**1nc- da**

**The debt ceiling will pass but it will be a fight**

**Washington Post, 9/15/13** (“Congress can turn back to the budget now” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-can-turn-back-to-the-budget-now/2013/09/15/e05c975c-1ca5-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0\_story.html)

WITH PRESIDENT Obama’s bid for congressional support for a military strike against Syria on hold for the time being, members of the House and Senate can devote their attention to what was previously supposed to have been their priority for September: **avoiding a potential political and economic train wreck over the federal government’s finances**.

Specifically, Congress needs to fund the government after the current spending law expires on Sept. 30, and it needs to raise the $16.7 trillion debt limit, which will be reached sometime in the second half of October, and which must be increased to avoid the possibility of a U.S. default.

Alas, these two pieces of what should be routine business have become entangled in the politics of Obamacare, which is to say the decreasingly comprehensible politics of the House Republican caucus. A sizable minority of GOP members insists on “defunding” the health care law before the major parts of it begin to take effect in January. According to a recent Congressional Research Service analysis, this is an operationally futile goal. It would be bad policy even if it were possible.

What’s more, it’s bad politics for the GOP to risk a government shutdown in pursuit of this chimera — a fact Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) recognizes but which has, so far, failed to sway his back-benchers. This is why Democrats are content, for now, to sit back and cheer on the Republicans’ internal feud. Also, that’s easier than countering the Republicans’ anti-Obamacare crusade with realistic budget alternatives.

How this latest impasse plays out is anyone’s guess, though there are plausible scenarios under which Mr. Boehner can give the ultras in his caucus a chance to vote one more time against Obamacare, while engineering Democratic acquiescence in a short-term continuation of the current $988 billion annual spending rate. Such a result would avoid a partial government shutdown — for a few months.

The debt ceiling, too, probably can be finessed, as it has been in the past. Exactly how is admittedly difficult to predict given Mr. Obama’s insistence that raising it is not negotiable and Mr. Boehner’s seemingly incompatible insistence that he won’t increase Washington’s borrowing capacity except in return for progress on deficit reduction. But a default would not be in either side’s political interest.

**Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio – Cuba policy is totally unique**

**LeoGrande, 12**

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a **major role** in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the **price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill** to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was **stymied by indifference or resistance** elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to **avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger.** When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team **delayed the announcement for several months** at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration **surrendered to** Senator **Rubio's demand** that it limit the licensing of travel providers **in exchange** for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to **sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives**, both Democrat and Republican, who are **willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba**. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a **strong incentive to try the same tactic again**. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been **thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners**. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the **bruising battle** with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that **require a significant expenditure of political capital** rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

**Capital is finite and spending it elsewhere prevents a debt ceiling deal**

**Moore, 9/10/13 -** Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also **eats up credibility in asking for the next favor.** It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and **focus with intensity** on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, **one at a time**.

**Default will destroy the U.S. and global economy**

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed **financial disaster in history.**

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse **far worse than anything we’ve seen** in the past several years.

**Nuclear war**

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

**1nc –da**

**Plan kills Brazil’s sugar industry.**

**Miami Herald 02** (6/26/02, “Cuba embargo under fire - Sally Grooms Cowal's Group cites benefits for U.S.,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/706185/posts)//DR. H

4. The next reason in favor of doing away with the embargo runs as follows: Look here, there is money to be made in Cuba. Remember Coolidge’s, the "business of America is business?" If everything else fails, appeal to greed . There are some salivating mouths claiming that 6 billion dollars worth of goods and commodities could be sold to Cuba. But unless the U.S. takes the place of the Soviet Union and initially subsidizes the Cuban economy with credits and loans (coming out of American tax paying pockets), and rebuild its shattered infrastructure at a cost of billions upon billions of dollars, the U.S. would have to buy Cuban sugar produced by workers paid now 10 dollars per month in order to enable Cubans to have money to pay for all these goodies, without any guarantees that the large portion of the profits made would not go first to the apparatus of repression (armed forces, secret police and Communist Party cadres) and to the modernization of its weapons systems and only lastly, to the Cuban people. Moreover, one must ask: what happens to the sugar industry of Florida now producing 25% of the sugar consumed in the U.S.?. Furthermore, according to the American Sugar Alliance, 80-85% of the sugar produced in the U.S. is consumed here. The remainder 15% is imported from 40 foreign countries--about 1,5 million tons. Under WTO and NAFTA rules the U.S. is required to bring in AT LEAST that amount, even if the U.S. does not need it now! Any sale of Cuban sugar to a sugar producing country like the U.S. would mean that there would be less of the market for the American sugar industry to go around.

In addition, **what would happen abroad to Brazil’s sugar market**, one of the largest producers of sugar, (even if a significant amount of that country's sugar is used to produce ethanol)? and to the Dominican Republic’s or Mexico's market? to mention only three sugar producing countries in our hemisphere. We should ponder, in this context, the following statement issued on August 10, 2000 by Joseph Terrell, Director of Public Affairs of the American Sugar Alliance: "We are well aware of the challenges lifting the Cuban embargo could have on the US sugar industry. Also, quota holders in other countries are monitoring the situation closely as well because they could stand to lose…we are monitoring this closely." A similar view has been advanced by the general manager of the Louisiana Sugar Cane Cooperative and secretary/treasurer of the Louisiana Farm Bureau Foundation, Jackie Theriot, who said: **Lifting the embargo -- without holding Cuba to production limits -- would flood the U.S. market with sugar, dropping the prices and bankrupting the domestic industry.** (quoted by Kevin Blanchard in his article "Now no Time to Help Cuba," The Advocate ONLINE (April 11, 2002) However, it is unlikely that Castro's Cuba would accept being hamstrung by production limits and it would go against the free trade ideology espoused by Washington these days.

Is the U.S. going to harden the grip of Castro by granting him even a significantly diminished market opening at the expense of its own sugar industry? Imperil the Brazilian sale of sugar to the U.S. just to please Castro? Is the U.S. going to finance the the conversion of Cuban sugar into ethanol, as means to reduce the worldwide glut of sugar even though the prospects of creating a large U.S. ethanol market is still an economic entelechy? Moreover, consider that during one year, in the decade of the 50’s (1959, for example) Cuba’s sugar quota in the U.S. totaled 1.256 million metric tons, roughly the same amount that the U.S. now imports from 40 countries! It is well known that when Cuba lost its generous American sugar quota in the 60’s this amount was allocated to other countries. which used the allocation to maintain their sugar industry and increase their production. What would be the ripple effect of the Cuban re-intervention in the American sugar market, given that it will be considerably less than what it sold in the 50’s and will offer sugar at a low price to gain a foothold in the market? This macroeconomic assessment has not been addressed in the public arena by Castro’s acolytes and foot soldiers in this country. In addition, in the case Dominican Republic, the European Union subsidized exports have already caused a 20% income loss of income in that country. If Cuba’s sales of sugar take a slice of the American market, both the domestic and international suppliers, such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Mexico (who incidentally, has been encouraged to develop an ethanol industry) are going to feel even more severely impacted. Even if Cuba did not make efforts to create a capital intensive industry, as the cane sugar producers in the U.S and producers of sugar in the world have done it, Cuban sugar would be produced more cheaply, as already indicated, doubtlessly, with Communist government subsidies in order to retain a share of the American market.

**That causes Brazilian economic instability.**

**SC 12** (Sugarcane.org, AT: Website’s Bias!!! – Cites objective data…, 6/19/12, “Impact on Brazil's Economy,” http://sugarcane.org/the-brazilian-experience/impact-on-brazils-economy)//DR. H

The sugarcane industry – including cultivation, processing and refined products – represents an important segment of the Brazilian economy.

Economic Contribution

In 2010, the sugarcane sector contributes US$50 billion to Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) – equivalent to almost 2.4% of the entire Brazilian economy and comparable to the GDP of a European country like Slovenia (US$47.7 billion).

When you add in the various suppliers and stakeholders who depend on Brazil’s sugarcane industry, the entire sugarcane agro-industrial system generates gross revenues totaling more than US$86 billion annually.

Good Jobs

The sugarcane industry employs 1.28 million workers, according to 2008 data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment’s Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS).

**Nuclear war.**

**Shulz 2k** (Donald, Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE, March)

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be Brazil, which already accounts for almost half of Latin America’s economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 active troops).53 That country could very well assume a more commanding political and military role in the decades ahead. Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States.

# 1nc – t

**The plan engages with non-governmental organizations.**

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

**That violates the word “its”.**

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 05**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

**That’s a voting issue –**

**1. Limits – infinite non-governmental organizations that can be engaged become topical – makes it impossible to predict the aff killing clash, decisionmaking, and research.**

**2. Ground – core topic education generics like relations disads are nullified.**

**1nc – da**

**Plan shifts oil reliance to Cuba.**

**Padgett ‘8**

Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami & Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine – Oct. 23, 2008 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN

The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still, the concessions so far represent **less than a quarter** of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, **the only people really able to do it to the extent the Cubans need are the Americans."**

**That trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties.**

**Alhaiji and Maris ‘4**

[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of **massive**¶ **oil deposits** in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

**That causes Saudi Prolif.**

**Guzansky ‘13**

Yoel Guzansky is a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. His main research area is Gulf security. He has also served as Iran coordinator at Israel's National Security Council. His recent publications include The Gulf States in a Changing Strategic Environment (2012), One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, and The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West – Middle East Quarterly¶ Spring 2013, pp. 59-64 – available at: http://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon

Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on **the quality of relations between the two countries** and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.¶ After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the **number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation** in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's **doubts about the reliability of Washington** is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, **at present**, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. **But strategic interest**, motivated by considerations of survival, **could have the upper hand**. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

**Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.**

**Edelman ‘11**

(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among **three** or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

**1nc – cp**

**The United States federal government should establish a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to study current U.S. policy on Cuba. The Commission should recommend that the The United States federal government should substantially ease its economic restrictions with the Republic of Cuba.**

**A Bipartisan Commission on Cuba solves the case but avoids politics**

**Ratliff, 13** -research fellow and former curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution. He is also a research fellow of the Independent Institute. An expert on Latin America, China, and US foreign policy, he has written extensively on how traditional cultures and institutions influence current conditions and on prospects for economic and political development in East/Southeast Asia and Latin America (William, “Cuba's Tortured Transition” 1/30, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281

A New Policy to Cuba

Since the early 1990s U.S. “proactive” policies have done more to stoke than reduce domestic tensions in Cuba, though we profess to seek a “peaceful transition.” Most U.S. legislators have supported pro-embargo Cuban-Americans even though Gallup polls have long shown that most Americans favor diplomatic relations with Havana and lifting the embargo. **On balance,** politicians don’t think Cuba policy is important enough to be worth stirring up the hornets in the still fairly militant and well-financed pro-embargo lobby. Not only have all presidential candidates including Obama supported the embargo, most have resisted even seriously discussing it.

This U.S. commitment to a failed policy has given Washington a "special stake” in the island’s so-called “independent” sector whose goals appeal to Americans. But tragically, paraphrasing journalist Scotty Reston, Americans will do anything for these dissidents except listen to them. My talks with many in Cuba and abroad suggest that most oppose the embargo and three have co-authored articles with me saying so. If these dissidents come under focused government fire in the years ahead, many Americans will feel compelled to intervene even more directly—perhaps militarily—on their behalf.

Two points stand out: Cuba is not the security threat that our current policy treats it as; and our sanctions do not advance the desirable political, economic, and humanitarian improvements that we say we seek on the island. The bottom line is that we must base our policy on national security interests and realities, not unattainable dreams, however noble those dreams may seem.

During his second and final term, and after having drawn unprecedented electoral support as a Democrat from Cuban-Americans in Miami, President Obama is in a position to make serious reforms, if he has the will to do so. He might begin by resurrecting a 1998-99 proposal—then endorsed by former secretaries of state Kissinger and George Shultz, but killed by President Clinton—for convening a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to seriously examine the pros and cons of the policy. It would certainly see the need for change and its findings would **give Obama cover for action.**

**1nc – k**

**Disorder and insecurity are inevitable because we live in a dangerous world. Efforts to control this fear have resulted in the deaths of millions and the creation of WMDs. The alternative is a negative gesture of indifference—we must learn to live with the world as it is. This allows us to break out of the death cycle.**

**Der Derian, 98** (James, (Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts)On Security, ed: Lipschitz, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, Decentering Security).

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an *ontotheology*  of security, that is, an *a priori*  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, *other than us* ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word *alternative* . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

**1nc transition adv**

**No impact to Cuba’s economy – (chances are the card is terrible).**

**Cuba’s economy is growing now**

**Havana Times 7/7** (7/7/13 “Cuban Gov. Presents “Favorable” Stats” <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95985> 7-7-13)

The economy showed an overall a “favorable performance”, said Yzquierdo. Almost all sectors recorded growth, “including trade, transport, communications and manufacturing,” he noted.¶ Yzquierdo said the Cuban trade balance was positive at the end of the first quarter and pointed to a similar trend for year-end. At the same time, he spoke of a “slowdown” in the global economic situation.¶ Cuba recently reduced its forecasts for annual growth in 2013 from the 3.6 percent initially estimated to somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. He emphasized that the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) has been influenced by the crisis in the international arena.¶ In the first semester, the island’s economy grew 2.3 percent, according Yzquierdo, despite “external stress”, the “internal weaknesses” and the effects of Hurricane “Sandy”, which swept across the east of Cuba in October 2012.¶ “Sandy” affected 11 provinces and caused losses of almost 7 billion dollars, according to the minister.¶ The inaugural session of the eighth legislature of the National Assembly of People’s Power closes on, Sunday. Raul Castro is expected to pronounce in a speech to the parliament.¶ In a Communist Party Central Committee meeting last week, Castro came down hard on what he called “indiscipline and illegalities” in the State apparatus. He will most likely refer to the fight against corruption, one of the banner efforts of his administration.

**Impacts empirically denied – Cuba’s economy should’ve collapse by now since the embargo’s been in place for so long.**

Internal Link Turn **– Lifting the embargo makes the situation worse for a laundry list of reasons**

**Suchlicki 2k**, Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, 00 (Jaime, 6/2000, University of Miami, “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba,” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf, p. 2-4, accessed 6/24/13, IC)

Introduction ¶ Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and ¶ the travel ban are lifted, the Cuban people would benefit economically; ¶ American companies will penetrate and influence the Cuban market; the ¶ Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic ¶ society would be accelerated. ¶ These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, ¶ that Castro and the Cuban leadership are naïve and inexperienced and, ¶ therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the ¶ revolution and influence internal developments in the island. Second, that ¶ Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the ¶ economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest. ¶ Third, that Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is ¶ willing to risk what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years – total ¶ control of power and a legacy of opposition to “Yankee imperialism,” – in ¶ exchange for economic improvements for his people. During the Fifth ¶ Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized “We will do what is ¶ necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and ¶ we will not abandon our Socialist system.” ¶ Castro also reiterated his long-standing anti-American posture, ¶ accusing the U.S. of waging economic war against his government and ¶ calling for “military preparedness against imperialist hostility.” A change in U.S. policy toward Cuba may have different and ¶ unintended results. The lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without ¶ meaningful changes in Cuba will: ¶ Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures. ¶ Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses ¶ owned by the Cuban government. Most businesses are owned in ¶ Cuba by the state and, in all foreign investments, the Cuban ¶ government retains a partnership interest. ¶ Lead to greater repression and control since Castro and the ¶ leadership will fear that U.S. influence will subvert the revolution ¶ and weaken the Communist party’s hold on the Cuban people. ¶ Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy on the island. ¶ Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations such as ¶ the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars ¶ to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and ¶ has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new ¶ loans will be wasted by Castro’s inefficient and wasteful system, ¶ and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay ¶ back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his ¶ economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on ¶ the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt ¶ welfare system on the island. Perpetuate the rather extensive control that the military holds over ¶ the economy and foster the further development of “Mafia type” ¶ groups that manage and profit from important sectors of the ¶ economy, particularly tourism, biotechnology, and agriculture. ¶ Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin America which ¶ emphasize democracy, human rights, and market economies. ¶ Send the wrong message to the enemies of the U.S.: that a foreign ¶ leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the ¶ use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at ¶ the U.S.; espouse terrorismand anti-U.S. causes throughout the ¶ world; and eventually the U.S. will “forget and forgive,” and ¶ reward him with tourism, investments, and economic aid. ¶

**no advantage—normalization happens by 2018—you have to win that bioterror causes exintction**

**Afghanistan withdrawal solves overstretch internal link**

**Tapper, 2/13** CNN Chief Washington Correspondent (Jake, “Obama announces 34,000 troops to come home” February 13, 2013 CNN News http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/12/politics/obama-sotu-afghanistan-troops) // czhang

Washington (CNN) -- President Barack Obama announced in his State of the Union speech on Tuesday night that some 34,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan will have returned home by this time next year.¶ The move will reduce the number of U.S. forces in the country by more than half. There are now about 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.¶ A Washington Post poll on Tuesday showed that 80% of registered voters support the president's policy to end the war in Afghanistan.¶ In January, Obama met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Washington, where they agreed to accelerate the military transition in Afghanistan.¶ Afghan forces will take the lead in combat missions throughout the country starting in the spring, instead of mid-year, as was previously expected.¶ 5 things we learned¶ Afghan forces are ready¶ Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, said National Army forces are "completely ready" to take over the country's security responsibilities.¶ "We welcome the announcement of the withdrawal ... and we (will) always remember their efforts and sacrifice," he said. "We are very happy that these soldiers are returning home to their families."¶ The Taliban also welcomed the news, saying Western governments "must salvage themselves from the protracted and pointless war in Afghanistan."¶ But as expected, the militants continued their call for a complete withdrawal of outside forces.¶ "The Afghans should be granted control, choice of government and sovereignty of their country," the Taliban statement said. "If not such then our sacred Jihad will intensify and forge ahead successfully even if one foreign soldier is present in our country ..."

#### I really don’t have to read defense to any of the terminal impact scenarios because they have no reverse causal internal link- just because Cuban instability prevents the US from addressing war or terrorism does not mean that solving Cuba is sufficient to prevent global wars

**No impact to bioterror.**

**Soligenex 13** (Soligenex Inc. is a clinical stage biopharmaceutical company focused on developing products to treat inflammatory diseases and biodefense countermeasures, BioDefense and Emerging Diseases, http://www.soligenix.com/prod\_def.shtml, Website last updated 2013)

Since 2001, a new sense of vulnerability to radiation, infectious diseases, toxins and chemical agents has generated significant research and development efforts to identify and produce innovative therapies and means to protect against threats that could be used as biological weapons. There is a growing need for products that protect the population against such agents of bioterrorism, as well as against emerging infectious diseases that could arise through natural epidemics. With very few exceptions, such products do not exist, and those that are available for current deployment are based on outdated and sometimes ineffective technologies. Many of these products will only be used in the event of an emergency. Products to combat biological warfare or bioterrorism will be supplied to the population from medicines stored in the US Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The federal government has previously established a special fund to acquire biological warfare countermeasures (termed Project Bioshield), which allocated $5.6 billion over a 10-year period to acquire products for the SNS. Realizing that many of these countermeasures do not yet exist, the US government has recently established the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). The existence of BARDA creates a situation in which products arising from research, primarily sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Defense (DoD), can be prioritized and then developed for large-scale manufacturing and clinical evaluation, and ultimately acquisition of the product for the SNS. Soligenix, Inc. is addressing the development of products and technologies that can be used to protect against several biological threats considered agents of bioterrorism, consistent with biological warfare threats and emerging diseases that the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), a division of the NIH, has identified as high priorities. Soligenix is developing several potential products to prevent morbidity and mortality due to the threat of biological toxins for which preventive vaccination is the most feasible means to protect a susceptible population. This approach is being taken because the known mechanism of protection against toxin exposure is mediated through antibodies in the serum or present on mucosal surfaces that can be elicited by vaccination with subunit immunogens. Soligenix's process for product development of biodefense products is highly cooperative with government funding, since the government itself will be the final supplier of the products. Currently, Soligenix is operating under a $9.4 million grant award from NIAID, which will fund, over a five-year period, the development of formulation and manufacturing processes for vaccines, including RiVax™ (ricin toxin vaccine), and VeloThrax™ (anthrax vaccine) that are stable at elevated temperatures. The grant will also fund the development of improved thermostable adjuvants expected to result in rapidly acting vaccines that can be given with fewer injections over shorter intervals. In addition, Soligenix is expanding the range of applicability of its lead product, oral beclomethasone dipropionate (BDP), referred to as OrbeShield™, for gastrointestinal Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS).

**Current security is sufficient to prevent major blowout**

**Lloyd’s Register 2004** (“Statement on LNG risks from Lloyd's Register North America, Inc,” http://www.lr.org/News+and+Events/News+Archive/2004/Statement+on+LNG+risks+from+Lloyds+Register+North+America+Inc.htm)

LNG is transported globally in insulated tanks on specialised ships. These tanks provide four physical barriers and two layers of insulation between the LNG and the outside environment. Further, the separation between the inner and outer hulls of an LNG carrier is typically over two meters. These two factors combined mean that LNG cargo carried at sea has a very high in-built level of protection from external blast sources. In the event of an attack, even if a one-meter hole were to be formed in the inner hull, the resultant holes in the primary containment barrier would be significantly smaller due to the increased separation distance from the blast source combined with the pressure absorption properties of the secondary containment barrier and insulation materials. It is unrealistic to imagine that the entire cargo of any ship can be instantaneously released. To mount an attack on an LNG carrier that would result in the instantaneous release of all of its cargo would require the equivalent of a full scale military operation, not a clandestine terrorist operation like those carried out against the USS Cole and the Limburg. The idea that LNG carriers are potential nuclear devices is erroneous. There is a lot of energy in LNG and natural gas, as in any hydrocarbon. However, the 'nuclear explosion' statement describes the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. For example, a lump of coal contains lots of energy, but when set on fire, its energy doesn't all come out instantly like a bomb. Instead, the coal burns over a period of time releasing its energy as it goes. Similarly, LNG carriers contain large quantities of energy, but the energy can only be released slowly in the event of a spill or a fire. An LNG spill in open air will not result in a bomb-like explosion. This has been consistently demonstrated in experiments. Not everything that is ignited explodes like a bomb. For example, when a match is lit, it burns but does not explode. Similarly, the natural gas vapour that could result from an LNG carrier spill also falls under the category of substances that will burn but not explode like a bomb. Reason and caution Paul Huber, Director of LRNA, says: "There are risks associated with the transport and storage of LNG, as there are with any hydrocarbon energy source, and these are precisely the reasons that the LNG industry operates with extensive international and national regulations which govern the safety of LNG transport and storage. The effectiveness of these regulations is apparent in the LNG shipping sector, which has an unblemished safety record spanning 40 years - a track record which is unrivalled by any other maritime sector and most land-based industries. It should also be remembered that LNG itself is one of the cleanest-burning and most environmentally friendly energy sources currently available on a global scale. "While the shadow of terrorism hangs over us, we have to do as much as we can to protect ourselves and our borders, but it is misleading to state, as some have, that an attack on an LNG carrier would be similar to a nuclear event. It is difficult for us to know the rationale behind the assertion contained in the speech to the Houston Forum, but it is clear that it is not supported by fact.

**Empirically denied and no escalation**

**Gettleman, ‘10** [Jeffrey, East Africa bureau chief for the New York Times, March/April, “Africa's Forever Wars: Why the continent's conflicts never end.” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas\_forever\_wars]

There is a very simple reason why some of Africa's bloodiest, most brutal wars never seem to end: They are not really wars. Not in the traditional sense, at least. The combatants don't have much of an ideology; they don't have clear goals. They couldn't care less about taking over capitals or major cities -- in fact, they prefer the deep bush, where it is far easier to commit crimes. Today's rebels seem especially uninterested in winning converts, content instead to steal other people's children, stick Kalashnikovs or axes in their hands, and make them do the killing. Look closely at some of the continent's most intractable conflicts, from the rebel-laden creeks of the Niger Delta to the inferno in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and this is what you will find. What we are seeing is the decline of the classic African liberation movement and the proliferation of something else -- something wilder, messier, more violent, and harder to wrap our heads around. If you'd like to call this war, fine. But what is spreading across Africa like a viral pandemic is actually just opportunistic, heavily armed banditry. My job as the New York Times' East Africa bureau chief is to cover news and feature stories in 12 countries. But most of my time is spent immersed in these un-wars. I've witnessed up close -- often way too close -- how combat has morphed from soldier vs. soldier (now a rarity in Africa) to soldier vs. civilian. Most of today's African fighters are not rebels with a cause; they're predators. That's why we see stunning atrocities like eastern Congo's rape epidemic, where armed groups in recent years have sexually assaulted hundreds of thousands of women, often so sadistically that the victims are left incontinent for life. What is the military or political objective of ramming an assault rifle inside a woman and pulling the trigger? Terror has become an end, not just a means. This is the story across much of Africa, where nearly half of the continent's 53 countries are home to an active conflict or a recently ended one. Quiet places such as Tanzania are the lonely exceptions; even user-friendly, tourist-filled Kenya blew up in 2008. Add together the casualties in just the dozen countries that I cover, and you have a death toll of tens of thousands of civilians each year. More than 5 million have died in Congo alone since 1998, the International Rescue Committee has estimated. Of course, many of the last generation's independence struggles were bloody, too. South Sudan's decades-long rebellion is thought to have cost more than 2 million lives. But this is not about numbers. This is about methods and objectives, and the leaders driving them. Uganda's top guerrilla of the 1980s, Yoweri Museveni, used to fire up his rebels by telling them they were on the ground floor of a national people's army.Museveni became president in 1986, and he's still in office (another problem, another story). But his words seem downright noble compared with the best-known rebel leader from his country today, Joseph Kony, who just gives orders to burn.

**The warrant for Caucasus war= Russian sphere of influence—Russia has no incentive to go to war**

**Aron 06** – (Leon, Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, “The United States and Russia”, 6-29,

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24606/pub\_detail.asp)

Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains very remote for at least three reasons. First, despite the erosion, the countries’ geopolitical assets are still very weighty, as the bedrock issues of anti-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and energy will continue to force them to seek common ground and at least limited partnership.[17]

Second, the “restorationist” foreign policy notwithstanding, the three basic elements of the 1992-1993 national consensus on the foreign policy and defense doctrine remain largely the same. Russia is to stay a nuclear superpower and the regional superpower, but it seems to have settled for the role of one of the world’s great states, rather than a global superpower engaged in a worldwide competition with the United States. While these desiderata will continue to cause occasional sparring with the United States, they are no longer dedicated to the attainment of goals inimical to the vital interests of the United States and are not likely to ignite a relentless antagonistic struggle to the bitter end.

Lastly, despite the muscular rhetoric emanating of late from the Kremlin, unlike the Soviet Union twenty years ago and China today, Russia is not a “revisionist” power. It does not seek radically to reshape the geopolitical “balance of forces” in its favor. Moscow may rail at the score, but it is unlikely to endeavor to change the rules of the game. For that, one needs a different ideology and, as a result, a different set of priorities. Yet even in today’s Russia flush with petrodollars, the share of GDP devoted to defense (around 3 percent) is not only at least ten times smaller than in the Soviet Union, but also below the 1992-1997 average in a Russia that inherited an empty treasury from the Soviet Union and that was, like every revolutionary government, unable to collect taxes. Calculated in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defense expenditures in 2005 ($47.77 billion) were less than one-eleventh of what the U.S. spent ($522 billion).[18]

**1nc – agriculture adv**

**the only terminal impact= warming—delay 5 years of normalization**

**Years and years of data prove no impact—pesticides are low and natural chemicals are worse**

**Trewavas 2004** (Anthony, Prof. U. Edinburgh Studying Plant Physiology and Molecular Biology, Crop Protection, “A critical assessment of organic farming-and-food assertions with particular respect to the UK and the potential environmental benefits of no-till agriculture”, 23:9, ScienceDirect)

Chemophobia, the unreasonable fear of chemicals, is a common public reaction to scientific or media reports suggesting that exposure to various environmental contaminants may pose a threat to health (Safe, S.H., 1995. Xeno-oestrogens and breast cancer. New Engl. J. Med. 337, pp. 1303–1304.Safe, 1995). The spectre of cancer birth defects and irreversible effects invariably scares people and various groups that campaign on environmental issues find the anxiety raised a useful source of political issue. Virtually all chemicals can be shown to be dangerous at high doses and this includes the thousands of natural chemicals that are consumed every day in food but most particularly in fruit and vegetables. The assessment of chemical safety normally requires determination of the maximum tolerated dose (MTD) in rodents. Doses slightly lower than this figure are used to extrapolate linearly to a concentration at which observed effects would be limited to one in a million of the population and a “safe” exposure for the public set at figures 100-fold lower than this. Thus the safe level is frequently 10−5–10−6 the MTD and on theoretical grounds it is very unlikely that the same cellular receptor (binding) sites could be occupied and the same effect induced, varying only in degree. Most cellular binding sites go from null saturation to full saturation over a 30–50-fold change in dose, not one million. The effects at high dose are therefore a priori expected to be qualitatively different from low dose and the effects of toxicity or cancer of little consequence to public exposure (Ames and Gold, 2000). Ames and Gold (1999) indicate that the carcinogenic effects of many chemicals at MTD are really the result of induction of cell division which normally occurs only at high dose. The public attitude towards synthetic pesticides derives from the views of Rachel Carson (1962). Unfortunately anecdotal evidence forms much of the basis of Carson's book and a number of simple errors have been identified ( Van Embden and Peakall, 1996). While Carson's book helped alert to the impact of agricultural techniques at the time on the environment, her primary misunderstanding resulted from the claim that “for the first time” the human population was exposed to chemicals (pesticides) from birth to death. Plants synthesise an estimated 10,000 chemicals whose function is to kill or deter insect pests and occasionally larger herbivores. These natural pesticides are found in all fruit and vegetables; when tested at MTD they prove to be equally as damaging as synthetic pesticides ( Ames and Gold (1999) and Ames and Gold (2000)). Furthermore the daily consumption of natural pesticides or carcinogens outweighs the traces of synthetic pesticides consumed by the public by many thousands to one. Mankind has always been exposed to “dangerous” chemicals and since many current crops have only recently been used as food and are also the result of extensive plant breeding, the kinds of natural chemical to which we are now exposed is too recent to allow for biological evolution to have ensured safe consumption ( Ames and Gold, 1999). Solanine, chaconine, cucurbitacin, psoralen and genestein in potato, cucurbits, celery and soy have all been shown to have physiological effects if slightly elevated in food ( Trewavas and Stewart, 2003). Carson (1962) alerted in her book to the potential effects of DDT accumulation through food chains, to observed eggshell thinning and thus brood failure of predatory birds. Attempts to repeat these observations in the laboratory failed ( Wildavsky, 1995). However because organochlorines like DDT are environmentally stable, bans on its use were instituted in the early 70's. In western countries DDT was replaced by effective but far less stable pesticides. But pressure on developing countries to do the same led to enormous increases in malaria, a disease that particularly kills young children ( Attaran and Maharaj, 2000; Simon, 1996). In developing countries, cheap DDT also killed many crop and other human disease insect vectors and lowered food prices that benefited the poorest most. Recent evidence has revealed that organochlorines are formed in substantial amounts (mg/kg) in decaying plant materials such as crop roots in soil ( Myeni, 2002). Because organochlorines are fat soluble, they will be found in all plant food materials and mankind has therefore been exposed to these stable chemicals probably throughout evolutionary history and so far as is known without effect. In fact any natural pesticide can bio-concentrate like DDT if it is fat soluble. Potato contains the fat soluble neurotoxins, solanine and chaconine, and high doses of these have been shown to cause birth defects ( Ames and Gold, 1999). However chemophobia is the commonest reason for the public to buy organic food on the assumption that such food is free of synthetic pesticides. Organic food contains synthetic pesticide traces although understandably the amounts are lower than in conventional produce (Baker et al., 2002). Life expectancy continues to increase unabated (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002) and figures specific for the UK are to be found in Lomborg (2001). Centenarians are now ten times more common in the UK than they were 50 years ago. There has been no obvious effect of the introduction of pesticides and use through 50 years on life expectancy or on general public health ( Coggon and Inskip, 1994).

**Even if the model spills over – the system is unsustainable**

**Kost, 4** – agricultural economist, Specialty Crops Branch, Economic Research. Service, US Department of Agriculture (William, “CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?” http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf)

Even without an organic approach to food production, is Cuba’s urban gardening system viable? In Cuba, both were an integral part of a common development. That integration is not required. While it is possible to have a high-tech and chemical-based production system in a small-scale gardening environment, it is unlikely to be sustainable at levels sufficient to provide a significant portion of a city’s food needs. Most high-tech and chemical technologies employed respond to economies of scale. Incentives to grow into commercial operations will exist and production will shift away from central cities to areas with less severe constraints on land. Urban gardening systems are also labor-intensive systems. As long as labor is freely available or wages are low elsewhere, urban gardening can afford to utilize high-labor production techniques. As the Cuban economy grows and recovers, the demand for labor in other industries will grow and wages will rise. Because it will be more profitable to work elsewhere, labor would likely be drawn away from the urban gardens. Replacing labor with mechanization could also shift production away from urban locations. Mechanization also generates benefits from economies of scale. Thus, fewer and fewer urban gardens would remain producing for the urban markets.

At the same time, economic growth in Cuba should make commercial agriculture enterprises more profitable, more productive, and better able to supply food to urban markets. Marketing infrastructures should improve. With higher incomes, urban workers would be more able to purchase needed food. Commercial agricultural sources would become increasingly competitive with food from urban gardens, and urban workers would increasingly quit growing their own food. While there might continue to be urban gardens, it is unlikely that they will have a long-term role in providing a substantial portion of urban consumers’ food needs.

**The alternative to organic farming solves food shortages, diseases and turns their environment impact – organic farming can exist, but not alone**

**Wilcox 11** (Christie, 7/18/11, “Mythbusting 101: Organic Farming > Conventional Agriculture,” http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/science-sushi/2011/07/18/mythbusting-101-organic-farming-conventional-agriculture/)//DR. H

Myth #3: Organic Farming Is Better For The Environment

As an ecologist by training, this myth bothers me the most of all three. People seem to believe they’re doing the world a favor by eating organic. The simple fact is that they’re not – at least the issue is not that cut and dry.

Yes, organic farming practices use less synthetic pesticides which have been found to be ecologically damaging. But factory organic farms use their own barrage of chemicals that are still ecologically damaging, and refuse to endorse technologies that might reduce or eliminate the use of these all together. Take, for example, organic farming’s adamant stance against genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

GMOs have the potential to up crop yields, increase nutritious value, and generally improve farming practices while reducing synthetic chemical use – which is exactly what organic farming seeks to do. As we speak, there are sweet potatoes are being engineered to be resistant to a virus that currently decimates the African harvest every year, which could feed millions in some of the poorest nations in the world15. Scientists have created carrots high in calcium to fight osteoperosis, and tomatoes high in antioxidants. Almost as important as what we can put into a plant is what we can take out; potatoes are being modified so that they do not produce high concentrations of toxic glycoalkaloids, and nuts are being engineered to lack the proteins which cause allergic reactions in most people. Perhaps even more amazingly, bananas are being engineered to produce vaccines against hepatitis B, allowing vaccination to occur where its otherwise too expensive or difficult to be administered. The benefits these plants could provide to human beings all over the planet are astronomical.

Yet organic proponents refuse to even give GMOs a chance, even to the point of hypocrisy. For example, organic farmers apply Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxin (a small insecticidal protein from soil bacteria) unabashedly across their crops every year, as they have for decades. It’s one of the most widely used organic pesticides by organic farmers. Yet when genetic engineering is used to place the gene encoding the Bt toxin into a plant’s genome, the resulting GM plants are vilified by the very people willing to liberally spray the exact same toxin that the gene encodes for over the exact same species of plant. Ecologically, the GMO is a far better solution, as it reduces the amount of toxin being used and thus leeching into the surrounding landscape and waterways. Other GMOs have similar goals, like making food plants flood-tolerant so occasional flooding can replace herbicide use as a means of killing weeds. If the goal is protect the environment, why not incorporate the newest technologies which help us do so?

But the real reason organic farming isn’t more green than conventional is that while it might be better for local environments on the small scale, organic farms produce far less food per unit land than conventional ones. Organic farms produce around 80% that what the same size conventional farm produces16 (some studies place organic yields below 50% those of conventional farms!).

Right now, roughly 800 million people suffer from hunger and malnutrition, and about 16 million of those will die from it17. **If we were to switch to entirely organic farming, the number of people suffering would jump by 1.3 billion**, assuming we use the same amount of land that we’re using now. Unfortunately, what’s far more likely is that switches to organic farming will result in the creation of new farms via the destruction of currently untouched habitats, thus plowing over the little wild habitat left for many threatened and endangered species.

Already, we have cleared more than 35% of the Earth’s ice-free land surface for agriculture, an area 60 times larger than the combined area of all the world’s cities and suburbs. Since the last ice age, nothing has been more disruptive to the planet’s ecosystem and its inhabitants than agriculture. What will happen to what’s left of our planet’s wildlife habitats if we need to mow down another 20% or more of the world’s ice-free land to accommodate for organic methods?

The unfortunate truth is that until organic farming can rival the production output of conventional farming, its ecological cost due to the need for space is devastating. As bad as any of the pesticides and fertilizers polluting the world’s waterways from conventional agriculture are, it’s a far better ecological situation than destroying those key habitats altogether. That’s not to say that there’s no hope for organic farming; better technology could overcome the production gap, allowing organic methods to produce on par with conventional agriculture. If that does occur, then organic agriculture becomes a lot more ecologically sustainable. On the small scale, particularly in areas where food surpluses already occur, organic farming could be beneficial, but presuming it’s the end all be all of sustainable agriculture is a mistake.

**Soil erosion doesn’t hurt agriculture production**

**Ruttan, 99** (Vernon, Professor of Applied Economics @ Minnesota, 1999 “The Transition to Agricultural Sustainability” http://www.pnas.org/content/96/11/5960.full.pdf)

It is unlikely that soil loss and degradation will represent a serious constraint on global agricultural production over the next half-century. But soil loss or degradation could become a serious constraint on production on a local or regional scale in some fragile resource areas. This possibility will be greatest if slow productivity growth in robust resource areas should lead to intensification or expansion of crop and animal production in fragile resource areas, i.e., tropical rain forests, arid and semiarid regions, and the high mountain areas. In some such areas, however, the possibility of sustainable production can be enhanced by irrigation, terracing, careful soil management, and changes in commodity mix and farming systems.

**can’t solve warming**

**No warming impacts.**

**Burnett, 12** – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with **as good or better credentials** and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are **very modestly funded** when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

**Even if it’s real, it's irreversible.**

**Spaeth, 12** [12/5, “Why it's probably too late to roll back global warming”, Ryu, The Week News, http://theweek.com/article/index/237392/why-its-probably-too-late-to-roll-back-global-warming

Two degrees Celsius. According to scientists, that's the rise in global temperature, measured against pre-industrial times, that could spark some of the most catastrophic effects of global warming. Preventing the two-degree bump has been the goal of every international treaty designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including a new one currently being hammered out at a United Nations summit in Doha, Qatar. But **a new study** published by the journal Nature Climate Change shows that **it's incredibly unlikely that global warming can be limited to two degrees**. According to the study, the world in 2011 "pumped nearly 38.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the air from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil," says Seth Borenstein at The Associated Press: The total amounts to more than 2.4 million pounds (1.1 million kilograms) of carbon dioxide released into the air every second. Because emissions of the key greenhouse gas have been rising steadily and most carbon stays in the air for a century, it is not just unlikely but "rather optimistic" to think that the world can limit future temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), said the study's lead author, Glen Peters at the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway. What happens when the two-degree threshold is crossed? Most notably, that's when the polar ice caps will begin to melt, leading to a dangerous rise in sea levels. Furthermore, the world's hottest regions will be unable to grow food, setting the stage for mass hunger and global food inflation. The rise in temperature would also likely exacerbate or cause extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and droughts. There is a very small chance that the world could pull back from the brink. The U.N. could still limit warming to two degrees if it adopts a "**radical plan**," says Peters' group. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers study, such a plan would entail cutting carbon emissions "by 5.1 percent every year from now to 2050, essentially slamming the breaks on growth starting right now," says Coral Davenport at The National Journal, "and keeping the freeze on for 37 years." However, the U.N. has set a deadline of ratifying a new treaty by 2015, and implementing it by 2020, which means the world is already eight years behind that pace. There are still major disagreements between the U.S. and China over whether the developed world, which industrialized first, should bear the bulk of the cost of reducing carbon emissions. And there is, of course, a large contingent of Americans who don't even believe climate change exists, putting any treaty's ratification at risk. Climate change is so politically toxic in America that Congress has prioritized the fiscal cliff over — no exaggeration — untold suffering and the end of the world as we know it. In other words, it isn't happening. And if that's not bad enough, keep in mind that the two-degree mark is just the beginning, says Davenport: Michael Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Nobel Prize-winning U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, says that a 2-degree rise is not itself that point, but rather **the beginning of irreversible changes**. "It starts to speed you toward a tipping point," he said. "It's driving toward a cliff at night with the headlights off. We don't know when we'll hit that cliff, but after 2 degrees, we're going faster, we have less control. After 3, 4, 5 degrees, you spiral out of control, you have even more irreversible change." Indeed, at the current emissions rate, the world is expected to broach the four-degree mark by 2100 — at which point, we can expect even worse environmental catastrophes.

**Adaptation checks.**

**Singer et al 11** Dr. S. Fred, Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, Professor Emeritus of Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a Member of the International Academy of Astronautics; Robert M. Carter, Research Professor at James Cook University (Queensland) and the University of Adelaide (South Australia), palaeontologist, stratigrapher, marine geologist and environmental scientist with more than thirty years professional experience; and Craig D. Idso, founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, and Association of American Geographers, et al, 2011, “Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/FrontMatter.pdf

Decades-long empirical trends of climate-sensitive measures of human well-being, including the percent of developing world population suffering from chronic hunger, poverty rates, and deaths due to extreme weather events, reveal dramatic improvement during the twentieth century, notwithstanding the historic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. The magnitude of the impacts of climate change on human well-being depends on society's adaptability (adaptive capacity), which is determined by, among other things, the wealth and human resources society can access in order to obtain, install, operate, and maintain technologies necessary to cope with or take advantage of climate change impacts. The IPCC **systematically underestimates adaptive capacity** by failing to take into account the **greater wealth and technological advances** that will be present at the time for which impacts are to be estimated. Even accepting the IPCC's and Stern Review's worst-case scenarios, and assuming a compounded annual growth rate of per-capita GDP of only 0.7 percent, reveals that net GDP per capita in developing countries in 2100 would be **double the 2006 level of the U.S.** and triple that level in 2200. Thus, even **developing countries' future ability** to cope with climate change would be **much better than that of the U.S. today**. The IPCC's embrace of biofuels as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was premature, as many researchers have found "even the best biofuels have the potential to damage the poor, the climate, and biodiversity" (Delucchi, 2010). Biofuel production consumes nearly as much energy as it generates, competes with food crops and wildlife for land, and is unlikely to ever meet more than a small fraction of the world's demand for fuels. The notion that global **warming might cause war** and social unrest is not only wrong, but even **backwards** - that is, **global cooling has led to wars** and social unrest in the past, whereas global warming has coincided with periods of **peace, prosperity, and** social **stability**.