# 1

#### Immigration will pass – current GOP defections are creating political opportunity to pressure leadership

**Sargent, 10/30/13** (Greg, The Plum Line blog, Washington Post, “Immigration reform is definitely undead” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/30/immigration-reform-is-definitely-undead/>)

We now have three House Republicans who have signed on to the House Dem comprehensive immigration reform bill, putting immigration reform officially back in the “undead” category.¶ GOP Rep. David Valadao of California is officially on board with the bipartisan proposal, according to a statement from the Congressman sent my way:¶ “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year.¶ “By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.”¶ Valadao’s move is not wholly unexpected, given that he inhabits a moderate district with a lot of Latinos. But his insistence that addressing immigration reform “cannot wait” is helpful. It seems like an implicit message to the GOP leadership: We must act this year, and on this bill, if necessary.¶ This comes after GOP Reps. leana Ros-Lehtinen and Jeff Denham Jeff Denham did the same. Denham has said he expects “more” Republicans to ultimately sign on, and has also said that the House GOP leadership told him there will be a vote on something immigration-related by the end of the year.¶ It’s unclear whether there will actually be a House vote on anything involving immigration before the year runs out, and it seems very unlikely that there will be a vote on the House Dem measure, which is essentially the Senate comprehensive immigration reform bill, without the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment that House Dems dislike, and instead with another border security amendment House Dems like swapped in.¶ However, the movement among Republicans towards the Dem bill — even if it is only a trickle for now — is interesting, as a reminder that immigration reform can happen if House GOP leaders actually want it to.¶ To be sure, immigration reform faces a huge obstacle: The stark underlying structural realities of the House Republican caucus. Far too few Republican members have large enough Latino populations to impact the outcome in 2014. With primaries coming, there just may be no incentive for Republicans to act until after the 2014 elections.¶ But there are other factors to consider. In some key respects, immigration reform poses its own unique set of political challenges and conditions — it is not quite as polarizing an issue as, say, Obamacare or even the question of whether to agree to new revenues as part of a budget deal. Major GOP aligned constituencies — the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, evangelicals, high tech and agricultural interests in the districts of House Republicans – want immigration reform. What’s more, there is a built-in incentive for Republicans to put this issue behind them, given the slow forward march of demographic realities.¶ Also, as longtime immigration operative Simon Rosenberg explains, Congressional Republicans have a long history of working on this issue. And some polls show that even sizable chunks of Republican voters want comprehensive reform, particularly if it is packaged with border security. Republican pollster Whit Ayres’ research, in particular, has shown that even GOP primary voters want action when informed that the other option is the status quo or “de facto amnesty,” as some pro-reform Republicans put it.¶ Indeed, if there is anything that can make something happen, it’s the possibility that inaction is far more difficult politically for Republicans than many of them (and many commentators) claim. The immigration problem — “de facto amnesty” is not going away. If more Republicans like these three urge action inside the GOP caucus, it’s not impossible that House GOP leaders will allow votes on border security, the Kids Act, or potentially the legalization proposal that Republicans are said to be working on. That could possibly get us to conference.

#### It will be a fight and it requires all of Obama’s capital to pass it

**Orlando Sentinel, 11/1/13** (editorial, “It’ll take both parties to clear immigration logjam” database: LibraryPressDisplay (at the University of Michigan)

For those who thought the end of the government shutdown would provide a break from the partisan bickering in Washington, think again. The battle over comprehensive immigration reform could be every bit as contentious.¶ Polls show the popular momentum is there for comprehensive reform, which would include a path to citizenship for many of the nation's 11 million undocumented immigrants. But it'll take plenty of political capital from President Obama and leaders in both parties on Capitol Hill to make it happen.¶ Immigration-reform activists, who have been pushing for reform for years, are understandably impatient. This week police arrested 15 who blocked traffic at a demonstration in Orlando.¶ There are plenty of selling points for comprehensive immigration reform. An opportunity for millions of immigrants to get on due right side of the law. Stronger border security. The chance for law enforcement to focus limited resources on real threats to public safety instead of nannies and fruit pickers. A more reliable work force to meet the needs of key industries. Reforms to let top talent from around the world stay here after studying in U.S. universities.¶ The Senate passed its version of comprehensive immigration in June. It includes all of the benefits above. Its path to citizenship requires undocumented immigrants to pay lines, learn English, ass a criminal background check and wait more than a decade.¶ So far, House Republicans have balked, taking a piecemeal rather than comprehensive approach. Many members fear being challenged from the light for supporting "amnesty”.¶ Yet polls show the public supports comprehensive reform. In June, a Gallup poll found 87 percent of Americans - including 86 percent of Republicans - support a pathway to citizenship like the one outlined in the Senate bill.¶ Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio took flak from tea-party supporters for spear- heading the comprehensive bill. Now, apparently aiming to mend fences, he says immigration should be handled piecemeal He's politically savvy enough to know that's a dead end.¶ But comprehensive reform won't have a chance without President Obama making full use of his bully pulpit to promote it, emphasizing in particular all that undocumented immigrants would need to do to earn citizenship. House Democratic leaders will have to underscore the president’s message.

#### Loads of Cuba Lobbies cost Obama immense political capital and overwhelms any turns

LeoGrande, 12

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The 113th Congress Congress has held a central role in U.S. policy toward Cuba ever since it codified the U.S. embargo into law in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton). To move beyond limited improvements in relations on issues of mutual interest or limited commercial activity– that is, to move toward the full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations– the president would have to win congressional approval to change the law. In 2000, the Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which legalized the sale of food products to Cuba, albeit on a cash-only basis, but at the same time prohibited tourist travel by U.S. residents. For the next four years, the bipartisan Cuba Working Group in the House of Representatives worked to end all prohibitions on travel to Cuba. In 2001, Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), the founder along with Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) of the Cuba Working Group, introduced an amendment to the Treasury appropriation bill prohibiting enforcement of the travel ban. The House approved it in July by a wide margin (240-186), but it was dropped in conference committee by the Republican House leadership in response to Bush’s veto threat. For the next three years, this scenario was replayed annually. The House (and the 27 Senate in 2003 and 2004) voted to end enforcement of the travel ban, but congressional Republicans conspired with the White House to prevent it from becoming law by repeatedly dropping the provision from the final bill. “People are wrong to underestimate what it means to have President Bush on our side,” Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fla) said with satisfaction. By 2005, 28 a sense of futility had eroded the Cuba Working Group. Aided by campaign contributions to key members of the House from the new pro-embargo U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, Republicans were able to defeat amendments easing restrictions on travel to Cuba and block consideration of others in 2005 and 2006.29 With President Obama promising a new policy of engagement toward Cuba and having lifted travel restrictions on Cuban Americans in 2009, freedom-to-travel advocates launched a new congressional campaign to lift the travel ban. With large Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, hopes ran high for success. Over 170 cosponsors quickly signed on in the House. A broad coalition of some 130 business groups and foreign policy NGOs formed behind the campaign, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Farm Bureau Federation, National Farmers Union, American Society of Travel Agents, Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. The travel web site Orbitz collected over 100,000 signatures on a petition to lift the travel ban. As a measure of its commitment, the Chamber of Commerce warned legislators that their vote on Cuba would be “scored” as a key business vote included in the Chamber’s annual “How They Voted” scorecard.30 Public opinion, even among Cuban-Americans, favored the freedom to travel. A 2008 poll in south Florida by Florida International University found that 67% favored “ending current travel restrictions for all Americans.” A national poll of Cuban-Americans the following year by Bendixen and Associates found the same result, and a 2010 poll by a faculty member at the University of Miami found support at 64%. The general public’s view was even more lopsided: 31 70% favored unrestricted travel to Cuba, and even 62% of Republicans agreed.32 Opponents blasted the freedom-to-travel coalition as venial for putting dollars ahead of human rights. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who pledged to filibuster the bill if it ever got to the Senate, denounced businessmen who “only care about padding their profits by opening up a new market,” even though it meant “enriching the Castro regime.” Congresswoman Ros 33 Lehtinen attacked proponents of free travel for, “seek[ing] to reward the Cuban regime with tourism cash flows as the dictatorship tightens its stranglehold on the Cuban people.”34 The legislative vehicle for opening travel and facilitating agricultural sales was House Resolution (H.R.) 4645, the “Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act,” cosponsored by House Agricultural Committee Chair Collin Peterson (D-Minn) and Jerry Moran (R-Kan.). It cleared the Agricultural Committee on July 1, 2010, by a narrow 25-20 margin, and was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. For weeks, Committee Chair Howard Berman (D-Calif.) tried to collect the votes needed to report the bill out to the House floor. In September, still one or two votes short, with Congress drawing to a close for the election campaign, he gave up. The bill died in committee. The principal obstacle faced by supporters of the travel bill was not the opposition of Republicans like Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balart brothers, but opposition from moderate and conservative Democrats. In the Senate, not only did Menendez promise to block any travel bill, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev) also opposed unfettered travel, and he controlled the flow of legislation to the Senate floor. In the House, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, a rising star of the party from south Florida, took it upon herself to organize opposition to the travel bill within the Democratic caucus. Wasserman Schultz was in charge of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's “Red to Blue” project in the 2008 election cycle, aimed at unseating Republican incumbents (though not in south Florida, where Wasserman Schultz refused to campaign against her three Republican friends– Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balarts). Many freshman Democrats– especially those from relatively conservative districts– were in her debt. A vote on Cuba, which was not a salient or popular issue in their constituencies, was a small price to pay to stay in Wasserman Schultz’s good graces. When supporters of the travel bill first rolled it out with 178 cosponsors, Wasserman Schultz recruited 53 House Democrats to write a letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi declaring their determination to vote against it– a formidable number that foreshadowed a nasty battle inside the Democratic caucus if the bill went to the House floor, and put final passage in doubt. In 2011, President Obama selected Wasserman Schultz to chair the Democratic National Committee

#### It’s key to the economy and US leadership

Javier Palomarez, Forbes, 3/6/13, The Pent Up Entrepreneurship That Immigration Reform Would Unleash, www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/06/the-pent-up-entrepreneurship-that-immigration-reform-would-unleash/print/

The main difference between now and 2007 is that today the role of immigrants and their many contributions to the American economy have been central in the country’s national conversation on the issue. Never before have Latinos been so central to the election of a U.S. President as in 2012. New evidence about the economic importance of immigration reform, coupled with the new political realities presented by the election, have given reform a higher likelihood of passing. As the President & CEO of the country’s largest Hispanic business association, the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), which advocates for the interests of over 3 million Hispanic owned businesses, I have noticed that nearly every meeting I hold with corporate leaders now involves a discussion of how and when immigration reform will pass. The USHCC has long seen comprehensive immigration reform as an economic imperative, and now the wider business community seems to be sharing our approach. It is no longer a question of whether it will pass. Out of countless conversations with business leaders in virtually every sector and every state, a consensus has emerged: our broken and outdated immigration system hinders our economy’s growth and puts America’s global leadership in jeopardy. Innovation drives the American economy, and without good ideas and skilled workers, our country won’t be able to transform industries or to lead world markets as effectively as it has done for decades. Consider some figures: Immigrant-owned firms generate an estimated $775 billion in annual revenue, $125 billion in payroll and about $100 billion in income. A study conducted by the New American Economy found that over 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies were started by immigrants or children of immigrants. Leading brands, like Google, Kohls, eBay, Pfizer, and AT&T, were founded by immigrants. Researchers at the Kauffman Foundation released a study late last year showing that from 2006 to 2012, one in four engineering and technology companies started in the U.S. had at least one foreign-born founder — in Silicon Valley it was almost half of new companies. There are an estimated 11 million undocumented workers currently in the U.S. Imagine what small business growth in the U.S. would look like if they were provided legal status, if they had an opportunity for citizenship. Without fear of deportation or prosecution, imagine the pent up entrepreneurship that could be unleashed. After all, these are people who are clearly entrepreneurial in spirit to have come here and risk all in the first place. Immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses as native-born Americans, and statistics show that most job growth comes from small businesses. While immigrants are both critically-important consumers and producers, they boost the economic well-being of native-born Americans as well. Scholars at the Brookings Institution recently described the relationship of these two groups of workers as complementary. This is because lower-skilled immigrants largely take farming and other manual, low-paid jobs that native-born workers don’t usually want. For example, when Alabama passed HB 56, an immigration law in 2012 aimed at forcing self-deportation, the state lost roughly $11 billion in economic productivity as crops were left to wither and jobs were lost. Immigration reform would also address another important angle in the debate – the need to entice high-skilled immigrants. Higher-skilled immigrants provide talent that high-tech companies often cannot locate domestically. High-tech leaders recently organized a nationwide “virtual march for immigration reform” to pressure policymakers to remove barriers that prevent them from recruiting the workers they need. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, fixing immigration makes sound fiscal sense. Economist Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda calculated in 2010 that comprehensive immigration reform would add $1.5 trillion to the country’s GDP over 10 years and add $66 billion in tax revenue – enough to fully fund the Small Business Administration and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce for over two years. As Congress continues to wring its hands and debate the issue, lawmakers must understand what both businesses and workers already know: The American economy needs comprehensive immigration reform.

**Extinction**

**Auslin 9**

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and **global chaos** followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would **dramatically raise tensions** inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in **all regions of the globe** and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce **into a big bang**.

# 2

#### First – Embargo limits status quo drilling. Plan involves the US – unlocking *large-scale* Cuban production.

\*Using less than a ¼ of possible drilling blocks in Cuba \* companies can’t drill because need their own capital, equipment, and knowledge- US has the best of all of these 3

Padgett ‘8

Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami & Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine – Oct. 23, 2008 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN

The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still, the concessions so far represent less than a quarter of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, the only people really able to do it to the extent the Cubans need are the Americans."

#### Cuban production trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties

\*Cuba very close to the US \*Cuba could possibly have many wells—impact on economy and environment in entire region \* Enough oil to change US trade with ME countries

Alhaiji and Maris ‘4

[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of massive¶ oil deposits in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

#### Perception. Saudi Arabia fears the narrative that the US may abandon them for North American supplies.

\*US produces low density crude oil while refineries geared to heavier crudes \*Get heavy crude from Saudi, but same type of oil in Cuba \*Stable US security promises key to stop Saudi from developing bomb

Rogers 3/20

[2013 – Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science, technology and national security policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change, environmental cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen. Dempsey,” Center for New American Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-security-despite-changing-relationship-regions-]

America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the crude oil is coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average, increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day.¶ Not all of this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A number of factors matter, most importantly the crude oil grade. The United States is producing light tight oil, that is, low-density crude oil, whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from Saudi Arabia. Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.¶ Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand for oil (a consequence of slow economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could conceivably help wean America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable point).¶ Whether or not one believes that the United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and partners in the Persian Gulf are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region. After all, if the United States no longer relies on energy from the region, why should American foot the bill for protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – or so the narrative goes.¶ The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply shocks will contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly those in East Asia that have grown more dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned about the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next 20 years because of oil. That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the world where we had – where we had not, except for a few bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it, bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing called oil but rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where threats could be managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know, oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only speak, as I dress, from the military perspective – that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that we build by working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –you will find that the future will be a period of greater commitment.¶ Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil.¶ So we have two powerful strategic cross-currents that the Obama administration will have to confront in the near term.¶ This week marks the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in the Middle East, not more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to Middle East oil, and the domestic narrative speaks for itself. At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security commitment to our partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about security challenges in the region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt Irvine recently published a report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to Saudi Arabia developing the bomb – Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite persuasively that a number of factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the big caveats to this is a credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel comfortable about this commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access to the region’s oil? The public perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will have to be managed carefully. What a tightrope to walk.

#### That causes Saudi Prolif.

Guzansky ‘13

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\*Riyadh remains skeptical on security from US if not providing them oil \*Pakistan said it will give nucs to Saudi \* Strategic move of getting weapons may outweigh other prices

Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on the quality of relations between the two countries and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.¶ After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's doubts about the reliability of Washington is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, at present, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. But strategic interest, motivated by considerations of survival, could have the upper hand. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.

Edelman ‘11

(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

# 3

#### Text: Using its licensing authority and enforcement discretion, the United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should exempt transactions involving biotechnology from enforcement under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

#### First, the counterplan solves via specific exemptions — OFAC has broad discretion over sanctions enforcement.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation* (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

2. Ability to Mitigate Collateral Damage

Because OFAC prefers to formulate its sanctions program broadly, its economic sanctions can affect the lives of unintended targets, such as ordinary citizens of foreign countries that have no influence in their sanctioned government. n347 The broad reach of U.S. sanctions can also unnecessarily put U.S. citizens and companies at a competitive disadvantage, undermine international support for the sanctions programs, and even undermine the policy objectives of the programs. n348 One way in which OFAC mitigates [\*792] the collateral damage of its holistic sanctions is by issuing licenses that permit U.S. citizens to export food and medical supplies n349 and provide humanitarian aid n350 to people in sanctioned countries. In an effort to avoid placing private enterprises at an unnecessary competitive disadvantage, which can damage U.S. influence internationally and U.S. interests as a whole, OFAC may also allow certain activities from an otherwise sanctioned country. n351 Additionally, OFAC issues licenses to avoid interfering with the legitimate activities of international and charitable organizations and to permit U.S. persons to participate in such organizations. n352 By licensing these types of activities and transactions, OFAC focuses its sanctions and the punitive consequences thereof, to the extent possible, on those in a position to produce the desired change, rather than on innocent civilians and businesses. n353

#### Second, the counterplan solves quickly and without political fallout — it doesn’t require legislative or regulatory action.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation* (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

3. Adaptability

The third core competency of OFAC's licensing practices is the ability to adapt a particular sanctions program quickly in response to political or circumstantial changes. n388 In situations where sanctions goals can change with the tides of revolution, the slow march of legislative and rulemaking processes may be incapable of producing a timely response. Sanctions targeting government-owned or government-operated entities may need to be lifted in response to a positive regime change or re-imposed in the event that the new government fails. n389 OFAC often utilizes general licenses to manage these fast-paced scenarios, either by easing sanctions through license adoption or strengthening sanctions through license revocation. n390 By issuing or revoking general licenses, OFAC can react to the changing political circumstances of a targeted country without requiring a regulatory overhaul or the signing or withdrawal of an executive order. n391

# 4

#### Gradual transition now---political liberalization is facilitating an economic “soft landing”---solves the Aff

**Piccone, 10/3** – Acting Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute (Ted, “Cuba’s Stroll Toward Change: A View from the Streets”, Brookings Institute, 10/3/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/03-cuba-trip-piccone)//SJF

We are witnessing today the unfolding of a transitional hybrid economy that has one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake. On one hand, a host of ongoing reforms in the domains of agriculture, tourism, property transfers, travel abroad and even sports are unshackling Cubans from a predominant state. President Obama’s decision in 2009 to relax U.S. travel and remittances rules has also helped give oxygen to the more liberal features of the reforms by providing seed money for new businesses and facilitating the flow of goods and capital from the Cuban diaspora in Florida. On the other hand, implementation of reforms is slow and often limited to pilot projects dispersed throughout the island. Rules for foreign investment are too restrictive and arbitrarily enforced and property rights remain in doubt.

Nonetheless, the package of changes underway in Cuba, under the auspices of Raúl Castro and other heroes of the Revolution, lends a certain political legitimacy to the project that could facilitate a soft landing for such a hard situation. As Richard Feinberg argues in a new Brookings report on the emerging middle classes due out this November, such a soft landing is already underway as small and medium enterprises and cooperatives gain traction. Castro’s announcement last year that his current five-year term will be his last, and the appointment of a much younger vice president to guide the party to the next phase of “prosperous socialism,” give Cubans I spoke to some hope that, in the next five years, Cuba will look even more different than it did five years ago.

This shift is already visible. Open debates among Cuban citizens, including one I attended on the national budget process in a well-appointed theater organized by a leading public affairs magazine, are slowly underway. The Catholic Church is also playing an interesting role. The Conference of Catholic Bishops in Cuba recently released its first pastoral letter in 20 years endorsing the government’s economic liberalization and calling for a political opening that respects “the right to diversity with respect to thoughts, to creativity and to the search for truth.” Outspoken activists are touring European, Latin American and North American cities with their critiques of the current system and returning to the island determined to continue their campaign for greater freedoms, despite continued harassment and detentions. Change is in the tropical air.

As Cuba opens its economy to the world, and gradually finds the confidence to let Cubans be more open at home as well, the United States would be smart to move beyond the confines of its Cold War policy and let Americans see what they can do to support the Cuban people. President Obama can start by expanding the steps he took in his first term to facilitate greater trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people and budding small enterprises. He can also credibly remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which is severely hampering a whole host of basic financial transactions for legitimate American travelers and businesses alike. It is time to exploit the opportunity offered by Cuba’s economic reforms and let reconciliation – both within the island and across the Florida Straits – begin.

#### Cuba has no preparation for change and wouldn’t be able to take it all at once---lifting the embargo would cause a rapid democratic uprising

**Erikson, 8** – Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State and has an M.A. in Public Policy from Harvard University and a B.A. from Brown University (Daniel P., “The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution”, Bloomsbury Press, 10/28/08, p. 250-251)//EX

Like most of his colleagues, Monreal readily agreed that the United States was the unpredictable eight-hundred pound gorilla with the potential to transform Cuba’s future: “Lifting the embargo would be totally disruptive for Cuba. I don’t know if the impact would be good or bad,” he told me. “You know it’s a mistake to believe that the Cuban government would have the ability and the manpower to manage or control the events that would follow. That is false. Because if the embargo were lifted, it would have such a huge, rapid impact that Cuba – at least the Cuba I know – would not be prepared for the changes it would bring. If you imagine that this is a boxing match, then right now the Cuban boxer is in the United States, but he knows the other guy’s moves and how to protect himself. But what if, all at once, the boxer is put in the ring against fifteen other guys? You’d have the ring crying! And for better or worse, the ability of the Cuban government to control this fight is very limited.”

#### Unstable transition causes instability and war---kills US ability to control international conflict escalation

**Gorrell, 5 -** Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

# Soft Power

#### Tons of alt causes and Cuba’s not key – their ev.

Grandin 10 – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” *New Labor Forum*, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//DR. H

Washington’s relations with Latin America—particularly in terms of the gap between what its policy toward the region is and what it could be—precisely measure the degree to which domestic ideologies, narrow corporate and sectional interests, and a sclerotic political system are hastening the decline of the United States as a global power. As a result, the U.S. is deepening its dependence on unstable policies in order to leverage its dwindling influence in the hemisphere. It is easy to imagine an improved U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America, designed not to advance a set of altruistic ideals but merely to defend its interests—broadly defined to mean stable politics and economies that are open to U.S. capital and commodities—and to achieve what those in the liberal wing of the foreign policy establishment have long advocated:  a maximization of U.S. “soft power.” Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion,” through an enhanced understanding and utilization of multilateral institutions, mutually beneficial policies, cultural exchanges, and commercial relations.1 There are no immediate threats to the U.S. in Latin America. A majority of the region’s political elite—even most of its current govern- ing leftists—share many of the same values the United States claims to embody, even more so following the election of the first African-American president, who is wildly popular in Latin America. As a result, there is no other place in the world that offers U.S. president Barack Obama the opportunity to put into place the kind of intelligent foreign policy that he and his closest advisors, such as United Nations (U.N.) ambassador Susan Rice, believe is necessary to stop the hemorrhaging of U.S. prestige—one that would both improve Washington’s ability to deploy its many competitive advantages, while removing key points of friction. Here’s what such a policy could look like: Washington would concede to longstanding Brazilian demands by reducing tariffs and subsidies that protect the U.S. agricultural industry, opening its market to Brazilian com- modities, especially soy and sugar, as well as value-added ethanol.  It would yield on other issues that have stalled the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), such as a demand for strident intellectual property rights enforcement, which Brazil objects to because it would disadvantage its own pharmaceutical industry and hinder its ability to provide low-cost medicine to those infected with the HIV virus.  Such concessions would provide an incentive for Brasilia to take the lead in jumpstarting the FTAA, a treaty that would ultimately benefit U.S. corporations, yet would be meaningless without Brazil, South America’s largest and most dynamic economy.

The U.S. would scale back its military operations in Colombia—including recent con- troversial plans to establish a series of military bases which have raised strong criticisms from the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.  Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—who is entering the last year of his second and last term—has become the spokesperson for the collective discontent, an indication of his country’s regional authority. In exchange for the U.S. dialing down its military presence, a soon-to-be post-Lula Brazil might find it convenient to tilt away from Venezuela and toward the United States. Washington would also drop the five-decade-old trade embargo on Cuba, thus burying a Cold War relic that continues to tarnish the U.S. image.  Normalizing relations with Cuba would create an additional enticement for Brazil to cooperate with the U.S., since its formidable agro-industry is beginning to invest in Cuba and is therefore well-placed to export to the U.S. market.  Politically, Washington would formally recommit to a multilateral foreign policy, even as it set up a de facto arrangement with Brazil to administer the region.  This would mean demonstrating its willingness to work through the Organization of American States (OAS).  More importantly, it would mean leashing the quasi-privatized “democracy promotion” organizations—largely funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development, and run by the International Republican Institute—that have become vectors of trans- national, conservative coalition building throughout the hemisphere. These groups today do overtly what the CIA used to do covertly, as NED's first president, Allen Weinstein, admitted—they fund oppositional “civil soci- ety” groups that use the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to menace Left govern- ments throughout the region, including the promotion of an aborted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and successful ones in Haiti in 2004 and Honduras in 2009.2  Similar destabilization efforts tried to topple Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 2008 but failed, at least partly because Brazil and Chile let it be known that they would not accept those kinds of machinations in their backyards.  It would be easy for the Obama administration to rein these groups in, and to agree to Latin American demands to make their funding more transparent and their actions more accountable. Washington would also take a number of other initiatives to modernize hemispheric diplomacy, including deescalating its failed “War on Drugs,” as Latin America’s leading intellectuals and policymakers—including many former presidents—are demanding; in the last few months, both Mexico and Argentina have legalized some drug use and possession, including small quantities of cocaine and heroin.3 The U.S. would renew its assault weapons ban, as Mexico—battered by over five thousand narcotics-related murders a year, many of them committed with smuggled U.S. guns—is begging.   It could also pass meaningful immigration reform, providing a path to U.S. citizenship for the millions of undocumented Latin Americans, mostly from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andes, but also Brazil.  Such a move would go a long way toward improving relations with south- ern neighbors. It would also be good domestic politics for the Democrats, guaranteeing the loyalty of the Latino vote in 2012 and moving Texas, by creating millions of new vot- ers, closer to swing-state status. It could also provide progressives and the Democratic Party with a real wedge issue: Catholics, increasingly pulled into the con- servative camp by issues such as abortion and gay rights, overwhelmingly favor immigration reform. Any one of the above steps would go far in reestablishing U.S. legitimacy in Latin America. Taken together they could serve as a diplomatic revolution, one which would not weaken U.S. power but consolidate it much the way the Good Neighbor Policy did, allowing Washington to project its power in the region through stable multilateral mechanisms freed from the burdens of confrontation and militarism.  A retooled FTAA, updated for the post-Great Recession world and stripped of the ideologi- cal baggage of failed neoliberal globalization, might provide a blueprint for a sustainable regional economy, one that balances national development and corporate profit.4 And like the Good Neighbor Policy, a reinvigorated hemispheric diplomacy could serve as a model for the rest of the world, a design for a practical twenty-first century multilateralism, capable of responding to transnational problems—both those that concern liberals, such as climate change, poverty, and migration, and those that concern conservatives, such as crime and ter- rorism—while respecting, at least rhetorically, the sovereignty of individual nations. In short, the Western Hemisphere offers an unparalleled opportunity to realize the vision of Barack Obama’s September 2009 address to the United Nations—hailed by many as a clarion call for a new internationalism—to, in his words, “embrace a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” It’s not going to happen. Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be blocked by powerful domestic interests. Take biofuels. The idea to liberalize the U.S. agricultural market—and have the rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the reality—is recommended by all mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step to win back Brazil. Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bush’s outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Shannon—respected in establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, “the most talented and successful individual” to serve as Washington’s envoy to Latin America “in at least two decades”—as its ambassador. Yet Shannon’s confirmation had been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominee’s comment during his confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to proceed.5 The White House’s quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care reform, a further indicator of how foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6 As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7 Obama could easily assemble a majority coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power centers—expansion has given way to involution. The U.S. political system seems to be literally devouring itself from within, paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust to a rapidly changing world. Unable to leverage its soft, smart power even in its own hemisphere, Washington is ever more dependent on the military and corporate mercenary forces that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes. As a candidate, Obama—referring to Bush’s decision to invade Iraq—said he wasn’t opposed to all wars, just stupid ones. Washington’s “War on Drugs” in Latin America is the stupid- est war one can imagine. As the centerpiece of that war, “Plan Colombia”—a program, established by Bill Clinton and extended by George W. Bush and Barack Obama, that has provided Colombia with billions of dollars of aid, mostly for the military’s counternarcotic and counterinsurgent operations—has served to entrench paramilitary power, enrich pri- vate contractors (such as the Virginia-based DynCorp), and turn more than four million Colombians into refugees.9 It has also fore- closed the possibility of a negotiated, regionally brokered solution to the crisis and inflamed a conflict that has already once spilled beyond national borders—in March 2008, Colombian troops launched a military raid into Ecuador to assassinate members of the insurgent Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. And, while it has not lessened narcotics exports to the United States, the drug war has spread the violence associated with the illegal narcotics trade up through Central America and into Mexico, accounting for the staggeringly high number of homicides in the region. Much like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Washington’s militarization of the drug problem in Latin America has worsened what it sought to solve, thus pro- viding an excuse for even more militarism. Thus Southcom—which runs the Department of Defense’s South American operations—is expanding its presence in Colombia, recently brokering a deal that will give the U.S. military access to at least seven bases, running from the Caribbean to the Andes. Colombia and the U.S. insist that this expansion is directed to ensure Colombia’s internal security; but Brazil’s military is concerned that the bases give the U.S. the ability to project its power deep into South America. Colombia serves as the anchor of a broader strategic shift on the part of the U.S., one that reflects its position as a declining hegemon. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the U.S.— confident of its ascension as a world power—treated Latin America largely as a unified region, working through inter-American organizations set up via the Good Neighbor Policy and during World War II, such as the OAS and the Rio Pact (a mutual defense treaty that became the model for NATO). When one or another country tried to break out of its dependent relationship with the U.S.—i.e., Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the early 1970s, or Nicaragua in the 1980s—the U.S. took independent, often covert steps either to isolate it or bring it back into the fold. Yet throughout the Cold War (and for about a decade following the Cold War), Washington continued to view the region as a single administrative zone. But today, the U.S. is increasingly relying on a strategy of divide and rule. Washington’s relationship with Colombia is the centerpiece of this new approach, and the Andean country functions as something like Latin America’s Israel: a heavily militarized U.S. ally that allows Washington to project its power into a hostile region. Like Israel, its preemptive, unilateral actions are encouraged by Washington in the name of national security. Colombia’s reckless raid into Ecuador in 2008—denounced by every South American country—was endorsed not just by George W. Bush but by then- U.S. presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama. Like Israel, Colombia’s security forces serve as a model and a resource for wars elsewhere. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has commented that “many of us from all over the world can learn from what has happened with respect to the very successful develop- ments of ‘Plan Colombia,’” and suggested that it be franchised “specifically to Afghanistan.”10 Some of private military contractor Xe’s—née Blackwater—best recruits are retired Colombian soldiers, trained for Middle East operations on Colombian military bases; before taking control of the murderous Iraq Special Operations Forces, U.S. brigadier gen- eral Simeon Trombitas served in Colombia.11 Recently, Colombian paramilitaries have been recruited as mercenaries by Honduran plantation owners, to protect their property in the wake of the crisis unleashed by the coup.12 Colombia also boasts one of the most sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in its region—bolstered by massive infusions of U.S. dollars—capable of carrying out not just widespread surveillance but covert operations, including attempts to destabilize neighboring Venezuela.13 On the diplomatic circuit, an embassy posting in Colombia has become a way station toward a more prominent role in the Great Game. Current ambassadors to Afghanistan and Pakistan—William Wood and Anne Paterson, respectively—previously served as Bush’s envoys to Colombia. Like Israel, Colombia inspires many who see it as an exemplar of how to balance democracy—a place that offers relatively free elections, with three independent (at least in principle) branches of government—and security. “Colombia is what Iraq should eventually look like, in our best dreams,” writes influen- tial Atlantic contributor Robert Kaplan. “Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has fought—and is winning—a counterinsurgency war even as he has liberalized the economy, strengthened institutions, and improved human rights.”14 The Council on Foreign Relations has put aside its earlier strong criticism of “Plan Colombia” and now hails it as a success for having established a state presence in “many regions previously con- trolled by illegal armed groups, reestablishing elected governments, building and rebuilding public infrastructure, and reaffirming the rule of law.” The Council recommends a similar solution for violence-plagued Mexico and Central America.15 Throughout Latin America, a resurgent Right looks to Colombia for inspira- tion and Uribe as its standard bearer, a backstop against Hugo Chávez-style populism. As Forrest Hylton has argued, Uribe’s suc- cess at consolidating power rests on an alliance between death-squad paramilitaries—who have used “Plan Colombia” as a cover to execute an enormous land grab and to establish their rule in the countryside—and drug traffickers who have decided to stop fighting the state and become part of it. Medellín, the showcase city of Latin America’s New Right, has the eighth highest murder rate in the world; Uribe himself has deep ties to both paramilitaries and drug cartels.16 Colombia also serves as an anchor to a new geopolitics, an attempt by Washington to build a “security corridor” running from Mexico, through Central America, and into Colombia. Under the auspices of such programs as the Merida Initiative, “Plan Puebla-Panama,” and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the objective is to integrate the region’s trans- portation and communications infrastructure, energy production and distribution network, and, most importantly, its military capacities. Call it top-down, transnational state forma- tion, an attempt to coordinate the region’s intelligence agencies, militaries, and police (as well as mercenary corporations like DynCorp), subordinated under the direction of the U.S. military. Thomas Shannon, Bush’s envoy to Latin America and now Obama’s ambassador to Brazil, described it in a moment of candor as “armoring NAFTA.” In other words, the U.S. is retrenching, pulling back from efforts to preside over the entirety of Latin America, instead consolidating its authority over a circumscribed territory, with a deepening reliance on applied military power. This shift is significant, and could unleash a period of heightened instability. One consequence of Washington’s past strategy of treating Latin America as a single unit was that inter-state conflicts were contained; since the 1930s, most bloodletting was internally directed, aimed at trade unionists, peasant activists, intellectuals, reformist politicians, and progressive religious leaders demanding a more equitable share of economic and political power. But now, with a waning superpower banking its authority on “armoring” one region in order to contain another, that might be changing—as evinced by Colombia’s 2008 raid into Ecuador and recent tensions caused by U.S. plans to expand its military footprint in the Andean country. As Adam Isacson, of the Center for International Policy, says of Washington’s new Colombian bases, the U.S. is “creating a new capability in South America, and capabilities often get used.”17 Adding to the potential for instability is the regrouping of the Right. Political scientist Miguel Tinker-Salas notes that “for some time, the Right has been rebuilding in Latin America; hosting conferences, sharing experiences, refining their message, working with the media, and building ties with allies in the United States. This is not the lunatic right-wing fringe, but rather the mainstream Right with powerful allies in the middle-class that used to consider themselves center, but have been frightened by recent Left electoral victories and the rise of social movements.”18 This nascent reaction has been buoyed by the June 2009 Honduran coup, which the right-wing sees as the first successful rollback of populism since the 2004 overthrow of Aristide, as well as by recent victories at the ballot box: in May, a conservative millionaire won the presidency in Panama. In Argentina, Cristina Fernández’s center-left Peronist party has recently suffered a midterm electoral defeat and lost control of Congress. And polls show that presidential elections coming up in Chile and Brazil will be close, possibly dealing further losses to progressives, containing the South American Left to Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the Central American Left to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Two broad arcs of crises have defined U.S.-Latin American relations. The first began in the early nineteenth century and paralleled the first, youthful phase of U.S. territorial and economic expansion. Latin American intellectuals, politicians, and nationalists reacted with increasing hostility toward not only the growing influence of U.S. capital—which both displaced European economic interests and subordinated aspiring domestic elites—but toward ever more frequent and threatening military interventions: the Mexican-American War; the Spanish-American War; the creation of Panama; and invasions and occupations throughout the Caribbean basin. The second round coincided with the advent of the Cold War and marked the U.S.’s maturity as a global power. It intensified with Eisenhower’s over- throw of Guatemala’s democratically elected government in 1954, and continued with the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the series of right- wing coups in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating with the violent repression of Central American insurgencies in the 1980s, which paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s. It seems we are entering a third period of conflict—this time driven less by the tendency toward expansion that marked the U.S.’s global ascension than by a frantic attempt to hold on to what it has left as it enters its senescence—as domestic ideologues, unchecked corporate power, and political paralysis quicken the U.S.’s fall.

#### Soft power’s outdated – Iraq proves

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Soft power has been highly criticized as being a rather ineffective and vague concept. Neorealist scholars place emphasis on hard power, meaning economic and military power and downgrade the role of culture and values in shaping events. Critics argue that soft power is just a reflection of hard power. States are able to exercise soft power, only through their hard power. Only states with a capable military, economic power and industrial strength can claim to exercise soft power effectively. Another point of criticism is that it is difficult to measure power in general and soft power in particular. By its very nature, soft power is a relative and intangible concept, that is inherently difficult to quantify. Quantitative metrics can be used to measure elements of hard power like population, defence expenditure, military assets, gross domestic products and the effects of economic sanctions, but it is tricky to meaure influence, reputation and cultural power. The lack of a clear conceptual framework on soft power is evident when the latter is translated into public diplomacy and strategic communication. The way soft power campaigns are conducted depends on the nature of the state that exercises soft power, the type of message that is transmitted and the nature of the target. Recent cases of soft power operations highlight the fact that successful application of soft power is rather limited. In Iraq, the United States were unable to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. The vast majority of the polulation was against the U.S military occupation and this had a profound effect in the duration and intensity of the counterinsurgency campaign. The Coalition Forces failed to communicate their message successfully. The reasons for this failure lay in the nature of both the messenger (U.S / Coalition Forces) and the target (Iraqis). The U.S in general lacked credibility in the Arab World and the Iraqis were very skeptical of Washington’s intention. The U.S lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi populace and in certain cases even lost the trust of some of their allies. After years of totalitarianism Iraqis were ill-equipped to value the credibility of information and it was difficult for the Coalition Forces to counter misinformation in a society that is not culturally receptive to such messages. In addition, the U.S information campaign had to compete with a rather sophisticated information campaign that took place both inside and outside Iraq. The insurgents were able to mobilize part of the population and provide a credible anti-American rhetoric. Furthermore, the Iraqi populace was for the first time exposed to alternative sources of information. In the post-invasion era, the Iraqis had access to satellite television and foreign news services and as a result, part of the population was alienated and hostile to U.S forces. The occupation clashed the interest of the Iraqi population that wanted to regain control of their country and viewed the U.S forces as an imperial power that invaded in order to exploit their natural resources. The case of Iraq, vividly demonstrates the limitations of soft power. A serious constraint is that no state, no matter how powerful, can control the information sphere. The U.S did not have the monopoly on communication and therefore was unable to shape the battlefield of perception in a close society like Iraq. Responding to misinformation, refuting conspiracy theories, filling information vacuums and building credibility is not an easy task, even for a hegemon.

#### It’s resilient

Bev 12 – regular columnist to Forbes Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, and Strategic Review, Associate Partner of Fortune PR Indonesia and based in Northern California (Jennie S, “The Power of American "Soft Power"” 5/23/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-of-american-soft-power/)//SJF

Almost four years since the beginning of the Great Recession, signified by the implosion of the financial industry and the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the United States is recovering. In fact, some sectors have grown to new heights. Thus, a “declining USA” is no more than a myth. This myth is likely to continue for a while despite the recession officially ending in June 2009 as the high unemployment and on-going foreclosure crisis have cloaked significant economic improvements. In the last four years, declinism and declinists have been spreading paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine this with Nouriel “Dr. Doom” Roubini’s “the perfect storm” forecast in 2013 and you probably would become even more paralyzed. Daniel Gross’ best-selling book Better, Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is probably one of the first books that presents encouraging facts in this recovery period rather than discouraging views of America’s future. The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of one’s fall that lingers in mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day our loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life with us. Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution. The world was so shocked with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasn’t yet created a lasting mental image. Good news, American “soft power” is more powerful than any fiscal policy and political maneuver. Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government says “soft power” refers to the ability to get through attraction rather than coercion or payments. By “to get” it means to receive favorable treatments based upon attractiveness of a country’s culture, ideals, and policies. For instance, inspired by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan aspire to study medicine at an American university. Infatuated by the idea of a fair trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. “Soft power” can be hardcore power. And the American brand is still the best out there. Also, thanks to low US dollar value, a record 62 million foreign tourists visited USA in 2011. In 2010, some 1.04 million immigrants applied for permanent residency, following 1.13 million in the previous year, which reflects the world’s insatiable faith in the US brand. The people of the world still believe that the USA is the place to visit, to reside, and to prosper. US brands, such as automobile giants Buick, GM, and Ford, continue to grow outside of the USA. US brands continue to influence socio-political-economic wellbeing of people of the world: Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube are vital in demonstrations and social unrests. US brands continue to serve people’s mobility and communication: Apple, Microsoft, CISCO, Oracle, and Boeing. People of the world is a market of seven-billion, and most of them have occasionally consumed black soda drinks called Coca-Cola and Pepsi. The US government has lost its geopolitical epicenter, yet American brands keep the legend alive. And the shift has occurred from public power to private power, from political power to economic power, from hard power to soft power, with the end of the Cold War as the turning point. The recent approval of the JOBS Act in April 2012 may as well pick up where the failure of previous policies have left, as its intention is creating an encouraging environment for growth of startup companies through more efficient and lenient procedures of capital raising, including crowdsourcing, venture capitalizing, and angel investing. And it is expected that every new investment would create at least six new jobs. I can see the greatness of American brands supported by the JOBS Act creating another shift in economic recovery, as once again a policy is providing a conducive environment for growth, just like when Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. Now the question is: How far will the JOBS Act’s ripple effect go? And which direction does it go? North or south? Growth, stagnation, or decadence? Still, I believe in the power of “USA” as a brand and American brands. The world loves us.

# Biotech

#### Cooperation now solves.

Chi 4/1 (Quynh, 4/1/13, “Vietnam- Cuba: Strengthening Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cooperation,” http://vccinews.com/news\_detail.asp?news\_id=28205)//DR. H

\*Cuba a leading expert \*working with Vietnam on biotech \*signed economic and trade agreements

Cuba's leading experts in the field of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, as well as Vietnamese enterprises interested in the Cuban market had a direct talk at the seminar "Introduction to potential of cooperation with Cuba in the field of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals” recently held by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the Cuban Embassy in Vietnam.

According to Dr Doan Duy Khuong, VCCI Vice President, since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1960, over more than 50 years of cooperation and mutual support, Vietnam and Cuba have always been loyal brothers and faithful partners of each other. During the war, Cuba was a leader in the movement of people in the world to support the fight for the independence, freedom, and construction of Vietnam. Cuba has been promoting all aspects of relations with Vietnam, especially in the economic field with the strengths of Cuba such as construction, transportation, biotechnology, education, health, sports and agriculture.

The two sides also signed many economic and trade agreements to facilitate trade activities between the two countries such as the Agreement on trade and other forms of economic cooperation (1996), Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (1995); Agreement on cooperation in tourism (1999), Agreement on cooperation in quarantine and plant protection (1999); and the Agreement on avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion for income taxes (2002).

#### Cuban biotech has the potential to fuel biological terrorism

Zilinskas 11 - Director, Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury College (Raymond, ABSTRACT OF: “Cuba, Terrorism, and Biotechnology”, 7/15/2011, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/0471686786.ebd0151.pub2/abstract, HW)

\*Cuba has supported terrorists \*more Cuban biotech makes it easier for for that allocation

The Cuban government has in the past been known to directly support terrorist groups and, as well, nations that are or were supporters of terrorists. In addition, it has taken steps over its existence to acquire a powerful biotechnology infrastructure. Is it possible that Cuban biotechnology has been misused for the purpose of acquiring biological weapons? There certainly have been allegations made by high U.S. government officials to this effect. This entry addresses the relationships between Cuba, terrorism, and biotechnology. It has two sections. The first section considers Cuba's history of terrorist support and associations with nations that have been named by the United States as supporting terrorists, such as Iran, Libya, and Syria. Second, Cuba's powerful biotechnological capability is reviewed, as well as its potential for biological weapons acquisition.

#### Bioterror causes extinction – 9 hour time frame.

Discovery 09 **–** Award-winning source of credible, unbiased, and easy-to-understand explanations of how the world actually works (How Stuff Works, February 19, 2009, “10 Ways the World Might End: A Monster Plague,” http://videos.howstuffworks.com/science/10-ways-the-world-will-end-videos-playlist.htm)//DR. H

\*Release of one weapon leads to plague \*spread in 9 hours \*collapse economy, medical system can’t keep up, will impact everyone

[Narrator:] Conventional science holds the deadly viruses that typically originate in other species, and then jump to humans. Some scientists believe the biggest threat from plague could come from outer space.

[Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:] Looking at the…the pattern of diseases and the how they extract the earth, I would say that every new strain of virus, new subtype of virus, it has a space connotation to it.

[Narrator:] If Chandra is right, it is possible an asteroid could one day deliver a deadly new strain of plague.

[Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:] There is the possibility that sometime in the future, there will be a strain of virus or bacteria that we have not encountered throughout evolution history that could cause absolute devastation.

[Narrator:] A killer plague from outer space isn’t the only concern. Deadly new bioweapons are also being developed in the barges around the world. Fringe cults, and apocalyptic madmen could right now be developing such bioweapons. As deadly as atomic bombs, and far cheaper to produce, infection with a few particles could mean a slow, agonizing death. It might only take one moment of madness from an absent minded buffet to release such a deadly new strain of plague. Once out of the lab, this grotesque killer would quickly begin to spread.

[Guest] Anywhere in the world, infection is on our doorstep, or moving around the world, within nine hours, that virus could arrive here in London, or anywhere else.

[Narrator:] No one will be safe, as the deadly invisible assassin will swiftly bring entire cities to a standstill.

[Guest] There’s two features, of actually meeting your cad. And what we ask is, how long is the incubation period. That’s the time between the time you get infected, and the time you show symptoms. And the other thing we look for is what’s called its reproductive number, and its reproductive number is basically how many people are going to be infected by one person with that virus. If the reproductive number is high, and the incubation period is short, then you’ve got a problem on your hands.

[Narrator:] This monster plague, will bring death on an unprecedented scale, economies will collapse, the medical system will be unable to cope, no one will be spared a terrible, ugly death.

#### Lifting the embargo spurs doctor flight from Cuba – collapses the industry.

Garrett 10. Laurie Garrett, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Pulitzer prize-winning science journalist and writer of two bestselling books, August 2010 [“Castro Care In Crisis: Will Lifting The Embargo On Cuba Make Things Worse?”, National Center for Policy Anaylsis, http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article\_ID=19706] JH

Cuba is a Third World country that aspires to First World medicine and health. Any achievements have come at tremendous financial and social cost, says Laurie Garrett, senior fellow for health at the Council on Foreign Relations. For instance: The Cuban government's 2008 budget of $46.2 billion allotted $7.2 billion (about 16 percent) to direct health care spending. Only Cuba's expenditures for education exceeded those for health, and Cuba's health costs are soaring as its aging population requires increasingly expensive chronic care. Cuba's economic situation has been dire since 1989, when the country lost its Soviet benefactors and its economy experienced a 35 percent contraction. Today, Cuba's major industries -- tourism, nickel mining, tobacco and rum production, and health care -- are fragile. Cubans blame the long-standing U.S. trade embargo for some of these strains and are wildly optimistic about the transformations that will come once the embargo is lifted. Overlooked in these dreamy discussions of lifestyle improvements, however, is that Cuba's health care industry will likely be radically affected by any serious easing in trade and travel restrictions between the United States and Cuba, says Garrett: Its public health network could be devastated by an exodus of thousands of well-trained Cuban physicians and nurses. For-profit U.S. companies could transform the remaining health care system into a prime destination for medical tourism from abroad. The very strategies that the Cuban government has employed to develop its system have rendered it ripe for the plucking by the U.S. medical industry and by foreigners eager for affordable, elective surgeries in a sunny climate. In short, although the U.S. embargo strains Cuba's health care system and its overall economy, it may be the better of two bad options, says Garrett.

#### No impact to disease – they either burn out or don’t spread

Posner 05 – Senior Lecturer at University of Chicago (Richard A, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.”, Winter, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1)//WL

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

# Democracy

#### Cuba’s economy is growing now.

Havana Times 7/7 (7/7/13 “Cuban Gov. Presents “Favorable” Stats” <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95985> 7-7-13)

The economy showed an overall a “favorable performance”, said Yzquierdo. Almost all sectors recorded growth, “including trade, transport, communications and manufacturing,” he noted.¶ Yzquierdo said the Cuban trade balance was positive at the end of the first quarter and pointed to a similar trend for year-end. At the same time, he spoke of a “slowdown” in the global economic situation.¶ Cuba recently reduced its forecasts for annual growth in 2013 from the 3.6 percent initially estimated to somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. He emphasized that the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) has been influenced by the crisis in the international arena.¶ In the first semester, the island’s economy grew 2.3 percent, according Yzquierdo, despite “external stress”, the “internal weaknesses” and the effects of Hurricane “Sandy”, which swept across the east of Cuba in October 2012.¶ “Sandy” affected 11 provinces and caused losses of almost 7 billion dollars, according to the minister.¶ The inaugural session of the eighth legislature of the National Assembly of People’s Power closes on, Sunday. Raul Castro is expected to pronounce in a speech to the parliament.¶ In a Communist Party Central Committee meeting last week, Castro came down hard on what he called “indiscipline and illegalities” in the State apparatus. He will most likely refer to the fight against corruption, one of the banner efforts of his administration.

#### Turn – the embargo’s actually key to a democratic transition.

Sadowski 12 Managing Editor of Production of the Journal of International Business and Law, Hoftra [Sadowski, Richard. "Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo." Sustainable Development Law & Policy 12.1 (2012): 10.]

Conclusion

Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba’s failures,94 recent changes suggest the embargo is indeed close to accomplishing its goals.95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil producers, want the embargo dropped. Regardless of criticism, the embargo must remain in place until its goals are met. Environmental fears can be effectively countered through bilateral response and preparation agreements with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately, with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan’s bill, the United States should exercise its political and economic power to pressure foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The United States can dissuade foreign investment without compromising the embargo. It appears an end to oppressive communist rule in Cuba is nearing. Now is the time for the United States to both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in meeting the goals of the economic embargo.

#### Transition’s impossible – laundry list of reasons.

Suchlicki 12 – Jaime Suchlicki is the founding Director of the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. He is also the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor of History. (“Getting Ready for Life after Castro”, May 11, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting\_ready\_for\_life\_after\_castro?page=0,0)

In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems, particularly concerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cuban nationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation. (Property Rights in the Post-Castro Cuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Post-Castro Cuba, Mátias F. Traviesco-Diáz.) The U.S. and other countries whose citizens' assets were seized without compensation are likely to support such demands. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate the complexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-Socialist Transformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, János Kornai). Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in major need of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry. Transportation is inadequate. Communication facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitates have deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases constitute a real menace to the population. In addition, environmental concerns such as the pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention. (Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.) Economic and legal problems are not, however, the only challenges facing Cuba in the future. A major problem that will confront post-Castro Cuba is the power of the military. (The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Brian Latell.) Cuba has a strong tradition of militarism, but in recent years, the military as an institution has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable future scenario, the military will continue to be a decisive player. Like Nicaragua, Cuba may develop a limited democratic system in which Cubans are allowed to elect civilian leaders, but with the military exercising real power and remaining the final arbiter of the political process. An immediate and significant reduction of the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible. A powerful and proud institution, the military would see any attempt to undermine its authority as an unacceptable intrusion into its affairs and as a threat to its existence. Its control of key economic sectors under the Castro regime will make it difficult to dislodge it from these activities and to limit its role strictly to external security. Cutting the armed forces will also be problematic. The civilian economy may not be able to absorb large numbers of discharged soldiers quickly, especially if the government cannot come up with viable programs for retraining them. The role of the military will also be shaped by social conflicts that may emerge in a post-Castro period. For the first half of the twentieth century, political violence was seen by many as a legitimate method to effect political change, and this could well have an effect on societal expectations in the future. Communist rule has engendered profound hatred and resentment. Political vendettas will be rampant; differences over how to restructure society will be profound; factionalism in society and in the political process will be common. It will be difficult to create mass political parties as numerous leaders and groups vie for power and develop competing ideas about the organization of society, economic policy, the nature of the political system, and unraveling the legacy of decades of communist dictatorship. A newly free and restless labor movement will complicate matters for any future government. During the Castro era, the labor movement remained docile under continuous government control; only one unified labor movement was allowed. In a democratic Cuba, labor will not be a passive instrument of any government. Rival labor organizations will develop programs to protect the rights of workers, and to demand better salaries and welfare for their members. A militant and vociferous labor movement will surely characterize post-Castro Cuba. Similarly, the apparent harmonious race relations of the Castro era may also experience severe strains. There has been a gradual Africanization of the Cuban population over the past several decades due to greater intermarriage and out-migration of a million mostly white Cubans. This has led to some fear and resentment among whites in the island. At the same time, blacks feel that they have been left out of the political process, as whites still dominate the higher echelons of the Castro power structure. The dollarization of the economy and the recent relaxation in the amount of remittances allowed to flow from the U.S. to Cuba has accentuated these differences. Since most Cuban-Americans are white, black Cubans receive fewer dollars from abroad. Significant racial tension could well result as these feelings and frustrations are aired in a politically open environment. (Race Relations in Cuba, Juan Antonio Alvarado - in Spanish). Perhaps the most difficult problem that a post-Castro leadership will have to face is acceptance of the rule of law. (Establishing the Rule of Law in Cuba, Laura Patallo Sánchez.) Every day, Cubans violate communist laws: they steal from state enterprises, participate in the black market, and engage in all types of illegal activities, including widespread graft and corruption. They do this to survive. Getting rid of those necessary vices will not be easy, especially since many of them pre-date the Castro era. Unwillingness to obey laws will be matched by the unwillingness to sacrifice and endure the difficult years that will follow the end of communism. A whole generation has grown up under the constant exhortations and pressures of the communist leadership to work hard and sacrifice for the sake of society. The youth are alienated from the political process, and are eager for a better life. Many want to immigrate to the United States. If the present rate of visa requests at the U.S. consular office in Havana is any indication, more than two million Cubans want to move permanently to the United States. Under the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, Cubans will be free to visit the United States. Many will come as tourists and stay as illegal immigrants; others will be claimed as legal immigrants by relatives who are already naturalized citizens. A significant out-migration is certain, posing an added major problem for U.S. policymakers at a time of increasing anti-immigration sentiment. While many Cubans want to leave Cuba, few Cuban-Americans will be inclined to abandon their lives in the United States and return to the island, especially if Cuba experiences a slow and painful transition period. Although those exiles who are allowed to return will be welcomed initially as business partners and investors, they are also likely to be resented, especially if they become involved in domestic politics. Readjusting the views and values of the exile population to those of the island will be a difficult and lengthy process. (The Role of the Cuban-American Community in the Cuban Transition, Sergio Diaz Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez). The future of Cuba is therefore clouded with problems and uncertainties. More than five decades of communism have left profound scars on Cuban society. As in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua, reconstruction may be slow, painful, and tortuous. Unlike these countries, Cuba has at least three unique advantages: a long history of close relations with the United States; excellent preconditions for tourism; and a large and wealthy exile population. These factors could converge to transform the country's living standards, but only if the future Cuban leadership creates the necessary conditions for an open, legally fair economy and an open, tolerant, and responsible political system. Unfortunately, life in Cuba is likely to remain difficult for a while longer.

#### No impact to democracy, it just happens to coincide with other measure of progress

Robert **Kaplan**, influential journalist and author, 19**98**, At the End of the American Century, p. 95

What does democracy do? It does not create middle classes. The record of history suggests that middle classes, which are in fact the pre­requisite for stability in modern and postmodern societies, tend to emerge more easily under various kinds of authoritarian regimes— whether in East Asia or elsewhere. The values brought to America were often middle-class values or petty bourgeois values that were generated in Europe under some form of authoritarian regime. **Democracy emerges best when it emerges last—after all the other prerequisites of order are in place**. In other words, it is difficult for ethnically or region­ally based parties to debate issues like budgets and gun control until they have settled more explosive topics. The situation in Central and Eastern Europe bodes well for democ­racy because of a sufficient prewar tradition of bourgeois values and other strong indicators of social stability—including literacy rates of 99 percent and low birthrates. Yet in places such as Pakistan and sub­Saharan Africa, democracy will not be enough to guarantee a stable gov­ernment: literacy is relatively low; parties, when they are formed, are often just masks for various regions or ethnic groups; and there is often no significant middle class and very little industrialization. One there­fore should not place too much hope in the mere fact that elections are being held in many parts of the Third World.

# 2nc

# cp

## at: perm do both

#### Links to the net-benefit — the plan sparks political fallout. Independent OFAC action avoids backlash — its decisions aren’t subjected to public scrutiny.

## at: perm do cp

#### Mutually exclusive — licensing authority and enforcement discretion are distinct mechanisms from sanctions repeal.

#### Ther perm’s severance – that’s a voting issue – makes it impossible to neg – they can spike out of all links and counterplans.

#### 1. “*lift*” means to remove by an official act.

Dictionary.com 13 — Dictionary.com Unabridged—based on the Random House Dictionary, 2013 (“Lift,” Available Online at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/lift?s=t, Accessed 07-19-2013)

verb (used with object)

1. to move or bring (something) upward from the ground or other support to a higher position; hoist.

2. to raise or direct upward: He lifted his arm in a gesture of farewell; to lift one's head.

3. to remove or rescind by an official act, as a ban, curfew, or tax: a court decision to lift the ban on strikes by teachers.

4. to stop or put an end to (a boycott, blockade, etc.): The citizenry will have to conserve food and water until the siege against the city is lifted.

5. to hold up or display on high.

#### The counterplan *exempts* but doesn’t *lift* — sanctions are still in place. This is a crucial distinction.

Amnesty 13 — Amnesty International, 2013 (“Somalia: UN arms embargo must stay in place,” March 4th, Available Online at http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/somalia-un-arms-embargo-must-stay-place-2013-03-04, Accessed 07-19-2013)

It is premature for the UN Security Council to consider lifting an arms embargo on Somalia later this week, Amnesty International said as it warned such a move could see armed groups such as al-Shabab getting its hands on even more weapons, while removing existing mechanisms of transparency and accountability.

Despite improvements in security in some areas of the country, including in Mogadishu, civilians still face a high risk of being killed or injured during outbreaks of fighting, in air strikes, mortar shelling or through the use of suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices.

“Without adequate safeguards, arms transfers may expose Somali civilians to even greater risk and worsen the humanitarian situation,” said Gemma Davies, Amnesty International’s Somalia researcher.

“For several years, the arms embargo on Somalia has been continuously violated with arms supplied to armed groups on all sides of the conflict. The flow of arms to Somalia has fuelled serious human rights abuses committed during the conflict.”

The widespread availability of arms in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia continues to lead to greater insecurity for civilians.

During a recent Security Council debate on Somalia, Fowsiyo Yusuf Haji Adan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Government urged both financial and military support to consolidate peace and to help hold areas recovered from the control of armed groups.

Adan also requested the lifting of the arms embargo, stating her government’s intention of putting in place “the necessary mechanisms to ensure that armaments do not fall into the wrong hands”.

Although this intention is welcome, Amnesty International believes that such mechanisms should be implemented first and that the Security Council should only proceed with the lifting of the arms embargo once they prove effective.

“Instead of lifting the embargo, it should be strengthened by incorporating strict rules granting exemptions to prevent arns from getting into the wrong hands and being used to commit human rights and humanitarian abuses.”

#### 2. The counterplan keeps sanctions on the books—it’s competitive.

Steven Lee Myers 13 Public Policy Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Affiliation: Diplomatic Correspondent, Washington Bureau, The New York Times, 6-30-2013 “U.S. Companies Investing in Myanmar Must Show Steps to Respect Human Rights” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/asia/us-companies-investing-in-myanmar-must-show-steps-to-respect-human-rights.html?pagewanted=all

Mr. Obama has welcomed the initial steps to loosen the military dictatorship and met Mr. Thein Sein in the White House in May, but the sanction laws remain on the books and can be reinstated if the reforms are reversed. The president used his authority to waive the sanctions and grant companies licenses to operate there. The State Department then spent months drafting the requirements after holding public hearings and inviting comments from companies and advocates.

## at: links to politics

#### OFAC action flies below the radar – it escapes public and congressional scrutiny.

Ortblad 8 — Vanessa, J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2009; B.A., University of Washington, 2002, “THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY,” Northwestern University, School of Law, <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jclc/backissues/v98/n4/9804_1439.Ortblad.pdf>, “CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING: THE PUNITIVE EFFECTS OF OFAC FREEZING SANCTIONS,” ADM

Unfortunately, U.S. courts have not considered any of the policy implications of OFAC’s actions because of its extreme deference to executive actions. Furthermore, Congress has amplified the Executive’s current powers through the USA PATRIOT Act and IEEPA, so no argument can be made that the President is acting “in a zone of twilight.”156 Congress currently seems most concerned with verifying that OFAC’s blocking actions are actually effective in countering terrorism financing by demanding better quantitative and qualitative measures for assessing OFAC’s efforts.157 But Congress should especially take note of the effect of OFAC’s actions on civil liberties. In the face of the expansion of executive power to combat the war on terror, it is particularly important for Congress to also focus its attention on safeguarding civil liberties, especially in light of past excesses during wartime. OFAC sanctions tend to fly below the radar when competing for attention with abuses at Abu Ghraib, debates over whether water-boarding is actually torture, and discussions regarding the possible closure of Guantanamo Bay. In light of these other pressing policy concerns, OFAC has largely escaped the media scrutiny and public policy discussion it merits.

#### OFAC is low profile — no perception of the counterplan.

Lee and Slear 6 — Judith Lee, Partner at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher— a global law firm with more than 1100 lawyers in 18 offices across the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, and James Slear, Counsel at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, 2006 (“Beware of OFAC,” *International Financial Law Review*, September, Available Online at http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/pubs/Lee-Slear-BewareOFAC0906.pdf, Accessed 07-19-2013, p. 58)

Tucked away in the labyrinthine US Department of the Treasury, in the old Treasury Annex across from the main Treasury Building and the White House on Lafayette Square, toil approximately 150 employees and officials of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). If you have not heard of OFAC you are not alone. This small agency deliberately keeps a low profile – direct phone numbers are not published and seldom given out even to frequent callers, and often the person at the end of the phone will provide only a first name.

#### Beyonce and Jay-Z prove our argument — the White House was unaffected.

Nelson and Yeargin 13 — Lindsey Nelson, Associate at Nixon Peabody LLC—a Global 100 law firm, holds a J.D. from George Washington University Law School, and Grayson Yeargin, Partner at Nixon Peabody LLC—a Global 100 law firm, holds a J.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center, 2013 (“‘Can I get a . . .’ OFAC license? Beyoncé and Jay-Z’s travel to Cuba highlights embargo’s restrictions,” *Export Controls Alert*—a publication of Nixon Peabody LLC, April 9th, Available Online at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/156171\_Export\_Controls\_Alert\_09APR2013.pdf, Accessed 07-19-2013)

Add potential sanctions violations to Jay-Z’s 99 problems. Following a recent trip to Cuba with his wife, Beyoncé, two Republican representatives from Florida are investigating the couple’s island travel. Although Paris may have been a more expected destination, the couple decided to leave their “empire state of mind” to celebrate their fifth wedding anniversary in Cuba. After photos of Shawn Carter and Beyoncé Knowles-Carter looking “crazy in love” while strolling the Havana streets hit the U.S. media, Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario Diaz-Balart requested that the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) “check on it” to determine whether the couple received approval for the trip.

In a letter to OFAC, which is responsible for administration of the U.S. sanctions on Cuba, the representatives said they are seeking “information regarding the type of license that Beyoncé and Jay-Z received, for what purpose, and who approved such travel.” The letter continued, stating, “Despite the clear prohibition against tourism in Cuba, numerous press reports described the couple’s trip as tourism, and the Castro regime touted it as such in its propaganda.” On Monday, the White House declined to comment on any specifics of the trip or licenses obtained. Though it is likely that little, if anything, will come of this once politicians and the media move on to the next hot topic, Bey and Jay’s travel does serve as a reminder for the 400,000 U.S. citizens who travel to Cuba each year that there are specific limitations that apply to these trips.

#### OFAC will enact the counterplan quietly—Iran proves.

Cutler and Ferrari 12 (Staff writers for the Almonitor, “US Loosens Sanctions On Medicine Sales to Iran,” October 29, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/iran-sanctions-medicine.html)

While most Americans and the US foreign policy elite were focused on last week’s final presidential debate, a small office within the US Treasury Department, without fanfare, rewrote regulations governing key aspects of the Iranian sanctions. New rules issued Oct. 22 by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) — named the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations — implement sanctions contained in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act and Executive Order 13599, which required American institutions to freeze the assets of the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran and all other Iranian financial institutions. However, in an unexpected move, the regulations now permit US companies to sell certain medicines and basic medical supplies to Iran without first seeking a license from OFAC. It is clear that the Treasury Department did not want much publicity surrounding the release of the new regulations. Such a major change to US sanctions would normally warrant at least a press release; even mid-level narcotics traffickers usually merit a cursory statement by OFAC Director Adam Szubin when they are designated by the office and their assets in the US are frozen. What is most curious about the radio silence that has greeted this abrupt change is that the humanitarian costs of sanctions, particularly reported medicine shortages in Iranian hospitals, have long been an area of concern for international organizations and media.

## 2nc overvivew

#### The Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls is responsible for enforcing the embargo – by using its licensing authority and enforcement discretion, OFAC can exempt specific transactions from U.S. sanctions without *legislative* or *regulatory* action. OFAC discretion is sufficient to resolve the harms *without touching the embargo* — that’s Golumbic and Ruff.

## Agriculture/Medicine Solvency

#### OFAC can issue licenses for *agricultural commodities* and *medical items*

GT 9 — GreenbergTaurig LLP, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, September, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&ved=0CJABEBYwDg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gtlaw.com%2Fportalresource%2Flookup%2Fwosid%2Fcontentpilot-core-401-13516%2FpdfCopy.name%3D%2FGTAlert_New%2520Gen%2520Lic%2520for%2520AgMed%2520Cuba%2520Travel_Sep2009.pdf%3Fview%3Dattachment&ei=-kDpUYjRMsKVygHy_YHwBA&usg=AFQjCNHhSnsOy348JVJyRrDsYGRomo5skA&sig2=rfnGEiEpIta__DgqzQufbw>, “New General License for AgMed Travel to Cuba,” ADM

On September 3, 2009, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the “Cuba Regulations”), 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (2009), providing a General License for travel to Cuba for marketing and sales of eligible agricultural commodities and medical items. The revisions will be published in the September 8, 2009, Federal Register, but are effective as of September 3, 2009. The revisions implement provisions of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (“Omnibus Act”) and President Obama’s April 13, 2009, initiative lessening restrictions imposed against Cuba (see previous GT Alerts, Cuba: Congress Begins To Push Open The Door; White House Continues Momentum on Relaxing Cuban Restrictions). The new General License, to be published at Section 515.533(e) of the Cuba Regulations, permits U.S. individuals, employees of U.S. companies and employees of subsidiaries of U.S. companies to travel to Cuba without prior authorization from OFAC for the marketing and sale of eligible U.S. agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices to Cuba, under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), (also known as the “AgMed Program”).

#### BIS and OFAC can issue licenses for agricultural and medical sales – status quo regulations prohibit banks from financing trade

Jurenas 4 — Remy, Congressional Research Service, 9/17, <http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/briefingbooks/Agriculture/Economic%20Sanctions%20and%20Agricultural%20Exports.htm>, “Economic Sanctions and Agricultural Exports,” ADM

The interim rules to implement the 2000 Act's provisions took effect on July 26, 2001. The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) regulations allow for the commercial sale of agricultural products to Cuba without an export license if other Federal agencies do not object within 11 days. The Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) rules require an exporter to obtain a one-year export license for sales of agricultural and medical sales to Iran and Sudan and institute various checks in the process to ensure that only sales to permitted buyers are approved. If a reviewing agency objects within 11 days, the license application is denied; if a "concern" is raised, OFAC has 30 more days to review the license request. Both agencies use the same detailed definition for agricultural and medical products. OFAC's regulations continue policy that prohibits U.S. banks from financing the sale of permitted agricultural product sales to Cuba, Iran and Sudan. Any approved sale must be paid for in cash or financed through eligible third country banks. With the normalization of U.S. political and economic relations with Libya announced in late April 2004, agricultural sales to that country are no longer subject to TSRA provisions.

## xt – econ growing

#### Uniqueness – all sectors of Cuba’s economy are growing now – that’s Havana Times – prefer this, it’s future predictive estimating growth throughout 2013 around 3 percent and takes into account recent external and internal stresses.

# soft power

### XT #2: Resilient

#### Soft power resilient

**Nye 6** – IR Professor, Harvard (Joseph, 6/25, Why Do They Hate Us?, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062200972_pf.html>)

\*produce “meta” softpower – win grudging admiration even when policies are unpopular
\*America is self critical- even when we have bad actions, still get residual attraction

Fortunately, even when the U.S. government's foreign policies are unattractive to others, our culture and our open political processes can produce a "meta" form of soft power -- winning grudging admiration for our freedoms at the same time that our policies are unpopular. After all, anti-American protests were rampant around the world during the Vietnam War, but the protesters did not sing "The Internationale"; they sang the American civil rights anthem "We Shall Overcome." Today, the fact that America remains democratic and self-critical, that its free press exposes governmental flaws and that the legislative and judicial branches can act against the executive, means that anti-American critics of U.S. foreign policies can still feel a residual attraction to our society. As Sweig puts it, "The best antidote to Anti-America may well come not from how we fight (or prevent) the next war but from the degree to which we keep intact the social contract and international appeal of American society." She also urges Washington to adopt a changed foreign policy style that develops empathy for foreign cultures, practices better manners and pays more attention to rules and fairness. Anti-Americanism will not go away, but it need not dominate the 21st century if Americans follow the advice of this well-reasoned book.

#### Legitimacy is resilient and will recover

**Kagan, 06** - (Robert, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Washington Post, 1/15, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr)

\*stands oli

This does not mean the United States has not suffered a relative decline in that intangible but important commodity: legitimacy. A combination of shifting geopolitical realities, difficult circumstances and some inept policy has certainly damaged America's standing in the world. Yet, despite everything, the American position in the world has not deteriorated as much as people think. America still "stands alone as the world's indispensable nation," as Clinton so humbly put it in 1997. It can resume an effective leadership role in the world in fairly short order, even during the present administration and certainly after the 2008 election, regardless of which party wins. That is a good thing, because given the growing dangers in the world, the intelligent and effective exercise of America's benevolent global hegemony is as important as ever.

#### New administration’s diplomacy ensure resilience

**Kessler, 09** (Glenn, The Washington Post, “The Global Listening Tour,” 2/20, lexis)

To a large extent, this is Clinton's new campaign -- repairing the U.S. image abroad. Her boss, President Obama, has helped ease the way simply by not being former president George W. Bush. But it is unclear whether all this public outreach will yield much beyond a few extra lines in the foreign news media, especially when America's policies -- and how they are viewed around the world -- are largely responsible for its image. Everywhere she has gone in Asia, Clinton has tried to highlight some of the tangible ways that the Obama administration hopes to be different from its predecessor: a commitment to address climate change, the appointment of a Middle East peace envoy, a refocusing on Afghanistan and an effort to reach out to longtime U.S. antagonists such as Iran, North Korea and Burma. The administration is so new that many of these shifts are still wisps of ideas, not fully formed policies. In some areas, such as relegating human rights in China to a side issue, it is uncertain whether Obama's team will do things much differently than Bush's. But as every politician knows, the tone can make all the difference. Clinton has emphasized that she is looking for partnership -- or better yet, a "comprehensive partnership" -- on these issues. Her pitch is that the problems of the world -- the financial crisis, climate change and extremism -- are so overwhelming that no country can handle them alone, certainly not the United States. Remember, she's saying, how the Bush administration went to war in Iraq virtually by itself (with Clinton's vote of approval)? That's in the past. We need help. And we want to listen. "My trip here today is to hear your views, because I believe strongly that we learn from listening to one another," Clinton told students at Tokyo University on Tuesday. "And that is, for me, part of what this first trip of mine as secretary of state is about." Clinton has made a big deal of her choice to go to the Pacific rim of Asia for her first trip, rather the standard European or Middle Eastern tour. Yet in many ways that has made her job easier: The U.S. image is pretty good here. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted a survey last year in the four countries Clinton is visiting this week -- China, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia -- and found that the United States outperformed China in political, diplomatic, economic and human capital "soft power," a favorite Clinton buzz phrase. Indeed, the survey concluded that the view of the United States in these countries, even majority Muslim Indonesia, is "largely positive."

### XT #2: Democracy Doesn’t Solve

#### Democracy doesn't solve anything – Pakistan proves

**Peters, 5 –** Former Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army and Member, Board of Contributors, USA Today (Ralph, “When democracy fails,” USA Today, 1/10, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2005-01-10-democracy-pakistan\_x.htm?csp=34)//SY

The problem is that it doesn't always work. As the vital Iraqi elections approach, there is more reason for sober optimism than for pre-emptive declarations of failure. More than 80% of the country's population is anxious to vote, with only foreign terrorists and an embittered minority of Sunni Arabs actively hostile to the balloting. But we need to think beyond the polls to understand how new democracies fail. Pakistan has been the greatest disappointment among the major states that tried democracy. It should have been a contender, having begun its nationhood with a legacy of British legal traditions, an educated political class and a vigorous press. Instead, Pakistan became a swamp of corruption, demagogy and hatred. Those who believe in democracy need to recognize an ugly truth: Military government remains Pakistan's final hope — and even that hope is a slight one. This is painful for us to accept. Well-intentioned Americans with no personal experience of the outrageous criminality that came to characterize every one of Pakistan's major political parties rebel against the notion that any military government can ever be good. Certainly, military regimes are despicable. Gen. Pervez Musharraf's government, albeit imperfect, is the sole exception in the world today.

### XT #1: No Democracy

#### Global democracy impossible because of wealth distribution

**Dixon 10** [Dr. Patrick Dixon, PhD Foreign Policy, “The Truth About the War With Iraq”, http://www.globalchange.com/iraqwar.htm]

And so we find an interesting fact: those who live in democratic nations, who uphold democracy as the only honourable form of government, are not really true democrats after all. They have little or no interest in global democracy, in a nation of nations, in seeking the common good of the whole of humanity.

And it is this single fact, more than any other, this inequality of wealth and privilege in our shrinking global village, that will make it more likely that our future is dominate by terror groups, freedom fighters, justice-seekers, hell-raisers, protestors and violent agitators.

#### Hypocrisy and failure of American democracy doom solvency.

Michael **Lind**, Financial Times, 1/25/**05**, lexis

The US is being sidelined even in the area that Mr Bush identified in last week's address as America's mission: the promotion of democracy and human rights. The EU has devoted far more resources to consolidating democracy in post-communist Europe than has the US. By contrast, under Mr Bush the US hypocritically uses the promotion of democracy as the rationale for campaigns against states it opposes for strategic reasons. Washington denounces tyranny in Iran but tolerates it in Pakistan. In Iraq, the goal of democratisation was invoked only after the invasion, which was justified earlier by claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and was collaborating with al-Qaeda.Nor is American democracy a shining example to mankind. The present one-party rule in the US has been produced in part by the artificial redrawing of political districts to favour Republicans. The role of money in American politics continues to grow. America's judges - many of whom will be appointed by Mr Bush - increasingly behave as partisan political activists in black robes. America's antiquated winner-take-all electoral system has been abandoned by many other democracies for more inclusive versions of proportional representation.

#### *ONLY* prolif from Iran *IF* Saudi perceives weakened US commitment

McDowall ‘13

Angus McDowall is a British freelance reporter who lived in Tehran between 2003-07. He is internally quoting a report from the Center for a New American Security, whose lead author, CNAS senior fellow Colin Kahl, served as deputy assistant Defense secretary for the Middle East from 2009 to 2011. *Colin Kahl is also an associate professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a former finalist at the National Debate Tournament. Maybe we’ll get him to come and talk to the camp*. “Iran nuke unlikely to start Mideast arms race: report” – Source: Reuters

February 20, 2013 – http://www.cnas.org/node/10078

Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil exporter, is engaged in a fierce rivalry with Shi'ite power Iran and is seen in Western countries as the most likely Middle Eastern state to seek an atomic weapon if Iran did the same.¶ Analysts have also said an Iranian nuclear weapons capability might persuade Egypt and Turkey to seek a bomb too.¶ Israel, which has never declared its atomic weapons capability, is thought to be the Middle East's only nuclear-armed power now although Iran's eastern neighbor Pakistan has atomic weapons.¶ In December 2011, former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal said that if Tehran did gain nuclear weapons capability, Saudi Arabia should consider matching it.¶ Riyadh has also announced plans to build 17 gigawatts of atomic energy by 2032 as it moves to reduce domestic oil consumption, freeing up more crude for export.¶ However, a report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) says that although there is some risk that Saudi Arabia would seek an atomic bomb, it would more likely rely on its ally, the United States, to protect it. "The conventional wisdom is probably wrong," the report said.

# Saudi

# 2NC Perception

#### New oil markets makes Saudis *perceive* decline in US-Saudi ties

House ‘12

(not oft-disgruntled House, M.D., but Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Karen Elliott House. Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles – November 30, 2012 – lexis)

QUESTION: Warren Hoge[28], International Peace Institute.¶ Karen, there's a lot of talk in American politics about the desire to become energy independent, no longer dependent upon countries like Saudi Arabia, and there's a real possibility that could happen. The numbers are there, fracking and offshore oil, that sort of thing. Suppose that does happen. How would that affect our relationship with Saudi Arabia, and is this something the Saudis themselves worry about?¶ KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: I don't think they like it when we talk about energy independence. They do take that as a personal insult. I think it would loosen somewhat our sense of dependence. But the global economy is still going to be not we so much; I mean we're not a major importer of Saudi oil now but the global economy is a major importer of Saudi oil and will continue to be.¶ There are a lot of people, like John Deutch[29], who is a very smart man and certainly knows energy, who believes that it doesn't matter who runs Saudi Arabia, they will export oil. And they obviously will export some. But if you assume that if anything happened to take the royal family out of the picture, the only other organized structure because nothing is allowed to organize, no book clubs, no photography clubs, no soccer leagues other than the one the government runs is the religious organization. There are 70,000 mosques all over the country. That's basically one for every 150 men. So that's the most organized group.

# AT: US oil triggers Link

#### Cuba creates competition- Has heavy crude

Alhaiji & Maris ‘4

[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The Insthere is a US boom, titute for Cuban & Cuban American studies states on its web site¶ that oil was discovered in Cuba in 1914. In a different location, it indicates¶ that oil was first discovered in 1881, about 20 years after its commercial discovery¶ in the United States.4 However, it was not developed commercially¶ until the early 1930s. The USGS estimates that Cuban waters may contain¶ about 4 billion barrels of oil. Several political and economic factors have limited¶ the development of Cuban oil. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the¶ loss of Soviet oil shipments forced Cuba to increase its exploration activities¶ and develop its oil resources. Several reports estimate proven oil reserves to¶ be between 510 million barrels5 (mb) and 750 mb in 2004.6 Even conservative estimates reflect a substantial increase in Cuba’s oil reserves in recent years, which stood at 284mb in 2001. All current crude comes from onshore fields. Almost all Cuban crude is heavy with high sulfur content. Cuba needs to find light crude oil reseres in order to achieve its goal of self sufficiency.

1. Their no link evidence doesn’t apply- their evidence speaks of a US boom. Saudi president has said he’s not worried

1. Even if there is a US boom, not enough oil to scare Saudi

#### US shale has *overstated supply.*

Husain ‘13

[internally quoting Dr Bassam Fattouh, the Director of the Oil and Middle East Programme at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Research Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University and professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies was in Dhahran. Syed Rashid Husain, Energy Columnist at Saudi Gazette, CEO at Husain's Associates, Toronto, CANADA, Vice President at Al-Azzaz Est; Education: Institute of Business Administration, 6/2/13, “Breaking down US energy independence hype,” Dawn, http://beta.dawn.com/news/1015486/breaking-down-us-energy-independence-hype]

Last week, Dr Bassam Fattouh, the Director of the Oil and Middle East Programme at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Research Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University and professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies was in Dhahran, talking about the ongoing revolution in the energy world, the challenges it presents and, ‘the disconnect’ between the hype that Washington is soon to be free of dependence on the oil rich Middle East and the reality.¶ Can Washington really be on a solo flight? Would the geopolitics of the oil rich Middle East about to change on account of the shale revolution? Isn’t all this for domestic political consumption?¶ Fattouh kept countering and discarding the arguments of the hype mongers — one after the other. He underlined in very clear terms, that no shale revolution would have taken place without the sustained high crude market prices. The prices, he said, has been one of the major ‘enablers’ of this revolution.¶ While many in the industry continue to argue that crude markets are about to turn soft — rather considerably — due to the weakening market fundamentals, yet Fattouh says the possibility of a price meltdown is not too high.¶ Even today producers are hedging their output in mid 90s, indicating that the prices may continue to be around the current price level. And then the ongoing shale revolution owes its origin to cheap capitals — made available by the governments all around.¶ He argued that looking at the incremental supplies from the US; one might get an impression of abundance. But that is not the case — he countered.¶ “Despite the sloppy global demand, why are the oil prices not going down?” he questioned. An interesting counter argument indeed.¶ The US developments alone could not transform the global markets, he emphasised. Other factors, such as continued dwindling demand in the US and the rest of the world, non-Opec production scenario, squeeze on Opec and lack of cohesion within the producers’ group, could lead to that. And with situation about the above issues not very clear, the current ongoing hype is only adding to uncertainty in the markets.¶ Fattouh also raised questions about the sustainability of the US output, underlining that 90 per cent of the output from Bakken and Eagle Ford are coming from 5/6 counties while the decline rates in the wells are considerable. Consequently, to ensure steady growth, the numbers of wells being drilled are on rise.¶ Turning to the evolving market, he pointed out that US domestic production has led to lack of demand of light and medium crude. However, demand for the heavy crude, produced by the Saudi Arabia is there.¶ And in the meantime, due to price discount the Canadian producers need to provide to their customers, the growth in Canadian output is slowing down, resulting in continued US imports from the Middle East, the director at the Oxford Institute for Energy Research underlined.c. US fracking *quality* is too low.

Owen ‘13

[Jane Owen, resident and founder of Citizens League for Environmental Action Now (CLEAN), “Long-Term Costs Of Fracking Are Staggering,” Climate Progress, 03/19/2013, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/03/19/1742171/long-term-costs-of-fracking-are-staggering/?mobile=nc]

All the hype by the fossil fuel industry about energy independence from fracking (hydraulic fracturing) in tight gas reservoirs like the Barnett Shale has left out the costs in energy, water and other essential natural resources.¶ Furthermore, a recent report from the Post Carbon Institute finds that projections for an energy boom from non-conventional fossil fuel sources is not all it’s cracked up to be.¶ The report cites a study by David Hughes, Canadian geologist, who says the low quality of hydrocarbons from bitumen – shale oil and shale gas – do not provide the same energy returns as conventional hydrocarbons due to the energy needed to extract or upgrade them. Hughes also notes that the “new age of energy abundance” forecast by the industry will soon run dry because shale gas and shale oil wells deplete quickly. In fact, the “best fields have already been tapped.”¶ “Unconventional fossil fuels all share a host of cruel and limiting traits,” says Hughes. “They offer dramatically fewer energy returns; they consume extreme and endless flows of capital; they provide difficult or volatile rates of supply over time and have large environmental impacts in their extraction.”

# \*\*\*IMPACTS\*\*\*

#### Disad outweighs and turns the case

#### That will result in Extinction

Toon ‘7

(Owen B, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### Most probable impact.

Russell ‘9

James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Miscalc in the Mid-East is especially likely.

Kapila ‘9

(Subhash, Royal British Army Staff College, MA Defense Science – Madras U., PhD Strategic Studies – Allahabad U., Consultant in Strategic Affairs – South Asia Analysis Group, South Asia Analysis Group Paper # 3114, “MIDDLE EAST 2009: POLITICAL DYNAMICS STIRRED BY UNITED STATES”, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers32%5Cpaper3114.html)

More than any other strategic regions of the globe, the Middle East in the 21st Century presents the dubious prospect of being the most conflict-prone region globally. Global armed conflicts or strategic jostling can arise at any moment in this region not only because of intra-regional rivalries but more for reasons connected to energy security, control of strategic choke points and nuclear and WMD proliferation. Besides these major issues the propensity of major conservative Islamic countries not to be pro-active in controlling or liquidating Islamic Jihadi impulses to proliferate to threaten US and the West, are another complicating feature.

### A-to “Saudis won’t ever prolif”

#### ( ) Aff ev doesn’t assume *perceived* breakdown of US-Saudi ties—that causes prolif.

Lippman ‘11

(Sr. Adjunct Scholar-Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia’s-nuclear-policy-lippman/)

So let us suppose that Saudi Arabia’s currently testy relationship with the United States deteriorated to the point where the Saudis no longer *felt* they could rely on Washington’s protection. If the Saudis could no longer assume that the armed forces of the United States are their ultimate weapon against external threats, might they not wish to acquire a different ultimate weapon? With that in mind, could not a reasonable case be made in the Saudis’ minds for the development of an alternative security relationship, and perhaps a nuclear agreement, with another major power should relations with the United States deteriorate? A possible candidate for such a role would of course be China, a nuclear power that has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia’s ally Pakistan and a growing need for imported oil. Sufficiently remote from the Gulf not to pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, and no longer part of any international communist movement, China could theoretically be an attractive partner. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia is actually seeking such a relationship with any country other the United States, or that China would undertake such a mission, but to be unaware of any such outreach is not to exclude it from the realm of possibility. THE STRATEGY GAP The Saudi Arabian armed forces have never developed a coherent national security doctrine that could provide a serious basis for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. But to summarize the reasons why Saudi Arabia might pursue such a course: it is a rich but weak country with armed forces of suspect competence; outmanned by combat-hardened, truculent and potentially nuclear-armed neighbors; and no longer confident that it can count on its American protector. Even before the Iraq War, Richard L. Russell of the National Defense University argued in a 2001 essay arguing the case for Saudi acquisition of nuclear capability that “It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the cornerstone of [its] national-security posture out of an assumption that the United States would come to the kingdom’s defense under any and all circumstances.” It might be even more imprudent now. “From Riyadh’s perspective,” continued Russell, “the acquisition of nuclear weapons and secure delivery systems would appear logical and even necessary.” Those “secure delivery systems,” Russell argued, would not be aircraft, which are vulnerable to ground defenses, but “ballistic-missile delivery systems that would stand a near-invulnerable chance of penetrating enemy airspace” — namely, the CSS-2s. Military experts say it is theoretically possible that the missiles could be made operational, modernized, and retrofitted with nuclear warheads acquired from China, Pakistan or perhaps, within a few years, North Korea. Any attempt to do so, however, would present immense technical and political difficulties — so much so that Saudi Arabia might emerge less secure, rather than more.

#### ( ) Lack of oil relations causes rapid prolif

Black ‘9

(Major Chris, master’s program at the Joint Forces Staff College, “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the Middle East to China.,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA530125&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

All of these factors have slowly led to Saudi Arabia wanting to assume a more independent role in its own security.181 In 2007, Saudi Arabia brokered a deal between Fatah and Hamas and hosted an Arab League Summit which they had declined to attend the two previous years. Also in 2007, King Abdullah also hosted Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and canceled a state dinner with President Bush.182 Recently Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faial warned Iran on two separate occasions to stop meddling in inter-Arab affairs and has urged Arabs to unify clearly concerned with Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.183 Additionally, this has brought about a renewed emphasis by the Saudis to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads which is a major concern by the US.184 Saudi Arabia is now flexing their muscle in the Middle East and has taken an increasing role in managing their own affairs. This scenario could lead to either cooperation or competition between the US and China in the region. Further, in this scenario, Saudi Arabia will increasingly align with the countries who are buying their oil. A geopolitical shift will begin with the rise of China in the Persian Gulf region secondary to a diminishing American presence, which will intensify Saudi Arabian concerns for their security.