 2009). Substantial uncertainty remains around the likelihood, timing and onset of such risk due to a range of factors including uncertainty in precipitation changes, effects of CO2 concentration increase on water use efficiency and the CO2 fertilization effect, land-use feedbacks and interactions with fire frequency and intensity, and effects of higher temperature on tropical tree species and on important ecosystem services such as pollinators. While climate model projections for the Amazon, and in particular precipitation, remain quite uncertain recent analyses using IPCC AR4 generation climate indicates a reduced risk of a major basin wide loss of precipitation compared to some earlier work. If drying occurs then the likelihood of an abrupt shift to a drier, less biodiverse ecosystem would increase. Current projections indicate that fire occurrence in the Amazon could double by 2050, based on the A2 SRES scenario that involves warming of approximately 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Silvestrini et al., 2011), and can therefore be expected to be even higher in a 4°C world. Interactions of climate change, land use and agricultural expansion increase the incidence of fire (Aragão et al., 2008), which plays a major role in the (re)structuring of vegetation (Gonzalez et al., 2010; Scholze et al., 2006). A decrease in precipitation over the Amazon forests may therefore result in forest retreat or transition into a low biomass forest (Malhi et al., 2009). Moderating this risk is a possible increase in ecosystem water use efficiency with increasing CO2 concentrations is accounted for, more than 90 percent of the original humid tropical forest niche in Amazonia is likely to be preserved in the 2°C case, compared to just under half in the 4°C warming case (see Figure 5 in Zelazowski et al., 2011) (Cook, Zeng, and Yoon, 2012; Salazar and Nobre, 2010). Recent work has analyzed a number of these factors and their uncertainties and finds that the risk of major loss of forest due to climate is more likely to be regional than Amazon basin-wide, with the eastern and southeastern Amazon being most at risk (Zelazowski et al., 2011). Salazar and Nobre (2010) estimates a transition from tropical forests to seasonal forest or savanna in the eastern Amazon could occur at warming at warming of 2.5–3.5°C when CO2 fertilization is not considered and 4.5–5.5°C when it is considered. It is important to note, as Salazar and Nobre (2010) point out, that the effects of deforestation and increased fire risk interact with the climate change and are likely to accelerate a transition from tropical forests to drier ecosystems. Increased CO2 concentration may also lead to increased plant water efficiency (Ainsworth and Long, 2005), lowering the risk of plant die-back, and resulting in vegetation expansion in many regions, such as the Congo basin, West Africa and Madagascar (Zelazowski et al., 2011), in addition to some dry-land ecosystems (Heyder et al., 2011). The impact of CO2 induced ‘greening’ would, however, negatively affect biodiversity in many ecosystems. In particular encroachment of woody plants into grasslands and savannahs in North American grassland and savanna communities could lead to a decline of up to 45 percent in species richness ((Ratajczak and Nippert, 2012) and loss of specialist savanna plant species in southern Africa (Parr, Gray, and Bond, 2012). Mangroves are an important ecosystem and are particularly vulnerable to the multiple impacts of climate change, such as: rise in sea levels, increases in atmospheric CO2 concentration, air and water temperature, and changes in precipitation patterns. Sea-level rise can cause a loss of mangroves by cutting off the flow of fresh water and nutrients and drowning the roots (Dasgupta, Laplante et al. 2010). By the end of the 21st century, global mangrove cover is projected to experience a significant decline because of heat stress and sea-level rise (Alongi, 2008; Beaumont et al., 2011). In fact, it has been estimated that under the A1B emissions scenario (3.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels) mangroves would need to geographically move on average about 1 km/year to remain in suitable climate zones (Loarie et al., 2009). The most vulnerable mangrove forests are those occupying low-relief islands such as small islands in the Pacific where sea-level rise is a dominant factor. Where rivers are lacking and/ or land is subsiding, vulnerability is also high. With mangrove losses resulting from deforestation presently at 1 to 2 percent per annum (Beaumont et al., 2011), climate change may not be the biggest immediate threat to the future of mangroves. However if conservation efforts are successful in the longer term climate change may become a determining issue (Beaumont et al., 2011). Coral reefs are acutely sensitive to changes in water temperatures, ocean pH and intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones. Mass coral bleaching is caused by ocean warming and ocean acidification, which results from absorption of CO2 (for example, Frieler et al., 2012a). Increased sea-surface temperatures and a reduction of available carbonates are also understood to be driving causes of decreased rates of calcification, a critical reef-building process (De’ath, Lough, and Fabricius, 2009). The effects of climate change on coral reefs are already apparent. The Great Barrier Reef, for example, has been estimated to have lost 50 percent of live coral cover since 1985, which is attributed in part to coral bleaching because of increasing water temperatures (De’ath et al., 2012). Under atmospheric CO2 concentrations that correspond to a warming of 4°C by 2100, reef erosion will likely exceed rates of calcification, leaving coral reefs as “crumbling frameworks with few calcareous corals” (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). In fact, frequency of bleaching events under global warming in even a 2°C world has been projected to exceed the ability of coral reefs to recover. The extinction of coral reefs would be catastrophic for entire coral reef ecosystems and the people who depend on them for food, income and shoreline. Reefs provide coastal protection against coastal floods and rising sea levels, nursery grounds and habitat for a variety of currently fished species, as well as an invaluable tourism asset. These valuable services to often subsistence-dependent coastal and island societies will most likely be lost well before a 4°C world is reached. The preceding discussion reviewed the implications of a 4°C world for just a few examples of important ecosystems. The section below examines the effects of climate on biological diversity Ecosystems are composed ultimately of the species and interactions between them and their physical environment. Biologically rich ecosystems are usually diverse and it is broadly agreed that there exists a strong link between this biological diversity and ecosystem productivity, stability and functioning (McGrady-Steed, Harris, and Morin, 1997; David Tilman, Wedin, and Knops, 1996)(Hector, 1999; D Tilman et al., 2001). Loss of species within ecosystems will hence have profound negative effects on the functioning and stability of ecosystems and on the ability of ecosystems to provide goods and services to human societies. It is the overall diversity of species that ultimately characterizes the biodiversity and evolutionary legacy of life on Earth. As was noted at the outset of this discussion, species extinction rates are now at very high levels compared to the geological record. Loss of those species presently classified as ‘critically endangered’ would lead to mass extinction on a scale that has happened only five times before in the last 540 million years. The loss of those species classified as ‘endangered’ and ‘vulnerable’ would confirm this loss as the sixth mass extinction episode (Barnosky 2011). Loss of biodiversity will challenge those reliant on ecosystems services. Fisheries (Dale, Tharp, Lannom, and Hodges, 2010), and agronomy (Howden et al., 2007) and forestry industries (Stram and Evans, 2009), among others, will need to match species choices to the changing climate conditions, while devising new strategies to tackle invasive pests (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp, 2012). These challenges would have to be met in the face of increasing competition between natural and agricultural ecosystems over water resources. Over the 21st-century climate change is likely to result in some bio-climates disappearing, notably in the mountainous tropics and in the poleward regions of continents, with new, or novel, climates developing in the tropics and subtropics (Williams, Jackson, and Kutzbach, 2007). In this study novel climates are those where 21st century projected climates do not overlap with their 20th century analogues, and disappearing climates are those 20th century climates that do not overlap with 21st century projected climates. The projections of Williams et al (2007) indicate that in a 4°C world (SRES A2), 12–39 percent of the Earth’s land surface may experience a novel climate compared to 20th century analogues. Predictions of species response to novel climates are difficult because researchers have no current analogue to rely upon. However, at least such climates would give rise to disruptions, with many current species associations being broken up or disappearing entirely. Under the same scenario an estimated 10–48 percent of the Earth’s surface including highly biodiverse regions such as the Himalayas, Mesoamerica, eastern and southern Africa, the Philippines and the region around Indonesia known as Wallacaea would lose their climate space. With limitations on how fast species can disperse, or move, this indicates that many species may find themselves without a suitable climate space and thus face a high risk of extinction. Globally, as in other studies, there is a strong association apparent in these projections between regions where the climate disappears and biodiversity hotspots. Limiting warming to lower levels in this study showed substantially reduced effects, with the magnitude of novel and disappearing climates scaling linearly with global mean warming. More recent work by Beaumont and colleagues using a different approach confirms the scale of this risk (Beaumont et al., 2011, Figure 36). Analysis of the exposure of 185 eco-regions of exceptional biodiversity (a subset of the so-called Global 200) to extreme monthly temperature and precipitation conditions in the 21st century compared to 1961–1990 conditions shows that within 60 years almost all of the regions that are already exposed to substantial environmental and social pressure, will experience extreme temperature conditions based on the A2 emission scenario (4.1°C global mean temperature rise by 2100) (Beaumont et al., 2011). Tropical and sub-tropical eco-regions in Africa and South America are particularly vulnerable. Vulnerability to such extremes is particularly acute for high latitude and small island biota, which are very limited in their ability to respond to range shifts, and to those biota, such as flooded grassland, mangroves and desert biomes, that would require large geographical displacements to find comparable climates in a warmer world. The overall sense of recent literature confirms the findings of the AR4 summarized at the beginning of the section, with a number of risks such as those to coral reefs occurring at significantly lower temperatures than estimated in that report. Although non-climate related human pressures are likely to remain a major and defining driver of loss of ecosystems and biodiversity in the coming decades, it is also clear that as warming rises so will the predominance of climate change as a determinant of ecosystem and biodiversity survival. While the factors of human stresses on ecosystems are manifold, in a 4°C world, climate change is likely to become a determining driver of ecosystem shifts and large-scale biodiversity loss (Bellard et al., 2012; New et al., 2011). Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Such damages to ecosystems would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (e.g., hydrology—quantity flow rates, quality; fisheries (corals), protection of coastline (loss of mangroves). Barnosky has described the present situation facing the biodiversity of the planet as “the perfect storm” with multiple high intensity ecological stresses because of habitat modification and degradation, pollution and other factors, unusually rapid climate change and unusually high and elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In the past, as noted above, this combination of circumstances has led to major, mass extinctions with planetary consequences. Thus, there is a growing risk that climate change, combined with other human activities, will cause the irreversible transition of the Earth´s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience (Barnosky et al., 2012 The emission pledges made at the climate conventions in Copenhagen and Cancun, if fully met, place the world on a trajectory for a global mean warming of well over 3°C. Even if these pledges are fully implemented there is still about a 20 percent chance of exceeding 4°C in 2100.10 If these pledges are not met then there is a much higher likelihood—more than 40 percent—of warming exceeding 4°C by 2100, and a 10 percent possibility of this occurring already by the 2070s, assuming emissions follow the medium business-as-usual reference pathway. On a higher fossil fuel intensive business-as-usual pathway, such as the IPCC SRESA1FI, warming exceeds 4°C earlier in the 21st century. It is important to note, however, that such a level of warming can still be avoided. There are technically and economically feasible emission pathways that could still limit warming to 2°C or below in the 21st century. To illustrate a possible pathway to warming of 4°C or more, Figure 22 uses the highest SRES scenario, SRESA1FI, and compares it to other, lower scenarios. SRESA1FI is a fossil-fuel intensive, high economic growth scenario that would very likely cause mean the global temperature to exceed a 4°C increase above preindustrial temperatures. Most striking in Figure 22 is the large gap between the projections by 2100 of current emissions reduction pledges and the (lower) emissions scenarios needed to limit warming to 1.5–2°C above pre-industrial levels. This large range in the climate change implications of the emission scenarios by 2100 is important in its own right, but it also sets the stage for an even wider divergence in the changes that would follow over the subsequent centuries, given the long response times of the climate system, including the carbon cycle and climate system components that contribute to sea-level rise. The scenarios presented in Figure 22 indicate the likely onset time for warming of 4°C or more. It can be seen that most of the scenarios remain fairly close together for the next few decades of the 21st century. By the 2050s, however, there are substantial differences among the changes in temperature projected for the different scenarios. In the highest scenario shown here (SRES A1FI), the median estimate (50 percent chance) of warming reaches 4°C by the 2080s, with a smaller probability of 10 percent of exceeding this level by the 2060s. Others have reached similar conclusions (Betts et al. 2011). Thus, even if the policy pledges from climate convention in Copenhagen and Cancun are fully implemented, there is still a chance of exceeding 4°C in 2100. If the pledges are not met and present carbon intensity trends continue, then the higher emissions scenarios shown in Figure 22 become more likely, raising the probability of reaching 4°C global mean warming by the last quarter of this century. Figure 23 shows a probabilistic picture of the regional patterns of change in temperature and precipitation for the lowest and highest RCP scenarios for the AR4 generation of AOGCMS. Patterns are broadly consistent between high and low scenarios. The high latitudes tend to warm substantially more than the global mean. RCP8.5, the highest of the new IPCC AR5 RCP scenarios, can be used to explore the regional implications of a 4°C or warmer world. For this report, results for RCP8.5 (Moss et al. 2010) from the new IPCC AR5 CMIP5 (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project; Taylor, Stouffer, and Meehl 2012) climate projections have been analyzed. Figure 24 shows the full range of increase of global mean temperature over the 21st century, relative to the 1980–2000 period from 24 models driven by the RCP8.5 scenario, with those eight models highlighted that produce a mean warming of 4–5°C above preindustrial temperatures averaged over the period 2080–2100. In terms of regional changes, the models agree that the most pronounced warming (between 4°C and 10°C) is likely to occur over land. During the boreal winter, a strong “arctic amplification” effect is projected, resulting in temperature anomalies of over 10°C in the Arctic region. The subtropical region consisting of the Mediterranean, northern Africa and the Middle East and the contiguous United States is likely to see a monthly summer temperature rise of more than 6°C. Contention 2: Solvency "The United States of America cannot afford to bet our long-term prosperity and security on a resource that will eventually run out." n1 This dramatic quote from President Obama opens the White House's forty-four page Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future. n2 The resource referred to, oil, is indeed finite. "The output of conventional oil will peak in 2020," according to estimates from the chief economist for the International Energy Agency. n3 The transportation sector has increased its oil consumption over the past thirty years in the United States while residential, commercial, and electric utilities have decreased consumption. n4 Simply put, America's oil problem is an automobile problem. *173 There are a number of ways the U.S. transportation sector could reduce the amount of oil it consumes: raising vehicle fuel efficiency standards further; increasing and improving light rail and other public transportation options; building more walkable communities so daily errands could be made without using an automobile; encouraging people to live closer to where they work; and increasing the availability of electric cars. n5¶ Yet, even using all of these strategies comprehensively will not change a fundamental fact of our oil-based transportation system - in certain areas (like rural communities and outer suburbs) the automobile is essential for transportation, and liquid fuel is extremely convenient for automobiles. With a liquid fuel engine, a driver can "re-charge" his or her car in a few minutes with a substance that is widely available from Boston to Boise and everywhere in between. With the conveniences of oil, however, come costs. Oil is a finite resource, and its consumption pollutes the air and contributes to climate change. Furthermore, it is expensive n6 and will only get more expensive in the future. n7 However, any realistic plan for dealing with a future of reduced oil use must include liquid fuels that are similar in convenience and availability to gasoline, given the geography of the United States, the state of the current domestic transportation system, n8 and the ease of using liquid fuel for the personal automobile.¶ This does not mean, however, that corn-based ethanol, thus far the major liquid-fuel petroleum alternative pursued by the United States, is the best answer. While it has benefitted the Midwest economically, the domestic ethanol industry has also contributed to a number of negative environmental effects. There is, however, another liquid fuel option other than fossil-fuel based *174 gasoline and corn-based ethanol. The Obama Administration's energy plan includes a wide range of strategies to reduce U.S. fossil fuel consumption, yet one strategy is notably absent from the Blueprint: replacing a percentage of U.S. gasoline with ethanol imported from outside the United States. n9 A number of influential commentators, such as Thomas Friedman n10 and The Economist, n11 have called for the United States to encourage the importation of sugarcane-based ethanol from countries like Brazil. But the possibility of importing ethanol from Cuba has been largely ignored by influential opinion-makers as well as the United States government. n12 While by no means a silver bullet for solving the United States' energy problems, importing ethanol made from sugarcane grown in Cuba would bring a number of environmental and economic benefits - partially offset by regionalized economic harms - to the United States. This possibility, at the very least, deserves much greater consideration and evaluation than it has thus far received. And, joint ventures jumpstart the Cuban ethanol energy industry The rise of the price of oil above 80 USD/bbl. provides an incentive for the development of sugarcane bioenergy through both ethanol fuel production and surplus electricity surplus cogeneration in Cuba. Cuba's longstanding experience and expertise in sugar production and its sugar agro-industry infrastructure, its current neglect and mismanagement notwithstanding, put Cuba in a good position to become an important producer of sugar-based bioenergy.¶ Cuba's own acute energy and hard currency shortages further point to an incremental increase in sugarcane energy use as the country's first viable renewable energy source. No other source of renewable energy in Cuba has the potential that sugarcane has.¶ International experiences in developing sugarcane energy, particularly that of Brazil and to a lesser extent Mauritius, have demonstrated that the technological and environmental barriers to sugarcane energy production and use can be overcome. Aside from providing an alternative energy source to fossil fuels, sugarcane ethanol production and sugarcane biomass power generation have, in the face of an oversupply of sugar and low sugar prices, been promoted in several countries to save domestic sugar industries.¶ The main weakness to the introduction of ethanol fuel production and sugarcane biomass power generation in Cuba continues to be the lack of hard currency required to modernize Cuban sugar mills. The Cuban government has already utilized joint ventures with foreign natural gas, oil (in the case of the Caribbean offshore exploration mentioned previously) and nickel mining companies to secure the capital investment and technology needed to exploit its natural resources. The joint venture agreement for a recently constructed natural gas power plant could serve as a model for modernization of sugar bioenergy infrastructure. Under this agreement, the foreign partner owns a third of the plant's output, participates in the plant's management, and receives a proportion of the plant's profits. While the legal, institutional and political barriers to investment in Cuba are high, heavy recent foreign investments in sugar ethanol production facilities in Brazil suggest the feasibility of similar investments in Cuba.¶ Whether the modernization and recovery of the Cuban sugar agro-industry comes to pass is of course an open question. The authors offer no predictions. What has been argued though is that, despite the prolonged decline outlined above, the Cuban sugar industry nonetheless remains well-positioned to participate in the growing global movement toward the development of sugarcane as a viable alternative source of energy. B. Environmental Effects of Sugarcane-Based Ethanol¶ If future legislation does not revive the United States ethanol tariff that expired at the end of 2011 and the trade embargo against Cuba is kept in place, Brazil will likely be the primary beneficiary. n109 The argument can be made that Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol is a more environmentally beneficial fuel source than domestic-corn based ethanol, because of the nature of sugarcane-based ethanol (discussed below). n110 Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol comes, however, with its own set of environmental consequences.¶ The full debate over the environmental consequences of the Brazilian biofuel production n111 is largely beyond the scope of this Article. Still, the primary issue in this dispute is worth noting, because it accentuates one of the most significant differences between the U.S. corn-based ethanol industry and the potential Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry. In Brazil, the expansion of sugarcane production to meet demand for ethanol production has led to land use changes *190 that parallel the expansion of corn production for ethanol in the United States. Clearing portions of the Amazon rainforest - one of the most significant repositories of carbon on Earth n112 - would represent an environmental cost of ethanol production that outweighs its benefits. The Amazon region, however, is largely unsuitable for sugarcane production. n113 But, sugarcane production is contributing to destruction of another sensitive habitat, the bio-diverse Cerrado savannah region of Brazil. n114¶ Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would have the environmental benefits of Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol without its most obvious negative factor, damaging habitat in the Cerrado. The environmental effects of biofuels depend on a number of factors. Whether or not a given type of biofuel is environmentally beneficial "depends on what the fuel is, how and where the biomass was produced, what else the land could have been used for, how the fuel was processed and how it is used." n115 Taken together, these factors point to sugarcane-based ethanol grown in Cuba as one of the most environmentally friendly biofuels possible.¶ The environmental benefits of using sugarcane to produce ethanol are numerous. First, it is much more energy efficient to derive ethanol from sugarcane than corn. Making ethanol from corn only creates approximately 1.3 times the amount of energy used to produce it, but making ethanol from sugarcane creates approximately eight times the amount of energy used to produce it. n116 Second, unlike much of the corn presently grown in Great Plains states, sugarcane grown in Latin America does not need to be irrigated. n117 Third, sugarcane requires relatively small amounts of chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. n118 Fourth, whereas most U.S. ethanol refineries are powered by coal or natural gas, n119 sugarcane ethanol refineries can be powered by bagasse, a natural product left over from the sugar refining process. n120 In fact, refineries powered with bagasse can even produce more electricity than they need and sell *191 power back to the electric grid. n121 Fifth, although corn can only be planted and harvested once a year, in tropical climates sugarcane can be cut from the same stalks multiple times per year. n122¶ Each of these factors in favor of sugarcane ethanol is true of ethanol from Brazil as well as of any potential ethanol from Cuba. However, there are additional environmental factors that clinch Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol as one of the most environmentally friendly fuel sources available to the United States under current technology. n123 First, because Cuba is closer to the United States, transporting ethanol from Cuba to the United States would require less energy than transporting ethanol from Brazil to the United States (especially if it is used in Florida, an option further explored in the section on economic effects). n124¶ Another reason Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol could be one of the most environmentally friendly fuels possible is that Cuba could produce a significant amount of ethanol without any negative impacts on native habitat. A striking amount of Cuban agricultural land - fifty five percent as of 2007 - is simply lying fallow and is not cultivated with anything. n125 Although its character may have changed due to years of neglect, this land is not virgin native habitat like the grasslands of North Dakota or the Cerrado of Brazil. Cuba therefore could greatly increase its production of sugarcane, and thus its production of sugarcane-based ethanol, without negative impacts on wildlife habitat. While it is not environmentally perfect - no form of energy is - Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would raise fewer environmental concerns than the fuel sources it would displace: petroleum, domestic corn-based ethanol, and Brazilian sugarcane based ethanol. Therefore, from a purely environmental perspective, changing U.S. law and policy in order to promote the importation of Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol should be encouraged. | 10/18/13 |
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