# 1

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must advocate the resolution through an instrumental defense of action by the United States federal government.

#### They aren’t topical –

#### a. resolved requires a policy

**Louisiana House 05 –** 3-8-2005, http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### b. “United States federal government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental action

**Ericson 03 –** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb **should**—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The **entire debate** is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### c. “economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties

**Çelik 11** – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies **differ from other tools** in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of **deliberate expanding economic ties** with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.

**d) substantially means in substance, not imaginary**

**Merriam-Webster, 8** (“substantial”, 2008, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=substantially)

Main Entry: sub·stan·tial

1 a: consisting of or relating to substance b: not imaginary or illusory : real, true c: important, essential

#### A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life – even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable – this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact – T debates solve your offense

**Steinberg and Freeley 08 –** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a **means of settling differences**, so there **must be a** difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest** before there can be a debate. **If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, there is **no need for debate**: **the matter can be settled by unanimous consent**. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, **there is no debate**. In addition, debate **cannot produce effective decisions** without **clear identification of a question or questions to be answered**. For example, **general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration**. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is **not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question** and identification of a line **demarcating sides in the controversy**. To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly**. **Vague understanding** results in **unfocused deliberation** and **poor decisions**, frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007**.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions**, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.** **A gripe session would follow**. But if a **precise question** is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more **profitable area of discussion** is opened up **simply by placing a focus on the search** for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a **productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making** by directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined**. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a **general subject**, we have not yet stated a problem. **It is still too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a **debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, or **that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy**; in fact, **these sorts of debates may be very engaging**. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Turns the AFF – a predictable topic forces pre-round internal-reflective deliberation which is the only way to convince people of the legitimacy of the 1ac

**Goodin and Niemeyer 03 –** (Robert and Simon, Australian National University, “When Does Deliberation Begin, Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy” Political Studies, Volume 50, p 627-649, WileyInterscience)

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing **attention on a topic**, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to **internal-reflective deliberation**, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earl iest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally **organized group discussions** might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

# 2

**Text:** ***We* advocate** **imagining there being no border between the US and Mexico**

**Anonymity in social movements is crucial to prevent the movement from becoming identified with individuals rather than the overall cause and therefore preventing marginalization of social movements.**

**Public Sphere Project, ’08** – (an initiative of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) to help promote more effectiveand equitable public spheres all over the world, “Liberating Voices! A Pattern Language for Communication Revolution,” http://www.publicsphereproject.org/patterns/pattern.pl/public?pattern\_id=379)

By refusing to put a face on those in a group or movement, the cause becomes the focus and not the individuals promoting it. (By insisting "we are you" the masks worn by Zapatistas are promoted to be mirrors that reflect the face of onlookers, (not the wearers) the emphasis is allowed to remain on the(ir) issue.) Groups who want to create social change without the entanglements of personalities can use this generic pattern. Appealing to humanity on a global scale requires common identifiers. Resistance by marginalized and repressed groups against governing forces is a universally recognized struggle. (By maintaining anonymity the Zapatistas are able to evade being minimalized as cultural or indigenous resistors.) Anonymity permits transcendent identification with their core message, which is to defend safe places of democracy for those who desire them. For example, the Indigenous people of Chiapas Mexico have been forced from their anonymous lifestyle into the global sphere to protect their culture and create a safe democratic space in order to continue their lifestyle in freedom. In the process, they have assumed an anonymous identity that represents all marginalized and discriminated citizens of the world. The Zapatistas of Chiapas, Mexico have awakened conscientious members of society who join them in solidarity. The phrase “we are you” refers to the anonymous mask worn by Zapatistas which is purported to be a mirror reflecting the identity of all those who fight for freedom from tyranny. Therefore: Anonymity is a tool that affords groups to bring focus to their agenda rather than the participants of the movement. Anonymity is a successful strategy to prevent a movement from being marginalized into a cultural issue rather than one resisting control and insisting on peace, democracy and freedom for the oppressed (etc). This form of communicating information is more effective at promoting conviviality in the human sphere as it promotes identification with any timeless struggle we face. The use of anonymity as a perennial solution of a recurring problem (control) within a social change context brings life to the Zapatista movement and translates what began as a grass roots resistance for survival into the fight for peace and democracy for the marginalized populations of the world.

**Like the masks of the Zapatistas, our anonymity represents the struggle against co-option. We wear masks and do not use our names in order to avoid becoming reduced to a photo on the t-shirt of a rich white teenager in America who calls for revolution while knowing nothing of hardship.**

**Elmer, ’02** – (Greg, Ph.D. in Communications, Bell Globe media Research Chair, Associate Professor of Radio TV Arts, and Director of the Infoscape Research Lab at Ryerson University, 2002. “Critical Perspectives on the Internet,” pp. 116-17)

The masked commander Marcos’s mestizo ethnicity affirms this fluidity of Zapatista identity. While “the Sup,” as he is affectionately called, gained immediate notoriety as well as the hero status in the eyes of many Mexicans, including peasants and middle-class people throughout the country, by projecting the image of a Robin Hood defending the rights of the downtrodden against an unjust and repressive government. As a disguise, the black ski mask not only shields Marcos and other Zapatistas from being identified by the government and the military, but **it also masks differences among Zapatistas and symbolizes the antiauthoritarian structure of the movement**. In his writings, he also uses the mask as a metaphor for how the neoliberal establishment ignores and disguises the human suffering it has created. He thus submits a call to “break silences and pull off masks.” He primarily considers the signature black ski masks as symbolic challenge against authoritative rule: “The main reason is that we have to be careful that nobody tries to be the main leader. The masks are meant to prevent this from happening. **It is about being anonymous, not because we fear for ourselves, but rather to avoid being corrupted.** Nobody can then appear all the time and demand attention. Our leadership is a collective leadership and we must respect that. Even though you are listening to me now, elsewhere there are others who are masked and who are also talking. So, the masked person here today is called “Marcos” and tomorrow might be “Pedro in Las Margaritas, or “Josue” in Ocosingo, or “Alfredo” in Altamarino, or whatever he is called. So the one who speaks is a more collective heart, not a single leader, or caudillo. That is what I want you to understand, not acaudillo in the old style and image. The only image that you will have is that those who have made this rebellion wear ski masks. And the time will come when the people will realize that it is enough to have dignity and put on a mask and say that they too can do this.” (Harvey, 1998, 7) The black ski masks are rich in meaning. While providing safety through anonymity and communicating strength through their threatening appearance, they also symbolize the collaborative and pluralistic structure of the movement. **Note that one does not hide by wearing the mask, rather by taking it off.** Furthermore the mask symbolizes transformation. Wearing the ski mask legitimizes Marcos as a movement spokesperson for it symbolizes his own transformation from middle-class intellectual to crusader for indigenous rights. He strips away his old identity so that he may be considered equal with others who wear ski masks. By wearing the mask, movement supporters take on the collective identity, which is in turn, enacted through the movement’s centralized organizational structure.

**Just like our embrace of anonymity, the masks of the Zapatistas prevent the development of a cult of personality around any particular leader in their movement and preserve their cause from marginalization and commodification by the system against which they fight.**

**Pitawanakwat, ’2k**– (Brock,University of Victoria, “The Mirror of Dignity: Zapatista Communications &Indigenous Resistance” pp. 10-11)

Perhaps the most visible and well-known Zapatista symbol is the ski mask, balaclava, or pasamontañas in Spanish. During the first day of the uprising, Subcommandante Marcos explained to surprised witnesses of the rebellion in San Cristóbal that until indigenous peoples put on their masks, no one saw them. Various interpretations exist for their use by the rebels. For example, they: 1) maintain equality amongst the leadership and dispute the idea that it was led by any single rebel 2) show solidarity between the indigenous and the mestizo within the EZLN; 3) constitute a unifying form of self-identification analogous to the beards of the Cuban rebels during that country’s 1959 revolution; 4) function as a symbol of Mexico’s refusal to recognize its indigenous peoples;5) shield the identities of the rebels in order to prevent reprisals against their communities and families; and 6) perhaps more practically, protect against the cold weather.Marcos, has stated that he will remove his own mask only when “Mexican society takes off its own mask, the one it uses to cover up the real Mexico.”In his first appearance in the media spotlight, Marcos explained to reporters that the rebels were masked in order to prevent any particular commandante from becoming a figurehead and therefore a target for government cooptation or corruption.But in preventing the figurehead syndrome, the mask also helps to maintain a collective and diffused leadership that prevents “protagonism” and supports the movement’s “leading by obeying” principle.The mask has been symbolically tied to Mexico’s attempt to hide the third world conditions in which its indigenous peoples live while its government attempts to secure first world status with trade deals such as NAFTA.

# Case

The affirmative’s representations ultimately homogenize all borders into one metaphorical border, taking the uniqueness and difference present at every border and reducing it to something analogous to themselves. THEIR particular border becomes ALL borders. This ideological imperialism not only reduces the diversity of the other to what is analogous to the self, it also produces a utopian politics that ignores the complex ways resistance itself is produced in power relations, and reproduces a universalist politics that replicates colonialist practices

Vila, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio, 2005 [Pablo, “Conclusion: The Limits of American Border Theory,” *Ethnography at the Border*, Ed. Pablo Vila, p.307-315]

After dominating the field for some time, this corpus of work has come under criticism in recent years. This criticism does not deny the pathbreaking character of those books but seeks to address several shortcomings that have now become apparent. As Heyman points out, "A single-image representing grand theoretical assertions is too general for the political and economic environment of the border. I propose that we specify our analytical tools for the border: that is, that we respect the concretely located nature of the Mexico–U.S. border" (1994, 43). Thus several authors have lately advanced different criticisms of mainstream border theory.

First, some Mexican scholars (Tabuenca, Barrera) have complained that the U.S.–Mexico border most of this work portrays with such theoretical sophistication has little resemblance to the border they experience from the other side of the (literal) fence. Second, other writers have noted the exclusionary character of border studies and theory exemplified in these major works and claim that current mainstream border theory essentializes the cultures that must be crossed. Third, as I claim hereafter, in the vast majority of recent border scholarship, there is a general failure to pursue the theoretical possibility that fragmentation of experience can lead to the reinforcement of borders instead of an invitation to cross them. Thus crossing borders, and not reinforcing borders, is the preferred metaphor in current border studies and theory.

Fourth, a corollary of the previous trend is the tendency to construct the border crosser or the hybrid (in some cases the Latin American international immigrant in general, but in others the Chicano in particular—at least in the books I am criticizing here) into **a new "privileged subject of history"** Fifth, border studies have recently moved from the study of issues related to the U.S.–Mexico border in particular to broader themes, in which the metaphor of borders is used to represent any situation where limits are involved. Border studies thus takes as its own object of inquiry any physical or psychic space about which it is possible to address problems of boundaries: borders among different countries, borders among disciplines, and the like. Borderlands and border crossings seem to have become ubiquitous terms to represent the experience of (some) people in a postmodern world described as fragmented and continually producing new borders that must again and again be crossed. And if current border studies and theory propose that borders are everywhere, the border-crossing experience is in some instances assumed to be similar: that is, it seems that for the "border crosser" or the "hybrid," the experience of moving among different disciplines, different ethnicities, and different countries and cultures is not dissimilar in character (Grossberg 1996). **This approach not only homogenizes distinctive experiences but also homogenizes borders.**

Sixth, there is a tendency in current border studies and theory to confuse the sharing of a culture with the sharing of an identity, so that use of the "third country" metaphor promotes the idea that Fronterizo Mexicans and Mexican Americans construct their social and cultural identities in similar ways. My criticism here is that it is quite possible to share aspects of the same culture while developing quite different narrative identities, to the point, in some instances, where the "other kind of Mexican" is constructed as the abject "other."

Finally, in some extreme circumstances and in particular locales, these theoretical processes have developed a version of identity politics on the U.S.–Mexico border that rely on the metaphor of "brotherhood"— meaning the purportedly intrinsic connections between Mexican nationals, Mexican immigrants, and Chicanos. Yet because that brotherhood does not exist in particular border situations (as exemplified, for instance, in Mexican American support for Operation Blockade in the region dealt with in this collection), this form of identity politics is doomed to failure.

It seems to me that the appearance of those admittedly brilliant books shifted the field so completely that the important history of border studies before those books' existence has almost totally been erased, and the output of scholars who were working (and still are) in a more empirically oriented vein has been marginalized and sometimes excluded from serious consideration. Along these lines, **neither Anzaldúa, Rosaldo, Hicks** makes any mention of the important empirical research done in earlier border studies about the topics (race, ethnicity, identity, etc.) they cover in their books. The erasure of the past is so complete that some people falsely believe border studies and border theories were born with the appearance of Anzaldúa's, Rosaldo's, and Hicks's works.2

One of the goals of this collection of essays has been to address some of the problems that border studies leave unanswered in their current theoretical incarnation. Our goal in that regard was to route mainstream border discourses (highly informed by poststructuralism and notions of the multiply positioned subject) onto a specific map and history (Clifford 1994). To do so, the contributors to this volume wrote their chapters from the vantage point of extended fieldwork experience. Further, they actually lived (and some are still living) for extended periods of time at the sites where their fieldwork was carried out—unlike most of the current border theorists, who have not lived on any political or geographic border.3 At the same time, this collection of essays is not about borders in general (between disciplines, ethnicities, or countries). To be even more precise, it is not even about the U.S.–Mexico border.4z On the contrary, the collection addresses a particular stretch of that border: between Ciudad Juarez and El Paso. And it does so at a particular period of time: the early 1990s.

THE "U.S.-MEXICO" BORDER VERSUS "LA FRONTERA ENTRE MEXICO Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS"

Many Mexican scholars who have studied the Mexican side of the border over the last two decades do not feel represented by the border as it is portrayed by current mainstream U.S.-based border studies and theory.5 As Socorro Tabuenca points out, "border writing most of the time refers to concepts, not to a geographic region . . . for those who do these kind of studies on the Mexican side, it is difficult to think about the border only as a metaphor" (1997, 87; translation mine). At the same time, Eduardo Barrera (1995) stresses **that both borders and migrants are used as mere tropes** to illustrate processes of identity differentiation and deterritorialization, where the migrants become mere carriers of cultural codes crossing abstract frontiers between territories that are only semiotic spaces. The economic migrant becomes the semiurgic nomad Barrera describes in his contribution to this collection.

Tabuenca (1997, 87) also claims that portraying the border as it looks from the U.S. side alone perpetuates entrenched U.S. colonialist practices. Thus, according to Tabuenca, what began as a movement to give voice to a previously marginalized actor (Chicanos) has become a movement that marginalizes others (Mexican nationals), "silencing" their voices. One example Tabuenca offers is the work of Guillermo Gómez-Peña and his scholarly legitimization by important "hybrid" scholars (Nestor García Canclini and Homi Bhabha) and border anthropologist Robert Alvarez Jr. (1995, 448). For instance, Alvarez claims that "Gómez-Peña illustrates how the borders metaphor can be elusive, undefinable, tautological, and even mystifying . . . his experience is ambiguous and characterized by multiple identities, which, like the metaphor of the border itself, is difficult to precisely define."

But according to Socorro Tabuenca:

Gómez-Peña's border and that of Mexicans, above all Fronterizo Mexicans, are very different. . . . The United States has decided to consider (un)documented immigrants as one of the most important public enemies, has reinforced its southern frontier, has transformed immigrants into scapegoats and has re-elaborated an anti-immigrant discourse. Therefore, in such scenario, Gómez-Peña's performance, instead of being an "alternative reality" or creating an international dialogue, becomes very risky. When the artist projects the image of a migrant and displaces the flesh-and-blood referent, "he leaves him before the real [Border Patrol's Operation] blockade, and [Proposition] 187 lonelier and more exploited than before, after having exploited his existential surplus value (Barrera 1995, 16). In the same vein, his artistic representation of the border erases and oppresses the many other border artistic representations. (1997, 88; translation mine)

When the "migrant" of mainstream border studies is epitomized by Gomez-Peña's performances, several other migrant experiences are silenced. For instance, the Mexican migrant as represented by Gomez-Pena is one who celebrates international immigration, something that many Mexicans do not celebrate, because "they reject the celebration of migrations caused many times by their poverty, which repeats itself in the U.S." (García Canclini 1990, 302; translation mine). The migrant of mainstream border studies, the exemplary "border crosser," is one who is completely bilingual (in order to take full advantage of being "in between"), while many Mexican immigrants are Spanish monolingual or have low English proficiency. People like Gómez-Peña, the "hybrid" par excellence, want to stay in the United States, whereas many Mexican immigrants want to turn to their homeland. Migrants like Gómez-Peña, the celebrated artist, have highly marketable skills, unlike many Mexican immigrants. The list of differences goes on and on.

The problem, according to Eduardo Barrera (see also this volume), is that a kind of "incestuous" relationship has been established between Gomez-Peña and certain "hybrid" theorists:

The use of Gomez-Pena by Garcia Canclini and Homi Bhabha is not a mere coincidence. The artist's texts are the product of his fascination with the border's syncretism, and it would be ingenuous to think that he has not been influenced by the poststructuralist literature. While the academicians "prove" their arguments with Gómez-Peña's texts, he constructs his border using the same theoretical sources. This quasi-incestuous relationship becomes a circuit that excludes the primary referents. Gómez-Peña's border becomes Garcia Canclini's and Homi Bhabha's "Border," and the artist becomes "the Migrant." This migrant is a semiurgic migrant in which the sign has totally replaced matter. (Barrera 1995, 15; translation mine)

Gómez-Peña has even come to represent "the immigrant" not only in literary or theoretical border studies work but even in some ethnographic research that has been done on the border. As Claire Fox points out:

Gómez-Peña's self-presentation as a shaman in performances such as Border Brujo has clearly been read by academics, journalists, and others as that of a spokesperson for all border crossers. His descriptions of "border consciousness," for example, appear repeatedly in a recent article by an anthropologist [Rouse 1991] about a transborder migration circuit of undocumented workers between Aguililla, Mexico, and Redwood City, California, but at no point in the article does the author quote his own informants regarding their lifestyle and consciousness. (1994, 69)

This phenomenon is occurring not only on the western (Tijuana–San Diego) end of the U.S.–Mexico border, where Gómez-Peña performs, but also on the eastern end (the Lower Rio Grande Valley), where a similar process of "silencing," "displacement," and "essentialization" is also happening. I am referring here to the much-celebrated work of Gloria Anzalúa, Borderlands/La Frontera. Here we again see the U.S.–Mexico border reduced solely to the U.S. version. As Socorro Tabuenca points out:

In Anzaldúa's text . . . **the geographic border and the relationships between Mexico and the United States are essentialized.** In it, U.S. whites are presented as "them" and minorities as "us." Its border "es una herida abierta where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds." ... But this third country, the **border culture** according to Anzaldúa, **is also a metaphorical culture narrated from the vantage point of the First World**. (1997, 89; translation mine)

In Anzaldúa's "American version of the third country," the actors are rigid, excessively demarcated, clearly contradicting the self-proclaimed attempt to show all the possibilities that crossing borders imply. "We" (all the possible outcasts on the American side of the border) are different from "them" (all the powerful people on the same side). But what about other "others"? What about the Southern Mexican immigrant othered by Northern Mexican natives (as revealed in Felipe's quotation on page 317); the Chicanos othered as "pochos" by Juarenses; the Mexican illegal immigrant othered by the Mexican legal immigrants (Rosario's comment earlier); the Mexican immigrant othered by Mexican Americans, Anglos, and African Americans; the people of Mexican heritage—regardless of nationality—othered by Anglos and blacks; and so on (Vila 2000)? From the vantage point of the American side, many of these differences cannot be seen, and many others have a completely different

meaning than they do when they are viewed from the Mexican side of the line. The theoretical construction of a third country on the U.S.–Mexico border is an American enterprise that few Mexican nationals (whether they are scholars or not) agree with. The Lone Star experience is still remembered in Northern Mexico anytime someone proposes to create another country on the border. This is the reason why mainstream border studies are seen by many Mexican nationals as yet another ruse of U.S. power:

Anzaldúa and Gómez-Peña (among others), talking from the interstices of U.S. culture, have authorized their hybridity in the social discourse of difference. However, being authorized and canonized . . . they ally themselves with the practices of international political and economic power, regardless of the fact that their writing or actions resist those practices. And, as it occurs with any consecration of some people, they support the silencing of others. In this sense, we could point out the tension and distance that exists between theory and practice, regardless of the textual negotiations of these writers. (Tabuenca 1997, 90)

For scholars doing border studies from the Mexican side of the line, it is difficult to see the border as mere metaphor, as the epitomized possibility of crossings, hybrids, and the like. For those who live on the Mexican side, the border studies metaphor of borderlands is incarnated in long and unpleasant hours of waiting at the international bridges, in tedious immigration proceedings, in the continual threat of harassment from Customs or Border Patrol workers, in the risk of (possibly deadly) encounters with American soldiers patrolling the border, and in heated debates with Americans—Anglos and Chicanos alike—about the "insulting" gigantic Mexican flags that wave in major Mexican border towns. That is why Socorro Tabuenca (who does border studies from Ciudad Juarez–El Paso) claims:

In [North American] discourses about the border there is a constant: for most Chicanos, the Borderlands are the promised land, the return to Mexican or Latin American tradition, the place of the desired identity. It is a site where one goes, generally, throughout remembrance, reading or writing; it is a place, however, that Chicanos rarely visit or in which they seldom settle themselves . . . for those of us who study, cross and live on the geographical border, it is problematic (both in discourses and everyday life) to see the border as a metaphor or utopia. (1997, 92)

It is one thing to write about the metaphor, but quite another to cross it daily.

CULTURES THAT MUST BE CROSSED VERSUS CULTURES ALWAYS ALREADY CROSSED

Current border studies suffer from two contradictory and equally problematic tendencies. The first essentializes the differences it finds in any border encounter, and the second ignores such differences. We have glimpsed these tendencies in the criticism that Mexican scholars such as Tabuenca and Barrera direct toward Gomez-Peña, Anzaldúa, and border theorists who consider these latter writers' experiences the "epitome" of border crossing. In this section I will delve further into the first of these two problematic trends.

One of the most important criticisms of border studies in its current theoretical incarnation comes from David E. Johnson and Scott Michaelsen: "We begin with an understanding that **for all of border studies' attempts to produce a cultural politics of diversity and inclusion, this work literally can be produced only by means of—can be founded only upon—exclusions"** (1997, 3). These exclusions can be of different sorts: geographic, ethnic, theoretical. At the same time, Johnson and Michaelsen claim that the reason the current model of border studies and theory is exclusionary is that it relies so much on a logic of difference/ identity, a logic that, according to Bhabha, celebrates culture as an "epistemological object" (1994, 34). The problem with this logic, according to Johnson and Michaelsen, is that **the cultures considered different, yet related within a multicultural context such as the border, are totalized and reified.**

They argue that Anzaldúa and Hicks exemplify the problems they address in this formulation. Both authors establish a similar distinction between modern and premodern worlds. Both are concerned with saving all individual cultures from destruction. Both believe that cultural isolationism poses grave dangers. Each postulates that salvation involves increasing attention to border crossing. Each proposes **a project of global wellness that "preserves all existing cultures and languages by stitching together the border subjectivities that embody them"** (Johnson and Michaelsen 1997, 12). And both premise saving the world on recourse to the indigenous. In this respect, Johnson and Michaelsen accuse these authors, above all Anzaldúa, of **proposing an anticolonialist discourse that basically uses the very narrative devices she criticizes: that is, claiming that "her" culture** (Spanish American culture in this case) **is simultaneously both unique and universal**. In so doing, she essentializes and stereotypes premodern peoples while at the same time claiming that those indigenous cultures constitute "the" possibility of a new universal humanism. She also claims a future of inclusiveness while fiercely criticizing Anglo culture. In sum, **"for every bare multiculturalist gesture in these texts, there is another gesture toward the demonization and repression of a presumed white or Anglo culture"** (Johnson and Michaelsen 1997, 13).

I might add here that what Hicks, Anzaldúa, and other border theorists are in danger of doing, if one follows their arguments to the extreme, is constructing Anglo or white culture as the constitutive "other." As Grossberg points out: "The act of power comes . . . in negating the positivity of the [Anglo] world with all of its diversity, for example, to nothing but a singular constitutive other, to the different. Thus, it is precisely the articulation of difference on top of otherness that becomes the material site of discursive power and which is, I would argue, a fundamental logic of formations of modern power" (1996, 96).

Anzaldúa's and Hicks's project aims to essentialize "their" own premodern culture and ask people to cross their own essentialized culture in order to meet somewhere in between (under the guidance of the culture that possesses privileged access to the whole—which, not coincidentally, is Anzaldúa's and Hicks's). To this, Johnson and Michaelsen (1997) oppose a different project. In theirs, which is highly influenced by Derrida, no borders exist to be crossed, because a border is always already crossed and crossed again, without possibility of the "trans" cultural.6 In this kind of border, identities are thus always open to "outside" cultures. At the same time, they have "always already enfolded the other within itself, with the border between the inside and outside, in principle, unclosable" (15).7

Moreover, treating debate itself as a borderland that links geographically and ideologically different borders leads to a shallow politics that cannot produce change—instead of contact with actual others, debate becomes a detour that teaches us to enjoy communicating this metaphor of the border, while flattening out and detaching us from specific political contests

Ang, Prof. of Cultural Studies at the University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 1998 [Ien, “Doing cultural studies at the crossroads,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 1(1), p. 18-20]

It is this paradox that I find myself in need of coming to terms with in thinking about cultural studies as/at the crossroads. To put it bluntly, meetings at a crossroads – say, the 'Crossroads in Cultural Studies' conference – are more often than not just brief encounters; they are seemingly decontextualized, **fleeting moments** of incidental and transient linkage **after which we all go our separate ways**, on to our individual destinations back in our own countries, institutions, discip­linary enclaves, and specialist fields of interest. If this conference is a meeting place for such a diverse range of people to share their ideas under the common banner of 'cultural studies', what can that sharing consist of? Or better, how can we make sure that that sharing takes place, that the brief encounters we make here will have more long-standing effects? Of course, brief encounters are by no means inevitably inconse­quential – we all know that they are not! – but for them to have life-changing impacts, so to speak, there would need to be some pretty powerful and effective communicative exchange going on. And just as in advertising, effective communication in the heterogeneous field of cultural studies also depends on the right rhetorical strategies.

Let me give you a concrete example to clarify what kind of difficulties I have in mind. As a cultural studies practitioner, I am currently engaged in a research project with a highly localized and historically specific focus. It bears the peculiar title 'Reimagining Asians in a Multicultural Australia' and is funded by the Australian Research Council. When the conference organizers asked me to deliver a keynote speech at the `Crossroads in Cultural Studies' conference, I felt the desire to speak about this project, but felt I could not do so without first addressing the wretched audience problem.3 How could I speak about the project, in a keynote speech where I engage in a brief encounter with an audience, without losing some of them along the way? If I were to talk about the contextual specificities of the project, about the regional and theoretical subtleties governing the formulation of the questions I intend to address in it, and the particular political interventions I hope to make in answering those questions, I would risk sinking into a discourse of conjunctural idiosyncrasy that may fail to connect and intersect with other concerns, other interests, other knowledges. Somehow it would seem much easier to evoke the concepts of race, ethnicity and nation, for example, or those of migrancy, hybridity and diaspora – which, as the title of my project should make clear, are the key concepts framing my particular object of study – without rather than with a particular reference to the uncommon specificities of the Australian context.

The paradox, then, is that while cultural studies has staked so much on the irreducible significance of context, on the importance of specificity and particularity, on the articulation of historical conjuncture, the valori­zation of crossroads encounters in the borderlands can actually have the effect of **discouraging us from grounding our discourse in the uncom­promising contingencies of concrete particularities and specificities**, as it would necessitate the tedious explanation of a wealth of more or less rarefied descriptive nuances that might not resonate with the curiosity and the interests of our audience. **In such a situation the metalanguage of metaphor and theory** – **the stylish abstractions of which can be picked up and recycled without the inhibiting interference of particularizing context** – **would be much more instantly gratifying for its apparent communicative achievement.** Thus, it is probably much more likely for an Australian and a Finnish conference delegate to find quick common ground, say, in a discussion about the figure of the migrant as a metaphor for the prototypical postmodern subject – an ontological discourse able to be globalized as if it were context-neutral – than in a sustained and more timme-consuming cross-cultural exchange about the history of Aboriginal politics in Australia, on the one hand, and that of Sami politics in Finland, on the other, even though **a superficial similarity** can be found in the trans-specific category of 'indigenous peoples'. Of course, as Stuart Hall, Larry Grossberg and many others have repeatedly argued, cultural studies can only proceed through a 'detour through theory' – for no understanding can be reached without an appropriate level of theoretical abstraction – but **there is a danger**, within the borderland cultural intellectualism of contemporary cultural studies, **to never return from the detour, to turn the detour into a never-ending trip in itself.** The comparison I made a while ago with the world of advertising is not entirely gratuitous in this respect. Precisely because theory 'travels' more easily across cultural and national borders, it is also more amenable to global marketing, as any academic publisher would tell you. As Meaghan Morris and Stephen Muecke (1995: 1) remark in their editorial statement to the new Australian cultural studies journal the UTS Review, 'as publishers want cultural studies from all over the world to be written for an international market', what tends to be favoured is a 'socially groundless, history-free genre of "Theory" that cannot engage with the cultural differences it endlessly evokes'. Decontextualized theory sells precisely because its abstractions allow it to be appropriated by a wide range of audiences, while localized studies and knowledges are always in danger of being ghettoized in their own field of particularity.4

Ultimately, this reduction of diverse borders to a universal metaphor is a smoothing out of differences to make compelx lives fit into our politics. This smoothing out of all differences is precisely what authorizes the normalizing violence of societies—this fantasy world has always been the ideology that begins to eliminate that which does not fit—like Stalin and Hitler, we begin by eliminating groups, and end by wishing for the elimination of everything

Bogard, Professor of Sociology at Whitman, 2000 [William, “Smoothing Machines and the Constitution of Society,” *Cultural Studies* 14 (2), 269-275]

Introduction

IMAGINE SOCIERY AT A production of ‘smoothing machines’. In such a society, everything fits – work, play, eating, sex, sleep, and images – everything connects and disconnects the way it should. No rough spots, no bottlenecks or pinch points, just everything free, clean and fast. Smooth is good. We like things smooth, and we like smooth things, life and death to name just two. A life where my work is perfect, my sex is perfect, my image is perfect – and TV proves it. When I die, it will be a perfect death, smooth, fast and clean. I won’t even notice it. The right blend of things, the right mixture of ingredients, gives me intense pleasure and a feeling of power. My child is perfect, my home is perfect, this time and place are perfect. A society that smoothes, that is a smoothing machine, is fast and clean and perfect. I enter your number, and here you are! I order a thing, and it arrives. I imagine a scene, and it appears, as if by magic. Perhaps one day in the not too distant future, people and things will arrive even before they are summoned, and appearances will precede, even replace, my imagination of them. A society of perfect information, perfect communication, perfect control. *All is not utopia in this society*, though – not yet anyway. For better or worse, my body will bear the marks of all these smoothing machines – perfect vision (contact lenses, lens implants), perfect skin (cosmetic operations), perfect organs (transplants, artificial pumps and filters), perfect birth (episiotomy), perfect genes (spliced and diced). But marked as it is, that’s what makes it a smooth body, a smoothing-body. Fast and clean. Connected to all the other smooth bodies in its territory, in a smooth-running collective machine.

When I say society ‘as the production’ of smoothing machines, I am referring to the flow of production – to societalization1 – not just to what is produced. Society is not the ‘object’ or ‘end’ of production, but as Marx understood, production itself. More precisely, it is smoothing-production – not a ‘product’ of smoothing machines, like the shine on a shoe, but the shining that marks the shoe. Smoothing machines are not subjects, either, but markings. They are conducts through which a body or bodies is inscribed as a subject.2 As forces of inscription, smoothing machines have a double function – extraction and deposition. They cut or tear bodies from their surroundings, produce streams of waste, and deposit new surfaces. Like a hurricane, they leave a line of destruction, but also a levelled plane. Like a fine polish, they cover over an imperfection. Subjects and objects are, literally, surfaces extracted from and deposited on bodies, which in turn bear the marks of their smoothing, each mark a cut, each cut a partition of bodies and a multiplication of surfaces, each new surface the deposit of a passing machine. The wound, you could say, is a smoothing mark, as is the ‘cut’ of one’s collar or the shaved face. They are marks of purification, as well as status and rank. Lévi-Strauss thinks that writing is the origin of slavery – how many dead bodies has it left in its wake? How many dead bodies does it take to make a smooth subject, autonomous, decontaminated, normalized? How many streams of waste to produce a pure object, shining and sharpened, moving at absolute speed? Deposition and extraction are two of faces smoothing, a violent movement despite its deceptive name. And it is backwards to search first for subjects or objects of smoothing. The subject is as much an effect of smoothing as the object, both, and their relation to each other, a ‘machining social’. Society is not a machine, but to machine – precisely, to machine bodies into subjects and objects. It is objectification and subjectification as smoothing-production.

I have in mind, of course, Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987: 474–500) paradigm of smooth and striated space. Subjects and objects are striations. They are marks on the surfaces of bodies produced by smoothing, i.e. by means of extraction and deposition. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari often oppose smooth space to striated space, in the sense of heterogeneous to homogeneous space, formlessness to formed space, movement to fixation, multiplicity to unity. But what interests Deleuze and Guattari most are not these kinds of opposition, but rather the passages between them and their combinations or mixtures, ‘how the forces at work within space continually striate it, and how in the course of its striation it develops other forces and emits new smooth spaces’ (p. 500). These forces I call smoothing machines, although it would be just as possible to call them striating (or marking) machines. The two can happen simultaneously, even though, in my view, the more interesting problems about the constitution of society involve smoothing, and specifically the re-smoothing of striated, societalized forms. We can make, Deleuze and Guattari say, a de jure distinction between smooth and striated space, but it is the de facto mixes and asymmetrical communications between them that make it necessary to develop different models of their interaction (p. 475). Deleuze and Guattari develop six such models – technological, musical, maritime, mathematical, physical, and aesthetic – which they use to trace the variable movements from smooth to striated to (re)smoothed space. Here, I will ignore the authors’ warning not to multiply models, and suggest a seventh, the social model. In the social, like the others, it is smoothing, not striation, which produces the most intriguing and important movements. It is smoothing production that creates striated, marked space; but it is also smoothing production that generates the passage from striated to (re)smoothed space – the better, Deleuze and Guattari say, to control already striated space more completely (p. 480). The two passages, moreover, are not symmetrical; they have different intensities and produce different effects. Later, we shall see that there are (at least) two kinds of smoothing machine. One that traces a line of death, the other mapping a line of flight. While the social smoothing machine, like any marking machine, generates blockages, exclusions, and dissipates energies, it also creates zones of inclusion, vitality, and freedom. And, we shall also see, there is no easy formula we can apply in advance for deciding which

is which.

The category of smoothing machines, then, includes far more than what we would call smoothing ‘technologies’, e.g. grinding wheels, abrasives, polishing equipment. Technical instruments are only one kind of machine implicated in social production, which in addition to material flows must also machine thought and desire. It is true, nevertheless, that smoothing technologies play a foundational role in societalization. It has been shown by Malkin (1989), for instance, that grinding and abrasive technologies are basic to the production of the earliest tools, and to the origins of industry in general.3 Without them, it is difficult to imagine the development of human civilization, and indeed, such tools seem almost to belong to the very idea of civilization. The production of agricultural implements, eating and cooking utensils, weapons, coins, means of transport, all these rely on smoothing technologies in the limited sense – grindstones, polishing devices, cutting tools, coating and layering materials, etc.

Guattari (1995, 1990) notes, however, that the technological machine itself cannot be considered solely in terms of its materiality or in isolation from other machines. From the beginning such machines are connected to others that move in completely different registers, e.g. as language systems, systems of communication, affect, desire, myth, etc. It is this exteriority of machinic relations that defines a smoothing machine in the wider sense; and what we call society, or the social smoothing machine, is in fact a collection of diverse machinic ‘interfaces’. At the interface of the tool and the hand is a smoothing-machine, fitting one to the other, but also along the ‘surface’ between hand and idea, idea and percept, percept and affect, word and thing. The social smoothing machine, like all smoothing machines, is a surfacing machine – it operates at the interface of machines that may differ in kind or nature, and enhances their fit and communication (like the shine on a shoe ‘fits’ a walking-machine to a status-machine, to a commodity-machine, to a pleasure-machine, etc.). In essence, the problem of societalization is one of the smooth interfaces of a multiplicity of machines, some material and technological, some not, geared to the production of subjects, objects, and their relations.

Most stories about machines as technologies take the form of a tired dialectic of man and machine whose redemptive or apocalyptic outcomes we know all too well. Either the machine is seen as a vehicle for human progress or the end of the world – we control it, or in the end it destroys us. Smoothing machines, however, have no particular historical trajectories, no universal laws governing their development. They operate neither above nor below the level of bodies, but on their varied surfaces, along their interface with other bodies. They are molecular as well as molar, assembling and aligning body parts, co-ordinating small movements with large strides, ranking intensities, generating

**(Continues…)**

# 2nc

# f/w

# state good

## at: state bad impact turn

#### Turn – the only way to truly take the State out of debate is to debate the positive and negative impacts of state action – rejecting it in a vacuum just makes them more powerful

**Wallace 96 –** (William Wallace, Baron of Saltaire; Ph.D.; fmr Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics, 1996 “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats,” JSTOR)

The failure of the Weimar Republic to establish its legitimacy owed something to the **irresponsibility of intellectuals** of the right and left, preferring the private certainties of their ideological schools to critical engagement with the difficult compromises of democratic politics. The Frankfurt School of Adorno and Marcuse were Salonbolschewisten, 'relentless in their hostility towards the capitalist system' while 'they never abandoned the lifestyle of the haute bourgeoisie'. The followers of Nietzsche on the right and those of Marx on the left both worked to denigrate the limited achievements and the political compromises of Weimar, encouraging their students to adopt their own radically critical positions and so **contribute to undermining the republic**. Karl Mannheim, who had attempted in Ideology and Utopia to build on Weber's conditional and contingent sociology of knowledge, was among the first professors dismissed when the Nazis came to power. Intellectuals who live within relatively open civil societies have a responsibility to the society within which they live: **to act themselves as constructive critics**, and to encourage their students to contribute to the strengthening of civil society rather than to undermine it. 32 (308-9)

## 2nc overview

**\*\*\*\*Scenarios are key to policy relevance AND policy is key to academic value.**

**Mahnken and Junio 13** – (2013, Thomas, PhD, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Timothy, Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, PhD in Political Science expected 2013, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395, September 2013)

The role of academics in policymaking is a cyclical debate in the IR subfield. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a vocal group has once again elevated the perspective that political science professors should be contributing to these pressing national security problems (Andres and Beecher 1989; George 1993; Putnam 2003; Monroe 2005; Nye 2009; Mead 2010). Nearly all of the discourse on “bridging the gap” between academia and the policy world emphasizes how academics may help policymakers, particularly with rigorous methods for testing social science hypotheses. **The scenario method is one way in which political scientists may improve the policy relevance of their work**. It also shows that ideas flowing in the other direction are promising: the policy community and other disciplines have potential to improve the quality of political science research. The future counterfactual approach has been used by policymakers and wealth creators to improve decisions for decades, while our discipline has consistently relied to a great degree on the past. Thinking and writing about the future in a robust way offers political scientists an exciting opportunity to push the boundaries of current debates and to generate new ones, while also improving the **processes of teaching and theory building**.

##  2nc ground da

#### Decision-making turns and outweighs their framework impacts

**Steinberg & Freeley 08** – \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg is a Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of **intense debate**, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps **equally difficult** for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. **Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made**. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. **Life demands decision making**. We make **countless individual decisions** every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. **Every profession** requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through **military invasion or diplomacy**? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? **And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others**. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. **We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it** and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

**Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us**. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

##  2nc stasis da

#### This outweighs –

#### Broad limits turn exclusion – ethical obligation to vote negative

**Rowland 84 –** (Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective Ed. Parson, p. 53-4)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing both in scope and size. This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breadth. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. National debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change. The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of topics has all but **destroy**ed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues thqat because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process. Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske believes that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breath of the topic and experience “negophobia,” the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novice through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caught without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.” The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters who eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also **discourage experienced debaters** from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much time and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are **forced out** of the activity. Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.” The final effect may be that **entire programs wither** cease functioning or **shift to value debate** as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.” In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some **small schools** to **cancel their programs**.