Tournament: Note | Round: Finals | Opponent: You | Judge: Me
Cuba Oil Aff
1AC Inherency
Contention One: Inherency – The status quo system is broken.
a. The embargo on Cuba is an outdated relic of the Cold War. It hasn’t worked to force change on the Island and is inhibiting US interests. Specifically, the embargo prevents efforts to explore and access Cuban oil.
BMI 13 – (Business Model International, “Cuba,” Americas Oil and Gas, August 2013, Issue 87, Proquest)Bwang
Problems in acquiring rigs underscore the challenges facing nascent exploration in Cuba on the back of continued US trade embargoes and sanctions. The restrictions prevent operators in the country from securing equipment from the US. As a result, firms are required to import goods from further afar, which according to some estimates adds an additional 20 to exploration expenses, which are already steep giving the depth and geology. Current regulations prohibit the involvement of US companies and use of equipment with more than 10 US content.
The US embargo prevents successful Cuban oil development
Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)
But why has Sherritt succeeded when the perception on the part of many American observers has been that Cubans are difficult and mercurial partners? Sherritt Oil is a medium sized firm with medium sized aspirations that simultaneously seeks to produce a reasonable return on investment for its ventures in Cuba while operating a commercial enterprise that is working within a country in dire need of reliable energy sources that operates under the strictures of a command economy.8¶ This perhaps explains why Sherritt has been successful where others failed. The terms of “doing business” in Cuba are often too severe for conventional profit-seeking firms, but in this case, Sherritt appears to have altered its basis for success to coordinate its objectives with those available under the prevailing Cuban joint venture model. The Spanish oil firm, Repsol spent $53 million in oil and gas exploration in 2004 and came up with nothing and yet has contracted to continue exploration of 8 offshore tracks on the northwest coast of Cuba.9¶ It is also interesting that all, of the firms operating in Cuba at the present time are operating with dated technology and must be able to service all of its own exploration operations. This owes in part to the fact that American oil engineering represents the leading edge of oil exploration technology and explicit in all of its foreign sales are export control stipulations that none of that technology can be sold or transferred to a short but well known list of countries: Iraq; North Korea; until recently Libya; and of course, Cuba. This proscription adds up to 30 percent to the operating costs that what is still for Sherritt, and other joint venture partners, a profit making venture. Sherritt must also account for being largely responsible for providing all engineering support services as Cuba provides few of these services owing to the denial of technology on the part of the U.S. ¶ On this point, the U.S. embargo has been successful in relegating Cuba’s energy development schemes to a less than world class status. Moreover, it appears to have had a residual effect – as not to appear to be suffering from a technology gap, Cuba pursues upstream investment, such as the purchase of three drilling rigs from the Chinese for symbolic as well as practical reasons.10 Legitimately, given the existing resources on the island and interest from oil and gas exploration firms from Europe, Latin America and Canada, and especially because of Cuba’s cozy relationship with oil-rich Venezuela it is perhaps a questionable investment. American oil industry experts suggest that for a small country like Cuba, it could derive a greater benefit from investment in oil infrastructure such as pipelines, terminals, batteries, etc. These are the types of services essential to oil production and serve as revenue generating sources long after the reverie of an oil find. In an inherently risk driven industry it makes better sense for a small relatively resource constrained state to pursue this course of energy investment.
1AC Significant Harms Options
Observation Two: Significant Harms –
If the status quo continues, we will face serious and significant consequences. We will isolate (_ ) impacts that become advantages to voting affirmative.
1AC Advantage – Relations
Advantage _: Relations Run this
a. The US-Cuban relationship is at a crossroads – Chavez’ death means now is the key time to restore relations.
Gomez 13 – assistant professor in the Department of Public Policy and Administration at Rutgers University (Eduardo J. Gomez, “Ahmadinejad's hug and the future of Chavez's alliance” CNN, March 13 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/13/opinion/gmez-chavez-ahmadinejad-america) MR
Chávez's death is certainly changing the political calculus in Venezuela, but will it also result in a broader shift that could realign much of Latin America and affect attitudes toward, and relationships with, the United States? The answer is likely "yes." First, the grouping of nations previously opposing the United States under Chávez's leftist alliance -- namely the "Alba" alliance, comprised of Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia -- could well wither away, due to Venezuela's ongoing recession and fears that alliance members will no longer have Venezuela's financial backing. When combined with reports of Chávez's expressed desire to strengthen ties with the Obama administration, regional hostility towards the United States may decline. Since assuming office in 1999, Chávez viewed Washington as an oppressive force manipulating Latin American politics while keeping the region underdeveloped through its dependence on U.S. resources. In response, Chávez approached like-minded leaders to build a coalition challenging the regional influence of the United States. By 2005, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, Honduras and Ecuador joined Chávez's coalition, which led to the formation of the Bolivian Alliance of the Americas, also known as Alba. Alba served as an alternative to the Free Trade Act of the Americas, with an explicit focus on poverty reduction, but it also facilitated the unification of these nations in their anti-American sentiments . With Chávez gone, however, there may be no one left who has the clout to keep financing this alliance. Venezuela is Alba's largest financier, contributing millions in aid to its members as well as oil at low prices. But Venezuelans may believe that with ongoing poverty and inequality, their country's needs are more important than those of Chávez's small club of nations. This situation worries Alba members. According to Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, while Bolivia and Ecuador are independently wealthy and not financially dependent on Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua are. Cuba receives roughly 100,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil a day, while Venezuela accounted for $8.3 billion of Cuba's $20 billion in foreign trade in 2011. Chávez also paid approximately $6 billion annually for 40,000 Cuban doctors and nurses, according to Reuters. Cuban citizens fear that Chávez's death will push them back to the days of the post-Cold War recession, when Russia gradually withdrew its funding for Cuba. Meanwhile, Nicaragua has received approximately $500 million a year in loans and oil credits, increasing to $609 million in 2011, while earnings from agricultural exports to Venezuela increased from $2 million in 2006 to $300 million in 2011. But alliance members also realize that they have options. Nicaragua's economic minister, Bayardo Arce, recently stated that it's time to diversify Nicaragua's economic relations with China, Europe and the United States, mainly because Nicaragua has "to anticipate that Alba is not going to be permanent." Cuba may also seek to strengthen its relations with Brazil, its second-largest trade partner in the region. In fact, both governments already have plans to engage in several trade and infrastructure projects and are ramping up trade, mainly in sugar exports. Ecuador and Nicaragua are working more closely with Brazil in helping to construct hydroelectric energy plants and chemical industries, respectively. In addition to strong economic growth rates, Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff's policy commitments to the poor and enhanced control over key economic sectors, such as oil, may provide a more appealing leftist model. In recent years, Chávez was also interested in improving relations with the United States. He saw President Obama's re-election victory as an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic ties. Chávez once commented: "I wish we could begin a new period of normal relations." Chávez was so committed to this endeavor that even from his hospital in Cuba, he authorized his second in command, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, to start negotiating with the U.S. State Department. While it may seem that Maduro may have a difficult time working with the United States, considering his accusations that the United States has historically plotted against Venezuela and the recent removal of U.S. diplomats from Caracas, it appears that this was mainly done to gain the trust of Chávez political supporters in order to secure Maduro's position as the next president. U.S. diplomatic officials view Maduro as a pragmatist and the fact that he was supportive of initiating closer ties with the United States last year suggests that this could continue, especially in light of Venezuela's economic troubles and the need to increase revenues through trade. Chávez's passing should motivate the United States to seek a new partnership with Venezuela. First, Secretary of State John Kerry should reopen the U.S. embassy in Caracas, which has been closed since 2010, while assigning diplomats who are committed to engaging in peaceful dialogue and political and economic cooperation. Second, Kerry should take this opportunity to strengthen cooperation over issues that can provide mutual benefits in the areas of national security and the economy, such as counternarcotics, counterterrorism, as well as sustaining oil trade: the United States currently imports just under 1 million barrels a day from Venezuela. But the United States should also see this situation as an opportunity to strengthen its ties with other nations, such as Cuba. With the likely decline in economic assistance to Cuba from Venezuela, Cuban President Raul Castro may consider stepping up negotiations with the Obama administration over the U.S. embargo, human rights and the release of American prisoners, such as Alan Gross. Chávez is gone, but the United States' commitment to peaceful democratic relations persists. Going forward, the United States should explore ways of strengthening its ties with Venezuela and other Latin American nations.
b. The plan allows for US-Cuban energy cooperation—spurs broader relations
Benjamin 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”
Conclusion and Recommendations
Oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise; there are always trade-offs between negatives and positives relating to energy security, environmental integrity, and geostrategic considerations. The consensus arising from the studies and the analyses in this book is that the creation of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the United States and Cuba is long overdue. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Cuban infrastructure and economic development were direct beneficiaries of commercial relations with the United States. This relationship was instrumental in providing Cuba with access to advanced technologies and the signs of modernity that were unparalleled in Latin America and far beyond.¶ Once again, the United States is presented with an opportunity that might serve as the basis of a new relationship between the United States and Cuba. It holds out the possibility of enhancing the stability and development of a region that is wrestling with questions of how and when it too might benefit from engagement with a global economic development model. The question is whether the United States chooses to be at the center, or to leave Cuba to seek some alternate path toward its goals.¶ Ironically, Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil, oil equipment, and service companies possess the capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of our almost five-decades-old unilateral political and economic embargo. The United States can end this impasse by licensing American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources. By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the United States will be strategically positioned to play an important role in the future of the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and democratic future. The creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector will bolster state capacity in Cuba while enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests, and can help Cuba’s future leaders avoid illicit business practices, minimize the influence of narcotrafficking enterprises, and stanch the outflow of illegal immigrants to the United States.¶ If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), it will give the United States the opportunity to engage Cuba’s future leaders to carry out long-overdue economic reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a more open and representative society while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region and beyond.¶ Under no circumstances is this meant to suggest that the United States should come to dominate energy development policy in Cuba. The United States certainly has a role to play, but unlike its past relationship with Cuba, its interaction and cooperation will be predicated on its ability to accept, at a minimum, that Cuba will be the dominant partner in potential commercial ventures, and an equal partner in future diplomatic and interstate relations. Without a doubt Cuban government actors are wary of the possibility of being dominated by the “colossus of the North,” but as Cuba’s energy policymakers face the daunting reality of their nation’s energy future, it is abundantly clear that they possess the willingness and the capacity to assiduously pursue sound policy objectives and initiatives that begin to address the island’s immediate and long-term challenges. In the end, this course of action will have direct and tangible benefits for the people of Cuba, it neighbors, and beyond.
c. Strong US-Cuban relations solves US influence in Latin America and stops Chinese encroachment
Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)
Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry. ¶ To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3¶ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.
d. Chinese influence in Latin America causes Taiwan war
Fergusson 12 Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business Times, Former Conference and Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/
Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the ’China seat’ to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,” 51 highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘Taiwan issue’ unilaterally. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” 53 Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts and Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. 54¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” 55 the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” 56 the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” 57 This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” 58 further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.
e. Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear---no defense
Lowther 3/16 William, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”
1AC Advantage – Cuban Economy
Advantage _: The Cuban Economy
a. Cuba’s economy is on the verge of collapse – Venezuela is going to cut Cuba off from their cheap oil.
Keppel 3/16 (Stephen, ABC News, “What Chávez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the U.S.” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuela-us/story?id=18669003)
Upon hearing news of the death of Hugo Chávez, scores of Venezuelans gathered in cautious celebration in Doral, a South Florida community with the highest concentration of Venezuelans outside Venezuela. They are hoping that Chávez's passing will bring about change in their homeland.¶ Others in the region were not as happy.¶ Sure Chávez was politically influential in Latin America, but in many ways his economic influence was even greater — especially with friendly countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia and a score of Caribbean nations that benefited from Venezuela's oil-discount program, PetroCaribe.¶ In the name of "economic solidarity," Chávez was extremely generous with these friends, offering oil at discounted rates and with flexible lending conditions. Nicaragua, for example, was known to pay for Venezuelan oil with shipments of beef, sugar, coffee, milk and even 19,000 pairs of pants.¶ According to figures from the state-owned oil company PDVSA, in 2011 Venezuela sent 243,500 barrels of oil a day (or around 8 percent of its production) to 16 countries across Latin America.¶ Yet the absence of Chávez and the potential drawdown of economic support would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political consultants and other "professionals."¶ That's because Chávez had a special relationship with Cuba and the Castros. His relationships with other presidents were also often very personal. That approach may be difficult to sustain in his absence. Even if Nicolas Maduro, Chávez's chosen replacement, wins the upcoming election, he will be more susceptible to domestic pressure to reduce Venezuela's foreign aid, given all the economic challenges at home.¶ The Cubans have bad memories of the ending of Soviet patronage in the 1990s and are right to be worried about what the death of Chávez may bring.¶ Where will Cuba turn this time if Venezuelan aid dries up? Maybe the United States. That doesn't mean the U.S. government, however. Rather, Cuba would likely turn to the nearly two million Cubans living in this country. They are already sending around $2 billion a year back to the island in remittances. Already, Raul Castro seems to have been preparing to make the Cuban economy a little bit more flexible and open to investment, and the Obama administration has made it easier for Cubans in the U.S. to send money back home.¶ Which brings us to Venezuela's financial situation. The truth is the economic state there has been uncertain and chaotic ever since Chavez got sick, and that is unlikely to change in the short term. There is supposed to be a new election, and it appears that Maduro will win. But he will face a tough economic situation. Plus, he lacks the charisma of Chávez and may not be able to maintain popularity if things get tougher.
b. The plan solves Cuba’s oil dependence problem and builds revenue for political reforms.
Pinon 11 – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU. Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)"casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964_Hemisphere_Vol._20.pdf
If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take between three and five years to develop them fully. Production volumes would have to reach more than 200,000 barrels per day to have the same positive economic impact currently derived from foreign oil subsidies. If this occurs, significant revenues from oil, natural gas and sugarcane ethanol would integrate Cuba into global and regional markets within the next five years.¶ International oil companies such as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil Norsk Hydro and Brazil’s Petrobras are actively exploring Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban authorities have invited United States oil companies to participate in developing the island’s offshore oil and natural gas resources, but US law does not allow this.¶ Although US oil, oil equipment and service companies have the capital, technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine Cuba’s potential reserves in a safe and responsible manner, the almost five-decade old unilateral political and economic embargo keeps them on the sidelines.¶ Cuba currently relies on heavily subsidized oil from Venezuela for two-thirds of its petroleum needs. This supply contributes to the Cuban government’s ability to maintain a politically antagonistic and belligerent position towards the US.¶ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Cuba aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of depending on a single source of imported oil. Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore hydrocarbon resources, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an 18-month oil exploration drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves.¶ US support of such endeavors would be beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize or avoid an environmental disaster.¶ To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill.¶ The United States and Cuba are already parties to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to another’s. The United States, therefore, must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two countries as part of any oil spill response.¶ The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following an oil spill.¶ Cuba’s long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the island’s environment. The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States.
c. Cuban economic collapse causes nuclear war
Gorrell ‘5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)
Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5 of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?
1AC Advantage – Oil Spills
Advantage _: Oil Spills Good
a. While the status quo prevents US exploration of oil, Cuba is preparing to go it along and will drill by themselves.
Reuters 13 – World News Agency (“Cuban oil hopes sputter as Russians give up for now on well”, May 29, 2013, Reuters.com, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/cuba-oil-idUSL2N0EA00W20130529, JL)
In a development that is potentially both interesting and controversial, Norway's Statoil ASA, which also partnered with Repsol, appears to be looking at possibilities on Cuba's mostly unexplored Caribbean side. A Cubapetroleo map on display at a recent geosciences conference in Havana indicated that as of last November, Cuba was in negotiations with the Norwegian oil giant to lease three large blocks along the central and southeastern coast, between the archipelago of the Gardens of the Queen and the coast in the Gulf of Ana Maria and the Gulf of Guacanayabo. Statoil does not comment on pending projects, but industry sources said it may just be sniffing around as it does all over the world looking for oil prospects and that its level of interest remains to be seen. The company has not mentioned Cuba in its drilling plans for the next two years. It is likely also mindful of the sensitivity and potential dangers of drilling near the Garden of the Queens, which is regarded as one of the world's most pristine coral reefs and whose preservation as such has become a cause for international environmental groups. The same Cubapetroleo map showed that a Brazilian firm, Synergy Corp, was in negotiations for a near-shore block on Cuba's north coast that state-owned Petrobras abandoned two years ago, citing poor prospects.
b. That makes gulf spills inevitable – current response capabilities are insufficient
Bolstad 12 (Erika Bolstad Worked from 2007-2011 as the Washington correspondent for the Anchorage Daily News and the Idaho Statesman. Her work on the Larry Craig scandal for the Statesman was a finalist for the 2007 Pulitzer Prize in the breaking news category, “Cuba embargo could threaten oil-drilling safety, expert says”, May 10, 2012, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#storylink=cpy,JL)
WASHINGTON — The 50-year-old U.S. embargo of Cuba is getting in the way of safety when it comes to deepwater drilling in Cuban waters, an expert on the communist country’s offshore drilling activity said Thursday. Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, warned that Cold War-era economic sanctions threaten not only Florida’s economy and environment but that of Cuba, too, in the event of a major disaster on the scale of 2010’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The worst-case scenario is "state-sponsored chaos at a disaster site," Hunt said during an event sponsored by the Center for International Policy, a Washington think tank that advocates for a foreign policy based on human rights. The U.S. Coast Guard has extensive response plans, as does the state of Florida. But Hunt said he would give prevention efforts an "F" grade. He likened the work to stocking body bags for a plane crash – but not training pilots to fly safely or to maintain aircraft properly. "We’re getting ready for what will inevitably happen if we don’t take the right proactive steps," Hunt said. His warning and that of other experts came as the Spanish oil company Repsol is about to tap an offshore reservoir beneath 5,600 feet of seawater and about 14,000 feet of rock. The company, the first of many set to drill for oil off Cuba’s coast, is working just 77 nautical miles from Key West. Workers are about a week from completing their drilling and are beginning the technically demanding phase of capping the well and preparing it for possible production, the panelists at the event said. Former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency chief William Reilly, who along with former Florida Sen. Bob Graham co-chaired the presidential commission that examined BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill, said that in his most recent visit to Cuba he was reassured that Repsol was moving slowly in Cuban waters to avoid any surprises. Dan Whittle of the Environmental Defense Fund said that in his visits to Cuba, well-thumbed copies of the commission’s report looked as though they were "read even more in Havana than here." Reilly also noted that Cuban officials are regular readers of daily bulletins from U.S. agencies on U.S. oil drilling regulations. He said he urged them to follow Mexican offshore guidelines – which he said are based on U.S. rules. "Nobody is predicting a catastrophe in association with anything that the Cubans are overseeing," Reilly said. "In every way, the Cuban approach to this is responsible, careful and attentive to the risks that they know they’re undertaking." "Nevertheless, should there be a need for a response . . . the United States government has not interpreted its sanctions policy in a way that would clearly make available in advance the kind of technologies that would be required," Reilly said. Several of the experts said Thursday they are confident that the Treasury Department could react quickly in an emergency to allow U.S. oil response teams to get emergency permits to do business with the Cuban government.
c. Cuban oil drilling threatens the most biodiverse area in the region. Only the plan can prevent and contain a spill
Almeida, 12 http://gcaptain.com/drilling-cuba-embargo-badly/?46322 Drilling Off Cuba, and How the Embargo Could be Very Costly for the US BY ROB ALMEIDA ON MAY 18, 2012JH
Prior to commencing drilling operations, Repsol contracted Helix Energy Solutions Group to provide immediate well intervention and other subsea services in case of well issues.¶ It’s a great start, and Helix certainly proved their capabilities during the 2010 Macondo well blowout and oil spill, however Cuba is under a full economic and diplomatic embargo with massive implications.¶ This means:¶ 1) The Scarabeo 9’s blowout preventer, the most crucial piece of well control equipment on board the rig was made by a US company. The trade embargo prohibits OEM spare parts or repair items to be sold to Repsol. Also, technical expertise from the OEM cannot be provided.¶ 2) The “capping stacks” which have been created by Helix ESG, BP, the MWCC and others, are not authorized for use in Cuban waters. This means, if an uncontrolled blowout does occur, these essential piece of equipment will not be available until authorization is given and a delivery method determined.¶ This is a significant issue considering the BP “capping stack” weighs somewhere around a half million pounds. Reports indicate there are no cranes in Cuba capable of lifting such a piece of gear that massive on to a ship.¶ 3) The deepwater drilling experts in the US are not authorized to provide assistance to Cuba in case of a disaster.¶ 4) All the training programs that have been developed post-Macondo are not available for Cuban nationals. In fact, any training that will result in a professional license or certification is off limits to Cubans.¶ 5) Tyvek suits, the essential work-wear for HAZMAT cleanup, are not authorized to be brought into Cuba due to supposed military applications.¶ In addition…¶ The Scarabeo 9 was classed by DNV on 19 August 2011 in Singapore, and she is due for her 1-year “checkup” on 19 August 2012, with a 3 month window on either side of that date. As expected, DNV has told us that there will be no US-based employees involved.¶ What sort of legal, or commercial implications might DNV face when they actually DO send someone to inspect the Scarabeo 9?¶ We asked the Bahamian registry, which is the flag state for the rig, the same question about a week ago and received no response. I spoke with DNV today and they are still researching the matter.¶ In short however, Cuba’s access to containment systems, offshore technology, and spill response equipment is severely restricted by the US embargo, yet if a disaster occurs offshore, not only will Cuban ecosystems be severely impacted, but those of the Florida Keys, and US East Coast.¶ If disaster strikes offshore Cuba, US citizens will have nobody else to blame except the US Government because outdated policies are impacting the ability to prepare sufficiently for real-life environmental threats. Considering Cuba waters are home to the highest concentration of biodiversity in the region and is a spawning ground for fish populations that migrate north into US waters, a Cuban oil spill could inflict unprecedented environmental devastation if not planned for in advance.
d. Loss of Bio-Diversity causes extinction
Nautiyal and Nidamanuri 10 – Centre for Ecological Economics at Institute for Scoial and Economic Change, Nidamanuri: Economic change and Department of Earth and Space Sciences at the Indian Institute of space science and Technology (Sunil Nautiyal and Rama Rao Nidamanuri, “Conserving Biodiversity in Protected Area of Biodiversity Hotspot in India: A Case Study,” http://www.researchgate.net/publicat ion/229046655_Conserving_Biodiversity_in_Protected_Area_of_Biodiversity_Hotspot_in_India_A_Case_Study, )
The hotspots are the world’s most biologically rich areas hence recognized as important ecosystems not important¶ only for the rich biodiversity but equally important for the human survival as these are the homes for more than¶ 20 of the world’s population. India got recognition of one of the mega-diversity countries of world as the country¶ is home of the two important biodiversity hotspots: the Himalaya in north and the Western Ghats in the southern¶ peninsula. Policy makers and decision takers have recognized the importance of biodiversity (flora and fauna) and¶ this has resulted to segregate (in the form of protected areas) the rich and diverse landscape for biodiversity¶ conservation. An approach which leads towards conservation of biological diversity is good efforts but such¶ approaches should deal with humans equally who are residing in biodiversity hotspots since time immemorial. In¶ this endeavor, a study was conducted in Nagarahole National Park of Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve, in Karnataka. Our¶ empirical studies reveal that banning all the human activities in this ecosystem including agriculture, animal¶ husbandry has produced the results opposite to the approach ‘multiple values’ of national park. To monitor the¶ impact, existing policies have been tested from an economic and ecological view-point. Unfortunately, the local¶ livelihoods (most of them belongs to indigenous tribes) in the area have received setbacks due to the¶ implementation of the policies, though unintentionally. However, the ecological perspective is also not showing¶ support for the approach and framework of the current policies in the hotspots. Satellite data showed that the¶ temporal pattern of ecosystem processes has been changing. An integrated approach for ecosystem conservation and¶ strengthening local institutions for sustainable ecosystem management in such areas is therefore supported by this¶ study.
1AC Advantage – Narcotrafficking
Advantage _: Narcotrafficking Good
a. The plan is key to energy cooperation—that solves narcotrafficking
Benjamin 10 – (Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation” Conclusion and Recommendations)KY
Oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise; there are always trade-offs between negatives and positives relating to energy security, environmental integrity, and geostrategic considerations. The consensus arising from the studies and the analyses in this book is that the creation of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the United States and Cuba is long overdue. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Cuban infrastructure and economic development were direct beneficiaries of commercial relations with the United States. This relationship was instrumental in providing Cuba with access to advanced technologies and the signs of modernity that were unparalleled in Latin America and far beyond.¶ Once again, the United States is presented with an opportunity that might serve as the basis of a new relationship between the United States and Cuba. It holds out the possibility of enhancing the stability and development of a region that is wrestling with questions of how and when it too might benefit from engagement with a global economic development model. The question is whether the United States chooses to be at the center, or to leave Cuba to seek some alternate path toward its goals.¶ Ironically, Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil, oil equipment, and service companies possess the capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of our almost five-decades-old unilateral political and economic embargo. The United States can end this impasse by licensing American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources. By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the United States will be strategically positioned to play an important role in the future of the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and democratic future. The creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector will bolster state capacity in Cuba while enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests, and can help Cuba’s future leaders avoid illicit business practices, minimize the influence of narcotrafficking enterprises, and stanch the outflow of illegal immigrants to the United States.¶ If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), it will give the United States the opportunity to engage Cuba’s future leaders to carry out long-overdue economic reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a more open and representative society while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region and beyond.¶ Under no circumstances is this meant to suggest that the United States should come to dominate energy development policy in Cuba. The United States certainly has a role to play, but unlike its past relationship with Cuba, its interaction and cooperation will be predicated on its ability to accept, at a minimum, that Cuba will be the dominant partner in potential commercial ventures, and an equal partner in future diplomatic and interstate relations. Without a doubt Cuban government actors are wary of the possibility of being dominated by the “colossus of the North,” but as Cuba’s energy policymakers face the daunting reality of their nation’s energy future, it is abundantly clear that they possess the willingness and the capacity to assiduously pursue sound policy objectives and initiatives that begin to address the island’s immediate and long-term challenges. In the end, this course of action will have direct and tangible benefits for the people of Cuba, it neighbors, and beyond.
b. The impact is bioweapons and LNG attacks
Flynn and Bryan 01 (Stephen, Senior Fellow @ CFR and Commander in US Coast Guard, and Anthony, Dir. North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation” October 21, 2001, pg online @ CFR)
Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.
c. Bioweapon use causes extinction.
Ochs, 2 – MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park (Richard, “Biological Weapons Must be Abolished Immediately,” Jun 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html)
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.
1AC Plan Text
Thus we offer the following Plan:
The United States federal government should allow United States oil companies to contract with Cuba for deep-water oil drilling.
1AC Solvency
Observation Three: Solvency – Our plan is effective and the best policy option.
a. Licensing American companies to develop Cuban offshore resources leads to effective drilling and increased influence in the region
Pascual and Huddleston 9 Carlos, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy, the Brookings Institution and Vicki, Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf
Licensing U.S. companies to provide services for the development of Cuban offshore oil and gas would provide benefits to the United States and Cuba. (At this point it should be noted that the Secretary of Treasury has always had and contin - ues to have the authority—as embodied in OFAC regulations—to license any transaction found to be in the U.S. national interest. This power has been used over the past fifteen years by various r epublican and Democratic administrations to license a variety of commercial transactions between the United States and Cuba). The following are some of the reasons we might wish to become engaged in developing Cuba’s offshore oil and gas. First, if U.S. and other reputable companies are involved in Cuba’s offshore oil development it would reduce Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela for two-thirds of its oil imports. Second, it is preferable that U.S. oil companies with high standards of transparency develop these resources rather than, for example, Russia’s notoriously corrupt oligarchy. Third, U.S. influence in Cuba is likely to increase if U.S. companies have an economic relationship on the ground. Fourth, U.S. companies have the technology and expertise to develop Cuba’s offshore oil and gas.
b. The plan allows for effective US-Cuban oil cooperation
Benjamin 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”
Conclusion and Recommendations
Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008,when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cuba’s president. Now, the opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities, and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, Cuban energy authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the- art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been overwhelmingly positive.9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities.¶ The United States and Cuba will have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to work in critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction, and engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in these areas. The Cubans have accumulated experience and training from past energy cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans’ high level of competence and strong work ethic. The Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-venture partners on the island.¶ The United States possesses few options when it comes to balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand, because U.S. energy independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United States needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to improve the integrity of the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more flexible view on the quest for resources—a view that does not shun a source from a potential strategic partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look dispassionately at potential energy partners in terms of the role they might play in meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security. The Obama administration has signaled that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation and integration; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is consistent with, and may be central to, that objective. ¶ The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United States’ largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and the overall dismal state of the global economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security interests of the United States vis-à-vis energy. Cuba’s energy infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lion’s share of the financial burden of upgrading Cuba’s energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. Changes in U.S. policy to allow investment and assistance in Cuba’s energy sector are a precondition for international entities to make significant investments, yet this change implies a large American footprint. Trade and investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely constrained by the conditions of the embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These constraints also affect foreign firms seeking to do business in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S. technologies needed for oil and gas exploration and production. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a large portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. The longer that work is delayed, the higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns from such undertakings.¶ U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium. The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives, diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions that create commercial and trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba.¶ This discussion is intended to help distill understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an understanding of possible outcomes is important to those crafting future policy and making changes in the policymaking milieu.
c. Cuba wants US investment—officials and empirics
Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)
6. Cuba would welcome U.S. investment.¶ At MINCEX, the staff discussed the impact of the embargo on Cuba’s access to capital. Ministry staff said the embargo is harmful to Cuba’s ability to attract foreign investments, capital, and technology. Cuban officials repeatedly emphasized that the country is open to any foreign investor, and that Havana would welcome U.S. investment, subject to the same conditions it places on all foreign investors.¶ According to a senior official in Cuba’s diplomatic corps, when Cuba decided to drill off-shore in the Gulf of Mexico in the mid-1990s, the first letters sent by Cuba’s government to invite foreign concerns to participate went exclusively to U.S. energy companies. They declined interest, due to the embargo, and Cuba looked for partners elsewhere.