Tournament: Homewood-Flossmoor | Round: 1 | Opponent: Glenbrook South AB | Judge: Christian Palacios
Contention 1 is Laundering 

Current money laundering policies fail—increased accountability efforts between the US and Mexico are key
(Blickman 13, Tom Blickman, specialises in International Drug Control Policy and Organised Crime as a researcher at TNI's Drugs and Democracy Programme, formerly worked for Bureau Jansen and Janssen, a research institute on intelligence and police matters, “Deficiencies in financial oversight enable money laundering”, Transnational Institute, http://www.tni.org/article/deficiencies-financial-oversight-enable-money-laundering)
In July 1989, the leaders of the economic powers assembled at the G7 Paris
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volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States.

Scenario 1 is the Drug Trade:
Drug violence is escalating now and spilling over into Latin America —the Calderon-US militarization
Rawlins ’13 – editor at CFR (Aimee, “Mexico’s Drug War,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/11/13, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689#p4)
Mexico's War Effort From 2006 to 2012, Calderón sent more than 50,000
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thought safe, are being affected by the violence as well (NYT).

Money laundering shifts the strategy--- financing through banks is key—cartels rely on them for transactions
(Feinstein 13, senior United States Senator,  “The Buck Stop Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices”, US Caucus on International Narcotics Control, April 2013, http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee)
Over the last three years, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control has released
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but who may not otherwise be a hardened criminal, from getting involved.”

The plan shifts the strategy away from militarizing the border
 (Goddard 12, Terry Goddard, JD from Arizona State University, made significant progress in attacking cartel money laundering, seizing approximately $20 million and culminating in an historic $94 million settlement with Western Union in February 2010. Goddard received the Kelly-Wyman Award for 2010, the top recognition given by his fellow Attorneys General., “The Solution: Follow the Money”, How To Fix a Broken Border, October 2012,  https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/publications-reports/2012-how-to-fix-a-broken-border-part-3-follow-the-money)
For all the political rhetoric and chest pounding about border security in recent¶ years
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resources building more fences and chasing would-be workers through the desert.

Mexican cartels threaten Latin American stability—
Beittel ’13 – analyst in Latin American affairs (June, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence,” Congressional Research Service, 4/15/13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf)

As violence continues at a high level and to reach more of Mexico’s territory,
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are present in more than 1,000 U.S. cities.

Latin American instability causes global conflicts
Manwaring, 5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson, Retired U.S. Army colonel (Max G., “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most
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they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.

Escalates—other countries drawn in
Shingal ’11 - Ankur Shingal, University of California, Los Angeles (“At the Tipping Point: Why the United States Must Assist Mexico in the Mexican Drug War” Agathai Quarterly Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2011 http://www.mortarboardatucla.org/uploads/4/7/8/9/4789362/winter_journal.pdf#page=26)

The third reason why the United States must enhance its aid to Mexico is the
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it has no choice but to fight a war on its home front.

Scenario 2 is Terrorism-- 

Laundering money is key to sufficient capital
White House ‘11– (President of the United States Barack Obama, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” the White House, July 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf)

Threats to the Economy, U.S. Competitiveness, and Strategic Markets.
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human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.

Mexico is the prime target—safe haven for criminal transactions the bypasses border security and smuggling  
Lanzante ’09 – area port director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, masters from the University of Illinois, master’s in security studies from the Naval Postgraduate School (Joseph, “The Relationship Between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations and Human Smuggling,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514191)
Western Hemisphere countries present a variety of conditions that favor transnational crime and terrorist activity
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from Hezbollah at farms in Honduras that are owned by wealthy Muslim businessmen. 

Finance is the prerequisite to a nuclear attack—the plan targets operational infrastructure and solves alternative sources of financing  
(Gurulé  08, Professor of Law  of University of Notre Dame, has worked in a variety of high-profile public law enforcement positions including as Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2001-2003), where he had oversight responsibilities for the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice (1990-1992); and Assistant U.S. Attorney, where he served as Deputy Chief of the Major Narcotics Section of the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office (1985-1989) , Jimmy Gurulé, Terrorists Need Money to Terrorize, “Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism”, 2008)
Money is the 'lifeblood' of al Qaeda Arabic for ‘the base‘) and
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hands.¶ and he will disgrace them and make you victorious over them."

Nuclear terror is coming-high probability
Bunn ’7
Senior research director at Harvard, Nuclear Threat Initiative,
Matthew, "Nuclear Terrorism FAQ" September 26, 2007; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401154.html

Is it really plausible that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb? Yes
AND
government studies have repeatedly concluded that this possibility also cannot be ruled out.

The risk is high-terrorists have the motivation and the capability,
(Angela Weaver 8/21/13, researcher for the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Nuclear Terrorism Threat – Preventing Catastrophe,” CSIS, https://csis.org/blog/nuclear-terrorism-threat-preventing-catastrophe)

The report argues that terrorist organizations are capable of sophisticated planning, as was demonstrated
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Without these measures, the threat of nuclear attack will most likely rise.
Extinction
Ayson 10 Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, InformaWorld)
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a
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be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

Contention 2 is Relations 

US-Mexico relations are at a crossroads---Mexican diversification has decreased US influence in the region—resetting strategy on the drug war resets collaboration
(McKinnon 9/10, Dallin McKinnon , research assistant in Brigham Young’s political science department , “At a Crossroads with Mexico”, Praemon, September 10, 2013, http://praemon.org/2013/09/10/at-a-crossroads-with-mexico/)

The United States is at a crossroads in its relationship with Mexico. Congress is
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positive relationship with Mexico’s leader, whose term does not end until 2018.

Failing to increase money laundering cooperation closes the window for relations—undermines Mexican trust and is a flip-flop on Obama’s previous promises
(Shirk 11, David A. Shirk, Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, former fellow at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of San Diego, Director of the Justice in Mexico Project,  Council on Foreign Relations, “The U.S. Role”, The Drug War in Mexico Confronting a Shared Threat, March 2011, pg. 13-14)
As the world’s largest consumer of drugs and its largest supplier of fire- arms
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border will be difficult to control as long as market demand remains strong.
Recent summit doesn’t solve-interruptions and lack of specifics strain the relationship,
(Christi Parsons 2/19/14, “At North American Trade Summit in Mexico, Talks Don’t Go Far,” LA Times, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-obama-mexico-20140220,0,86032.story#axzz2u3c9tVMQ)

They came to talk about their roles as powerhouses in world trade, but President
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said Christopher Wilson, an associate at the Washington-based Mexico Institute.

Relations are structurally critical to border biodiversity
(PCIC ’09, international affairs organization focused on West Coast policy issues, task force co-chaired by Robert Bonner, former commissioner of U.S. CBP and former administrator of the DEA, and Andrés Rozental, former deputy foreign minister of Mexico and founder of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems,” Pacific Council on International Policy, report by the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border, 2009, http://pacificcouncil.org/page.aspx?pid=326, pp. 8-9)

The 1,952-mile Mexico-U.S. border is unique
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of living by destroying non-renewable resources and adversely affecting human health. 

Cooperation creates a model for cross-border environmental management
(Wilson Center ’09, “The United States and Mexico: Towards a Strategic Partnership,” Wilson Center Mexico Institute, January 2009, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/events/documents/TheUnitedStatesandMexico.TowardsaStrategicPartnership.pdf, pp. 54-55)
The environment knows no national boundaries. Air and water quality on one side of
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of a river that originates in Mexico and ?ows into the United States.

It’s key to act—border biodiversity is being drastically lost and reaching points of irreversibility-land use is a unique internal link
Van Schoik, 04 – Rick, teaches international environmental security, science, and policy at San Diego State University, California (“Biodiversity on the U.S.-Mexican Border,” World Watch Institute, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/567)

The U.S.-Mexican border region has the highest rate of species endangerment
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-that the border is starkly visible to people flying over in airliners.

No alt causes-- Mexico is a key region--- ecosystem diversity, endemics, quantity  
Geo Mexico 2010 (This blog supports Geo-Mexico; the geography and dynamics of modern Mexico, the book by Dr. Richard Rhoda and Tony Burton (Sombrero Books 2010). Geo-Mexico is the first book specifically about the geography of the entire country of Mexico, written in English and aimed at an adult audience, ever published, “Mexico’s mega-biodiversity,” http://geo-mexico.com/?p=2765)

People from elsewhere generally think of Mexico as an arid country with lots of cacti
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, India, Malaysia, The Philippines,  Papua New Guinea, and Australia

Loss of biodiversity causes extinction
Takacs 96 (Instructor in Department of Earth Systems Science and Policy at California State-Monterey Bay David, 1996 Philosophies of Paradise, pg. http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as
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of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.14 

Comparatively the biggest environmental threat-studies,
(Jim Erickson ‘12, reporter, award winning science journalist, “Ecosystem Effects of Biodiversity Loss could Rival Impacts of Climate Change, Pollution,” University of Michigan News Service, 5/2/12, http://ns.umich.edu/new/multimedia/slideshows/20366-ecosystem-effects-of-biodiversity-loss-could-rival-impacts-of-climate-change-pollution)

Loss of biodiversity appears to impact ecosystems as much as climate change, pollution and
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working on this study were surprised by the comparative strength of those effects."

Plan

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with Mexico on accountability-based anti-money laundering initiatives. 

Solvency
Bilateral accountability-based efforts solve and spillover
(Brien 11, Nicolas Brien et. al, Spokesperson for the Parisian Government in the Ministry of Women’s Rights,  former political risk analyst, MA in International Finance and Economic Policy, “A Bilateral Study on Money Laundering in the United States and Mexico”, May 2011, http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/workshops/documents/RevisedReportMay24.pdf

In this study, we used an economic model to estimate the proceeds from organized
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financial flows and allow for further studies of key originator or destination countries.

Recent Mexican legislation won’t make an impact—no capacity to implement—cooperation is key
(Smith, 11/27, Jan Smith, Director in EDC’s Mexico City office and leads EDC's practice in Latin America, a company that advises Fortune 500 and investment firms, “How Well is Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Law Working”, Inter-American Dialogues: Latin America Advisor—Financial Services, Nov 14-27, 2013, http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/LAA/FSA/2013/FSA131127.pdf)
A Jan Smith, director for Latin America at Edgar, Dunn and Co.
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limited means to track drug money and monitor this type of cash transactions.” 

Mexico says yes-already requested stronger AML policy
Stier, 09— Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs (Ken, “Foreign tax cheats find US banks a safe haven”, Time—Business and Money, October 29, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933288,00.html)IK
Washington has spent much of this year showing how tough it is on tax cheats
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capacities to protect our peoples and wealth," Carstens wrote in his letter. 

Current US-Mexico approaches lack coordination—the plan is key
Realuyo ’12 – President of CBR Global Advisors, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, former State Department Director of Counterterrorism Finance Program (Celina, “It’s All about the Money: Advancing Anti-Money Laundering Efforts in the U.S. and Mexico to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” Wilson Center, 5/16/12, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Realuyo_U.S.-Mexico_Money_Laundering_0.pdf)
The U.S. and Mexico have made considerable progress in the fight against
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private and civic sectors in the fight against the TCOs and money laundering.

Mexico is key—hotspot for laundering issues
Levin and Coburn ’12 – U.S. Senators on the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations (““U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History”, U.S. Senate, 7/17/12, https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=2andved=0CDgQFjABandurl=http3A2F2Fwww.levin.senate.gov2Fdownload2F3Fid3D90fe8998-dfc4-4a8c-90ed-704bcce990d4andei=I0EiUv-fL7G5sQTiw4GACQandusg=AFQjCNHb-VV1iGT7eowxZKuK-gOrvRFrvwandsig2=Rl-7k4EdKWmHLt0C6_5u6g)
According to U.S. law enforcement officials, Mexico remains one of the
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S. deposits by casas de cambio of sequentially numbered monetary instruments.183

Modeling—Other countries perceive the US as central to global AML regime  
(Reuter 04, Peter Reuter, Professor in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Criminology at the University of Maryland. He served as editor of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management from 1999-2004. He founded and directed RAND's Drug Policy Research Center from 1989-1993 “The Anti–Money Laundering Regime”, Chasing Dirty Money, 2004, http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/381/4iie3705.pdf)
The US anti–money laundering regime is central to the global regime be-
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visory authorities are uncomfortable with the techniques of criminal inves- tigative authorities.

US assistance across the globe is inevitable—plan provides the right framework
(Winer 98, JONATHAN WINER, Former DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,  “Statement to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services”, Committee on Financial Services—Democrats,  http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/banking/61198jw.shtml, 1998)
The Administration has created an anti-money laundering and financial crime program with activities
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failure to adhere to these norms have resulted in financial or economic chaos.

US key Is key—we’re vulnerable now
(Stringer 11, Kevin D. Stringer , ¶ Visiting Professor of International Studies¶ Thunderbird School of Global Management , “Tackling Threat Finance: A Labor for Hercules or Sisyphus?”, 2011¶ http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011spring/Stringer.pdf)
If the United States government is going to lean on other world finan- cial
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challenges. The lead for this effort should be the Department of Justice.¶ 

Target money laundering solves--- other types of transfers like digital aren’t sustainable—regulations
(Peter Cohan ‘13, founder of a consulting and venture capital firm, worked at various other financial institutions, Forbes contributor, “After Liberty Reserve Shut Down, is Bitcoin Next?” Forbes, 5/29/13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2013/05/29/after-liberty-reserve-shut-down-is-bitcoin-next/)

The world’s financial system ought to stop criminals from dealing drugs, funding terrorism,
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first of many government efforts to wipe out Bitcoin. Watch out Winkelvii!

Bilateral accountability based policies are necessary to solve  
(Goddard 12, Terry Goddard, JD from Arizona State University, made significant progress in attacking cartel money laundering, seizing approximately $20 million and culminating in an historic $94 million settlement with Western Union in February 2010. Goddard received the Kelly-Wyman Award for 2010, the top recognition given by his fellow Attorneys General., “The Solution: Follow the Money”, How To Fix a Broken Border, October 2012,  https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/publications-reports/2012-how-to-fix-a-broken-border-part-3-follow-the-money)
The Manchester Guardian reported in April 2011 how hundreds of billions of dollars in “wire transfers, traveler’s cheques and cash shipments” were moved illegally through Wachovia Bank and across the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005 and the years preceding. These funds undoubtedly paid for murder and mayhem in Mexico, yet an investigation into Wachovia Bank’s procedures resulted in a fine of less than 10 percent of the money laundered and no criminal prosecutions.23 As one commentator rightfully observed, the best way to end these insidious practices is the “rattling of hand cuffs in some bank boardrooms.” Yet one of the consistent factors in money laundering prosecutions is the lack of penal consequences. Major¶ 12¶ financial institutions continue to be less than diligent in enforcing anti-money laundering regulations and some actually respond to law-enforcement subpoenas in ways that undercut the investigations. The 10-year-long investigation of HSBC has not yet produced any indictments in spite of confessions by top management of major failures in anti-money laundering compliance (New York Times, August 24, 2012).¶ Generally speaking, the failures of the anti-money laundering effort are not because of inadequate statutes, but a failure of enforcement.24 Again and again, huge amounts of funds flowing illegally out of this country could have been stopped, if financial institutions and government agencies focused on the problem. But the prevailing attitude is permissive of violations and reluctant to sanction violators. Of course, there will always be sophisticated nuances and complex trade relationships which can be exploited to move money illegally, but the billions of dollars going to the drug cartels are not flowing through nuances. They are going through the front door of the financial system, through bank accounts, large trade transactions, prepaid access devices, and wire ¶ transmissions. As opponents, the cartels have not made the problem any easier, proving to be extraordinarily innovative and opportunistic. They have mastered the international financial system and exploited it to their great advantage.¶ The U.S. government must enforce existing anti-money laundering provisions and quickly close the identified loopholes to stop (or at least slow down) the cash flowing to the cartels. Until government agencies, especially Treasury, get more serious about cutting off the illegal international flow of funds, we can never say we have a “secure” border. Stopping less than one percent of the opponent’s cash smuggling transactions should never be considered a good job. Especially when the money pouring across the border is wreaking such havoc in Mexico and making a mockery of the U.S. border defenses.¶ The United States should be making every effort to strengthen Mexico’s hand right now, before the problems in Mexico get even worse and the incredible violence that has besieged that country bursts over the border. The most effective means available is to stop the cash that makes the cartels so strong. We can fix the “broken” border and stop the bloodshed in Mexico — by following the money.

Accountability based policy is key to effectiveness of regulations,
(Tom Burghardt ’13, researcher for Global Research, contributed to The Global Economic Crisis, writer for WikiLeaks, “Wall Street Looting: Will JPMorgan Chase be Held Accountable for Money Laundering ‘Lapses’?” Global Research, 1/13/13, http://www.globalresearch.ca/wall-street-looting-will-jpmorgan-chase-be-held-accountable-for-money-laundering-lapses/5318781)

As a sop to outraged public opinion over Wall Street’s looting of the real economy
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media will disappear whatever dirty secrets eventually emerge down the proverbial memory hole.
New law fails-focuses on other industries, unconstitutional, and it’s too early to tell if it solves accountability,
(Dale Quinn ’13, freelance journalist in Mexico covering international companies, “Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Law is Bad for Business,” Quartz, 10/29/13, http://qz.com/139570/mexicos-new-anti-money-laundering-law-is-bad-for-business/)

Money laundering in Mexico is big business: $10 billion in drug money was
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as a shifting of the burden from the government to the private sector.”

Status quo doesn’t solve-fragmented strategies don’t solve accountability-based enforcement and empirically require military intervention,
(Patricia Rey Mallen 2/13/14, Latin America correspondent, quoting Oberlin Perez, executive director of Mexico’s Financial Security Bureau, “In Mexico, Around $10B Every Year Come from Money Laundering, which was Not Illegal in 16 Out of 31 States,” International Business Ties, http://www.ibtimes.com/mexico-around-10b-every-year-come-money-laundering-which-was-not-illegal-16-out-31-states-1555099)

Three years ago, all Mexican states agreed to strengthen all measures to stop money
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started, the army wouldn’t have had to intervene,” he pointed out.

Tournament: IHSA State | Round: 1 | Opponent: ALL Rounds | Judge: NA
Contention 1
Contention 1 is Laundering
Current money laundering policies fail—increased accountability efforts are key
 (Aaron Kaufman 2/21/14, “The Ugly Truth Behind Major Banks Financing Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” Elite Daily, http://elitedaily.com/news/business/shadowy-role-banks-play-financing-mexicos-drug-cartels/)
Prior to his election 14 months ago, the United States was actively engaged in Mexico’s effort to combat drug cartels
AND
. “It’s the banks laundering money for the cartels that finances the tragedy,” Martin Woods said in an interview

Scenario 1 is the Drug Trade:
Drug violence is escalating—Guzman’s imprisonment has caused turf wars
(Dave Graham 2/23/14, “Mexico Kingpin’s Arrest a Victory that May Fuel Violence,” Chicago Tribune, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-23/news/sns-rt-us-mexico-drugs-cartels-analysis-20140223_1_sinaloa-cartel-drug-lord-joaquin-guzman)
Mexico's government scored a huge victory with the capture of the country's most wanted drug
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Without that, the arrests end up being inconsequential for dismantling the organization."
Reject their empirics-violence has fundamentally shifted making escalation uniquely likely- only addressing corruption solves,
Rawlins ’13 – editor at CFR (Aimee, “Mexico’s Drug War,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/11/13, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689#p4)
Mexico's War Effort From 2006 to 2012, Calderón sent more than 50,000
AND
thought safe, are being affected by the violence as well (NYT).

Money laundering shifts the strategy--- financing through banks is key—cartels rely on them for transactions
(Feinstein 13, senior United States Senator,  “The Buck Stop Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices”, US Caucus on International Narcotics Control, April 2013, http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee)
Over the last three years, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control has released
AND
but who may not otherwise be a hardened criminal, from getting involved.”
Mexican cartels threaten Latin American stability—
Beittel ’13 – analyst in Latin American affairs (June, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence,” Congressional Research Service, 4/15/13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf)

As violence continues at a high level and to reach more of Mexico’s territory,
AND
are present in more than 1,000 U.S. cities.

Latin American instability causes global conflicts
Manwaring, 5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson, Retired U.S. Army colonel (Max G., “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most
AND
they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.

Escalates—other countries drawn in
Shingal ’11 - Ankur Shingal, University of California, Los Angeles (“At the Tipping Point: Why the United States Must Assist Mexico in the Mexican Drug War” Agathai Quarterly Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2011 http://www.mortarboardatucla.org/uploads/4/7/8/9/4789362/winter_journal.pdf#page=26)

The third reason why the United States must enhance its aid to Mexico is the
AND
it has no choice but to fight a war on its home front.

Scenario 2 is Terrorism-- 

Laundering money is key to sufficient capital
White House ‘11– (President of the United States Barack Obama, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” the White House, July 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf)

Threats to the Economy, U.S. Competitiveness, and Strategic Markets.
AND
human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.

Mexico is the prime target—safe haven for criminal transactions the bypasses border security and smuggling  
Lanzante ’09 – area port director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, masters from the University of Illinois, master’s in security studies from the Naval Postgraduate School (Joseph, “The Relationship Between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations and Human Smuggling,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514191)
Western Hemisphere countries present a variety of conditions that favor transnational crime and terrorist activity
AND
from Hezbollah at farms in Honduras that are owned by wealthy Muslim businessmen. 

Finance is the prerequisite to a nuclear attack—the plan targets operational infrastructure and solves alternative sources of financing  
(Gurulé  08, Professor of Law  of University of Notre Dame, has worked in a variety of high-profile public law enforcement positions including as Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2001-2003), where he had oversight responsibilities for the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice (1990-1992); and Assistant U.S. Attorney, where he served as Deputy Chief of the Major Narcotics Section of the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office (1985-1989) , Jimmy Gurulé, Terrorists Need Money to Terrorize, “Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism”, 2008)
Money is the 'lifeblood' of al Qaeda Arabic for ‘the base‘) and
AND
hands.¶ and he will disgrace them and make you victorious over them."

Nuclear terror is coming-high probability
Bunn ’7
Senior research director at Harvard, Nuclear Threat Initiative,
Matthew, "Nuclear Terrorism FAQ" September 26, 2007; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401154.html

Is it really plausible that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb? Yes
AND
government studies have repeatedly concluded that this possibility also cannot be ruled out.

Terrorists have motivation and capability
(Angela Weaver 8/21/13, researcher for the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Nuclear Terrorism Threat – Preventing Catastrophe,” CSIS, https://csis.org/blog/nuclear-terrorism-threat-preventing-catastrophe)

The report argues that terrorist organizations are capable of sophisticated planning, as was demonstrated
AND
Without these measures, the threat of nuclear attack will most likely rise.
Extinction
Ayson 10 Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, InformaWorld)
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a
AND
be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

Contention 2
Contention 2 is Relations 

US Mexico relations are stalled and dominated by a lack of agenda—ambitious shifts in policy that prioritize Mexican interests turn rhetoric into action
(Hakim 2/28, Peter Hakim, member of the Latin American Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue , “What Did the 'Three Amigos' Summit Accomplish?”, Latin American Advisor, 2/28/14, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32andpubID=3533)
A: Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the
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, or its partnerships will remain limited and critical opportunities will be lost."

Failing to increase anti-money laundering destroys cooperation—undermines Mexican trust and is a flip-flop on Obama’s previous promises
(Shirk 11, David A. Shirk, Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, former fellow at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of San Diego, Director of the Justice in Mexico Project,  Council on Foreign Relations, “The U.S. Role”, The Drug War in Mexico Confronting a Shared Threat, March 2011, pg. 13-14)
As the world’s largest consumer of drugs and its largest supplier of fire- arms
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border will be difficult to control as long as market demand remains strong.
Relations are structurally critical to border biodiversity and spillover to broader cooperation  
(PCIC ’09, international affairs organization focused on West Coast policy issues, task force co-chaired by Robert Bonner, former commissioner of U.S. CBP and former administrator of the DEA, and Andrés Rozental, former deputy foreign minister of Mexico and founder of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems,” Pacific Council on International Policy, report by the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border, 2009, http://pacificcouncil.org/page.aspx?pid=326, pp. 8-9)
The 1,952-mile Mexico-U.S. border is unique
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of living by destroying non-renewable resources and adversely affecting human health. 

It’s key to act—border biodiversity is being drastically lost and reaching points of irreversibility-land use is a unique internal link
Van Schoik, 04 – Rick, teaches international environmental security, science, and policy at San Diego State University, California (“Biodiversity on the U.S.-Mexican Border,” World Watch Institute, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/567)

The U.S.-Mexican border region has the highest rate of species endangerment
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-that the border is starkly visible to people flying over in airliners.

Brink is approaching
(Allan Wall ‘8, journalist and expert on Mexico, “Mexican Biodiversity – 6 Species in Peril,” Banderas News, March 2008, http://www.banderasnews.com/0803/eden-mexdiversity.htm)
Mexico has a great variety of plant and animal life, the country's collection of
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, cooperation, and constant vigilance to give them an opportunity to survive.
Loss of biodiversity causes extinction
Takacs 96 (Instructor in Department of Earth Systems Science and Policy at California State-Monterey Bay David, 1996 Philosophies of Paradise, pg. http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as
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of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.14 

Specifically, it takes out safety nets against famine and causes disease  
(Terry Sunderland ‘11, conservation scientist with the Center for International Forestry Research, “Food Security: Why is Biodiversity Important?” International Forestry Review Volume 13 Number 3, September 2011, http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/cfa/14655489/v13n3/s2.pdf?expires=1395029583andid=77540611andtitleid=41000064andaccname=Guest+Userandchecksum=A50E36C2E9118810A6A5795E0133FE3F, pp. 266-267)
Biodiversity at three levels, ecosystems, the species they ¶ contain and the genetic
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critical to the maintenance of agricultural systems (Thrupp 2000, Benton 2007). 

Disease causes extinction
Yu 2009 5/22, Victoria, Dartmouth Undergraduate
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could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

Food shortages cause conflict – they’re coming now
(Klare 12, Michael T. Klare, Professor of peace and Security Studies at Hampshire College, The Hunger Wars in Our Future”, 8/8/12, http://www.guernicamag.com/daily/michael-t-klare-the-hunger-wars-in-our-future/)
Food–affordable food–is essential to human survival and well-being.
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not just in the United States, but globally for the indefinite future.

Major powers get drawn in
Calvin 98, (Calvin 1998 (William H.; Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences – University of Washington) January "The Great Climate Flip-Flop" Atlantic Monthly 281:1 EBSCO
The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would
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longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

No alt causes-- Mexico is a key region--- ecosystem diversity, endemics, quantity  
Geo Mexico 2010 (This blog supports Geo-Mexico; the geography and dynamics of modern Mexico, the book by Dr. Richard Rhoda and Tony Burton (Sombrero Books 2010). Geo-Mexico is the first book specifically about the geography of the entire country of Mexico, written in English and aimed at an adult audience, ever published, “Mexico’s mega-biodiversity,” http://geo-mexico.com/?p=2765)

People from elsewhere generally think of Mexico as an arid country with lots of cacti
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, India, Malaysia, The Philippines,  Papua New Guinea, and Australia

Major species losses snowball
Koh et al ‘4 (Lian Pin Koh et al ‘4, Associate Professor and chair of the Applied Ecology and Conservation group and the Environment Institute at the University of Adelaide, “Species Coextinctions and the Biodiversity Crisis,” Science Magazine, 9/10/04, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/305/5690/1632.full.html)
For all but the most host-specific affiliate groups (e.g.,
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most important cause of species extinctions, it is certainly an insidious one.

Plan

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with Mexico on accountability-based anti-money laundering initiatives. 

Contention 3: Solvency
Bilateral accountability-based efforts solve and spillover
(Brien 11, Nicolas Brien et. al, Spokesperson for the Parisian Government in the Ministry of Women’s Rights,  former political risk analyst, MA in International Finance and Economic Policy, “A Bilateral Study on Money Laundering in the United States and Mexico”, May 2011, http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/workshops/documents/RevisedReportMay24.pdf

In this study, we used an economic model to estimate the proceeds from organized
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financial flows and allow for further studies of key originator or destination countries.

Any new Mexican legislation won’t make an impact—no capacity to implement
(Smith, 11/27, Jan Smith, Director in EDC’s Mexico City office and leads EDC's practice in Latin America, a company that advises Fortune 500 and investment firms, “How Well is Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Law Working”, Inter-American Dialogues: Latin America Advisor—Financial Services, Nov 14-27, 2013, http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/LAA/FSA/2013/FSA131127.pdf)
A Jan Smith, director for Latin America at Edgar, Dunn and Co.
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limited means to track drug money and monitor this type of cash transactions.” 

Mexico says yes-already requested stronger AML policy
Stier, 09— Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs (Ken, “Foreign tax cheats find US banks a safe haven”, Time—Business and Money, October 29, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933288,00.html)IK
Washington has spent much of this year showing how tough it is on tax cheats
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capacities to protect our peoples and wealth," Carstens wrote in his letter. 

Current US-Mexico approaches lack coordination—the plan is key
Realuyo ’12 – President of CBR Global Advisors, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, former State Department Director of Counterterrorism Finance Program (Celina, “It’s All about the Money: Advancing Anti-Money Laundering Efforts in the U.S. and Mexico to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” Wilson Center, 5/16/12, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Realuyo_U.S.-Mexico_Money_Laundering_0.pdf)
The U.S. and Mexico have made considerable progress in the fight against
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private and civic sectors in the fight against the TCOs and money laundering.
The aff overcomes alt causes-cash has to be laundered,
(Celina Realuyo ‘12, former U.S. diplomat, international banker with Goldman Sachs, U.S. State Department Director of Counterterrorism Finance Programs, professor of national security and international relations at Georgetown, George Washington, and the National Defense Univesrity, M.B.A. from Harvard, M.A. from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, International Institute for Strategic Studies, published in the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Instittue, "It's All about the Money: Advancing Anti-Money Laundering Efforts in the U.S. and Mexico to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Realuyo_U.S.-Mexico_Money_Laundering_0.pdf)
Traditional Banking/Wire Transfers/Money Services Businesses. While transnational organized crime is
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transfers or personal checks deposited into business accounts with no apparent legitimate purpose.

US assistance across the globe is inevitable—plan provides the right framework
(Winer 98, JONATHAN WINER, Former DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,  “Statement to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services”, Committee on Financial Services—Democrats,  http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/banking/61198jw.shtml, 1998)
The Administration has created an anti-money laundering and financial crime program with activities
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failure to adhere to these norms have resulted in financial or economic chaos.

Other countries also model—perceive us as central to global AML regime  
(Reuter 04, Peter Reuter, Professor in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Criminology at the University of Maryland. He served as editor of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management from 1999-2004. He founded and directed RAND's Drug Policy Research Center from 1989-1993 “The Anti–Money Laundering Regime”, Chasing Dirty Money, 2004, http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/381/4iie3705.pdf)
The US anti–money laundering regime is central to the global regime be-
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visory authorities are uncomfortable with the techniques of criminal inves- tigative authorities.

Supply is key-demand only approaches empirically fail,
(ONDCP ’99, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “1999 National Drug Control Strategy,” National Criminal Justice Reference Service, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/99ndcs/iv-g.html)
7. Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs Supply reduction is an essential component of
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and eradication; alternative development; strengthening public institutions; and foreign assistance.*

US key Is key—we’re vulnerable now
(Stringer 11, Kevin D. Stringer , ¶ Visiting Professor of International Studies¶ Thunderbird School of Global Management , “Tackling Threat Finance: A Labor for Hercules or Sisyphus?”, 2011¶ http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011spring/Stringer.pdf)
If the United States government is going to lean on other world finan- cial
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challenges. The lead for this effort should be the Department of Justice.¶ 

Mexico is key—hotspot for laundering issues
Levin and Coburn ’12 – U.S. Senators on the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations (““U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History”, U.S. Senate, 7/17/12, https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=2andved=0CDgQFjABandurl=http3A2F2Fwww.levin.senate.gov2Fdownload2F3Fid3D90fe8998-dfc4-4a8c-90ed-704bcce990d4andei=I0EiUv-fL7G5sQTiw4GACQandusg=AFQjCNHb-VV1iGT7eowxZKuK-gOrvRFrvwandsig2=Rl-7k4EdKWmHLt0C6_5u6g)
According to U.S. law enforcement officials, Mexico remains one of the
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S. deposits by casas de cambio of sequentially numbered monetary instruments.183

Target money laundering solves--- other types of transfers like digital aren’t sustainable—regulations
(Peter Cohan ‘13, founder of a consulting and venture capital firm, worked at various other financial institutions, Forbes contributor, “After Liberty Reserve Shut Down, is Bitcoin Next?” Forbes, 5/29/13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2013/05/29/after-liberty-reserve-shut-down-is-bitcoin-next/)

The world’s financial system ought to stop criminals from dealing drugs, funding terrorism,
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first of many government efforts to wipe out Bitcoin. Watch out Winkelvii!

Bilateral accountability based policies are necessary to solve  
(Goddard 12, Terry Goddard, JD from Arizona State University, made significant progress in attacking cartel money laundering, seizing approximately $20 million and culminating in an historic $94 million settlement with Western Union in February 2010. Goddard received the Kelly-Wyman Award for 2010, the top recognition given by his fellow Attorneys General., “The Solution: Follow the Money”, How To Fix a Broken Border, October 2012,  https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/publications-reports/2012-how-to-fix-a-broken-border-part-3-follow-the-money)
The Manchester Guardian reported in April 2011 how hundreds of billions of dollars in “
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” border and stop the bloodshed in Mexico — by following the money.

The regime’s not working
(Blickman 13, Tom Blickman, specialises in International Drug Control Policy and Organised Crime as a researcher at TNI's Drugs and Democracy Programme, formerly worked for Bureau Jansen and Janssen, a research institute on intelligence and police matters, “Deficiencies in financial oversight enable money laundering”, Transnational Institute, http://www.tni.org/article/deficiencies-financial-oversight-enable-money-laundering)
In July 1989, the leaders of the economic powers assembled at the G7 Paris
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volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States.

Accountability based policy is key to effectiveness of regulations,
(Tom Burghardt ’13, researcher for Global Research, contributed to The Global Economic Crisis, writer for WikiLeaks, “Wall Street Looting: Will JPMorgan Chase be Held Accountable for Money Laundering ‘Lapses’?” Global Research, 1/13/13, http://www.globalresearch.ca/wall-street-looting-will-jpmorgan-chase-be-held-accountable-for-money-laundering-lapses/5318781)

As a sop to outraged public opinion over Wall Street’s looting of the real economy
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media will disappear whatever dirty secrets eventually emerge down the proverbial memory hole.
New law fails-focuses on other industries, unconstitutional, and it’s too early to tell if it solves accountability,
(Dale Quinn ’13, freelance journalist in Mexico covering international companies, “Mexico’s New Anti-Money Laundering Law is Bad for Business,” Quartz, 10/29/13, http://qz.com/139570/mexicos-new-anti-money-laundering-law-is-bad-for-business/)

Money laundering in Mexico is big business: $10 billion in drug money was
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as a shifting of the burden from the government to the private sector.”

Status quo doesn’t solve-fragmented strategies don’t solve accountability-based enforcement and empirically require military intervention,
(Patricia Rey Mallen 2/13/14, Latin America correspondent, quoting Oberlin Perez, executive director of Mexico’s Financial Security Bureau, “In Mexico, Around $10B Every Year Come from Money Laundering, which was Not Illegal in 16 Out of 31 States,” International Business Ties, http://www.ibtimes.com/mexico-around-10b-every-year-come-money-laundering-which-was-not-illegal-16-out-31-states-1555099)

Three years ago, all Mexican states agreed to strengthen all measures to stop money
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started, the army wouldn’t have had to intervene,” he pointed out.

Tournament: New Trier | Round: 2 | Opponent: Niles West BC | Judge: Rufus Coates Welsh
Contention 1
Contention 1 is Laundering 

Current money laundering policies fail—increased accountability efforts between the US and Mexico are key
(Blickman 13, Tom Blickman, specialises in International Drug Control Policy and Organised Crime as a researcher at TNI's Drugs and Democracy Programme, formerly worked for Bureau Jansen and Janssen, a research institute on intelligence and police matters, “Deficiencies in financial oversight enable money laundering”, Transnational Institute, http://www.tni.org/article/deficiencies-financial-oversight-enable-money-laundering)
In July 1989, the leaders of the economic powers assembled at the G7 Paris summit decided to establish a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to counter money laundering as an effective strategy against drug trafficking by criminal ‘cartels’. However, since the inception of the international anti-money laundering (AML) regime there is a growing awareness that the regime is not working as well as intended.¶ A case in point is the recent HSBC money laundering scandal: from 2006 to 2010, the Sinaloa cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle cartel in Colombia moved more than $881 million in drug proceeds through HSBC’s US and Mexican branches. Most observers suspect that this is only the tip of the iceberg. In total, the bank’s US and Mexican branches failed to effectively monitor the origin of more than $670 billion in wire transfers and more than $9.4 billion in purchases of US dollars from HSBC Mexico.¶ Traf­fickers would sometimes deposit hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash in a single day into a single account using boxes designed to fit the precise dimension of the tellers’ windows in HSBC’s Mexico branches. In December 2012, US federal and state authorities negotiated a $1.92 billion fine with the London-based HSBC to settle charges rather than seeking a criminal indictment against the bank. The fine is less than 10 per cent of HSBC’s $20.6 billion worldwide profit before taxes for 2012 and is about five weeks of income for the bank. HSBC’s US branch offered correspondent banking services to HSBC’s Mexican branch, treating it as a low risk client, despite the obvious money laundering and drug trafficking chal­lenges in Mexico. Services included high risk clients like casas de cambio (currency exchange houses), high risk products like US dollar accounts in the Cayman Islands, a secrecy jurisdiction, with inadequate customer due diligence and weak AML controls.¶ The evidence in the case suggests that customers barely had to submit a real name and address, much less explain the legitimate origins of their deposits. The Mexican branch transported $7 billion in cash US dollars to the US branch from 2007 to 2008, outstripping other Mexican banks, even one twice its size, raising red flags that the volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States.

Scenario 1 is the Drug Trade: 

Drug violence is escalating now—spilling over into Latin America
Rawlins ’13 – editor at CFR (Aimee, “Mexico’s Drug War,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/11/13, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689#p4)
Mexico's War Effort From 2006 to 2012, Calderón sent more than 50,000 soldiers onto Mexico's streets, invested billions of dollars on equipment and training, attempted to vastly reform the police and judicial systems, and strengthened Mexico's partnership with the United States (PDF). But a legacy of "political manipulation of law enforcement and judicial branches, which limited professionalization and enabled widespread corruption" has left the government with "only weak tools to counter increasingly aggressive crime networks," writes CFR's Shannon O'Neil in America's Quarterly. The police are easily bought, in part because in many cities, they earn less than teachers or even burrito vendors. On the website InSight Crime, Patrick Corcoran notes that "an underpaid officer could double or triple his salary by simply agreeing to look the other way." The CFR report notes police agencies "suffer from dangerous and deplorable working conditions, low professional standards, and severely limited resources." The Calderón administration attempted to counter police corruption by dramatically increasing the role of the military in the fight against drug cartels. Not only have tens of thousands of military personnel been deployed to supplement, and in many cases replace, local police forces, they have also been heavily recruited to lead civilian law enforcement agencies (PDF). Mexico's judicial system—with its autocratic judges and lack of transparency—is also highly susceptible to corruption. The Congressional Research Service report noted that even when public officials are arrested for working with a cartel, they are rarely convicted. Calderón's militarization strategy also resulted in accusations of serious human rights abuses. A November 2011 report by Human Rights Watch found that "rather than strengthening public security in Mexico, Calderón's 'war' has exacerbated a climate of violence, lawlessness, and fear in many parts of the country." The report, which looked at five states, documented more than one hundred and seventy cases of torture, thirty-nine disappearances, and twenty-four extrajudicial killings. Despite the problems associated with the militarization of Mexican law enforcement, the administration has heralded the successes of its offensive against the cartels. Through bilateral cooperation with the United States, the government killed or captured twenty-five of the top thirty-seven most wanted drug kingpins in Mexico. Escalating Violence Instead of diminishing the cartels' presence, in many instances Calderón's strategy amplified drug-related violence. According to the Mexican government's figures, as of September 2012, a total of 47,515 people have been killed in drug-related violence since Calderón began his military assault on criminal cartels. Since 2006, more than 3,000 Mexican soldiers and police have been killed by the cartels (NPR). Moreover, in 2010, the nature of the violence began to shift. Since January 2010, more than twenty sitting mayors have been killed by cartels (IBT), and many other politicians have since been murdered or have disappeared. Massacres of civilians, beheadings, and mass graves also have becomeincreasingly common (Reuters). The eradication efforts also have led to violent succession battles within the cartels (PDF). Claremont McKenna Mexico expertRoderic Camp notes that in addition to drug-related homicides, there is an increase "in homicides that are the product of one cartel killing members of another cartel." In 2012, Mexico's attorney general said that the crackdown on cartel leaders splintered the organizations, creating between sixty and eighty new cartels (Reuters). The Committee to Protect Journalists cites Mexico as the eighth-deadliest country for reporters. Traditional media outlets have come to fear reprisals for reporting drug-related crimes, which has led to an increased use of blogs and social media outlets, although these, too, have been increasingly targeted by the cartels (AS/COA). And while violence has decreased in some areas, a report by the University of San Diego's Trans-Border Institute found that in other states, it dramatically increased (PDF),showing that, "at best, troop deployments appeared to merely displace the violence." The violence is also spilling into other parts of Central America (FP). In 2011, 60 percent of cocaine traffic into the United States traveled through Mexico via Central America, up from 1 percent in 2007, which is considered a significant contributor to the region's high murder rates. Regions such as Guadalajara and Veracruz, once thought safe, are being affected by the violence as well (NYT).

Money laundering is key—cartels rely on banks for transactions  
(Feinstein 13, senior United States Senator,  “The Buck Stop Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices”, US Caucus on International Narcotics Control, April 2013, http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee)
Over the last three years, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control has released bipartisan reports focused on U.S. counternarcotics policies and efforts in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and Afghanistan. In carrying out this work, we have become convinced that we cannot stop the drug trade without first cutting off the money that flows to drug trafficking organizations. Money laundering – very often through legitimate U.S. businesses and financial institutions – must be stopped to make real progress in curtailing the drug trade.¶ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that $1.6 trillion, or 2.7 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), was laundered in 2009. If one only takes into account financial flows related to drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime, $580 billion or 1 percent of global GDP was laundered in 2009.5¶ John Cassara, a former Treasury agent and an anti-money laundering expert, explains that we should be most concerned with how few U.S. drug proceeds are captured by authorities. He writes:¶ “The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that Americans spend approximately $65 billion per year on illegal drugs. Yet according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), only about $1 billion is seized per year domestically by all federal agencies combined. The approximately 1.5 percent successful seizure rate is actually even more depressing because identifying bulk cash related to drugs is probably the most straight forward anti-money laundering investigation. So we can infer the seizure rate is much worse for other kinds of money laundering in the United States that collectively total in the hundreds of billions of dollars.”6¶ Statistics regarding the amount of illicit drug proceeds leaving the United States vary widely which speaks to how little U.S. authorities know about how much money is moved, stored and laundered annually. The National Drug Intelligence Center estimates that Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations “annually generate, remove and launder between $18 billion and $39 billion in wholesale distribution proceeds,” much of it across the U.S. Southwest border.7 While statistics on illegal activities are never easy to come by, we must do¶ significantly more to bring to light the extent to which proceeds from crime flow through our legitimate financial institutions.¶ Who are the Launderers?¶ In several briefings, Caucus staff was told that increasingly, it is not drug trafficking organizations themselves who launder money but instead third-party contractors.8 These individuals act as “facilitators” helping transnational criminals to launder money through the legitimate financial system. In July 2011, President Obama released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime which effectively explains the role of these facilitators:¶ “Transnational organized criminal networks rely on industry experts, both witting and unwitting, to facilitate corrupt transactions and to create the necessary infrastructure to pursue their illicit schemes, such as creating shell corporations, opening offshore bank accounts in the shell corporation’s name, and creating front businesses for their illegal activity and money laundering. Business owners or bankers are enlisted to launder money, and employees of legitimate companies are used to conceal smuggling operations.”9¶ Heather Lowe, with the Washington, D.C. based research and advocacy organization Global Financial Integrity, points out that much more needs to be done to hold these facilitators accountable. She explains, “One of the biggest problems that I see in getting to grips with transnational crime is that we do not hold facilitators accountable in a way that dissuades them, their colleagues and anyone else looking to get a piece of the action but who may not otherwise be a hardened criminal, from getting involved.”

Mexican cartels threaten Latin American stability—
Beittel ’13 – analyst in Latin American affairs (June, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence,” Congressional Research Service, 4/15/13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf)

As violence continues at a high level and to reach more of Mexico’s territory, some observers and policy analysts are continuing to raise concerns about the Mexican state’s stability. The Calderón government strongly objected to the so-called “failed state” thesis that was put forward by some analysts in 2008 and 2009, which suggested that the Mexican government was no longer exercising sovereignty in all areas of the country.18 However, in early August 2010, when former President Calderón initiated a series of public meetings to discuss his counterdrug strategy, he described the violence perpetrated by the DTOs as “a challenge to the state, an attempt to replace the state.”19 While some observers consider parts of Mexico lost to DTO control, this is definitely not the case for most of the country.20 In September 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that the violence by the DTOs in Mexico may be “morphing into or making common cause with what we would call an insurgency.”21 This characterization was quickly rejected by the Mexican government and revised by then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela, the Director of the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy Gil Kerlikowske, and later reportedly by President Barack Obama.22 It became clear that the Obama administration generally rejects the term “insurgency” to describe the violence of drug traffickers in Mexico and their objectives. However, many U.S. government officials and policy makers have concerns about the Mexican government’s capacity to lower the violence in Mexico and control insurgent-like or terrorist tactics being employed by the DTOs. Congressional Concerns Mexico’s stability is of critical importance to the United States and the nature and the intensity of the violence has been of particular concern to the U.S. Congress. Mexico shares a nearly 2,000mile border with the United States and has close trade and demographic ties. In addition to U.S. concern about this strategic partner and close neighbor, policy makers have been concerned that the violence in Mexico could “spill over” into U.S. border states (or further inland) despite beefed up security measures. According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice, the potential harm of Mexico’s criminal groups is formidable. Mexican DTOs and their affiliates “dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States” and are present in more than 1,000 U.S. cities.

Latin American instability causes global conflicts
Manwaring, 5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson, Retired U.S. Army colonel (Max G., “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.

Scenario 2 is Terrorism-- 

Two internal links---
First is funding--- laundering money is key to sufficient capital
White House ‘11– (President of the United States Barack Obama, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” the White House, July 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf)

Threats to the Economy, U.S. Competitiveness, and Strategic Markets. TOC threatens U.S. economic interests and can cause significant damage to the world financial system through its subversion, exploitation, and distortion of legitimate markets and economic activity. U.S. business leaders worry that U.S. firms are being put at a competitive disadvantage by TOC and corruption, particularly in emerging markets where many perceive that rule of law is less reliable. The World Bank estimates about $1 trillion is spent each year to bribe public officials, causing an array of economic distortions and damage to legitimate economic activity. The price of doing business in countries affected by TOC is also rising as companies budget for additional security costs, adversely impacting foreign direct investment in many parts of the world. TOC activities can lead to disruption of the global supply chain, which in turn diminishes economic competitiveness and impacts the ability of U.S. industry and transportation sectors to be resilient in the face of such disruption. Further, transnational criminal organizations, leveraging their relationships with state-owned entities, industries, or state-allied actors, could gain influence over key commodities markets such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals, along with potential exploitation of the transportation sector. Crime-Terror-Insurgency Nexus. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to TOC to generate funding and acquire logistical support to carry out their violent acts. The Department of Justice reports that 29 of the 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the United States, were associated with terrorist groups. Involvement in the drug trade by the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is critical to the ability of these groups to fund terrorist activity. We are concerned about Hizballah’s drug and criminal activities, as well as indications of links between al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and the drug trade. Further, the terrorist organization al-Shabaab has engaged in criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom and extortion, and may derive limited fees from extortion or protection of pirates to generate funding for its operations. While the crime-terror nexus is still mostly opportunistic, this nexus is critical nonetheless, especially if it were to involve the successful criminal transfer of WMD material to terrorists or their penetration of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.

Mexico is the prime target—safe haven for criminal transactions  
Lanzante ’09 – area port director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, masters from the University of Illinois, master’s in security studies from the Naval Postgraduate School (Joseph, “The Relationship Between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations and Human Smuggling,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514191)
Western Hemisphere countries present a variety of conditions that favor transnational crime and terrorist activity (Berry et al., 2003). In particular, Mexico, Central America, and the Tri Border Area (TBA) of South America present similar problems for U.S. security. However, the U.S itself is also ripe for transnational crime and terrorist activity. The criminal and terrorist organizations in these parts of the Western Hemisphere, including the U.S., are known for their activities associated with drug smuggling, human smuggling, money laundering, and fund raising activities in support of terrorism. Mexico serves as a safe haven for transnational criminal and terrorist groups because of its geographic proximity to the U.S., fluid cross-border movement of people, goods, and cash, an existing criminal infrastructure, and an environment of corruption among Mexican institutions (Berry et al., 2003). For example, there are alien smuggling and document forgery rings in Mexico that are linked to MS-13 and M-18. There are also Russian criminal organizations engaged in a wide array of illegal activities in Mexico, which include drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, and alien smuggling (Miro and Curtis, 2003). Additionally, Asian criminal organizations are active in Mexico and have partnered with the domestic alien smuggling and human trafficking rings. Furthermore, there are alien smuggling rings that specialize in smuggling Middle Eastern nationals into the U.S. (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005). 43 A Mexican immigration official stated in January 2002 that there are people linked to terrorism in Mexico. He went on to identify Hezbollah and made reference to others that have links to Osama Bin Laden (Miro and Curtis, 2003). He further expounded that there are six or seven organizations with links to terrorist groups, but the six or seven are not engaged in terrorist activities. Mexico’s immigration service denies the statements made by the immigration official. According to Berry et al., (2003), the larger and more sophisticated drug trafficking groups in Mexico are less likely to knowingly cooperate with terrorist groups because of the risk to their narcotics empire. However, some of the smaller, less established criminal organizations may be more willing to engage in a relationship with terrorist organizations. Central and South America are popular transit points because of their proximity to the U.S. and the ease with which migrants from other countries with terrorist ties can, legally or through bribery, obtain tourist visas (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005). According to the March 2009 report titled Operation Cazando Anguilas or “hunting eels” (outsourced by the Department of Defense to a Latin American security consulting company), there is an alliance between terrorist organizations in Latin America, Mexican drug cartels, and “Muslim businessmen.” Apparently, the Muslim businessmen are providing the drug cartels and terrorist organizations with money laundering services. Furthermore, the Muslim businessmen, drug cartels, and Central American gangs (i.e., MS-13 and M-18) are collaborating to smuggle Persons of Interest of Islamic Origin (PIIO) from terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah into the U.S. (Kimery, 2009). The drug cartels and gangs are acting as the “street enforcers” for these operations and MS-13 and M-18 are providing the “transportation security.” The PIIO’s are “Muslims who are arriving in Panama and Central America via Venezuela and Colombia.” The report describes them as “shooters” and “managers of some terrorist element.” Operation Cazando Anguilas reveals that approximately two years ago a peace treaty was “negotiated” between the gangs by “Muslim businessmen” in order to increase the “success of currency, drug, and human smuggling operations managed by these 44 Muslim Kingpins” (Kimery, 2009). This alliance provides radical Islamic supporters with access to MS-13 and M-18’s expansive and fully capable network throughout Central America, Mexico, and the U.S. According to Johnson and Muhlhausen (2005) and National Gang Intelligence Center (2009) MS-13 are experts at gaining illegal entry into the U.S. and will cross the U.S.-Mexico border with this as their sole intent. In order to assist PIIO smuggling, special schools have been set up by the Muslim businessmen to train the PIIO’s to speak Spanish and learn the Hispanic culture. Conversely, the gang members who escort the PIIO’s are taught Arabic and indoctrinated into Islamic fundamentalism (Kimery, 2009). Furthermore, Homeland Security Today obtained classified intelligence that some gang members are receiving Arabic and military training from Hezbollah at farms in Honduras that are owned by wealthy Muslim businessmen. 

Finance is the lifeblood  of terrorists organizations—the plan a prevents nuclear attack
(Gurulé  08, Professor of Law  of University of Notre Dame, has worked in a variety of high-profile public law enforcement positions including as Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2001-2003), where he had oversight responsibilities for the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice (1990-1992); and Assistant U.S. Attorney, where he served as Deputy Chief of the Major Narcotics Section of the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office (1985-1989) , Jimmy Gurulé, Terrorists Need Money to Terrorize, “Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism”, 2008)
Money is the 'lifeblood' of al Qaeda Arabic for ‘the base‘) and other like-¶ minded terrorist groups.‘ Al Qaeda and its global network of affiliated ter-¶ rorist organizations cannot successfully implement their deadly agenda¶ without ?nancial resources Shutting off the ?ow of funds to the global¶ jihadists can disrupt their shortterm operations while undermining their¶ long-term capabilities. 'Disrupting and dismantling terrorist ?nancing networks is essential to combat terrorism. Terrorist organisations’ diverse¶ requirement for ?nancing creates a strong logic for seeking to disrupt ter-¶ rorism by choking off funding ?ows to all terrorist-linked activities.‘-‘¶ Money is critical to ?nancing al Qaeda's terrorist operations (operational¶ costs) as well as sustaining its organizational infrastructure organizational¶ costs.4 Al Qaeda cannot pursue sophisticated operations like the 9/11¶ terror attacks without adequate funding. However. the Islamist militants¶ also need money to ?nance their organizational activities, including paying¶ operatives, recruiting and training new members, bribing government¶ officials, forging ties with other jihadist organizations, paying travel and¶ communications expenses and acquiring military weapons, explosives and¶ radiological materials to construct a nuclear device or ‘dirty bomb.“¶ Attacking the ?nancial infrastructure of al Qaeda is fundamentally a¶ preventive strategy That is, starving the terrorists of funding worldwide is¶ critical to preventing terrorist acts The ultimate goal is to save lives by pre-¶ venting the use of funds to fuel terrorist attacks However. going after the¶ money is important for other reasons as well. Investigating al Qaeda's¶ ?nancial network may ‘expose terrorist ?nancing “money trails" that may¶ generate leads to previously unknown terrorist cells and ?nanciers“¶ Identifying and disrupting channels of funding may also force members of¶ al Qaeda to use more costly and less efficient and reliable means to transfer¶ money globally to ?nance terrorist activities.7 Blocking the assets of front¶ companies, arresting terrorist ?nanciers, and shutting down corrupt¶ Islamic charities may further deter wealthy donors from providing ?nancial¶ assistance to al Qaeda. Simply stated, depriving al Qaeda of funding is as¶ important as targeting the operational terror cells themselves.“¶ Al Qaeda is pursuing a deadly agenda that threatens global peace and¶ security: Osama bin Laden, the Islamist militant group's inspirational and¶ ideological leader, has declared war against America and called upon all¶ Muslims to join in waging jihad or holy war against the United States and¶ its allies.” Bin Laden's global jihad sanctions the killing of innocent civil-¶ ians. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. the so-called ‘Blind Sheikh‘ and bin¶ Laden's spiritual adviser. '" has directed Muslims everywhere to:¶ Cut olT all relations with the Americans. Christians, and Jews, tear them to¶ pieces, destroy their economies, burn their corporations destroy their peace, sink¶ their ships, shoot down their planes and kill them on air, sea, and land. And kill¶ them wherever you may ?nd them. ambush them. take them hostage . . . Kill¶ these In?dels. . . . Fight them. and God will torture them through your hands.¶ and he will disgrace them and make you victorious over them."

Second is smuggling—
Mexico is key--- proximity and criminal networks
(Todd Steinmetz, master’s in terrorism and counterterrorism studies, homeland security analyst at Information and Infrastructure Technologies, worked for the National Guard, Texas Border Security Operations Center, and the Critical Infrastructure Protection Center, “Mitigating the Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Criminal Organizations,” Fall 2011, Journal of Strategic Security, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124andcontext=jss)

It is difficult to accurately quantify the true threat terrorists pose to American borders. Today, the primary statistic used by border security experts to evaluate the threat posed by terrorism is the number of Other than Mexicans (OTM) and SIAs encountered along the border. However, basing terrorist threat assessments on the number of OTMs and SIAs detained along the border is misleading. Not all SIAs are terrorists, and some individuals originating from non-special-interest countries could also pose a threat. It is unclear how many illegal aliens avoid capture, and therefore, just as difficult to define the number of SIAs entering the country each year. Terrorism at the Southwest Border History demonstrates that terrorists search for security gaps and invent creative ways to exploit them. In fact, terrorists rely on security weaknesses to operate effectively. International terrorist groups know that criminal organizations in Central and South America maintain well established networks that enable them to smuggle large quantities of narcotics and people across America's southern border. Terrorists could use these illicit criminal networks to smuggle weapons, chemicals, biological contaminants, and/or explosives into the United States. As Zapata County, Texas Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez observed: "If smugglers can bring in tons of marijuana and cocaine at one time and can smuggle twenty–thirty persons at one time, one can just imagine how easy it would be to bring in two to three terrorists or their weapons of mass destruction…chances of apprehension are very slim."31 Terrorists also know that large segments of both the northern and southern border remain relatively unsecured. It is a known fact that several radical international Islamic groups maintain significant operations in Central and South America and engage in money laundering, drug trafficking, arms dealing, and other legitimate and illegitimate means to funnel millions of dollars every year into the hands of transnational terrorists.32

Border security fails-drones prove,
(Andrew Becker ’13, journalist covering national security for the Center for Investigative Reporting, has reported in The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, New York times, Newsweek, Frontline, and NPR, former fellow at the UC Berkeley School of Journalism reporting on the U.S.-Mexico border, “New Drone Report: our Border is not as Secure as we Thought,” 4/4/13, The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/04/new-drone-report-our-border-is-not-as-secure-as-we-thought.html)

The U.S. Border Patrol has caught a fraction of the border crossers spotted by a sophisticated sensor mounted on unmanned spy aircraft and flown over remote stretches of desert, casting doubts on claims that the area is more secure than ever, according to documents obtained by the Center for Investigative Reporting. The border crossers were spotted with a new, all-seeing radar system developed for use in the Afghanistan War and patrolling above the U.S.-Mexico border in parts of Arizona since March 2012. The system can reveal every man, woman, and child under its gaze from a height of about 25,000 feet. Between October and December, records show, the remotely operated aircraft detected 7,333 border crossers during its Arizona missions. Border Patrol agents, however, reported 410 apprehensions during that time, according to an internal agency report. The sensor was credited with providing surveillance that led to 52 arrests and 15,135 pounds of seized marijuana. Dubbed VADER (Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar) and conjuring images of the Star Wars villain, the sensor can cover a wide swath of land and follow movement as it happens. The system, which is on loan from the U.S. Army, is used to identify roadside bombers in war zones. Customs and Border Protection officials, who aim to buy two systems for the agency, have touted the system’s effectiveness and testified before Congress that it is changing the Border Patrol’s long-term strategy on securing the border. Yet its unique abilities could shine an uncomfortable light on the agency’s ability to effectively patrol the border. The radar system is providing the Border Patrol with an important snapshot to judge what it calls “situational awareness”—what’s actually happening at the border. But it has left the agency grappling to measure its own success and define “security.” Using the system, remote operators can track vehicles and people on foot in real time and distinguish humans from animals. The technology allows the aircraft to fly above bad weather or dust storms that otherwise might ground it, while it sends signals to ground stations that display the human targets as moving dots or black-and-white images. The internal Customs and Border Protection intelligence report outlines several limitations of the system, including the obvious—it can’t tell the difference between a U.S. citizen and noncitizen. On-the-ground video and other sensors are sometimes needed to confirm these so-called nefarious tracks. And simply identifying someone crossing the border is just the first step. On the ground, Border Patrol agents often are not available to respond because of rugged terrain or other assignments. As a result, thousands of people have slipped through. At the Border Patrol, they’re known as “gotaways.” In one week in January, for instance, the sensor detected 355 “dismounts,” or on-foot movement, on the U.S. side of the border in Arizona. Border Patrol agents caught 125 of those, about 35 percent, while an additional 141 people evaded apprehension and 87 more turned back south to Mexico. Two were unaccounted for. The sensor detections led to more than 1,100 pounds of seized drugs. VADER “has proven to be an extremely effective system in countering threats and supporting the ground commander’s mission in theater,” Boomer Rizzo, a Department of the Army civilian who helps run the radar program, said in an email. “This sensor can track smaller and slower moving targets that traditional radar systems are not able to effectively operate against.” As for whether the system’s effectiveness has highlighted failures with the nation’s border security, Customs and Border Protection spokesman Michael Friel said the technology is still being tested and its accounting is being refined. The initial approach used to count who is caught and who evades arrest after VADER detections “was flawed and reflected an incomplete picture of border enforcement,” he said. “There is no silver bullet in border technology.” “The border is more secure than ever? Well, that’s a pretty low bar.” Specifically, the agency hadn’t accounted for apprehensions once the unmanned spy plane was no longer patrolling the area or ones made out of its view, he said. As Congress once again takes up immigration reform, Obama administration officials and others have pointed to the lowest levels of unauthorized border crossers—as measured by Border Patrol apprehensions—and plummeting crime statistics on the U.S. side as proof that their methods are working. Conservatives have long said that immigration reform cannot come before the border is secure. Immigration-reform supporters, while acknowledging the political need for border security, say the flood of migrants is a symptom rather than a root cause of complex problems now being addressed by Congress. Amid this debate, unauthorized border traffic has picked up in recent months in some parts of the country. In the Rio Grande Valley sector in South Texas, apprehensions jumped to 97,762 last year, an increase of 65 percent from the previous year, according to internal records. Some border experts speculate that more immigrants, particularly from Central America, are crossing in recent months because of excitement about an expected immigration-law overhaul, federal budget cuts, and the recent release of detained immigrants by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “The border is more secure than ever? Well, that’s a pretty low bar,” said Michael Nicley, who retired in 2007 as the Border Patrol’s sector chief in Tucson, Arizona. “Border Patrol agents would be the first to stick out their chests and say the border is under control. That’s not what they’re saying. Agents I talk to down here say we’re getting hammered.” Another recent Border Patrol report offers more insights into what VADER detects and how that information passes from one shift of on-duty agents to the next. The March report highlights various sensor detections—from groups of fewer than 10 to more than 100 south of the border. One group of nearly 20 wore booties to disguise its tracks. More than eight hours after VADER spotted them, they were labeled outstanding and passed to the next shift.

That means the plan solves the need for border security
(Goddard 12, Terry Goddard, JD from Arizona State University, made significant progress in attacking cartel money laundering, seizing approximately $20 million and culminating in an historic $94 million settlement with Western Union in February 2010. Goddard received the Kelly-Wyman Award for 2010, the top recognition given by his fellow Attorneys General., “The Solution: Follow the Money”, How To Fix a Broken Border, October 2012,  https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/publications-reports/2012-how-to-fix-a-broken-border-part-3-follow-the-money)
For all the political rhetoric and chest pounding about border security in recent¶ years, the U.S. has done very little, and¶ politicians have said almost nothing about¶ cutting off massive amounts of funds flowing illegally across the southwest¶ border and feeding the drug cartels. The¶ most basic, the most effective approach to fighting organized crime has always been to cut off their money. But this is not being¶ done in the case of the cartels. Billions of dollars in illegal revenue from the sale of drugs and other contraband continues to flow illegally into cartel pocketbooks, as well as to criminals inside the U.S.¶ The money pours over the border by many means, from bulk cash shipments and wire transfers to funnel bank accounts and stored value instruments. Most of these transactions clearly violate anti- money laundering laws. Yet, rather than disrupting this flow of cash, the U.S. government expends almost all of its border security resources building more fences and chasing would-be workers through the desert.

Nuclear terrorism is coming now-immediate and extreme danger,
(Meggaen Neely ‘13, researcher for the Project on Nuclear Issues at the CSIS, “Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,” 3/21/13, http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism)

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) cites nuclear terrorism as “today’s most immediate and extreme danger.” To counter this danger, the NPR lists research initiatives, securing nuclear materials, and a “commitment to hold fully accountable” any who help terrorists obtain nuclear weapons. Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel, the self-described authors of U.S. strategy for deterring terrorist networks, explain further how the United States can discourage terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon. They make useful distinctions between actors in terrorist organizations, which can have implications for U.S. policies. However, the United States should not rely exclusively on deterrence – that is, those policies that attempt to discourage terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon. Complementary policies that may be more effective will focus on securing nuclear materials and implementing defensive measures, in addition to conventional counterterrorism strategies. Although this shift will not make the task of preventing nuclear terrorism easier, recognizing the limits of deterrence policies will allow the United States to make smarter choices in defending against nuclear terrorism. Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism The risk that terrorists will set off a nuclear weapon on U.S. soil is disconcertingly high. While a terrorist organization may experience difficulty constructing nuclear weapons facilities, there is significant concern that terrorists can obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials. The fear that an actor could steal a nuclear weapon or fissile material and transport it to the United States has long-existed. It takes a great amount of time and resources (including territory) to construct centrifuges and reactors to build a nuclear weapon from scratch. Relatively easily-transportable nuclear weapons, however, present one opportunity to terrorists. For example, exercises similar to the recent Russian movement of nuclear weapons from munitions depots to storage sites may prove attractive targets. Loose nuclear materials pose a second opportunity. Terrorists could use them to create a crude nuclear weapon similar to the gun-type design of Little Boy. Its simplicity – two subcritical masses of highly-enriched uranium – may make it attractive to terrorists. While such a weapon might not produce the immediate destruction seen at Hiroshima, the radioactive fall-out and psychological effects would still be damaging. These two opportunities for terrorists differ from concerns about a “dirty bomb,” which mixes radioactive material with conventional explosives. According to Gary Ackerman of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the number of terrorist organizations that would detonate a nuclear weapon is probably small. Few terrorist organizations have the ideology that would motivate nuclear weapons acquisition. Before we breathe a sigh of relief, we should recognize that this only increases the “signal-to-noise ratio”: many terrorists might claim to want to detonate a nuclear weapon, but the United States must find and prevent the small number of groups that actually would. Transportable nuclear weapons and loose fissile materials grant opportunities to terrorists with nuclear pursuits. How should the United States seek to undercut the efforts of the select few with a nuclear intent?

Extinction
Ayson 10 Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, InformaWorld)
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

 Contention 2
Contention 2: Financial Credibility 

Financial credibility is on the brink now—the plan sustains it by increasing the perception of accountability-based government crackdowns
Johnson 13, Simon Johnson, professor of entrepreneurship at MIT's Sloan School of Management and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics , “Money-Laundering Banks Still Get a Pass From U.S.”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-31/money-laundering-banks-still-get-a-pass-from-u-s-.html, Mar 31, 2013)
Money laundering by large international banks has reached epidemic proportions, and U.S. authorities are supposedly looking into Citigroup Inc. (C) and JPMorgan Chase and Co. Governor Jerome Powell, on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, recently testified to Congress on the issue, and he sounded serious. But international criminals and terrorists needn’t worry. This is window dressing: Complicit bankers have nothing to fear from the U.S. justice system. To be on the safe side, though, miscreants should be sure to use a really large global bank for all their money-laundering needs. There may be fines, but the largest financial companies are unlikely to face criminal actions or meaningful sanctions. The Department of Justice has decided that these banks are too big to prosecute to the full extent of the law, though why this also gets employees and executives off the hook remains a mystery. And the Federal Reserve refuses to rescind bank licenses, undermining the credibility, legitimacy and stability of the financial system. To see this perverse incentive program in action, consider the recent case of a big money-laundering bank that violated a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, openly broke U.S. securities law and stuck its finger in the eye of the Fed. This is what John Peace, the chairman of Standard Chartered Plc (STAN), and his colleagues managed to get away with March 5. The meaningful consequences for him or his company are precisely zero. Chairman’s Statement At one level, this is farce. Standard Chartered has long conceded that it broke U.S. money-laundering laws in spectacular and prolonged fashion. In late 2012, it entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, agreeing to pay a fine that amounts to little more than a slap on the wrist (in any case, such penalties are paid by shareholders, not management). Then, on a March 5 conference call with investors, Peace denied that his bank and its employees had willfully broken U.S. law with their money-laundering activities. This statement was a clear breach of the deferred prosecution agreement (see paragraph 12 on page 10, where the bank agreed that none of its officers should make “any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by SCB set forth above or the facts described in the Factual Statement”). Any such statement constitutes a willful and material breach of the agreement. This is where the theater of the absurd begins. For some reason, it took the bank 11 business days, not the required five, to issue a retraction. No doubt a number of people, in the private and public sectors, were asleep at the switch. (The Justice Department and Standard Chartered rebuffed my requests for details on the timeline.) The implications of the affair are twofold. First, with his eventual retraction, Peace admitted that he misled investors. It also was an implicit admission that he had failed to issue a timely correction. Waiting 11 days to correct a material factual error is a serious breach of U.S. securities law for any nonfinancial company. Wake me when the Securities and Exchange Commission brings a case against Standard Chartered. Of course, it’s possible that Peace didn’t deliberately violate the deferred prosecution agreement because he hadn’t read it, or at least not all the way to page 10. Peace is an accomplished professional with a long and distinguished track record. Everyone can have a forgetful moment. That still doesn’t explain why the bank took so long to correct the facts. ¶ Leadership Matters Tone at the top matters, as reporting around JPMorgan Chase and its relationship with regulators makes clear. Will Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon be more cooperative than he was, for example, in August 2011 when he refused to provide detailed information on the goings-on in his investment bank? Why hasn’t Standard Chartered’s board, which is made up of talented and experienced individuals, forced out Peace as a result of this bungling? (I called for his resignation on my blog last week.) The only possible explanation is that the board thinks Peace did nothing wrong. They may even regard U.S. laws as onerous and the Department of Justice as heavy-handed. They would be entitled to their opinions, of course. But if they would like their bank to do business in the U.S., the rules are (supposedly) the rules. If used appropriately, permission to operate a bank in the U.S. grants the opportunity to earn a great deal of profit. At a recent congressional hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts asked what it would take for a company to lose its U.S. banking license. Specifically, “How many billions of dollars do you have to launder for drug lords?” Powell, the Fed governor, replied that pulling a bank’s license may be “appropriate when there’s a criminal conviction.” I have failed to find any cases of the Fed ordering the termination of banking activities in the U.S. for a foreign bank after a criminal conviction for money laundering. Nor, for that matter, has the Fed taken action to shut down a bank that signed a deferred prosecution agreement, which, in the case of Standard Chartered (STAN), was an acknowledgment of criminal wrongdoing. Nor has it taken action when such an agreement was violated. To see what the Fed is empowered to do under the International Banking Act, and working with state authorities, look at the case of Daiwa Bank, which received an Order to Terminate United States Banking Activities in 1995. Note to big banks: Don’t allow illegal trading in the U.S. Treasury market; on this, we may still have standards. By the way, in the case of Daiwa, there was no criminal conviction.

Investors evaluate it on a perception basis---  
Unger 06 (Brigitte Unger, professor at Utrecht University, chair of public sector economics at the Utrecht School of Economics, author of three books and other papers on money laundering, consultant for the Dutch Ministry of Finance, UNODC, and the EU on money laundering, and director of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences WSI, “The Amounts and the Effects of Money Laundering,” 2006, report for the Netherlands on money laundering, https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=4andved=0CEYQFjADandurl=http3A2F2Fwww.rijksoverheid.nl2Fbestanden2Fdocumenten-en-publicaties2Frapporten2F20062F022F162Fonderzoeksrapport-the-amounts-and-the-effects-of-money-laundering2Fwitwassen-in-nederland-onderzoek-naar-criminele-geldstromen.pdfandei=J6JLUqnNFeSIygG48YHwDAandusg=AFQjCNE0PWfm0lnYqMebmohTYcFS8xWVlAandsig2=x5hx0AljFv5tziAcWw7PQg
The great majority of authors are concerned with the effects of ML on the reputation of the financial sector. Organized crime can infiltrate financial institutions (FATF 2002a). Money laundering impairs the development of the financial sector for two reasons: First, it erodes financial institutions themselves; there is a correlation between money laundering and fraudulent activities undertaken by employees. Second, customer trust is fundamental to the growth of sound financial institutions. (Bartlett 2002). Once a financial institution becomes involved in money laundering operations and this is subsequently detected, it will loose credibility and customer confidence (Barlett 2002). Due to the perceived risk of fraud and corruption associated with money laundering, economic agents will choose to avoid such institutions and conduct their business elsewhere. This negative effect is not restricted solely to the institutions implicated. In the context of smaller countries, the involvement in money-laundering operations of several of its financial institutions can result in the loss of reputation of the financial system as a whole McDonell 1997, p. 9). Furthermore, even the potential for such an involvement is sufficient to damage financial credibility. As an illustrative example, McDonnell cites the Seychelles, which in 1996 passed legislation affording immunity from prosecution to anyone placing at least $10 million in certain investments. The aforementioned law was viewed by the international community as encouraging money laundering and brought about a warning to banks to deter from engaging in financial transactions with the Seychelles (McDonell 1997, p. 10). For a more recent update on the Seychelles see Rawlings and Unger (2005). 4.2.19 Illegal business contaminate legal business Illegal transactions can contaminate legal ones. According to Quirk (1997, p.4), certain perfectly legal transactions involving foreign participants are reported to have become less appealing as a result of alleged association with money laundering. Quirk does not provide any evidence in support of his assertion, which was subsequently taken up as a given in the literature (FATF 2002a, p. 3 and Camdessus 1998). His contention seems, however, logically given that association with money laundering or even just the possibility of such an association leads, as discussed above, to erosion of other economic agents’ confidence. On the other hand, it is also likely that such transactions and enterprises will become more appealing in launderer circles. By gaining a reputation of willingness to co-operate with launderers, they could potentially attract illegal capital (Alldridge 2002, p. 315).

Scenario 1: US-China Relations 

Financial credibility is key to relations—restoring trust after the financial crisis   
(Lieberthal and Pollack 12, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. Lieberthal was a professor at the University of Michigan for 1983-2009, and Jonathan D. Pollack, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council from August 1998 to October 2000, and Jonathan D. Pollack, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program and director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. A specialist on East Asian international politics and security, he has published extensively on Chinese political-military strategy, U.S.-China relations, “Establishing Credibility and Trust¶ The Next President Must Manage America’s Most Important Relationship”, Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/16-china-lieberthal-pollack, March 16, 2012)
In the coming presidential term, the administration will need to confront the reality that the single biggest factor determining the shape of the U.S.-China relationship will be the extent of America’s success in getting its domestic house in order. It will therefore need to focus enormous attention on setting the United States on a fiscally sound path that includes allocating resources for investments necessary for long-term growth and innovation. ¶ Whoever is president during 2013–17 also must work to establish initiatives with the new Chinese leadership that hold out the possibility of building greater trust based on deeper consultations and concrete actions. A key part of achieving this goal is to conduct in-depth, sustained discussions of U.S. and Chinese military doctrines in Asia, their perspectives toward potential contingencies on the Korean peninsula, their efforts to address their respective domestic economic challenges, and the prospects for the coordination of development assistance and possibly other policies in Central Asia. ¶ The Obama Administration’s Record¶ President Obama entered office convinced of the need to place U.S. relations with Asia at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. In the president’s view, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and advances in the struggle against al Qaeda should enable a rebalancing of U.S. attention and engagement toward the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. As the self-declared “first Pacific president,” he believed regional issues in the Asia-Pacific had not received full or appropriate attention in the aftermath of September 11. He sought at the same time to avoid the increased tensions in U.S.-China relations that have typically occurred during the first year of a new president’s term. ¶ However, the mushrooming global financial crisis of 2008–09 had immediate consequences for how the U.S. and Chinese leaderships perceived their respective interests and capabilities. Before 2008 Beijing had viewed the United States as having the most capable financial system in the world, and it anticipated that China would not be seen as a major global player until 2013 or later. But the financial crisis changed this—Beijing regarded the crisis as “made in America,” and Washington’s credibility for financial wisdom and prowess declined precipitously. In addition, Beijing suddenly found that its own relative standing in the global pecking order had advanced far faster than anyone there had anticipated. ¶ President Obama decided that the United States should treat China as an emergent global power and that China must assume responsibilities commensurate with its increased economic weight. He broached these possibilities in his first meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao at the G-20 summit in London in April 2009, where both leaders discussed their respective plans for global economic recovery. ¶ During 2009 the Obama administration sought to sketch out a vision for long-term U.S.-China relations that involved efforts to reassure Beijing of U.S. strategic intentions, while also inviting China’s greater participation in the redesign of global institutions. Both presidents assented to ambitious shared goals in a joint communiqué issued during President Obama’s state visit to China in November 2009. Three areas were identified as comprising the principal components of a twenty-first-century policy agenda: reform of global financial arrangements and institutions; heightened attention to mitigating the effects of climate change (the United States and China already ranked as the leading emitters of greenhouse gases); and accelerated efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, with North Korea and Iran the immediate test cases. At the same time, Washington and Beijing agreed to manage their differences over an inherited array of bilateral issues so as not to permit differences over any one issue to spill over and disrupt the entire relationship. The Obama administration felt that treating China as a major power and according it the opportunity to contribute directly to designing the future global order would foster far closer bilateral ties. ¶ Relations since Obama’s November 2009 visit to China have fallen well short of expectations. Though the atmosphere bilaterally has remained generally quite positive, most of the administration’s longer-term policy objectives have remained unmet. The unprecedented frequency and scope of exchanges at senior leadership levels (including numerous meetings and telephone conversations between the two presidents and between Cabinet officers) have not produced genuine strategic trust between both countries. Bilateral relations are not confrontational or zero-sum, but they lack a sense that both leaderships are prepared to act fully on a mutual recognition of shared interests. 

Cooperation is key to regional wars that escalate
(Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, chair of China Studies, senior associate with the Pacific Forum at the CSIS, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” April 2012, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)
The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult. A second contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over natural gas deposits, especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling. The United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June 2011, a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China, Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands. With improving political and military ties between Manila and Washington, including a pending agreement to expand U.S. access to Filipino ports and airfields to refuel and service its warships and planes, the United States would have a great deal at stake in a China-Philippines contingency. Failure to respond would not only set back U.S. relations with the Philippines but would also potentially undermine U.S. credibility in the region with its allies and partners more broadly. A U.S. decision to dispatch naval ships to the area, however, would risk a U.S.-China naval confrontation. Disputes between China and Vietnam over seismic surveys or drilling for oil and gas could also trigger an armed clash for a third contingency. China has harassed PetroVietnam oil survey ships in the past that were searching for oil and gas deposits in Vietnam's EEZ. In 2011, Hanoi accused China of deliberately severing the cables of an oil and gas survey vessel in two separate instances. Although the Vietnamese did not respond with force, they did not back down and Hanoi pledged to continue its efforts to exploit new fields despite warnings from Beijing. Budding U.S.-Vietnam relations could embolden Hanoi to be more confrontational with China on the South China Sea issue. The United States could be drawn into a conflict between China and Vietnam, though that is less likely than a clash between China and the Philippines. In a scenario of Chinese provocation, the United States might opt to dispatch naval vessels to the area to signal its interest in regional peace and stability. Vietnam, and possibly other nations, could also request U.S. assistance in such circumstances. Should the United States become involved, subsequent actions by China or a miscalculation among the forces present could result in exchange of fire. In another possible scenario, an attack by China on vessels or rigs operated by an American company exploring or drilling for hydrocarbons could quickly involve the United States, especially if American lives were endangered or lost. ExxonMobil has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Vietnam, making this an existential danger. In the short term, however, the likelihood of this third contingency occurring is relatively low given the recent thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an agreement outlining principles for resolving maritime issues. The effectiveness of this agreement remains to be seen, but for now tensions appear to be defused. Strategic warning signals that indicate heightened risk of conflict include political decisions and statements by senior officials, official and unofficial media reports, and logistical changes and equipment modifications. In the contingencies described above, strategic warning indicators could include heightened rhetoric from all or some disputants regarding their territorial and strategic interests. For example, China may explicitly refer to the South China Sea as a core interest; in 2010 Beijing hinted this was the case but subsequently backed away from the assertion. Beijing might also warn that it cannot "stand idly by" as countries nibble away at Chinese territory, a formulation that in the past has often signaled willingness to use force. Commentaries and editorials in authoritative media outlets expressing China's bottom line and issuing ultimatums could also be a warning indicator. Tough language could also be used by senior People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers in meetings with their American counterparts. An increase in nationalistic rhetoric in nonauthoritative media and in Chinese blogs, even if not representing official Chinese policy, would nevertheless signal pressure on the Chinese leadership to defend Chinese interests. Similar warning indicators should be tracked in Vietnam and the Philippines that might signal a hardening of those countries' positions. Tactical warning signals that indicate heightened risk of a potential clash in a specific time and place include commercial notices and preparations, diplomatic and/or military statements warning another claimant to cease provocative activities or suffer the consequences, military exercises designed to intimidate another claimant, and ship movements to disputed areas. As for an impending incident regarding U.S. surveillance activities, statements and unusual preparations by the PLA might suggest a greater willingness to employ more aggressive means to intercept U.S. ships and aircraft.
Defusing a U.S.-China Incident
The history of crisis management in U.S.-China relations suggests that leaders in both countries go to great lengths to prevent a crisis from escalating to military conflict. Nevertheless, pre-crisis steps could be taken to limit the harmful consequences of a confrontation. Political agreements could be reached that would increase the possibility that communication mechanisms in place would be employed in a crisis. Steps should be taken to enhance operational safety at sea between U.S. and Chinese ships. Confidence-building measures should also be implemented to build trust and promote cooperation.

South China Sea conflict coming soon-disputes now,
(Joel Brinkley ‘13, professor of journalism at Stanford, Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign correspondent for the New York Times, “Tensions Rapidly Escalating Around South China Sea,” Politico, 2/24/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/tensions-rapidly-escalating-around-south-china-sea-88012.html)

China’s assertion that almost all of the South China Sea and adjacent waters are part of its territory seems to be growing more dangerous with each passing week. China and Japan are scrambling fighter jets in their faceoff over disputed islands. Last month, China “painted” a Japanese military helicopter and destroyer with weapons-lock radar — bringing harsh criticism from Japanese and American military officials. The Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and several other states are responding angrily to their own territorial disputes with China, so that a common refrain among analysts and observers has become “one stupid mistake could start a war.” Already, Xi Jinping, China’s new leader, has told the state’s military to “prepare for war.” But as this crisis continues and worsens month after month, the one player seldom heard from is the United States. And China is making it plain that Beijing is little worried about America. “From a Chinese perspective, 2013 appears to bear similarities to 1913,” Ruan Zongze, vice president of the China Institute of International Studies, the Foreign Ministry’s official think tank, said last month at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Hong Kong. One century ago “marked the rise of the West,” he intoned. But today, “the opposite is happening with money, power and influence flowing away from America and the West into Asia. “It’s déjà vu all over again” — except in reverse, he said. Ruan, like many other Chinese, also blames the United States military’s “pivot” to Asia for stirring trouble in the region. But in fact, China’s aggressive expansionism began even before that — born of two domestic political needs. Xia Yeliang, an economics professor at Peking University, noted in an interview that a few years ago some in the military were growing restless and wanted to start some kind of military conflict with Japan, China’s longtime adversary, to regain their relevance. President Hu Jintao was unwilling to go along with that. But as China’s social and economic situation continued to deteriorate, Xia and others said, in the spring of 2009 another opportunity arose for re-establishing military relevance — while also distracting disgruntled Chinese with a new foreign conflict. That’s when most nations had to file papers with the United Nations stating their offshore jurisdictions as part of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Much earlier, in 1946, pushed by the West to clarify its maritime position, the Republic of China had issued an official map showing its claim to nearly all of the South China Sea. Few paid attention then because a few years later the Chinese Communist Party defeated the nationalist Kuomintang and seized control of the country. But in 2009, when it came time for each nation to give the United Nations documentation of its claim to maritime territory, the Chinese government officially submitted that 1946 map. Since then, it has repeatedly asserted that nearly the entire sea and adjacent waters are “an inherent part of Chinese territory.” “This was the first time China had brought this up since 1946,” Yann-huei Song, a research fellow at the Institute of European and American studies in Taipei, Taiwan, said in an interview. So China’s claim that U.S. provocation is responsible for the South China Sea dispute is wrong. President Barack Obama didn’t first raise his notion of the pivot from the Middle East to Asia until late in 2011. And since then, the State Department has repeatedly said it would not take sides in the debate — even after China changed the map of its territory printed in Chinese passports to include 80 percent of the South China Sea. (Vietnam refuses to stamp those new passports. Instead, it stamps a piece of paper and inserts that into the passport.) Visiting the region last fall, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the Asian states to draw up a code of conduct for the nations bordering the South China Sea but added: “The United States does not take a position on competing territorial claims or land features” — even though the farthest point China now claims is more than 1,200 miles away from the Chinese mainland. (One reason the U.S. may be deferring is that Congress never ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty. Republicans blocked ratification once again last year. ) That’s just fine with Beijing. “China doesn’t want the U.S. involved in any way,” said Jose Cuisia Jr., the Philippines’ ambassador to the United States, at a Stanford University conference. China’s territorial assertions have alienated almost everyone in the neighborhood — perhaps finally giving the Chinese military what it wanted: new relevance. “Yes, China doesn’t have any partners in the region anymore,” Song said. Except one — Cambodia. China is pouring more money into Cambodia than all the other donor nations combined — $8 billion in the past few years. After meeting with Chinese officials in Beijing last year, Prime Minister Hun Sen won a commitment for an additional $5 billion over the next several years. Most important, that money comes with no strings attached — no demands to end corruption, home seizures, dissident repression or any of Cambodia’s many other social ills — problems also endemic to China. China has essentially purchased Cambodia’s loyalty, which has proved to be quite useful for Beijing. At the same time, landlocked Laos is an ambivalent ally. The two nations have a fraught history. North Korea is a resentful, dependent state. Everyone else in the region is angry over China’s expansionist maritime claims. Last year, Cambodia held the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN’s two meetings last year were held in Phnom Penh with Hun Sen as conference chairman. The first was in July, and when ASEAN delegates traveled to Phnom Penh from the airport, they saw billboards along the highway honoring Chinese President Hu, as well as hundreds of tiny Chinese flags hanging everywhere. Hu had visited Hun Sen a short time earlier, but neither country said anything meaningful about their discussion. In the region, however, all the speculation centered on China’s concern that the ASEAN states would try to put out a joint code of conduct for the ongoing South China Sea dispute. Hu, it was said, wanted Hun Sen to be sure that did not happen, and the Cambodian leader manage to keep that subject off the agenda. When the conference ended, ASEAN issued no final statement for the first time in its 45-year history. Then, in November, Obama attended the second and final ASEAN conference in Cambodia. He was the first American president to visit the country, and as he was driven from the airport into town the streets were virtually deserted. All he could see from his vehicle window were Chinese flags and billboard portraits, this time of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who was also attending the meeting. A few days earlier, thousands of Cambodians had gathered along the streets to wave and cheer as Wen drove into town, regional papers reported. At the end of the meeting, Hun Sen read a statement asserting that ASEAN had reached consensus: The South China Sea controversy would not be “internationalized” — meaning that each ASEAN nation would have to negotiate with China on its own. That’s exactly what China wanted. “China wants bilateral talks with each of the nations,” said I-Hsin Chen, vice president of the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies in Taiwan. “But the U.S. and Asian states want multilateral talks.” As the conference closed, nearly all of the other ASEAN members angrily complained that they’d never agreed to any such thing. But it was too late. Still, as that conference closed, Cambodia’s chairmanship ended, and Hun Sen passed the gavel to Brunei — a small, wealthy state that will serve as chairman through 2013. It takes no money from China; Brunei doesn’t need it. Brunei also is involved in a barely significant territorial dispute with China — a submerged reef that both nations claim. But even with a more neutral ASEAN chairman, Cuisia, the Philippines’ ambassador, warned: “Territorial disputes between states are always difficult to resolve.”

Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/tensions-rapidly-escalating-around-south-china-sea-88012.html#ixzz2hGj2fDlc

Scenario 2: Banking 

Financial credibility is key to banks—the alternative is market collapse
(Johnson ’12 – professor of entrepreneurship at MIT, co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You” (Simon, “The Federal Reserve and the Libor Scandal,” New York Times, 7/19/12, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/the-federal-reserve-and-the-libor-scandal/)
Mr. Bernanke’s answer raises – but does not address – the central issue. The Federal Reserve is responsible for the “safety and soundness” of the financial system in the United States. Does allowing suspicions of fraud to continue unchecked at the heart of this system help to sustain the credibility and legitimacy of markets? Surely not.¶ Trust is essential to all financial transactions. When trust evaporates – or is smashed to oblivion through reckless and self-serving behavior at megabanks – the consequences can be dire.¶ The severity of the financial crisis in fall 2008 can be directly attributed to the collapse of trust among financial institutions. Cheating on Libor was not the only cause of this collapse but – if Mr. Bernanke is right and market participants knew what was going on – it must have contributed to it. Concerns about governance may be tolerated in boom times; when the economy goes sour, investors worry much more about who is hiding problems and may be about to collapse.¶ The Fed has jurisdiction whenever the safety and soundness of the financial system is at stake. Scott Alvarez, general counsel at the Board of Governors, acknowledged this point in a briefing to Senate staff members last week. According to The Financial Times:¶ In response to questions from Senate aides, Mr. Alvarez said that the Fed was unable to do more because the alleged manipulation of Libor did not constitute a so-called “safety and soundness” concern – a term used by bank regulators to signify threats to a lender’s viability.¶ It is hard to see how Mr. Alvarez and his colleagues could have been more wrong – manipulation of Libor most definitely raises safety and soundness concerns.¶ Third, why wasn’t the impact of potential Libor-related litigation included in recent stress tests for the American banks that may prove to be involved?¶ Three American banks are involved in Libor panels today – and apparently also during the period in question. (I have asked the British Bankers’ Association to confirm this and other details; it has indicated a willingness to help but was unable to respond by my deadline, and I will report on its information in a future post.) Bank of America is a member of the United States dollar Libor panel; Citigroup belongs to several of the larger Libor panels (including the United States dollar, the British pound and euro); and JPMorgan Chase is present on 9 of the 10 Libor panels.¶ One argument now being advanced from some financial circles against large fines for the banks involved is that this would reduce their shareholder capital enough to constitute a risk to the financial system.¶ More broadly, we do not yet know with whom Barclays personnel colluded – or the full extent of the damage to investors and borrowers. Consequently, no one yet knows the scale of balance-sheet damage that will be done by settlements of Libor-rigging claims.¶ This could even become a “tobacco moment,” in which an industry is forced to acknowledge its practices have been harmful – and enters into a long-term agreement that changes those practices and provides continuing financial compensation. Certainly attorneys general from states that have been damaged will be thinking along these lines.¶ Yet in his conference call with analysts on July 13, JPMorgan Chase’s chief executive, Jamie Dimon, was already discussing the possibility of resuming share buybacks later this year. It is hard to know how the Fed could agree to such reduction in shareholder capital. It is also hard to understand why the Fed continues to allow the payment of bank dividends under these circumstances.¶ The Libor scandal is different in some ways than other recent financial fiascos; it involves egregious, flagrant criminal conduct, with traders caught red-handed in e-mails and on tape. This is the definition of a “smoking gun.”¶ It is inexcusable and indefensible if these traders aren’t soon brought to account, facing criminal charges in court. That should be first step, with the full support of the Fed (although it obviously doesn’t run criminal investigations).¶ As Dennis Kelleher of Better Markets told Eliot Spitzer this week (see from around 3:29 in this excerpt): “Slapping handcuffs on these traders has to be the next step,” adding, “Handcuffs, squeeze them, handcuffs, squeeze them and move up the chain.” Mr. Kelleher continued, “This is an open and shut case” and “this is egregious criminal conduct.”¶ He went on: “There’s never been any accountability on Wall Street. Wall Street’s a high-crime area and the criminals are just let to run free. This would never be tolerated anywhere else in America, and it’s time to end the two sets of laws.”¶ This is what should have been done years ago for all the illegal behavior that led up to the crisis.¶ And the Fed should want this clean-up, in the interest of financial stability and ensuring future economic prosperity. The integrity and legitimacy of markets are at stake.¶ There are slight glimmers of hope that Fed thinking may be heading in the right direction, at least in thinking about the structure of the problem.

That escalates to full scale conflict—impact studies conclude affirmative
Royal, 2010 2010, Jedediah Royal is the Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives”, ed. By Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Financial stability is a preventive measure--  any other scenario for economic conflict could be controlled with banks are stable  
Mishra et al ’13 – Mishra is an economist specializing in the financial sector and Chief General Manager of the Reserve Bank of India, Majumdar is Director of the Financial Stability Unit of the Reserve Bank of India, and Bhandia is the General Manager of the Financial Stability Unit of the Reserve Bank of India (Rabi, S. Majumdar, and Dimple Bhandia, “Banking Stability-A Precursor to Financial Stability,” Reserve Bank of India, 1/18/13, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=14916)
The issue of financial stability is organically linked with banking stability. In fact the historical evidences demonstrate that those financial crisis which had stronger involvement of the banking sector had more devastating effect on the real sector in terms of fall in real output and reduction in employment level. The financial crisis of 2007-08 was no exception. The theoretical analysis of the events that preceded the financial crisis prove amply that whatsoever may the origin of the financial crisis be, its trigger took place in the banking sector. There are also evidences that the financial crisis persisted for a longer period because of weaknesses in the banking sector which went unnoticed for a longer period. In view of these developments there is an additional emphasis to ensure the stability of the banking sector by strengthening regulatory norms, focusing on empirical research on the leading indicators of banking stability and by preparing banking stability map and banking stability indicator.¶ Banking stability is a yardstick to determine whether an economy is sufficiently strong enough to withstand both the internal and external shocks. On the other side, financial stability is a by-product of stability conditions prevailing in the areas of banking, financial market and the real economy. Out of the three, banking stability conditions emerge as a vital ingredient to financial stability in a country. Banking stability in itself relies on the efficacies of the several parameters of individual banks, e.g., asset quality, liquidity, capital, costs and return on assets, etc. for its degree of stability during the period under review and in the days ahead. Though, the stability of the banking sector gets affected positively or negatively with the conditions prevailing in the financial market and the real economy; ultimately it determines as to what extent financial stability is ensured in the economy by its ability to absorb the shocks. Stability of the banking sector may, therefore, be treated as a forerunner of financial stability in an economy.¶ In view of these developments, in the recent period central banks and other supervisory authorities have started regularly assessing the situation in the banking sector with a focus on how the sector will evolve in the medium term. Initially, the issue of the banking stability was covered under the arena of banking crisis, which was based on the binary variables, signaling whether a banking sector is in crisis or not. But as banking crisis are rare birds, binary variable approach are less suitable to depict the condition of the sector. However, the absence of a full-blown crisis does not mean that the banking sector would continue to be stable in the medium term. In view of the limitations of binary variable oriented models, there have been efforts to develop banking stability indicator through which banking sector stress could be discerned. In fact the advantages banking stability indicator is that it represents a continuum of stability/instability describing the banking sector condition ranging from low level of stability, where the banking sector is in a stage of near crisis, to the high level of stability, when the banking sector is in tranquil.

Plan

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its assistance for coordinated anti-money laundering engagement to Mexico through the creation of an accountability-based bilateral Transnational Criminal Organization Finance Working Group.
Contention 3: Solvency
Mexico says yes-already requested stronger AML policy
Stier, 09— Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs (Ken, “Foreign tax cheats find US banks a safe haven”, Time—Business and Money, October 29, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933288,00.html)IK
Washington has spent much of this year showing how tough it is on tax cheats. The Justice Department triumphantly declared in August that it had reached a settlement with Swiss banking giant UBS for it to turn over the names of approximately 4,450 American account holders suspected by the IRS of evading taxes. This week, the IRS revealed the formation of a special task force to go after wealthy tax dodgers, and members of Congress introduced a bill to force foreign firms doing business in the U.S. to disclose all its U.S. clients with accounts overseas. (See 25 people to blame for the financial crisis.) But for all the bluster about cracking down on Americans who hide money overseas, the U.S. turns a virtual blind eye to foreign tax cheats who are parking money in the U.S. banking system. In particular, the U.S. effectively serves the role of Switzerland for Mexico, which suffers from rampant tax evasion — rates go as high as 70 among professionals and small businesses, and 40 among larger businesses. Much of the estimated $42 billion a year of illicit funds flowing out of Mexico each year (not including drug cartel money) ends up in U.S. banks, according to Global Financial Integrity, an advocacy group in Washington. Soon after the Obama Administration took office, Mexico sent Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner a letter complaining about the de facto secrecy U.S. banks offer Mexicans holding accounts by not reporting to anyone the names or interest income paid on those deposits. "The exchange of information on interest paid by banks will certainly provide us with a powerful tool to detect, prevent and control tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist financing, drug trafficking and organized crime," said the Feb. 9 letter from Mexican Finance Secretary Agustin Carstens, who also noted that the two countries do not have a "solid and reliable mechanism to verify actual residence of the foreign depositors." "Replace the nationalities mentioned in the letter, and you've replicated the UBS affair point for point," says Robert Goulder, international editor in chief at Tax Analysts, a nonprofit publisher about taxes worldwide, which first reported on the Carstens letter. "If you are a Mexican drug lord, you can put as much money as you want into U.S. banks. We ain't going to tax it, and the Mexicans can't tax it because they are never going to know about it. It's the financial equivalent of 'Don't ask, don't tell.' " It's not that the U.S. has no policies in place to stem the flow of illicit monies into the U.S. banking system. American banks are in fact required to file suspicious activity reports (SARs) for cash deposits over $10,000 or when they detect deposit patterns in lower amounts, known as "structuring." The problem is that the U.S. government is overwhelmed by more than a million of these reports a year. Computers can detect some irregularities, but these need to be combed through carefully by 85 SAR review teams — combining FBI, IRS, DEA and U.S. Attorneys — across the country. That's why, says international white collar crime lawyer Bruce Zagaris, "U.S. officials have practically begged banks to call them when they have something really good." (Read "The Stimulus Spending Bill: Is It Working at All?") This could change significantly with a seemingly simple regulatory adjustment, which Mexico has requested: they want the same information-exchange arrangement that Washington exclusively has with Canada, which automatically reports interest income paid by U.S. banks to Canadian account holders. "Being the world's largest trading block under the NAFTA, and fighting considerably the higher security threat than a decade ago, I truly believe that we should enhance our cooperation and strengthen our capacities to protect our peoples and wealth," Carstens wrote in his letter. 

Current US-Mexico approaches lack coordination—the plan is key
Realuyo ’12 – President of CBR Global Advisors, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, former State Department Director of Counterterrorism Finance Program (Celina, “It’s All about the Money: Advancing Anti-Money Laundering Efforts in the U.S. and Mexico to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” Wilson Center, 5/16/12, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Realuyo_U.S.-Mexico_Money_Laundering_0.pdf)
The U.S. and Mexico have made considerable progress in the fight against money laundering over the past few years. While there may be debate over the amount of money earned and laundered by criminal organizations, attacking the economic power of the Mexican-based TCOs has become an integral part of the U.S. and Mexican strategies to combat the TCOs. Constraining their operating environment and increasing their cost of doing business can damage the strength of the TCOs. To this end, there are several ways to further advance anti-money laundering efforts on both sides of the border. The way forward will require continued political commitment, the institutionalization of anti-money laundering measures and mechanisms, increased bilateral cooperation, and strategic communications to stigmatize transnational organize crime and money laundering with the general public. First, both the U.S. and Mexico must demonstrate the political will and continued resolve to confront TCOs and focus on their finances. To combat TCOs, we must strike at the heart of their operations – their money. While anti-money laundering investigations are complex and cannot be captured by videotape like a law enforcement raid on a suspected trafficker’s safe house, “following the money trail” often times leads law enforcement to TCO leadership or their financial facilitators, and disrupting TCO money laundering operations increase the cost of doing business. Many bilateral anti-money laundering initiatives are underway in the U.S. and Mexico as described above, but these activities and authorities are often dispersed amongst various governmental agencies making coordination more difficult. In this context, the U.S. and Mexico should establish a coordinating mechanism such as a bi-national TCO Finance Working Group that would enable the governments to consolidate information on all anti-money laundering initiatives and investigations underway on both sides of the border. Such a measure could enhance interagency and bilateral cooperation and help evaluate the successes or shortcomings of anti-money laundering efforts in combating transnational organized crime. Moreover, while both the U.S. and Mexico have the requisite legal authority and institutions in place to fight money laundering, they must dedicate adequate human and financial capital to more successfully pursue TCO financing. There have been indications that more staff will be added to anti-money laundering agencies in the U.S. and Mexico, but actions speak louder than words. On the strategic communications front, the U.S. and Mexico must educate and engage the private and civic sectors in the fight against the TCOs and money laundering.

Mexico is key—hotspot for laundering issues
Levin and Coburn ’12 – U.S. Senators on the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations (““U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History”, U.S. Senate, 7/17/12, https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=2andved=0CDgQFjABandurl=http3A2F2Fwww.levin.senate.gov2Fdownload2F3Fid3D90fe8998-dfc4-4a8c-90ed-704bcce990d4andei=I0EiUv-fL7G5sQTiw4GACQandusg=AFQjCNHb-VV1iGT7eowxZKuK-gOrvRFrvwandsig2=Rl-7k4EdKWmHLt0C6_5u6g)
According to U.S. law enforcement officials, Mexico remains one of the most challenging money laundering jurisdictions for the United States, especially with regard to the investigation of money laundering activities involving the cross-border smuggling of bulk currency from drug transactions. While Mexico has taken a number of steps to improve its anti-money laundering system, significant amounts of narcotics-related proceeds are still smuggled across the border. In addition, such proceeds can still be introduced into the financial system through Mexican banks or casas de cambio, or repatriated across the border without record of the true owner of the funds.”176¶ The State Department’s relentlessly negative assessments of Mexico’s drug trafficking and money laundering vulnerabilities continued unabated. In 2008, the State Department wrote that “U.S. officials estimate that since 2003, as much as U.S. $22 billion may have been repatriated to Mexico from the United States by drug trafficking organizations.”177 Four years later, in 2012, the State Department wrote that drug cartels were using Mexican and U.S. financial institutions to launder as much as $39 billion each year: “According to U.S. authorities, drug trafficking organizations send between $19 and $39 billion annually to Mexico from the United States.”178¶ Warnings. The State Department is far from the only governmental agency to have warned about the money laundering risks in Mexico. The U.S. Congress has held repeated hearings over the years highlighting money laundering and drug trafficking problems in Mexico.179 Witnesses have included the U.S. Justice Department, Homeland Security Department, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Customs and Border Patrol, and Coast Guard, among others. From 1996 to 2011, these hearings have painted the same grim picture drawn in the State Department’s annual reports regarding the drug trafficking and money laundering threats in Mexico.¶ In addition, warnings about money laundering problems in Mexico have been directed specifically to financial institutions operating in the United States. In 2005, multiple U.S. agencies worked together to produce a U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment which identified thirteen key money laundering methods and specifically identified Mexico as a high risk jurisdiction for several of them, including bulk cash smuggling, misuse of money orders, and suspicious funds sent through money service businesses.180 In 2006, FinCEN issued an advisory to all U.S. financial institutions to “better guard against an increasingly prevalent money laundering threat involving the smuggling of bulk U.S. currency into Mexico,” warning in particular against “the abuse of their financial services” by Mexican casas de cambio.181 The advisory explained that drug traffickers were smuggling bulk cash from the United States into Mexico, then depositing the funds with casas de cambios who were sending the cash back to the United States via armored transport or by selling the U.S. dollars to U.S. banks.182 The advisory also warned about multiple wire transfers that “bear no apparent business relationship” with a particular casa de cambio, and U.S. deposits by casas de cambio of sequentially numbered monetary instruments.183

We solve globally--
Modeling—Other countries replicate US policies—perceive us as central to global AML regime  
(Reuter 04, Peter Reuter, Professor in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Criminology at the University of Maryland. He served as editor of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management from 1999-2004. He founded and directed RAND's Drug Policy Research Center from 1989-1993 “The Anti–Money Laundering Regime”, Chasing Dirty Money, 2004, http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/381/4iie3705.pdf)
The US anti–money laundering regime is central to the global regime be- cause the central role of the US economy and financial system in the world today frequently results in the United States being the ultimate destination, or at least the conduit, for proceeds from crimes that may have been committed outside the country. Thus, the US AML regime is often, although not always, a model for other national regimes. The first column of table 4.1 chronologically lists the major developments in the US AML regime since 1970. Thumbnail descriptions of the major entries are in the glossary.¶ In many respects, the US prevention pillar is more elaborate and has evolved more than the enforcement pillar. Although the list of US predi- cate crimes that can give rise to money-laundering investigations and prosecutions has expanded substantially. In practice, there may be some tension between the two pillars, as when, for example, financial super- visory authorities are uncomfortable with the techniques of criminal inves- tigative authorities.

Enforcement--- US assistance across the globe is the status quo—plan provides the right framework
(Winer 98, JONATHAN WINER, Former DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,  “Statement to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services”, Committee on Financial Services—Democrats,  http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/banking/61198jw.shtml, 1998)
The Administration has created an anti-money laundering and financial crime program with activities that literally span the globe. Working in a coordinated fashion, U.S. diplomats, law enforcement agents, regulators and financial analysts have drafted and reviewed money laundering legislation and regimes in the Americas, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Europe and have provided training and technical assistance to countries seeking to strengthen their capabilities against money laundering.¶ In Russia, for instance, U.S. regulatory, law enforcement and foreign affairs specialists are working as a team with their counterparts to develop new laws, regulations and investigative capabilities. The Administration plans to implement new anti-money laundering initiatives in countries in countries throughout the world, including in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Romania. The Administration also has embarked upon an innovative, multi-year, multilateral training program with the European Union in conjunction with CFATF and UNDCP in the Caribbean to address the problem of money laundering in that region.¶ As technology improves and continues to provide new ways to steal and launder money, so too will the Administration marshall the resources necessary to thwart such criminal enterprises. With significant U.S. contributions, CFATF is attacking these problems by bringing together experts on issues such as cyberpayment systems and Internet gaming. With the active support of the United States and our international partners, CFATF is emerging as a model for development of other regional anti-money laundering organizations around the globe.¶ As money launderers and other financial criminals constantly search for jurisdictions with weak regulatory, legal and law enforcement regimes, the Administration is committed to raising international crime fighting standards by promoting the development of such regional organizations and encouraging those regional bodies to work together in a spirit of cooperation. In the coming years, the FATF will promote the development of regional FATF-style bodies and will likely increase its own membership to expand its effectiveness. As FATF norms continue to gain prominence throughout the world, so too do the anti-money laundering practices that the United States and other FATF members are continuing to develop and implement. In the same vein, the Administration is continuing to seek support of entities such as the multilateral development banks and regional political bodies to promote increased transparency and good governance practices by nations in which failure to adhere to these norms have resulted in financial or economic chaos.

US key Is key—we’re vulnerable now
(Stringer 11, Kevin D. Stringer , ¶ Visiting Professor of International Studies¶ Thunderbird School of Global Management , “Tackling Threat Finance: A Labor for Hercules or Sisyphus?”, 2011¶ http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011spring/Stringer.pdf)
If the United States government is going to lean on other world finan- cial centers, it needs to be self-critical and take domestic actions within the interagency process.69 According to research, the US is potentially the world’s leading money laundering center. This makes sense considering the US market is where a large portion of the global drug revenues are produced. Additionally, it represents a stable and secure location in which various entities can invest the monies. Even criminals run the risk of losing their assets in unsafe or higher risk locations.70 The quantitative research of John Walker and Brigitte Unger reveals that locations like the United States are extremely attractive for money laundering, and the subsequent investment of its proceeds. In fact, in one study, the United States was second out of five desirable locations for money launder- ing: behind Luxembourg and ahead of Switzerland.71¶ Jason Sharman, a political scientist at Australia’s Griffith University, concludes that, “In practice Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have much laxer regulation on shell corpora- tions than classic tax havens . . . And the U.S. is the worst on this score, worse than Liechtenstein and worse than Somalia.” 72 This conclusion was confirmed by a money-laundering threat assessment in 2005 conducted by the federal government which found that the corporate anonymity offered by Nevada, Delaware, and Wyoming rivaled that of some of the most infamous off-shore financial centers. In Nevada, its official website touts “limited reporting and¶ Spring 2011 111¶ Kevin D. Stringer¶ disclosure requirements” and a speedy one-hour incorporation service. Nevada does not ask for the names of company shareholders, nor does it routinely share information with the federal government. The state, with a population of only 2.6 million, incorporates about 80,000 new firms a year, currently totaling more than 400,000—roughly one for every six people. A study by the Internal Revenue Service found that 50 to 90 percent of those registering companies were already in breach of federal tax laws elsewhere.73 Delaware and Wyoming have similar records.74¶ The possibilities for misuse are endless. If these state laws are not changed, the US threat financing campaign will not be credible in the international context, leaving America with a vulnerability gap on its own territory. The Congress, in cooperation with state authorities, needs to alter the legal landscape in a number of states if the United States is going to eliminate this home for threat finance. This will require the cooperation of several agencies to investigate existing shell corporations in various jurisdictions. This strategy, however, is fraught with the potential to generate a firestorm regarding federal control and states’ rights, and will require sound legal steps to avoid political and judicial challenges. The lead for this effort should be the Department of Justice.¶ 

Bilateral accountability based policies are necessary to solve  
(Goddard 12, Terry Goddard, JD from Arizona State University, made significant progress in attacking cartel money laundering, seizing approximately $20 million and culminating in an historic $94 million settlement with Western Union in February 2010. Goddard received the Kelly-Wyman Award for 2010, the top recognition given by his fellow Attorneys General., “The Solution: Follow the Money”, How To Fix a Broken Border, October 2012,  https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/publications-reports/2012-how-to-fix-a-broken-border-part-3-follow-the-money)
The Manchester Guardian reported in April 2011 how hundreds of billions of dollars in “wire transfers, traveler’s cheques and cash shipments” were moved illegally through Wachovia Bank and across the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005 and the years preceding. These funds undoubtedly paid for murder and mayhem in Mexico, yet an investigation into Wachovia Bank’s procedures resulted in a fine of less than 10 percent of the money laundered and no criminal prosecutions.23 As one commentator rightfully observed, the best way to end these insidious practices is the “rattling of hand cuffs in some bank boardrooms.” Yet one of the consistent factors in money laundering prosecutions is the lack of penal consequences. Major¶ 12¶ financial institutions continue to be less than diligent in enforcing anti-money laundering regulations and some actually respond to law-enforcement subpoenas in ways that undercut the investigations. The 10-year-long investigation of HSBC has not yet produced any indictments in spite of confessions by top management of major failures in anti-money laundering compliance (New York Times, August 24, 2012).¶ Generally speaking, the failures of the anti-money laundering effort are not because of inadequate statutes, but a failure of enforcement.24 Again and again, huge amounts of funds flowing illegally out of this country could have been stopped, if financial institutions and government agencies focused on the problem. But the prevailing attitude is permissive of violations and reluctant to sanction violators. Of course, there will always be sophisticated nuances and complex trade relationships which can be exploited to move money illegally, but the billions of dollars going to the drug cartels are not flowing through nuances. They are going through the front door of the financial system, through bank accounts, large trade transactions, prepaid access devices, and wire ¶ transmissions. As opponents, the cartels have not made the problem any easier, proving to be extraordinarily innovative and opportunistic. They have mastered the international financial system and exploited it to their great advantage.¶ The U.S. government must enforce existing anti-money laundering provisions and quickly close the identified loopholes to stop (or at least slow down) the cash flowing to the cartels. Until government agencies, especially Treasury, get more serious about cutting off the illegal international flow of funds, we can never say we have a “secure” border. Stopping less than one percent of the opponent’s cash smuggling transactions should never be considered a good job. Especially when the money pouring across the border is wreaking such havoc in Mexico and making a mockery of the U.S. border defenses.¶ The United States should be making every effort to strengthen Mexico’s hand right now, before the problems in Mexico get even worse and the incredible violence that has besieged that country bursts over the border. The most effective means available is to stop the cash that makes the cartels so strong. We can fix the “broken” border and stop the bloodshed in Mexico — by following the money.

Tournament: Niles Tournament | Round: 2 | Opponent: Lane Tech BW | Judge: Tara Tate
Contention 1

Current money laundering policies fail—increased accountability efforts between the US and Mexico are key
(Blickman 13, Tom Blickman, specialises in International Drug Control Policy and Organised Crime as a researcher at TNI's Drugs and Democracy Programme, formerly worked for Bureau Jansen and Janssen, a research institute on intelligence and police matters, “Deficiencies in financial oversight enable money laundering”, Transnational Institute, http://www.tni.org/article/deficiencies-financial-oversight-enable-money-laundering)
In July 1989, the leaders of the economic powers assembled at the G7 Paris summit decided to establish a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to counter money laundering as an effective strategy against drug trafficking by criminal ‘cartels’. However, since the inception of the international anti-money laundering (AML) regime there is a growing awareness that the regime is not working as well as intended.¶ A case in point is the recent HSBC money laundering scandal: from 2006 to 2010, the Sinaloa cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle cartel in Colombia moved more than $881 million in drug proceeds through HSBC’s US and Mexican branches. Most observers suspect that this is only the tip of the iceberg. In total, the bank’s US and Mexican branches failed to effectively monitor the origin of more than $670 billion in wire transfers and more than $9.4 billion in purchases of US dollars from HSBC Mexico.¶ Traf­fickers would sometimes deposit hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash in a single day into a single account using boxes designed to fit the precise dimension of the tellers’ windows in HSBC’s Mexico branches. In December 2012, US federal and state authorities negotiated a $1.92 billion fine with the London-based HSBC to settle charges rather than seeking a criminal indictment against the bank. The fine is less than 10 per cent of HSBC’s $20.6 billion worldwide profit before taxes for 2012 and is about five weeks of income for the bank. HSBC’s US branch offered correspondent banking services to HSBC’s Mexican branch, treating it as a low risk client, despite the obvious money laundering and drug trafficking chal­lenges in Mexico. Services included high risk clients like casas de cambio (currency exchange houses), high risk products like US dollar accounts in the Cayman Islands, a secrecy jurisdiction, with inadequate customer due diligence and weak AML controls.¶ The evidence in the case suggests that customers barely had to submit a real name and address, much less explain the legitimate origins of their deposits. The Mexican branch transported $7 billion in cash US dollars to the US branch from 2007 to 2008, outstripping other Mexican banks, even one twice its size, raising red flags that the volume of dollars included proceeds from illegal drug sales in the United States.

Scenario 1 is the Drug Trade: 

Drug violence is escalating now—spilling over into Latin America
Rawlins ’13 – editor at CFR (Aimee, “Mexico’s Drug War,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/11/13, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689#p4)
Mexico's War Effort From 2006 to 2012, Calderón sent more than 50,000 soldiers onto Mexico's streets, invested billions of dollars on equipment and training, attempted to vastly reform the police and judicial systems, and strengthened Mexico's partnership with the United States (PDF). But a legacy of "political manipulation of law enforcement and judicial branches, which limited professionalization and enabled widespread corruption" has left the government with "only weak tools to counter increasingly aggressive crime networks," writes CFR's Shannon O'Neil in America's Quarterly. The police are easily bought, in part because in many cities, they earn less than teachers or even burrito vendors. On the website InSight Crime, Patrick Corcoran notes that "an underpaid officer could double or triple his salary by simply agreeing to look the other way." The CFR report notes police agencies "suffer from dangerous and deplorable working conditions, low professional standards, and severely limited resources." The Calderón administration attempted to counter police corruption by dramatically increasing the role of the military in the fight against drug cartels. Not only have tens of thousands of military personnel been deployed to supplement, and in many cases replace, local police forces, they have also been heavily recruited to lead civilian law enforcement agencies (PDF). Mexico's judicial system—with its autocratic judges and lack of transparency—is also highly susceptible to corruption. The Congressional Research Service report noted that even when public officials are arrested for working with a cartel, they are rarely convicted. Calderón's militarization strategy also resulted in accusations of serious human rights abuses. A November 2011 report by Human Rights Watch found that "rather than strengthening public security in Mexico, Calderón's 'war' has exacerbated a climate of violence, lawlessness, and fear in many parts of the country." The report, which looked at five states, documented more than one hundred and seventy cases of torture, thirty-nine disappearances, and twenty-four extrajudicial killings. Despite the problems associated with the militarization of Mexican law enforcement, the administration has heralded the successes of its offensive against the cartels. Through bilateral cooperation with the United States, the government killed or captured twenty-five of the top thirty-seven most wanted drug kingpins in Mexico. Escalating Violence Instead of diminishing the cartels' presence, in many instances Calderón's strategy amplified drug-related violence. According to the Mexican government's figures, as of September 2012, a total of 47,515 people have been killed in drug-related violence since Calderón began his military assault on criminal cartels. Since 2006, more than 3,000 Mexican soldiers and police have been killed by the cartels (NPR). Moreover, in 2010, the nature of the violence began to shift. Since January 2010, more than twenty sitting mayors have been killed by cartels (IBT), and many other politicians have since been murdered or have disappeared. Massacres of civilians, beheadings, and mass graves also have becomeincreasingly common (Reuters). The eradication efforts also have led to violent succession battles within the cartels (PDF). Claremont McKenna Mexico expertRoderic Camp notes that in addition to drug-related homicides, there is an increase "in homicides that are the product of one cartel killing members of another cartel." In 2012, Mexico's attorney general said that the crackdown on cartel leaders splintered the organizations, creating between sixty and eighty new cartels (Reuters). The Committee to Protect Journalists cites Mexico as the eighth-deadliest country for reporters. Traditional media outlets have come to fear reprisals for reporting drug-related crimes, which has led to an increased use of blogs and social media outlets, although these, too, have been increasingly targeted by the cartels (AS/COA). And while violence has decreased in some areas, a report by the University of San Diego's Trans-Border Institute found that in other states, it dramatically increased (PDF),showing that, "at best, troop deployments appeared to merely displace the violence." The violence is also spilling into other parts of Central America (FP). In 2011, 60 percent of cocaine traffic into the United States traveled through Mexico via Central America, up from 1 percent in 2007, which is considered a significant contributor to the region's high murder rates. Regions such as Guadalajara and Veracruz, once thought safe, are being affected by the violence as well (NYT).

Money laundering is key—cartels rely on banks for transactions  
(Feinstein 13, senior United States Senator,  “The Buck Stop Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices”, US Caucus on International Narcotics Control, April 2013, http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=311e974a-feb6-48e6-b302-0769f16185ee)
Over the last three years, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control has released bipartisan reports focused on U.S. counternarcotics policies and efforts in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and Afghanistan. In carrying out this work, we have become convinced that we cannot stop the drug trade without first cutting off the money that flows to drug trafficking organizations. Money laundering – very often through legitimate U.S. businesses and financial institutions – must be stopped to make real progress in curtailing the drug trade.¶ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that $1.6 trillion, or 2.7 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), was laundered in 2009. If one only takes into account financial flows related to drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime, $580 billion or 1 percent of global GDP was laundered in 2009.5¶ John Cassara, a former Treasury agent and an anti-money laundering expert, explains that we should be most concerned with how few U.S. drug proceeds are captured by authorities. He writes:¶ “The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that Americans spend approximately $65 billion per year on illegal drugs. Yet according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), only about $1 billion is seized per year domestically by all federal agencies combined. The approximately 1.5 percent successful seizure rate is actually even more depressing because identifying bulk cash related to drugs is probably the most straight forward anti-money laundering investigation. So we can infer the seizure rate is much worse for other kinds of money laundering in the United States that collectively total in the hundreds of billions of dollars.”6¶ Statistics regarding the amount of illicit drug proceeds leaving the United States vary widely which speaks to how little U.S. authorities know about how much money is moved, stored and laundered annually. The National Drug Intelligence Center estimates that Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations “annually generate, remove and launder between $18 billion and $39 billion in wholesale distribution proceeds,” much of it across the U.S. Southwest border.7 While statistics on illegal activities are never easy to come by, we must do¶ significantly more to bring to light the extent to which proceeds from crime flow through our legitimate financial institutions.¶ Who are the Launderers?¶ In several briefings, Caucus staff was told that increasingly, it is not drug trafficking organizations themselves who launder money but instead third-party contractors.8 These individuals act as “facilitators” helping transnational criminals to launder money through the legitimate financial system. In July 2011, President Obama released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime which effectively explains the role of these facilitators:¶ “Transnational organized criminal networks rely on industry experts, both witting and unwitting, to facilitate corrupt transactions and to create the necessary infrastructure to pursue their illicit schemes, such as creating shell corporations, opening offshore bank accounts in the shell corporation’s name, and creating front businesses for their illegal activity and money laundering. Business owners or bankers are enlisted to launder money, and employees of legitimate companies are used to conceal smuggling operations.”9¶ Heather Lowe, with the Washington, D.C. based research and advocacy organization Global Financial Integrity, points out that much more needs to be done to hold these facilitators accountable. She explains, “One of the biggest problems that I see in getting to grips with transnational crime is that we do not hold facilitators accountable in a way that dissuades them, their colleagues and anyone else looking to get a piece of the action but who may not otherwise be a hardened criminal, from getting involved.”

Mexican cartels threaten Latin American stability—
First, they cause violent insurgency
Beittel ’13 – analyst in Latin American affairs (June, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence,” Congressional Research Service, 4/15/13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf)

As violence continues at a high level and to reach more of Mexico’s territory, some observers and policy analysts are continuing to raise concerns about the Mexican state’s stability. The Calderón government strongly objected to the so-called “failed state” thesis that was put forward by some analysts in 2008 and 2009, which suggested that the Mexican government was no longer exercising sovereignty in all areas of the country.18 However, in early August 2010, when former President Calderón initiated a series of public meetings to discuss his counterdrug strategy, he described the violence perpetrated by the DTOs as “a challenge to the state, an attempt to replace the state.”19 While some observers consider parts of Mexico lost to DTO control, this is definitely not the case for most of the country.20 In September 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that the violence by the DTOs in Mexico may be “morphing into or making common cause with what we would call an insurgency.”21 This characterization was quickly rejected by the Mexican government and revised by then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela, the Director of the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy Gil Kerlikowske, and later reportedly by President Barack Obama.22 It became clear that the Obama administration generally rejects the term “insurgency” to describe the violence of drug traffickers in Mexico and their objectives. However, many U.S. government officials and policy makers have concerns about the Mexican government’s capacity to lower the violence in Mexico and control insurgent-like or terrorist tactics being employed by the DTOs. Congressional Concerns Mexico’s stability is of critical importance to the United States and the nature and the intensity of the violence has been of particular concern to the U.S. Congress. Mexico shares a nearly 2,000mile border with the United States and has close trade and demographic ties. In addition to U.S. concern about this strategic partner and close neighbor, policy makers have been concerned that the violence in Mexico could “spill over” into U.S. border states (or further inland) despite beefed up security measures. According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice, the potential harm of Mexico’s criminal groups is formidable. Mexican DTOs and their affiliates “dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States” and are present in more than 1,000 U.S. cities.

Second, destroy investment
Wiggin ’11 – (Teke, “Wealthy Mexicans are Increasingly Investing in the U.S. to Escape Cartel Violence,” Fox News, 5/21/11, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/05/21/wealthy-mexicans-increasingly-investing-escape-cartel-violence/)

Mexican businessman Juan Jose Pardo had finally seen enough of the drug killings in his country, and was increasingly worried over the safety of his wife and two children. “You feel that the problem is approaching,” he said. “We decided it’s better to start taking action instead of waiting for something to happen.” Pardo is one of a rapidly increasing number of wealthy Mexicans to who are attempting to escape the violence by investing $500,000 or more in American business projects -- thereby earning legal and permanent residency status in the U.S. “It appears to be the easiest way to get your papers so you can immigrate,” said Pardo, who manages a clothing center and tourism company in Mexico City. Members of the Mexican elite are filing for EB-5 visas, which can grant the well-heeled financiers and their families green cards in exchange for investments in projects demonstrated to create or sustain 10 U.S. jobs. The majority of the investments are arranged through so-called “regional centers,” designated public or private economic units, which according to law accept a minimum of $500,000 for economic growth projects in rural or high unemployment areas, or a minimum of $1 million for projects outside such areas. Mexicans last year made up a small fraction of EB-5 applicants -- who are approved around 75 percent of the time -- with just 34 filings, according to the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. By contrast, more than 1,200 Chinese applied for the visa. But Marco Ramirez, director of USA Now, a Texas regional center that markets itself exclusively to Central and South Americans and operates in the Texas counties of Webb, Zapata, Starr, Hidalgo, Willacy, Kenedy and Cameron, says his organization has raised $90 million from 160 Mexican investors since June 2010, and expects to have about 280 commitments by the year’s end. “A good way to call it is an exodus. Those who can leave are leaving,” he said. Meanwhile, by the end of the year Star of Texas Regional Center expects to land 100 Mexican investors who will contribute to a $70 million fund for projects that will revitalize hurricane-damaged areas of Galveston Bay, according to the center’s founder, Jim Hayes. The numbers cannot be confirmed, but seem to agree with a sharp increase in EB-5 interest among Mexicans reported by immigration consultants. Stephen Parnell, joint senior partner of consultancy firm Which EB-5, said inquiries to his company from Mexicans have “at least doubled” in the past year. “They feel under pressure for the potential for kidnap and extortion,” he said. Ramirez said 40 percent of his clients “have already had a situation of insecurity,” adding that at the least they have paid street taxes and at the worst lost family members to violence. Supporters say the Mexican investments are a tonic to stagnant communities normally shunned by risk-averse lenders and only a preview of much larger investments to come. “They have $500,000 to put up -- that doesn’t mean that’s all they have … They’re going to get bored in our country; they’re going to set up shop here,” Ramirez said. They also defend the program by pointing to its rigorous approval process, which requires applicants to demonstrate the money they invested was lawfully earned and prove after a two-year period that the investment created or sustained 10 jobs in the U.S. The process, they argue, ensures all EB-5 holders who receive permanent residency rights have done so to the benefit of U.S. communities. But some critics see things differently, asking whether rich Mexicans should be able to effectively buy residency in the U.S. And Mexican politicians argue the migration of Mexico’s biggest spenders could deal a serious blow to its economy -- possibly spurring even more illegal immigration to the U.S. The regional center program, launched in 1993, is set to expire in September 2012. But Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, pointing to projects in his state like two EB-5-financed ski resorts as indications of the program’s success, is sponsoring a bill to permanently charter it. “Making the EB-5 program permanent should receive bipartisan support,” Leahy said at a March press conference. Meanwhile, Pardo -- who plans to invest in CMB, an organization of two regional centers overseeing projects in and around U.S. military bases -- will bide his time in Mexico City as he waits to hear whether his initial EB-5 filing is approved. He applied at the beginning of the year but probably won’t hear for months to come. Even if his application is approved, Pardo must face a stark irony before he can finally immigrate: to escape the violence in Mexico, he will first have to enter its bowels with his family. He and his family must travel to the U.S. Embassy in the crime-afflicted city of Ciudad Juarez in order to pick up their visas. “They know you’re an outsider,” he said of Juarez’s hordes of criminals. “Everything is going to be looking suspicious, and you’re going to be drawing attention.”

Latin American instability causes global conflicts
Manwaring, 5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson, Retired U.S. Army colonel (Max G., “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.

Escalates—other countries drawn in
Shingal ’11 - Ankur Shingal, University of California, Los Angeles (“At the Tipping Point: Why the United States Must Assist Mexico in the Mexican Drug War” Agathai Quarterly Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2011 http://www.mortarboardatucla.org/uploads/4/7/8/9/4789362/winter_journal.pdf#page=26)

The third reason why the United States must enhance its aid to Mexico is the possibility of a failed Mexican state. The drug war in Mexico has become a life or death struggle for the Mexican government. Despite substantial US aid, the Mexican authorities remain outgunned and outmanned. The drug cartels, although not acting as an alternative government per say, enjoy near autonomy throughout a number of cities across the country, including border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez. In effect, the Mexican government has completely committed itself to fighting against the drug cartels, but is at best failing to make progress and at worst losing the war. What is even more disheartening is the consideration that the drug cartels are the ones with time on their side. While the Mexican government has neither the resources nor the man power to continue its major offensive without more substantial assistance from the United States, the drug cartels remain as powerful as ever. It is distinctly possible to foresee a day when the Mexican government, in spite of its efforts, is unable to control the drug cartels, and Mexico essentially becomes a failed state. While there are a number of scholars and politicians, including Mexican President Calderón, who ardently argue that the Mexican state will not fail, it is significant to note that the US government is already preparing itself for that possibility. In fact, according to a study by the United States Joint Forces Command, which looks to uncover future developments to ensure that the US military will not be caught off guard, Mexico is considered a ?large and important state that bears consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse.?177 The study also states that ?the Mexican government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by…drug cartels. That internal conflict… is having a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state.?178 The US government has already begun to take specific actions to ensure that it is ready for that increasingly likely possibility of a failed state. One example is that the Texas state government is spending millions of tax dollars to construct refugee camps to prepare for the possibility that thousands flee Mexico if the state fails. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for the defense and foreign policy center at the Cato Institute, argues that while a complete collapse may be ?a relative long shot…it‘s not out of the question....It‘s obviously prudent to consider that possibility and not get blindsided should it happen.?179 While it is true that the United States preparing itself does not necessarily mean that the Mexican collapse is imminent, such preparation is a product of the US government‘s fear that such an event has a very real potential to actually occur. If the Mexican government were to fail, the United States would be forced to take direct military action against the drug cartels. As the Joint Forces Command report notes, ?any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.?180 That response could prove to be nothing less than a full scale war because, unlike in the current situation, the United States would not have the luxury of having the Mexico state to fight on its behalf. Essentially, if the United States does not provide more meaningful aid now, then it may be forced to fight another war that would affect its own citizenry directly. It is irrefutable that the amount of aid that is necessary is substantially more than the four hundred million dollars worth that the United States has already promised , through the Mérida Initiative. But all of those extra costs, all of which are economic, pale in comparison to the amount of money and manpower that the United States would have to expend to win a war against the drug cartels directly. Therefore, it would be prudent for the US to provide more aid now rather than waiting and possibly being forced into a position where it has no choice but to fight a war on its home front.

Scenario 2 is Terrorism-- 

Terrorists are turning to financial markets to generate funding— key for sufficient capital
White House ‘11– (President of the United States Barack Obama, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” the White House, July 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf)

Threats to the Economy, U.S. Competitiveness, and Strategic Markets. TOC threatens U.S. economic interests and can cause significant damage to the world financial system through its subversion, exploitation, and distortion of legitimate markets and economic activity. U.S. business leaders worry that U.S. firms are being put at a competitive disadvantage by TOC and corruption, particularly in emerging markets where many perceive that rule of law is less reliable. The World Bank estimates about $1 trillion is spent each year to bribe public officials, causing an array of economic distortions and damage to legitimate economic activity. The price of doing business in countries affected by TOC is also rising as companies budget for additional security costs, adversely impacting foreign direct investment in many parts of the world. TOC activities can lead to disruption of the global supply chain, which in turn diminishes economic competitiveness and impacts the ability of U.S. industry and transportation sectors to be resilient in the face of such disruption. Further, transnational criminal organizations, leveraging their relationships with state-owned entities, industries, or state-allied actors, could gain influence over key commodities markets such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals, along with potential exploitation of the transportation sector. Crime-Terror-Insurgency Nexus. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to TOC to generate funding and acquire logistical support to carry out their violent acts. The Department of Justice reports that 29 of the 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the United States, were associated with terrorist groups. Involvement in the drug trade by the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is critical to the ability of these groups to fund terrorist activity. We are concerned about Hizballah’s drug and criminal activities, as well as indications of links between al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and the drug trade. Further, the terrorist organization al-Shabaab has engaged in criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom and extortion, and may derive limited fees from extortion or protection of pirates to generate funding for its operations. While the crime-terror nexus is still mostly opportunistic, this nexus is critical nonetheless, especially if it were to involve the successful criminal transfer of WMD material to terrorists or their penetration of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.

Mexico is the prime target—safe haven for criminal transactions  
Lanzante ’09 – area port director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, masters from the University of Illinois, master’s in security studies from the Naval Postgraduate School (Joseph, “The Relationship Between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations and Human Smuggling,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514191)
Western Hemisphere countries present a variety of conditions that favor transnational crime and terrorist activity (Berry et al., 2003). In particular, Mexico, Central America, and the Tri Border Area (TBA) of South America present similar problems for U.S. security. However, the U.S itself is also ripe for transnational crime and terrorist activity. The criminal and terrorist organizations in these parts of the Western Hemisphere, including the U.S., are known for their activities associated with drug smuggling, human smuggling, money laundering, and fund raising activities in support of terrorism. Mexico serves as a safe haven for transnational criminal and terrorist groups because of its geographic proximity to the U.S., fluid cross-border movement of people, goods, and cash, an existing criminal infrastructure, and an environment of corruption among Mexican institutions (Berry et al., 2003). For example, there are alien smuggling and document forgery rings in Mexico that are linked to MS-13 and M-18. There are also Russian criminal organizations engaged in a wide array of illegal activities in Mexico, which include drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, and alien smuggling (Miro and Curtis, 2003). Additionally, Asian criminal organizations are active in Mexico and have partnered with the domestic alien smuggling and human trafficking rings. Furthermore, there are alien smuggling rings that specialize in smuggling Middle Eastern nationals into the U.S. (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005). 43 A Mexican immigration official stated in January 2002 that there are people linked to terrorism in Mexico. He went on to identify Hezbollah and made reference to others that have links to Osama Bin Laden (Miro and Curtis, 2003). He further expounded that there are six or seven organizations with links to terrorist groups, but the six or seven are not engaged in terrorist activities. Mexico’s immigration service denies the statements made by the immigration official. According to Berry et al., (2003), the larger and more sophisticated drug trafficking groups in Mexico are less likely to knowingly cooperate with terrorist groups because of the risk to their narcotics empire. However, some of the smaller, less established criminal organizations may be more willing to engage in a relationship with terrorist organizations. Central and South America are popular transit points because of their proximity to the U.S. and the ease with which migrants from other countries with terrorist ties can, legally or through bribery, obtain tourist visas (Terror-Linked Migrants, 2005). According to the March 2009 report titled Operation Cazando Anguilas or “hunting eels” (outsourced by the Department of Defense to a Latin American security consulting company), there is an alliance between terrorist organizations in Latin America, Mexican drug cartels, and “Muslim businessmen.” Apparently, the Muslim businessmen are providing the drug cartels and terrorist organizations with money laundering services. Furthermore, the Muslim businessmen, drug cartels, and Central American gangs (i.e., MS-13 and M-18) are collaborating to smuggle Persons of Interest of Islamic Origin (PIIO) from terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah into the U.S. (Kimery, 2009). The drug cartels and gangs are acting as the “street enforcers” for these operations and MS-13 and M-18 are providing the “transportation security.” The PIIO’s are “Muslims who are arriving in Panama and Central America via Venezuela and Colombia.” The report describes them as “shooters” and “managers of some terrorist element.” Operation Cazando Anguilas reveals that approximately two years ago a peace treaty was “negotiated” between the gangs by “Muslim businessmen” in order to increase the “success of currency, drug, and human smuggling operations managed by these 44 Muslim Kingpins” (Kimery, 2009). This alliance provides radical Islamic supporters with access to MS-13 and M-18’s expansive and fully capable network throughout Central America, Mexico, and the U.S. According to Johnson and Muhlhausen (2005) and National Gang Intelligence Center (2009) MS-13 are experts at gaining illegal entry into the U.S. and will cross the U.S.-Mexico border with this as their sole intent. In order to assist PIIO smuggling, special schools have been set up by the Muslim businessmen to train the PIIO’s to speak Spanish and learn the Hispanic culture. Conversely, the gang members who escort the PIIO’s are taught Arabic and indoctrinated into Islamic fundamentalism (Kimery, 2009). Furthermore, Homeland Security Today obtained classified intelligence that some gang members are receiving Arabic and military training from Hezbollah at farms in Honduras that are owned by wealthy Muslim businessmen. 

Finance is the lifeblood  of terrorists organizations—the plan a prevents nuclear attack
(Gurulé  08, Professor of Law  of University of Notre Dame, has worked in a variety of high-profile public law enforcement positions including as Under Secretary for Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2001-2003), where he had oversight responsibilities for the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice (1990-1992); and Assistant U.S. Attorney, where he served as Deputy Chief of the Major Narcotics Section of the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office (1985-1989) , Jimmy Gurulé, Terrorists Need Money to Terrorize, “Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism”, 2008)
Money is the 'lifeblood' of al Qaeda Arabic for ‘the base‘) and other like-¶ minded terrorist groups.‘ Al Qaeda and its global network of affiliated ter-¶ rorist organizations cannot successfully implement their deadly agenda¶ without ?nancial resources Shutting off the ?ow of funds to the global¶ jihadists can disrupt their shortterm operations while undermining their¶ long-term capabilities. 'Disrupting and dismantling terrorist ?nancing net-¶ works is essential to combat terrorism. Terrorist organisations’ diverse¶ requirement for ?nancing creates a strong logic for seeking to disrupt ter-¶ rorism by choking off funding ?ows to all terrorist-linked activities.‘-‘¶ Money is critical to ?nancing al Qaeda's terrorist operations (operational¶ costs) as well as sustaining its organizational infrastructure organizational¶ costs.4 Al Qaeda cannot pursue sophisticated operations like the 9/11¶ terror attacks without adequate funding. However. the Islamist militants¶ also need money to ?nance their organizational activities, including paying¶ operatives, recruiting and training new members, bribing government¶ officials, forging ties with other jihadist organizations, paying travel and¶ communications expenses and acquiring military weapons, explosives and¶ radiological materials to construct a nuclear device or ‘dirty bomb.“¶ Attacking the ?nancial infrastructure of al Qaeda is fundamentally a¶ preventive strategy That is, starving the terrorists of funding worldwide is¶ critical to preventing terrorist acts The ultimate goal is to save lives by pre-¶ venting the use of funds to fuel terrorist attacks However. going after the¶ money is important for other reasons as well. Investigating al Qaeda's¶ ?nancial network may ‘expose terrorist ?nancing “money trails" that may¶ generate leads to previously unknown terrorist cells and ?nanciers“¶ Identifying and disrupting channels of funding may also force members of¶ al Qaeda to use more costly and less efficient and reliable means to transfer¶ money globally to ?nance terrorist activities.7 Blocking the assets of front¶ companies, arresting terrorist ?nanciers, and shutting down corrupt¶ Islamic charities may further deter wealthy donors from providing ?nancial¶ assistance to al Qaeda. Simply stated, depriving al Qaeda of funding is as¶ important as targeting the operational terror cells themselves.“¶ Al Qaeda is pursuing a deadly agenda that threatens global peace and¶ security: Osama bin Laden, the Islamist militant group's inspirational and¶ ideological leader, has declared war against America and called upon all¶ Muslims to join in waging jihad or holy war against the United States and¶ its allies.” Bin Laden's global jihad sanctions the killing of innocent civil-¶ ians. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. the so-called ‘Blind Sheikh‘ and bin¶ Laden's spiritual adviser. '" has directed Muslims everywhere to:¶ Cut olT all relations with the Americans. Christians, and Jews, tear them to¶ pieces, destroy their economies, burn their corporations destroy their peace, sink¶ their ships, shoot down their planes and kill them on air, sea, and land. And kill¶ them wherever you may ?nd them. ambush them. take them hostage . . . Kill¶ these In?dels. . . . Fight them. and God will torture them through your hands.¶ and he will disgrace them and make you victorious over them."

Extinction
Ayson 10 Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, InformaWorld)
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

 Contention 2
Contention 2: Financial Credibility 

Financial credibility is on the brink now—the plan sustains it by increasing the perception of government crackdowns on illicit flows
Johnson 13, Simon Johnson, professor of entrepreneurship at MIT's Sloan School of Management and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics , “Money-Laundering Banks Still Get a Pass From U.S.”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-31/money-laundering-banks-still-get-a-pass-from-u-s-.html, Mar 31, 2013)
Money laundering by large international banks has reached epidemic proportions, and U.S. authorities are supposedly looking into Citigroup Inc. (C) and JPMorgan Chase and Co. Governor Jerome Powell, on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, recently testified to Congress on the issue, and he sounded serious. But international criminals and terrorists needn’t worry. This is window dressing: Complicit bankers have nothing to fear from the U.S. justice system. To be on the safe side, though, miscreants should be sure to use a really large global bank for all their money-laundering needs. There may be fines, but the largest financial companies are unlikely to face criminal actions or meaningful sanctions. The Department of Justice has decided that these banks are too big to prosecute to the full extent of the law, though why this also gets employees and executives off the hook remains a mystery. And the Federal Reserve refuses to rescind bank licenses, undermining the credibility, legitimacy and stability of the financial system. To see this perverse incentive program in action, consider the recent case of a big money-laundering bank that violated a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, openly broke U.S. securities law and stuck its finger in the eye of the Fed. This is what John Peace, the chairman of Standard Chartered Plc (STAN), and his colleagues managed to get away with March 5. The meaningful consequences for him or his company are precisely zero. Chairman’s Statement At one level, this is farce. Standard Chartered has long conceded that it broke U.S. money-laundering laws in spectacular and prolonged fashion. In late 2012, it entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, agreeing to pay a fine that amounts to little more than a slap on the wrist (in any case, such penalties are paid by shareholders, not management). Then, on a March 5 conference call with investors, Peace denied that his bank and its employees had willfully broken U.S. law with their money-laundering activities. This statement was a clear breach of the deferred prosecution agreement (see paragraph 12 on page 10, where the bank agreed that none of its officers should make “any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by SCB set forth above or the facts described in the Factual Statement”). Any such statement constitutes a willful and material breach of the agreement. This is where the theater of the absurd begins. For some reason, it took the bank 11 business days, not the required five, to issue a retraction. No doubt a number of people, in the private and public sectors, were asleep at the switch. (The Justice Department and Standard Chartered rebuffed my requests for details on the timeline.) The implications of the affair are twofold. First, with his eventual retraction, Peace admitted that he misled investors. It also was an implicit admission that he had failed to issue a timely correction. Waiting 11 days to correct a material factual error is a serious breach of U.S. securities law for any nonfinancial company. Wake me when the Securities and Exchange Commission brings a case against Standard Chartered. Of course, it’s possible that Peace didn’t deliberately violate the deferred prosecution agreement because he hadn’t read it, or at least not all the way to page 10. Peace is an accomplished professional with a long and distinguished track record. Everyone can have a forgetful moment. That still doesn’t explain why the bank took so long to correct the facts. ¶ Leadership Matters Tone at the top matters, as reporting around JPMorgan Chase and its relationship with regulators makes clear. Will Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon be more cooperative than he was, for example, in August 2011 when he refused to provide detailed information on the goings-on in his investment bank? Why hasn’t Standard Chartered’s board, which is made up of talented and experienced individuals, forced out Peace as a result of this bungling? (I called for his resignation on my blog last week.) The only possible explanation is that the board thinks Peace did nothing wrong. They may even regard U.S. laws as onerous and the Department of Justice as heavy-handed. They would be entitled to their opinions, of course. But if they would like their bank to do business in the U.S., the rules are (supposedly) the rules. If used appropriately, permission to operate a bank in the U.S. grants the opportunity to earn a great deal of profit. At a recent congressional hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts asked what it would take for a company to lose its U.S. banking license. Specifically, “How many billions of dollars do you have to launder for drug lords?” Powell, the Fed governor, replied that pulling a bank’s license may be “appropriate when there’s a criminal conviction.” I have failed to find any cases of the Fed ordering the termination of banking activities in the U.S. for a foreign bank after a criminal conviction for money laundering. Nor, for that matter, has the Fed taken action to shut down a bank that signed a deferred prosecution agreement, which, in the case of Standard Chartered (STAN), was an acknowledgment of criminal wrongdoing. Nor has it taken action when such an agreement was violated. To see what the Fed is empowered to do under the International Banking Act, and working with state authorities, look at the case of Daiwa Bank, which received an Order to Terminate United States Banking Activities in 1995. Note to big banks: Don’t allow illegal trading in the U.S. Treasury market; on this, we may still have standards. By the way, in the case of Daiwa, there was no criminal conviction.

Scenario 1: US-China Relations 

Financial credibility is key to relations—restoring trust after the financial crisis   
(Lieberthal and Pollack 12, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. Lieberthal was a professor at the University of Michigan for 1983-2009, and Jonathan D. Pollack, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council from August 1998 to October 2000, and Jonathan D. Pollack, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program and director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. A specialist on East Asian international politics and security, he has published extensively on Chinese political-military strategy, U.S.-China relations, “Establishing Credibility and Trust¶ The Next President Must Manage America’s Most Important Relationship”, Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/16-china-lieberthal-pollack, March 16, 2012)
In the coming presidential term, the administration will need to confront the reality that the single biggest factor determining the shape of the U.S.-China relationship will be the extent of America’s success in getting its domestic house in order. It will therefore need to focus enormous attention on setting the United States on a fiscally sound path that includes allocating resources for investments necessary for long-term growth and innovation. ¶ Whoever is president during 2013–17 also must work to establish initiatives with the new Chinese leadership that hold out the possibility of building greater trust based on deeper consultations and concrete actions. A key part of achieving this goal is to conduct in-depth, sustained discussions of U.S. and Chinese military doctrines in Asia, their perspectives toward potential contingencies on the Korean peninsula, their efforts to address their respective domestic economic challenges, and the prospects for the coordination of development assistance and possibly other policies in Central Asia. ¶ The Obama Administration’s Record¶ President Obama entered office convinced of the need to place U.S. relations with Asia at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. In the president’s view, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and advances in the struggle against al Qaeda should enable a rebalancing of U.S. attention and engagement toward the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. As the self-declared “first Pacific president,” he believed regional issues in the Asia-Pacific had not received full or appropriate attention in the aftermath of September 11. He sought at the same time to avoid the increased tensions in U.S.-China relations that have typically occurred during the first year of a new president’s term. ¶ However, the mushrooming global financial crisis of 2008–09 had immediate consequences for how the U.S. and Chinese leaderships perceived their respective interests and capabilities. Before 2008 Beijing had viewed the United States as having the most capable financial system in the world, and it anticipated that China would not be seen as a major global player until 2013 or later. But the financial crisis changed this—Beijing regarded the crisis as “made in America,” and Washington’s credibility for financial wisdom and prowess declined precipitously. In addition, Beijing suddenly found that its own relative standing in the global pecking order had advanced far faster than anyone there had anticipated. ¶ President Obama decided that the United States should treat China as an emergent global power and that China must assume responsibilities commensurate with its increased economic weight. He broached these possibilities in his first meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao at the G-20 summit in London in April 2009, where both leaders discussed their respective plans for global economic recovery. ¶ During 2009 the Obama administration sought to sketch out a vision for long-term U.S.-China relations that involved efforts to reassure Beijing of U.S. strategic intentions, while also inviting China’s greater participation in the redesign of global institutions. Both presidents assented to ambitious shared goals in a joint communiqué issued during President Obama’s state visit to China in November 2009. Three areas were identified as comprising the principal components of a twenty-first-century policy agenda: reform of global financial arrangements and institutions; heightened attention to mitigating the effects of climate change (the United States and China already ranked as the leading emitters of greenhouse gases); and accelerated efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, with North Korea and Iran the immediate test cases. At the same time, Washington and Beijing agreed to manage their differences over an inherited array of bilateral issues so as not to permit differences over any one issue to spill over and disrupt the entire relationship. The Obama administration felt that treating China as a major power and according it the opportunity to contribute directly to designing the future global order would foster far closer bilateral ties. ¶ Relations since Obama’s November 2009 visit to China have fallen well short of expectations. Though the atmosphere bilaterally has remained generally quite positive, most of the administration’s longer-term policy objectives have remained unmet. The unprecedented frequency and scope of exchanges at senior leadership levels (including numerous meetings and telephone conversations between the two presidents and between Cabinet officers) have not produced genuine strategic trust between both countries. Bilateral relations are not confrontational or zero-sum, but they lack a sense that both leaderships are prepared to act fully on a mutual recognition of shared interests. 

Relations are key to solve Middle East and Indo-Pak conflicts
Xuecheng; 2009, Executive V.P at China Institute for International Studies Liu. Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the China Institute of International Studies. He is a member of several expert groups on China and Asia, including the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts/Eminent Persons; the Asia Cooperation Dialogue High-Level Study Group; and the China-U.S. People’s Friendship Association (council member). Robert Oxnam. President of The Asia Society for over a decade (1981-92). The Asia Society, America’s leading public education institution on all aspects of the Asia/Pacific region, grew rapidly under his direction to encompass corporate, contemporary, and cultural programs concerning over 30 Asian countries. Prior to his presidency, he served as the Society’s Vice President and Washington Center Director (1979-81) and as China Council Director (1975-81). Most recently, he served on the Asia policy advisory team for the Obama presidential campaign February 13. “The
Pivotal Relationship: How Obama Should Engage China.” The East West Institute. http://www.ewi.info/pivotal-relationship-how-obama-should-engage-china accessed: 7/13/11AG
The notion of reframing the United States and China as a “pivotal relationship” has special significance in terms of bilateral, regional, and global security. The strength of Sino-American relations is pivotal to the stability of the AsiaPacific region. Of course, we have ongoing interests in two potentially hot issues: North Korea, where the Six Party Talks must continue and where both Beijing and Washington must press for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and Taiwan, where the current situation has eased in the wake of Ma Yingjeou’s election, but also where both the United States and China must work assiduously to avoid crises and facilitate peaceful relations. But we also have interests around the world, sometimes in agreement, often with conflicting outlooks; thus we need to think globally about Sino-American security deliberations. Two hot spots deserve special mention. South Asia (especially Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) is an area of acute mutual concern to both China and the United States where we could benefit from sharing differing perspectives and intelligence. Similarly, in the Middle East (from the IsraelPalestinian situation to the questions of Iraq and Iran), Beijing and Washington have been pursuing quite distinct strategies while failing to engage in deep discussions until global crises emerge (such as UN debates over sanctions concerning Iran’s nuclear program). Put differently, if we are the “most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century world,” then our bilateral dialogue must encompass the most important global issues of our time and must occur at the highest levels on a frequent basis.

Middle East goes nuclear
(Russell 09, James A, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf)
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world. 

Indo-Pak war escalates quickly to extinction-~--no checks
Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. ¶ Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. ¶ Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal. ¶ A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. ¶ The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.¶ Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly escalate.

Relations independently solve cyberattacks—outweigh all of your impacts
 (Lieberthal and Singer 12, Kenneth Lieberthal, PhD in Political Science, director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asia at the U.S. National Security Council during the Clinton Administration, and Peter W. Singer, PhD in Government from Harvard,  “Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations”, ?John L. Thornton China Center, 02/2012, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/2/2320cybersecurity20china20us20singer20lieberthal/0223_cybersecurity_china_us_lieberthal_singer_pdf_english)
There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as that between the U.S. and China. No other two nations play such dominant roles in critical global issues from peace and¶ security to finance, trade, and the environment. How these two powers manage their relationship will likely be a key determinant of not only their own political and economic futures, but also wider global stability and prosperity.¶ In the web of relationships that have built up between the U.S. and China, no issue has emerged of such importance, and generated such friction in so short a time span, as cybersecurity. Just a generation ago, “cyberspace” effectively did not exist beyond the nascent links among a limited number of university labs’ computer networks. Today, the cen- trality of cyberspace to our entire global pattern of life is almost impos- sible to fathom. There are some 4 billion people behind the roughly 50 billion devices that connect to the Internet. They send more than 90 trillion emails a year, and conduct more than two trillion transactions.1 Domains that range from commerce to communication to the critical infrastructure that powers and protects our modern day civilization all depend on the safe and secure operation of this globalized network of networks.¶ And yet, concerns over this domain have rapidly moved to the forefront of U.S.-China relations. While both senior policymakers and general publics are struggling to understand the cyber realm’s basic dynamics and implications, the issue of cybersecurity is looming ever larger in U.S.-China relations and is seriously affecting threat perceptions on both sides.2 Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the cyber realm is proving to be as challenging as the more traditional concerns that have long dominated the U.S.-China agenda (such as trade, human rights, cross-Strait relations, and regional territorial disputes).¶ The underlying concern is driven by the fact that the malevolent side of cyberspace has increased hand in hand with the growing scale and use of the benevolent side. There are an estimated 55,000 new pieces of malware found each day and another 200,000 computers worldwide turned into “zombies” (compromised computers under the control of an actor other than the owner) each day. These computers are often bundled together into “botnets,” chains of thousands and in some cases even millions of computers externally controlled and often used for nefarious activities.3¶ But even more important than the growing numbers behind the mali- cious use of the Internet may be the evolution of the cyber threat land- scape from one dominated by individual hackers, often motivated by a search for attention, to one driven by complex, organized groups, which range from international criminal networks to state-related es- pionage and military efforts. The result is that just as the positive side of the cyber domain is rippling out into the physical domain with rapid and often unexpected consequences, so too is the negative side.¶ The Internet thus may have no formal state borders, but it is increas- ingly a place that state entities both operate in and care deeply about. In U.S.-China relations, the most recent cyber trends have generally been negative. Stories about suspected “Chinese” attacks on U.S. and allied interests in both the public and private domain have become an al- most daily occurrence in the media, and a source of regular discussion within the Washington, D.C. policy community.4 In 2011, this took on a new level of concern and publicity with several major reported intrusions into American and allied government, military, corporate, university, NGO, and think tank networks. The most notable per- haps was the disclosure of the “Shady RAT” attacks that successfully¶ targeted some 72 governments, international institutions, corpora- tions, and think tanks.5 Such incidents have reportedly involved the unapproved copy- ing and exportation of startling amounts and varieties of valuable data. The information accessed ranged from state secrets and weapons technology to business intellectual property and corporate negotiating strategies to personal files and communications of both high ranking and notable individuals and members of the general pub- lic. Some claim that if the overall scale of the loss were measured in financial terms, it would be the largest theft in history.6 Despite China’s own blanket denials of culpability in such actions, the perception is growing at both the popular and elite level in America that the cyber threat from China, while multifaceted, has a large gov- ernment-directed component. Such incidents are repeatedly described as being different from normal cyber crime in that very specific stra- tegic objectives seemed to have been particularly targeted: inputs into decisions concerning China, monitoring and threatening dissidents who live abroad, proprietary technology of special strategic inter- est (a frequently cited example is that normal cybercriminals would have little to gain from targeting systems in NASA’s Space Shuttle), and military-oriented planning and reconnaissance. The public debate also notes that accessing such networks for theft also can simultaneously lay the potential groundwork for future exploitation and attack.7 In short, U.S. concern about cybersecurity has reached a fever pitch— to the extent that the U.S. government’s 2011 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report specifically names China as the “most active and persistent” perpetrator of cyber intrusions into the United States.8 In the press, the mood is best captured by the depiction of a cyberattack as a massive pixilated mushroom cloud looming over every American city (as the cover of the July 2010 Economist magazine had it). Similarly, in senior policy circles, malware has been described as “like a WMD weapon of mass destruction” (Sen. Carl Levin, chair of Senate Armed Services Committee), able to “destroy our society” (former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft), meaning it should be looked at as “an existential threat” (Adm. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).9 Indeed, many are now framing the U.S.-China relationship in this space as a digital echo of the Cold War between the U.S. and USSR of a past generation.10¶ While the Cold War metaphor is certainly a flawed parallel, as scholars at Brookings have recently argued,11 concern has grown to view the cyber threat on that scale. President Barack Obama’s 2011 Cyberspace Policy Review declared that “cybersecurity risks pose some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century.”12 And, in turn, there have been a host of new U.S. legislative initiatives and the launch of a new cyber deterrence strategy by the U.S. military to accompany the creation of its U.S. Cyber Command. While it did not specify any individual nation, the Pentagon Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace was clearly keyed to China as among the many threats it foresaw in this realm.13 It sought to lay out a cyber deterrence doctrine clearly targeting state actors, including leaving open the option for es- calation to traditional military means in the physical realm if the U.S. ever felt it suffered too dearly in the cyber realm.¶ Unsurprisingly, Chinese writers and officials have reacted angrily to the above narrative of direct and veiled accusations, describing them as “groundless and reflecting Cold War mentality.”14 In both public and private, Chinese writers and officials assert that it is their systems that are more frequently under attack.15 The Ministry of Public Security has noted that the number of cyber attacks on Chinese computers and websites has soared by more than 80 percent annually, and, by the raw numbers, China is the world’s largest victim of cyberattacks.16 Indeed, in December 2011, more than a dozen of China’s most popular online shopping, microblogging, social networking and gaming websites were hacked, resulting in the release of more than 100 million Internet user- names, passwords and emails.17¶ Even more, many believe that China’s systems are more vulnerable than are America’s.18 This assertion has merit, in part because greater use of “pirated” software by Chinese companies and institutions means that their systems typically do not get the same upgrades of protection to evolving cyber threats that normal buyers receive. Some estimate that 10 million or more Chinese computers are currently part of botnets.19¶ Chinese officials and writers also assert that most attacks on Chinese computers originate in the United States, claiming that China has been the target of some 34,000 cyber attacks from the US.20 While the num- bers are arguable, it is undeniable that a large amount of malicious In- ternet activity emanates from or at least moves through the U.S. For example, security researchers at HostExploit have found that 20 of the top 50 crime-spewing ISPs (Internet Service Providers—the compa- nies that provide access to the Internet) in the world are American.21 Also, U.S. government agencies like the NSA are active and expert in cyber operations.¶ Finally, Chinese actors often express a sense of unfairness. Many feel that the U.S. has a too highly privileged position in the global cyber communications world as a legacy of its seminal role in developing the Internet and many related cyber technologies. They note, for example, that of the 13 root servers that are essential to the function of the entire Internet, 10 were originally located in the U.S. (and include U.S. gov- ernment operators like the U.S. Army Research Lab and NASA), and the other 3 are in U.S. allies (Japan, Netherlands, Sweden). Similarly, ICANN, which essentially manages the protocol addresses so essential to preserving the stability and smooth operation of the global Internet, started out through a U.S. government mandate.22¶ Whichever position one takes, what is even more worrisome is that such tensions and concerns are inexorably growing. The last year has amplified all of these trends. On top of this, both the scale and sophis- tication of attacks in cyber space has grown, notably in the Stuxnet episode. In this situation, a specially designed computer worm targeted Siemens Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used to run the centrifuges at five Iranian nuclear research facilities. The episode was viewed as a success for counter-proliferation efforts (in that it hampered illegal nuclear weapons research in a highly fo- cused way), but also was described in both American and Chinese circles as an indicator of a new level of threat.23¶ Indeed, two scholars at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences re- leased a report whose tone effectively captured the perceived level of tension and confusion this issue has generated in such a short period: “Of late, an Internet tornado has swept across the world ... massively impacting and shocking the globe. Behind all this lies the shadow of America. Faced with this warm-up for an Internet war, every nation and military can’t be passive but is making preparations to fight the Internet war.”24¶ In sum, distrust of each other’s actions in the cyber realm is growing between the U.S. and China, and such distrust easily spills over into broader assessments of the other country’s long term intentions. It is heightened by the link between the cyber domain and key values like individual privacy on the U.S. side and concerns with internal stabil- ity on the Chinese side. Even more, the potentially poisoning effect of cybersecurity on the relationship is occurring at a time when there is genuine uncertainty about the degree and speed of changes in the global balance of power. The disagreements feed into the anxieties on all sides as to whether America and China will have a basically coop- erative or antagonistic relationship over the coming several decades.25

Scenario 2: Banking 

Financial credibility is key to banks—the alternative is market collapse
(Johnson ’12 – professor of entrepreneurship at MIT, co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You” (Simon, “The Federal Reserve and the Libor Scandal,” New York Times, 7/19/12, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/the-federal-reserve-and-the-libor-scandal/)
Mr. Bernanke’s answer raises – but does not address – the central issue. The Federal Reserve is responsible for the “safety and soundness” of the financial system in the United States. Does allowing suspicions of fraud to continue unchecked at the heart of this system help to sustain the credibility and legitimacy of markets? Surely not.¶ Trust is essential to all financial transactions. When trust evaporates – or is smashed to oblivion through reckless and self-serving behavior at megabanks – the consequences can be dire.¶ The severity of the financial crisis in fall 2008 can be directly attributed to the collapse of trust among financial institutions. Cheating on Libor was not the only cause of this collapse but – if Mr. Bernanke is right and market participants knew what was going on – it must have contributed to it. Concerns about governance may be tolerated in boom times; when the economy goes sour, investors worry much more about who is hiding problems and may be about to collapse.¶ The Fed has jurisdiction whenever the safety and soundness of the financial system is at stake. Scott Alvarez, general counsel at the Board of Governors, acknowledged this point in a briefing to Senate staff members last week. According to The Financial Times:¶ In response to questions from Senate aides, Mr. Alvarez said that the Fed was unable to do more because the alleged manipulation of Libor did not constitute a so-called “safety and soundness” concern – a term used by bank regulators to signify threats to a lender’s viability.¶ It is hard to see how Mr. Alvarez and his colleagues could have been more wrong – manipulation of Libor most definitely raises safety and soundness concerns.¶ Third, why wasn’t the impact of potential Libor-related litigation included in recent stress tests for the American banks that may prove to be involved?¶ Three American banks are involved in Libor panels today – and apparently also during the period in question. (I have asked the British Bankers’ Association to confirm this and other details; it has indicated a willingness to help but was unable to respond by my deadline, and I will report on its information in a future post.) Bank of America is a member of the United States dollar Libor panel; Citigroup belongs to several of the larger Libor panels (including the United States dollar, the British pound and euro); and JPMorgan Chase is present on 9 of the 10 Libor panels.¶ One argument now being advanced from some financial circles against large fines for the banks involved is that this would reduce their shareholder capital enough to constitute a risk to the financial system.¶ More broadly, we do not yet know with whom Barclays personnel colluded – or the full extent of the damage to investors and borrowers. Consequently, no one yet knows the scale of balance-sheet damage that will be done by settlements of Libor-rigging claims.¶ This could even become a “tobacco moment,” in which an industry is forced to acknowledge its practices have been harmful – and enters into a long-term agreement that changes those practices and provides continuing financial compensation. Certainly attorneys general from states that have been damaged will be thinking along these lines.¶ Yet in his conference call with analysts on July 13, JPMorgan Chase’s chief executive, Jamie Dimon, was already discussing the possibility of resuming share buybacks later this year. It is hard to know how the Fed could agree to such reduction in shareholder capital. It is also hard to understand why the Fed continues to allow the payment of bank dividends under these circumstances.¶ The Libor scandal is different in some ways than other recent financial fiascos; it involves egregious, flagrant criminal conduct, with traders caught red-handed in e-mails and on tape. This is the definition of a “smoking gun.”¶ It is inexcusable and indefensible if these traders aren’t soon brought to account, facing criminal charges in court. That should be first step, with the full support of the Fed (although it obviously doesn’t run criminal investigations).¶ As Dennis Kelleher of Better Markets told Eliot Spitzer this week (see from around 3:29 in this excerpt): “Slapping handcuffs on these traders has to be the next step,” adding, “Handcuffs, squeeze them, handcuffs, squeeze them and move up the chain.” Mr. Kelleher continued, “This is an open and shut case” and “this is egregious criminal conduct.”¶ He went on: “There’s never been any accountability on Wall Street. Wall Street’s a high-crime area and the criminals are just let to run free. This would never be tolerated anywhere else in America, and it’s time to end the two sets of laws.”¶ This is what should have been done years ago for all the illegal behavior that led up to the crisis.¶ And the Fed should want this clean-up, in the interest of financial stability and ensuring future economic prosperity. The integrity and legitimacy of markets are at stake.¶ There are slight glimmers of hope that Fed thinking may be heading in the right direction, at least in thinking about the structure of the problem.

That escalates to full scale conflict—impact studies conclude affirmative
Royal, 2010 2010, Jedediah Royal is the Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives”, ed. By Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Financial stability is a preventive measure--  any other scenario for economic conflict could be controlled with banks are stable  
Mishra et al ’13 – Mishra is an economist specializing in the financial sector and Chief General Manager of the Reserve Bank of India, Majumdar is Director of the Financial Stability Unit of the Reserve Bank of India, and Bhandia is the General Manager of the Financial Stability Unit of the Reserve Bank of India (Rabi, S. Majumdar, and Dimple Bhandia, “Banking Stability-A Precursor to Financial Stability,” Reserve Bank of India, 1/18/13, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=14916)
The issue of financial stability is organically linked with banking stability. In fact the historical evidences demonstrate that those financial crisis which had stronger involvement of the banking sector had more devastating effect on the real sector in terms of fall in real output and reduction in employment level. The financial crisis of 2007-08 was no exception. The theoretical analysis of the events that preceded the financial crisis prove amply that whatsoever may the origin of the financial crisis be, its trigger took place in the banking sector. There are also evidences that the financial crisis persisted for a longer period because of weaknesses in the banking sector which went unnoticed for a longer period. In view of these developments there is an additional emphasis to ensure the stability of the banking sector by strengthening regulatory norms, focusing on empirical research on the leading indicators of banking stability and by preparing banking stability map and banking stability indicator.
Banking stability is a yardstick to determine whether an economy is sufficiently strong enough to withstand both the internal and external shocks. On the other side, financial stability is a by-product of stability conditions prevailing in the areas of banking, financial market and the real economy. Out of the three, banking stability conditions emerge as a vital ingredient to financial stability in a country. Banking stability in itself relies on the efficacies of the several parameters of individual banks, e.g., asset quality, liquidity, capital, costs and return on assets, etc. for its degree of stability during the period under review and in the days ahead. Though, the stability of the banking sector gets affected positively or negatively with the conditions prevailing in the financial market and the real economy; ultimately it determines as to what extent financial stability is ensured in the economy by its ability to absorb the shocks. Stability of the banking sector may, therefore, be treated as a forerunner of financial stability in an economy.
In view of these developments, in the recent period central banks and other supervisory authorities have started regularly assessing the situation in the banking sector with a focus on how the sector will evolve in the medium term. Initially, the issue of the banking stability was covered under the arena of banking crisis, which was based on the binary variables, signaling whether a banking sector is in crisis or not. But as banking crisis are rare birds, binary variable approach are less suitable to depict the condition of the sector. However, the absence of a full-blown crisis does not mean that the banking sector would continue to be stable in the medium term. In view of the limitations of binary variable oriented models, there have been efforts to develop banking stability indicator through which banking sector stress could be discerned. In fact the advantages banking stability indicator is that it represents a continuum of stability/instability describing the banking sector condition ranging from low level of stability, where the banking sector is in a stage of near crisis, to the high level of stability, when the banking sector is in tranquil.

Laundering isn’t profitable—increases systemic risks—plan solves without killing profits
(Gongloff 12, Mark Gongloff, Chief financial writer at The Huffington Post , “Obama Administration Essentially Admits That Some Banks Are Too Big To Jail, Which Is Troubling”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/hsbc-too-big-to-jail_n_2279439.html, 12/11/2012)
For one thing, according to University of Notre Dame law professor Jimmy Gurulé, a former assistant U.S. Attorney General and former Undersecretary for Enforcement for the U.S. Treasury Department, the government could have formally charged Europe's biggest bank in such a way as to help it avoid death. The bank's U.S. business may have been disrupted for some time, but the bank could have survived. The punishment that was meted out -- taking about half a quarter's profit -- was so far removed from a "death penalty" that it can't possibly be a deterrent for any other big bank.¶ And even if the government felt it could not formally charge HSBC, it could easily have charged individuals at the bank without causing financial armageddon. Instead, not a single HSBC individual faces criminal prosecution, despite evidence that billions of dollars were laundered on behalf of Mexican drug lords, the Iranian government and other evildoers for years.¶ Nor have any individuals been charged at the five other big European banks that have also managed to dodge formal money-laundering charges in recent years, including British bank Standard Chartered, which entered its own deferred prosecution agreement on Monday. Apparently, all of this constant money laundering was done by robots.¶ "The message this is sending is if you want to engage in money laundering, make sure you're doing it within the context of your employment at a bank," Gurulé said in a phone interview. "And don't go small. Do it on a very large scale, and you won't get prosecuted." "It's essentially telling the executives in these institutions crime pays," Neil Barofsky, former Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the government's bailout program, told CNN. "Go ahead, do whatever you want to do, enjoy your profits, and the worst thing that happens, well, you have some fines that really make up a couple of weeks of profits that you lose."¶ Finally, if the Obama administration's attitude about banks is truly that it is terrified of prosecuting them, for fear of upsetting the global economic order, then that is a damning statement about our financial system -- though it is of a piece with everything else we've learned since the crisis: If you're a bank and you're big enough, you're basically going to get away with everything short of murder. And maybe that, too. You can certainly create and sell toxic securities while also betting against them and trigger a global depression without having to worry about doing any jail time.¶ "Somebody else is bound to look for the next hole in the system at another international bank, and exploit it," Anthony Michael Sabino, a professor at St. John's University's Peter J. Tobin College of Business, wrote in an email. "It’s time we started asking are these banks just too big to meaningfully regulate.”

Plan
Thus the plan: The United States federal government should increase accountability based anti money laundering efforts with Mexico

Contention 3: Solvency
Mexico says yes-already requested stronger AML policy
Stier, 09— Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs (Ken, “Foreign tax cheats find US banks a safe haven”, Time—Business and Money, October 29, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933288,00.html)IK
Washington has spent much of this year showing how tough it is on tax cheats. The Justice Department triumphantly declared in August that it had reached a settlement with Swiss banking giant UBS for it to turn over the names of approximately 4,450 American account holders suspected by the IRS of evading taxes. This week, the IRS revealed the formation of a special task force to go after wealthy tax dodgers, and members of Congress introduced a bill to force foreign firms doing business in the U.S. to disclose all its U.S. clients with accounts overseas. (See 25 people to blame for the financial crisis.) But for all the bluster about cracking down on Americans who hide money overseas, the U.S. turns a virtual blind eye to foreign tax cheats who are parking money in the U.S. banking system. In particular, the U.S. effectively serves the role of Switzerland for Mexico, which suffers from rampant tax evasion — rates go as high as 70 among professionals and small businesses, and 40 among larger businesses. Much of the estimated $42 billion a year of illicit funds flowing out of Mexico each year (not including drug cartel money) ends up in U.S. banks, according to Global Financial Integrity, an advocacy group in Washington. Soon after the Obama Administration took office, Mexico sent Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner a letter complaining about the de facto secrecy U.S. banks offer Mexicans holding accounts by not reporting to anyone the names or interest income paid on those deposits. "The exchange of information on interest paid by banks will certainly provide us with a powerful tool to detect, prevent and control tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist financing, drug trafficking and organized crime," said the Feb. 9 letter from Mexican Finance Secretary Agustin Carstens, who also noted that the two countries do not have a "solid and reliable mechanism to verify actual residence of the foreign depositors." "Replace the nationalities mentioned in the letter, and you've replicated the UBS affair point for point," says Robert Goulder, international editor in chief at Tax Analysts, a nonprofit publisher about taxes worldwide, which first reported on the Carstens letter. "If you are a Mexican drug lord, you can put as much money as you want into U.S. banks. We ain't going to tax it, and the Mexicans can't tax it because they are never going to know about it. It's the financial equivalent of 'Don't ask, don't tell.' " It's not that the U.S. has no policies in place to stem the flow of illicit monies into the U.S. banking system. American banks are in fact required to file suspicious activity reports (SARs) for cash deposits over $10,000 or when they detect deposit patterns in lower amounts, known as "structuring." The problem is that the U.S. government is overwhelmed by more than a million of these reports a year. Computers can detect some irregularities, but these need to be combed through carefully by 85 SAR review teams — combining FBI, IRS, DEA and U.S. Attorneys — across the country. That's why, says international white collar crime lawyer Bruce Zagaris, "U.S. officials have practically begged banks to call them when they have something really good." (Read "The Stimulus Spending Bill: Is It Working at All?") This could change significantly with a seemingly simple regulatory adjustment, which Mexico has requested: they want the same information-exchange arrangement that Washington exclusively has with Canada, which automatically reports interest income paid by U.S. banks to Canadian account holders. "Being the world's largest trading block under the NAFTA, and fighting considerably the higher security threat than a decade ago, I truly believe that we should enhance our cooperation and strengthen our capacities to protect our peoples and wealth," Carstens wrote in his letter. 

Current US-Mexico approaches lack coordination—the plan is key
Realuyo ’12 – President of CBR Global Advisors, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, former State Department Director of Counterterrorism Finance Program (Celina, “It’s All about the Money: Advancing Anti-Money Laundering Efforts in the U.S. and Mexico to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” Wilson Center, 5/16/12, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Realuyo_U.S.-Mexico_Money_Laundering_0.pdf)
The U.S. and Mexico have made considerable progress in the fight against money laundering over the past few years. While there may be debate over the amount of money earned and laundered by criminal organizations, attacking the economic power of the Mexican-based TCOs has become an integral part of the U.S. and Mexican strategies to combat the TCOs. Constraining their operating environment and increasing their cost of doing business can damage the strength of the TCOs. To this end, there are several ways to further advance anti-money laundering efforts on both sides of the border. The way forward will require continued political commitment, the institutionalization of anti-money laundering measures and mechanisms, increased bilateral cooperation, and strategic communications to stigmatize transnational organize crime and money laundering with the general public. First, both the U.S. and Mexico must demonstrate the political will and continued resolve to confront TCOs and focus on their finances. To combat TCOs, we must strike at the heart of their operations – their money. While anti-money laundering investigations are complex and cannot be captured by videotape like a law enforcement raid on a suspected trafficker’s safe house, “following the money trail” often times leads law enforcement to TCO leadership or their financial facilitators, and disrupting TCO money laundering operations increase the cost of doing business. Many bilateral anti-money laundering initiatives are underway in the U.S. and Mexico as described above, but these activities and authorities are often dispersed amongst various governmental agencies making coordination more difficult. In this context, the U.S. and Mexico should establish a coordinating mechanism such as a bi-national TCO Finance Working Group that would enable the governments to consolidate information on all anti-money laundering initiatives and investigations underway on both sides of the border. Such a measure could enhance interagency and bilateral cooperation and help evaluate the successes or shortcomings of anti-money laundering efforts in combating transnational organized crime. Moreover, while both the U.S. and Mexico have the requisite legal authority and institutions in place to fight money laundering, they must dedicate adequate human and financial capital to more successfully pursue TCO financing. There have been indications that more staff will be added to anti-money laundering agencies in the U.S. and Mexico, but actions speak louder than words. On the strategic communications front, the U.S. and Mexico must educate and engage the private and civic sectors in the fight against the TCOs and money laundering.

Mexico is key—hotspot for laundering issues
Levin and Coburn ’12 – U.S. Senators on the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations (““U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History”, U.S. Senate, 7/17/12, https://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=2andved=0CDgQFjABandurl=http3A2F2Fwww.levin.senate.gov2Fdownload2F3Fid3D90fe8998-dfc4-4a8c-90ed-704bcce990d4andei=I0EiUv-fL7G5sQTiw4GACQandusg=AFQjCNHb-VV1iGT7eowxZKuK-gOrvRFrvwandsig2=Rl-7k4EdKWmHLt0C6_5u6g)
According to U.S. law enforcement officials, Mexico remains one of the most challenging money laundering jurisdictions for the United States, especially with regard to the investigation of money laundering activities involving the cross-border smuggling of bulk currency from drug transactions. While Mexico has taken a number of steps to improve its anti-money laundering system, significant amounts of narcotics-related proceeds are still smuggled across the border. In addition, such proceeds can still be introduced into the financial system through Mexican banks or casas de cambio, or repatriated across the border without record of the true owner of the funds.”176¶ The State Department’s relentlessly negative assessments of Mexico’s drug trafficking and money laundering vulnerabilities continued unabated. In 2008, the State Department wrote that “U.S. officials estimate that since 2003, as much as U.S. $22 billion may have been repatriated to Mexico from the United States by drug trafficking organizations.”177 Four years later, in 2012, the State Department wrote that drug cartels were using Mexican and U.S. financial institutions to launder as much as $39 billion each year: “According to U.S. authorities, drug trafficking organizations send between $19 and $39 billion annually to Mexico from the United States.”178¶ Warnings. The State Department is far from the only governmental agency to have warned about the money laundering risks in Mexico. The U.S. Congress has held repeated hearings over the years highlighting money laundering and drug trafficking problems in Mexico.179 Witnesses have included the U.S. Justice Department, Homeland Security Department, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Customs and Border Patrol, and Coast Guard, among others. From 1996 to 2011, these hearings have painted the same grim picture drawn in the State Department’s annual reports regarding the drug trafficking and money laundering threats in Mexico.¶ In addition, warnings about money laundering problems in Mexico have been directed specifically to financial institutions operating in the United States. In 2005, multiple U.S. agencies worked together to produce a U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment which identified thirteen key money laundering methods and specifically identified Mexico as a high risk jurisdiction for several of them, including bulk cash smuggling, misuse of money orders, and suspicious funds sent through money service businesses.180 In 2006, FinCEN issued an advisory to all U.S. financial institutions to “better guard against an increasingly prevalent money laundering threat involving the smuggling of bulk U.S. currency into Mexico,” warning in particular against “the abuse of their financial services” by Mexican casas de cambio.181 The advisory explained that drug traffickers were smuggling bulk cash from the United States into Mexico, then depositing the funds with casas de cambios who were sending the cash back to the United States via armored transport or by selling the U.S. dollars to U.S. banks.182 The advisory also warned about multiple wire transfers that “bear no apparent business relationship” with a particular casa de cambio, and U.S. deposits by casas de cambio of sequentially numbered monetary instruments.183

US key Is key—we’re vulnerable now
(Stringer 11, Kevin D. Stringer , ¶ Visiting Professor of International Studies¶ Thunderbird School of Global Management , “Tackling Threat Finance: A Labor for Hercules or Sisyphus?”, 2011¶ http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011spring/Stringer.pdf)
If the United States government is going to lean on other world finan- cial centers, it needs to be self-critical and take domestic actions within the interagency process.69 According to research, the US is potentially the world’s leading money laundering center. This makes sense considering the US market is where a large portion of the global drug revenues are produced. Additionally, it represents a stable and secure location in which various entities can invest the monies. Even criminals run the risk of losing their assets in unsafe or higher risk locations.70 The quantitative research of John Walker and Brigitte Unger reveals that locations like the United States are extremely attractive for money laundering, and the subsequent investment of its proceeds. In fact, in one study, the United States was second out of five desirable locations for money launder- ing: behind Luxembourg and ahead of Switzerland.71¶ Jason Sharman, a political scientist at Australia’s Griffith University, concludes that, “In practice Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have much laxer regulation on shell corpora- tions than classic tax havens . . . And the U.S. is the worst on this score, worse than Liechtenstein and worse than Somalia.” 72 This conclusion was confirmed by a money-laundering threat assessment in 2005 conducted by the federal government which found that the corporate anonymity offered by Nevada, Delaware, and Wyoming rivaled that of some of the most infamous off-shore financial centers. In Nevada, its official website touts “limited reporting and¶ Spring 2011 111¶ Kevin D. Stringer¶ disclosure requirements” and a speedy one-hour incorporation service. Nevada does not ask for the names of company shareholders, nor does it routinely share information with the federal government. The state, with a population of only 2.6 million, incorporates about 80,000 new firms a year, currently totaling more than 400,000—roughly one for every six people. A study by the Internal Revenue Service found that 50 to 90 percent of those registering companies were already in breach of federal tax laws elsewhere.73 Delaware and Wyoming have similar records.74¶ The possibilities for misuse are endless. If these state laws are not changed, the US threat financing campaign will not be credible in the international context, leaving America with a vulnerability gap on its own territory. The Congress, in cooperation with state authorities, needs to alter the legal landscape in a number of states if the United States is going to eliminate this home for threat finance. This will require the cooperation of several agencies to investigate existing shell corporations in various jurisdictions. This strategy, however, is fraught with the potential to generate a firestorm regarding federal control and states’ rights, and will require sound legal steps to avoid political and judicial challenges. The lead for this effort should be the Department of Justice.¶ 

Plan leads to global anti-crime efforts centered around laundering  
(Shetterly 06, Darryl Shetterly, Director, Discovery Analytics and Review Services at Orrick (Law Firm), participated in investigations involving the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of the Attorney General “STARVING THE TERRORISTS OF FUNDING: HOW THE UNITED STATES TREASURY IS FIGHTING THE WAR ON TERROR”, Regent University Law Review, 2006,
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/studentorgs/lawreview/docs/issues/v18n2/620Shetterly.pdf)
The world’s financial markets are inseparably interconnected. Thus, the United States needs international cooperation and assistance to starve the terrorists of funding. While many countries have initiated legislation designed to fight terrorist financing and comply with international standards, these countries are often unsophisticated in their efforts.114 Even sophisticated countries, such as the European Union, differ on what constitutes a terrorist organization.115 The Treasury is assisting these countries on a bi-lateral basis by “delivering anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing technical assistance, including legislative drafting, FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit) development, judicial and prosecutorial training, financial supervision, and financial crime investigatory training.”116 For example, the Treasury is currently assisting the Philippines, Turkey, Serbia, and Montenegro in drafting anti-money laundering legislation designed to increase transparency and intercept terrorist finances.117 To date, the Treasury has met with officials from over 111 countries.118 The Treasury’s influences are seen as far away as the streets of Kuwait where it is now illegal to make a cash donation to a charity.119 On October 14, 2004, following a visit from a delegation from the Treasury, Kuwait announced that only approved charities may accept donations; charities must get governmental approval before transferring money abroad; and donations may only be made with special coupons authorizing deductions from the donor’s bank account.120 The Treasury has worked jointly with “Italy, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the Bahamas,” to shut down “an insidious network of financial houses an¶ investment firms” and has even taken action against a “network of honey shops and bakeries in Yemen that funded al Qaida’s operations.”121¶ On a multi-lateral level, the Treasury is working to ease the financial burden on poorer countries who cannot afford to comply with international standards. Toward the end of facilitating donor countries assisting poorer countries, the Treasury established the Counter- Terrorism Action Group (CTAG)122 and is co-chairing a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Working Group on Terrorist Financing.123 These entities are collaborating with donor states, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee in coordinating the delivery of technical assistance to those governments.124

Tournament: Caucus | Round: 1 | Opponent: WDV DS | Judge: Gallini-Matyas
The United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with Mexico on accountability-based anti-money laundering initiatives

Tournament: Contact Information | Round: 1 | Opponent: NA | Judge: NA
For 2AC cites for specific off case positions listed in round reports/questions roth.sam11@gmail.com

Tournament: IMPORTANT ADDENDUM | Round: 1 | Opponent: NA | Judge: NA
Hey it's Pauline--

So, we've been disclosing the neg strats that teams read against us in our round reports-- it just occurred to me that this may not be okay with some teams who are hitting us.   

The reason why we do it is because that way, teams can request specific 2AC block cites instead of asking for all 2AC block cites from a tournament. That saves us a lot of time and also seems more efficient for other teams because they don't have to sift through unnecessary information. 

That said, we totally understand if you don't want us listing your neg strat on the wiki. If anyone wants their neg strat removed (or alternatively, we can also list the team as anonymous for that round), don't hesitate to email at:

paulineesman@gmail.com

Tournament: Caucus | Round: 1 | Opponent: WDV DS | Judge: Gallini-Matyas
Contention 2
Contention 2 is Relations 

US-Mexico relations are at a crossroads---Mexican diversification has decreased US influence in the region—resetting strategy on the drug war resets collaboration
(McKinnon 9/10, Dallin McKinnon , research assistant in Brigham Young’s political science department , “At a Crossroads with Mexico”, Praemon, September 10, 2013, http://praemon.org/2013/09/10/at-a-crossroads-with-mexico/)

The United States is at a crossroads in its relationship with Mexico. Congress is
AND
positive relationship with Mexico’s leader, whose term does not end until 2018.

Failing to increase money laundering cooperation closes the window for relations—undermines Mexican trust and is a flip-flop on Obama’s previous promises
(Shirk 11, David A. Shirk, Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, former fellow at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of San Diego, Director of the Justice in Mexico Project,  Council on Foreign Relations, “The U.S. Role”, The Drug War in Mexico Confronting a Shared Threat, March 2011, pg. 13-14)
As the world’s largest consumer of drugs and its largest supplier of fire- arms
AND
border will be difficult to control as long as market demand remains strong.

Scenario 1 is Biodiversity:
Relations are critical to border biodiversity
(PCIC ’09, international affairs organization focused on West Coast policy issues, task force co-chaired by Robert Bonner, former commissioner of U.S. CBP and former administrator of the DEA, and Andrés Rozental, former deputy foreign minister of Mexico and founder of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems,” Pacific Council on International Policy, report by the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border, 2009, http://pacificcouncil.org/page.aspx?pid=326, pp. 8-9)

The 1,952-mile Mexico-U.S. border is unique
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of living by destroying non-renewable resources and adversely affecting human health. 

It’s key to act—border biodiversity is being drastically lost and reaching points of irreversibility
Van Schoik, 04 – Rick, teaches international environmental security, science, and policy at San Diego State University, California (“Biodiversity on the U.S.-Mexican Border,” World Watch Institute, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/567)

The U.S.-Mexican border region has the highest rate of species endangerment
AND
-that the border is starkly visible to people flying over in airliners.

Mexico is a key region--- accounts for over 10 of species on the planet
Geo Mexico 2010 (This blog supports Geo-Mexico; the geography and dynamics of modern Mexico, the book by Dr. Richard Rhoda and Tony Burton (Sombrero Books 2010). Geo-Mexico is the first book specifically about the geography of the entire country of Mexico, written in English and aimed at an adult audience, ever published, “Mexico’s mega-biodiversity,” http://geo-mexico.com/?p=2765)

People from elsewhere generally think of Mexico as an arid country with lots of cacti
AND
, India, Malaysia, The Philippines,  Papua New Guinea, and Australia

Loss of biodiversity causes extinction
Takacs 96 (Instructor in Department of Earth Systems Science and Policy at California State-Monterey Bay David, 1996 Philosophies of Paradise, pg. http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as
AND
of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.14 

Scenario 2 is the Economy—

Mexico is key to the US economy—failure to cooperate renders the economy unsustainable  
(Christopher Wilson ’11, Program Associate with the Mexico Institute, focusing on U.S.-Mexico economic integration and the border, master’s in International Affairs from American University, “Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico,” Wilson Center, November 2011, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working20Together20Full20Document.pdf)

Trade with Mexico is vitally important to the U.S. economy and the
AND
bilateral trade keeps production, and therefore jobs, in the United States.

Increased cooperation to maximize economic success and counters the negative effects of expanding trade
(Rueda 13, Manuel Rueda, Latin America Correspondent for the ABC/Univision website. He is based in Mexico City and travels frequently throughout the region, reporting on Latin American politics, the drug war, environmental issues and more. Rueda holds a Journalism Masters Degree from Columbia University, and a BA in International Affairs from the University of Virgina , “What Obama can Achieve in Mexico”, ABC, May 2 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/obama-mexico-trip-intelligence-sharing-economy-top-issues/story?id=19093463andpage=2)

Some economists in the U.S. and Mexico have suggested that both countries
AND
Mexico would also be a good market for U.S. companies. 

Economic decline escalates to full scale conflict—impact studies conclude affirmative
Royal, 2010 2010, Jedediah Royal is the Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives”, ed. By Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict
AND
such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.