Tournament: UGA | Round: 1 | Opponent: NA | Judge: NA
Plan
The United States Federal Government should offer substantial financing for advanced biofuels in Mexico.
1AC
1
Advantage One – Mexico
Post-NAFTA agricultural corrections will collapse the Mexican economy – US biofuel investment solves
McDonald 9 – JD and MBA @ U Mississippi, LLM in International Legal Studies @ American
(Jeff, “Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the United States,” ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)
Additionally, Mexican agricultural resources are scant in ¶ comparison to its North American counterparts.113 In fact, ¶ only 12 of Mexico’s land is considered arable, with less than ¶ 3 of that land being irrigated.114 Agriculturally, the country ¶ has been slow to modernize, failing to take advantage of the ¶ ethanol movement and other technological advancements ¶ such as genetically modified crops.115 Further, state operated ¶ granaries and distribution networks are withering, and ¶ agriculture cooperatives may be key to the survival of Mexican ¶ agriculture.116 Regardless, the future of Mexican agriculture ¶ depends on advances in irrigation, agricultural infrastructure, ¶ and mechanization, and these advances will likely only result ¶ from foreign direct investment. ¶ IV. A Possible Solution?¶ A. Cooperative Advances in Agriculture and Infrastructure¶ The devastation of Mexican agriculture post-NAFTA, ¶ while problematic, may have been an inevitable development.117¶ The resulting downfall of the Mexican ejido, while initially ¶ displacing Mexican farm workers and further weakening ¶ Mexican agricultural production, might be viewed as a market ¶ correction demanding efficient production and modernization ¶ while providing a better economic quality of life for rural ¶ Mexicans.118 However, because the Mexican economy may not be able to survive such a correction, the country might ¶ benefit from the help of its Northern neighbor. U.S. assistance ¶ should consist of both direct aid and investment in Mexico, ¶ and concurrent changes in domestic agricultural practices and ¶ subsidization.¶ Under comparative trade theory, the U.S. should become ¶ Mexico’s supplier of basic grains, and Mexico should supply ¶ most, if not all, of U.S. fruits and vegetables.119 However, ¶ special consideration should be given to the socio-economic ¶ conditions of the rural Mexican farmer, and Mexican ¶ producers of traditional varieties of maize must be protected ¶ from market intrusion.120 Part of any agreement must be ¶ an inherent interest in mutual socio-cultural preservation. ¶ In trade, nations must recognize the higher responsibility ¶ to protect vulnerable aspects of one another’s culture and ¶ heritage. As this analysis will demonstrate, the effects of ¶ protecting Mexican farmers of white corn will be marginal to ¶ U.S. yellow corn farmers as inflated demand for U.S. corn will ¶ be eliminated, and any income lost in the Mexican market will ¶ be recouped by environmental credits, and the harvesting of ¶ biomass for domestic biofuel production. ¶ Notwithstanding the need to protect this sector of Mexican ¶ agriculture, recent land reforms in Mexico has given rise to ¶ increased U.S. interest in contract farming and marketing ¶ arrangements. 121 Permitting U.S. firms to operate on Mexican ¶ agricultural lands, and invest in its development, will likely ¶ enhance Mexican agricultural efficiency, productivity, ¶ and profitability, while facilitating land ownership for the ¶ Mexican farmer. With Mexican sugar production becoming ¶ ever-important in the establishment of a North American ¶ biofuel industry, FDI from the United States should focus ¶ on the supply and development of agricultural technology, ¶ the engineering of biofuel production facilities, and the ¶ infrastructure necessary to transport ethanol throughout both ¶ countries, and to points of export.
Mexican collapse saps critical diplomatic capital
Haddick 8 - University of Illinois, managing editor of the Small Wars Journal, was a U.S. Marine Corps officer, served in the 3rd and 23rd Marine Regiments, and deployed to Asia and Africa. He has advised the State Department, the National Intelligence Council, and U.S. Central Command
(Robert, “Now that would change everything,” December 21, http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html)
On November 25th, United States Joint Forces Command released to the public The Joint Operating Environment, the command’s “historically informed, forward-looking effort to discern most accurately the challenges we will face at the operational level of war, and to determine their inherent implications.” The report discusses demographic, economic, environmental, technological, and regional trends and their implications for military planning. USJFCOM insists that the report is neither a forecast of the future, nor a statement of official U.S. government policy. But in order to be the slightest bit useful, the report would have to be a little provocative. Thus, on page 35 we get to a section titled “Weak and Failing states” from which I extract this excerpt: There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Yes, the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government, indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.
That leads to Asian wars
Lohman 13 – MA in Foreign Affairs @ UVA
(Walter, “Honoring America’s Superpower Responsibilities,” http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2013/06/honoring-americas-superpower-responsibilities)
When you withdraw from the world, either by imposing trade barriers or drawing down military commitments, you lose your ability to influence events.¶ Those considering an Asia with less American presence have to ask themselves whether freedom would do as well without us. In fact, proponents of American withdrawal have to ask themselves a more important question: Whether they have responsibility for anyone’s well-being but their own!¶ Times are, indeed, changing in Asia. Power is shifting. I have traveled to Asia quite a bit—easily 50 times over the course of my career. I’ve seen the change first-hand. One thing that is not changing is that the U.S. is the one “indispensable” ingredient for continued peace, prosperity, and freedom around the world. Everyone I talk to in Asia tells me that. They must be talking to President Obama, too, because he’s also used the word “indispensable” to describe America’s role in the world.¶ Of course, these countries want access to our markets and our capital. But on the diplomatic side, it is also the case that the U.S. is the closest thing in Asia to an honest broker. And because if anything, nationalist tensions in Asia are only growing, this is not going to change anytime soon. Sure, there are South Koreans who would rather not have American troops in their country. But they are not the majority. And they like us a whole heck of a lot more than they like the prospect of another invasion. They like us a lot better than they like the Japanese. Imagine how the Koreans feel about the prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to defend itself. That’s what they would have to do without the benefit of the American nuclear deterrent.
These wars escalate
Mead 10
(Mead, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations, 2010 Walter, American Interest, “Obama in Asia”, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia/)
The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation. East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth, environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here. American objectives in this region are clear. While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, Kaiser Wilhelm-like dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China. We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free. Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure. Asia’s failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world’s two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia. The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are there. The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well. This is where the world’s fastest growing economies are. It is where the worst environmental problems exist. It is the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well. Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores. East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved. The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam. From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world’s most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns. That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is intended to address.
Independently – Mexican oil-dependent economy is unsustainable – PEMEX decline collapses US-Mexico relations
Miller and DeLeon 9 - *Stephanie, consultant on U.S.-Latin America relations and was formerly the Research Associate for the Americas Project on the National Security Team. Born in Venezuela with family from Colombia, Miller earned her degree from Duke University in International Comparative Studies with a focus on Latin America. She currently lives in Bogotá, Colombia, Rudy, Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at American Progress
(“Transcending the Rio Grande,” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/pdf/mexico.pdf)
Energy is a third area where the U.S. and Mexican economies are extremely interlinked. ¶ Mexico is the third-largest provider of petroleum and crude oil to the United States—¶ behind Canada and Saudi Arabia. It is only recently, however, that Mexico slipped behind ¶ Saudi Arabia as Mexican production has steadily declined during the past four years.¶ Mexico’s oil industry suffers from an outmoded, although recently modestly reformed, ¶ fiscal policy that places enormous obligations on Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, Mexico’s ¶ state-run oil company, to provide almost one-fifth of federal revenue from exports,21 as ¶ well as generate nearly 40 percent of all public-sector income.22 Complicating matters is the fact that Cantarell, Mexico’s largest oil field, is in decline and exploration activities ¶ have found no suitable replacement because Pemex lacks the technological capacity to ¶ drill in deep waters where new reserves may potentially be located. Furthermore, Mexico’s ¶ almost spiritual connection to its oil makes partnering with foreign companies that do ¶ have the technological capacity to undertake deep water drilling constitutionally challenging if not politically impossible.¶ All of this has significant implications for the United States as it seeks to strengthen its ¶ energy security, in part by emphasizing imports from politically stable sources in an ever ¶ more complicated global energy architecture. For Mexico, declining oil production will ¶ force its political and economic establishment to find creative solutions to avert a possible ¶ energy crisis, which would also spell an economic crisis the effects of which would inevitably reverberate in the U.S. economy as well. ¶ The vitality of Mexico’s energy sector is thus not only crucial to Mexico, but also to the ¶ United States and the bilateral relationship in general. In crafting policy toward Mexico, ¶ U.S. policymakers must understand the reason for production declines and the surrounding internal Mexican dynamics and account for them in shaping a strategic vision.
A new biofuel alliance is key
Morales 11 – PhD, Professor @ El Colegio de Mexico
(Isidro, “The Energy Factor in Mexico-US Relations,” Baker Institute, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-MoralesFactor-04292011.pdf)
With the inception of NAFTA in 1994, and the emergence of a new security alliance between the two countries with the establishment of SPP (2005) and the Merida Initiative (2007), the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the U.S. might evoke memories of WWII. However, in this new edition of global warfare, conventional oil resources arc not as crucial as 70 years ago. Instead, technology, intelligence gathering, critical infrastructure, competitiveness, and a more diversified mix of energy resources, in which non-conventional and renewable fuels are critical, have become much more important devices for coping with the security challenges of the 21st century. In this regard, Mexico's assets in terms of territory, people, natural resources, and governance capabilities have moved the country from being a simple buffer zone to a critical pivot. If the pivot turns unstable, unsafe, and unpredictable, this will directly impact the U.S.¶ This explains why, at present time, the top priority in the agenda of the two countries is the escalation of violence in Mexico, and the political challenges unleashed by the activities of organized crime. Mexico's public safety has become a part of U.S. security, that is, it has become an "intcrmestic" problem," and this explains why security trumps other issues on the agenda. As long as Mexico remains a major exporter of crude oil to the U.S.—something that is in Mexico's economic and political interests— U.S. energy interests will be fulfilled, despite limited opportunities for private participation in Mexico's energy industry. If Mexican exports decline dramatically, this will negatively impact Mexico's economic opportunities and intensify¶ tensions in a bilateral relationship already under stress. Furthermore, Mexico has the potential of strengthening its energy relationship with the U.S. as non-conventional and renewable fuels become higher profile. The production of energy from solar, wind, and biomass sources, as well as biofuels, escapes the nationalistic and sovereign-based governance of conventional energy resources in Mexico. That is why it is crucial that Mexicans define the new cooperative architecture under which Mexico and the U.S. will pursue their mutual interests while equally reaping the benefits.
Specifically – export-import partnerships spill up into the broader relationship
Donnelly 10 – Program Associate, Mexico Institute @ Wilson Center
(Robert, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation on Renewable Energy: Building a Green Agenda,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/us-mexico-cooperation-renewable-energy-building-green-agenda)
Discussant Johanna Mendelson Forman stressed the linkages connecting climate change, energy, and economic development. It is a problem for the United States, too, that Mexico not have adequate energy stocks, she said, adding that "energy poverty is a real issue in Mexico." The CSIS senior associate remarked that energy and climate, which are perceived as less polemical than other issues, are good entry points for a broader U.S.-Mexico dialogue. And she said financing needs for the development of renewables businesses are felt on both sides of the border and not just in Mexico, as U.S. companies suffer from a lack of adequate export-import financing.
Relations solve border terrorism and drug networks
Storrs 6 (K. Larry Storrs, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of CRS, 1/18/2006 “Mexico’s Importance and Multiple Relationships with the United States”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33244_20060118.pdf)//JG
Sharing a 2,000-mile border and extensive interconnections through the Gulf of¶ Mexico, the United States and Mexico are so intricately linked together in an¶ enormous multiplicity of ways that President George W. Bush and other U.S.¶ officials have stated that no country is more important to the United States than¶ Mexico. At the same time, Mexican President Vicente Fox (2000-2006), the first¶ president to be elected from an opposition party in 71 years, has sought to strengthen¶ the relationship with the United States through what some have called a “grand¶ bargain.” Under this proposed bargain, the United States would regularize the status¶ of undocumented Mexican workers in the United States and economically assist the¶ less developed partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),¶ while Mexico would be more cooperative in efforts to control the illegal traffic of¶ drugs, people, and goods into the United States.¶ The southern neighbor is linked with the United States through trade and¶ investment, migration and tourism, environment and health concerns, and family and¶ cultural relationships. It is the second most important trading partner of the United¶ States, and this trade is critical to many U.S. industries and border communities. It¶ is a major source of undocumented migrants and illicit drugs and a possible avenue¶ for the entry of terrorists into the United States. As a result, cooperation with Mexico¶ is essential to deal effectively with migration, drug trafficking, and border, terrorism,¶ health, environment, and energy issues.
The impact is an attack on US soil
McCaul 12 – JD @ St. Mary’s, former federal prosecutor
(Michael, “A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER,” UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Lexis)BB
Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional ¶ Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 ¶ homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a ¶ more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist ¶ organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to ¶ exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition ¶ emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing ¶ presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs Drug Trafficking Organizations to exploit paths ¶ into the United States.¶ During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for ¶ violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim ¶ extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to ¶ special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were ¶ radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al ¶ Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists ¶ around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused ¶ Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of ¶ Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In ¶ several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United ¶ States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist ¶ arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the ¶ United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on ¶ Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use¶ operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to ¶ conduct terror operations.3¶ The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al ¶ Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who ¶ then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the ¶ possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil ¶ into a weapon of mass destruction.
Nuclear war
Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington
(Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld)BB
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.
2
Advantage two – Agriculture
Mexican production transitions the US away from corn ethanol
McDonald 9 – JD and MBA @ U Mississippi, LLM in International Legal Studies @ American
(Jeff, “Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the United States,” ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)
Producing ethanol from sugar, for many reasons, is simply ¶ a better option than current corn-based ethanol production.152¶ Sugar is a much more efficient producer of ethanol than corn, ¶ and converting surplus sugar production to ethanol does not ¶ put undue pressure on a global staple food. Sugar is also the ¶ most feasible ethanol food stock in Mexico, and production ¶ facilities can easily be constructed alongside current sugar ¶ mills.153 Finally, Mexico may hold a comparative advantage ¶ in sugar production due to its geographical location which ¶ provides for more growing area and longer growing seasons ¶ than the United States. ¶ Notwithstanding the advantages of using sugar as a ¶ source for ethanol production, it must be acknowledged that ¶ without a further evolution to producing cellulosic ethanol, ¶ biofuels may not be the best way to reduce greenhouse gas ¶ emissions.154 Current cellulosic biofuel technology makes fuel ¶ production from biomass, cost-prohibitive in the short-term. ¶ However, as the technology becomes economically viable, ¶ and as the North American ethanol industry begins to rely ¶ on sugar as its primary resource, surplus farmland—previously ¶ planted in corn—should be diverted to biomass through land ¶ retirement, subsidization, and the demands of the market. ¶ As the production of sugar-ethanol migrates to Mexico, the ¶ United States can also transition facilities currently devoted to ¶ corn-based ethanol to production of ethanol from biomass or ¶ cellulosic materials.155¶ c. Biomass¶ Cellulosic biofuels might be produced from wood, crops ¶ or crop residues, or other specialty crops such as switchgrass; ¶ Cellulosic materials are generally considered better ethanol ¶ feed stocks, can be grown cheaply and efficiently, and do not strain food supplies.156 Diversification from single crop ethanol ¶ sources also avoids problems associated with monoculture ¶ production.157 Furthermore, the use of native species, or ¶ climate-tolerant alternatives offer many advantages. Such feed ¶ stocks are adaptable to local soil and water conditions, tend ¶ to be more blight resistant, and often require less irrigation, ¶ fertilization, tillage, and overall energy input.158 Finally, use ¶ of these non-food crops for energy production avoids adverse ¶ effects on local and global food markets,159 while contributing ¶ to the revitalization of farmland.
This leads to sustainable framing – solves food-for-fuel tradeoffs
McDonald 9 – JD and MBA @ U Mississippi, LLM in International Legal Studies @ American
(Jeff, “Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the United States,” ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)
The problems discussed above, like any potential solutions, ¶ are all cyclical and reinforcing in nature. Like many global ¶ political and economic issues, each one affects the other. ¶ Restoring prosperous farming conditions to Mexico will ¶ undoubtedly result in less immigration, as will the creation of ¶ industrial and transportation jobs. ¶ Conversion to sugar-based ethanol and the establishment ¶ of a Mexican and/or American ethanol industry in Mexico ¶ creates new jobs and drives production costs for ethanol ¶ down, simultaneously easing the pressure on U.S. corn crops, ¶ and reducing demand on a global food staple. Ideally, these ¶ changes will also be felt at the pump and in larger petroleum ¶ policy. Meanwhile, demand for sugar feedstock should alleviate ¶ high costs of farm support for domestic sugar, while providing ¶ a resurgent cash crop for Mexico. As demand for U.S. corn ¶ falls, farmers may have the opportunity to advance biofuel ¶ technology and implement sustainable practices, and with this ¶ a cycle of reinforcing solutions become more complete.¶ Changes in agricultural practices stimulated by concurrent ¶ policy change completes the cycle, incentivizing conservative ¶ practices, reducing domestic subsidy payments, encouraging ¶ the shift in agricultural policy, and funding the new biofuel ¶ industry in Mexico. By paying corn farmers to grow biomass ¶ feedstock, essentially ensuring payments equal to the value ¶ of the corn harvest less profits from the biomass harvest, the ¶ U.S. saves money which would otherwise be spent on farm ¶ support. With that “saved” money, the environmental and ¶ sugar-ethanol movements can be funded, commencing yet ¶ another problem-solving cycle, creating economic growth, ¶ easing demands on world food supplies, and easing pressure ¶ on U.S. farmlands.
The impact is global food shocks
Wise 12 - Policy Research Director, Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University
(Timothy, “US corn ethanol fuels food crisis in developing countries,” http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210993632838545.html)
Besides Egypt, North African countries saw particularly high ethanol-related losses: Algeria ($329m), Morocco ($236m), Tunisia ($99m) and Libya ($68m). Impacts were also high in other strife-torn countries in the region - Syria ($242m), Iran ($492m) and Yemen ($58m). North Africa impacts totalled $1.4bn. Scaled to population size, these economic losses were at least as severe as those seen in Mexico. The link between high food prices and unrest in the region is by now well documented, and US ethanol is contributing to that instability.¶ Biofuel impacts on food prices¶ The debate over biofuels has grown urgent since food prices first spiked in 2007-2008, ushering in a food crisis characterised by repeated jumps in global food prices. Prices for most staple foods doubled, fell when the bubble burst in 2009, then jumped again to their previous high levels in 2010-2011.¶ After a brief respite in the first half of this year, the US drought triggered a new wave of price spikes, the third in just five years. Corn prices were particularly hard-hit, reaching record levels of more than $8.00/bushel, and more than $300 per metric tonne. Before the first spikes, prices had languished around $100/metric tonne.¶ Experts have debated how much of the price increases should be blamed on global biofuels expansion. Few argue now that the contribution is small. A US National Academy of Sciences review attributed 20-40 per cent of the 2007-2008 price spikes to global biofuels expansion. Subsequent studies have confirmed this range for the later price increases.¶ Why is the impact so large? Because so much food and feed is now diverted to produce fuel, and so much land is now used for biofuels feedstocks - corn and sugar for ethanol, soybeans, palm oil and a variety of other plants for biodiesel. This rapidly growing market was fuelled by a wide range of government incentives and mandates and by the rising price of petroleum.¶ Nowhere is the impact clearer than in the diversion of US corn into ethanol production. Ethanol now consumes roughly 40 per cent of the US corn crop, up from just 5 per cent a decade ago. The biggest jump came after the US Congress enacted the RFS in 2005 then expanded it dramatically in 2007.¶ A blending allowance of 10 per cent for domestic gasoline added to the demand, a level now potentially being raised to 15 per cent. These mandates for rising corn ethanol production combined with tax incentives to gasoline blenders and tariff protection against cheaper imports to create today's massive ethanol demand for corn.¶ As corn prices rose farmers increased production, but not enough to accommodate the increased ethanol demand. So prices just kept rising and corn stocks just kept getting thinner and thinner. They were at dangerously low levels - about 15 per cent of global use - when the first price spikes happened in 2007-2008. They are at 14 per cent now.¶ Impact on developing countries¶ Corn is probably the most problematic feedstock for biofuels. In many parts of the world it is grown as food for human consumption, serving as the staple grain for some one billion people worldwide. It is also a key feed for livestock, giving it another direct link to the human food supply through meat, dairy and egg prices.¶ US corn ethanol is particularly disruptive to international markets. The United States is by far the largest producer and exporter of corn in the world. That 40 per cent of the US corn crop being put into US cars represents an astonishing 15 per cent of global corn production. The diversion of so much corn from food and feed markets has produced a "demand shock" in international markets since 2004.¶ For our study of the impacts on corn importers, we relied on estimates of how much lower corn prices would have been if ethanol production had not grown past its 2004 levels. The impacts rose with ethanol demand, reaching an estimated 21 per cent in 2009. We took those annual estimates and calculated the added cost each year, 2005-10, to the world's net corn-importing countries based on their net import volumes.¶ The largest importer by far is Japan and the ethanol premium cost Japan an estimated $2.2bn. But our interest was developing countries because of their vulnerability to food price increases.¶ Over the last 50 years, and particularly since the 1980s, the world's least developed countries have gone from being small net exporters of agricultural goods to huge net importers. The shift came when structural reforms in the 1980s forced indebted developing country governments to open their economies to agricultural imports while reducing their support for domestic farmers. The result: a flood of cheap and often-subsidised imports from rich countries, forcing local farmers out of business and off the land. ¶ In the price spike of 2008, the world's least developed countries imported $26.6bn in agricultural goods and exported only $9.1bn, leaving an agricultural trade deficit for these overwhelmingly agricultural countries of $17.5bn, more than three times the deficit recorded in 2000 ($4.9bn). This squeezes government budgets, strains limited foreign exchange reserves and leaves the poor more exposed to food price increases.¶ Guatemala, for example, saw its import dependence in corn grow from 9 per cent in the early 1990s to around 40 per cent today. This in a corn-producing country, the birthplace of domesticated corn. According to our estimates, Guatemala saw $91bn in ethanol-related impacts, $28m in 2010 alone. How big an impact is that? It represents six times the level of US agricultural aid that year and nearly as much as US food aid to Guatemala. It is equivalent to over 10 per cent of the government's annual expenditure on agricultural development. It is devastating for a country in which nearly half of children under five are malnourished. ¶ Of course, poor consumers are the ones most hurt by ethanol-related price increases, especially those in urban areas. Even in a net corn exporting country like Uganda, domestic corn prices spiked as international prices transmitted to local markets. Ugandans spend on average 65 per cent of their cash income on food, with poor urban consumers getting 20 per cent of their calories from corn purchased in the marketplace. More than half of Ugandans were considered "food insecure" in 2007, and the price spikes have only made that worse.¶ US ethanol expansion has accounted for 21 per cent of corn prices in recent years, so it has forced thousands of Ugandans deeper into poverty and hunger.
A diversity of studies confirm corn biofuels are a key internal link to global food shocks
Bryce 12 - senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, is the author, most recently, of Power Hungry: The Myths of “Green” Energy and the Real Fuels of the Future
(Robert, “Democrats and Republicans Support Harmful Ethanol Subsidies for the Sake of Votes,” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/05/democrats-and-republicans-support-harmful-ethanol-subsidies-for-the-sake-of-votes.html)
At least 17 studies—done by organizations ranging from Purdue University to the World Bank—have exposed the link between increasing biofuel production and higher food prices. Last year the Farm Foundation, a nonprofit entity formed in 1933 that focuses on agriculture issues, issued a report saying that the ethanol mandate creates a “large, persistent and non-price responsive demand for corn.” The report went on, saying “there is little doubt that biofuels play a role in the corn price level and variability, and this has spilled over into other commodity markets.”
Biofuel-induced shocks kills a billion people
Runge and Senauer 7 – *Professor of Applied Economics @ U Minn, Professor of Applied Economics @ U Minn
(C. Ford, Distinguished McKnight University Professor of Applied Economics and Law and Director of the Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy at the University of Minnesota; Benjamin, Professor of Applied Economics and Co-director of the Food Industry Center at the University of Minnesota, ‘How Biofuels could starve the poor,’ Foreign Affairs, May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86305/c-ford-runge-benjamin-senauer/how-biofuels-could-starve-the-poor.html)
Biofuels may have even more devastating effects in the rest of the world, especially on the prices of basic foods. If oil prices remain high -- which is likely -- the people most vulnerable to the price hikes brought on by the biofuel boom will be those in countries that both suffer food deficits and import petroleum. The risk extends to a large part of the developing world: in 2005, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, most of the 82 low-income countries with food deficits were also net oil importers. Even major oil exporters that use their petrodollars to purchase food imports, such as Mexico, cannot escape the consequences of the hikes in food prices. In late 2006, the price of tortilla flour in Mexico, which gets 80 percent of its corn imports from the United States, doubled thanks partly to a rise in U.S. corn prices from $2.80 to $4.20 a bushel over the previous several months. (Prices rose even though tortillas are made mainly from Mexican-grown white corn because industrial users of the imported yellow corn, which is used for animal feed and processed foods, started buying the cheaper white variety.) The price surge was exacerbated by speculation and hoarding. With about half of Mexico's 107 million people living in poverty and relying on tortillas as a main source of calories, the public outcry was fierce. In January 2007, Mexico's new president, Felipe Calderón, was forced to cap the prices of corn products. The International Food Policy Research Institute, in Washington, D.C., has produced sobering estimates of the potential global impact of the rising demand for biofuels. Mark Rosegrant, an IFPRI division director, and his colleagues project that given continued high oil prices, the rapid increase in global biofuel production will push global corn prices up by 20 percent by 2010 and 41 percent by 2020. The prices of oilseeds, including soybeans, rapeseeds, and sunflower seeds, are projected to rise by 26 percent by 2010 and 76 percent by 2020, and wheat prices by 11 percent by 2010 and 30 percent by 2020. In the poorest parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where cassava is a staple, its price is expected to increase by 33 percent by 2010 and 135 percent by 2020. The projected price increases may be mitigated if crop yields increase substantially or ethanol production based on other raw materials (such as trees and grasses) becomes commercially viable. But unless biofuel policies change significantly, neither development is likely. The production of cassava-based ethanol may pose an especially grave threat to the food security of the world's poor. Cassava, a tropical potato-like tuber also known as manioc, provides one-third of the caloric needs of the population in sub-Saharan Africa and is the primary staple for over 200 million of Africa's poorest people. In many tropical countries, it is the food people turn to when they cannot afford anything else. It also serves as an important reserve when other crops fail because it can grow in poor soils and dry conditions and can be left in the ground to be harvested as needed. Thanks to its high-starch content, cassava is also an excellent source of ethanol. As the technology for converting it to fuel improves, many countries -- including China, Nigeria, and Thailand -- are considering using more of the crop to that end. If peasant farmers in developing countries could become suppliers for the emerging industry, they would benefit from the increased income. But the history of industrial demand for agricultural crops in these countries suggests that large producers will be the main beneficiaries. The likely result of a boom in cassava-based ethanol production is that an increasing number of poor people will struggle even more to feed themselves. Participants in the 1996 World Food Summit set out to cut the number of chronically hungry people in the world -- people who do not eat enough calories regularly to be healthy and active -- from 823 million in 1990 to about 400 million by 2015. The Millennium Development Goals established by the United Nations in 2000 vowed to halve the proportion of the world's chronically underfed population from 16 percent in 1990 to eight percent in 2015. Realistically, however, resorting to biofuels is likely to exacerbate world hunger. Several studies by economists at the World Bank and elsewhere suggest that caloric consumption among the world's poor declines by about half of one percent whenever the average prices of all major food staples increase by one percent. When one staple becomes more expensive, people try to replace it with a cheaper one, but if the prices of nearly all staples go up, they are left with no alternative. In a study of global food security we conducted in 2003, we projected that given the rates of economic and population growth, the number of hungry people throughout the world would decline by 23 percent, to about 625 million, by 2025, so long as agricultural productivity improved enough to keep the relative price of food constant. But if, all other things being equal, the prices of staple foods increased because of demand for biofuels, as the IFPRI projections suggest they will, the number of food-insecure people in the world would rise by over 16 million for every percentage increase in the real prices of staple foods. That means that 1.2 billion people could be chronically hungry by 2025 -- 600 million more than previously predicted. The world's poorest people already spend 50 to 80 percent of their total household income on food. For the many among them who are landless laborers or rural subsistence farmers, large increases in the prices of staple foods will mean malnutrition and hunger. Some of them will tumble over the edge of subsistence into outright starvation, and many more will die from a multitude of hunger-related diseases.
Food shocks escalate to all-out war
Klare 12 - professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College
(Michael, “The Hunger Wars in our Future,” http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-215_162-57489345/the-hunger-wars-in-our-future/?pageNum=1andtag=page)
The Great Drought of 2012 has yet to come to an end, but we already know that its consequences will be severe. With more than one-half of America's counties designated as drought disaster areas, the 2012 harvest of corn, soybeans, and other food staples is guaranteed to fall far short of predictions. This, in turn, will boost food prices domestically and abroad, causing increased misery for farmers and low-income Americans and far greater hardship for poor people in countries that rely on imported U.S. grains.¶ This, however, is just the beginning of the likely consequences: if history is any guide, rising food prices of this sort will also lead to widespread social unrest and violent conflict.¶ Food -- affordable food -- is essential to human survival and well-being. Take that away, and people become anxious, desperate, and angry. In the United States, food represents only about 13 of the average household budget, a relatively small share, so a boost in food prices in 2013 will probably not prove overly taxing for most middle- and upper-income families. It could, however, produce considerable hardship for poor and unemployed Americans with limited resources. "You are talking about a real bite out of family budgets," commented Ernie Gross, an agricultural economist at Omaha's Creighton University. This could add to the discontent already evident in depressed and high-unemployment areas, perhaps prompting an intensified backlash against incumbent politicians and other forms of dissent and unrest.¶ It is in the international arena, however, that the Great Drought is likely to have its most devastating effects. Because so many nations depend on grain imports from the U.S. to supplement their own harvests, and because intense drought and floods are damaging crops elsewhere as well, food supplies are expected to shrink and prices to rise across the planet. "What happens to the U.S. supply has immense impact around the world," says Robert Thompson, a food expert at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. As the crops most affected by the drought, corn and soybeans, disappear from world markets, he noted, the price of all grains, including wheat, is likely to soar, causing immense hardship to those who already have trouble affording enough food to feed their families.¶ The Hunger Games, 2007-2011¶ What happens next is, of course, impossible to predict, but if the recent past is any guide, it could turn ugly. In 2007-2008, when rice, corn, and wheat experienced prices hikes of 100 or more, sharply higher prices -- especially for bread -- sparked "food riots" in more than two dozen countries, including Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Senegal, and Yemen. In Haiti, the rioting became so violent and public confidence in the government's ability to address the problem dropped so precipitously that the Haitian Senate voted to oust the country's prime minister, Jacques-Edouard Alexis. In other countries, angry protestors clashed with army and police forces, leaving scores dead.¶ Those price increases of 2007-2008 were largely attributed to the soaring cost of oil, which made food production more expensive. (Oil's use is widespread in farming operations, irrigation, food delivery, and pesticide manufacture.) At the same time, increasing amounts of cropland worldwide were being diverted from food crops to the cultivation of plants used in making biofuels.¶ The next price spike in 2010-11 was, however, closely associated with climate change. An intense drought gripped much of eastern Russia during the summer of 2010, reducing the wheat harvest in that breadbasket region by one-fifth and prompting Moscow to ban all wheat exports. Drought also hurt China's grain harvest, while intense flooding destroyed much of Australia's wheat crop. Together with other extreme-weather-related effects, these disasters sent wheat prices soaring by more than 50 and the price of most food staples by 32.¶ Once again, a surge in food prices resulted in widespread social unrest, this time concentrated in North Africa and the Middle East. The earliest protests arose over the cost of staples in Algeria and then Tunisia, where -- no coincidence -- the precipitating event was a young food vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, setting himself on fire to protest government harassment. Anger over rising food and fuel prices combined with long-simmering resentments about government repression and corruption sparked what became known as the Arab Spring. The rising cost of basic staples, especially a loaf of bread, was also a cause of unrest in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. Other factors, notably anger at entrenched autocratic regimes, may have proved more powerful in those places, but as the author of "Tropic of Chaos," Christian Parenti, wrote, "The initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread."¶ The Hunger Games, 2012-??¶ If this was just one bad harvest, occurring in only one country, the world would undoubtedly absorb the ensuing hardship and expect to bounce back in the years to come. Unfortunately, it's becoming evident that the Great Drought of 2012 is not a one-off event in a single heartland nation, but rather an inevitable consequence of global warming which is only going to intensify. As a result, we can expect not just more bad years of extreme heat, but worse years, hotter and more often, and not just in the United States, but globally for the indefinite future.¶ Until recently, most scientists were reluctant to blame particular storms or droughts on global warming. Now, however, a growing number of scientists believe that such links can be demonstrated in certain cases. In one recent study focused on extreme weather events in 2011, for instance, climate specialists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Great Britain's National Weather Service concluded that human-induced climate change has made intense heat waves of the kind experienced in Texas in 2011 more likely than ever before. Published in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, it reported that global warming had ensured that the incidence of that Texas heat wave was 20 times more likely than it would have been in 1960; similarly, abnormally warm temperatures like those experienced in Britain last November were said to be 62 times as likely because of global warming.¶ It is still too early to apply the methodology used by these scientists to calculating the effect of global warming on the heat waves of 2012, which are proving to be far more severe, but we can assume the level of correlation will be high. And what can we expect in the future, as the warming gains momentum?¶ When we think about climate change (if we think about it at all), we envision rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, freakish storms, hellish wildfires, and rising sea levels. Among other things, this will result in damaged infrastructure and diminished food supplies. These are, of course, manifestations of warming in the physical world, not the social world we all inhabit and rely on for so many aspects of our daily well-being and survival. The purely physical effects of climate change will, no doubt, prove catastrophic. But the social effects including, somewhere down the line, food riots, mass starvation, state collapse, mass migrations, and conflicts of every sort, up to and including full-scale war, could prove even more disruptive and deadly.¶ In her immensely successful young-adult novel "The Hunger Games" (and the movie that followed), Suzanne Collins riveted millions with a portrait of a dystopian, resource-scarce, post-apocalyptic future where once-rebellious "districts" in an impoverished North America must supply two teenagers each year for a series of televised gladiatorial games that end in death for all but one of the youthful contestants. These "hunger games" are intended as recompense for the damage inflicted on the victorious capital of Panem by the rebellious districts during an insurrection. Without specifically mentioning global warming, Collins makes it clear that climate change was significantly responsible for the hunger that shadows the North American continent in this future era. Hence, as the gladiatorial contestants are about to be selected, the mayor of District 12's principal city describes "the disasters, the droughts, the storms, the fires, the encroaching seas that swallowed up so much of the land and the brutal war for what little sustenance remained."¶ In this, Collins was prescient, even if her specific vision of the violence on which such a world might be organized is fantasy. While we may never see her version of those hunger games, do not doubt that some version of them will come into existence -- that, in fact, hunger wars of many sorts will fill our future. These could include any combination or permutation of the deadly riots that led to the 2008 collapse of Haiti's government, the pitched battles between massed protesters and security forces that engulfed parts of Cairo as the Arab Spring developed, the ethnic struggles over disputed croplands and water sources that have made Darfur a recurring headline of horror in our world, or the inequitable distribution of agricultural land that continues to fuel the insurgency of the Maoist-inspired Naxalites of India.¶ Combine such conflicts with another likelihood: that persistent drought and hunger will force millions of people to abandon their traditional lands and flee to the squalor of shantytowns and expanding slums surrounding large cities, sparking hostility from those already living there. One such eruption, with grisly results, occurred in Johannesburg's shantytowns in 2008 when desperately poor and hungry migrants from Malawi and Zimbabwe were set upon, beaten, and in some cases burned to death by poor South Africans. One terrified Zimbabwean, cowering in a police station from the raging mobs, said she fled her country because "there is no work and no food." And count on something else: millions more in the coming decades, pressed by disasters ranging from drought and flood to rising sea levels, will try to migrate to other countries, provoking even greater hostility. And that hardly begins to exhaust the possibilities that lie in our hunger-games future.¶ At this point, the focus is understandably on the immediate consequences of the still ongoing Great Drought: dying crops, shrunken harvests, and rising food prices. But keep an eye out for the social and political effects that undoubtedly won't begin to show up here or globally until later this year or 2013. Better than any academic study, these will offer us a hint of what we can expect in the coming decades from a hunger-games world of rising temperatures, persistent droughts, recurring food shortages, and billions of famished, desperate people.
The impact is extinction
Brown 9 – Founder of Worldwatch and EPI
(Lester R, founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May)
The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding see sidebar at left. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy. Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six). Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.
3
Advantage three – Competitiveness
US-Mexico energy cooperation boosts regional competitiveness
Wilson 11 – MA in International Affairs @ American U, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs
(Christopher, “Working Together,” Mexico Institute @ Woodrow Institute, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working20Together20Full20Document.pdf)
With studies focused at the regional level, some analysts have argued that U.S.-Mexico integration has facilitated the displacement of some American jobs due to the lower wages paid to Mexican workers. Of course, many others retort that the U.S. has benefited from strong export growth, cheaper final goods and inexpensive inputs for U.S. industry, but taking a global perspective moves us beyond many of these traditional arguments. The reality is that China and, to a lesser extent, other emerging suppliers in Asia represent the largest and most threatening source of competition for the U.S. economy. Due to geographical proximity and a number of key complementarities, economic cooperation with Mexico is one of the best ways for the United States to improve its global competitiveness and defend American industry.
Advanced biofuels are key – create integrated markets that spill over throughout the region
Philippidis 10 – energy director of the Applied Research Center and co-director of the Global Energy Security Forum at Florida International University in Miami
(George, “Panamerican Energy Cooperation,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Philippidis_Energy_in_the_Americas.pdf)
Encouraging signs of biofuels collaboration in the Americas have emerged from the ¶ area of next-generation biofuels4¶ . These so called “advanced biofuels” are derived from ¶ cellulosic biomass and algae, technologies that do not use food crops (hence no food ¶ vs. fuel controversy) and do not necessitate land-use change, since biomass is already ¶ available as an agricultural byproduct and algae can be cultivated on marginal nonagricultural land. The United States and Canada are the world leaders in cellulosic and ¶ algal technology development, but it is Latin America that possesses large quantities of ¶ biomass, such as sugarcane bagasse, and large areas of unutilized or underutilized ¶ land, along with plenty of sunshine and warm weather, for production of algal biodiesel ¶ and renewable hydrocarbons. In fact, advanced biofuels production co-located at ¶ existing sugarcane mills in Latin America can reduce the capital expenditure and ¶ operation cost of such fuels and make them a commercial reality. Hence, partnerships ¶ in the forthcoming commercialization of advanced biofuels, which will bring together ¶ technologies and feedstocks, represent excellent prospects for Panamerican energy ¶ collaboration.
That solves US economic leadership
Noriega and Cardenas 12 – *Former US State Dept Official, director with Vision Americas
(“An action plan for US policy in the Americas,” December, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/)
Key points in this Outlook:
America’s economic crisis and threats to US security have undermined its traditional global-leadership role and weakened its connections to Latin American nations that continue to modernize their economies.¶ The United States must recover its regional credibility by taking bold initiatives to restore its fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. ¶ The United States must then retool its strategy for its partners in the Americas by working with them to combat threats such as cross-border criminality and radical populism, encouraging dialogue with regional leaders, and ensuring law enforcement cooperation to develop a mutually beneficial relationship. ¶ ¶ A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. The region is home to three of the top four foreign sources of energy to the United States, as well as the fastest-growing destinations for US exports and investment. Clearly, geography and shared values predetermine a united destiny for the United States and its neighbors in the Americas. How positive and fruitful that destiny will be depends on whether US policymakers, private businesses, and civil society move with a greater sense of purpose toward seizing promising opportunities and meeting critical challenges.¶ Times have changed. The US fiscal crisis and preoccupation with two distant wars have distracted policymakers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the Americas. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits are highly valued by most countries in the Western Hemisphere, today, the United States is no longer the only major partner to choose from. Asia (principally China) and Europe are making important inroads. So, as US policymakers retool their strategy for the Americas, they must shelve the paternalism of the past and be much more energetic in forming meaningful partnerships with willing neighbors.¶ Of course, the United States must recover its credibility by making bold decisions to restore its own fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. Then, Washington will be better positioned to cultivate greater economic and political cooperation among its neighbors, beginning with an open and candid dialogue with the region’s leaders about their vision, their challenges, and their priorities. Partnerships can thus be built on common ground.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by petrodollars and allied with dangerous extraregional forces pose daunting challenges. Although it is wise to prioritize a positive socioeconomic and political agenda, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable prerequisite to achieving US security and regional leadership.¶ To make the most of their united destiny, the United States and its partners in the Americas should:¶ Promote and defend democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and private property as the building blocks of just societies, accountable governments, and prosperous economies;¶ Advocate and support the empowerment of individuals through the development of strong free-market economies, healthy private sectors, and free trade among nations;¶ Assist neighbors in addressing their essential security needs so they can grow in peace and be more effective allies to prevent or confront common threats;¶ Incentivize capital markets and encourage new and innovative technology cooperation to develop a regional community that is interdependent in the production and distribution of a range of products and services—particularly energy;¶ Confront international organized crime in Mexico and Central America by supporting effective law-enforcement institutions and competent judicial systems;¶ Work with willing allies to restore the Organization of American States to its essential mission of promoting and defending common values and meeting common threats;¶ Address the role of China and Russia in the Americas by encouraging open and transparent regional investment and trade and rejecting exploitive policies that undermine local societies, regional security, and economic growth;¶ Combat threats posed by authoritarian regimes and their ties with Iran, Hezbollah, and transnational criminal organizations; ¶ Assist the Cuban people in transitioning to a post–Castro Cuba by helping to jump-start their private sector, rehabilitate their economy, and restore their political freedoms when the dictatorship collapses.¶ ¶ Maximizing Mutual Global Competitiveness¶ Expanding regional economic cooperation is crucial to US economic growth. An aggressive trade promotion and investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive, globalized economy is not a policy option; it is an imperative. Clearly, prosperity at home depends on success abroad. The economic opportunities in the Western Hemisphere are enormous, and US policy-makers and the private sector must recognize them as critical to US economic growth.¶ In 2011, US exports reached a record $2.1 trillion in total value, despite the fact that only 1 percent of US businesses export their products to foreign markets. The United States must expand on these opportunities. Exports benefit the US economy by offering companies opportunities to tap new markets, expand their production, and earn more consumer dollars. Today, 95 percent of the world’s consumers live outside the United States, and the International Monetary Fund predicts that, through 2015, some 80 percent of economic growth will take place beyond US shores.¶ It is indisputable that an aggressive US trade policy—meaning selling US goods and services in as many markets as possible—is essential for the US economy to hone its competitive edge in the 21st century. In this sense, America’s future is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbors in its own hemisphere. A prosperous hemisphere means a more prosperous United States.
The link is reverse causal – lack of US leadership collapses competitiveness
Farnsworth 13 – MPA in IR @ Princeton, former State Department official, Vice President of the Council of the Americas and the Americas Society
(Eric, “ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,” House Testimony, Lexis)
As well, for the past several years the Council has organized our Energy Action Group, a ¶ public-private dialogue that seeks to focus on the strategic, policy, and commercial issues ¶ at the heart of hemispheric energy matters with a view to providing recommendations to ¶ policymakers on the Western Hemisphere energy agenda. We genuinely appreciate the ¶ opportunity to appear before you to provide testimony regarding energy security ¶ opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. ¶ Mr. Chairman, if I may give you the bottom line first: energy security for the United ¶ States is of fundamental strategic importance. It underlies our ability to function as a ¶ modern society, and ensuring energy security has long been a critical component of U.S. ¶ foreign policy globally on a bipartisan basis. It is within this context that we firmly ¶ believe the nations of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada must be considered, ¶ leading to a new and abiding appreciation at the most senior levels of government of the ¶ strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere to the United States.¶ The region cannot be an afterthought or taken for granted. Already, just over half of U.S. ¶ energy imports come from the Western Hemisphere, meeting approximately one quarter ¶ of our daily energy needs. Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela are three of our top suppliers ¶ worldwide. We receive more than twice as much energy from Canada, our top supplier, ¶ as from Saudi Arabia, our second largest supplier. Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil also ¶ contribute significant amounts. ¶ Even when political relations are troubled with certain countries, for example Venezuela ¶ and Ecuador, the United States continues to engage in energy trade on a commercial ¶ basis. At the same time, a dramatic expansion of new energy resources across the ¶ hemisphere made possible by new technologies including ultra-deep water drilling ¶ offshore and biofuel production and fracking onshore has created the possibility of a new, ¶ highly favorable paradigm for hemispheric energy. ¶ Herein lies the primary opportunity for regional partnership, if we are nimble enough, ¶ collectively, to grasp it: working together as a hemisphere to increase energy security for ¶ all parties in a manner that lowers costs through increased production and greater ¶ efficiencies, encourages sustainable economic growth, development, and job creation, ¶ and supports a clean energy matrix with appropriate environmental protections. In fact, ¶ energy partnership was one of the key initiatives at the 1994 Summit of the Americas in ¶ Miami, at the insistence of Venezuela, and was one of the deliverables coming out of the ¶ 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. Changing sector dynamics make ¶ the vision truly compelling, to the extent that regional political challenges can be ¶ minimized or overcome.¶ At the same time, the United States is not the only nation that sees the potential for ¶ cooperation in Latin American, Caribbean, and Canadian energy. China, which is now ¶ the world’s top energy consumer, is a relatively recent but very active participant in the ¶ development of regional energy resources, as are other nations such as India and Russia, ¶ a trend that we expect will continue and also accelerate into the indefinite future. This is ¶ a region that is now in play and in my view, the United States must do a better job ¶ making the case for regional partnership because alternatives for the region exist today ¶ which simply did not exist a decade ago. A strategic approach to the hemisphere with ¶ energy at the core should be at the top of our agenda.
US growth solves great power war
Khalilzad 11 – PhD, Former Professor of Political Science @ Columbia, Former ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan
(Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992. "The Economy and National Security" Feb 8 www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/259024)
Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.
Nuclear war
Harris and Burrows 9
Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf
Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
The US has comparatively the most peaceful economic model
Posen 9 - deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics
Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf
In the postwar period, US power’ and prestige, beyond the nation’s military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries’ economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from overrepresented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries’ leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis’ apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the shortterm by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US’ traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing – communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets – and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea – are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico’s continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany’s and Japan’s obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country’s detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.
Solvency
Finally – solvency
Mexican bioenergy avoids historical drawbacks of biofuels
GNEB 11 – Good Neighbor Environmental Board, The Good Neighbor Environmental Board was created in 1992 by the Enterprise for the Americas ¶ Initiative Act, Public Law 102-532.The purpose of the Board is to “advise the President and the Congress on the need for implementation of environmental and infrastructure projects (including projects that affect agriculture, rural development, and human nutrition) within the States of the United States contiguous to Mexico in order to improve the quality of life of persons residing on the United States side of the border.” The Board is charged with submitting an annual report to the President and the Congress. Management responsibilities for the Board were delegated to the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by Executive Order 12916 on May 13, 1994
(“The Potential Environmental and Economic Benefits of Renewable Energy Development in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” http://www.epa.gov/ofacmo/gneb/gneb14threport/English-GNEB-14th-Report.pdf)
Unlike for much of the United States, bioenergy potential along the border rarely contemplates ¶ growing and harvesting biomass (e.g., corn) specifically for use as an energy stock or fuel (e.g., ethanol). ¶ Thus, many of the negative implications associated with full life-cycle impacts of agriculture for biofuels ¶ (nutrient and pesticide use, runoff, etc.) are not as prevalent along the border. One social concern with ¶ certain biomass to energy programs is that extensive use of vegetable oils as a feedstock could contribute ¶ to food shortages in developing nations73 or cause domestic food prices to rise, putting stress on poorer ¶ populations. Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, the biomass sources with the most potential for energy ¶ production are based primarily on feedstocks that originate from waste products (i.e., municipal solid ¶ waste, wastewater treatment sludge), landfill gas, or more recently, algae farms. Based on these potential ¶ feedstock sources, positive impacts may include, indirectly, decreased reduction of air emissions such as ¶ less methane emissions from diverted “waste” from landfills or agriculture waste, and reduced carbon ¶ dioxide, sulfur oxides, and nitrogen oxides emissions in biofuels.
FDI is key – creates economies of scale
Valles 13 – Director of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(Guillermo, et al, “MEXICO’S AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT,” United Nations, http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/11166.pdf)
There is significant potential for energy extraction from the residuals of thirteen key agricultural products, in terms ¶ of bioelectricity, bioethanol, biodiesel and biomethane. It is estimated that revenues of between USD 2.4 and 4.3 ¶ billion could be generated for Mexican agriculture and given that many of the thirteen products are cultivated in ¶ smallholder systems, bioenergy revenue streams could significantly increase income-generation and (skilled) job ¶ opportunities within rural areas and help reduce rural poverty, seasonal fluctuations in agricultural employment ¶ and rural emigration. It is important that Mexico is cognizant of the potential of biofuels as a contributor to rural ¶ development, in particular as a source of employment and income creation in rural areas.¶ There are many challenges that need to be met, however, before the potential of second generation biofuels ¶ can be realized. Many regulatory and technological objectives need to be addressed including initializing a ¶ comprehensive framework to accelerate the evolution and adoption of related technology and demand for ¶ biofuels produced from residues. Regarding the latter, the inclusion of minimum purchase requirements within ¶ public procurement mechanisms would encourage second generation biofuel production. There are existing ¶ rural investment programs but they are too numerous and complex that it is unclear which if any, would provide ¶ support for biofuel production. International cooperation will be fundamental in terms of both research and ¶ development of related technologies (cost reduction, speed of development) and through the creation of large ¶ markets in order to exploit available economies of scale. Most importantly, second generation biofuel adoption ¶ will only become widespread after considerable strategic, political and economic integration between energy and ¶ agricultural production.
Only the US solves
Farnsworth 13 – MPA in IR @ Princeton, former State Department official, Vice President of the Council of the Americas and the Americas Society
(Eric, “ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,” House Testimony, Lexis)
More broadly, the United States has a strategic interest in working with willing nations in ¶ the hemisphere to develop their own energy resources effectively, while promoting ¶ models that reduce the negative if unintended consequences of regional energy ¶ development, including a lack of transparency and official corruption, the distorting ¶ impact of consumption subsidies, an over-reliance on a single commodity or sector, ¶ environmental concerns, and a concentration of wealth and political power around the ¶ sector. In order to develop their respective industries, nations need U.S. technology, ¶ management expertise, and investment dollars. They need our education system to ¶ develop their engineers and seismologists, they need help to understand regulatory, tax, ¶ and policy models that work, they need to be exposed to best practices in environmental ¶ mitigation, and they need our technical assistance to improve the investment climate and ¶ the rule of law.
US-Mexco high level economic dialogue now- link is non-uq
Wilson 9/20- Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
(Christopher, “Biden Kicks-off US-Mexico Economic Dialogue”, 9/20, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/biden-kicks-us-mexico-economic-dialogue)
Five years ago, the United States and China launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a reflection of the growing complexity and enormous importance of US-China relations. Earlier this year at their meeting in Mexico City, President Obama and President Peña Nieto agreed to a similar initiative, the US-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED), for much the same reasons, and Vice President Biden is in Mexico today to officially launch the initiative.¶ Before looking at the content of the Dialogue, let’s take a quick look at why this matters:¶ Source: United States Census Bureau, 2013¶ Mexico is the United States’ second largest export market (Canada is first), and since 2009, exports to Mexico have grown faster than exports to any of our other top trading partners. Some six million US jobs depend on trade with Mexico. Investment and financial flows between the two countries are also important, but the massive trade relationship is still the centerpiece of the economic relationship.¶ In addition to being big, trade with Mexico is also unique. Imports from China contain, on average, four percent US content. This is because most of the parts and materials in Chinese goods are either produced domestically in China or regionally in Asia. Imports of final goods from Mexico, on the other hand, contain an average of forty percent US content. US inputs are widely used in Mexican factories, which means any growth in Mexico’s manufacturing sector fuels growth in the US, and vice versa. A look at the chart below shows how closely linked industry on both sides of the border have become, and also how quickly production in Mexico has expanded in the years since the Great Recession.¶ Source: Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, StatExtracts, 2013.¶ The HLED will b e centered on three pillars, and the selection of these tells us a lot about the evolving nature of the global economy and especially the US-Mexico economic relationship.¶ Pillar 1. Promoting Competitiveness and Connectivity: What’s important here is the decision to put these two issues together. Back in the Nineties, NAFTA eliminated most tariffs on trade within the region and thereby stimulated a huge increase in commerce. The construction of transportation infrastructure, the highways and border crossings on which this trade travels, have lagged way behind the growing flows of goods and people. Increased border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 made the border an even greater bottleneck, and at this point infrastructure and border crossing issues have become a big drag on the competitiveness of manufacturers in the region. This is the local version of the worldwide transition from trade policy based on tariff reductions to one based on non-tariff barriers and the building of robust supply chains. Connectivity also refers to other areas of joint opportunity like telecommunications and electricity.¶ Pillar 2. Fostering Economic Growth, Productivity and Innovation: As technology and advanced manufacturing techniques have evolved, they have lowered the portion of production costs devoted to unskilled labor, and although many may still think of Mexican industry in terms Maquiladoras along the border pumping out cheap electronics, Mexico has slowly but surely climbed up the rungs of the value-added ladder, from sewing t-shirts and cobbling shoes to building cars and airplanes. So at this point, whether in the United States or Mexico, the formula for creating good, high-paying jobs is based on building human capital—increasing the knowledge and skills of workers. Instead of line workers, the US and Mexico need highly-skilled programmers, designers and engineers, and since our manufacturing sectors are deeply interconnected, we need them not only in the US or Mexico. We need them in both countries. ¶ Closely connected to the HLED is an initiative that hits at the heart of these issues. The Mexico-United States Entrepreneurship and Innovation Council (or MUSEIC) is coordinated by the two governments but involves private sector representatives from both countries. Meeting regularly to discuss ways in which entrepreneurship and innovation affect competitiveness, sub-committees deal with a range of issues from tech clusters to the role of women in business. And the talks are not just at the abstract level: a meeting of the sub-committee on financing issues in July resulted in the signing of 35 deals between participants.¶ The Vice President will also touch on the theme of educational cooperation during his visit, an issue to which the Mexican government has attached great importance. Increasing university level exchanges between the two nations and improving human capital formation in both countries will be a crucial component in securing future competitiveness. Despite the depth of US-Mexico ties, there are currently less than 14,000 Mexican students studying in American universities, and Mexico ranks ninth among countries that send students to the United States for undergraduate education and tenth for graduate education, far below Turkey, Iran, and other smaller and more distant countries. Increasing educational exchange would help both countries achieve their human capital goals. ¶ Pillar 3. Partnering for Regional and Global Leadership: In this context, trade is an especially relevant topic. The United States and Mexico are each in the midst of negotiating super-regional trade agreements, and given the integrated nature regional production, the US and Mexico have a great number of shared interests in these negotiations. It makes sense, then, for the two countries to negotiate as a bloc. Both countries are already parties to the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, making it the perfect venue to begin such an approach. Mexico and the US would each also do well to consider inviting the other into the Pacific Alliance and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, respectively.¶ Within these three pillars, a number of specific programs will be developed. Some will be the next stage of ongoing projects, but several will be brand new. The topics of innovation and entrepreneurship, for example, are being added to the bilateral agenda for the first time. Domestic factors, like the economic reform agenda in Mexico and the battle over the budget in the United States, will always be the main determinants of each country’s economic competitiveness, but the new ideas being generated through the HLED, backed-up by the leadership of Vice-President Biden and the strong momentum behind the recent growth in US-Mexico trade, could provide both nations with a significant boost.¶