1NC - T QPQ Saudi Oil DA Race DA Syria Politics DA 2NC1NR - Saudi Oil DA Race DA Case defense 2NR - Saudi Oil DA Case defense
Wake Forest
4
Opponent: Riverhill SS | Judge: Abe Corrigan
1NC - Reverse FW Afropessimism K 2NC1NR - Reverse FW Afropessimism K Case defense 2NR - Afropessimism K
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
Entry
Date
1AC - Cuban Embargo - Golden Desert
Tournament: Golden Desert | Round: 6 | Opponent: Brophy MS | Judge: John Vitz 1AC - AHS RS – Ohio Valley Contention 1: Instability Castro’s reforms will inevitably fail – that triggers economic and social collapse Morales 8-31-13 (Ermilio, He holds a B.S. in Computer Science from the José Antonio Echevarría Higher Polytechnic Institute in Havana, and a Masters in Marketing from the University of Havana. He also earned an MBA from the Higher School of Marketing in Madrid, Spain. As a high-ranking professional in Cuba, he worked for more than 10 years in marketing research, and authored or co-authored more than 50 different government marketing studies of products and services in the health-care field, tourism, cell phones, retailing, medical equipment, tourism, and investment strategies. He provided technical service for the Cuban government in a variety of binational projects in South Africa, Argentina and Canada, “Cuban reforms: the ultimate utopia?” August 23rd, 2013, http://thehavanaconsultinggroups.com/index.php?option=com_contentandview=articleandid=3483Acuban-reforms-the-ultimate-utopiaandcatid=473Aeconomyandlang=en)//moxley The reforms that began under Raúl Castro's government, despite having the greatest reach since AND as architects, engineers and programmers-- are not included in these reforms. Normalization of relations is inevitable – only an immediate and complete rollback of the embargo can ensure successful reform and prevent Cuban collapse Timothy Ashby, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 3/29/13 (PRESERVING STABILITY IN CUBA AFTER NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES – THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADING WITH STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/)
Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and AND -way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs. There are four impacts – Cuban instability distracts the US from critical hotspots and causes Latin American instability, terrorism, and democratic backsliding Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074) Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s AND in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba? First, Global hotspots threaten global nuclear war. Effective management is key. Bosco 06 (David Bosco, a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine, “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III,” July 2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_) The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the AND -long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? Second, Latin American instability goes nuclear and turns all their impacts Manwaring ‘5, (General Douglas MacArthur Chair and Prof of Military Strategy @ U.S. Army War College, Ret U.S. Army Colonel, Adjunct Professor of International Politics @ Dickinson College (Max G, October, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf) President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous AND and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65 Third, Indo – Pak conflict causes extinction GSN, 10 Global Security Newswire, 3/16/2010, “Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100315_4193.php Computer modeling suggests a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun AND the Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Department at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Fourth, Korean instability causes nuclear war Chol. 11’. Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences 8/20/11, "Dangerous games,"www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.htmlMR The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, with AND each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.
Contention 2: Multilateralism
Anti-Americanism and unilateral military policies are decimating US legitimacy which leads to war Kupchan 12 – Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford, Associate Professor of International Relations @gtown, Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Charles Kupchan, “Sorry, Mitt: It Won't Be an American Century”, FEBRUARY 6, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/06/it_won_t_be_an_american_century?page=0,2) In an election season, such talk rolls easily off the tongue. But Romney's AND secure and prosperous even as economic and military strength spreads to new quarters. President Barack Obama is on the correct path. Leaving Iraq and overseeing a paced AND the president's pledge to focus on "nation-building here at home." Romney has already denigrated Obama's pragmatism, charging that "our president thinks America is AND speaks directly to an electorate yearning for more equity and prosperity at home. According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, 46 percent of Americans want the AND But Obama's commitment to nation-building at home will play even better. Even if Romney's rhetoric were to get more domestic traction, it would still bear no resemblance to the new global landscape that is fast emerging. The United States is indeed an exceptional nation -- in its prized geographic location, commitment to freedom and democracy, and brand of international leadership. But the country's exceptionalism should not be used as an excuse to hide from global realities. China's GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. AND years ahead. Nonetheless, a more level global playing field is inevitable. To be sure, America's military superiority will remain second to none for decades to AND be at least as important as raw power in ensuring the country's security. To acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not, as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial. Adjusting to the rise of the rest requires, for starters, making more room at the table for newcomers. That process is already well under way. The G-20 has supplanted the G-8, widening the circle for global consultations. In the aftermath of reforms adopted in 2010, developing countries now have enhanced weight at the World Bank and IMF. The enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, though currently bogged down in wrangling, is also in the offing. But making international institutions more representative is the easy part. More challenging will be managing the ideological diversity that will accompany the coming realignment in global power. Precisely because the United States is an exceptional nation, its version of liberal democracy may well prove to be the exception, not the rule. In China, Russia, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, state- AND no excuse for his silence on how he plans to manage these complexities. Promoting international stability will grow more demanding as rising powers bring to the table their AND as stakeholders in that order, not merely as objects of American power. Shepherding the transition to this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership." Obama should welcome this debate and refuse to let his opponents hide behind the veil AND do much more for the United States than congratulatory talk of American primacy. A smarter, more selective, and less costly U.S. role in AND but on guiding a more diverse and unwieldy globe to consensus and cooperation.
The impact is global conflict escalation Brooks, et al, 13 Don't Come Home, America: The Case AND Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ Even if deep engagement's costs are AND disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences.
Multilateralism is a credible alternative- it promotes band-wagoning and international coalitions among US allies Ikenberry and Kupchan 04 – (John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, “Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy,” National Interest (Fall 2004)) It is misguided, however, to assume that America's preponderant power, when combined AND deployed in the exclusive pursuit of national self-interest does the opposite. The Bush Administration's grand strategy rests on a second geopolitical misconception: that U. AND power, as they rise, array their strength against the United States. Finally, the Bush Administration has overestimated the advantages of military superiority and mistaken brute AND . policy do not have the military wherewithal to stand in America's way. Although it is correct that other countries are not forming alliances against the United States AND its current course, it will enjoy military supremacy, but little else. FROM THE perspective of liberal realism, management of the global balance of power would AND the costs of unilateral action usually far exceed the costs of seeking consensus. Second, liberal realism entails moving with--rather than against--the secular diffusion AND rise, but the ends to which it will use its growing strength. Third, liberal realism rests on a multidimensional understanding of power, sensitive to the AND and to make disaffected allies again feel like stakeholders in the international system.
Specifically, it solves inevitable Asian transition wars which go nuclear Kugler 06 – Professor of World Politics at Claremont Graduate University (Jacek, “The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?”, http://sobek.colorado.edu/~lewiso/Kugler20-20The20Asian20Ascent.pdf)//NG Given the fundamental importance of demographic and economic forces in establishing the roster of states AND of the enormous costs that reasonably would be anticipated from a nuclear war.
The plan solves–
First, repeal would represent a commitment to multilateralism for the international community and bolster human rights credibility Burgsdorff 09 – Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation which was AND it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.
That bolsters legitimacy of U.S. hegemony, which locks in institutional norms to bring rising powers into the system safely Fujimoto 12 (Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11) The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term AND protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.
Second, the plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model which prevents conflict Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf) NG At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a AND of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations. While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore AND back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba. On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba AND continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner. Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy. Policy and National Interest Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to AND Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration AND by 1974, 45 of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7 The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, AND ” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations AND Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and AND allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15 By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s AND tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments. The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. A History of Anger and Distrust After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U. AND conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations. Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian AND encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress AND .S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20 Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral AND , and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26 Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest AND now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries. It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S AND U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro. Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement AND 28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. AND generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate AND is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations. Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is AND . to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed. How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three AND . acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba. Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on AND , our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security. In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable AND foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool. Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.? Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean AND are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems. While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a AND not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations. Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow. The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has AND conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate. Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. AND these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these. We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba AND U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government. If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a AND to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections. The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions. While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot AND the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected. Conclusion Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s AND Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for AND decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.
That conflict model bolsters Obama’s credibility and convinces other countries to negotiate with the US Hinderdael, 11– M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true)//NG Conclusion¶ The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe AND truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.¶
Third, the plan sends a clear signal of cooperation to Latin America White 13 – Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times, 3/7/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all)//TL FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas. I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose AND region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century. Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders AND D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations. Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism. During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service. The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes. After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked AND and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.” Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and AND States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative. At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.” Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor. Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba. Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime. After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero. And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that AND Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.) Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive? The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez AND president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help. Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments. If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.
Increased regional standing bolsters influence in international institutions allowing the US to lead multilateral forums Sabatini and Berger 12 – Christopher Sabatini is editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas. Ryan Berger is a policy associate at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas(Christopher/Ryan, "Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America" 6/13/12, CNN/Global Public Square, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/)//AD Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called AND S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.
That leads to greater power sharing and international cooperation, resolving conflict Pouliot 11 — Professor of Political Science at McGill University (Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26)NG Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints AND that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23
Plan The United States federal government should normalize trade relations with Cuba. Contention 3: Solvency
Normal Trade Relations are vital – no trade occurs without it *normal trade relations are critical – even if the US were to lift the entire embargo, that doesn’t initiate trade because actual trade depends on the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners – otherwise sustainable trade is impossible French 09 – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note, has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf) If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would AND most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations AND desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need AND years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes. The unconditional offer of normal trade relations boosts US-Cuban relations and fosters a stable transition *unconditional offer of the plan is critical – adding a condition to the offer makes the US seem like a coercive entity that is attempting to forcefully extract concessions from Cuba which exacerbates the imperialist symbol of the embargo *plan fosters a stable Cuban democratic transition – normalization of trade relations gives the US the opportunity to provide foreign economic aid to Cuba in the case of Cuban economic decline – allows a stable transition to a democratic state Koenig 10 – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, “Time for a New Cuba Policy” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130) The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is AND her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas. ¶ Lifting the embargo won’t speed reform – instability is more likely without the plan Whiting 13 – (Ashley, LEEHG Institute for Foreign Policy, Policy Recommendation to Lift the Cuban Embargo, 1/30/13, http://www.leehg.org/?p=467) The United States’ embargo against Cuba has failed to fulfill its purpose even half a AND embargo and take a new approach in influencing the domestic politics of Cuba.
The plan changes elite calculus – it removes the fear of regime change and creates buy in for economic and political reform Lopez-Levy 11 – PhD candidate at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, coauthor of “Raul Castro and the New Cuba” (Arturo, New America Foundation, May 2011, http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf_all_cuba_reform_final.pdf)//EK Diplomacy, not sanctions, must be the primary tool for resolving differences with Havana AND civil society. The United States should support such a course in Cuba.
Embargo prevents meaningful econ reform CSG 13 – (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032) The primary consequences of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions have been to isolate AND that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island.
2/11/14
1AC - Cuban Embargo - Ohio Valley
Tournament: Ohio Valley | Round: 1 | Opponent: Stratford OC | Judge: Hemphill 1AC - AHS RS – Ohio Valley Contention 1: Instability Castro’s reforms will inevitably fail – that triggers economic and social collapse Morales 8-31-13 (Ermilio, He holds a B.S. in Computer Science from the José Antonio Echevarría Higher Polytechnic Institute in Havana, and a Masters in Marketing from the University of Havana. He also earned an MBA from the Higher School of Marketing in Madrid, Spain. As a high-ranking professional in Cuba, he worked for more than 10 years in marketing research, and authored or co-authored more than 50 different government marketing studies of products and services in the health-care field, tourism, cell phones, retailing, medical equipment, tourism, and investment strategies. He provided technical service for the Cuban government in a variety of binational projects in South Africa, Argentina and Canada, “Cuban reforms: the ultimate utopia?” August 23rd, 2013, http://thehavanaconsultinggroups.com/index.php?option=com_contentandview=articleandid=3483Acuban-reforms-the-ultimate-utopiaandcatid=473Aeconomyandlang=en)//moxley The reforms that began under Raúl Castro's government, despite having the greatest reach since AND as architects, engineers and programmers-- are not included in these reforms. Normalization of relations is inevitable – only an immediate and complete rollback of the embargo can ensure successful reform and prevent Cuban collapse Timothy Ashby, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 3/29/13 (PRESERVING STABILITY IN CUBA AFTER NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES – THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADING WITH STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/)
Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and AND -way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs. There are four impacts – Cuban instability distracts the US from critical hotspots and causes Latin American instability, terrorism, and democratic backsliding Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074) Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s AND in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba? First, Global hotspots threaten global nuclear war. Effective management is key. Bosco 06 (David Bosco, a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine, “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III,” July 2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_) The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the AND -long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? Second, Latin American instability goes nuclear and turns all their impacts Manwaring ‘5, (General Douglas MacArthur Chair and Prof of Military Strategy @ U.S. Army War College, Ret U.S. Army Colonel, Adjunct Professor of International Politics @ Dickinson College (Max G, October, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf) President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous AND and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65 Third, Indo – Pak conflict causes extinction GSN, 10 Global Security Newswire, 3/16/2010, “Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100315_4193.php Computer modeling suggests a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun AND the Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Department at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Fourth, Korean instability causes nuclear war Chol. 11’. Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences 8/20/11, "Dangerous games,"www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.htmlMR The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, with AND each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.
Contention 2: Multilateralism
Anti-Americanism and unilateral military policies are decimating US legitimacy which leads to war Kupchan 12 – Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford, Associate Professor of International Relations @gtown, Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Charles Kupchan, “Sorry, Mitt: It Won't Be an American Century”, FEBRUARY 6, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/06/it_won_t_be_an_american_century?page=0,2) In an election season, such talk rolls easily off the tongue. But Romney's AND secure and prosperous even as economic and military strength spreads to new quarters. President Barack Obama is on the correct path. Leaving Iraq and overseeing a paced AND the president's pledge to focus on "nation-building here at home." Romney has already denigrated Obama's pragmatism, charging that "our president thinks America is AND speaks directly to an electorate yearning for more equity and prosperity at home. According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, 46 percent of Americans want the AND But Obama's commitment to nation-building at home will play even better. Even if Romney's rhetoric were to get more domestic traction, it would still bear no resemblance to the new global landscape that is fast emerging. The United States is indeed an exceptional nation -- in its prized geographic location, commitment to freedom and democracy, and brand of international leadership. But the country's exceptionalism should not be used as an excuse to hide from global realities. China's GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. AND years ahead. Nonetheless, a more level global playing field is inevitable. To be sure, America's military superiority will remain second to none for decades to AND be at least as important as raw power in ensuring the country's security. To acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not, as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial. Adjusting to the rise of the rest requires, for starters, making more room at the table for newcomers. That process is already well under way. The G-20 has supplanted the G-8, widening the circle for global consultations. In the aftermath of reforms adopted in 2010, developing countries now have enhanced weight at the World Bank and IMF. The enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, though currently bogged down in wrangling, is also in the offing. But making international institutions more representative is the easy part. More challenging will be managing the ideological diversity that will accompany the coming realignment in global power. Precisely because the United States is an exceptional nation, its version of liberal democracy may well prove to be the exception, not the rule. In China, Russia, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, state- AND no excuse for his silence on how he plans to manage these complexities. Promoting international stability will grow more demanding as rising powers bring to the table their AND as stakeholders in that order, not merely as objects of American power. Shepherding the transition to this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership." Obama should welcome this debate and refuse to let his opponents hide behind the veil AND do much more for the United States than congratulatory talk of American primacy. A smarter, more selective, and less costly U.S. role in AND but on guiding a more diverse and unwieldy globe to consensus and cooperation.
The impact is global conflict escalation Brooks, et al, 13 Don't Come Home, America: The Case AND Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ Even if deep engagement's costs are AND disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences.
Multilateralism is a credible alternative- it promotes band-wagoning and international coalitions among US allies Ikenberry and Kupchan 04 – (John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, “Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy,” National Interest (Fall 2004)) It is misguided, however, to assume that America's preponderant power, when combined AND deployed in the exclusive pursuit of national self-interest does the opposite. The Bush Administration's grand strategy rests on a second geopolitical misconception: that U. AND power, as they rise, array their strength against the United States. Finally, the Bush Administration has overestimated the advantages of military superiority and mistaken brute AND . policy do not have the military wherewithal to stand in America's way. Although it is correct that other countries are not forming alliances against the United States AND its current course, it will enjoy military supremacy, but little else. FROM THE perspective of liberal realism, management of the global balance of power would AND the costs of unilateral action usually far exceed the costs of seeking consensus. Second, liberal realism entails moving with--rather than against--the secular diffusion AND rise, but the ends to which it will use its growing strength. Third, liberal realism rests on a multidimensional understanding of power, sensitive to the AND and to make disaffected allies again feel like stakeholders in the international system.
Specifically, it solves inevitable Asian transition wars which go nuclear Kugler 06 – Professor of World Politics at Claremont Graduate University (Jacek, “The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?”, http://sobek.colorado.edu/~lewiso/Kugler20-20The20Asian20Ascent.pdf)//NG Given the fundamental importance of demographic and economic forces in establishing the roster of states AND of the enormous costs that reasonably would be anticipated from a nuclear war.
The plan solves–
First, repeal would represent a commitment to multilateralism for the international community and bolster human rights credibility Burgsdorff 09 – Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation which was AND it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.
That bolsters legitimacy of U.S. hegemony, which locks in institutional norms to bring rising powers into the system safely Fujimoto 12 (Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11) The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term AND protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.
Second, the plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model which prevents conflict Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf) NG At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a AND of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations. While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore AND back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba. On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba AND continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner. Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy. Policy and National Interest Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to AND Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration AND by 1974, 45 of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7 The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, AND ” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations AND Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and AND allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15 By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s AND tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments. The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. A History of Anger and Distrust After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U. AND conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations. Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian AND encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress AND .S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20 Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral AND , and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26 Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest AND now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries. It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S AND U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro. Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement AND 28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. AND generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate AND is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations. Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is AND . to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed. How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three AND . acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba. Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on AND , our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security. In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable AND foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool. Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.? Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean AND are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems. While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a AND not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations. Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow. The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has AND conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate. Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. AND these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these. We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba AND U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government. If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a AND to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections. The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions. While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot AND the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected. Conclusion Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s AND Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for AND decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.
That conflict model bolsters Obama’s credibility and convinces other countries to negotiate with the US Hinderdael, 11– M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true)//NG Conclusion¶ The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe AND truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.¶
Third, the plan sends a clear signal of cooperation to Latin America White 13 – Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times, 3/7/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all)//TL FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas. I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose AND region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century. Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders AND D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations. Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism. During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service. The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes. After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked AND and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.” Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and AND States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative. At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.” Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor. Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba. Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime. After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero. And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that AND Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.) Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive? The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez AND president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help. Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments. If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.
Increased regional standing bolsters influence in international institutions allowing the US to lead multilateral forums Sabatini and Berger 12 – Christopher Sabatini is editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas. Ryan Berger is a policy associate at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas(Christopher/Ryan, "Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America" 6/13/12, CNN/Global Public Square, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/)//AD Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called AND S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.
That leads to greater power sharing and international cooperation, resolving conflict Pouliot 11 — Professor of Political Science at McGill University (Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26)NG Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints AND that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23
Plan The United States federal government should normalize trade relations with Cuba. Contention 3: Solvency
Normal Trade Relations are vital – no trade occurs without it *normal trade relations are critical – even if the US were to lift the entire embargo, that doesn’t initiate trade because actual trade depends on the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners – otherwise sustainable trade is impossible French 09 – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note, has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf) If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would AND most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations AND desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need AND years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes. The unconditional offer of normal trade relations boosts US-Cuban relations and fosters a stable transition *unconditional offer of the plan is critical – adding a condition to the offer makes the US seem like a coercive entity that is attempting to forcefully extract concessions from Cuba which exacerbates the imperialist symbol of the embargo *plan fosters a stable Cuban democratic transition – normalization of trade relations gives the US the opportunity to provide foreign economic aid to Cuba in the case of Cuban economic decline – allows a stable transition to a democratic state Koenig 10 – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, “Time for a New Cuba Policy” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130) The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is AND her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas. ¶ Lifting the embargo won’t speed reform – instability is more likely without the plan Whiting 13 – (Ashley, LEEHG Institute for Foreign Policy, Policy Recommendation to Lift the Cuban Embargo, 1/30/13, http://www.leehg.org/?p=467) The United States’ embargo against Cuba has failed to fulfill its purpose even half a AND embargo and take a new approach in influencing the domestic politics of Cuba.
The plan changes elite calculus – it removes the fear of regime change and creates buy in for economic and political reform Lopez-Levy 11 – PhD candidate at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, coauthor of “Raul Castro and the New Cuba” (Arturo, New America Foundation, May 2011, http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf_all_cuba_reform_final.pdf)//EK Diplomacy, not sanctions, must be the primary tool for resolving differences with Havana AND civil society. The United States should support such a course in Cuba.
Embargo prevents meaningful econ reform CSG 13 – (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032) The primary consequences of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions have been to isolate AND that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island.
12/10/13
1AC - Cuban Oil - Carrollton
Tournament: Carrollton | Round: 1 | Opponent: HoCo | Judge: Libby Mandarino 1AC – Cuban Oil - Alpharetta RS Contention 1: Oil Development The embargo prevents successful Cuban oil development *current firms operating with dated tech and have to service own operations – embargo prevents tech from being sold or transferred to Cuba Benjamin-Alvadaro 06 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf) But why has Sherritt succeeded when the perception on the part of many American observers AND a small relatively resource constrained state to pursue this course of energy investment. Cuban oil dependence is unsustainable - Venezuela is going to cut Cuba off from special oil discounts *chavez had special relation with cuba – maduro will be more susceptible to pressure to excel as a new leader Will need to reduce aid as a result of current Venezuelan economic situation – will not be able to maintain popularity if he doesn’t take action fast, oil = first take of action Keppel. 13’. Reporter for ABC News Stephen, 3/06/2013,“What Chávez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the U.S,” ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuela-us/story?id=18669003MR Upon hearing news of the death of Hugo Chávez, scores of Venezuelans gathered in AND Chávez and may not be able to maintain popularity if things get tougher. Venezuelan oil is key to Cuba’s economy Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”) The power and hydrocarbon sectors are inextricably linked, as Cuba produces about 85 percent AND uses; this is consistent with the usage breakdown seen in other countries. Sudden change from discounted oil causes economic instability in Cuba *cuba vulnerable to change – been so dependent on them for so long Used Venezuelan oil wealth as a diplomatic tool Oil imports would have to decrease from 20-25 Leogrande. 13’. William Leogrande is a professor in the Department of Government, School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, D.C. William, 4/2/2013,“The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez,” World Poltics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreign-policy-after-chavezMR The Dangers of Dependency Cuba has twice experienced the pain of ruptured economic relations with AND part, an effort to reduce Cuba's vulnerability to an external oil shock. Cuban oil solves dependence on Venezuela-~--revenues lead to political reforms that create stability *integrate them into global and regional markets – increases exposure to international cooperation Need to diversify suppliers and develop resources to achieve economic interdependence – in us interest to aid them to develop comprehensive energy plan to get stabilize politically and economically – US serves as model Pinon. 11’. – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)," Miami Consortium, casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964_Hemisphere_Vol._20.pdfMR If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take AND from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States. Only the plan solves - catalyzes investment that allows Cuban oil development *efforts to excel now but not successful – trade relations allow FDI and transfer of tech and info Now key or it will cost more to revitalize energy sector with growing expenses Trade = most sufficient point of entry into coop – catalyst for confidence, trust, and coop Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf) Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face AND confidence, trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.
Cuban oil solves dependence on Venezuela-~--revenues lead to political reforms that create stability *integrate them into global and regional markets – increases exposure to international cooperation Need to diversify suppliers and develop resources to achieve economic interdependence – in us interest to aid them to develop comprehensive energy plan to get stabilize politically and economically – US serves as model Pinon. 11’. – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)," Miami Consortium, casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964_Hemisphere_Vol._20.pdfMR If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take AND from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States. Cuban instability distracts the US from critical hotspots and causes Latin American instability *power vacuum = instability and civil was throughout the region refugee crisis – thousands will flee and come to the US – unstable cuba = increased chance of radical groups to operate drug trafficking operations and export terrorist activity from cuba to US threatens developing democracies in the Latin American region US can’t trade off focus from Africa/Causus/NK/Iran – hot spots for terrorist activity Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074) Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s AND in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba? First, Global hotspots threaten global nuclear war. Effective management is key. Bosco 06 (David Bosco, a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine, “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III,” July 2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_) The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the AND -long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? Second, Latin American instability goes nuclear and turns all their impacts Manwaring ‘5, (General Douglas MacArthur Chair and Prof of Military Strategy @ U.S. Army War College, Ret U.S. Army Colonel, Adjunct Professor of International Politics @ Dickinson College (Max G, October, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare”, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf) President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous AND and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65 Indo – Pak conflict causes extinction GSN, 10 Global Security Newswire, 3/16/2010, “Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100315_4193.php Computer modeling suggests a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun with large amounts of airborne debris, disrupting global agriculture and leading to the starvation of around 1 billion people, Scientific American reported in its January issue (see GSN, March 4). The nuclear winter scenario assumes that cities and industrial zones in each nation would be AND , according to Peter Lavoy, an analyst with the Naval Postgraduate School. The nuclear blasts and subsequent blazes and radiation could kill more than 20 million people in India and Pakistan, according to the article. Assuming that each of the 100 bombs would burn an area equivalent to that seen at Hiroshima, U.S. researchers determined that the weapons used against Pakistan would generate 3 million metric tons of smoke and the bombs dropped on India would produce 4 million metric tons of smoke. Winds would blow the material around the world, covering the atmosphere over all continents within two weeks. The reduction in sunlight would cause temperatures to drop by 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit for several years and precipitation to drop by one-tenth. The climate changes and other environmental effects of the nuclear war would have a devastating affect on crop yields unless farmers prepared for such an occurrence in advance. The observed effects of volcano eruptions, smoke from forest fires and other events support the findings of the computer modeling, the researchers said. "A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at once, and AND the Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Department at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Korean instability causes nuclear war *tension in region makes conflict on insignificant issues all the more likely – chain reaction North Koreans have been preparing for nuclear war with Americans for almost 50 years and are prepared to use any resources necessary to win including use of nuclear weapons Chol. 11’. Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences 8/20/11, "Dangerous games,"www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.htmlMR The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, with AND each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs. Contention 2: Relations Contention Two is Relations: Scenario 1 is China US-Cuban oil coop checks US-China resource war. *china influence in Cuba growing – intensifying competition over energy resources ? competition Energy resources in Cuba serve as buffer against disruptions in US energy production Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication –obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 9-11 Those involved in managing the security interests of the United States need to understand the AND after the United States and Japan— to access oil and gas resources. US-Sino war goes nuclear. Crisis management won’t check *escalation management would be extremely difficult – miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and both countries are constantly suspicious of the others actions Once a conflict is initiated there’s no risk of deterrence Lowther ‘13 Note: when this card has a line that reads “it says”, it is referencing a 42-page report by the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS and the PONI (Project on Nuclear Issues) – several of them have worked for that organization and will have unique insights. The study at hand was prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time article was written by William Lowther, who is the Washington DC staff writer for that organization and he is citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3-16-2013, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
“Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, AND arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”
This specific type of resource war escalates – causing huge death tolls. *Oil wars escalate – a. peak oil approaching – lack of a sustainable supply makes US oil wars inevitable b. Causes wars – the US needs resources to maintain security and absent sufficient resources, US attack on China is inevitable c. Escalates – nuclear war over resources draws in every power because each country depends on resources to succeed Lendman ‘7 (Stephen Lendman is a renowned author and Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG). The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal. The CRG is involved in book publishing, support to humanitarian projects as well as educational outreach activities including the organization of public conferences and lectures. The Centre also acts as a think tank on crucial economic and geopolitical issues. Stephen has written extensively on war and peace, social justice in America and many other national and international issues. Stephen Lendman is a recipient of a 2008 Project Censored Award, University of California at Sonoma – “Resource Wars – Can We Survive Them?” – Global Research, June 06, 2007 – http://www.globalresearch.ca/resource-wars-can-we-survive-them/5892)
With the world’s energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and AND , or at least a big part of it, would have survived.
Deterrence gets warped – energy conflicts rapidly escalate Cabral ‘10 (Jim, Professor of International Relations and Political Science – Landmark College, “Book Review – Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet”, Z Magazine, July, http://www.zcommunications.org/rising-powers-shrinking-planet-by-jim-cabral) Not surprisingly, the accelerating militarization of energy procurement increases the possibilities for armed international AND but also increasing the risk that they will be caught in any conflagration." Plan sufficiently hedges US energy security. Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 118-19 In chapter 1, I spotlighted five “S” characteristics of energy security and AND the redirection of oil shipments as needed owing to any number of circumstances.
Scenario 2 is US-Venezuela Relations US-Venezuela ties are low because the US leads-from-behind – that vacuum causes laundering and Iran proliferation *US-Venezuela ties are low – the US lead from behind strategy fails to directly influence Venezuela’s posturing in Latin America, our bare-back presence in Latin America allows Iran to launder billions in funds from Venezuela to evade international sanctions to acquire their nuclear acquisition program Noriega 12 – Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – “After Chávez, the Narcostate” – April 11th – http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/after_chavez_the_narcostate?page=0,0
Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez has tried for 10 months to conceal the fact that he AND our own neighborhood, "leading from behind" is not an option.
Now’s a key time for the kick start – US engagement can break the Venezuelan-Iran nexus *we control uniqueness – Venezuela is at a point where Maduro is being boxed in by both powerful drug lords and the US, active economic engagement lets the US twist Maduro’s arm to achieve concession on nuclear acquisition Noreiga 13 – Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – Washington Times – March 07, 2013 – http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/igniting-the-post-chavez-explosion/
The next few days and weeks stand as a signal moment for the United States to re-seize its traditional leadership role in the Americas on behalf of democratic and free-market development. An abdication of that leadership would mean the continuation of a lawless Venezuelan government in cahoots with Cuba, Iran and drug traffickers to the detriment of all decent people in the region
Plan kick-starts ties – no embargo, more refineries, and better Venezuelan transit routes *plan solves Venezuelan relations – 1) increases regional refining capacity to meet Venezuelan oil exports which rejuvenates their economy; 2) increases transit capabilities and ease with which Venezuela can influence powers in Latin America Benjamin-Alvarado 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 122
U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for AND as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba.
Improved US-Venezuelan ties would scuttle Iranian proliferation efforts *relations as a result of the plan spills over to scuttle Iran proliferation efforts – increased Venezuelan ties allow the US to influence them to blockade the flow of economic resources used to promote Iran’s nuclear program Jones 13 – Steve Jones is a professor of history at Southwestern Adventist University. He specializes in American foreign policy and military history. Steve has fifteen years editorial experience in newspapers and magazines and another sixteen as a college professor. He regularly teaches a class in foreign policy. He is the author of The Right Hand Of Command: Use And Disuse Of Military Staffs In The Civil War, and several book chapters and encyclopedia entries on elements of warfare and its relation to foreign policy and social change. Steve received a B.A. in journalism from Northwestern Oklahoma State University in 1988. He earned an M.A.(1990) and Ph.D.(1997) in American history, both from Oklahoma State University. He did post-doctorate work in political science at the University of Texas at Arlington. “Does Chavez' Death Mean Better Relations Between U.S. and Venezuela?” – US Foreign Policy – About.com – March 7th – http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/Does-Chavez-Death-Mean-Better-Relations-Between-U-s-And-Venezuela.htm
Venezuela And Iran While the U.S. State Department isn't holding its collective AND , agricultural products, optical and medical instruments, autos and auto parts."
Iran proliferation causes mid-east nuclear arms race – results in nuclear war *Iran proliferation causes a cascade of rapid nuclear acquisition from regional Middle Eastern powers – forces other nations to acquire nukes to stabilize the power balance – minor tensions rapidly increase the risk of escalation to nuclear war Allison 06 – Graham, Prof of Government at Harvard, “The Will to Prevent”, Fall, Harvard International Law Review, page lexis Meanwhile, Iran is testing the line in the Middle East. On its current AND us to have control of weapons of destruction that can threaten our existence.”
Iranian-sponsored attack will hit US soil – Iran-Venezuelan ties are key *separate internal link – increased US-Venezuelan relations makes Venezuela a mediator between the US and Iran to coerce Iran into retaining peaceful ties with the United States via their economic interdependency *Iran will attack the US – the Director of National Intelligence concludes that Iranian officials are willing to conduct attacks on US soil Noriega ’12 – Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – “Iran's influence and activity in Latin America” – February 16, 2012 – http://67.208.89.102/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/irans-influence-and-activity-in-latin-america/
Since you announced your inquiry, the Director of National Intelligence, James R. AND that give Chávez unprecedented capabilities to threaten its neighbors and the United States.
That causes the U.S. lash out, precipitating global war *state-sponsored terrorism in the US creates a torrential flood of public fear which creates coalitions in the public demanding retaliation – the effect of which is US-led nuclear lashout drawing in greater powers Schwartz-Morgan ‘1 – Nicole, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada, 10/10/2001, “Wild Globalization and Terrorism,” http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm
The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan AND advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists. Scenario 3 is Nuke Terror Cuba is key to US-Latin American Relations. Specifically spills-over to global coop on nuclear material transfers.
Shifter ‘12 (Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and AND consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem.
Nuclear terrorism escalates to major nuclear war. Global coop on material transfers is key.
Ayson’10 Robert – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington – “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, obtained via InformaWorld
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by AND , is further international cooperation on the control of existing fissile material holdings. Terrorists can easily obtain nuclear weapons
NTA ‘10 (Internally quoting Graham Allison – Founder of the Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, “National Terror Alert, April 18, 2010, http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2010/04/18/threat-of-terrorists-obtaining-nuclear-weapons-a-reality/, “Threat of Terrorists Obtaining Nuclear Materials is a Reality,” National Terror Alert, DA: 7/14/10) The United States again reasserted itself as the world’s police last week, leading the AND have immediate, but long lasting radiation effects at the point of detonation.
Plan
The United States Federal Government should ease its restrictions on upstream petroleum cooperation toward the Republic of Cuba
Contention 3: Solvency
First - The Secretary of the Treasury can modify the embargo to allow drilling and link non-unique to all Disads Huddleston. 09’. Vicki Huddleston is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa at the Department of Defense, visiting fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition from 2007 to 2009 Vicki,“Use "Smart Power" to Help Cubans,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/02/24-cuba-huddlestonMR Executive authority¶ Again and again we hear that the embargo can't be changed because AND to live up to international norms of human rights, democracy and transparency. Second – Plan is effective, topical, and US firms would say “yes”. Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 125-26 There are numerous areas in the energy sector in which the United States and Cuba AND changes in the Cuban embargo so that this type of engagement can occur.
Third – Cuba also says “yes”. This spills-into broader coop. Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 120 Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust AND the way to establishing much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities.
1/17/14
1AC - Imperialism - Samford vs Detroit Community
Tournament: AAA - Contact Info | Round: 1 | Opponent: Contact Info | Judge: Contact Info 1AC 1AC – Imperialism
In 1846, William Gilpin, the then governor of Colorado territory wrote: "The destiny of the American People is to subdue the continent, to unite the world in one social family. ... Divine task! Immortal mission! America leads the host of nations as they ascend to this order of civilization. ... the industrial conquest of the world."
Gilpin’s view is descriptive of American policies since the founding of the nation – the goal always to conquer at any cost – this is what led to the destruction of native cultures and now more recently the Cuba Embargo
The history of US economic engagement toward Cuba has been characterized by imperialism and subjugation – the embargo is just a 21st century, hegemonic extension of the Monroe Doctrine which excuses endless intervention and violence into the lives of the Cuban population Lamrani 3 (Dr. Salim Lamrani is a lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, “U.S. Economic sanctions against Cuba: objectives of an imperialist policy”, 2003, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Caribbean/USEconomicSanctions_Cuba.html)//moxley The economic sanctions imposed on Cuba by the United States are unique in view of AND Spain, Cuba was in the U.S. line of sight.
And the embargo makes domination of the Cuban population inevitable – the goal is to hoist the Stars and Stripes over Havana once again but lifting represents a shift in goals and a concession to Cuban independence and freedom from American domination Lamrani 3 (Dr. Salim Lamrani is a lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, “U.S. Economic sanctions against Cuba: objectives of an imperialist policy”, 2003, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Caribbean/USEconomicSanctions_Cuba.html)//moxley The total blockade of the island imposed on February, 7, 1962 violates international AND living they were used to fret over before the triumph of the Revolution.
Sanctions are a colonialist tool premised on the ideology recolonization – this results in the commodification of the Cuban body and destruction of the other – this scapegoating causes other forms of injustices in domestic and foreign policies – only challenging the government can solve Harrison 8 (Faye Venetia Harrison. Professor of Anthropology and African American Studies. University of Florida, Everyday Neoliberalism in Cuba “Outsider Within: Reworking Anthropology in the Global Age” 2008, pg. 218)moxley The U.S. embargo, like structural adjustment policies, is premised on AND and foreign policies that fail to do justice to our sense of humanity.
Economic terrorism will not ease Lamrani 3 (Dr. Salim Lamrani is a lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, “U.S. Economic sanctions against Cuba: objectives of an imperialist policy”, 2003, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Caribbean/USEconomicSanctions_Cuba.html)//moxley As long as Cuba continues to challenge the dominant and dogmatic ideology of free market AND to the same voluble and outdated arguments that its representatives keep on repeating.
1AC – Advocacy The Cuban Embargo should be lifted.
1AC – Framing Institutionalized, participatory debate over a plan is the best model for debate on Cuban politics - key to agency and effective decision making – breaks down imperialism Marce Cameron, political scholar; activist with the Australia-Cuba Friendship Society (ACFS), 09 “Cuba's socialist renewal: forging a culture of debate,” Direct Action, Issue 18, December, http://directaction.org.au/issue18/cuban_socialist_renewal_forging_a_culture_of_debate This implies an evolution towards a more institutionalised participatory political culture with more public criticism AND and debating each other and columnists such as Luis Sexto in Juventud Rebelde.
Reforms are the best approach-~--it avoids a mobilization of politics around maintaining identity rather than articulating a future of social justice for society Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_) Political mobilisation around suffering engenders solidarities between those who are suffering and those who afford AND since it is rather the promise of success for any movement for justice.
Epistemological communities like debate are a good place to make normative claims about how we want the world to be, even if we can’t directly identify with those experiences Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_) We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward AND sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the AND ” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects. Policy focus key to combat racism-~--anti-blackness is not ontological Jamelle Bouie 13, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of AND helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.
1/17/14
Contact Info
Tournament: Contact Info | Round: 1 | Opponent: Contact Info | Judge: Contact Info Aff - mili.raina@gmail.com