# 1NC Round 2

### 1NC DA TO

#### NASA’s Commercial Crew Program will be funded now but it’s on the chopping block and fragile funding levels are key – that’s key to private space development

Kremer, 5/30 [Dr. Ken Kremer, speaker, scientist, freelance science journalist, PhD in Organic Chemistry and over 25 years of Research & Development and Manufacturing experience, “’Why Commercial Crew is Critical for Future Exploration: One-on-One Interview with NASA Administrator Charles Bolden,” http://www.universetoday.com/112192/why-commercial-crew-is-critical-for-future-exploration-one-on-one-interview-with-nasa-administrator-charles-bolden/, 5-30-2014, Evan]

NASA GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, MD – Why is NASA’s Commercial Crew Program to

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indication that the budget for commercial crew is going to be pretty good.”

#### The plan trades off with NASA’s budget—finite private and public funds

Mangu-Ward, 13 [Katherine Mangu-Ward, managing editor of Reason magazine and a Future Tense fellow at the New America Foundation, “Is the Ocean the Real Final Frontier?”, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\_tense/2013/09/sea\_vs\_space\_which\_is\_the\_real\_final\_frontier.html, 9/4/2013, Evan]

While many of the technologies for space and sky are the similar, right down

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or what makes for a good sell on a crowdfunding site like Kickstarter.

#### Commercial Crew is uniquely key to ISS effectiveness and leadership—that’s a vital internal link to disease treatments, science leadership, and STEM—however, stable, continued funding is key

AIA, 13 [Aerospace Industries Association, NASA Issue Paper, “Enabling International Space Station’s Tremendous Research through Commercial Crew and Cargo Programs,” http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/AIA\_2013\_NASA\_Authorization\_ISS\_Issue\_Paper.pdf, Evan]

As our nation looks to develop new capabilities for human spaceflight, it’s important to

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goals of developing new systems and re-establishing American access to ISS.

#### ISS key to disease prevention – zero gravity environments are a critical testbed for vaccine development

ESA 12 (European Space Agency, “International Space Station Plays Role In Vaccine Development,” 08/16/2012, http://www.esa.int/Our\_Activities/Human\_Spaceflight/International\_Space\_Station\_Benefits\_for\_Humanity/International\_Space\_Station\_Plays\_Role\_in\_Vaccine\_Development)

Have you ever been afflicted with a case of food poisoning so awful it made

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them streamlined access that will help to accelerate progress for several different lifesaving vaccines

### 1NC DA SOI

#### China is investing diplomatic capital to become an ocean exploration leader – it’s competing with the US for soft power

**Marlow, 13**  - reporter for WIRED (Jeffrey, “Ocean exploration: the deep space age” Vision: Perspectives from Dubai, March, <http://vision.ae/en/life/articles/ocean_exploration_the_deep_space_age>)//DH

The race is on to discover what lies at the bottom of the world’s final

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to invest in oceanographic research, and it has become a major programme.”

#### Soft power is zero-sum – expanding US influence tradesoff with peer competitors

**Kochan, 12** - Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law (Donald, “CIVIL RESISTANCE AND THE LAW: NONVIOLENT TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: YOU SAY YOU WANT A (NONVIOLENT) REVOLUTION, WELL THEN WHAT? TRANSLATING WESTERN THOUGHT, STRATEGIC IDEOLOGICAL COOPTATION, AND INSTITUTION BUILDING FOR FREEDOM FOR GOVERNMENTS EMERGING OUT OF PEACEFUL CHAOS” 114 W. Va. L. Rev. 897, lexis)

The concept of soft power focuses on the strength and influence that a nation can

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elements of soft power such as the attractiveness of its political values." n94

#### Chinese soft power is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction

Zhang, 12 – Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy (9/4, WeiWei, “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower,” China, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm)

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must

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As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

### Case Econ

#### Economic growth will cause global war and extinction by 2025

**Chase-Dunn and Podobnik ‘99** (Christopher Chase-Dunn, Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems, University of California-Riverside, and Bruce Podobnik, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College, 1999, in The Future of Global Conflict, ed. Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, p. 43)

While the onset of a period of hegemonic rivalry is in itself disturbing, the

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occur (Chase-Dunn and O’Reilly, 1989; Goldfrank, 1987).

#### Collapse now provides sufficient resources to transition to a sustainable society—delay causes extinction.

**Barry ‘8** Glen Barry, Ph.D. in Land Resources from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, MS in Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development from Madison, Founder and President of Ecological Internet, January 14, 2008, “Economic Collapse and Global Ecology,” online: <http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm>)

Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy

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; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon.

#### Solves runaway warming—extinction.

**Li ‘10** (Dr. Minqi, Assistant Professor Department of Economics, University of Utah, “The 21st Century Crisis: Climate Catastrophe or Socialism” Paper prepared for the David Gordon Memorial Lecture at URPE Summer Conference 2010, AM)

The global average surface temperature is now about 0.8C (0.8

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of the means of production and society-wide planning (Section 6).

#### Wars from economic growth are more likely and more severe

Goldstein 87 (Joshua S. Goldstein, PhD, professor of International relations, Dec 1987, Pg 592-593 “Long Waves in War, Production, Prices, and Wages: New Empirical Evidence”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/174156.pdf?acceptTC=true> SC)

This effect of economic growth on the severity of war may be augmented by a

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that "prosperity expands markets, intensifies contact, sharpens conflict and war."

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

Morris **Miller 2k**,

Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, 2K (Interdisciplinary Science Review, volume 25, number 4)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a

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the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded.

#### Recent empirics go neg

**Barnett ‘9**, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze

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example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### Trade does not solve war—there’s no correlation between trade and peace

MARTIN et al ‘8 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues

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, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

### Case Biod

#### Individual ecosystems are resilient

**Ridder 2008** – PhD, School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania (Ben, Biodiversity And Conservation, 17.4, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation”) \*ES = environmental services

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples

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1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).

#### Overfishing is inevitable. They don’t read evidence that indicates that other countries WILL model US policies means that foreign governments will always overfish because they are profit driven. Japan proves—its sushi industry enforces a continuation.

#### Too many alt causes

**Pynn 7** (Larry, staff writer at The Vancouver Sun, “Global warming not biggest threat: expert,” The Vancouver Sun, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=6e2988da-31ab-4697-810d-7a008306d571&p=1)

"We all worry about climate change, as we should, but it doesn't

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as a thriving agricultural industry, including vineyards, and increased urban development.

#### Litany of alt causes

Bruno 10, associate professor UNC Chapel Hill, [John F., May 3, “[Biodiversity Loss Continues Unabated Despite International Efforts](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html)”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html>]

Betting on biodiversity loss is a pretty sure thing. The earth'splant and animal species

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observed and documented striking biodiversity losses even on isolated and seemingly untouched reefs.

#### 12. Collapse of biodiversity won’t collapse the entire ecosystem and many species are redundant.

Carlos **Davidson**, conservation biologist, 5-1-**2k** [Bioscience, Vol. 50, No. 5, lexis]

Biodiversity limits. The original rivet metaphor (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981) referred to

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a putative cliff that humans will fall off of somewhere down the road.

#### biodiversity collapse and doesn’t cause extinction – keystone species dont exist

Doremus, Berkeley Law, 2K [Holly, Law Professor – Cal Berkeley, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, L/N]

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close

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a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

# 1NC Round 4

## 1NC K

### Queer Theory

#### The development of a queer ecocriticsm is hindered by the current environmental focus on futurity; a focus on reproduction does intrinsic violence by staining environmentalism with the violence of a heteronormative imperative.

Ensor 12 (Sarah Ensor, Spinster Ecology: Rachel Carson, Sarah Orne Jewett, and Nonreproductive Futurity” Graduate Student @ Cornell University 2012 , American Literature 2012 Volume 84, Number 2: 409-435, DS)//JK

Attempting to discredit Rachel Carson’s 1962 ¶ book Silent Spring, former Secretary of Agriculture

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the two camps legible, what possibly constitutes a sustainable “no future”?

#### Notions of preserving some sort of future for our species valorize reproductive, heterogenital sex, while subordinating queer sex to nothing more than “meaningless acrobatics.” This impregnates heterosexuality with the future of signification, necessitating violence against queerness.

Edelman 2004 (Lee Edelman, Prof. English at Tufts University, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” 2004, pp. 11-13)

Charged, after all, with the task of assuring “that we being dead

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division incised by the signifier, that “meaning,” despite itself, means

#### Their hope for the future is not benign – it is a new fascism that will always plague their political movement. This directly damns the queer person and subordinates bodies to the functions of desire – turning case.

Edelman 04 (Lee Edelman, Prof. English Lit @ Tufts, "No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive," 151)//JK

Its sources in history no less deep because not different from those of fascism,

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in the essay on Benjamin, “no such thing as the human.

#### The sacralization of the Child as an idol of reproductive futurism depends on the sacrifice of the queer. Privileging large scale impacts over the systemic violence outlined in our criticism is the kind of bankrupt rationale that legitimizes violence in the first place.

Edelman 2004 (Lee Edelman, Prof. English at Tufts University, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” 2004, pp. 28-31)

Bernard Law, the former cardinal of Boston, mistaking (or maybe understanding too well) the degree of authority bestowed on him by the signifier of his patronymic, denounced in 1996 proposed legislation giving health care benefits to same-sex partners of municipal employees. He did so by proclaiming, in a noteworthy instance of piety in the sky, that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish the marital bond. “Society,” he opined, “has a special interest in the protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage.” With this fatal embrace of a futurism so blindly committed to the figure of the Child that it will justify refusing health care benefits to the adults that some children become, Law lent his voice to the mortifying mantra of a communal jouissance that depends on the fetishization of the Child at the expense of whatever such fetishization must inescapably queer. Some seven years later, after Law had resigned for his failure to protect Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state-recognized same-sex unions as parodic versions of authentic families, “based on individual egoism” rather than genuine love. Justifying that condemnation, he observed, “Such a ‘caricature’ has no future and cannot give future to any society.” Queers must respond to the violent force of such constant provocations not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives, not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order’s coherence and integrity, but also by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand here anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck annie; fuck the waif from *Les Mis*; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. We might like to believe that with patience, with work, with generous contributions to lobbying groups or generous participation in activist group so generous doses of legal savvy and electoral sophistication, the future will hold a place for us – a place at the political table that won’t have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed or the bar or the baths. But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queer, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no future at all: that the future, as Annie’s hymn to the hope of “Tomorrow” understands, is *“always* / A day / Away.” Like the lover son Keat’s Grecian urn, forever “near the goal” of a union they’ll never in fact achieve, we’re held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself, constrained to pursue the dream of a day when today are one. That future is nothing but kid stuff, reborn each day to screen out the grave that gapes from within the lifeless letter, luring us into, ensnaring us in, reality's gossamer web. Those queered by the social order that projects its death drive onto them are no doubt positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy that so defines them. But they're positioned as well to recognize the irreducibility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to the logic of social organization as such. Acceding to this figural identification with the undoing of identity, which is also to say with the disarticulation of social and Symbolic form, might well be described, in John Brenkman's words, as "politically self-destructive."33 But politics (as the social elaboration of reality) and the self (as mere prosthesis maintaining the future for the figural Child), are what queerness, again as figure, necessarily destroys — necessarily insofar as this " s e l f " is the agent of reproductive futurism and this "politics" the means of its promulgation as the order of social reality. But perhaps, as Lacan's engagement with Antigone in Seminar 7 suggests, political self-destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life. If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of futurity, if the jouissance, the corrosive enjoyment, intrinsic to queer (non)identity annihilates the fetishistic jouissance that works to consolidate identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction, then the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive we're called on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and the political order it enforces, that we, as Guy Hocquenghem made clear, are "not the signifier of what might become a new form of 'social organisation,' " that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future. We choose, instead, not to choose the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective identification with an always impossible future. The queerness we propose, in Hocquenghem's words, "is unaware of the passing of generations as stages on the road to better living. It knows nothing about 'sacrifice now for the sake of future generations' . . . [it] knows that civilisation alone is mortal."34 Even more: it delights in that mortality as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as pro-life. It is we who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we're condemned should we speak them or not: that m are the advocates of abortion; that the Child as futurity's emblem must die; that the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. Our queerness has nothing to offer a Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the negativity that pierces the fantasy screen of futurity, shattering narrative temporality with irony's always explosive force. And so what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively—to insist that the future stop here.

#### Heteronormativity instills a fundamental fear of impurity in society; this amplifies systemic violence against queerness and places our species on a trajectory towards omnicide.

Sedwick 1990 (Eve Sedgwick, Professor of English CUNY, “Epistemology of the Closet,” 1990, pp. 127-130.)

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorray, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing--the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist \*imaginaire\*. In our culture as in \*Billy Bud\*, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time \*after the homosexual\* is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time \*after the human\*; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there \*were\* homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow.Fragments of visions of a time \*after the homosexual\* are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture [book published in 1990 -Alec]. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations.26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine lustre this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked--in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact.It might be worth making explicit that the use of evolutionary thinking in the current wave of utopian/genocidal fantasy is, whatever else it may be, crazy [sic]. Unless one believes, first of all, that same-sex object-choice across history and across cultures is \*one thing\* with \*one cause\*, and, second, that its one cause is direct transmission through a nonrecessive genetic path--which would be, to put it gently, counter-intuitive--there is no warrant for imagining that gay populations, even of men, in post-AIDS generations will be in the slightest degree diminished. Exactly \*to the degree\* that AIDS is a gay disease, it's a tragedy confined to our generation; the long-term demographic depredations of the disease will fall, to the contrary, on groups, many themselves direly endangered, that are reproduced by direct heterosexual transmission. Unlike genocide directed against Jews, Native Americans, Africans, or other groups [the disabled -Alec], then, gay genocide, the once-and-for-all eradication of gay populations, however potent and sustained as a project or fantasy of modern Western culture, is not possible short of the eradication of the whole human species. The impulse of the species toward its own eradication must not either, however, be underestimated. Neither must the profundity with which that omnicidal impulse in entangled with the modern problematic of the homosexual: the double bind of definition between the homosexual, say, as a distinct \*risk group\*, and the homosexual as a potential of representation within the universal.27 As gay community and the solidarity and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority potentials and universalizing ones by opened and opened and opened?

#### Their fear of impacts necessarily excludes the queer body that can’t be reproduced. Heteronormativity maintains itself by viewing time in a linear fashion that is a progressive machine constantly avoiding an apocalyptic scenario. Paranoia infects every action and becomes the excuse for maintaining a top down system of domination.

Boellstorff 07 Tom, (associate professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of California, Irvine) GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 13.2-3 (2007) 227-248 When Marriage Falls Queer Coincidences in Straight Time

In her analysis, this **apocalyptic temporality "is attached to the time that has not yet been lived, which writes the present as the failure of the future** . . . **the present is the locus of temporal disorder; it cannot be inhabited without undoing the possibility of revolutionary time"** (807). **This temporality's uninhabitability is predicated on its straight character: it is as if only one object can take its place at any point along its linear trajectory**. In the United States, "conservative" and "progressive" political positions are complex. Progressive positions are often predicated on forms of coalitional affiliation and also often work to "conserve" (e.g., the welfare state), and conservatives are often spectacular innovators (and form coalitions of their own). Yet both **positions work within straight time, distinguishing themselves in terms of the pole to which they orient themselves**. The time of the conservative often takes the form of a future created by moving the past into the present: a "morning in America," to use the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, in which tradition [End Page 230] provides the model for the future itself. In contrast, **the time of the progressive often takes the form of a present created by moving the future into the present: a claim that we should see "progress,"** and thus efficacy, in terms of what Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida, among others, would call a future anterior temporality—a time **within which we "will have been" successful in our political aims**.19 These temporal displacements, once again, are produced by a straight time that does not allow two "times," and thus two objects in time, to co-occur. **This is the temporality that** Michel **Foucault termed "a linear time whose moments are integrated, one upon another, and which is orientated towards a terminal, stable point;** in short, an 'evolutive' time. . . . 'Evolutive' historicity, [which] is still self-evident for many today—is bound up with a mode of functioning of power."20 **For queer theory, working within the horizon of straight time produces a temporality in which the present is regressive: the "presence" of the "present" is**, in this implicit understanding and the practices based on it, **hopelessly compromised by its copresence with systems of domination.** The inability of straight time to provide a framework for theorizing co-incidence founds the "paranoid imperative" with which Sedgwick sees queer studies as having "a distinctive history of intimacy."21 **The** future anterior **orientation of straight time is revealed in that paranoia is anticipatory. . . . The unidirectionally future-oriented vigilance of paranoia generates**, paradoxically, **a complex relation to temporality that burrows both backward and forward: because there must be no bad surprises, and because learning of the possibility of a bad surprise would itself constitute a bad surprise, paranoia requires that bad news be always already known.Thus the paranoid stance is fundamentally linked to a unidirectional, straight framework that is complex in that it can burrow both backward and forward—but not laterally, in a circle, up or down. Its complexity thus meets its limit within its linear trajectory**: leaving that trajectory is not a thinkable option.

#### Their reproductive futurism is coopted to produce a culture of alarmism that rolls back effective change

Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University, ’10 [Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004, RSR]

Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future (II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and until it is substan- tively ‘filled in,’ the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsighted- ness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of com- peting dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. Foremost among the possible distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing of unwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios. State and market institutions may seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretch- ing interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismant- ling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief struc- tures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknow- ledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible (‘the world will not be so bad after all’), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism (‘things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive’).37 Much more com- mon, however, is the opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and resigna- tion would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two norma- tive concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precaution- ary principle and global justice.

#### Focusing on future generations screens out the fragility of our lives and the death drive, culminating in the elimination of all that is and may be Queer

Latimer 09 [Heather Latimer, MA. University of British Columbia, 2004 BA. University of Victoria, 2002 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Department of English SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY; “REPRODUCING AND REPRESENTING REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY NORTH AMERICAN TEXTS” Fall 2009] J|L
The Fantasy of the Child The effect of this effacement in the film is that the fetus, and by extension the child, comes to represent the natural inspiration, if not the solution, to a world of terrorism.. despair and fascism. This naturalization, in turn, leads to an embracement of what Lee Edelman has termed “reproductive futurism” (2). In No Future: Queer Theoiy and the Death Drive, Edelman argues that reproductive futurism is the process by which the image of the Child (which he always capitalizes to distinguish from the experience of an actual child) comes to represent the very notion or idea of the future itself. Reproductive futurism relies on the fantasy that we may somehow return to our own innocence or childhood, to a time that-never-quite-was, through constant attempts to protect our future world and our future children. In this way the image of the Child, much like the fetal citizen. is put in the position where it not only represents “the telos of the social order,” but is also seen “as the one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust” (11). Edehuan is working within a Lacanian framework by claiming that the image of the Child functions as a necessary part of the Symbolic because it works as a political fantasy by screening out the temporality of our own lives and the fragility of our own egos; it screens out the death drive Edelman argues that reproductive futurism is connected to the death drive in two ways: fast. in how the image of the Child enacts a logic of repetition that helps fix our identities as we identify with the future of the social order; and, second1 in how the image of the queer (which can be any number of queer figures for Edelman, including gay men and women. feminists, and those in favour of abortion) “comes to embody that order’s traumatic encounter with its own failure its encounter with the illusion of the future as suture to bind the constitutive wound of the subject’s subjection to the signifier, which divides it. paradoxically, both from and into itself’ (26). In other words, if we are always focusing on protecting our future generations rather than facing our on mortality we are given the illusion that our lives have purpose, order, and form so long as we can ensure those future generations will exist The fantasy of futurity therefore “assures the stability of our identities as subjects” and ensures coherence to “the Imaginary totalizations through which those identities appear to us in recognizable form” (7). As Edelman explains, this leads to a situation ;there the “figurai Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed” (li). Whatever appears as a threat to this mandate of the collective reproduction of the Child is a threat “not only to the organization of a given social order but also, and far more ominously, to the social order as such, insofar as it threatens the logic of the futurism on which meaning always depends” (11). The Child who does not yet exist represents the one figure that is always worth fighting for politically and worth protecting legally because as a symbol of the future this Child is part of the logic of futurity upon which Symbolic meaning is built. This is how it can make sense politically, for instance, to deny health-care benefits to queer couples (to actually once were children) in the name of future Children who, in turn, are imagined to be safe only through ensuring the “sanctity’ of heterosexual marriage and reproduction (i.e.: futurity). The effect of this is that heterosexual reproduction comes to represent the future itself and queerness is figured as the “unfuture” or limit of this system, as death itself The image of the Child becomes privileged as the embodiment of all that is “good” about heterosexuality; it is used to place “an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (2). Edelman sees this as a circular system, where the image of the Child becomes an imaginary fullness for the subject, the future becomes synonymous ‘with heterosexuality, and the queer is seen as antithetical to the Child, or as the place outside or beyond the system where the future ends.’° As he explains, this means “we are no more able to conceive of a politics without the fantasy of the future than we are able to conceive of a future without the figure of the Child” (il); the Child is futurity itself which helps explain why the “fantasy of the nuclear family is still the centerpiece of our cultural imagination” (Oliver nil). The image of the Child not only sets the limit on what is imaginable politically, but also gives subjects a fantasy to invest in so they may ward off their own lack, ward off the death drive and the queer, in hopes of maintaining the illusion of Symbolic wholeness, identity and meaning.

#### Overkill is ontologically different from other types of violence: the law protects and sustains these forms of violence by treating them as criminal aberrations, but in fact heterosexual society founds itself through a bargain bought at the price of queer life. Their impact calculus can never understand what It means to do violence to what is nothing.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)

Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the postmortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify? The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or gay- panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans- panic defense and received a four- year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans- panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of time, out of History, and into that which comes before.27 In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the specificity of historical and politically located intersections. To this end, the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal democracy, names rights- bearing subjects, or those who can stand as subjects before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal democracy. Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of, but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another way, the spectacular material- semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing.

#### The demand for organization is always recuperated and annihilated by statist capitalism. The Symbolic order structures anti-queer violence and thus the institution of language cannot comprehend or be used to understand our movement. Only a destruction of symbolic logic can act as a praxis for queer knowledge

Baedan 12 [Anonymous author, Anarchist Library, “The Anti-Social Turn”; summer 2012 <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan>] J|L

Edelman: The agent responsible for effecting their destruction has been given many names:… global extermination of meaning… gravediggers of society… whatever refuses to allow parents to cherish their children… homosexuals… the death drive and the Real of jouissance…. So [queerness] knots together these threats to reproductive futurism. No political catachresis, such as Butler proposes, could forestall the need to constitute, then, such a category of [queerness]. For even though, as Butler suggests, political catachresis may change over time the occupants of that category, the category itself… continues to mark the place of whatever refuses intelligibility. And so the question that is posed concerns the refusal of intelligibility. Contemporary arrangements of power have abolished the silence that once accompanied the dark ineffable desires of queerness and destruction. Rather than an injunction against speech, the power of biopolitical democracy is specifically to make us speak. Cybernetic relationships ensure that each of us as a speaking subject has the ability to name ourselves, aestheticize ourselves, deploy blogs and social networks and avatars to represent ourselves. The contemporary function of power can be understood as one unending move toward intelligibility — one of moving what had been blind spots into new subjects to be marketed; new identities to be surveilled. We are captured by the state every time we make ourselves intelligible. Whether demand, political subject, or formal organization, each intelligible form can be recuperated, represented, or annihilated. Our project then must proceed in the recognition of the paradox that its being made truly intelligible — even by us, even to us — would be its defeat. We must seize the possibility of a life neither constrained by nor produced through the omnipresence of capital and state. It is precisely by the fact that words fail to describe it and programs fail to bring it about that we can know this life. As such, any imperative to put this ineffable project into words must be understood as a compromise of what must be an uncompromising project. There is no language which can make our intentions comprehensible to the social order. Any move toward such comprehensibility would be a betrayal of the specific antagonistic character of our project against that social order. Camatte elaborates on this point: This is a revolution of life itself, a search for another way of living. Dialogue should be concerned only with the plans and ideas for realizing this desire. No dialogue can take place between the social order and those who are to overthrow it. If dialogue is still seen as a possibility, then this would be an indication that the movement is faltering. Underlying all this is a profoundly important phenomenon: all human life from the very beginning of its development within capitalist society, has undergone an impoverishment. More than this, capitalist society is death organized with all the appearances of life. Here it is not a question of death as the extinction of life, but death-in-life, death with all the substance and power of life. The human being is dead and is no more than a ritual of capital … but to those great number of smugly complacent people, who live on empty dramas and fantasies, this demand, this passionate need, just seems irrational, or, at best, a paradise that is by definition inaccessible. And so a queerness which opposes society must embody the death drive of what has become death-in-life, the intrinsic negation of a social order predicated on the use of life for its ends. In this project, we have nothing to gain by speaking the language of, or making demands to, the existent power structures. It is specifically these structures’ ability to comprehend antagonism that makes intelligibility synonymous with recuperation.

## Case

### Warming

#### CO2 not key – scientific consensus against catastrophic warming – doesn’t collapse the environment

Walter Cunningham (United States Marine Corps, National Aeronautics and Space Administration - pilot of Apollo 7, graduate degrees from UCLA in physics and the Harvard Graduate School of Business, member of the Advisory Board for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory) 2010 “Global Warming: Facts versus Faith” The Heartland Institute

More than 31,000 scientists in the United States have signed a petition saying “there is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s atmosphere and disruption of the Earth’s climate.”3 Debating Carbon DioxideThe advocates of AGW say the United States must impose a devastating tax scheme to force industry to emit less carbon dioxide, thereby reversing the warming trend. This policy prescription is based on three assumptions: (1) that CO2 is the cause of changes in the Earth’s temperature; (2) that a warmer Earth would be bad for the planet’s flora and fauna, including humans; and (3) that humans are capable of controlling the temperature of the Earth.In reality, water vapor has more than twice the impact on temperature as atmospheric CO2, aided and abetted by other greenhouse gases, like methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). With CO2 representing just 3.6 percent of greenhouse gases, by volume, and human activity responsible for only 3.2 percent of that, we can influence only a tiny portion of the total greenhouse gases. Some studies have found CO2 levels are largely irrelevant to global warming. The true believers in AGW base their case on a broad and weak correlation between CO2 and global temperature in the last half of the twentieth century. They cannot be sure which is cause and which is effect. Looking at much longer periods of the Earth’s history, it becomes clear that temperature increases have preceded high CO2 levels by anywhere from 100 to 800 years, suggesting that higher temperatures cause CO2 levels to rise, rather than vice versa. The only other time in history that temperature and CO2 levels were this low, together, was 300 million years ago. There have been periods when atmospheric CO2 levels were as much as 16 times higher than they are now—periods characterized not by warming but by glaciations. (See Figure 4.) You might have to go back half-a-million years to match our current level of atmospheric CO2, but you have to go back only to the Medieval Warm Period, from the tenth to the fourteenth century, to find an intense global warming episode, followed immediately by the drastic cooling of the Little Ice Age. Neither of those events can be attributed to variations in CO2 levels. Since CO2 is a relatively minor constituent of “greenhouse gases,” and human activity contributes only a tiny portion of atmospheric CO2, why have alarmists made it the whipping boy for global warming? Probably because they know how fruitless it would be to propose controlling other atmospheric drivers of climate—water, methane, and nitrous oxide—notto mention volcanic eruptions, or ocean temperature, or solar activity, etc. So they wage war on man-made CO2, no matter how ridiculous it makes them appear. Without the greenhouse effect to keep our world warm, the planet would have an average temperature of -18 degrees Celsius. Because we do have it, the temperature is a comfortable +15 degrees Celsius. Other inconvenient facts ignored by the activists: Carbon dioxide is a non-polluting gas that is essential for plant photosynthesis. Higher concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere produce bigger crop harvests and larger and healthier forests— results environmentalists used to like.

#### Can’t solve—there is no way outlined in the 1AC that DECREASES the Co2 in the atmosphere.

#### Alt causes –

#### A. Deforestation.

Nordhaus 8 [Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Founders-Break Through Institute, Break Through, p. 64]

None of this is to deny the ecological reality. The burning of forests, the loss of their role as net absorbers and storage banks of carbon, and the reality of global warming make the increasingly rapid destruction of the Amazon even more alarming than it was back in the mid-1980s, when the Amazon first became appreciated for its biodiversity. **Even if we reduced greenhouse gases by 70 percent worldwide overnight**, the continued destruction of the Amazon would **still leave the global climate system in jeopardy.**

#### B. Agriculture

Mead 11 [January 30, 2011 Mad Meat Making Scientist Proves Climate Doomsayers Wrong Walter Russell Mead Via Meadia http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/01/30/mad-meat-making-scientist-proves-climate-doomsayers-wrong/]

According to a United Nations report (which must as we all know be completely and unquestionably true when referring to matters of climate science having nothing to do with glacier melt), “**Cattle-rearing generates more global warming greenhouse gases**, as measured in CO2 equivalent, **than transportation.”** Ronald Reagan was widely and no doubt justly mocked for saying that trees cause more pollution than cars do; had he said cows instead of trees he could have appealed to the UN for support. In any case, the report (from the Food and Agricultural Organization) goes on: When emissions from land use and land use change are included, the livestock sector accounts for 9 per cent of CO2 deriving from human-related activities, but produces a much larger share of even more harmful greenhouse gases. It generates 65 per cent of human-related nitrous oxide, which has 296 times the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of CO2. Most of this comes from manure. And it accounts for respectively 37 per cent of all human-induced methane (23 times as warming as CO2), which is largely produced by the digestive system of ruminants, and 64 per cent of ammonia, which contributes significantly to acid rain. With increased prosperity, people are consuming more meat and dairy products every year, the report notes. Global meat production is projected to more than double from 229 million tonnes in 1999/2001 to 465 million tonnes in 2050, while milk output is set to climb from 580 to 1043 million tonnes.

### Heg

#### Hegemonic decline causes peaceful retrenchment—prevents great power war.

MacDonald and Parent 11 – Asst Prof. of PoliSci @ Williams College and Parent, Asst Prof. PoliSci @ U of Miami, Paul and Joseph, “Graceful Decline?” International Security, 35.4, Project MUSE

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.¶ First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.¶ Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.¶ Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.¶ <<<<<<<<<<<ARTICLE CONTINUES A TON OF PAGES LATER>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>¶ Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. ¶ We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 ¶ Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.¶ In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in [End Page 42] Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.98 Moreover, Washington's support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.99 ¶ A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory.100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.101

#### Retrenchment is stabilizing—it solves nuclear war with Russia and China.

MacDonald and Parent 11—Paul Macdonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College AND Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, The Wisdom of Retrenchment, Foreign Affairs, November/December

Retrenchment works in several ways. One is by shifting commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas. This can help pare back the number of potential flashpoints with emerging adversaries by decreasing the odds of accidental clashes, as well as reducing the incentives of regional powers to respond confrontationally. Whereas primacy forces a state to defend a vast and brittle perimeter, a policy of retrenchment allows it to respond to significant threats at the times and in the places of its choosing. Conflict does not become entirely elective, as threats to core interests still must be met. But for the United States, retrenchment would reduce the overall burden of defense, as well as the danger of becoming bogged down in a marginal morass.¶ It would also encourage U.S. allies to assume more responsibility for collective security. Such burden sharing would be more equitable for U.S. taxpayers, who today shoulder a disproportionate load in securing the world. Every year, according to Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, they pay an average of $2,065 each in taxes to cover the cost of national defense, compared with $1,000 for Britons, $430 for Germans, and $340 for Japanese.¶ Despite spending far less on defense, the United States' traditional allies have little trouble protecting their vital interests. No state credibly threatens the territorial integrity of either western European countries or Japan, and U.S. allies do not need independent power-projection capabilities to protect their homelands. NATO's intervention in Libya has been flawed in many respects, but it has demonstrated that European member states are capable of conducting complex military operations with the United States playing a secondary role. Going forward, U.S. retrenchment would compel U.S. allies to improve their existing capabilities and bear the costs of their altruistic impulses.¶ The United States and its allies have basically the same goals: democracy, stability, and trade. But the United States is in the awkward position of both being spread too thin around the globe and irritating many states by its presence on, or near, their soil. Delegating some of its responsibilities to allies would permit the U.S. government to focus more on critical objectives, such as ensuring a stable and prosperous economy. Regional partners, who have a greater stake in and knowledge of local challenges, can take on more responsibility. With increased input from others and a less invasive presence, retrenchment would also allow the United States to restore some luster to its leadership.¶ A MORE FRUGAL FUTURE¶ TO IMPLEMENT a retrenchment policy, the United States would have to take three main steps: reduce its global military footprint, change the size and composition of the U.S. military, and use the resulting "retrenchment dividend" to foster economic recovery at home.¶ First, the United States must reconsider its forward deployments. The top priority should be to deter aggression against its main economic partners in Europe and Asia. This task is not especially burdensome; there are few credible threats to U.S. allies in these regions, and these states need little help from the United States.¶ Although Russia continues to meddle in its near abroad and has employed oil and gas embargoes to coerce its immediate neighbors, western Europe's resources are more than sufficient to counter an assertive Russia. A more autonomous Europe would take some time to develop a coherent security and defense policy and would not always see events through the same lens as Washington. But reducing Europe's dependence on the United States would create a strong incentive for European states to spend more on defense, modernize their forces, and better integrate their policies and capabilities. U.S. forces in the European theater could safely be reduced by 40-50 percent without compromising European security.¶ Asia is also ready for a decreased U.S. military presence, and Washington should begin gradually withdrawing its troops. Although China has embarked on an ambitious policy of military modernization and engages in periodic saber rattling in the South China Sea, its ability to project power remains limited. Japan and South Korea are already shouldering greater defense burdens than they were during the Cold War. India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are eager to forge strategic partnerships with the United States. Given the shared interest in promoting regional security, these ties could be sustained through bilateral political and economic agreements, instead of the indefinite deployments and open-ended commitments of the Cold War.¶ In the event that China becomes domineering, U.S. allies on its borders will act as a natural early warning system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support for any necessary U.S. responses. Yet such a state of affairs is hardly inevitable. For now, there are many less expensive alternatives that can strengthen the current line of defense, such as technology transfers, arms sales, and diplomatic mediation. Defending the territorial integrity of Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands rapid-response forces with strong reserves, not the 30,000 soldiers currently stationed in each country. Phasing out 20 percent of those forces while repositioning others to Guam or Hawaii would achieve the same results more efficiently.¶ Reducing these overseas commitments would produce significant savings. A bipartisan task force report published in 2010 by the Project on Defense Alternatives estimated that the demobilization of 50,000 active-duty soldiers in Europe and Asia alone could save as much as $12 billion a year. Shrinking the U.S. footprint would also generate indirect savings in the form of decreased personnel, maintenance, and equipment costs.¶ Retrenchment would also require the United States to minimize its presence in South Asia and the Middle East. The United States has an interest in ensuring the flow of cheap oil, yet armed interventions and forward deployments are hardly the best ways to achieve that goal. These actions have radicalized local populations, provided attractive targets for terrorists, destabilized oil markets, and inflamed the suspicions of regional rivals such as Iran. Similarly, the United States has a strong incentive to deny terrorist groups safe havens in ungoverned spaces. It is unclear, however, whether large troop deployments are the most cost-effective way to do so. The U.S.-led NATO mission in Afghanistan has established temporary pockets of stability, but it has enjoyed little success in promoting good governance, stamping out corruption, or eradicating the most dangerous militant networks. Nor have boots on the ground improved relations with or politics in Pakistan.¶ More broadly, the Pentagon should devote fewer resources to maintaining and developing its capabilities for engaging in peripheral conflicts, such as the war in Afghanistan. Nation building and counter-insurgency operations have a place in U.S. defense planning, but not a large one. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised the profile of counterinsurgency doctrine and brought prominence to its advocates and practitioners, such as David Petraeus, the retired general who is now director of the CIA. This is an understandable development, considering that the defense establishment was previously unprepared to wage a counterinsurgency war. But such conflicts require enormous commitments of blood and treasure over many years, rarely result in decisive victory, and seldom bring tangible rewards. A retrenching United States would sidestep such high-risk, low-return endeavors, especially when counterterrorism and domestic law enforcement and security measures have proved to be effective alternatives. Although they cannot solve every problem, relatively small forces that do not require massive bases can nevertheless carry out significant strikes--as evidenced by the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.¶ Curbing the United States' commitments would reduce risks, but it cannot eliminate them. Adversaries may fill regional power vacuums, and allies will never behave exactly as Washington would prefer. Yet those costs would be outweighed by the concrete benefits of pulling back. A focus on the United States' core interests in western Europe would limit the risk of catastrophic clashes with Russia over ethnic enclaves in Georgia or Moldova by allowing the United States to avoid commitments it would be unwise to honor. By narrowing its commitments in Asia, the United States could lessen the likelihood of conflict over issues such as the status of Taiwan or competing maritime claims in the South China Sea. Just as the United Kingdom tempered its commitments and accommodated U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the last century, the United States should now temper its commitments and cultivate a lasting compromise with China over Taiwan.

# 1NC Quarters

### 1NC K

#### Framing the middle passage as only a “black” site makes queer theory insular. We must find ways to include the queer body in our evaluation of the middle passage: any alternative fails to evaluate identity.

Tinsley 08 (2008 Duke University Press, accessed through Michgan State University, “Black atlantic, Queer atlantic Queer imaginings of the Middle Passage,” Omise’eke Natasha Tinsley, Ph.D: Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley, Professor of African American & African Studies at the University of Minnesota, “GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies,” DS)

One of Butler’s important observations in Gender Trouble is that all sub- jects put together fictionally solid subjectivities from fluid, unstable experiences, and Brand’s Map supports this idea. Earlier in the text she observes, “There are ways of constructing the world — that is, of putting it together each morning, what it should look like piece by piece. . . . Before that everything is liquid, ubiquitous and mute. We accumulate information over our lives which bring various things into solidity, into view.”50 What proves innovative in Brand’s black queer Atlan- tic liquidity is how insistently she weaves these explorations of figurative fluidity together with poignant material engagements with the waters that shape raced, nationalized, classed, gendered, and sexualized selves in different moments and sites of diaspora. Understanding the particularity of the liquids that we put together daily is the project of A Map to the Door of No Return, a project that allows the marooned of the diaspora another kind of queer coupling: the possibility of putting the world together and putting the senses back together at the same time. As Wek- ker writes of her search for stories of women’s sexuality in the African diaspora, finding these stories involves collecting the curving, chipped, conch shell – like “pieces of [black women’s] conceptions of being human” that have been dispersed in the waters of forced transatlantic migrations and that individuals and commu- nities rearrange in creatively transculturated ways.51 The key to making black queer sense of such self-pieces is not turning to race-, class-, or geographically unmarked models of sexuality and humanity — based in the European Enlighten- ment philosophy that justified slavery in the first place — but tracing as carefully as possible the particular, specific, always marked contours, the contested beach- scapes of African diaspora histories of gender and sexuality. So in the black queer time and place of the door of no return, fluid desire is neither purely metaphor nor purely luxury. Instead — like the blue embrace of two bodies of water — its connections and crosscurrents look to speak through and beyond the washed lad- 212 GlQ: a JOurnal OF leSBian and GaY StudieS ing, the multiply effaced identities of the Middle Passage. Finally, Brand’s ruttiers chart how the marooned come to sail as maroons, continually stealing back the space where they live. this is my ocean, but it is speaking another language, since its accent changes around different islands — Derek Walcott, Midsummer The ocean does speak many languages, and I am only a novice linguist. So I have tried to present academic writing that is fluid, that in some way explores what it would mean to perform the oceanness that it thematizes. I have tried to broach more whispered secrets than I could draw out and raise more questions than can be answered, to pick apart metaphors, put them together without closure. At this point, then, I do not want to conclude or pretend to. Instead, I want to end with thoughts on some of the challenges that the Atlantic offers the border waters of African diaspora, queer, and queer African diaspora studies. The long-navigated Atlantic tells us that, like Brand’s resurrection of the marooned, queer Africana studies must explore what it means to conceive our field historically and materially. Like Lara and Brand, as we navigate the postmodern we must look for the fissures that show how the anti- and ante-modern continue to configure black queer broken-and-wholeness. At the same time, the meaningfully multiblued Atlantic tells us that we must continue to navigate our field metaphori- cally. As Frantz Fanon contended in The Wretched of the Earth, metaphors provide conceptual bridges between the lived and the possible that use language queerly to map other roads of becoming. My point is never that we should strip theory of watery metaphors but that we should return to the materiality of water to make its metaphors mean more complexly, shaking off settling into frozen figures. The territory-less Atlantic also tells us that, like the song between Micaela and la Mar, black queer studies must speak transnationally. When black becomes only Afri- can American, black queer theory becomes insular; as the crosscurrents between Atlantic and Caribbean, Atlantic and Mediterranean, Atlantic and Indian Ocean are richest in marine life, so they will be richest in depth of theorizing.52 Most simply, our challenge is to be like the ocean: spreading outward, running through bays and fingers, while remaining heavy, stinging, a force against our hands.

#### Antiracist struggles perpetuate the domination of heteronormativity – only a subversion of normative ideals of sexual and gender identity can solve

Smith 6 (Heteropatriarchy and the three pillars of white supremacy, from Color of Violence: the INCITE! Anthology)

Heteropatriarchy is the building block of US empire. In fact, it is the building block of the nation-state form of governance. Christian Right authors make these links in their analysis of imperialism and empire. For example, Christian Right activist and founder of Prison Fellowship Charles Colson makes the connection between homosexuality and the nation-state in his analysis of the war on terror, explaining that one of the causes of terrorism is same-sex marriage: Marriage is the traditional building block of human society, intend- ed both to unite couples and bring children into the world ... There is a natural moral order for the family... the family, led by a married mother and father, is the best available structure for both child- rearing and cultural health. Marriage is not a private institution designed solely for the individual gratification of its participants. If we fail to enact a Federal Marriage Amendment, we can expect not just more family breakdown, but also ore criminals behind bars and more chaos in our streets.” Colson is linking the well-being of US empire to the well-being of the heteropatriarchal family. He continues: When radical Islamists see American women abusing Muslim men, as they did in the Abu Ghraib prison, and when they see news coverage of same-sex couples being “married” in US towns, we make this kind of freedom abhorrent-the kind they see as a blot on Allah’s creation. We must preserve traditional marriage in order to protect the United States from those who would use our depravity to destroy us. As A n n Burlein argues in Lift High the Cross, it may be a mistake to argue thac the goal of Christian Right politics is to create a theocracy in the United States. Rather, Christian Right politics work through the private family (which is coded as white, patriarchal, and middle class) to create a “Christian America.” She notes that the investment in the private family makes it difficult for people to invest in more public forms of social connection. In addition, investment in the suburban pri- vate family serves to mask the public disinvestment in urban areas that makes the suburban lifestyle possible. The social decay in urban areas that results from this disinvestment is then construed as the result of deviance from the Christian family ideal rather than as the result of political and economic forces. As former head of the Christian Coalition, Ralph Reed, states: “‘The only true solution to crime is to restore the family,”10 and “Family break-up causes poverty.”” Concludes Burlein, “‘The family’ is no mere metaphor but a crucial technology by which modern power is produced and exercised.”’\* As I have argued elsewhere, in order to colonize peoples whose societies are not based on social hierarchy, colonizers must first naturalize hierarchy through instituting patriarchy.13 In turn, patriarchy rests on a gender binary system in which only two genders exist, one dominating the other. Consequently, Charles Colson is correct when he says that the colonial world order depends on heteronormativity. Just as the patriarchs rule the family, the elites of the nation-state rule their citizens. Any liberation struggle that does not challenge heteronormativity cannot substantially challenge colonialism or white supremacy. Rather, as Cathy Cohen contends, such struggles will maintain colonialism based on a politics of secondary marginalization where the most elite class of these groups will further their aspirations on the backs of those most marginalized within the community. Through this process of secondary marginalization, the national or racial justice struggle takes on either implicitly or explicitly a nation-state model as them**! point of its struggle-**a model of governance in which the elites govern the rest through violence and domination, as well as exclude those who are not members of "the nation." **Thus,** national liberation politics become less vulnerable to being coopted by the Right when we base them on a model of liberation that fundamentally challenges right-wing conceptions of t h e world . We need a model based on community relationships and on mutual respect. **Conclusion** Women of color-centered organizing points to the centrality of gender politics within antiracist, anticolonial struggles. Unfortunately, in our efforts to organize against white, Christian America, racial justice struggles often articulate an equally heteropatriarchal racial nationalism. This model of organizing either hopes to assimilate into white America, or to replicate it within an equally hierar- chical and oppressive racial nationalism in which the elites of the community rule everyone else. Such struggles often call on the importance of preserving the “Black family” or the “Native family” as the bulwark of this nationalist project, the family being conceived of in capitalist and heteropatriarchal terms**.** The response is often increased homophobia, with lesbian and gay community members con- strued as “threats” to the family. But, perhaps we should challenge the “concept” of the family itself. Perhaps, instead, we can reconstitute alternative ways of living together in which “families” are not seen as islands on their own. Certainly, indigenous communities were not ordered on the basis of a nuclear family structure**-**is the result of colonialism, not the antidote to it. **In proposing this model, I am speaking from my particular position in indigenous struggles. .**Other peoples might flesh out these logics more fully from different vantage points. Others might also argue that there are other logics of white supremacy are missing. Still others might complicate how they relate to each other. **But I see this as a starting point for women of color organizers that will allow us to** reenvision a politics of solidarity that goes beyond multiculturalism, and develop more complicated strategies that can really transform the political and economic status quo**.**

#### Their descriptions of silencing misread power- the injunction is to speak, not to silence so that structural antagonism can be re-cuperated.

#### Similarly, the idea that violence against the queer body is not endemic to the system prioritizes the privatization of anti-queer violence, viewing it as excess rather than part and parcel to the ordering of humanity itself

Stanley '11 Eric "Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture" Social Text 107 • Vol. 29, No. 2 • Summer 2011 Emeritus at Pembroke College, Oxford University

Thinking violence as individual acts versus epistemic force works to support the normative and normalizing structuring of public pain. In other words, privatizing antiqueer violence is one of the ways in which the national body and its trauma are heterosexualized, or in which the relegation of antiqueer violence, not unlike violence against women, racist violence, violence against animals (none of which are mutually exclusive), casts the national stage of violence and its ways of mourning as always human, masculinist, able- bodied, white, gender- conforming, and heterosexual. For national violence to have value it must be produced through the tangled exclusion of bodies whose death is valueless. To this end, as mainstream LGBT groups clamber for dominant power through attachment of a teleological narrative of progress, they too reproduce the argument that antiqueer violence is something out of the ordinary.22 The problem of privatizing violence is not, however, simply one of the re- narration of the incidents. The law, and specifically “rights” discourse, which argues to be the safeguard of liberal democracy, is one of the other motors that works to privatize this structural violence. Rights are inscribed, at least in the symbolic, with the power to protect citizens of the nation-state from the excesses of the government and against the trespass of criminality. In paying attention to the anterior magic of the law, it is not so much, or at least not only, that some are granted rights because they are human, but that the performative granting of rights is what constitutes the promise of humanity under which some bodies are held. This is important in thinking about the murder of Brazell, and about antiqueer violence at large, because it troubles the very foundations of the notion of protection and the formative violence of the law itself. According to the juridical logic of liberal democracy, if these rights are infringed upon, the law offers remedy in the name of justice. This necessary and assumptive formal equality before the law is the precursor for a system argued to be based on justice. In other words, for the law to lay claim to something called justice, formalized equality must be a precondition. The law then is a systematic and systematizing process of substitution where the singular and the general are shuttled and replaced to inform a matrix of fictive justice. Thus for the law to uphold the fantasy of justice and disguise its punitive aspirations, antiqueer violence, like all structural violence, must be narrated as an outlaw practice and unrepresentative of culture at large. This logic then must understand acts like the murder of Brazell in the singular. Through a mathematics of mimesis the law reproduces difference as similarity. By funneling the desperate situations and multiple possibilities into a calculable trespass kneading out the contours and the excess along the way, equality appears. To acknowledge the inequality of “equality” before the law would undo the fantastical sutures that bind the U.S. legal system. In the hope of being clear, for the law to read antiqueer violence as a symptom of larger cultural forces, the punishment of the “guilty party” would only be a representation of justice. To this end, the law is made possible through the reproduction of both material and discursive formation of antiqueer, along with many other forms of violence. I too quickly rehearse this argument in the hope that it might foreclose the singular reliance on the law as the ground, and rights as the technology, of safety.23 Killing Time¶ “He was my son — my daughter. It didn’t matter which. He was a sweet kid,” Lauryn Paige’s mother, trying to reconcile at once her child’s mur- der and her child’s gender, stated outside an Austin, Texas, courthouse.24 Lauryn was an eighteen- year- old transwoman who was brutally stabbed to death. According to Dixie, Lauryn’s best friend, it was a “regular night.” The two women had spent the beginning of the evening “working it” as sex workers. After Dixie and Lauryn had made about $200 each they decided to call it quits and return to Dixie’s house, where both lived. On the walk home, Gamaliel Mireles Coria and Frank Santos picked them up in their white conversion van. “Before we got into the van the very ﬁrst thing I told them was that we were transsexuals,” said Dixie in an interview.25 After a night of driving around, partying in the van, Dixie got dropped off at her house. She pleaded for Lauryn to come in with her, but Lauryn said, “Girl, let me ﬁnish him,” so the van took off with Lauryn still inside.26 Santos was then dropped off, leaving Lauryn and Coria alone in the van. According to the autopsy report, Travis County medical examiner Dr. Roberto Bayardo cataloged at least fourteen blows to Lauryn’s head and more than sixty knife wounds to her body. The knife wounds were so deep that they almost decapitated her — a clear sign of overkill.¶ Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the post- mortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not ﬁnished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a speciﬁc life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the ﬁrst few stab wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining ﬁfty wounds signify?¶ The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or gay- panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans- panic defense and received a four- year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans- panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of time, out of History, and into that which comes before.27¶ In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the speciﬁcity of historical and politically located intersection. To this end, the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal democracy, names rights- bearing subjects, or those who can stand as sub- jects before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal democracy.¶ Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of, but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another way, the spectacular material- semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing.

#### Their affirmation of the uncovering of Slavery grounds black identity in a calculus of visibility distribution, creating the same hegemony of white supremacy maintained through hypervisibility – disappearance is survival

Keeling 09 [Kara Keeling, GLQ, Duke University Press; “LOOKING FOR M —Queer Temporality, Black Political Possibility, and Poetry from the Future”; 2009] J|L

The storyline for M — involves hir joining the military to earn money for college. The ﬁlm provides images and interviews of hir while s/he is in the military. In the ﬁlm’s postscript, designed to provide narrative closure on the stories of the aggressives it features, the viewer learns that “during the US Invasion of Iraq,” M — “abruptly left the Army. Her current whereabouts are unknown.” Given that M — ’s disappearance from the ﬁlm’s mise-en-scène is a form of resistance and survival, what are the ethical implications of looking for hir and to what extent are they imbricated in a thinking through of black queer temporal- ity and political possibility? M — ’s disappearance from the ﬁlm’s mise-en-scène is hir refusal to remain bound to its visual economy. It is a political act that both undoes the ﬁlm’s pretense toward omniscient linear narration, narrative closure, and spatiotemporal continuity and opens a space of black queer desire that arises simultaneously from M — ’s resistance to hir working-class immobility (a resis- tance that rationalized hir enlistment in the army) and from hir efforts toward self-valorization via mechanisms outside the nation-state and its military, which, as s/he puts it, does not “care” about hir anyway. While the military and its police might look for hir, attempting to recognize hir in a speciﬁc space, they will not look after hir in either senses of that phrase discussed above. Though each deploys dif- ferent logics of visibility vis-à-vis sexuality, the primary axis that animates their looking for M — subsequent to hir disappearance is spatial; they might seek to recognize hir according to their hegemonic common senses to locate where s/he physically is now. The collective histories that have enabled hir appearance to date and the future beings desiring hir into existence today are what must be excised from the social body with hir captivity and conscription (in whatever form of service to the state) in order for the current hegemony to be maintained.20 This is accomplished through a variety of wars, in the United States and beyond its borders. In M — ’s case, by “abruptly disappearing” and thereby refusing to become a conscript of war, M — might live. Yet doing so also makes hir legible within the juridical log- ics of the state. To resist the terms of hir reinscription within the state’s logics, s/he disappears, becoming invisible and, therefore, utterly unprotected and vulnerable. If disappearing enables M — to live, dragging M — into sight here impli- cates my own work in the very processes and situations I seek to illuminate and challenge. To disappear, M — also becomes invisible within the regime of the image that renders “the aggressives” visible throughout the ﬁlm. The fact that s/he must disappear from the ﬁlm’s narrative highlights the ways that a critical apparatus predicated on making visible hidden images, sociocultural formations, ideas, concepts, and other things always drags what interests it onto the terrain of power and the struggle for hegemony. On this terrain, the beneﬁts of visibility are unevenly distributed. In the colonial world of which Fanon writes, for example, the hypervisibil- ity of blacks and the organizations of space that rationalize their hypervisibility are crucial techniques through which colonial power and white supremacy were maintained.21 Insofar as colonial logics can be said to undergird present socio- economic relations, black people can become visible only through those logics, so danger, if not death, attends every black’s appearance.22 Yet precisely because what is visible is caught in the struggle for hegemony and its processes of valoriza- tion, one cannot not want the relative security promised by visibility.

#### Afro-pessimism relies on American racial dynamics, reifying the North-South dichotomy and perpetuating the myth of African victimhood

Castro 07 [CRISTIAN CASTRO; PhD candidate in Latin American History and MA in History from the University of California, Davis; “Haunted Life: Visual Culture and Black Modernity by David Marriott”; 2007; <http://hemisphericinstitute.org/hemi/en/e-misferica-71/castro>] J|L

Some of the weaknesses of this volume lie in its incapacity to offer a decentralized definition of black modernity. Marriott tends to adopt a North-Atlantic-centered position that excludes, for example, the vast scholarship written on the lingering persistence of slave mentalities in Afro-Brazilian communities since the mid-20th century. Second, the ontological racial dichotomy proposed in this volume reproduces previous attempts to generalize and normalize racial relations according to the model of British or American racial dynamics. In the same vein as Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic, Marriott defines racial problems and categories through the lens of western academic imperialism, perpetuating the North-South dichotomy. Third, the Afro-pessimist approach resembles other attempts to construct knowledge using history as a legitimating tool with which to respond to contemporary politics; for example, in the past, Afro-centrism has triggered harsh criticism for neglecting a real historical review of Western culture that would aim to document and reassess the contributions that black people have made to world civilization. Through this logic, Afro-pessimists could be accused of perpetuating the myth of African victimhood as it emerged in Western political thought at the same moment that Africa achieved political liberation.

#### The order of intelligibility of their words is necessarily a product of capitalist, statist ordering – the demand for organization is always recuperated and annihilated. The Symbolic order structures anti-queer violence and thus the institution of language cannot comprehend or be used to understand our movement

Baedan 12 [Anonymous author, Anarchist Library, “The Anti-Social Turn”; summer 2012 <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan>] J|L

Edelman: The agent responsible for effecting their destruction has been given many names:… global extermination of meaning… gravediggers of society… whatever refuses to allow parents to cherish their children… homosexuals… the death drive and the Real of jouissance…. So [queerness] knots together these threats to reproductive futurism. No political catachresis, such as Butler proposes, could forestall the need to constitute, then, such a category of [queerness]. For even though, as Butler suggests, political catachresis may change over time the occupants of that category, the category itself… continues to mark the place of whatever refuses intelligibility. And so the question that is posed concerns the refusal of intelligibility. Contemporary arrangements of power have abolished the silence that once accompanied the dark ineffable desires of queerness and destruction. Rather than an injunction against speech, the power of biopolitical democracy is specifically to make us speak. Cybernetic relationships ensure that each of us as a speaking subject has the ability to name ourselves, aestheticize ourselves, deploy blogs and social networks and avatars to represent ourselves. The contemporary function of power can be understood as one unending move toward intelligibility — one of moving what had been blind spots into new subjects to be marketed; new identities to be surveilled. We are captured by the state every time we make ourselves intelligible. Whether demand, political subject, or formal organization, each intelligible form can be recuperated, represented, or annihilated. Our project then must proceed in the recognition of the paradox that its being made truly intelligible — even by us, even to us — would be its defeat. We must seize the possibility of a life neither constrained by nor produced through the omnipresence of capital and state. It is precisely by the fact that words fail to describe it and programs fail to bring it about that we can know this life. As such, any imperative to put this ineffable project into words must be understood as a compromise of what must be an uncompromising project. There is no language which can make our intentions comprehensible to the social order. Any move toward such comprehensibility would be a betrayal of the specific antagonistic character of our project against that social order. Camatte elaborates on this point: This is a revolution of life itself, a search for another way of living. Dialogue should be concerned only with the plans and ideas for realizing this desire. No dialogue can take place between the social order and those who are to overthrow it. If dialogue is still seen as a possibility, then this would be an indication that the movement is faltering. Underlying all this is a profoundly important phenomenon: all human life from the very beginning of its development within capitalist society, has undergone an impoverishment. More than this, capitalist society is death organized with all the appearances of life. Here it is not a question of death as the extinction of life, but death-in-life, death with all the substance and power of life. The human being is dead and is no more than a ritual of capital … but to those great number of smugly complacent people, who live on empty dramas and fantasies, this demand, this passionate need, just seems irrational, or, at best, a paradise that is by definition inaccessible. And so a queerness which opposes society must embody the death drive of what has become death-in-life, the intrinsic negation of a social order predicated on the use of life for its ends. In this project, we have nothing to gain by speaking the language of, or making demands to, the existent power structures. It is specifically these structures’ ability to comprehend antagonism that makes intelligibility synonymous with recuperation.

### Ocean Studies K

#### Using the ocean as a metaphor for social relations covers up its nature as a space BEYOND the HUMAN and the SOCIAL. Only an OCEAN-CENTERED ontology allows us to relate to the ocean and spillover to destabilize anthropocentrism

Steinberg 13

Philip E. Steinberg Professor in the Department of Geography @ Durham Of other seas: metaphors and materialities in maritime regions”, Atlantic Studies: Global Currents, 10:2, 156-169, DOI:10.1080/14788810.2013.785192

Conclusion

In her review of recent ocean-related scholarship in social and cultural geography, Kimberley Peters asks, ‘‘ Oceans and seas are three-dimensional, fluid and liquid, yet they are also undulating surfaces; how does the texture, the currents and the substance of the water impact contemporary social and cultural uses of that space? ’’ 46 Others have raised similar points. For instance, Elizabeth DeLoughrey asserts, ‘‘ Unlike terrestrial space, the perpetual circulation of ocean currents means that as a space, [the sea] necessarily dissolves local phenomenology and defracts the accumulation of narrative. ’’ 47 In a similar vein, Lambert, Martins, and Ogborn write, ‘‘ Clearly, climatic, geophysical, and ecological processes belong in work on the sea ... .Overemphasis on human agency, especially in accounts of the Atlantic, makes for a curiously static and empty conception of the sea, in which it serves merely as a framework for historical investigations, rather than being something with a lively and energetic materiality of its own. ’’ 48 Yet even those who advocate a ‘‘ more-than-human ’’ approach have difficulty incorporating the ocean ’ s geophysicality, not just as a force that impacts humans but as part of a marine assemblage in which humans are just one component. Thus, Lambert, Martins, and Ogborn discuss narratives of the White Atlantic (European migration), Black Atlantic (postcolonial connections), and Red Atlantic (the Atlantic as a space of labor) but curiously leave out a Blue Atlantic (a geophysical space of dynamic liquidity), and their example of the North Atlantic circular system supporting the ‘‘ triangular trade ’’ culminates in a distinctly human set of patterns and interrelations in which, as with all maritime trade, the underlying water is idealized as absent. 49 Despite their best intentions, the ocean environment, although recognized as being more complex than a mere surface, is still treated as ‘‘ a framework for historical investigations. ’’ A more systematic attempt to integrate geophysicality into our understanding of human activities in the sea can be seen in recently published works by Kimberley Peters and by Jon Anderson. Peters focuses on pirate radio broadcasters who are continually thwarted in their attempts to idealize the ocean as an abstract, extra-legal, extra-national space. Reflecting on the affective interaction between the maritime broadcaster and the sea, she conceptualizes a ‘‘ hydro-materiality ’’ that incorporates 164 P.E. Steinberg Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 15:01 08 May 2014 mobile biota (both human and non-human) as well as technologies and objects. 50 The geophysical properties of the ocean take on an even more profound role in Anderson ’ s research on surfing. He uses the relationship between the surfer and the wave to explore how the assemblage perspective can be expanded (or modified) to interpret fleeting moments of socio-biological-geophysical convergence. This ontology of convergence may well characterize all moments in time, but its applicability is particularly profound in the ocean because of the ocean ’ s underlying dynamism. 51 Peters and Anderson propose just two of the many ways in which we can take the ocean seriously as a complex space of circulations. These circulations are comprised not just of the people, ideas, commodities, and ships that move across its surface or the fish who swim in its water. Rather, in a more fundamental way, the ocean is a space of circulation because it is constituted through its very geophysical mobility. As in Lagrangian fluid dynamics, movement is not something that happens between places, connecting discrete points on a ‘‘ rim. ’’ Rather, movement emerges as the very essence of the ocean region, including the aqueous mass at its center. From this perspective, the ocean becomes the object of our focus not because it is a space that facilitates movement the space across which things move but because it is a space that is constituted by and constitutive of movement. This perspective not only enables us to understand the ocean in its entirety; it disassembles accepted understandings of relations between space and time, between stasis and mobility, and between human and non-human actants like ships, navigational aids, and water molecules. This perspective suggests an ambitious agenda, and one that goes well beyond more established goals in the ocean-region studies community, such as highlighting exchange over production or emphasizing the hybrid nature of cultural identities. And yet, it is only through engaging with the ocean in all its material complexity that we can develop the fluid perspective that allows us to use the sea to look beyond the sea.

#### Accounts of the middle passage and transatlantic that CENTER history in ocean studies DISPLACE its materiality. Clearly their historical account is important, but should not be understood as OCEAN exploration because it’s exploring SOCIALITY

Steinberg 13

Philip E. Steinberg Professor in the Department of Geography @ Durham Of other seas: metaphors and materialities in maritime regions”, Atlantic Studies: Global Currents, 10:2, 156-169, DOI:10.1080/14788810.2013.785192

In this light, it is interesting to compare Dirlik ’ s Pacific Rim with Paul Gilroy ’ s The Black Atlantic . 16 At first glance, Gilroy seems to cover the material (and the space) ignored by Dirlik. Whereas the distance and materiality of the ocean inside Dirlik ’ s Pacific Rim are seamlessly transcended by the circuits of multinational capital, the space in the middle (the Atlantic) and the frictions encountered in its crossing are central for Gilroy. The Black Atlantic is primarily a book about the connections that persist among members of the African diaspora and the ungrounded, unbounded, and multifaceted identities that result, and the trope of the Middle Passage is deployed throughout the book to reference the travel of African-inspired ideas and cultural products, as well as bodies, that continues to this day. Nonetheless, even as Gilroy appears to reference the ocean, the ultimate target of these references is far removed from the liquid space across which ships carrying Africans historically traveled. In fact, the geographic space of the ocean is twice removed from the phenomenon that captures Gilroy ’ s attention: it is used to reference the Middle Passage which in turn is used to reference contemporary flows, and by the time one connects this chain of references the materiality of the Atlantic is long forgotten. Venturing into Gilroy ’ s Black Atlantic, one never gets wet. 158 P.E. Steinberg Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 15:01 08 May 2014 The problem, then, is not that studies that reference an oceanic center lack empirical depth. Rather, the problem is that the experiences referenced through these studies typically are partial, mediated, and distinct from the various non-human elements that combine in maritime space to make the ocean what it is. This then leads us back to Blum ’ s call for a turn to actual experiences of the sea, as have been chronicled by anthropologists, labor historians, and historical geographers, as well as in maritime or coastal-based fiction. Unfortunately, a scholar of (Western) literature or history who pursues this agenda soon runs into methodological limits. As John Mack notes, Western accounts of ‘‘ life at sea, ’’ whether fictional or historical, are typically about ‘‘ life on ship, ’’ as they fail to attend to the surface on which the ship floats, let alone what transpires beneath that surface. 17 And yet, contrary to Dirlik ’ s dismissal, the physical geography of the ocean does matter. How we interact with, utilize the resources of, and regulate the oceans that bind our ocean regions is intimately connected with how we understand those oceans as physical entities: as wet, mobile, dynamic, deep, dark spaces that are characterized by complex movements and interdependencies of water molecules, minerals, and non-human biota as well as humans and their ships. The oceans that unify our ocean regions are much more than surfaces for the movement of ships (or for the movement of ideas, commodities, money, or people) and they are much more than spaces in which we hunt for resources. Although these are the perspectives typically deployed in humancentered sea stories (i.e. the ones advocated by Blum), such perspectives only begin to address the reality of the sea that makes these encounters possible. Rather, the oceans that anchor ocean regions need to be understood as ‘‘ more-than-human ’’ assemblages, 18 reproduced by scientists, 19 sailors, 20 fishers, 21 surfers, 22 divers, 23 passengers, 24 and even pirate broadcasters 25 as they interact with and are co-constituted by the universe of mobile non-human elements that also inhabit its depths, including ships, fish, and water molecules. 26 Although the actions and interests of humans around the ocean ’ s edges and on its surface certainly matter, a story that begins and ends with human ‘‘ crossings ’’ or ‘‘ uses ’’ of the sea will always be incomplete. The physical boundaries of a maritime region are indeed human-defined as Dirlik asserts, but the underlying, and specifically liquid nature of the ocean at its center needs to be understood as emergent with, and not merely as an underlying context for, human activities.

#### Using the Middle Passage as an emblem not only reduces the OCEAN – it reduces the important particulars of transatlantic slave trade

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- Paul Gilroy's Slaves, Ships, and Routes: The Middle Passage as Metaphor Joan Dayan (<http://ezproxy.latech.edu:2071/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/3819981.pdf?acceptTC=true>) CM

Paul Gilroy's The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness-a cartographyo f celebratoryjo urneys-reads like an expurgated epic history. The Black Atlantic refers to, and stresses again and again, the rites of the Middle Passage, the journey from Africa to the New World, as a kind of origin myth for later chosen tales of ocean crossings by Wright, Du Bois, Douglass, and others who make a modern journey from the Americas to Europe. Yet, there is something oddly dissembling about those sites of what Gilroy calls "contamination." For the idea of slavery, so central to his argument (and so necessary to our understandingo f what he calls the enlightened" complicityo f reasona nd terror") becomes nothing more than a metaphor. How this happens demands some discussion.A lthoughG ilroya rguesa gainst" Africentrisma"n di ts cult of Africathe nostalgia for Pharaoh's treasures instead of the liberation of the Exodus story-in Gilroy's story, the slave ship, the Middle Passage, and finally slavery itself become frozen, things that can be referred to and looked back upon, but always wrenched out of an historically specific continuum. What is missing is the continuity of the Middle Passage in today's world of less obvious, but no less pernicious enslavement. Although I can appreciate the terms used, and laud Gilroy's call for retrieval of a past either ignored or misrepresented, something is not quite right aboutt his heroics of choice and collaborationA. s terms like "hybridity,"" contamination," "mixture,"a nd "culturafl usion"w ere repeated,I wondereda boutt heirg rounding in history.W hat history?W hose history?T he answeri s apparentlys imple: black history-a "transnationadl,i asporic"h istoryo f black slaves with the "slave ship" as vessel of transit and means to knowledge. In Gilroy's attempt to anchor "black modernism" in "a continued proximity to the unspeakable terrors of the slave experience," the slave experience becomes an icon for modernity; and in a strangely magical way, the Middle Passage becomes a metaphor, anchored somewhere in a vanishing history. In Gilroy's transit there is no historical past except as an empty fact turned into a fashionable call that dulls any response that could carry the Middle Passage, slavery, ships, and routes into the present transnational drive of global capital and political terror. Gilroy stops short of questioning the choice of exile and passage by a minority of educated elites whose names we remember: Delaney, Douglass, Du Bois, and Wright, to name a few of Gilroy's chosen, along with the conveyors of "hip-hop," soul music, and rap in Gilroy's new, "keep on moving," world. Gilroy's Middle Passage and his celebration of "crossculturacl irculation"a nd "nomadism"le nd a false idea of choice to forced Migration Let me turn briefly to what I take to be the incisive plot of Gilroy's reflections, a plot that undergirdst he images and charactersc alled up on his broadc anvas of modernity. The plot takes up three or four moments in the historiography and representation of a new racialized culture of modernity or those of us who do literary history, the recovery of the institution of slavery and the presence of African Americans in the texts of the so-called "American Renaissance" have been essential to a rereading of gothic fiction in the Americas. Even the supernatural in many gothic tales, as I argued in "Amorous Bondage," had its real basis in the languageo f slaverya nd colonization,p ut fortha s the most naturalt hing in the world. One has only to read the 1685 Code noir of Louis XIV, that collection of edicts concerning "the Discipline and Commerce of Negro Slaves in the French Islands of America," to understandh ow what first seemed phantasmagoricis locked into a nature mangled and relived as a spectacle of servitude. In fixing his critique in his "deep sense of the complicity of racial terror with reason," Gilroy explores, "the ways in which closeness to the ineffable terrors of slavery was kept alive-carefully cultivated-in ritualized, social forms" (73). Here is a key to the excitement to be found in Gilroy's "doubleness":f or these social forms might reside in a practice like Haitian vodou, utterly cooptive, and absorptive-a ritualr eenactmento f the colonial past, as well as an alternativep hilosophy. Gilroy's ruminationss eem to encourages uch movementst o and fro, for "transnationald, iasporicc ulturali nnovation"a lways cuts both ways. Slavery is the hub-the rite of memory,a stayingc lose to "terror"in ordert o recognizea gain and again "the complicity of rationality and ethnocidal terror to which this book is dedicated" (213). Claiming quite rightly that slavery is not the "special property" of blacks-some easily discarded residue-but rather" a part of the ethical and intellectual heritage of the West as a whole" (49), Gilroy announces that it's time to reconstruct "the primal history of modernity" from the "slaves' point of view" (55). But what do we define as "the West as a whole"? And where, oh where do we find the slaves' point of view? To Naipaul'sc laim thatt he Caribbeanis nothingb ut the "ThirdW orld'sT hird World," Sidney Mintz argues that the Caribbean was "being force fit into the socalled First World before anything like a Third World ever existed" (47). As best testing ground for the claims and coercions of capital, the colonies could be argued to be more Western than what we deem to be West: places for excess, where a Jacobin could be more Jacobin than allowed in France, and Lady Maria Nugent in 18th-centuryJ amaicac ould be morel uxuriouslyd ressed-bearing gifts from Pauline Bonaparte Leclerc next door in Haiti-than a lady in London. There's an odd way in which the Caribbean colonies drop out of Gilroy's historiography. For Gilroy seems haunted by the ghosts of terms already defined by the metropolitan definers. In quest of what he calls a "compound outlook" in place of "a pre-rational, spiritual mode of African thought" (60-61), Gilroy oversimplifies the precarious encountero f colonial spiritualityt,a kingf or grantedt he very dichotomyh e claims to be debunking. Since he deals with late-in-coming cultural products as exempla, he ignores the contextualization of his supposed subject: slavery. To take an example from my recent Haiti, History, and the Gods, I am less interested in how the enlightenmenta nd the philosopherso f modernityw, hetherc alled Habermaso r Du Bois, Hegel, or Douglass, crafted their analyses out of the "brute facts of

#### The INSTRUMENTALIZATION of the ocean was crucial to starting the translatlantic slave trade - ontology comes first in this relation, both HISTORICALLY and CONCEPTUALLY

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Environmental Governance: Power and Knowledge in a Local-Global World, ed Gabriela Kütting, Ronnie Lipschutz Peter Jacques, Ph.D. Department of Political Science University of Central Florida P.O. Box 161356 4000 Central Florida Blvd. Orlando, FL 32816 1356 Phone: (407) 823 6773 Home (407) 977 0880 Fax (407) 823 0051 pjacques@mail.ucf.edu website: http://ucf.academia.edu/PeterJacques Education Ph.D., Political Science, Northern Arizona University, 2003, with distinction. Masters in Public Administration (M.P.A.), environmental policy focus, Northern Arizona University, 2000. B.A., Philosophy, Montana State University, with honors, 1993. B.A., Film and Theater Arts, Montana State University, with honors, 1993

Connery (2006: 499) writes that there is such an extensive Western antagonism to the sea that was not found elsewhere in the world, seen through Western biblical and mythological triumph over the sea until it is defeated and eliminated, that it serves as an elemental antithesis—or “object of elemental rage.” This, he notes, feeds into metaphors that make the ocean “meaningless materiality,” like that pointed out by Steinberg, where a 1990 Meryl Lynch two-page ad shows the ocean with the caption, “for us, this doesn’t exist” implying a mare nuUius. It is easy to also read both the Grotian and Seldenian ocean as one that is filled with meaningless materiality to be superseded: and, if this is the birth of “the international” then it is based on nullifying non-instrumental materiality for vulgar accumulation. International relations, then, is a study in irony. We might argue that both perspectives did eventually take hold, with Grotian law grasping the first chokehold on the oceans with free seas, then mare clausum national enclosures to 200 miles taking the second. In either case, the ocean is cast as commodity for global capitalist interests, epitomized through interests in accumulating wealth through overfishing, mining, enclosing of common pool mangroves for private shrimp ponds, global trade in seafood, and transportation of nearly all commodities. As Steinberg (2001) writes, the social construction of the ocean has changed from “Davy Jones’ Locker to the Foot Locker” (referring to the preternatural life-taking power of the ocean being transformed into a highway for commodity flows, where in one example, the cargo of shoes are lost at sea), and that it is insufiicient to refer to the usual supposed dichotomy of Grotius vs. Selden. Of power The power to dominate ways of being in the world has repercussions for the generation of all other types of power, from material use of force to agendasetting, because it normalizes one way of living in the world over others. At first, we see that the ocean was imbued with multiplicities and particular meanings through a great variety of cultures around the world. Many imbued the ocean with its own power and agency, as in indigenous coastal cultures, which limited what these cultures saw as legitimate uses of their own power and effort in the sea. Some of these cultures saw a multitude of spaces and identities as ontologically integrated with the rest of the world, and constitutive. Then, by “Art” as Ovid prescicntly describes, transformations of control spread over the Earth at the same time that European jurisprudence not only constituted the ocean as a tool for accumulation, but erased other ontological priorities and particularities, as a way to preclude other non-instrumental uses. Without this step, the rest would likely not have followed. If the ocean were the Christian god, it is difficult to imagine Grotius saying it could be used indiscriminately, and that anyone interfering with this use could be punished via war. Thus, the first modern power of the sea is to erase other notions and meanings with its own design. This design is made in a specific historical time of imperial nation-building that grows into diffuse, globalized commodified relations of contemporary corporate-led global capitalism that still sees the ocean as a tool for immediate (oil, fish) accumulation and intermediate accumulation through container ships, trawlers, and oil tankers. The Spanish saw fit to use the ocean to conquer and destroy people like the Taino as an opportunity to build up the proto-Spanish state, pretending to “civilize” indigenous peoples through dispossession. While Grotius rejects this pretense, the ocean is still a passage for imperio-corporate trade and profit which he believes is ordained in immutable natural law. Selden sees the ocean as limited and able to be dominated and controlled like any other “dull heap,” which also creates ideational pathways for trade and conquest. Grotius’ and Selden's arguments have often been counterposed, but their ontological assumptions and projects are the same, and both assume that the ocean belongs to and can be disposed of as their empires see fit. Ultimately, Mare Liberum was persuasive among the colonial set, imagining the World Ocean into the ultimate abstraction—limitless, vast, and free for all to use indiscriminately. This is exactly the kind of abstraction of space that Connery, via Edward Casey, notes was a “hegemonic category of thought” that emerged during the seventeenth century (remember Mare Liberum was published in 1604) for the purposes of nation-building. Here the ocean, as Connery describes it, becomes mere distance, “something to be superseded” (Connery 2006: 497). In superseding the dead “dull heap” of ocean, nations with imperial fleets can connect to other places to annihilate other people, as in the Taino, and loot its shores. Mare Liberum normalizes the oceans for just this type of enterprise, Grotius willing or not. This is seen historically in the Spanish search for gold, but also in the intercontinental sugar-cotton-slave triangle of domination operated by the British, among others, that took slaves from Africa, enslaved them in the Caribbean and the colonial and post-colonial United States, and shipped their cotton and sugar to Europe for manufacturing (Jacques 2006). Steinberg points out that mare liberum was much less absolute until the British imposed end to slavery—but modernity’s ontology of the ocean was necessary for the beginning of the intercontinental slave trade that rested upon the imperial bursting outward from the European continent.

#### ALTERNATIVE: we should root our discussions of the OCEAN in its MATERIALITY, not its status in human relations. We can talk about the Middle Passage, and we can talk about the ocean, but we should not EQUATE one with the other

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(Leslie Elizabeth Eckel, Associate professor of English at Suffolk University, “Atlantic Studies: Global Currents, Oceanic mirrors: Atlantic literature and the global chaosmos,” Pg. 129-131, 03/04/14)

In Frederick Douglass’s novella The Heroic Slave (1853), a first mate who has witnessed a consciousness-altering shipboard slave rebellion explains to a stubborn “old salt” that his national and racial prejudices simply will not “stand the test of salt water.” 1 What the first mate has experienced onboard the Creole, an actual ship that changed hands from masters to slaves on its intended passage from Richmond, Virginia to New Orleans in 1841, shakes his old assumptions loose and forces him to rethink the validity of territorial American law and its entrenched social hierarchies. Now a central text of what William Boelhower has called “the new Atlantic studies matrix,” 2 , Douglass’s narrative suggests that the Atlantic Ocean has a life of its own that is fundamentally separate from the historically implicated, culturally delineated lives led in the nations around its rim. The familiar revolutionary rhetoric used by Douglass’s protagonist can be misleading, as we think we know whose side the ocean is taking when we hear Madison Washington proclaim, “you cannot write the bloody laws of slavery on those restless billows. The ocean, if not the land, is free” (Douglass, 504). Washington sounds like a new Founding Father, a man clever enough to use the liberating space of the ocean to assert those transnational human rights that are not recognized on land. What both he and Douglass only begin to realize, however, is the extremity of the oceanic “free[dom]” that he invokes, as well as the extent to which the “restless billows” of the ocean’s waters threaten to obliterate all certainties belonging to those who attempt to “write” them into history – American, Atlantic, or global. As he shores up his own defense, the Creole’s former first mate describes the danger involved in any ocean voyage. Reversals of fortune can be comprehended, he says, “[…] when we learn, that by some mysterious disturbance in nature, the waters parted beneath, and swallowed the ship up, we lose our indignation and disgust in lamentation of the disaster, and in awe of the Power which controls the elements” (Douglass, 501). Here, Washington’s “restless billows” menace the very existence of the craft they grudgingly support, and through some “mysterious disturbance” display their elemental “Power,” subject to neither the words nor the will of any human being. This scene of conflict between those who attempt to interpret the Creole’s dramatic change of course points us toward two versions of Atlantic theory: the first rooted in the politics of human societies on land, which the narrative implies can be altered in a watery instant, and the second subject to the unfathomable nature of the ocean itself. It is this second, more disruptive form of Atlantic theory whose potential I intend to explore here by drawing on three oceanic novels: Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick (1851), CharlesJohnson’s Middle Passage (1990), and Amitav Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies (2008). Studies of Atlantic world literatures tend to lean heavily on historical approaches to knowledge. Recognizing their indebtedness to the paradigms constructed by Atlantic historians from the 1980s onwards, Atlantic literary scholars may struggle with the belatedness of their approaches or even with “plaintive” feelings about the comparative value of their own discipline, as Elizabeth Maddock Dillon has noted.3 These scholars often follow the interdisciplinary lines of inquiry established by Paul Gilroy and Joseph Roach, which, as Gilroy explains, “take the Atlantic as one single, complex unit of analysis” as they investigate the myriad cross-fertilizations generated by the movement of people, ideas, and cultural practices across the ocean and around the Atlantic rim.4 Critical studies of this kind often identify themselves with Gilroy’s Atlantic “unit of analysis” in a variety of ethnic, linguistic, and color-coded terms: black Atlantic, “Indian” Atlantic, transatlantic, circumatlantic, British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, or Spanish Atlantic, and “red” or “green” Atlantic (the latter two designations focus on revolutionary history and the Irish diaspora, respectively). With so much emphasis on categorizing and cataloguing its cultural activity, however, a full and balanced understanding of the oceanic element of the Atlantic has been lost. In his field-defining essay, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” David Armitage contends that circumatlantic, transatlantic, and cisatlantic studies together constitute a uniquely “three-dimensional” area of inquiry, but his analysis largely excludes the oceanic fourth dimension that can further deepen and complicate our understanding of the Atlantic world.5 Margaret Cohen recognizes this loss, calling it “hydrophasia,” a condition in which the ocean itself is forgotten en route to other critical destinations.6 Before it became a field upon which scholars could stake their territorial claims, the Atlantic was a space held in suspension by water, whose properties and influences are inherently distinct from those of earth.7 An oceanic theory of Atlantic studies invites us to imagine a true “history from below,” one that is less concerned with the immanence of slavery’s legacy or the exigencies of seafaring labor than with the ways in which the ocean, by what Kate Flint terms its “fluid, mutable, dangerous” nature, overwhelms the human mind and undermines attempts to analyze the meaning of its vast expanse.8 Both Boelhower, a literary scholar, and Armitage, an historian, have asked what would happen if we put the ocean itself at the center of our conception of the Atlantic world.9 Would this constitute, as Jed Esty has suggested, a “radical” change in our understanding of transatlantic studies, or, I would add, a productive challenge to our thinking about any geopolitical region defined by an ocean, including the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Rim, and the Mediterranean Sea?10 Can focusing on the Atlantic’s normally hidden identity as one ocean among many, all with a shared elemental nature, yet possessing separate historical footprints, uncover common losses and ruptures in consciousness that trouble the field imaginary of a “single, complex” Atlantic studies? The essays gathered in the Oceanic Studies cluster of the May 2010 issue of PMLA respond in part to these provocations, charting a promising “oceanic turn in literary studies” that considers the environmental implications, genre shifts, identity formations, and power relations constituted in human interactions with the sea.11 From Hester Blum’s perspective, attention to “the material conditions and praxis” of oceanic experience, particularly the working lives of sailors, “allow[s] for a galvanization of the erasure, elision, and fluidity at work in the metaphorics of the sea that would better enable us to see and to study the work of oceanic literature.”12 I want to suggest that an important way in which oceanic texts do this work is by mirroring the strong currents and blank zones of the waters they travel, especially as one ocean flows into and mingles with another: the Atlantic folds into the Indian Ocean, for instance, and then again into the Pacific. My critical method of “galvanizing” the global ocean’s power draws on both the figurative images of emptiness and perpetual transformation that the sea presents as well as the literal implications that those fluid conditions have for the cultures connected by the ocean’s waves. From a nineteenthcentury American standpoint, the prospect of oceanic emptiness is a daunting one, as it threatens to annihilate the nationally grounded self carefully cultivated by the precepts of Romantic individualism. Such is the case for Ishmael, the narrator of Melville’s Moby- Dick. In Middle Passage, Johnson challenges that assumption by exploring what emptiness looks like from a black Buddhist perspective, following Atlantic currents from the Americas to Africa and then into the Indian Ocean (and by religious implication, the Pacific). Finally, Ghosh considers the Indian Ocean as a dynamic mirror image of the Atlantic world in Sea of Poppies – a novel that dislocates the Atlantic’s categories of racial and national identity even as it recreates familiar oceanic patterns of the slave trade, the creolization of language, and the painful loss of landed bearings. The three novels with Atlantic roots (as well as global “routes,” accessed via Gilroy’s suggestive homonym) on which this essay focuses its attention bring oceanic encounters into their imaginative foreground and allow their narratives to flow with the sea’s shifting currents.13 They ask questions that shift our cultural frames of reference: How can emptiness be considered a victory, not a void? Where is “blackness” a sign of divinity, not a social danger? As they do so, they not only “relativize the Atlantic,” as Isabel Hofmeyr notes, putting it in dialogue with other oceanic world systems, but they invoke Johnson’s idea of the ocean as a spiritual “chaosmos,” in which a world that devolves into “chaos” from one perspective may also be recreated from another.14 That dynamic situates these novels between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans but also between human territory and divine cosmos: standing, or rather, sailing on what Cohen identifies as “the edge of knowledge,” facing the incomprehensible and the theoretically impossible.15 We have already been warned by Douglass and the Creole’s first mate – the farther we sail from land and away from the known world, the more dangerous the ocean will become. When we truly immerse ourselves in the vortex of the sea, all of our systems of thought will be called into question.

### Case

#### Their response to anti-blackness cannot be actualized within the framework of a political debate. The premise of their argument is that there is no political agency for the non-white body. Voting for the aff proves that’s incorrect, there is political efficacy to the non-white body.

#### Their radical negativity that essentializes the Black as an ontological category excludes the ontological position of mixed race folks & prevents contestation of the meaning of whiteness as well as building coalitions for white allies in the struggle against white supremacy. Whether Black or White, the politics of purity is a failure

Michael J. **Monahan,** Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University, Racial Justice and the Politics of Purity, '**8**, http://www.temple.edu/isrst/Events/documents/MichaelMonahanUpdated.doc

The abolitionist/elimitavist position demands that any legitimately anti-racist endeavor stand simultaneously as a rejection of race, or at least racialized identity. As Alcoff and Outlaw have argued (though in different ways), this demands that one have an ahistorical sense of identity – that one reject the way in which one’s “interpretive horizon” has been positioned by one’s racial membership. Again, this is because the abolitionist ontology both reduces whiteness to white supremacy – whiteness just is – purely - an affirmation of white supremacy, and offers an effectively disembodied account of agency, such that the only way to be anti-racist is to reject whiteness. But what I have been trying to show is the way in which the history of white people has always been one of ambiguity and contestation over the meaning of whiteness (and that the same is true, though in different ways, for members of all racial categories). The history is one of different people who were white in certain important ways, but were not white in other ways, or at least were white in ways different from other white people, engaging in a process of arbitrating the meaning and significance of that whiteness. Part of the project of white supremacy, therefore, was not merely the domination of non whites, but the determination of the meaning of whiteness as fixed, given, and above all, pure. It is a history of brutal conquest, genocide, chattel slavery, torture, and Jim Crow, and by no means do I wish to suggest that we ignore or “white wash” that history. But it is also the history of John Brown, Sophie Scholl, the San Patricio Brigade, and, among others, those Irish servants in Barbados who risked their lives alongside enslaved Africans. The insistence that antiracism must reject whiteness – that John Brown, in struggling against white supremacy, was therefore not white –capitulates to the politics of purity. We must understand racial membership, therefore, not as a static and pure category of identity, but as an ongoing context for negotiating who “we” are (both as individuals and as groups) and how we relate to each other. Because races, like all social categories, are historical, and this history gives them meaning and significance, their reality is manifest both politically (in how our social structures and organizations take shape and interact) and individually (in how we understand ourselves and our place in the world). But, and this is the crucial point for my approach, the histories themselves are histories of contestation of meaning, and fraught with ambiguity, such that we participate in the process of shaping the meaning of race not only in the here and now, but also its meaning and significance historically. The elimitavist ontology insists, therefore, not only on purity for racial categories themselves (one either is or is not white), but also employs a politics of purity in its approach to history. That is, it treats the history of whiteness purely as a history of white supremacy, and any individuals or groups who break politically with white supremacy thereby demonstrate their non-whiteness. What I am calling for is a rejection of purity in both of these senses. Racial memberships and the identities that go along with them never really function as all or nothing categories (though they may pretend to do exactly that), and to ignore white struggles against white supremacy is as much of an inadequate interpretation of history as it would be to ignore white affirmation of white supremacy. And this is true for all racial categories and identities. They are all fraught with ambiguity, indeterminacy, and even outright contradiction, and part of my claim is that the damage is done in large part by trying to conceive of them as purified of that ambiguity and contradiction, for it is that insistence on purity that links racial categories to oppressive norms.

#### their assumption of ontological blackness essentializes blackness as a racial category subservient to whiteness

Welcome 2004 – completing his PhD at the sociology department of the City University of New York's Graduate Center (H. Alexander, "White Is Right": The Utilization of an Improper Ontological Perspective in Analyses of Black Experiences, Journal of African American Studies, Summer-Fall 2004, Vol. 8, No. 1 & 2, pp. 59-73)

In many of the studies of blacks, the experiences of whites, not blacks, are used as the backing for the construction of the warrants/rules that are employed to evaluate black experiences, delimiting the "concepts and relationships that can exist" in the black community. The life histories of whites are used as the standard against which black experiences are measured and as the goals to which blacks are encouraged to strive. The employment of this ontology fallaciously limits the range of black agency, producing deceitful narratives where the navigation of the social environment by blacks is dictated by either a passive response to, or a passive adoption of, white scripts. This ontology erroneously limits descriptions and evaluations of black experiences, excluding viable causal determinants of the socio-economic status of blacks and constructing restricted descriptions of black agency. The utilization of whiteness to determine and/or evaluate blackness begins when whiteness and white life histories come to represent what is "right." "White is right" is a sarcastic phrase that was an extremely popular slur during the Black Power movement in the mid-1960s to the early 1970s; the utilization of this phrase represents a form of social critique that takes exception to both the privileging of white biographies as accurate descriptions of history and the reconstitution of these histories as a template that blacks and other people of color should follow for navigating social environments and achieving positive social mobility. Part of the prominence of the "white is right" perspective comes from the numerical superiority of whites. As a group, whites have been in the majority throughout the history of the United States and the prominence of the white experience has been used to argue that white experiences should be used as a social template. It has been used as such in the works of Robert Park (1939) and Gunnar Myrdal (1944), both of whom suggested that by copying the patterns of whites, blacks would achieve positive social mobility. However, use of the numerical superiority of whites to support claims about the "rightness" of white experiences relies on the equation of quantitative dominance with qualitative dominance and the employment of the fallacious argumentum ad populum. The actual source of the dominance of the "white is right" perspective lies in the dynamics of power. The location of the origins of the dominant ideology in power relations is conceptualized in the work of Michel Foucault (1980), who theorized that power is imbricated with discourse: We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (p. 101). Key to the deployment of discourses is an underlying strategy. As such, the prominence of the "white is right" perspective can be traced to attempts to create an "order,"or a way of thinking. Foucault's theoretical lens supports the hypothesis that the privileging of white experiences and the use of these experiences as an ontological framework for the analyses of black experiences is an effect of power imbalances.

#### Turns alt – essentialism makes true insurrection impossible

 Newman, Postdoctoral fellow:University of Western Australia, conducting research in the area of contemporary political and social though, 2003

#### (Saul, “Stirner and Foucault,” Postmodern Culture)

The idea of transgressing and reinventing the self--of freeing the self from fixed and essential identities--is also a central theme in Stirner's thinking. As we have seen, Stirner shows that the notion of human essence is an oppressive fiction derived from an inverted Christian idealism that tyrannizes the individual and is linked with various forms of political domination. Stirner describes a process of subjectification which is very similar to Foucault's: **rather than power operating as downward repression**, **it rules through the subjectification of the individual**, by defining him according to an essential identity. As Stirner says: "**the State betrays its enmity to me by demanding that I be a man** . . . it imposes being a man upon me as a duty" (161). Human essence imposes a series of fixed moral and rational ideas on the individual, which are not of his creation and which curtail his autonomy. **It is precisely this notion of duty**, of moral obligation--the same sense of duty that is the basis of the categorical imperative--**thatStirner finds oppressive**. For Stirner, then, **the individual must free him- or herself from** these oppressive ideas and obligations by first freeing himself from **essence--from**the **essential identity**that is imposed on him. Freedom involves, then, a transgression of essence, a transgression of the self. But what form should this transgression take? Like Foucault, Stirner is suspicious of the language of liberation and revolution--it is based on a notion of an essential self that supposedly throws off the chains of external repression. For Stirner, it is precisely this notion of human essence that is itself oppressive. Therefore, different strategies of freedom are called for--ones that abandon the humanist project of liberation and seek, rather, to reconfigure the subject in new and non-essentialist ways. To this end, Stirner calls for an insurrection: **Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions**, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; **the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from** men's **discontent with** them**selves**, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The revolution aimed at new arrangements; **insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves**, and sets no glittering hopes on "institutions." It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established. (279-80) So while a revolution aims at transforming existing social and political conditions so that human essence may flourish, an insurrection aims at freeing the individual from this very essence. Like Foucault's practices of freedom, the insurrection aims at transforming the relationship that the individual has with himself. The insurrection starts, then, with the individual refusing his or her enforced essential identity: it starts, as Stirner says, from men's discontent with themselves. Insurrection does not aim at overthrowing political institutions. It is aimed at the individual, in a sense transgressing his own identity--the outcome of which is, nevertheless, a change in political arrangements. **Insurrection is therefore not about becoming** what one is--becoming **human**, becoming man--**but about becoming what one is not**.This ethos of escaping essential identities through a reinvention of oneself has many important parallels with the Baudelarianaestheticization of the self that interests Foucault. Like Baudelaire's assertion that the self must be treated as a work of art, Stirner sees the self--or the ego--as a "creative nothingness," a radical emptiness which is up to the individual to define: "I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just positing or creating myself" (135). **The self**, for Stirner, **is a process, a continuous flow of self-creating flux**--it is a process that eludes the imposition of fixed identities and essences: "no concept expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me" (324). Therefore, Stirner's strategy of insurrection and Foucault's project of care for the self are both contingent practices of freedom that involve a reconfiguration of the subject and its relationship with the self. For Stirner, as with Foucault, freedom is an undefined and open-ended project in which the individual engages. The insurrection, as Stirner argues, does not rely on political institutions to grant freedom to the individual, but looks to the individual to invent his or her own forms of freedom. It is an attempt to construct spaces of autonomy within relations of power, by limiting the power that is exercised over the individual by others and increasing the power that the individual exercises over himself. The individual, moreover, is free to reinvent himself in new and unpredictable ways, escaping the limits imposed by human essence and universal notions of morality. The notion of insurrection involves a reformulation of the concept of freedom in ways that are radically post-Kantian. Stirner suggests, for instance, that there can be no truly universal idea of freedom; freedom is always a particular freedom in the guise of the universal. The universal freedom that, for Kant, is the domain of all rational individuals, would only mask some hidden particular interest. **Freedom**, according to Stirner, **is**an ambiguous and problematic concept, **an "enchantingly beautiful dream" that seduces the individual yet remains unattainable, and from which the individual must awaken**. Furthermore, freedom is a limited concept. It is only seen in its narrow negative sense. Stirner wants, rather, to extend the concept to a more positive freedom to. Freedom in the negative sense involves only self-abnegation--to be rid of something, to deny oneself. That is why, according to Stirner, the freer the individual ostensibly becomes, in accordance with the emancipative ideals of Enlightenment humanism, the more he loses the power he exercises over himself. On the other hand, positive freedom--or ownness--is a form of freedom that is invented by the individual for him or herself. Unlike Kantian freedom, ownness is not guaranteed by universal ideals or categorical imperatives. If it were, it could only lead to further domination: "The man who is set free is nothing but a freed man [...] he is an unfree man in the garment of freedom, like the ass in the lion's skin" (152). Freedom must, rather, be seized by the individual. For freedom to have any value it must be based on the power of the individual to create it. "**My freedom becomes complete only when it is my--might**; but by this I cease to be a merely free man, and become and own man" (151). Stirner was one of the first to recognize that the true basis of freedom is power. To see freedom as a universal absence of power is to mask its very basis in power. The theory of ownness is a recognition, and indeed an affirmation, of the inevitable relation between freedom and power. **Ownness is the realization of the individual's power over** him**self--the ability to create his or her own forms of freedom,**which are not circumscribed by metaphysical or essentialist categories. In this sense, ownness is a form of freedom that goes beyond the categorical imperative. It is based on a notion of the self as a contingent and open field of possibilities, rather than on an absolute and dutiful adherence to external moral maxims.

#### Wilderson’s conception of social death is based off of a flawed methodology which interrupts the transformative potential of the African Diaspora

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A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpusof films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225**)** there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### This logic of social death replicates the violence of the middle passage – rejection is necessary to honor the dead

Brown 2009 – professor of history and of African and African American Studies specializing in Atlantic Slavery (Vincent, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

But this was not the emphasis of Patterson’s argument. As a result, those he has inspired have often conflated his exposition of slaveholding ideology with a description of the actual condition of the enslaved. Seen as a state of being, the concept of social death is ultimately out of place in the political history of slavery. If studies of slavery would account for the outlooks and maneuvers of the enslaved as an important part of that history, scholars would do better to keep in view the struggle against alienation rather than alienation itself. To see social death as a productive peril entails a subtle but significant shift in perspective, from seeing slavery as a condition to viewing enslavement as a predicament, in which enslaved Africans and their descendants never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration. In part, the usefulness of social death as a concept depends on what scholars of slavery seek to explain—black pathology or black politics, resistance or attempts to remake social life? For too long, debates about whether there were black families took precedence over discussions of how such families were formed; disputes about whether African culture had “survived” in the Americas overwhelmed discussions of how particular practices mediated slaves’ attempts to survive; and scholars felt compelled to prioritize the documentation of resistance over the examination of political strife in its myriad forms. But of course, because slaves’ social and political life grew directly out of the violence and dislocation of Atlantic slavery, these are false choices. And we may not even have to choose between tragic and romantic modes of storytelling, for history tinged with romance may offer the truest acknowledgment of the tragedy confronted by the enslaved: it took heroic effort for them to make social lives. There is romance, too, in the tragic fact that although scholars may never be able to give a satisfactory account of the human experience in slavery, they nevertheless continue to try. If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, we might at least tell richer stories about how the endeavors of the weakest and most abject have at times reshaped the world. The history of their social and political lives lies between resistance and oblivion, not in the nature of their condition but in their continuous struggles to remake it. Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us.