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**The debt ceiling will pass but it will be a fight**

**Washington Post, 9/15/13** (“Congress can turn back to the budget now” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-can-turn-back-to-the-budget-now/2013/09/15/e05c975c-1ca5-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0\_story.html)

WITH PRESIDENT Obama’s bid for congressional support for a military strike against Syria on hold for the time being, members of the House and Senate can devote their attention to what was previously supposed to have been their priority for September: **avoiding a potential political and economic train wreck over the federal government’s finances**.

Specifically, Congress needs to fund the government after the current spending law expires on Sept. 30, and it needs to raise the $16.7 trillion debt limit, which will be reached sometime in the second half of October, and which must be increased to avoid the possibility of a U.S. default.

Alas, these two pieces of what should be routine business have become entangled in the politics of Obamacare, which is to say the decreasingly comprehensible politics of the House Republican caucus. A sizable minority of GOP members insists on “defunding” the health care law before the major parts of it begin to take effect in January. According to a recent Congressional Research Service analysis, this is an operationally futile goal. It would be bad policy even if it were possible.

What’s more, it’s bad politics for the GOP to risk a government shutdown in pursuit of this chimera — a fact Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) recognizes but which has, so far, failed to sway his back-benchers. This is why Democrats are content, for now, to sit back and cheer on the Republicans’ internal feud. Also, that’s easier than countering the Republicans’ anti-Obamacare crusade with realistic budget alternatives.

How this latest impasse plays out is anyone’s guess, though there are plausible scenarios under which Mr. Boehner can give the ultras in his caucus a chance to vote one more time against Obamacare, while engineering Democratic acquiescence in a short-term continuation of the current $988 billion annual spending rate. Such a result would avoid a partial government shutdown — for a few months.

The debt ceiling, too, probably can be finessed, as it has been in the past. Exactly how is admittedly difficult to predict given Mr. Obama’s insistence that raising it is not negotiable and Mr. Boehner’s seemingly incompatible insistence that he won’t increase Washington’s borrowing capacity except in return for progress on deficit reduction. But a default would not be in either side’s political interest.

**Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio – Cuba policy is totally unique**

**LeoGrande, 12**

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a **major role** in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the **price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill** to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was **stymied by indifference or resistance** elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to **avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger.** When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team **delayed the announcement for several months** at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration **surrendered to** Senator **Rubio's demand** that it limit the licensing of travel providers **in exchange** for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to **sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives**, both Democrat and Republican, who are **willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba**. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a **strong incentive to try the same tactic again**. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been **thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners**. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the **bruising battle** with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that **require a significant expenditure of political capital** rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

**Capital is finite and spending it elsewhere prevents a debt ceiling deal**

**Moore, 9/10/13 -** Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also **eats up credibility in asking for the next favor.** It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and **focus with intensity** on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, **one at a time**.

**Default will destroy the U.S. and global economy**

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed **financial disaster in history.**

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse **far worse than anything we’ve seen** in the past several years.

**Nuclear war**

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

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**Plan kills Brazil’s sugar industry.**

**Miami Herald 02** (6/26/02, “Cuba embargo under fire - Sally Grooms Cowal's Group cites benefits for U.S.,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/706185/posts)//DR. H

4. The next reason in favor of doing away with the embargo runs as follows: Look here, there is money to be made in Cuba. Remember Coolidge’s, the "business of America is business?" If everything else fails, appeal to greed . There are some salivating mouths claiming that 6 billion dollars worth of goods and commodities could be sold to Cuba. But unless the U.S. takes the place of the Soviet Union and initially subsidizes the Cuban economy with credits and loans (coming out of American tax paying pockets), and rebuild its shattered infrastructure at a cost of billions upon billions of dollars, the U.S. would have to buy Cuban sugar produced by workers paid now 10 dollars per month in order to enable Cubans to have money to pay for all these goodies, without any guarantees that the large portion of the profits made would not go first to the apparatus of repression (armed forces, secret police and Communist Party cadres) and to the modernization of its weapons systems and only lastly, to the Cuban people. Moreover, one must ask: what happens to the sugar industry of Florida now producing 25% of the sugar consumed in the U.S.?. Furthermore, according to the American Sugar Alliance, 80-85% of the sugar produced in the U.S. is consumed here. The remainder 15% is imported from 40 foreign countries--about 1,5 million tons. Under WTO and NAFTA rules the U.S. is required to bring in AT LEAST that amount, even if the U.S. does not need it now! Any sale of Cuban sugar to a sugar producing country like the U.S. would mean that there would be less of the market for the American sugar industry to go around.

In addition, **what would happen abroad to Brazil’s sugar market**, one of the largest producers of sugar, (even if a significant amount of that country's sugar is used to produce ethanol)? and to the Dominican Republic’s or Mexico's market? to mention only three sugar producing countries in our hemisphere. We should ponder, in this context, the following statement issued on August 10, 2000 by Joseph Terrell, Director of Public Affairs of the American Sugar Alliance: "We are well aware of the challenges lifting the Cuban embargo could have on the US sugar industry. Also, quota holders in other countries are monitoring the situation closely as well because they could stand to lose…we are monitoring this closely." A similar view has been advanced by the general manager of the Louisiana Sugar Cane Cooperative and secretary/treasurer of the Louisiana Farm Bureau Foundation, Jackie Theriot, who said: **Lifting the embargo -- without holding Cuba to production limits -- would flood the U.S. market with sugar, dropping the prices and bankrupting the domestic industry.** (quoted by Kevin Blanchard in his article "Now no Time to Help Cuba," The Advocate ONLINE (April 11, 2002) However, it is unlikely that Castro's Cuba would accept being hamstrung by production limits and it would go against the free trade ideology espoused by Washington these days.

Is the U.S. going to harden the grip of Castro by granting him even a significantly diminished market opening at the expense of its own sugar industry? Imperil the Brazilian sale of sugar to the U.S. just to please Castro? Is the U.S. going to finance the the conversion of Cuban sugar into ethanol, as means to reduce the worldwide glut of sugar even though the prospects of creating a large U.S. ethanol market is still an economic entelechy? Moreover, consider that during one year, in the decade of the 50’s (1959, for example) Cuba’s sugar quota in the U.S. totaled 1.256 million metric tons, roughly the same amount that the U.S. now imports from 40 countries! It is well known that when Cuba lost its generous American sugar quota in the 60’s this amount was allocated to other countries. which used the allocation to maintain their sugar industry and increase their production. What would be the ripple effect of the Cuban re-intervention in the American sugar market, given that it will be considerably less than what it sold in the 50’s and will offer sugar at a low price to gain a foothold in the market? This macroeconomic assessment has not been addressed in the public arena by Castro’s acolytes and foot soldiers in this country. In addition, in the case Dominican Republic, the European Union subsidized exports have already caused a 20% income loss of income in that country. If Cuba’s sales of sugar take a slice of the American market, both the domestic and international suppliers, such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Mexico (who incidentally, has been encouraged to develop an ethanol industry) are going to feel even more severely impacted. Even if Cuba did not make efforts to create a capital intensive industry, as the cane sugar producers in the U.S and producers of sugar in the world have done it, Cuban sugar would be produced more cheaply, as already indicated, doubtlessly, with Communist government subsidies in order to retain a share of the American market.

**That causes Brazilian economic instability.**

**SC 12** (Sugarcane.org, AT: Website’s Bias!!! – Cites objective data…, 6/19/12, “Impact on Brazil's Economy,” http://sugarcane.org/the-brazilian-experience/impact-on-brazils-economy)//DR. H

The sugarcane industry – including cultivation, processing and refined products – represents an important segment of the Brazilian economy.

Economic Contribution

In 2010, the sugarcane sector contributes US$50 billion to Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) – equivalent to almost 2.4% of the entire Brazilian economy and comparable to the GDP of a European country like Slovenia (US$47.7 billion).

When you add in the various suppliers and stakeholders who depend on Brazil’s sugarcane industry, the entire sugarcane agro-industrial system generates gross revenues totaling more than US$86 billion annually.

Good Jobs

The sugarcane industry employs 1.28 million workers, according to 2008 data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment’s Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS).

**Nuclear war.**

**Shulz 2k** (Donald, Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE, March)

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be Brazil, which already accounts for almost half of Latin America’s economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 active troops).53 That country could very well assume a more commanding political and military role in the decades ahead. Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States.

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**The plan engages with non-governmental organizations.**

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

**That violates the word “its”.**

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 05**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

**That’s a voting issue –**

**1. Limits – infinite non-governmental organizations that can be engaged become topical – makes it impossible to predict the aff killing clash, decisionmaking, and research.**

**2. Ground – core topic education generics like relations disads are nullified.**

**1nc – da**

**Plan shifts oil reliance to Cuba.**

**Padgett ‘8**

Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami & Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine – Oct. 23, 2008 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN

The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still, the concessions so far represent **less than a quarter** of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, **the only people really able to do it to the extent the Cubans need are the Americans."**

**That trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties.**

**Alhaiji and Maris ‘4**

[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of **massive**¶ **oil deposits** in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

**That causes Saudi Prolif.**

**Guzansky ‘13**

Yoel Guzansky is a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. His main research area is Gulf security. He has also served as Iran coordinator at Israel's National Security Council. His recent publications include The Gulf States in a Changing Strategic Environment (2012), One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, and The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West – Middle East Quarterly¶ Spring 2013, pp. 59-64 – available at: http://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon

Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on **the quality of relations between the two countries** and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.¶ After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the **number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation** in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's **doubts about the reliability of Washington** is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, **at present**, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. **But strategic interest**, motivated by considerations of survival, **could have the upper hand**. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

**Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.**

**Edelman ‘11**

(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among **three** or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

**1nc – k**

**Disorder and insecurity are inevitable because we live in a dangerous world. Efforts to control this fear have resulted in the deaths of millions and the creation of WMDs. The alternative is a negative gesture of indifference—we must learn to live with the world as it is. This allows us to break out of the death cycle.**

**Der Derian, 98** (James, (Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts)On Security, ed: Lipschitz, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, Decentering Security).

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an *ontotheology*  of security, that is, an *a priori*  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, *other than us* ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word *alternative* . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

**1nc – cp**

#### The United States federal government should establish a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to study current U.S. policy on Cuba. The Commission should recommend that The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with the Republic of Cuba.

**A Bipartisan Commission on Cuba solves the case but avoids politics**

**Ratliff, 13** -research fellow and former curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution. He is also a research fellow of the Independent Institute. An expert on Latin America, China, and US foreign policy, he has written extensively on how traditional cultures and institutions influence current conditions and on prospects for economic and political development in East/Southeast Asia and Latin America (William, “Cuba's Tortured Transition” 1/30, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281

A New Policy to Cuba

Since the early 1990s U.S. “proactive” policies have done more to stoke than reduce domestic tensions in Cuba, though we profess to seek a “peaceful transition.” Most U.S. legislators have supported pro-embargo Cuban-Americans even though Gallup polls have long shown that most Americans favor diplomatic relations with Havana and lifting the embargo. **On balance,** politicians don’t think Cuba policy is important enough to be worth stirring up the hornets in the still fairly militant and well-financed pro-embargo lobby. Not only have all presidential candidates including Obama supported the embargo, most have resisted even seriously discussing it.

This U.S. commitment to a failed policy has given Washington a "special stake” in the island’s so-called “independent” sector whose goals appeal to Americans. But tragically, paraphrasing journalist Scotty Reston, Americans will do anything for these dissidents except listen to them. My talks with many in Cuba and abroad suggest that most oppose the embargo and three have co-authored articles with me saying so. If these dissidents come under focused government fire in the years ahead, many Americans will feel compelled to intervene even more directly—perhaps militarily—on their behalf.

Two points stand out: Cuba is not the security threat that our current policy treats it as; and our sanctions do not advance the desirable political, economic, and humanitarian improvements that we say we seek on the island. The bottom line is that we must base our policy on national security interests and realities, not unattainable dreams, however noble those dreams may seem.

During his second and final term, and after having drawn unprecedented electoral support as a Democrat from Cuban-Americans in Miami, President Obama is in a position to make serious reforms, if he has the will to do so. He might begin by resurrecting a 1998-99 proposal—then endorsed by former secretaries of state Kissinger and George Shultz, but killed by President Clinton—for convening a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to seriously examine the pros and cons of the policy. It would certainly see the need for change and its findings would **give Obama cover for action.**

**1nc transition adv**

#### No Taiwan impact.

**Saunders and Kastner 09** – \*Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University, \*Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Politics

at the University of Maryland and former China Security Fellow at the Institute for National

Strategic Studies (Phillip and Scott, International Security, 33.4, “Bridge over troubled water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan peace agreement”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.87, WEA)

Most observers agree that the issue of Taiwan’s status is not ripe for resolution. China remains committed to the ultimate goal of unification and refuses to renounce the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence. Former President Jiang Zemin emphasized the goal of unification, and China’s policies sometimes implied a timetable for achievement of that objective.2 China’s policy toward the Taiwan issue, however, has undergone a significant shift under President Hu Jintao, who has emphasized the short-to-medium-term goal of deterring Taiwan independence, postponing unification into the indefinite future.3

On Taiwan, public opinion polls consistently show strong (more than 75 percent) public support for maintaining the status quo. Only a small percentage favors either immediate independence or immediate unification with China.4 Although this polling reflects conditional preferences that factor in the likelihood of China using force if Taiwan were to declare independence,5 it accurately reflects the widespread view on Taiwan that permanent resolution of the issue of Taiwan’s status is not presently possible. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has sought to mobilize voters by highlighting Taiwan’s separate identity and sought ways to emphasize Taiwan’s sovereignty during President Chen Shui-bian’s term in office, the KMT has adjusted the emphasis in its cross-strait policy to more closely match the views of mainstream Taiwan voters. In the 2008 presidential campaign, KMT candidate (and eventual victor) Ma Ying-jeou articulated “three nos” that would govern policy toward China in his administration. These were a pledge that there would be no pursuit of de jure independence, no negotiations with the mainland about unification, and no use of force.6 President Ma reiterated these points in his May 20, 2008, inaugural address.

Collectively, these positions suggest that China and Taiwan may be prepared to defer the issue of Taiwan’s status for resolution at some point in the future. **Both sides have expressed the desire to improve relations, expand cross-strait contacts, and negotiate a peace agreement** between Taipei and Beijing. These goals were articulated in the joint press communiqué issued following KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s April 2005 meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.7 Hu Jintao reiterated China’s willingness to negotiate a peace agreement with Taiwan in his statements at the October 2007 17th Party Congress: “On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful development of cross-straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful development.”8 Both candidates in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election called for negotiation of a peace agreement with Beijing, and President Ma repeated the call in his inaugural address.9 Upon assuming office, Ma moved quickly to restart dialogue between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the semiofficial bodies that previously served as vehicles for cross-strait dialogue.10

#### no internal link—US support of Taiwan is based on nuclear deterrence and security guarantees, not the Coast Guard that would address Cuban instability

**Stable Cuban growth now.**

**Havana Times 7/7** (7/7/13 “Cuban Gov. Presents “Favorable” Stats” <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95985> 7-7-13)

The economy showed an overall a “favorable performance”, said Yzquierdo. Almost all sectors recorded growth, “including trade, transport, communications and manufacturing,” he noted.¶ Yzquierdo said the Cuban trade balance was positive at the end of the first quarter and pointed to a similar trend for year-end. At the same time, he spoke of a “slowdown” in the global economic situation.¶ Cuba recently reduced its forecasts for annual growth in 2013 from the 3.6 percent initially estimated to somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. He emphasized that the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) has been influenced by the crisis in the international arena.¶ In the first semester, the island’s economy grew 2.3 percent, according Yzquierdo, despite “external stress”, the “internal weaknesses” and the effects of Hurricane “Sandy”, which swept across the east of Cuba in October 2012.¶ “Sandy” affected 11 provinces and caused losses of almost 7 billion dollars, according to the minister.¶ The inaugural session of the eighth legislature of the National Assembly of People’s Power closes on, Sunday. Raul Castro is expected to pronounce in a speech to the parliament.¶ In a Communist Party Central Committee meeting last week, Castro came down hard on what he called “indiscipline and illegalities” in the State apparatus. He will most likely refer to the fight against corruption, one of the banner efforts of his administration.

**Impacts empirically denied – Cuba’s economy should’ve collapse by now since the embargo’s been in place for so long.**

**squo solves—every other country in the world like the EU and Canada can invest in Cuba**

**Internal Link Turn – Lifting the embargo makes the situation worse for a laundry list of reasons**

**Suchlicki 2k**, Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, 00 (Jaime, 6/2000, University of Miami, “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba,” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf, p. 2-4, accessed 6/24/13, IC)

Introduction ¶ Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and ¶ the travel ban are lifted, the Cuban people would benefit economically; ¶ American companies will penetrate and influence the Cuban market; the ¶ Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic ¶ society would be accelerated. ¶ These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, ¶ that Castro and the Cuban leadership are naïve and inexperienced and, ¶ therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the ¶ revolution and influence internal developments in the island. Second, that ¶ Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the ¶ economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest. ¶ Third, that Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is ¶ willing to risk what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years – total ¶ control of power and a legacy of opposition to “Yankee imperialism,” – in ¶ exchange for economic improvements for his people. During the Fifth ¶ Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized “We will do what is ¶ necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and ¶ we will not abandon our Socialist system.” ¶ Castro also reiterated his long-standing anti-American posture, ¶ accusing the U.S. of waging economic war against his government and ¶ calling for “military preparedness against imperialist hostility.” A change in U.S. policy toward Cuba may have different and ¶ unintended results. The lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without ¶ meaningful changes in Cuba will: ¶ Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures. ¶ Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses ¶ owned by the Cuban government. Most businesses are owned in ¶ Cuba by the state and, in all foreign investments, the Cuban ¶ government retains a partnership interest. ¶ Lead to greater repression and control since Castro and the ¶ leadership will fear that U.S. influence will subvert the revolution ¶ and weaken the Communist party’s hold on the Cuban people. ¶ Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy on the island. ¶ Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations such as ¶ the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars ¶ to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and ¶ has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new ¶ loans will be wasted by Castro’s inefficient and wasteful system, ¶ and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay ¶ back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his ¶ economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on ¶ the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt ¶ welfare system on the island. Perpetuate the rather extensive control that the military holds over ¶ the economy and foster the further development of “Mafia type” ¶ groups that manage and profit from important sectors of the ¶ economy, particularly tourism, biotechnology, and agriculture. ¶ Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin America which ¶ emphasize democracy, human rights, and market economies. ¶ Send the wrong message to the enemies of the U.S.: that a foreign ¶ leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the ¶ use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at ¶ the U.S.; espouse terrorismand anti-U.S. causes throughout the ¶ world; and eventually the U.S. will “forget and forgive,” and ¶ reward him with tourism, investments, and economic aid. ¶

**no advantage—normalization happens by 2018—you have to win that bioterror causes exintction**

**Afghanistan withdrawal solves overstretch internal link**

**Tapper, 2/13** CNN Chief Washington Correspondent (Jake, “Obama announces 34,000 troops to come home” February 13, 2013 CNN News http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/12/politics/obama-sotu-afghanistan-troops) // czhang

Washington (CNN) -- President Barack Obama announced in his State of the Union speech on Tuesday night that some 34,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan will have returned home by this time next year.¶ The move will reduce the number of U.S. forces in the country by more than half. There are now about 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.¶ A Washington Post poll on Tuesday showed that 80% of registered voters support the president's policy to end the war in Afghanistan.¶ In January, Obama met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Washington, where they agreed to accelerate the military transition in Afghanistan.¶ Afghan forces will take the lead in combat missions throughout the country starting in the spring, instead of mid-year, as was previously expected.¶ 5 things we learned¶ Afghan forces are ready¶ Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, said National Army forces are "completely ready" to take over the country's security responsibilities.¶ "We welcome the announcement of the withdrawal ... and we (will) always remember their efforts and sacrifice," he said. "We are very happy that these soldiers are returning home to their families."¶ The Taliban also welcomed the news, saying Western governments "must salvage themselves from the protracted and pointless war in Afghanistan."¶ But as expected, the militants continued their call for a complete withdrawal of outside forces.¶ "The Afghans should be granted control, choice of government and sovereignty of their country," the Taliban statement said. "If not such then our sacred Jihad will intensify and forge ahead successfully even if one foreign soldier is present in our country ..."

**1nc – agriculture adv**

**No warming impacts.**

**Burnett, 12** – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with **as good or better credentials** and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are **very modestly funded** when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

**the only terminal impact= warming—delay 5 years of normalization**

#### No risk of a biodiversity impact.

Pearce, 6/3 – author and journalist (Fred, “Humans Have Shaped Earth for Millenia,” The Breakthrough, 6/3/13, http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/conservation-and-development/humanitys-pervasive-environmental-influence-began-long-ago/, SMS)

Are there any pristine ecosystems out there? The evidence is growing that our ideas about virgin nature are often faulty. In fact, the lush rainforest or wind-blown moorland we think is natural may be a human creation, with alien creatures from distant lands living beside native species. Realizing this will change our ideas about how ecosystems work and how we should do conservation. We like to think that most nature was pristine and largely untouched until recent times. But two major studies in recent weeks say we are deluded. In one, Erle Ellis, a geographer at the University of Maryland Baltimore County, and colleagues have calculated that at least a fifth of the land across most of the world had been transformed by humans as early as 5,000 years ago — a proportion that past studies of historical land use had assumed was only reached in the past 100 years or so. The human footprint was huge from the day, perhaps 60,000 years ago, when we began burning grasslands and forests for hunting, according to the Ellis study. It extended further with swidden “slash-and-burn” agriculture, and became more intense when farmers began to domesticate animals and plow the land. This seems odd given how few we were back then — tens of millions at most — and how primitive our technology was. But, says co-author Steve Vavrus of the University of Wisconsin, “early farmers didn’t need to be as efficient as modern farmers and therefore, counterintuitively, they used much more land per capita.” In other words, they spread out.¶ In fact, they farmed large areas that today look like virgin forests. But we now know that as much as a tenth of the trees in the Amazon rainforest grow on man-made “dark earths,” or terra preta, which archaeologists believe were created by pre-Columbian farmers who added organic wastes and charcoal to improve nutrient supply and boost yields. Much of the Amazon, Ellis concludes, is actually forest regrowth. Or — judging by the profusion of fruit trees and other valuable species still growing in terra preta areas – perhaps overgrown gardens. Other tropical rainforests also seem to have been farmed. In the past couple of years, James Fraser of Lancaster University in England has found dark earths in until-recently forested West Africa. And last year Doug Sheil and colleagues reported similar findings from Borneo. Other studies have found oil-palm nuts over wide areas of the central African jungle, suggesting the place was covered in palm-oil plantations 2,000 years ago.¶ Nor is this just about rainforests. The bison-grazed plains of North America were remade by Native Americans long before Europeans showed up. Many of the mist-shrouded treeless grasslands of the tropical Andes, known as the paramos, are the result of burning and grazing after locals cut down the natural forests centuries ago. In colder climes, the Scottish highlands tell a similar story. Just as geographers and archaeologists are hard-pressed to find untouched landscapes, so biologists are having similar trouble locating pristine ecosystems.¶ A new book, Novel Ecosystems, edited by Richard Hobbs of the University of Western Australia and others, shows how many superficially natural ecosystems are heavily influenced by the introduction of alien species. Whether intentional or accidental, most introductions seem to have human origins.¶ This is disconcerting. “Over large parts of the globe, the ‘wilderness’ that people refer back to never existed,” says one of the book’s authors, Michael Perring, also of the University of Western Australia.¶ Nature has always had open borders for alien species on the move. Those itinerants may have been a driving force of evolution. But human activity has dramatically increased their travel options. We move many deliberately, as commercial crops or domesticated animals, for instance. Today, others can hitch a ride on ship hulls or in ballast tanks, aboard planes or on the wheels of trucks or the backs of domesticated animals. This phenomenon seems to have been going on for much longer than we sometimes imagine. Conventionally, we regard these unwanted interlopers as a curse, destabilizing ecosystems and devouring indigenous species. Sometimes this is true, as Hobbs and his co-authors acknowledge. But they point out that, in the 21st century, aliens make up a substantial fraction of the planet’s biodiversity, and many are actively useful, even essential parts of ecosystems. Extinctions caused by new arrivals happen and can sometimes be devastating. The brown tree snake from New Guinea is eating its way through the wildlife of Guam, after arriving on a military plane. The zebra mussel, which came from the Black Sea region in the ballast water of ships, is notorious in the U.S., which returned the favor by inadvertently sending the Black Sea a jellyfish that devastated that ecosystem. But actually, such events are rare. Mostly, invaders swiftly settle down and become model eco-citizens, pollinating crops, spreading seeds, controlling predators, and providing food and habitat for native species. After a while we forget about them, or learn to love them. Where would North American be without the European honeybee? Usually, invaded ecosystems end up with more species than they had before. Places like New Zealand, Hawaii, even the Galapagos islands — all notorious for species invasions due to human activities — are actually all more biodiverse than before. Ellis calls them “anthropogenic melting pots.” Scientists who research the invaders and their hosts are discovering much that is intriguing. British researchers recently reported finding two species of native tits that have learned to eat the larvae of a wasp that was introduced to the country from the Middle East 180 years ago and that lays its eggs on the Turkey oak, another introduced species. The tits are spending more and more time in the trees, eating the larvae, especially in spring because climate change means their young now hatch before their previous food source, leaf-eating moth caterpillars appear.¶ Novel ecosystems are different, but not necessarily worse. San Francisco Bay, for instance, is widely regarded as the most invaded estuary on the planet. But that didn’t stop the U.S. government submitting it in January to the Ramsar Convention as a wetland of international importance, because of is a “key habitat for a broad suite of flora and fauna and a range of ecological services.” Much of its rich biodioversity — and some of its ecological services — is due to its alien species. Aliens may even contribute to rewilding those parts of the planet we no longer need. In Puerto Rico, abandoned sugarcane fields across half the island have sprouted new forest ecosystems, largely thanks to the invasive power of non-native species such as the African tulip tree, says Ariel Lugo of the International Institute of tropical Forestry. The tulip tree proved attractive to native birds and insects and now, after a few decades, native trees species have started to recover too.

#### can’t solve warming—coal plants in China and India are inevitable, changing agriculture won’t solve

#### No acidification impact.

CoECRS 7 /3(“Fish learn to cope in a high CO2 world” Nature Climate Change Center of Excellene for Coral Reef Studies PHYS.org http://phys.org/news/2012-07-fish-cope-high-co2-world.html)

Researchers at the ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies (CoECRS) today reported in the journal Nature Climate Change, encouraging new findings thatsome fish may be less vulnerable to high CO2 and an acidifying ocean than previously feared."There has been a lot of concern around the world about recent findings that baby fish are highly vulnerable to small increases in acidity, as more CO2 released by human activities dissolves into the oceans," says Dr Gabi Miller of CoECRS and James Cook University. "Our work with anemone fish shows that their babies, at least, can adjust to the changes we expect to occur in the oceans by 2100, provided their parents are also raised in more acidic water." "Human activity is expected to increase the acidity of the world's oceans by 0.3 to 0.4 pH by the end of this century, on our present trends in CO2 emissions," co-researcher Prof Philip Munday says. "Previous studies, and our own research, have shown that growth and survival of juvenile fish can be seriously affected when the baby fish are exposed to these sorts of CO2 and pH levels," he says. "However when we exposed both parents and their offspring in more acidic water we found that the anemone fish, at least, were able to compensate for the change" says Dr Miller. Whether this effect lasts all their lives, remains to be seen." she adds. How parent fish actually pass on this ability to deal with acidity to their offspring is still a mystery, says Prof Munday. "The time interval is too short for it to be genetic adaptation in the normal sense. However, it's an important parental effect that we need to factor in as we assess the vulnerability of the world's fish stocks to the planet-wide changes in ocean chemistry that humans are now causing." Based on evidence from past major extinction events, scientists have long feared that the acidity caused by the release of high levels of CO2 could cause havoc among sea-life, especially those which depend on calcium to form their bones and shells. New research has also shown that higher CO2 levels can cause the nervous systems of some marine species to malfunction. The recent increase in ocean acidity due to human activity in releasing carbon – about 0.1 of a pH unit over the last half century – is thought to be steeper even than in any of the past major extinctions, which eliminated between 70-90 per cent of marine species. "What this research shows is that some species, at least, may have more capacity to cope than we thought – which could help buy time for humanity to bring its CO2 emission under control," Prof Munday says.

**no transition—even if they win Cuban ag is cost competitive, takes a long time to overhaul the entire industrial infrastructure that currently exists**

**The alternative to organic farming solves food shortages, turns their environment impact – organic farming can exist, but not alone**

**Wilcox 11** (Christie, 7/18/11, “Mythbusting 101: Organic Farming > Conventional Agriculture,” http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/science-sushi/2011/07/18/mythbusting-101-organic-farming-conventional-agriculture/)//DR. H

Myth #3: Organic Farming Is Better For The Environment

As an ecologist by training, this myth bothers me the most of all three. People seem to believe they’re doing the world a favor by eating organic. The simple fact is that they’re not – at least the issue is not that cut and dry.

Yes, organic farming practices use less synthetic pesticides which have been found to be ecologically damaging. But factory organic farms use their own barrage of chemicals that are still ecologically damaging, and refuse to endorse technologies that might reduce or eliminate the use of these all together. Take, for example, organic farming’s adamant stance against genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

GMOs have the potential to up crop yields, increase nutritious value, and generally improve farming practices while reducing synthetic chemical use – which is exactly what organic farming seeks to do. As we speak, there are sweet potatoes are being engineered to be resistant to a virus that currently decimates the African harvest every year, which could feed millions in some of the poorest nations in the world15. Scientists have created carrots high in calcium to fight osteoperosis, and tomatoes high in antioxidants. Almost as important as what we can put into a plant is what we can take out; potatoes are being modified so that they do not produce high concentrations of toxic glycoalkaloids, and nuts are being engineered to lack the proteins which cause allergic reactions in most people. Perhaps even more amazingly, bananas are being engineered to produce vaccines against hepatitis B, allowing vaccination to occur where its otherwise too expensive or difficult to be administered. The benefits these plants could provide to human beings all over the planet are astronomical.

Yet organic proponents refuse to even give GMOs a chance, even to the point of hypocrisy. For example, organic farmers apply Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxin (a small insecticidal protein from soil bacteria) unabashedly across their crops every year, as they have for decades. It’s one of the most widely used organic pesticides by organic farmers. Yet when genetic engineering is used to place the gene encoding the Bt toxin into a plant’s genome, the resulting GM plants are vilified by the very people willing to liberally spray the exact same toxin that the gene encodes for over the exact same species of plant. Ecologically, the GMO is a far better solution, as it reduces the amount of toxin being used and thus leeching into the surrounding landscape and waterways. Other GMOs have similar goals, like making food plants flood-tolerant so occasional flooding can replace herbicide use as a means of killing weeds. If the goal is protect the environment, why not incorporate the newest technologies which help us do so?

But the real reason organic farming isn’t more green than conventional is that while it might be better for local environments on the small scale, organic farms produce far less food per unit land than conventional ones. Organic farms produce around 80% that what the same size conventional farm produces16 (some studies place organic yields below 50% those of conventional farms!).

Right now, roughly 800 million people suffer from hunger and malnutrition, and about 16 million of those will die from it17. **If we were to switch to entirely organic farming, the number of people suffering would jump by 1.3 billion**,

 assuming we use the same amount of land that we’re using now. Unfortunately, what’s far more likely is that switches to organic farming will result in the creation of new farms via the destruction of currently untouched habitats, thus plowing over the little wild habitat left for many threatened and endangered species.

Already, we have cleared more than 35% of the Earth’s ice-free land surface for agriculture, an area 60 times larger than the combined area of all the world’s cities and suburbs. Since the last ice age, nothing has been more disruptive to the planet’s ecosystem and its inhabitants than agriculture. What will happen to what’s left of our planet’s wildlife habitats if we need to mow down another 20% or more of the world’s ice-free land to accommodate for organic methods?

The unfortunate truth is that until organic farming can rival the production output of conventional farming, its ecological cost due to the need for space is devastating. As bad as any of the pesticides and fertilizers polluting the world’s waterways from conventional agriculture are, it’s a far better ecological situation than destroying those key habitats altogether. That’s not to say that there’s no hope for organic farming; better technology could overcome the production gap, allowing organic methods to produce on par with conventional agriculture. If that does occur, then organic agriculture becomes a lot more ecologically sustainable. On the small scale, particularly in areas where food surpluses already occur, organic farming could be beneficial, but presuming it’s the end all be all of sustainable agriculture is a mistake.

**No impact to industrial ag.**

**Trewavas 2004** (Anthony, Prof. U. Edinburgh Studying Plant Physiology and Molecular Biology, Crop Protection, “A critical assessment of organic farming-and-food assertions with particular respect to the UK and the potential environmental benefits of no-till agriculture”, 23:9, ScienceDirect)

Chemophobia, the unreasonable fear of chemicals, is a common public reaction to scientific or media reports suggesting that exposure to various environmental contaminants may pose a threat to health (Safe, S.H., 1995. Xeno-oestrogens and breast cancer. New Engl. J. Med. 337, pp. 1303–1304.Safe, 1995). The spectre of cancer birth defects and irreversible effects invariably scares people and various groups that campaign on environmental issues find the anxiety raised a useful source of political issue. Virtually all chemicals can be shown to be dangerous at high doses and this includes the thousands of natural chemicals that are consumed every day in food but most particularly in fruit and vegetables. The assessment of chemical safety normally requires determination of the maximum tolerated dose (MTD) in rodents. Doses slightly lower than this figure are used to extrapolate linearly to a concentration at which observed effects would be limited to one in a million of the population and a “safe” exposure for the public set at figures 100-fold lower than this. Thus the safe level is frequently 10−5–10−6 the MTD and on theoretical grounds it is very unlikely that the same cellular receptor (binding) sites could be occupied and the same effect induced, varying only in degree. Most cellular binding sites go from null saturation to full saturation over a 30–50-fold change in dose, not one million. The effects at high dose are therefore a priori expected to be qualitatively different from low dose and the effects of toxicity or cancer of little consequence to public exposure (Ames and Gold, 2000). Ames and Gold (1999) indicate that the carcinogenic effects of many chemicals at MTD are really the result of induction of cell division which normally occurs only at high dose. The public attitude towards synthetic pesticides derives from the views of Rachel Carson (1962). Unfortunately anecdotal evidence forms much of the basis of Carson's book and a number of simple errors have been identified ( Van Embden and Peakall, 1996). While Carson's book helped alert to the impact of agricultural techniques at the time on the environment, her primary misunderstanding resulted from the claim that “for the first time” the human population was exposed to chemicals (pesticides) from birth to death. Plants synthesise an estimated 10,000 chemicals whose function is to kill or deter insect pests and occasionally larger herbivores. These natural pesticides are found in all fruit and vegetables; when tested at MTD they prove to be equally as damaging as synthetic pesticides ( Ames and Gold (1999) and Ames and Gold (2000)). Furthermore the daily consumption of natural pesticides or carcinogens outweighs the traces of synthetic pesticides consumed by the public by many thousands to one. Mankind has always been exposed to “dangerous” chemicals and since many current crops have only recently been used as food and are also the result of extensive plant breeding, the kinds of natural chemical to which we are now exposed is too recent to allow for biological evolution to have ensured safe consumption ( Ames and Gold, 1999). Solanine, chaconine, cucurbitacin, psoralen and genestein in potato, cucurbits, celery and soy have all been shown to have physiological effects if slightly elevated in food ( Trewavas and Stewart, 2003). Carson (1962) alerted in her book to the potential effects of DDT accumulation through food chains, to observed eggshell thinning and thus brood failure of predatory birds. Attempts to repeat these observations in the laboratory failed ( Wildavsky, 1995). However because organochlorines like DDT are environmentally stable, bans on its use were instituted in the early 70's. In western countries DDT was replaced by effective but far less stable pesticides. But pressure on developing countries to do the same led to enormous increases in malaria, a disease that particularly kills young children ( Attaran and Maharaj, 2000; Simon, 1996). In developing countries, cheap DDT also killed many crop and other human disease insect vectors and lowered food prices that benefited the poorest most. Recent evidence has revealed that organochlorines are formed in substantial amounts (mg/kg) in decaying plant materials such as crop roots in soil ( Myeni, 2002). Because organochlorines are fat soluble, they will be found in all plant food materials and mankind has therefore been exposed to these stable chemicals probably throughout evolutionary history and so far as is known without effect. In fact any natural pesticide can bio-concentrate like DDT if it is fat soluble. Potato contains the fat soluble neurotoxins, solanine and chaconine, and high doses of these have been shown to cause birth defects ( Ames and Gold, 1999). However chemophobia is the commonest reason for the public to buy organic food on the assumption that such food is free of synthetic pesticides. Organic food contains synthetic pesticide traces although understandably the amounts are lower than in conventional produce (Baker et al., 2002). Life expectancy continues to increase unabated (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002) and figures specific for the UK are to be found in Lomborg (2001). Centenarians are now ten times more common in the UK than they were 50 years ago. There has been no obvious effect of the introduction of pesticides and use through 50 years on life expectancy or on general public health ( Coggon and Inskip, 1994).

**Even if the model spills over – the system is unsustainable**

**Kost, 4** – agricultural economist, Specialty Crops Branch, Economic Research. Service, US Department of Agriculture (William, “CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?” http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf)

Even without an organic approach to food production, is Cuba’s urban gardening system viable? In Cuba, both were an integral part of a common development. That integration is not required. While it is possible to have a high-tech and chemical-based production system in a small-scale gardening environment, it is unlikely to be sustainable at levels sufficient to provide a significant portion of a city’s food needs. Most high-tech and chemical technologies employed respond to economies of scale. Incentives to grow into commercial operations will exist and production will shift away from central cities to areas with less severe constraints on land. Urban gardening systems are also labor-intensive systems. As long as labor is freely available or wages are low elsewhere, urban gardening can afford to utilize high-labor production techniques. As the Cuban economy grows and recovers, the demand for labor in other industries will grow and wages will rise. Because it will be more profitable to work elsewhere, labor would likely be drawn away from the urban gardens. Replacing labor with mechanization could also shift production away from urban locations. Mechanization also generates benefits from economies of scale. Thus, fewer and fewer urban gardens would remain producing for the urban markets.

At the same time, economic growth in Cuba should make commercial agriculture enterprises more profitable, more productive, and better able to supply food to urban markets. Marketing infrastructures should improve. With higher incomes, urban workers would be more able to purchase needed food. Commercial agricultural sources would become increasingly competitive with food from urban gardens, and urban workers would increasingly quit growing their own food. While there might continue to be urban gardens, it is unlikely that they will have a long-term role in providing a substantial portion of urban consumers’ food needs.

**can’t solve warming**

**Even if it’s real, it's irreversible.**

**Spaeth, 12** [12/5, “Why it's probably too late to roll back global warming”, Ryu, The Week News, http://theweek.com/article/index/237392/why-its-probably-too-late-to-roll-back-global-warming

Two degrees Celsius. According to scientists, that's the rise in global temperature, measured against pre-industrial times, that could spark some of the most catastrophic effects of global warming. Preventing the two-degree bump has been the goal of every international treaty designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including a new one currently being hammered out at a United Nations summit in Doha, Qatar. But **a new study** published by the journal Nature Climate Change shows that **it's incredibly unlikely that global warming can be limited to two degrees**. According to the study, the world in 2011 "pumped nearly 38.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the air from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil," says Seth Borenstein at The Associated Press: The total amounts to more than 2.4 million pounds (1.1 million kilograms) of carbon dioxide released into the air every second. Because emissions of the key greenhouse gas have been rising steadily and most carbon stays in the air for a century, it is not just unlikely but "rather optimistic" to think that the world can limit future temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), said the study's lead author, Glen Peters at the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway. What happens when the two-degree threshold is crossed? Most notably, that's when the polar ice caps will begin to melt, leading to a dangerous rise in sea levels. Furthermore, the world's hottest regions will be unable to grow food, setting the stage for mass hunger and global food inflation. The rise in temperature would also likely exacerbate or cause extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and droughts. There is a very small chance that the world could pull back from the brink. The U.N. could still limit warming to two degrees if it adopts a "**radical plan**," says Peters' group. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers study, such a plan would entail cutting carbon emissions "by 5.1 percent every year from now to 2050, essentially slamming the breaks on growth starting right now," says Coral Davenport at The National Journal, "and keeping the freeze on for 37 years." However, the U.N. has set a deadline of ratifying a new treaty by 2015, and implementing it by 2020, which means the world is already eight years behind that pace. There are still major disagreements between the U.S. and China over whether the developed world, which industrialized first, should bear the bulk of the cost of reducing carbon emissions. And there is, of course, a large contingent of Americans who don't even believe climate change exists, putting any treaty's ratification at risk. Climate change is so politically toxic in America that Congress has prioritized the fiscal cliff over — no exaggeration — untold suffering and the end of the world as we know it. In other words, it isn't happening. And if that's not bad enough, keep in mind that the two-degree mark is just the beginning, says Davenport: Michael Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Nobel Prize-winning U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, says that a 2-degree rise is not itself that point, but rather **the beginning of irreversible changes**. "It starts to speed you toward a tipping point," he said. "It's driving toward a cliff at night with the headlights off. We don't know when we'll hit that cliff, but after 2 degrees, we're going faster, we have less control. After 3, 4, 5 degrees, you spiral out of control, you have even more irreversible change." Indeed, at the current emissions rate, the world is expected to broach the four-degree mark by 2100 — at which point, we can expect even worse environmental catastrophes.

## at: la relations

**Cuba’s not key to Latin American relations, or plan hurts them**

**Suchlicki 2k.** (Jaime, University of Miami, s Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History ¶ and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban ¶ and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. June “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)

**Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations**. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, and transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. **Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda**. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

**Failure to boost the economy causes Chinese collapse.**

**Pethokoukis** 9/22 (James, money and politics blogger for U.S. News & World Report , where he writes the monthly Capital Commerce magazine column. Pethokoukis is also the assistant managing editor of the magazine's Money & Business section, “Bailout Prevents Great Depression 2.0,” **2008**, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/capital-commerce/2008/09/22/bailout-prevents-great-depression-20.html)

Nope, I think they believed, and got Congress to believe, that the economy was on the verge of something far worse than the worst downturn in a generation. And that is why they went with the so-called nuclear option: the biggest financial bailout in history. In the words of JPMorgan Chase economist **James Glassman,** "Thankfully, we and our friends around the world who are watching the economic lights come on will never know where events would have led, if the clock had not stopped [last] Thursday afternoon.... Last week's events made the 1987 stock market crash look like child's play." As plumbers say about pricey repairs, "Sure, it costs money. It costs money because it saves you money." And plumber in chief Paulson had a pretty big pipe, loaded with toxic debt, to unclog. OK, let's run the numbers. Paulson is asking for $700 billion. But that massive amount doesn't include previous government actions to cure the credit crisis (like propping up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), nor does it take into account money the government may get back from selling the bad assets it will be purchasing. So let's say those situations cancel each other out, and we are really talking about $700 billion. Now that money is being borrowed. **So you take $700 billion borrowed for 30 years at prevailing interest rates, and you are talking about $2.5 trillion.** But as Paulson said last week, "I am convinced that this bold approach will cost American families far less than the alternative: a continuing series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets unable to fund economic expansion." Now let's do the math on the "alternatives." What would doing nothing cost? 1) **Scenario 1: Great Depression "Lite."** This is supposed to be the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. So let's assume that the total freezing up of American and global credit markets caused something half as bad as the Great Depression. From 1930 through 1933, the U.S. economy shrank by about 25 percent. Now let's say that by doing nothing and letting Mr. Market do his worst, the $12 trillion U.S. economy shrinks by half that amount (12.5 percent), or around $1.5 trillion over four years. (Also, figure a near doubling in unemployment.) But there's also the opportunity cost of not returning to growth, even at a so-so 2.0 percent a year. Doing nothing costs $1.1 trillion more in lost growth. So now we are down $2.6 trillion. But wait: There's more. Let's assume the stock market drops an additional 25 percent or so. That's $3 trillion more in lost market capitalization. Plus, we are forgoing the opportunity to gain back what we have lost in the market, about $3 trillion. So, add the $6 million in lost market capitalization to the lost economic output, and we are at $8.6 trillion. Then there is housing, already down $5 trillion, or roughly 20 percent. Let's conservatively say that we lose another $5 trillion by doing nothing. Plus, we forgo a partial rebound, say, $2.5 trillion. Adding together further housing losses (plus the lost opportunity to recoup some losses), and we are talking about a total cost of doing nothing of $15 trillion in four years for the whole megillah. But it could be worse. 2) **Scenario 2: Great Depression 2.0.** The economy shrinks by 25 percent over four years, or $3.2 trillion, plus $1.1 trillion in lost opportunity growth. Economic cost: $4.3 trillion. The market falls two thirds from its peak, losing $7 trillion in value from its current level, plus $3 trillion from not getting a rebound. Stock market cost: $10 trillion. Housing falls an additional $10 trillion from current levels, plus the lost opportunity of $2.5 trillion from a rebound. Housing cost: $12.5 trillion. Total four-year financial and economic cost of doing nothing: $26.8 trillion. Now this is all a very rough guesstimate and doesn't include the costs of all sorts of other ramifications. Here is a fun one: the dissolution of China. Its economy is built for hypergrowth. A dramatically rising standard of living is both keeping the Communist Party in power and keeping the country together. Neither might survive a global economic meltdown. What is the economic impact of that? I don't know. My guesstimator just blew up.

**US decline hurts developing economies**

**World Bank** 1/16/**2008** (Developing Countries to Cushion Rich-Country Slowdown in 2008, with Turkey’s GDP Growth accelerating from 5.1% in 2007 to 5.4% in 2008, http://go.worldbank.org/BSCQE8A5D0)

A weaker US dollar, the specter of an American recession and rising financial-market volatility could cast a shadow over this soft landing scenario for the global economy. These risks would cut export revenues and capital inflows for developing countries, and reduce the value of their dollar-investments abroad. In this context, the reserves and other buffers that developing countries have built up in past years may be needed to absorb unexpected shocks.

**Economic growth also solves warming and general biodiversity better than the aff—key to alternatives forms of energy and clean tech production, ie transtioning China away from coal**

**Anderson 4** [Terry L. professor of economics at Montana State University, Ph.D. in economics http://www.perc.org/articles/article446.php]

Hansen's essay concludes on an optimistic note, saying "the main elements [new technologies] required to halt climate change have come into being with remarkable rapidity." This statement would not have surprised economist Julian Simon. He saw the "ultimate resource" to be the human mind and believed it to be best motivated by market forces. Because of a combination of market forces and technological innovations, we are not running out of natural resources. As a resource becomes more scarce, prices increase, thus encouraging development of cheaper alternatives and technological innovations. Just as fossil fuel replaced scarce whale oil, its use will be reduced by new technology and alternative fuel sources. Market forces also cause economic growth, which in turn leads to environmental improvements. Put simply, poor people are willing to sacrifice clean water and air, healthy forests, and wildlife habitat for economic growth. But as their incomes rise above subsistence, "economic growth helps to undo the damage done in earlier years," says economist Bruce Yandle. "If economic growth is good for the environment, policies that stimulate growth ought to be good for the environment."

##  at: klein

#### Klein is quite wrong – empirics cuts both ways.

**Drum 3-12**. [Kevin, political blogger, “Presidents and the Bully Pulpit” Mother Jones -- http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/03/presidents-and-bully-pulpit]

I also think that Ezra doesn't really grapple with the strongest arguments on the other side. For one thing, although there are examples of presidential offensives that failed (George Bush on Social Security privatization), there are also example of presidential offensives that succeeded (George Bush on going to war with Iraq). The same is true for broader themes. For example, Edwards found that "surveys of public opinion have found that support for regulatory programs and spending on **h**ealth **c**are, welfare, urban problems, education, environmental protection and aid to minorities increased rather than decreased during Reagan’s tenure." OK. But what about the notion that tax cuts are good for the economy? The public may have already been primed to believe this by the tax revolts of the late '70s, but I'll bet Reagan did a lot to cement public opinion on the subject. And the Republican tax jihad has been one of the most influential political movements of the past three decades. More generally, I think **it's a mistake to focus narrowly on presidential speeches about specific pieces of legislation**. Maybe those really don't do any good. But presidents do have the ability to rally their own troops, **and that matters**. That's largely what Obama has done in the contraception debate. Presidents also have the ability to set agendas. Nobody was talking about invading Iraq until George Bush revved up his marketing campaign in 2002, and after that it suddenly seemed like the most natural thing in the world to a lot of people. Beyond that, it's too cramped to think of the bully pulpit as just the president, just giving a few speeches. It's more than that. It's a president mobilizing his party and his supporters and doing it over the course of years. That's harder to measure, and I can't prove that presidents have as much influence there as I think they do. But I confess that I think they do. Truman made containment national policy for 40 years, JFK made the moon program a bipartisan national aspiration, Nixon made working-class resentment the driving spirit of the Republican Party, Reagan channeled the rising tide of the Christian right and turned that resentment into the modern-day culture wars, and George Bush forged a bipartisan consensus that the threat of terrorism justifies nearly any defense. It's true that in all of these cases presidents were working with public opinion, not against it, but I think it's also true that different presidents might have shaped different consensuses.

Partisanship is about politics not ideology – proves our link story true – this cites the study your card cites.

Mellow 11. [Nicole, Associate Professor of Political Science, Chair of Leadership Studies Program @ Williams College, “Book Reviews: American Politics Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate” Perspectives on Politics, Vol 9, Issue 3, p. 722-723]

In 2008, Barack Obama's calls for a new postpartisan era struck a chord with many Americans. Yet President Obama has struggled with Congress to produce even bipartisan outcomes. The reigning wisdom on partisanship would suggest that this is because the ideological divide between the parties is simply too stark. Frances Lee's thoughtful new book, which is a study of Senate voting behavior from 1981 through 2004, offers an alternative interpretation, one that validates public skepticism of inside-the-beltway party politics. Her claim is that much of the congressional partisanship is about politics and power, rather than ideological differences. Collective political interests within each party predispose Democrats and Republicans to oppose each other, even on votes with no ideological content. If true, then public distaste for “partisan bickering” is reasonable, and much of the conventional scholarly understanding of congressional partisanship is wrong. Lee begins by historicizing and challenging the methodological individualism now dominating studies of Congress for ascribing legislator vote behavior to individual policy preference and treating party cohesion as ideological cohesion and party difference as ideological difference. As she astutely points out, the problem with this conceptualization is that it reads ideology into every partisan dispute. Rather than assuming ideological content based on the observed behavioral patterns of votes, Lee uses legislative language and Congressional Record debates to distinguish, a priori, those roll call votes that bear on liberal/conservative debates over the economy, social issues, and foreign policy from those that do not. What she discovers is that a full 44% of party votes are over issues of no identifiable ideological significance (p. 65).

#### Fights occur to score political points – context of each particular fight is key – prefer our issue specific capital key warrants.

**Mellow 11**. [Nicole, Associate Professor of Political Science, Chair of Leadership Studies Program @ Williams College, “Book Reviews: American Politics Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate” Perspectives on Politics, Vol 9, Issue 3, p. 722-723]

Lee's findings lead her to conclude that **Democrats and Republicans often fight to advance their party's political interests** in being perceived as effective or being associated with popular outcomes. The party, in her view, is a “political institution” (p. 182), a team of members who have gotten better at working together to advance collective electoral and political goals. Thus, one party will regularly disagree with the other simply to make the president look bad (or good), to discredit the opposition's integrity, **to attempt to control the debate**, or to burnish its image. In short, today's parties fight because there is political payoff even if there is no ideological reward. When we understand this, we see why bipartisanship is so hard to come by. Lee designs her research carefully and rigorously. For example, in determining whether to count a vote as ideological, she digs deeply into the public record to learn if senators discussed any aspect in ideologically identifiable terms. In coding nonideological votes, such as “good government” votes, Lee excludes those that may be even partially about ideology, such as nomination fights in which part of the debate was about the nominee's policy views and part was about credentials or ethics. Expansive ideological categories make for a harder test of her argument, as do narrower nonideological categories. There are some elements of the research, though, where greater clarification would be especially useful (some might claim critical). Most important is the description of nonideological votes. According to the author's method, these votes account for a sizable majority—nearly 60%—of all Senate votes in her time period (p. 65), and thus are central to her argument. She provides some textual description of the types of issues included (e.g., good government, institutional powers, some federal programs), but knowing more about these votes and how they break down, similar to what she usefully provides for ideological votes, would be helpful in evaluating her argument. One suspects that in any given political moment, a putatively “nonideological” partisan battle over an ethics investigation or presidential power is actually a proxy war about the party-in-power's liberal (or conservative) agenda. While the nominal issue at hand may, in principle, defy left/right categorization, the vote is nevertheless very much about ideological commitments. **Context is everything**, and without knowing more details of this broad category, it is difficult to ascertain whether an issue is as free of ideological portent as the public record suggests.

Public appeals aren’t even the main source of capital – your article’s generalizations are wrong.

Dickinson 9. [ Matthew, Professor of Political Science - Middlebury College, “We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research” Presidential Studies Quarterly Volume 39 Issue 4 -- December – p 736-770]

If higher approval ratings can augment a president's persuasive power in select cases, Neustadt remains skeptical that presidents can substitute "going public" for bargaining as a general means of influence. "Public appeals," he argues instead, "**are part of bargaining**, albeit a changing part since prestige bulks far larger than before in reputation" (Neustadt 1990, xv). A key reason why presidents cannot expect to rely on prestige to augment their power is that approval levels are largely governed by factors outside their control. "[L]arge and relatively lasting changes [in Gallup Polls measuring popular approval] come at the same time as great events with widespread consequences" (81).

## 2nc pc key (debt)

**PC is key to the debt deal**

**1). Credibility—unpopular policies prevent Obama’s hardline stance on debt ceiling and dilute the intensity of his threats—that’s Moore**

**2). Essential to avoid concessions**

**Garnham, 9/17/13** (Peter, “Summers not over for dollar strength” Euromoney,

Full article: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3255829/Category/16/ChannelPage/0/Summers-not-over-for-dollar-strength.html?single=true&copyrightInfo=true)

That is because seeking his confirmation in the US Senate could have cost Obama **valuable political capital.** As Geoffrey Yu, strategist at UBS, points out, that could have meant that reaching an agreement on raising the debt ceiling afterwards would have therefore **required even greater concessions from Obama** and created additional fiscal drag on the US economy. Overall, it would seem the ripple effects from Summers’ withdrawal from the race to become Fed chairman and the negative impact on the dollar could disappear quickly.

**Concessions will split the Democratic base and make a deal impossible**

**Cook, 9/17**/13 - Economic and Fiscal Policy Correspondent at National Journal (Nancy, “How Dangerous Is the Rift Among Democrats?” National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/how-dangerous-is-the-rift-among-democrats-20130917)

Remember that split among congressional Republicans on fiscal strategy? Well, now it seems the Democrats have the makings of a similar problem.

In recent weeks, congressional D's have been uncharacteristically independent, breaking with their leadership and the Obama administration. First they opposed military action in Syria, warning the president they would deny his request to strike. And then came Larry Summers, who was brought down by a handful of Senate Democrats who let the White House know they would not confirm him as Fed chief.

All this bodes quite poorly for President Obama (and Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi) as the spending and debt fights approach.

If Obama's advisers take anything away from the Syria and Summers episodes, Capitol Hill aides and lawmakers suggest it should be the message that Democrats are not going to get in line with a budget deal that compromises their liberal positions. No longer should the White House feel free, as it has in the past, to consider tweaks to programs like Medicare or Social Security, for instance (unless, of course, Republicans agree to extract more money from taxpayers).

Reid and one of his primary deputies, Sen. Patty Murray, continue to oppose the "chained CPI" proposal that would change the way government benefits are calculated and make them less generous—one of the ideas the president offered up in past budget negotiations. House Democrats largely are not in favor of one of the president's other previous budget offers—to cut Medicare by $400 billion.

These concessions would be an incredibly hard sell to Democrats during a year where the country's annual deficit continues to fall, says a House Democratic leadership aide.

"A lot of our members were concerned about the drift of the negotiations during the fiscal cliff," the aide said. "Our sense is that any deal this fall would not be as large so there is not as much of a necessity to offer up those items."

The White House hasn't ruled those items out though; it's not really even engaging in the discussion at all yet. If lawmakers start to draw lines in the sand, the president will have fewer tools to use and fewer levers to pull to score a deal that keeps the government running and the United States current on its debt.

**3). leverage to barter with Republicans**

**Lowrey, 9/16/13** (Annie, “Summers Seen as Costly in Political Terms” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/business/democrats-saw-summerss-fed-nomination-as-too-costly-in-political-capital.html?pagewanted=all)

For the White House, that would have left two options, Senate aides said, both unpalatable. The first would have been to lean on the Democratic “no” votes, asking members to agree to pass Mr. Summers out of committee even if they intended to vote against him on the Senate floor. But the White House had not laid the groundwork for such a strategy. Some Democratic offices had not heard from White House representatives about the nomination at all.

The second option would have been to **barter for Republican votes**. Aides described that strategy as possible: many Republicans would have been willing to vote for Mr. Summers, they said, **for a price**. But handing the Republicans leverage in the midst of the debt ceiling and budget debates would have weakened the White House’s hand.

**4). Key to drumming up public support to pressure the GOP**

**Meet the Press, 9/15/13** (NBC News, lexis) **Woodward = Bob Woodward, investigative journalist.**

GREGORY: Well, we`ll see.

But I want to bring up a point with about a minute left. You know, Syria is now going to get mired in whether this agreement is lived up to or not. We`ve got a budget battle that`s brewing again with the debt ceiling.

But, you think this is the next crisis that Obama is facing with Congress. Are we going to raise the debt ceiling? Will he negotiate? He says...

WOODWARD: And this is really serious. Back in 2011, when the crisis visited them, the Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner was running around and saying if we don`t fix this, **we could trigger a depression worse than the 1930s**. And when I talked to Obama about this, he said, it was the most intense three weeks of his presidency. More than Osama bin Laden and so forth.

So -- and the Republicans are out here, a group of them in the House, essentially using extortion and blackmail methods to say, if we don`t defund Obamacare we`re not going to do the routine things of government.

PARKER: Well, we`re at a game of chicken at this point. And they are not -- no one thinks they`re going to defund Obama, not even the people pushing for it.

And at some point, you know, the Republicans are going to have to blink and they`re going to fund it. If they pass a bill that doesn`t include funding for Obamacare, then the Senate won`t pass the bill and, you know, somebody`s got to blink. We`re not going to shut down government. We can`t.

NAVARRO: But let`s be I think fair to the Republicans here. It`s not all Republicans saying let`s shut down the government if we don`t defund Obamacare. So I don`t think it`s fair to paint it as the Republicans, because the Republicans that have been here today, including John McCain, have been very much against this and saying...

WOODWARD: Yes, it`s the 40 extremists that`s who`s doing it.

PARKER: The insane caucus.

WOODWARD: You used it.

GREGORY: We`ll leave it there.

NAVARRO: You`re going to get a lot of flak from mental health advocates.

PARKER: Never had that happen.

GREGORY: All right, thank you all very much. We`ll leave it there.

Coming up next the future of our economy five years after the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Among our guests, former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and CNBC`s Maria Bartiromo along with former Congresswoman Barney Frank on where we are five years later.

First our political collector Chuck Todd will be along with his "First Read Sunday." What to look for in the week ahead in politics. Back here in just a moment.

GREGORY: We`re back with more politics. Our political director Chuck Todd with his "First Read Sunday."

We just talked about the debt ceiling business. You`re looking at it this, this week. That of our poll.

CHUCK TODD, NBC NEWS CORRESPONDENT: We did. And we have a poll and we show the initial gauge of the public, the default position is don`t raise it. Look at this, 44 percent say no, 22 percent say yes. The White House pushing back on this poll saying you have to explain it to the people.

Well, this is the exact same place the debt ceiling was in April 2011.

Now, by the time if hit a crisis point, more of the public moved into in favor of raising the debt ceiling, but what this shows is the **president has to use political capital and time to flip these numbers**. It`s going to be a lot of work.

## 2nc pc key (theory)

#### Capital is key – prefer issue specific internal links – horse trading is unique to immigration reform negotiations due to ideological Republican positions, that’s 1nc Hindustan Times.

#### Political capital theory is real –

#### best peer reviewed evidence proves

\*evidence filter – default to qualified professors on the theory of political capital rather than News Post Writers postulating on the failures of Obama – 2nc Dickinson evidence cites several PhD professors in Political and Social Sciences

\*political capital theory is real, several reasons – 1) presidents have the ability to utilize persuasion and diplomatic maneuvering to rally public support and horse trade to effectively make strategic concessions to get his agenda through despite internal opposition in Congress; 2) targeting of capital – presidents have the capability to specifically target capital to assuage certain partisan parties and pivotal voters into voting for his agenda; 3) the impact is reverse causal – more capital is statistically linked to an increasing ability of a president to exert influence, decline is also linked to a lack of influence – their evidence lacks this evidentiary modeling – prefer our evidence

**Dickinson 09 –** (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars, these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress. This logic finds **empirical support in vote-switching studies** that indicate that presidents **do direct lobbying efforts** at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents **do influence** the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.). In one of the most concerted efforts to model how bargaining takes place at the individual level, Terry Sullivan examines presidential archives containing administrative headcounts to identify instances in which members of Congress switched positions during legislative debate, from initially opposing the president to supporting him in the final roll call (Sullivan 1988,1990,1991). Sullivan shows that in a bargaining game with incomplete information regarding the preferences of the president and members of Congress, there are a number of possible bargaining outcomes for a given distribution of legislative and presidential policy preferences. These outcomes depend in part on legislators' success in bartering their potential support for the president's policy for additional concessions from the president. In threatening to withhold support, however, members of Congress run the risk that the president will call their bluff and turn elsewhere for the necessary votes. By capitalizing on members' uncertainty regarding whether their support is necessary to form a winning coalition, Sullivan theorizes that presidents can reduce members of Congress's penchant for strategic bluffing and increase the likelihood of a legislative outcome closer to the president's preference. "Hence, the skill to bargain successfully becomes a foundation for presidential power even within the context of electorally determined opportunities," Sullivan concludes (1991, 1188). Most of these studies infer presidential influence, rather than measuring it directly (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996,128-29; see also Edwards 1991). Interestingly, however, although the vote "buying" approach is certainly consistent with Neustadt's bargaining model, none of his case studies in PP show presidents employing this tactic. The reason may be that Neustadt concentrates his analysis on the strategic level: "Strategically the question is not how he masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance" (Neustadt 1990, 4). For Neustadt, whether a president's lobbying efforts bear fruit in any particular circumstance depends in large part on the broader pattern created by a president's prior actions when dealing with members of Congress (and "Washingtonians" more generally). These previous interactions determine a president's professional reputation--the "residual impressions of [a president's] tenacity and skill" that accumulate in Washingtonians' minds, helping to "heighten or diminish" a president's bargaining advantages. "Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it can make persuasions easier, or harder, or impossible" (Neustadt 1990, 54).

## 2nc kt econ

**Raising the debt ceiling is key to the economy**

**1). sovereign default—prevents US government from paying interest on bonds + creates a financial disaster**

**2). financial system collapse—decline of the dollar’s credibility kills trade flows and global economic growth**

**3). treasury bond sell-off—perceived by investors as unstable investment, increases interest rates on consumer borrowing and spending**

#### 4). past brinks prove—S&P 500 fell 19% between July and August 2011

Milstead9-12[David, Writer for the Globe and Mail, “The under-the-radar threat to U.S. stocks” Factiva]

Conventional wisdom holds that the chief risk to the high-flying U.S. stock market is “tapering,” the potential cutback of the Federal Reserve's bond-buying program. It's an understandable view, given how the Fed's monetary policy has propped up the country's economy for years by helping to keep long-term interest rates at ultra-low levels. But it's also wrong. The greatest immediate hazard to stocks isn't the direction the six governors of the Federal Reserve will take. It's what the 535 members of Congress will do in the coming weeks when faced with two budgetary issues that ought to be routine – but will likely be anything but. The first issue is approving a federal budget for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, or at least a resolution that will keep the government open in its absence. The second is authorizing a new, higher number for the U.S. government's borrowing before Washington hits its debt ceiling, once again, possibly by mid-October. In the absence of such a vote, the U.S. must simply stop spending – and, in essence, default on its debt. If this sounds familiar, it's because we went through a similar showdown two years ago, in the summer of 2011. Yet it's easy to forget now how that fiscal gridlock roiled the markets. In the first day of trading after Standard & Poor's downgraded U.S. debt in early August, the S&P 500 fell nearly 7 per cent. The day after, the index was nearly 19 per cent below the level of early July. The rhetoric suggests this fiscal showdown could inflict similar damage. Eighty House Republicans recently signed a letter urging their leadership to use any new government-funding bill to cut all necessary money for President Barack Obama's signature accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act, more popularly known as Obamacare. The Republican House leadership, it is said, does not support such a move. That's apparently because they prefer to make it part of the showdown over the debt ceiling. (The National Review, one of the U.S.'s leading conservative publications, reported Tuesday that Eric Cantor, the House Majority Leader, told Republicans they will be demanding a one-year delay of Obamacare in exchange for an increase in the debt ceiling.) Failing to raise the debt ceiling doesn't mean default, its opponents argue. The Treasury can just do a better job of “prioritizing,” paying the creditors while axing other expenses. In the absence of a higher debt ceiling, the U.S. could pay the interest on Treasury securities, and keep on footing the tab for Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security, national defence and a handful of aid programs, according to the Bipartisan Policy Centre. But, starting Oct. 15, it won't be able to afford the salaries of other federal workers, or perform functions like road construction and air traffic control, or run the federal court system. Ted Yoho, the improbably named Republican representative from Florida, said this about a failure to raise the debt ceiling, according to a recording of one of his summertime town hall meetings leaked to the Huffington Post: “So they say that would rock the market, capital would leave, the stock market would crash … I think our credit rating would do better.” Better, I think, to take the U.S. Treasury's position that the markets will view the U.S. picking and choosing which bills to pay as an admission it simply can't pay them all. Deputy secretary Neil Wolin said during the last debt-ceiling showdown, in 2011, that it “would merely be default by another name.” That, however, is the view from the reality-based community, rather than the deeply irrational, anti-intellectual element that has hijacked the Republican Party and turned ordinary budgetary procedure into a partisan brawl. The liberal economic writer Jonathan Chait recently wrote “the chaos and dysfunction have set in so deeply that Washington now lurches from crisis to crisis, and once-dull, keep-the-lights-on rituals of government procedure are transformed into white-knuckle dramas that threaten national or even global catastrophe.” And yet stocks seem to be priced as if Democrats, Republicans and President Obama will come together to work something out. There is great faith that the United States will overcome its challenges and take the right path in the end. Investors could suffer double-digit losses in the coming weeks if that faith is misplaced.

**5). business confidence**

**McAuliff, 9/18/13** (Michael, “Debt Limit Showdown Could Be Catastrophic For Economy: Analysts” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/18/debt-limit-showdown\_n\_3950890.html)

The House Republican plan to have showdowns over both funding the government and raising the nation's debt limit could have severe consequences for the overall U.S. economy, non-partisan analysts said Wednesday.

The concern surrounding a potential political fight over the country's borrowing cap next month was highlighted prominently by Moody's economist Mark Zandi, a former adviser to Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) who testified at a joint congressional hearing Wednesday on "The Economic Costs of Debt-Ceiling Brinkmanship.”

The debt limit, which stands at $16.7 trillion, authorizes the Treasury Department to pay for the spending that has already been authorized by Congress. Treasury officials warned in the spring that they had begun taking extraordinary measures to keep the government's bills paid, and would likely have to default on some payments in mid-October if Congress did not grant borrowing authority that equals the spending it has written into law.

Such a default would be devastating, Zandi warned.

"You need to raise the debt limit. There's no other option," he told lawmakers. "Otherwise, it's disastrous. It's counterproductive to your own goals because it's going to result in a recession, bigger deficits and raise the debt."

House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) argued earlier on Wednesday that the debt limit is often used as a negotiating lever for politicians, and Rep. Sean Duffy (R-Wis.) made the same point during the hearing, asking why Democrats shouldn't be more willing to talk over Republican demands.

Much like Democrats who released their own report on the topic, Zandi noted, however, that in the last showdown over the debt ceiling two years ago, the U.S. government's credit rating was downgraded and the stock market tanked.

"You can only put the gun to your head so many times before someone's going to make a mistake and pull the trigger, and it's to everyone's detriment," Zandi told Duffy.

He gave a crushing summary of the potential impacts of a default.

"If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's box. It will be devastating to the economy," he predicted. "If you don't do it in time, confidence will evaporate, consumer confidence will sharply decline, [as well as] investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."

"We'll be in the middle of a very, very severe recession, and I don't see how we get out of it," he added.

#### 6). systemic consequences

**Schwarcz, 8/14/13** – professor of law at Duke, founding director of the Duke Global Capital Markets Center (Steven, “Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default” SSRN)

A U.S. debt default153 would also have both microeconomic and macroeconomic, or systemic,154 consequences. Observers have argued that a default would likely result in stocks, bonds, and the dollar “plummet[ing] in the immediate aftermath.”155 Credit markets would likely freeze,156 harming both companies and consumers.157 The downgrading of credit ratings on U.S. debt would also make it much more difficult and expensive for the country to borrow.158

Even a mere “technical” default, caused by illiquidity, could harm the real economy.159 The 1979 debt defaults, which were temporarily caused by a federal debt ceiling limit on new borrowings,160 resulted in a 60 basis point increase in the interest rate on Treasury bills161—an increase that appears to be permanent.162 Such a rate increase could also increase the cost of private borrowings. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has observed, for example, that a U.S. debt default would “raise all borrowing costs”163 because “US Treasuries set the benchmark borrowing rate” for private loans.164

Investment bank J.P. Morgan recently issued a report updating the potential economic impact of a technical default. The report assumes that the United States temporarily misses an interest or principal payment on its debt.165 Even if this temporary default does not reflect an actual deterioration of U.S. solvency, it still would “almost certainly have large systemic effects with long-term adverse consequences for Treasury finances and the U.S. economy.”166 At a minimum, the United States would likely see a one percent reduction in gross domestic product (GDP) due to higher interest rates and a likely equity selloff.167 Even worse, the report concluded, the default also “could leave lasting damage in its wake due to a permanent decline in foreign demand [for U.S. Treasury securities], which will likely lead to [continuing] higher borrowing costs and larger deficits.”168

## at: passage inev

**Delay risks economic collapse**

**Puzzanghera, 9/18/13** (Jim, “Delay in raising debt limit risky, Lew says” Los Angeles Times, lexis)

As the nation fast approaches its debt limit, Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew issued his strongest warning yet to Congress about the economic consequences of waiting until just before the deadline to pass an increase.

"Trying to time a debt-limit increase to the last minute could be very dangerous," Lew told the Economic Club of Washington on Tuesday. "We cannot afford for Congress to gamble with the full faith and credit of the United States of America."

Republicans are balking at raising the $16.7-trillion debt limit, which Congress must do by as early as mid-October, unless the Obama administration agrees to major concessions including deep spending cuts and a delay in implementing the healthcare reform law.

During a meeting last week, House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) gave Lew a list of times in the past when the White House and Congress used the need to raise the debt limit as a way to find bipartisan solutions on fiscal issues, Boehner's office said.

Boehner has said that any increase in the debt limit must be offset by budget cuts or spending reforms at least as large as the increase.

But Lew reiterated Tuesday that President Obama would not negotiate over raising the debt limit because it involves paying for bills already authorized by Congress and because the notion of a federal government default should not be a bargaining chip.

Lew specifically ruled out a delay in the healthcare law, the Affordable Care Act, a move being pushed by some House conservatives.

"That's just not reality, and they're going to have to start dealing in reality," he said.

But as the Treasury runs out of the accounting maneuvers it has used since the spring to continue borrowing to pay the nation's bills, Lew said lawmakers needed to act.

Since the U.S. technically reached its debt limit in the spring, the Treasury has been using so-called extraordinary measures, such as suspending investments in some federal pension funds, to juggle the nation's finances to pay bills. Those measures will be exhausted by the middle of October.

Lew noted that Washington politicians like to wait until they are up against a deadline to act, as they often do with spending bills and did last year with the so-called fiscal cliff, the combination of automatic tax increases and government spending cuts.

But the debt limit is different, Lew said, because of the complexity of identifying an exact date when the nation would run out of borrowing authority -- and because of the consequences of a first-ever federal government default.

Lew said a default would be "a self-inflicted wound that can do harm to our economy right at a moment when the recovery is strengthening."

A bitter battle over the debt limit in 2011, resolved at the last minute, raised fears of a first-ever U.S. government default. The lengthy standoff led Standard & Poor's to downgrade the nation's credit rating for the first time and triggered financial market turmoil along with a deep drop in consumer confidence.

"Some in Congress seem to think they can keep us from failing to pay our nation's bills by simply raising the debt ceiling right before the moment our cash balance is depleted," Lew said. Such a view is misguided, he said.

The Treasury Department doesn't know with precision the exact day that it won't have enough incoming cash to make all the required outgoing payments once it runs out of borrowing authority.

Lew formally told Congress last month that the Treasury would run out of borrowing authority in mid-October. At that point, the government would be able to pay bills only with cash on hand of about $50 billion on any given day.

An analysis released last week by the Bipartisan Policy Center, which also cited the difficulty of pegging an exact date, estimated that the U.S. would run out of borrowing authority between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5.

The vagaries of the debt-limit issue mean that Congress must act sooner rather than later, Lew said.

"I'm nervous about the desire to drive this to the last minute when the last minute is inherently unknowable and the risk of making a mistake could be catastrophic," he said.

**PC key to quick debt ceiling resolution**

**PACE, 9/12/13** — AP White House Correspondent (Julie, “Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda” http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/2013/09/12/3704721/obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic.html#storylink=cpy)

WASHINGTON — With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his **progress could hinge on the strength of his standing** on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis. "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach. "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said. The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1. Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities. Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support. Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012. Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers. "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is." For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action. Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles. That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul. On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law. The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending. "You can't talk about increasing the debt limit unless you're willing to make changes and reforms that begin to solve the spending problem that Washington has," the Ohio Republican said.