Tournament: All | Round: 1 | Opponent: All | Judge: All
Cuban Oil Aff- Stratford Novice
1AC — Plan
The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement toward the Republic of Cuba on the issue of offshore oil drilling including coordinating engineering and safety protocols.
1AC — Oil Spills Advantage
Contention One: Oil Spills
First, status quo policy prevents effective cooperation with Cuba over oil spill prevention and response.
Peterson et al. 12 — Emily A. Peterson, Master of Public Policy Candidate at Duke University, Daniel J. Whittle, Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director at the Environmental Defense Fund, former Adjunct Law Professor of Environmental Law at Wake Forest University Law School, holds a J.D. from the University of Colorado, and Douglas N. Rader, Chief Oceans Scientist for the Environmental Defense Fund, holds a Ph.D. in Biology from the University of North Carolina and an M.S. in Zoology from the University of Washington, 2012 (“Bridging the Gulf: Finding Common Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba,” Report by the Environmental Defense Fund, Available Online at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf, Accessed 05-08-2013, p. v-vi)
Current U.S. foreign policy on Cuba creates a conspicuous blind spot that is detrimental to the interests of both countries. The United States government enacted stricter regulations governing deepwater drilling in U.S. waters in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and has publicly acknowledged a need to better prepare for a potential major spill in neighboring Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Yet U.S. policy still does not do enough to lessen the likelihood of such a spill or to ensure that sufficient resources will be at the ready to respond to a spill in a timely and effective manner. Beyond their geographical proximity, Cuba end page v and the United States are tightly interconnected by ocean currents and share ecosystems such that a spill in either country could have profound impacts on fisheries, tourism, and recreation in the entire region. Yet, due to longstanding U.S. economic sanctions, international operators working in Cuba are unable to turn northward to the United States to freely access equipment and expertise in the event of an oil disaster.
Second, a Cuban oil spill is likely — but the status quo forecloses an effective response.
Piñon and Muse 10 — Jorge R. Piñon, Associate Director of The University of Texas at Austin Jackson School of Geoscience’s Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy, Advisor and Member of the Cuba Task Forces at The Brookings Institution and the Council of the Americas, holds a degree in Economics and a certificate in Latin American Studies from the University of Florida, and Robert L. Muse, lawyer in Washington, D.C. with substantial experience in U.S. laws relating to Cuba, has testified on legal issues involving Cuba before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Standing Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and the External Economic Relations Committee of the European Parliament, 2010 (“Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba Environmental Cooperation is Critical,” Brookings Institution U.S.-Cuba Relations Issue Brief No. 2, May, Available Online at http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/28688/1/Coping20with20the20Next20Oil20Spill20-20Why20US-Cuba20Environmental20Cooperation20is20Critical.pdf?1, Accessed 05-07-2013, p. 1)
The sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and the resulting discharge of millions of gallons of crude oil into the sea demonstrated graphically the challenge of environmental protection in the ocean waters shared by Cuba and the United States.
While the quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result of the latest calamity, it is unlikely to stop. It came as little surprise, for example, that Repsol recently announced plans to move forward with exploratory oil drilling in Cuban territorial waters later this year.1
As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves, the consequence to the United States of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the actual. The sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and proactive planning by Washington and Havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important is the planning necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising from this country’s oil industry that, through the action of currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines.
While Washington is working to prevent future disasters in U.S. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its current policies foreclose the ability to respond effectively to future oil disasters—whether that disaster is caused by companies at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies operating in U.S. waters.
Third, a Cuban spill won’t be contained — ocean currents magnify the impact of delays.
Bert and Clayton 12 — Melissa Bert, Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Chief of the Maritime and International Law Division at the U.S. Coast Guard, former Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Florida International University, holds a Command and Staff degree in strategic studies from the Naval War College and degrees from the Coast Guard Academy and the George Washington University Law School, graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and George Washington University Law, and Blake Clayton, Fellow for Energy and National Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, former lecturer in finance and economics at the Oxford University Programme for Undergraduate Studies and researcher at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, holds a doctorate in business economics and strategy from Oxford University, 2012 (“Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Brookings Institution Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 15, March 7th, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515, Accessed 05-07-2013)
A Chinese-built semisubmersible oil rig leased by Repsol, a Spanish oil company, arrived in Cuban waters in January 2012 to drill Cuba’s first exploratory offshore oil well. Early estimates suggest that Cuban offshore oil and natural gas reserves are substantial—somewhere between five billion and twenty billion barrels of oil and upward of eight billion cubic feet of natural gas. Although the United States typically welcomes greater volumes of crude oil coming from countries that are not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a surge in Cuban oil production would complicate the United States’ decades-old effort to economically isolate the Castro regime.
Deepwater drilling off the Cuban coast also poses a threat to the United States. The exploratory well is seventy miles off the Florida coast and lies at a depth of 5,800 feet. The failed Macondo well that triggered the calamitous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 had broadly similar features, situated forty-eight miles from shore and approximately five thousand feet below sea level. A spill off Florida’s coast could ravage the state’s $57 billion per year tourism industry.
Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba’s unseasoned oil industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba’s offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.
Fourth, a spill would devastate the marine environment, threatening endangered species.
Kozloff 10 — Nikolas Kozloff, holds a doctorate in Latin American history from Oxford University, 2010 (“Left Must Fine Tune Its Position on Cuba Embargo in Light of Oil Spill,” Mongabay, May 26th, Available Online at http://print.news.mongabay.com/2010/0526-kozloff_cuba.html, Accessed 05-08-2013)
From an environmental point of view, the prospect of offshore oil development going forward is not something to be taken lightly. Cuba is the most biologically diverse of all Caribbean islands and sports spectacular white sand beaches, vast coral reefs, and a wide range of fish populations. Cuba’s coastline and mangroves serve as breeding grounds for hundreds of species of fish as well as other marine organisms. Ocean currents carry important fish larvae from Cuba into U.S. waters, which in turn help to replenish ailing American fisheries.
The U.S. and Cuba share an ancient deepwater coral system stretching all the way up to North Carolina. In addition, Cuba has more than 4,000 islets which support important reef fish such as grouper. The islets also support sea turtles, dolphins and manatees the latter already in danger as a result of BP’s oil spill as I recently pointed out. Crucially important, the islets serve as refuges for endangered species.
If that was not enough reason to press the pause button on offshore oil, consider the plight of Caribbean birds. In recent days, the U.S. public has been subjected to the tragic spectacle of oiled pelicans in the Gulf. If oil production reaches Cuba we could have further disasters since important populations of North American migratory birds spend much of the year on the Caribbean island.
Fifth, this is particularly problematic in Cuba — it’s a biodiversity hotspot.
CEPF 10 — Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (“Ecosystem Profile: THE CARIBBEAN ISLANDS BIODIVERSITY HOTSPOT,” Prepared for CEPF by BirdLife International in collaboration with: Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust, Bath University, The New York Botanical Garden, January 15, 2010, Available Online: http://www.cepf.net/Documents/Final_Caribbean_EP.pdf, Accessed: 08/29/2013)
The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is one of the world’s greatest centers of biodiversity and endemism, yet its biodiversity and the natural services it provides are highly threatened. Although the islands have protected areas systems, most are inadequately managed and important areas lack protection. This strategy will ensure that CEPF funds are employed in the most effective manner and generate significant conservation results that not only complement the actions of other stakeholders but also enable significant expansion of strategic conservation for the benefit of all. Everyone depends on Earth’s ecosystems and their life-sustaining benefits, such as clean air, fresh water and healthy soils. Founded in 2000, the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF) has become a global leader in enabling civil society to participate in and benefit from conserving some of the world’s most critical ecosystems. CEPF is a joint initiative of l'Agence Française de Développement, Conservation International, the Global Environment Facility, the Government of Japan, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the World Bank. As one of the founding partners, Conservation International administers the global program through a CEPF Secretariat. CEPF provides grants for nongovernmental and other private organizations to help protect biodiversity hotspots, Earth’s most biologically rich and threatened areas. The convergence of critical areas for conservation with millions of people who are impoverished and highly dependent on healthy ecosystems is more evident in the hotspots than anywhere else. CEPF is unique among funding mechanisms in that it focuses on biological areas rather than political boundaries and examines conservation threats on a landscape-scale basis. A fundamental purpose of CEPF is to ensure that civil society is engaged in efforts to conserve biodiversity in the hotspots, and to this end, CEPF provides civil society with an agile and flexible funding mechanism complementing funding currently available to government agencies. CEPF promotes working alliances among community groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government, academic institutions and the private sector, combining unique capacities and eliminating duplication of efforts for a comprehensive approach to conservation. CEPF targets trans-boundary cooperation for areas rich of biological value that straddle national borders or in areas where a regional approach may be more effective than a national approach. A recent, updated analysis reveals the existence of 34 biodiversity hotspots, each holding at least 1,500 endemic plant species, and having lost at least 70 percent of its original habitat extent (Mittermeier et al. 2005). The Caribbean islands qualify as one of these global biodiversity hotspots by virtue of their high endemicity and high degree of threat. The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is exceptionally important for global biodiversity conservation. The hotspot includes important ecosystems, from montane cloud forests to coral reefs, and supports populations of unique species amounting to at least 2 percent of the world’s total species.
Finally, the collapse of ocean biodiversity causes extinction — ocean health is vital to the survival of the entire biosphere.
Craig 3 — Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003 (“Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii,” McGeorge Law Review (34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155), Winter, Available Online via Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life.
Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. *265
Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860
Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness.
However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world.
We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.
1AC — U.S.-Venezuela Relations Advantage
Contention Two: U.S.-Venezuela Relations
First, U.S.-Venezuelan relations are weak — increased economic ties are vital to overcome antagonism.
O’Neil 13 — Shannon K. O’Neil, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a B.A. from Yale University, an M.A. in International Relations from Yale University, and a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2013 (“New Era for U.S.-Venezuela Relations?,” Council on Foreign Relations—originally published by the BBC, March 6th, Available Online at http://shannononeil.com/blog/new-era-for-u-s-venezuela-relations/, Accessed 09-11-2013)
The U.S.-Venezuela relationship has been characterized over the past decade by public spats and outlandish statements, but it was not always so hostile. When Chavez was elected in 1998, interactions between the two countries were cordial; Chavez even traveled to Washington to meet then-President Bill Clinton. But the relations soon headed downhill.
In 2002 Chavez accused the U.S. of supporting the coup that briefly ousted him from power, as U.S. officials were quick to welcome the transition. In 2005 bilateral counter-narcotics operations ended. Since then American spokespersons have criticized Venezuelan officials for their involvement in the drug trade, skewering the country in annual drug reports and freezing the assets of at least seven current or former Venezuelan officials.
The bad blood was immortalized in Chavez’s 2006 United Nations speech when he theatrically referred to then-President George Bush as the devil, commenting on the distinct smell of sulphur that remained at the podium.
In 2010, Chavez declared then-Ambassador Patrick Duddy persona non grata, marking the last time that the U.S. had an ambassadorial presence in Venezuela (but not the last time the two countries have expelled diplomatic personnel).
With Chavez’s death, some have hoped for a change in the US-Venezuela relationship. But just because Chavez is gone it doesn’t mean the tensions in bilateral relations will ease. The U.S. is too useful and tempting a foil for papering over internal disagreements in Chavez’s party and for rallying loyal supporters for the upcoming presidential election to expect any abrupt change. Heir apparent and now interim President Nicolas Maduro’s speech right before Chavez’s death shows this. In it he expelled two U.S. diplomats and even accused the U.S. of causing Chavez’s cancer.
But in the longer term, trade, commercial relations and personal ties could shift U.S.-Venezuelan relations for the better. First and foremost are the economic ties between the two nations. Despite the rhetorical animosity of the last decade, trade continued. The U.S. remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil—some 40 percent percent of Venezuelan oil exports (and oil makes up over 90 percent of the country’s total exports). In turn, the U.S. has continued to send machinery and cars, and even increased exports of natural gas and petroleum products to the South American nation.
The hard currency and goods are vital to the functioning of Venezuela’s economy, government and society, and may become even more so through the anticipated tough economic times ahead.
Second, U.S.-Venezuelan relations are critical to overall U.S.-Latin American relations.
Delahunt 12 — William Delahunt, chairman of the Venezuela-US Friendship Group and former U.S. Representative (“A new role for the US and Venezuela,” Boston Globe, October 30, 2012, Available Online: http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/10/30/podium-venezuela/EJ6Jd2yRKfaJ76HYrXb4WJ/story.html, Accessed: 08/29/2013)
The recent election in Venezuela offers an opportunity to improve the US-Venezuela bilateral relationship. On Oc. 7th, President Hugo Chavez was reelected to a new six-year term by a nine point margin. I — along with hundreds of other international witnesses — was duly impressed with the transparency of the electoral process and the enthusiasm of Venezuelans for democracy. Eighty-one percent percent of registered voters went to the polls! This turnout was remarkable when compared to the United States and other “mature” democracies.
Whether or not one agrees with Chávez’s policies, there can be no doubt that he won these elections fairly. There are so many checks and balances in the electoral system in Venezuela that there is virtually no room for fraud. The voter registry, the voting machines, the electronic ballot and the data transmission system are all fully audited by representatives of all the different political parties and independent observers.
Former President Jimmy Carter recently called the Venezuelan voting system “the best in the world.” He noted that the voting machines print out a paper receipt that voters can look at to verify that their selection was recorded correctly, and poll workers check those receipts against the electronic tally.
I was particularly struck by the atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual respect in the voting centers, where monitors from both pro-government and opposition groups were present. In contrast with elections past, the two main candidates manifested a similar attitude. Once the election authorities announced the results, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles rapidly conceded defeat, and he quickly scolded “radical” opposition supporters who insisted on alleging that fraud had taken place, despite no evidence to support their claims. Chávez also behaved gracefully, calling Capriles the following day to express his willingness to work together to mitigate the polarization that divided Venezuelans.
Most of Venezuela’s political leadership — following a tumultuous power struggle, during which a coup d’Etat and violent protests occurred — appear to have accepted to follow the democratic rulebook and be more tolerant of one another. This is an important step forward, and the United States should encourage Venezuelans to continue seeking common ground, rather than support one group over another, as has at times been the case in recent years.
Most importantly, over 55 percent of Venezuelan voters cast their vote in favor of Chávez. The United States should respect this outcome and seek to improve relations in areas where we can agree. Commercial relations between our two countries have generally been excellent, despite political differences, and both countries would greatly benefit from their expansion.
Venezuela will no doubt continue to play a central role in the region’s new multilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Central American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The United States, which has increasingly found itself isolated in regional forums, would do well to find ways to work with these new groups on important issues such as drug trafficking and energy cooperation. Improved relations with Venezuela would greatly facilitate this task.
Our government will certainly have important differences with Venezuela, particularly in the area of international relations. But we can agree to disagree, as we do with many other partners throughout the world. I am convinced that the Venezuelan government is prepared to respond favorably to such an initiative.
Third, strong U.S.-Latin American relations are vital to address a wide range of impacts including economic growth, climate change, proliferation, democracy, and human rights.
Bachelet et al. 12 — Michelle Bachelet, former President of Chile, head of UN Women, and Carla A. Hills, Co-chair of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, served as United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under President Ford and as a U.S. Trade Representative under President Bush, co-chairs of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum of the Inter-American Dialogue—a non-partisan, 100-member group of politicians, academics, business leaders, and others from the United States and Latin America, et al., 2012 (“Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” Report of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum of the Inter-American Dialogue, April, Available Online at http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, Accessed 05-20-2013, p. 3-4)
There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties.
Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance. For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human rights. With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership. end page 3
Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing. If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart. The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation. Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.
Finally, the plan kick starts ties with Venezuela — logistics, refining capacity and regional cooperation.
Benjamin-Alvarado 10 — Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Professor of Political Science and Assistant Director of the Office of Latino/Latin American Studies at the University of Nebraska–Omaha, Senior Research Associate of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, 2010 (“Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Engagement: Findings and Recommendations,” Cuba's Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, Edited by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Published by the Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 0815704593, Available Online through Google Books, Accessed 08-29-2013, p. 122)
U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium. The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives, diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions that create commercial and trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba.
1AC — Solvency
First, lifting restrictions on energy development will spur substantial investment — American companies want the plan.
Benjamin-Alvarado 10 — Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Professor of Political Science and Assistant Director of the Office of Latino/Latin American Studies at the University of Nebraska–Omaha, Senior Research Associate of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, 2010 (“Prospects for U.S.-Cuban Energy Engagement: Findings and Recommendations,” Cuba's Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, Edited by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Published by the Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 0815704593, Available Online through Google Books, Accessed 08-29-2013, p. 125-126)
There are numerous areas in the energy sector in which the United States and Cuba can and should cooperate: exploration, energy production, downstream operations, transportation, and auxiliary services. In addition, the opportunity for U.S. firms to invest directly in the development of Cuban energy resources should be created. Recent history shows that Cuba possesses the potential to be a strong regional trade partner in the area of energy and infrastructure development. It might be premature for U.S. firms to begin opening branch offices along Avenida Quinta in the Miramar district of Havana, but it is rational to consider the benefits that would be drawn from the expansion of trade and cooperation between Cuba and the United States in energy development. There will be obvious limitations on such investment opportunities because of the empresa mixta joint-venture model that the Cuban government employs, but as previously stated, international oil companies are not averse to adjusting their investment models to specific market conditions, and in the case of Cuba it would be no different. In fact, there has been no lack of interest on the part of American international oil firms in developing a Cuban market. The prevailing Cuban model of joint-venture investment and cooperation has proved to be attractive internationally, and there are numerous opportunities in this area for American firms as soon as there are significant changes in the Cuban embargo so that this type of engagement can occur.
Second, the plan makes Cuban offshore drilling safe — licensing, information sharing, joint exercises, and scientific exchanges are needed to effectively prepare for a spill.
Piñon and Muse 10 — Jorge R. Piñon, Associate Director of The University of Texas at Austin Jackson School of Geoscience’s Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy, Advisor and Member of the Cuba Task Forces at The Brookings Institution and the Council of the Americas, holds a degree in Economics and a certificate in Latin American Studies from the University of Florida, and Robert L. Muse, lawyer in Washington, D.C. with substantial experience in U.S. laws relating to Cuba, has testified on legal issues involving Cuba before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Standing Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and the External Economic Relations Committee of the European Parliament, 2010 (“Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba Environmental Cooperation is Critical,” Brookings Institution U.S.-Cuba Relations Issue Brief No. 2, May, Available Online at http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/28688/1/Coping20with20the20Next20Oil20Spill20-20Why20US-Cuba20Environmental20Cooperation20is20Critical.pdf?1, Accessed 05-07-2013, p. 3-4)
The appropriate place for U.S. policymakers to begin is with an expedited identification of all current regulatory prohibitions on the transfer of the U.S. equipment, technology and personnel to Cuba that will be needed to combat an oil spill—whether it originates there or here. Once identified, those regulations should be rescinded or amended, as required.
In particular, the Obama Administration should complete the following actions as soon as possible:
- Proactive licensing by the Department of Commerce of temporary exports to Cuba of any U.S. equipment and technology necessary to emergency oil flow suppression, spill containment and clean-up. Examples include the licensing of submersibles and ROVs (remote operated vehicles), as well as booms and chemical dispersants.
2. The pre-approval of licenses for travel to Cuba by qualified U.S. citizens to contribute to emergency relief and clean-up efforts. For example, petroleum engineers, environmental specialists and others should be authorized for such travel.
3. Plans should be made for providing Cuba with the most up-to-date information, including satellite imagery and predictive models, to assess the potential impact of an oil disaster and to prepare for the worst eventualities.
4. The U.S. should hold joint exercises with Cuba to coordinate emergency responses, the deployment of resources and the identification of the specialized oil well technologies and clean-up equipment that will be needed to be shipped to Cuba in the event of an oil spill. end page 3
5. The U.S. should encourage and facilitate scientific exchanges at both government and NGO levels that will identify the nature and sequencing of effective responses to a marine disaster and the mitigation of environmental harm.
The President should also instruct the Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) and NOAA to meet with Cuban lead agencies such as the Transport Ministry’s Dirección de Seguridad e inspección Marítima, and the Science, Technology and Environment Ministry’s agencia del Medio ambiente. The goal of such meetings should be a bilateral agreement on the protocols of cooperation needed to respond quickly and effectively to any incident that threatens either country’s marine and coastal habitats.
The Obama Administration should also facilitate immediate cooperation between U.S. and Cuban academic and scientific institutions. For example, Texas AandM University’s Harte Research Institute (HRI) for Gulf of Mexico Studies has a long history of promoting a tri-national approach to understanding the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem of the United States, Mexico and Cuba. Among their most recent projects is the Proyecto Costa Noroccidental, a comprehensive multi-year research and conservation program for Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico Coast undertaken in cooperation with the University of Havana’s Center for Marine Research.
Another valuable resource available to the Administration is the Environmental Defense Fund which has worked on a number of projects with Cuba’s Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment in order to develop cooperative projects and workshops to restore depleted shark populations, protect shallow and deepwater coral reefs, and manage vulnerable coastal ecosystems such as mangroves and sea grasses.
In conclusion, it is worth underscoring that the President should use his executive authority to authorize the above recommended actions now, rather than in the context of an improvised response to a cataclysmic environmental disaster. Should the Obama Administration fail to act, then Congress should consider passing legislation authorizing the provision by U.S. citizens and companies to Cuba of the relief and reconstruction supplies and services necessary to respond to a marine disaster in that country’s waters and on its shores.
Third, Cuba welcomes U.S. engagement — the plan solves in the short-term through information sharing and technology sharing.
Lanier 13 — C. Adam Lanier, J.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina School of Law, holds a B.A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013 (“In Deepwater: Cuba, Offshore Drilling, and Political Brinkmanship,” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. and Com. Reg. 571), Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
A. Domestic Policy Change
- Immediate Steps the United States Should Take
Cuba is receptive to the idea of U.S. investment, especially when it comes to offshore drilling. n151 Because the United States is near the drill site and has significant experience with deepwater drilling, there is a substantial economic interest in allowing private companies to engage in Cuba's drilling efforts. n152 It is also important to consider the economic impact of a spill. For *596 example, the Florida Reef Tract - the world's third-largest barrier reef - generates approximately $ 2 billion in revenue each year from tourism. n153 This makes up only a fraction of the tourism dollars that Florida receives each year, yet it supplies the state with 33,000 jobs. n154 Considering the economic benefits and environmental security that would result from the United States being actively involved in Cuba's drilling efforts, it makes sense to lift the economic restrictions in a manner provided by the Western Hemisphere Energy Security Act. n155
To take advantage of this engagement with the Cuban government, the United States should develop a framework for information-sharing between the two governments. The Center for Democracy in the Americas suggests that "comprehensive information sharing with the Cuban government be standard operating procedure." n156 This information-sharing could include conducting joint workshops and conferences on issues of mutual interest, such as offshore drilling, drug trafficking, and immigration. It has also been suggested that information-sharing include technology sharing. n157 Technology sharing could include sharing oil spill mapping software with Cuba and providing it with subsea oil spill response technology, such as dispersants. Finally, U.S. regulatory agencies should engage their Cuban counterparts on a regular basis rather than attempting to channel all information-sharing through the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. n158