## 1nc -- da

#### Debt ceiling will pass – Obama political strength and Dem unity means the GOP will cave

**Bolton, 9/14/13** (Alexander, The Hill, “Confident Democrats want separate showdowns on shutdown and debt limit” Read more: http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/322247-confident-democrats-want-separate-showdowns-on-shutdown-and-debt-limit#ixzz2g92IX3s7

Democrats, however, want to force the GOP to debate these issues successively.

“We’re not negotiating on the debt ceiling. We think we have the high ground in both of those fights,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide.

The Senate Democratic strategy over the next several weeks will be to stand pat and refuse to make any significant concessions in exchange for funding the government or raising the debt ceiling.

“If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. “They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets.”

Schumer said Republicans are on stronger political ground if there’s a government shutdown, but warned “even on that one, they’re on weak ground because the public sort of is finally smelling that these guys are for obstructing.”

#### Increasing economic engagement splits Congressional Democrats and consumes political capital

Magnus, ‘9

John R. Magnus, trade lawyer in Washington, DC, is President of TradeWins LLC and Of Counsel

at Miller & Chevalier Chartered, ‘9

3. Votes: Will the new government allow any major trade-liberalizing items to come to a vote in the first two years? Conventional wisdom holds that trade votes are bad for the Democratic party -- they split the caucus, demoralize stakeholders, and generally spell trouble for the party’s political majority. Many regard allowing trade initiatives to reach the front of the legislative queue as a blunder of the early Clinton administration. A precious period of unified government was squandered when it could, the argument goes, have been used to enact important Democratic priorities. And then it might have lasted longer -- the 1994 Republican takeover could have been averted! Although questionable in several particulars, this narrative is present in the minds of many Democrats in and out of government today, and they are determined to manage the new period of unified government differently. There will be a strong temptation to use President Obama’s political capital exclusively for initiatives favored by a strong majority of Democrats, to keep trade-liberalizing measures (and related items like Trade Promotion Authority) off the voting agenda for months or even years, and to limit any congressional trade votes to matters like adjustment assistance and enforcement. But, of course, foreign policy concerns, and business community desires, will pull in the opposite direction.

#### It disrupts Obama’s attempt to prioritize the debt ceiling by consuming political capital

**Frumin, 9/21/13 –** reporter for MSNBC (Aliyah, “Bright prospects on foreign agenda; domestic in chaos” http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/09/21/bright-prospects-for-obama-on-foreign-agenda-domestic-in-chaos/)

Conservative strategist Keith Appell said having a full plate is just part of being president and his legacy is at risk because his number one priority of improving the economy has not been significantly addressed.

Fixing the economy, he said, could arguable be pegged to how much political capital he has on the issues Obama is currently facing (Syria, Iran, debt ceiling, gun control). “But certainly, if you’re talking about legacy, unless there is an overwhelming foreign policy situation like the Cold War, then it’s all about the economy.”

But Jeanne Zaino, a professor of political science at Iona College and of political campaign management at New York University said “Every time Obama tries to refocus on the economy, there’s these enormous crises that break out. You can just imagine how frustrating that can be and how it’s been difficult for him to prioritize.”

“It’s not only the amount he has on his plate. It’s that he doesn’t’ have the ability to get anything done without Congress,” she added.

#### That takes Obama off-message – it undermines his strategy of constant pressure on the GOP and makes a deal impossible

**Milbank, 9/27/13** – Washington Post Opinion Writer (Dana, “Obama should pivot to Dubya’s playbook” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-obama-should-try-pivoting-to-george-bushs-playbook/2013/09/27/c72469f0-278a-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9\_story.html)

If President Obama can stick to his guns, he will win his October standoff with Republicans.

That’s an awfully big “if.”

This president has been consistently inconsistent, predictably unpredictable and reliably erratic. Consider the events of Thursday morning:

Obama gave a rousing speech in suburban Washington, in defense of Obamacare, on the eve of its implementation. “We’re now only five days away from finishing the job,” he told the crowd.

But before he had even left the room, his administration let slip that it was delaying by a month the sign-up for the health-care exchanges for small businesses. It wasn’t a huge deal, but it was enough to trample on the message the president had just delivered.

Throughout his presidency, Obama has had great difficulty delivering a consistent message. Supporters plead for him to take a position — any position — and stick with it. His shifting policy on confronting Syria was the most prominent of his vacillations, but his allies have seen a similar approach to the Guantanamo Bay prison, counterterrorism and climate change. Even on issues such as gun control and immigration where his views have been consistent, Obama has been inconsistent in promoting his message. Allies are reluctant to take risky stands, because they fear that Obama will change his mind and leave them standing alone.

Now come the budget showdowns, which could define the rest of his presidency. Republican leaders are trying to shift the party’s emphasis from the fight over a government shutdown to the fight over the debt-limit increase, where they have more support. A new Bloomberg poll found that Americans, by a 2-to-1 margin, disagree with Obama’s view that Congress should raise the debt limit without any conditions.

But Obama has a path to victory. That poll also found that Americans think lawmakers should stop trying to repeal Obamacare. And that was before House Republicans dramatically overplayed their hand by suggesting that they’ll allow the nation to default if Obama doesn’t agree to their laundry list of demands, including suspending Obamacare, repealing banking reforms, building a new oil pipeline, easing environmental regulations, limiting malpractice lawsuits and restricting access to Medicare.

To beat the Republicans, Obama might follow the example of a Republican, George W. Bush. Whatever you think of what he did, he knew how to get it done: by simplifying his message and repeating it, ad nauseam, until he got the result he was after.

Obama instead tends to give a speech and move along to the next topic. This is why he is forever making “pivots” back to the economy, or to health care. But the way to pressure Congress is to be President One Note.

In the debt-limit fight, Obama already has his note: He will not negotiate over the full faith and credit of the United States. That’s as good a theme as any; it matters less what the message is than that he delivers it consistently.

The idea, White House officials explained to me, is to avoid getting into a back-and-forth over taxes, spending and entitlement programs. “We’re right on the merits, but I don’t think we want to argue on the merits,” one said. “Our argument is not that our argument is better than theirs; it’s that theirs is stupid.”

This is a clean message: Republicans are threatening to tank the economy — through a shutdown or, more likely, through a default on the debt — and Obama isn’t going to negotiate with these hostage-takers.

Happily for Obama, Republicans are helping him to make the case by being publicly belligerent. After this week’s 21-hour speech on the Senate floor by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the publicity-seeking Texan and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) objected to a bipartisan request to move a vote from Friday to Thursday to give House Republicans more time to craft legislation avoiding a shutdown. On the Senate floor, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) accused them of objecting because they had sent out e-mails encouraging their supporters to tune in to the vote on Friday. The Post’s Ed O’Keefe caught Cruz “appearing to snicker” as his colleague spoke — more smug teenager than legislator.

Even if his opponents are making things easier for him, Obama still needs to stick to his message. As in Syria, the president has drawn a “red line” by saying he won’t negotiate with those who would put the United States into default. If he retreats, he will embolden his opponents and demoralize his supporters.

**Default will destroy the U.S. and global economy**

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed **financial disaster in history.**

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse **far worse than anything we’ve seen** in the past several years.

#### Nuclear war

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

## 1nc – topicality

#### A. Interpretation - ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### B. Violation – the plan results in an increase in Cuba and the private sector’s economic engagement – not USFG economic engagement. There’s a difference

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

#### C. Voting issue –

**1. limits –offering for Cuba to engage allows for thousands of single commodity affs that would be topical—there are also infinite private actors that could export or import from Cuba**

**2. negative ground – the offer avoids core neg generics-- means we lose good links to diplomatic capital, politics, USFG action based CPs, and critiques**

**1nc – kritik (long)**

**Civil Society is founded upon a Master-to-Slave relationship that exploits and alienates the Black Body.**

**Wilderson 10** (Frank B., Professor of Drama @ UC Irvine- “Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms” pg. 9-11 [SG])

The polemic animating this research stems from (1) my reading of Native and Black American metacommentaries on Indian and Black subject positions written over the past twenty-three years and ( ) a sense of how much that work appears out of joint with intellectual protocols and political ethics which underwrite political praxis and socially engaged popular cinema in this epoch of multiculturalism and globalization. The sense of abandonment I experience when I read the metacommentaries on Red positionality (by theorists such as Leslie Silko, Ward Churchill, Taiaiake Alfred, Vine Deloria Jr., and Haunani-Kay Trask) and the metacommentaries on Black positionality (by theorists such as David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe) against the deluge of multicultural positivity is overwhelming. One suddenly realizes that, though the semantic field on which subjectivity is imagined has expanded phenomenally through the protocols of multiculturalism and globalization theory, **Blackness and** an unflinching articulation of **Redness are more unimaginable and illegible** within this expanded semantic field than they were during the height of the fbI’s repressive Counterintelligence Program (coIntelpro). On the semantic field on which the new protocols are possible, Indigenism can indeed become partially legible through a programmatics of structural adjustment (as fits our globalized era). In other words, for the Indians’ subject position to be legible, their positive registers of lost or threatened cultural identity must be foregrounded, when in point of fact the antagonistic register of dispossession that Indians “possess” is a position in relation to a socius structured by genocide. As Churchill points out, everyone from Armenians to Jews have been subjected to genocide, but the Indigenous position is one for which genocide is a constitutive element, not merely an historical event, without which Indians would not, paradoxically, “exist.”9 Regarding the Black position, **some might ask why, after** claims successfully made on the state by **the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic for** cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and **essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves?** In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the United States as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the state has come to pass. In other words, the election of a Black president aside, **police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of hIv** infection, **and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life.** But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: **the grammar of suffering** known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession **is arrived** at **in the calculations between those who sell labor power and** those **who acquire it**. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. **The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage.** Put another way, No slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a position against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy but on the one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.

**White supremacy is a global modality of genocidal violence – Slavery’s operational logic continues today. Reformist measures simply provide fuel for Whiteness.**

**Rodriguez ’11** (Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “The Black Presidential Non-Slave: Genocide and the Present Tense of Racial Slavery”, Political Power and Social Theory Vol. 22, pp. 38-43)

To crystallize what I hope to be the potentially useful implications of this provocation toward a retelling of the slavery-abolition story: if we follow the narrative and theoretical trajectories initiated here, it should take little stretch of the historical imagination, nor a radical distension of analytical framing, to suggest that **the singular institutionalization of** **racist** and peculiarly **antiblack social/state violence** in our living era - the US imprisonment regime and its conjoined policing and criminalization apparatuses - **elaborates the social logics of genocidal** racial **slavery within** the **America**n nation-building project, especially in the age of Obama. The formation and astronomical growth of the prison industrial complex has become a commonly identified institutional marker of massively scaled racist state mobilization, and the fundamental violence of this apparatus is in the prison's translation of the 13th Amendment's racist animus. By "reforming" slavery and anti-slave violence, and directly transcribing both into criminal justice rituals, proceedings, and punishments, the 13th Amendment permanently inscribes slavery on "post-emancipation" US statecraft. The state remains a "slave state" to the extent that it erects an array of institutional apparatuses that are specifically conceived to reproduce or enhance the state's capacity to "create" (i.e., criminalize and convict) prison chattel and politically legitimate the processes of enslavement/imprisonment therein. The crucial starting point for our narrative purposes is that the emergence of the criminalization and carceral apparatus over the last forty years has not, and in the foreseeable future will not build its institutional protocols around the imprisonment of an economically productive or profitmaking prison labor force (Gilmore, 1999).16 So, if not for use as labor under the 13th Amendment's juridical mandate of "involuntary servitude," what is the animating structural-historical logic behind the formation of an imprisonment regime unprecedented in human history in scale and complexity, and which locks up well over a million Black people, significantly advancing numbers of "nonwhite" Latinos as, and in which the white population is vastly underrepresented in terms of both numbers imprisoned and likelihood to be prosecuted (and thus incarcerated) for similar alleged criminal offenses?17 In excess of its political economic, geographic, and juridical registers, the contemporary US prison regime must be centrally understood as constituting an epoch-defining statecraft of race: a historically specific conceptualization, planning, and institutional mobilization of state institutional capacities and state-influenced cultural structures to reproduce and/or reassemble the social relations of power, dominance, and violence that constitute the ontology (epistemic and conceptual framings) of racial meaning itself (da Silva, 2007; Goldberg, 1993). In this case, the racial ontology of the postslavery and post-civil rights prison is anchored in the crisis of social meaning wrought on white civil society by the 13th Amendment's apparent juridical elimination of the Black chattel slave being. Across historical periods, the social inhabitation of the white civil subject - - its self-recognition, institutionally affirmed (racial) sovereignty, and everyday social intercourse with other racial beings - is made legible through its positioning as the administrative authority and consenting audience for the nation- and civilization-building processes of multiple racial genocides. It is the bare fact of the white subject's access and entitlement to the generalized position of administering and consenting to racial genocide that matters most centrally here. Importantly, this white civil subject thrives on the assumption that s/he is not, and will never be the target of racial genocide.18 (Williams, 2010) .Those things obtained and secured through genocidal processes - land, political and military hegemony/dominance, expropriated labor - are in this sense secondary to the raw relation of violence that the white subject inhabits in relation to the racial objects (including people, ecologies, cultural forms, sacred materials, and other modalities of life and being) subjected to the irreparable violations of genocidal processes. It is this raw relation, in which white social existence materially and narratively consolidates itself within the normalized systemic logics of racial genocides, that forms the condition of possibility for the US social formation, from "abolition" onward. To push the argument further: the distended systems of racial genocides are not the massively deadly means toward some other (rational) historical ends, but are ends within themselves. Here we can decisively depart from the hegemonic juridical framings of "genocide" as dictated by the United Nations, and examine instead the logics of genocide that dynamically structure the different historical-social forms that have emerged from the classically identifiable genocidal systems of racial colonial conquest, indigenous physical and cultural extermination, and racial chattel slavery. To recall Trask and Marable, the historical logics of genocide permeate institutional assemblages that variously operationalize the historical forces of planned obsolescence, social neutralization, and "ceasing to exist." **Centering a conception of racial genocide as a dynamic set of sociohistorical logics** (rather than as contained, isolatable historical episodes) **allows the slavery-to-prison continuity to be more clearly marked**: the continuity is not one that hinges on the creation of late-20th and early-list century "slave labor," but rather on a re-institutionalization of anti-slave social violence. Within this historical schema, the post-1970s prison regime institutionalizes the raw relation of violence essential to white social being while mediating it so it appears as non-genocidal, non-violent, peacekeeping, and justice-forming. This is where we can also narrate the contemporary racial criminalization, policing, and incarcerating apparatuses as being historically tethered to the genocidal logics of the post-abolition, post-emancipation, and post-civil rights slave state. While it is necessary to continuously clarify and debate whether and how this statecraft of racial imprisonment is verifiably genocidal, there seems to be little reason to question that it is, at least, protogenocidal - displaying both the capacity and inclination for genocidal outcomes in its systemic logic and historical trajectory. This contextualization leads toward a somewhat different analytical framing of the "deadly symbiosis" that sociologist Loi'c Wacquant has outlined in his account of antiblack carceral-spatial systems. While it would be small-minded to suggest that the emergence of the late-20th century prison regime is an historical inevitability, we should at least understand that **the structural bottom line** of Black imprisonment over the last four decades - wherein the quantitative fact of a Black prison/jail majority has become taken-for-granted as a social fact - **is a contemporary institutional manifestation of a genocidal racial substructure that has been reformed, and not fundamentally displaced**, by the juridical and cultural implications of slavery's abolition. I have argued elsewhere for a conception of the US prison not as a selfcontained institution or isolated place, but rather as a material prototype of organized punishment and (social, civil, and biological) death (Rodriguez, 2006). To understand the US prison as a regime is to focus conceptually, theoretically, and politically on the prison as a pliable module or mobilized vessel through which technologies of racial domin8ance institutionalize their specific, localized practices of legitimated (state) violence. Emerging as the organic institutional continuity of racial slavery's genocidal violence, the US prison regime represents a form of human domination that extends beyond and outside the formal institutional and geographic domains of "the prison (the jail, etc.)." In this sense, the prison is the institutional signification of a larger regime of proto-genocidal violence that is politically legitimized by the state, generally valorized by the cultural common sense, and dynamically mobilized and institutionally consolidated across different historical moments: it is a form of social power that is indispensable to the contemporary (and postemancipation) social order and its changing structures of racial dominance, in a manner that elaborates the social logics of genocidal racial slavery. **The binding presence of slavery** within post-emancipation US state formation is precisely why the liberal multiculturalist narration of the Obama ascendancy **finds itself compelled to posit an official rupture from the spectral and material presence of enslaved racial blackness**. It is this symbolic rupturing - the presentation of a president who consummates the liberal dreams of Black citizenship. Black freedom, Black non-resentment, and Black patriotic subjectivity - that constructs the Black non-slave presidency as the flesh-and-blood severance of the US racial/racist state from its entanglement in the continuities of antiblack genocide. Against this multiculturalist narrative, our attention should be principally fixated on the bottom-line Blackness of the prison's genocidal logic, not the fungible Blackness of the presidency. CONCLUSION: FROM "POST-CIVIL RIGHTS" TO WHITE RECONSTRUCTION The Obama ascendancy is the signature moment of the post-1960s White Reconstruction, a period that has been characterized by the reformist elaboration of historically racist systems of social power to accommodate the political imperatives of American apartheid's downfall and the emergence of hegemonic (liberal-to-conservative) multiculturalisms. Byfocusing on how such **reforms have** neither eliminated nor fundamentally alleviated the social emergencies **consistently produced by the historical logics of racial genocide**, the notion of White Reconstruction departs from Marable's notion of the 1990s as the "twilight of the Second Reconstruction" (Marable. 2007. p. 216)19 and points toward another way of framing and narrating the period that has been more commonly referenced as the "post-civil rights" era. Rather than taking its primary point of historical departure to be the cresting of the Civil Rights Movement and its legacy of delimited (though no less significant) political-cultural achievements. White Reconstruction focuses on how this era is denned by an acute and sometimes aggressive reinvention and reorganization of the structural-institutional formations of racial dominance. Defined schematically, the recent half-century has encompassed a generalized reconstruction of "classically" white supremacist apparatuses of state-sanctioned and culturally legitimated racial violence. This general reconstruction has (1) strategically and unevenly dislodged various formal and de facto institutional white monopolies and diversified their personnel at various levels of access, from the entry-level to the administrative and executive levels (e.g., the sometimes aggressive diversity recruitment campaigns of research universities, urban police, and the military); while simultaneously (2) revamping, complicating, and enhancing the social relations of dominance, hierarchy, and violence mobilized by such institutions - relations that broadly reflect the long historical, substructural role of race in the production of the US national formation and socioeconomic order. In this sense, the notion of White Reconstruction brings central attention to how the **historical logics of racial genocide may not only survive the apparent disruption of classical white monopolies on the administrative and institutional apparatuses that have long mobilized these violent social logics**, but may indeed flourish through these reformist measures, as such logics are re-adapted into the protocols and discourses of these newly "diversified" racist and white supremacist apparatuses (e.g.. the apparatuses of the research university, police, and military have expanded their capacities to produce local and global relations of racial dominance, at the same time that they have constituted some of the central sites for diversity recruitment and struggles over equal access). It is, at the very least, a remarkable and dreadful moment in the historical time of White Reconstruction that a Black president has won office in an electoral landslide while well over a million Black people are incarcerated with the overwhelming consent of white/multiculturalist civil society.

**The affirmative’s calls to “save the day” in Cuba through American engagement repeats the idea of the cultural deployment of military power throughout Latin America.**

**McPherson 09** (Alan, Associate professor of international and area studies and the Conoco Phillips Chair in Latin American Studies at the University of Oklahoma, April 2009, “Review of Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos by Louis A. Pérez,” JSTOR)//DR. H

The author now argues in Cuba in the American Imagination that **metaphors of Cuba legitimated U.S. power by articulating a moral imperative that compelled Americans to dominate the island for their self-interest while pretending to do so selflessly for Cuba's benefit.** From the day Americans imagined Cuba "at our very door" or as a "ripe fruit" in the nineteenth century, through turning points such as the war against Spain (and Cuban sovereignty) and the Cuban Revolution, **Americans thought of Cuba using naturalized images–Cuba as a woman, as a child–that fit into normative patterns that the American public and** its **policymakers read as a warrant for imperial behavior** (pp. 28, 30).

The argument is not necessarily new. Perez himself has made it previously, and John Johnson in Latin America in Caricature presented several cartoons in support of it. But the astounding variety and specificity of the metaphors examined and the breadth of the evidence make this book a must-read. The author reproduces no less than 105 illustrations, almost all of them U.S. cartoons.

In them, as well as in Congressional speeches, editorials, histories, films, travel books, novels, poems, theatre, and commemorations, the metaphors were obvious. In the nineteenth century, the **image of proximity**–Cuba as "almost within sight"–**indicated that the colony beckoned to be taken** from Spain (p. 27). Right after 1898, Cuba as child either misbehaving in a classroom, learning to ride a bike, or navigating a raft telegraphed U.S. doubts about Cuban self-government. Metaphors of cleanliness, meanwhile, buttressed U.S. military and civilizational policies. Later, Cuba as owing gratitude to the U.S. "liberator" justified the Piatt Amendment and still today, **the metaphor of "neighborhood" allowed U.S. observers** either to express concern or to **restore order if the island made** too much **"trouble"** (p. 37).

Perez offers a few metaphors of his own–"laboratory" and "microcosm," for instance–to add how **the U.S.-Cuba relationship**, while unique, also **exemplified the cultural deployment of U.S. power** elsewhere (p. 1). He even claims that this metaphorical armada helped Americans define themselves as a nation–a pure, self-less, moral global power.

**This frontier mythology guarantees nuclear imperialism and violence.**

**Slotkin 85** (Richard, Olin Professor of American Studies @ Wesleyan, *The Fatal Environment,* p. 60-61)

This **ideology of savage war has become** an essential trope of **our mythologization of history**, a cliche of political discourse especially in wartime. In the 1890s imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt rationalized draconian military measures against the Filipinos by comparing them to Apaches. Samuel Eliot Morison, in his multivolume history of naval operations in the Second World War, recounts the posting of this slogan at fleet headquarters in the South Pacific: "KILL JAPS, KILL JAPS, KILL MORE JAPS!" Suspecting that peacetime readers may find the sentiment unacceptably extreme, Morison offers the following rationale; This may shock you, reader; but it is exactly how we felt. We were fighting no civilized, knightly war . . . We were **back to** primitive days of **fighting Indians on the American frontier**; no holds barred and no quarter. The Japs wanted it that way, thought they could thus terrify an "effete democracy"; and that is what they got, **with the additional horrors of war that modem science can produce**.17 It is possible that the last sentence is an oblique reference to the use of **the atomic bomb** at the war's end. But aside from that, Morison seems actually to overstate the extraordinary character of the counterviolence against the Japanese (we did, after all, grant quarter) in order to rationalize the strength of his sentiments. Note too the dramatization of the conflict as a vindication of our cultural masculinity against the accusations of "effeteness." The trope **of savage war** thus enriches the symbolic meaning of specific acts of war, transforming them into episodes of character building, moral vindication, and regeneration. At the same time it **provides** advance **justification for** a pressing of the war to the extreme point of **extermination**, "war without quarter": and it puts the moral responsibility for that outcome on the enemy, which is to say, on its predicted victims. As we analyze the structure and meaning of this mythology of violence, it is important that we keep in mind the distinction between the myth and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. Mythology reproduces the world with its significances heightened beyond normal measure, so that the smallest actions are heavy with cosmic significances, and every conflict appears to press toward ultimate fatalities and final solutions. The **American mythology of violence** continually **invoke**s the prospect of **genocidal warfare and apocalyptic, world-destroying massacres**; and there is enough violence in the history of the Indian wars, the slave trade, the labor/management strife of industrialization, the crimes and riots of our chaotic urbanization, and **our wars against nationalist** and Communist **insurgencies in Asia and Latin America** to **justify** many critics in **the belief that America is an exceptionally violent society**.

**Discourse shapes reality – star this card. *(read yellow).***

**Whisnant 12** Associate Professor of EuropeanHistory (Clayton, November 10, 2012, “Foucault & Discourse,” http://webs.wofford.edu/whisnantcj/his389/foucault\_discourse.pdf)//DR. H

**Discourse creates a world. By shaping our perceptions** of the world, **pulling together chains** of associations **that produce** a meaningful **understanding, and** then **organizing the way we behave** towards objects in the world and towards other people, one might say that **discourse generates the world of our everyday life.** After all, even though science teaches us that the “real world” is the material world made up of atoms and energy, in a real way **the world** for most of us **is** a world of **colors, emotions, ideas, and life**. It is a kind of virtual world **generated by our minds**, but not by us alone—we construct this world **socially** through a complex interaction between experience, upbringing, and education. **Discourses**, as chains of language that bind us social beings together, **play a key role in the social construction of reality.**

** Discourse generates knowledge and “truth.”** **Discourse constitutes** not only **the world** that **we live in**, but also all forms of **knowledge and “truth.”** Knowledge for Foucault (as for most other structuralists and poststructuralists) was not something that existed independently of language. In other words, knowledge is not simply communicated through language; **all knowledge is organized through the structures, interconnections, and associations** that are **built into language.** Foucault would even go so far as to say that discourse generates truth—or what some have called truth-effects. **Certain discourses** in certain contexts **have the power to convince people to accept** statements **as true. This** power **can have no relation to any objective correctness of the statement.** The medical practice of **leeching was accepted** in the eighteenth century as helpful despite the harmful affects that we recognize today **because** it was embedded in a network **of ancient medical discourses** that many accepted as “true.” Likewise, many medical practices commonly accepted today might have seemed like madness or even barbaric because they had no discursive support.

** Discourse says something about the people who speak it.** **Discourse communicates knowledge not only about the** **intended meaning of the language, but also about the person speaking the discourse.** By analyzing the discourse a speaker uses, one can often tell things about the speaker’s gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class position, and even more specifically the speaker’s implied relationship to the other people around him. **Medical discourse**, for example, **gives doctors** the **authority** to speak, thereby **placing them in** a position of **power over their patients.** Foucault was particularly interested in looking at modes of discourse that not everyone had a right to use, or that require specific locations to gain authority. 11

A sermon that would be right at home behind a church lectern might produce only an awkward silence if given at a party. And **a** certified **lawyer acquires a** certain **right to speak legal discourse** in a courtroom setting through a complex system of education, a series of exams, and network of state controls.

** Discourse and Power.** This brings us to the fourth way that **discourse operates**, namely **by being** intimately **involved with socially embedded networks of power. Because certain types of discourse enable specific types of individuals to “speak the truth,” or at** the very **least to be believed** when speaking on specific subjects, **discourses** also **give** these **individuals degrees of social, cultural, and** even possibly **political power.** Doctors are generally believed when they talk about physical or mental illnesses, and this gives them an authority to recommend courses of action or patterns 11 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 50. of behavior. In many societies, and for long stretches of Western history, religious authorities wielded tremendous social and political power because they had the power to speak about the divine. This power was caught up with their specific position, but was also based on the fact that religious **discourse suffused all of life, shaping social organization and influencing how people interpreted the world.**

**Our alternative is to vote negative to rethink both the geographical bounds of U.S. American history and culture and their chronology – only through this step can we begin to take steps towards resolving social death and malevolent forms of imperialism.**

**Luis-Brown 08** (David, 9/15/08, “Waves of Decolonization: Discourses of Race and Hemispheric Citizenship in Cuba, Mexico, and the United States,” Duke University Press, pg 1-4)//DR. H

THE “WORLD ASPECT" OF THE “COLOR LINE” IN “TIME AND SPACE": DU BOlS’S CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STUDIES

In The Souls of Black Folk (1903), W. E. B. Du Bois writes, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line,—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”' The lesser-known second clause of **Du Bois‘s most famous pronouncement pushes the color line beyond the U**nited **S**tates, sketching out a global approach. What would the disciplines old American studies and American literature look like if scholars were to use the global Color line in order to transform their ﬁelds into comparative, transnational endeavors? Du Bois offers one possible answer in “Of the Dawn of Freedom" in Souls, which begins with this Formulation of the problem of the color line. Du Bois’.-1 assessment of the Freedmerfs Bureau’s efforts to enfranchise African Americans following the Civil War concludes, “Despite compromise, war, and struggle, the Negro is not free” (S 239). Nominal Freedom, we learnt is not a solution but rather a chronic problem: “Thus Negro suffrage ended a civil war by beginning a race feud,” Du Bois writes (S 238). By beginning this chapter with his theory of the color line, Du Bois transforms the meanings at **what is usually regarded as it chapter in U.S. history:** it **now appears as part of a broader series of fortifications and adjustments of the global color line.** Therefore the defeat of Reconstruction is not just a blow to U.S. democracy, but a loss felt by democratic movements across the world. Here Du Bois's technique is not to turn African Americans into figures of the universal but rather to magnify their signiﬁcance as a test of global democracy. Equally important, Du Bois's method is to take the conclusion of the Civil War period—the ostensible attainment of African American freedom in Reconstruction—as the beginning of inquiry, as itself a problem for both investigation and activism. **If the discourse of freedom**/emancipation **is the** North's **proposed resolution for slavery, a "second slavery" of inequality emerges that Reconstruction attempts to resolve with a discourse of racial equality** (S 220). In his own post-Reconstruction moment, Du Bois attempts to build on and refine that discourse of racial equality in Souls. He presents a two-pronged method of analysis, expanding outward from the United States along the cross-national "color line" and straddling the bounds of conventional historical periods in order to show that despite the fact that such periods appear to be finished, they are characterized by problems that extend into our present in altered form.

In order to understand the full implications of the color line as a methodology of periodization and transnational analysis, one needs to look beyond Souls, which mainly focuses on the United States along the cross-national "color line" and straddling the bounds of conventional historical periods in order to show that despite the fact that such periods appear to be finished, they are characterized by problems that extend into our present in altered form.

In order to understand the full implications of the color line as a methodology of periodization and transnational analysis, one needs to look beyond Souls, which mainly focuses on the United States, to his less-known texts. In an earlier speech, "The Present Outlook for the Dark Races of Mankind" (1900), in which Du Boise introduces the color line concept to the African American intellectuals gathered at the third annual meeting of the African American intellectuals gathered at the third annual meeting of the American Negro Academy, he states, "It is my purpose to consider with you the problem of the color line not simply as a national and personal question but rather in its larger world aspect in time and space." Time and space. Even in his earliest formulation of the color line, Du Bois emphasizes its connection not only with space, but also with time, confirming the two-pronged character of the color line as a methodology.

In this speech, the "world aspect" of the color line, somewhat implicit in "Of the Dawn of Freedom," comes to the fore, as Du Bois assesses the history of colonial conflict and racial strife in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. **Du Bois devotes special attention to U.S. imperial ambition in Latin America** and the Pacific:

Most significant of all at this period is the fact that **the colored population of our land is, through the new imperial policy, about to be doubled by our** own ownership of Porto Rico, and Hawaii, our **protectorate of Cuba**, and conquest of the Philippines. This is for us and for the nation the greatest event since the Civil War and demands attention and action on our part. What is to be our attitude toward these new lands and toward the masses of dark men and women who inhabit them? Manifestly it must be an attitude of deepest sympathy and strongest alliance. ("PO" 53)

Du Bois argues that U.S. imperialist expansion is the "most significant" development along the global color line since the Civil War and demands attention and action on our part. What is to be our attitude toward these new lands and toward the masses of dark men and women who inhabit them? Manifestly it must be an attitude of deepest sympathy and strongest alliance. ("PO" 53)

Du Bois argues that **U.S. imperialist expansion is the "most significant" development along the global color line since the Civil War**, thereby **linking** domestic **civil rights struggles to anti-imperialism.** Furthermore, in what is his boldest claim, Du Bois argues that numerous "colored" populations subjected to the "new imperial policy" have become de facto members of the U.S., if not yet de jure citizens, and therefore African Americans should forge alliances with them. One result for intellectual inquiry is that if for many scholars U.S. history can be viewed as an exclusively national story, such is not the case for Du Bois. More specifically, Du Bois figures **the extension of U.S. empire in** the Spanish-American-**Cuba**n War of 1898 **as the defining event for African Americans.** Here is a second result of Du Bois' emphasis on the importance of 1898: it calls on African Americans to forge a political identity that goes beyond their particular ethnic identity.

As Du Bois states to the audience of black intellectuals, "I freely acknowledge that in the red heat of a burning social problem like this, when each of us feels the bitter sting of proscription, it is a difficult thing to place one's self at that larger point of view and ask with the cold eye of the historian and social philosopher: What part is the color line destined to play in the twentieth century? And yet this is the task I have laid out for you this evening, and one which you must take up for yourselves; for, after all, **the secret of social progress is wide and thorough understanding of the social forces which move and modify** your age" ("PO" 47). Du Bois's challenge to the American Negro Academy—and, by extension, to today's American studies—is to adopt **"that larger point of view" and pay attention to the plight of those "dark faces" who face U.S. imperialism.**

More broadly, **this "larger point of view" calls for a rethinking of both the geographical bounds of** U.S. **American history and culture and their chronology**, linking and decentering the U.S.-based periods of slavery, Civil War, and Reconstruction **with a broader formulation, the global color line**, a chronotype, or figure of the interrelations of time and space, **for histories of racism, imperialism, and decolonization.** I would argue that the term decolonization captures Du Bois's focus on the dual temporal and spatial significance of thinking from the perspective of the color line. Here I understand decolonization to entail the intellectual activist project of assailing the antidemocratic policies of imperialism along the global color line and developing new and more egalitarian societies. **The color line's "world aspect in time" emerges in** the ways in which it **reshapes our sense of history** and the future by naming avant la lettre the longue durèe of decolonization, a term coined in 1932. The color line's "world aspect in ... space" is evident in the series of racial divisions that Du Bois explores. The notion of the color line presents conceptual difficulties because it traces and traverses national boundaries, but it also presents new opportunities because it suggests the need for linking domestic civil rights movements to struggles against imperialism.

## 1nc – cp

#### **Text: The People’s Republic of China should increase its imports of Cuban sugarcane ethanol and maintain the option of exporting sugarcane ethanol to the United States.**

#### China’s influence is growing in Cuba but US interference causes Chinese economic meltdown – also Cuba says no.

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 9/26, 2013, “Yang Yi: China Will Keep Advocating and Acting Fairly for Cuba,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1082193.shtml)//DR. H

On 25 September 2013, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

Wang Yi said that China and Cuba are good friends, good comrades and good partners. The newly elected government in China will continue to strengthen the already-tested traditional friendship between the two countries. China will, as always, support the efforts of the Cuban people to safeguard national sovereignty and oppose foreign interference. China supports the path chosen by Cuba itself and will do the best to provide help for Cuba. China will continue to advocate and act fairly for Cuba and firmly support Cuba's legitimate interests and concerns.

Rodriguez said that Cuba-China relations have maintained a strong momentum of development in recent years. China's successful experience in economic and social development is an important reference for Cuba. Cuba upholds the one China policy and opposes the interference of any external forces in China's internal affairs. Cuba will continue to firmly support China's position on issues concerning China's interests.

#### Chinese decline causes great power war.

Chuang 01(Major Liow Boon, Singapore Armed Forces, Pointer (The Journal of Singapore’s Armed Forces), “A Weak or Strong China: Which Is Better for the Asia-Pacific Region?” Volume 27, Number 1, January-March, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2001/Vol27\_1/7.htm)

'In the past, a weak China, beset by social disorder, inflation and civil war attracted foreign intervention by the great powers. The result was turbulence and instability inside China and at its borders'. China was invaded twice and suffered from several decades of civil wars and occupation by Japan.25 A loosening of China's political system has already been brought about by economic liberalization, more will follow as communications and education improve with economic growth. Indeed, lessons from Europe and the Soviet Union have taught that a rapid political liberalization unsupported by economic growth can easily lead to social disintegration, which if it divides China, will jeopardize the stability of the whole Asia-Pacific.26 Slow growth of the economy could increase the level of social discontent that would result in political instability. Chinese leaders will attempt to implement the structural reforms necessary to provide a sound framework for sustained future economic growth while minimising political unrest. China's leadership understand that for China to achieve great power status, economic power with a commensurate amount of military power will be the key.

It is commonly asserted that national leaders who are unable to overcome domestic difficulties sometimes pursue an aggressively extroverted foreign policy to distract their people from the problems at home. Samuel S. Kim seems to have this idea in mind when he argues that 'Today the main danger to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region stems more from China's domestic weakness than from its external assertiveness a weak, reactive, insecure and fragmenting China is more unpredictable and dangerous than a strong, confident and cohesive China.'27

There are already signs of unrest and secessionist movements in China, and if China is weak economically and governed by a weak government that does not handle these problems well, an internal break-up could occur and it could precipitate the fall of the country. Controlling the widening income gap between city dwellers and peasants is one pressing problem the Chinese government has to tackle, and keeping the secessionist movement of Muslims in Xinjiang Province and the banned Falungong cult under control are some urgent tasks.

**1nc – cuban econ adv**

**No internal link to hotspots—they have to first win that North Korea and Iran will first get nuclear weapons and start a war**

**Cuba’s economy is growing now**

**Havana Times 7/7** (7/7/13 “Cuban Gov. Presents “Favorable” Stats” <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95985> 7-7-13)

The economy showed an overall a “favorable performance”, said Yzquierdo. Almost all sectors recorded growth, “including trade, transport, communications and manufacturing,” he noted.¶ Yzquierdo said the Cuban trade balance was positive at the end of the first quarter and pointed to a similar trend for year-end. At the same time, he spoke of a “slowdown” in the global economic situation.¶ Cuba recently reduced its forecasts for annual growth in 2013 from the 3.6 percent initially estimated to somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. He emphasized that the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) has been influenced by the crisis in the international arena.¶ In the first semester, the island’s economy grew 2.3 percent, according Yzquierdo, despite “external stress”, the “internal weaknesses” and the effects of Hurricane “Sandy”, which swept across the east of Cuba in October 2012.¶ “Sandy” affected 11 provinces and caused losses of almost 7 billion dollars, according to the minister.¶ The inaugural session of the eighth legislature of the National Assembly of People’s Power closes on, Sunday. Raul Castro is expected to pronounce in a speech to the parliament.¶ In a Communist Party Central Committee meeting last week, Castro came down hard on what he called “indiscipline and illegalities” in the State apparatus. He will most likely refer to the fight against corruption, one of the banner efforts of his administration.

**No impact to Cuba’s economy – (chances are the card is terrible).**

#### No hotspots impact.

**Ghitis, 12** -an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida, World Politics Review, “Latin America, the World's Democracy Lab” 7/5,

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12127/world-citizen-latin-america-the-worlds-democracy-lab)

Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules for what continue to be fierce political battles. The disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now tend to spark bitter legislative maneuvers, even thinly disguised coups, punctuated with street protests that sometimes turn violent, but eventually die off. Latin America still contains the ingredients for violent social conflict, but the willingness to experiment within the elusive parameters of democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum. It has meant that even when the system disappoints, there is always another democratic path to chart, another formula to concoct. To be sure, violence is far from defeated. Central American countries have some of the highest murder rates in the world as a result of drug trafficking. Mexico has seen some 50,000 die in the battle to defeat the narco-gangs. The decades-old insurgency in Colombia is not finished, and street protests occasionally turn deadly throughout the region. But it's a long way from the civil wars and the "dirty wars" that characterized the region in the second half of the 20th century. Then, the routine means of deciding the shape of the political and economic system was by taking up arms and killing those on the other side of the ideological divide. No more.

**Impacts empirically denied – Cuba’s economy should’ve collapse by now since the embargo’s been in place for so long, also proves the embargo is an alt cause**

#### No terror—US objectives—there’s a difference between refugee flows and

#### No terror impact.

Chapman 12 (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “**the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems** tobe vanishinglysmall.” The **events required** to make that happen **comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks**.First, **a terrorist** group **has to get** a bomb or **fissile material**, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. **If that were easy, one would have already gone missing**. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. **Then comes the task of building a bomb.** It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. **It requires** millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with **specialized skills**, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, **they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.** Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. **This**, like every other step in the entire process, **means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on**, **multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up**. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. **Given the** formidable **odds, it** probably **won’t bother**. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

#### No US intervention—reluctance to get involved in recent Middle East conflicts like Libya and Syria disprove, also means their hotspots IL is empirically denied because we were able to focus on multiple hotspots at the same time

**1nc – ethanol front line**

#### No warming impacts.

Burnett, 12 – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with as good or better credentials and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are very modestly funded when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

#### Plan can’t solve warming—global replacement of fossil fuels for transportation and electricity would take decades

#### No methane burps impact – empirics.

**Before its News 10 –** (Do The Math: The Myth of A Giant Methane Explosion, Leaked Methane Has Less Than 1% of Energy of Mt. St. Helens, 7/6/10

http://beforeitsnews.com/gulf-oil-spill/2010/07/do-the-math-the-myth-of-a-giant-methane-explosion-leaked-methane-has-less-than-1-of-energy-of-mt-st-helens-94082.html?currentSplittedPage=0) // czhang

About 38 billion cubic feet of methane would be needed to produce a one megaton blast. By comparison the eruption of Mount Saint Helens on May 18, 1980 released 24 megatons of explosive energy. It would require 923 billion cubic feet of methane to explode simultaneously to produce the same energy as the Mt. St. Helens eruption. The 1908 Tunguska event released the energy equivalent of 10 megatons (Mton) of TNT. About 15 billion cubic feet of methane has escaped over 68 days from BP's busted Macondo Well at the Deepwater Horizon site, which has either dissolved in the Gulf of Mexico or dispersed into the atmosphere. Now as to why an explosive event is so highly unlikely as to border on mythical even with 230 million cubic feet of methane a day gushing from the BP well along with 60,000 barrels of oil.

#### No food wars, and they don’t escalate

**Salehyan 08** (Idean, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, 45:3, Sage, DOI: 10.1177/0022343308088812)

A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.

**No Internal link –**

**1. Not enough sugar and Castro says no**

**Sanchez ‘11**

Adriana E. Sanchez, NotiEn, News Agency, 2011, “Biofuels Fighting for Space in Central America and Cuba,” http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/12797/Biofuels%20Fighting%20for%20Space%20in%20Central%20America%20and%20Cuba.pdf?sequence=1

Similar to Central America, Cuba’s potential to become a leader in biofuel production is subject to speculation, and it will be strongly tied to the energy policy that the island adopts within the next few years. The Association for the Study of Cuban Economy (ASCE) says sugarcane could seemingly provide the raw material for biofuel production. But tight supplies might be a problem. The island nation is expected to produce only 1.2 million tons of raw sugar. This is a very small amount when compared to sugar production in the 1990s, which was estimated to reach 7 million to 8 million tons per year. With its current sugarcane output, Cuba could produce an estimated 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year, energy industry sources say. ¶ In an interview with NotiEn, Jorge Piñón, a well-known expert on Cuban energy policy, suggested that Cuba would have to stop its dependence on fossil fuels from foreign countries if it is to develop energy independence. "Cuba passed from papa Russia to papa Venezuela to solve its population’s energy demand," said Piñón. "Cuba must strive to start working on an energy policy that can help the country independent of who is in power." ¶ Piñón said ethanol production has not been more actively promoted because of the complicated relation that Cuba has had with sugarcane. "Fidel Castro puts his foot down every time there are talks about an increase in ethanol production; for him it is a political issue," said Piñón, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center and an analyst for the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami.

# 2nc

## 2nc overview

#### 5. Only rejection of the frontier mythology allows us to solve the case.

**Coles 02** (Roberta, Associate Professor of Sociology at Marquette University, Sociology of Religion, 63.4)

The discursive framework of Manifest Destiny, a 19th Century political doctrine, is aptly equipped for conflict. Indeed, many have argued that **war is inherent in this doctrine**. While not coined as a term until 1845, Manifest Destiny drew upon centuries old themes of American civil religion; it proffered America's superior and chosen nature and its duty to redeem the continent and perhaps the globe,1 as justification to expand America's geographical and political boundaries. Relying on these tenets, Presidents Polk and Tyler added more than 800 million acres of Mexican land to the United States in the mid-1800s through war and confiscation. Later in the century, again relying overtly on Manifest Destiny in the Spanish-American war, President William McKinley annexed in one status or another the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii, and part of Samoa. While some scholars argue that Manifest Destiny was supplanted by imperialism at the turn of the century, the distinctions between imperialism and Manifest Destiny are often nebulous.2 If Manifest Destiny is approached only as an overt political doctrine limited to land expansion, then it was nearing its demise after the turn of the Twentieth Century. As a term, it now connotes arrogance and racism and is rarely openly invoked. Nevertheless, if we recognize the mythic and religious nature of Manifest Destiny, delineating its civil religion components, as a number of scholars have done (Baritz 1985; Bostdorff 1994, for instance), rather than treating it as a political doctrine tied to a particular historical era or to a particular form of expansion, we find that Manifest Destiny has remained embedded in America's civil religion as a resilient and robust narrative useful for justifying war, intervening on behalf of a ubiquitous national interest, and restoring America's self-image of exceptionalism. The discourses of President George Bush as he prepared for and executed the 1991 Persian Gulf War and President Bill Clinton as he approached and implemented a military campaign in Kosovo were replete with the tenets of Manifest Destiny though neither ever invoked the term itself. 9

#### 6. Prefer our disjunctive scenarios to their short-term conjunctive scenarios – most qualified analysis is on our side

**Yudkowsky 06** – Eliezer Yudkowsky, 8/31/2006, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.

The **conjunction fallacy** similarly **applies to futurological forecasts**. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet **human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People** might **pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for** an **engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid** and alarming, **but the defense is more useful because it is more vague**. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. **Security expert** Bruce **Schneier observed** (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) **Overly detailed reassurances can** also **create false perceptions of safety**: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." **Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow** or **implausibly detailed risk scenarios**. More generally, **people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities**. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. **Rationally**, of course, **disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions**.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

## 2nc framework

#### 1. The affirmative’s interpretation of debate generates nationalistic ideologies which is at the root of war and removes meaning from life.

Shaffer 7 (Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html, MT)

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, **we** learn to **think of ourselves in terms of agencies** and/or abstractions **external to our independent being**. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to **internalize these external forces;** to **conform our thinking** and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. **Once we identify ourselves with the state**, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; **it is who we are**. To the politicized mind, **the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning**, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but **in the psychological sense**. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is **this** dynamic that **makes it easy** for political **officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state**. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. **Only when our** ego-**identities become wrapped up with** some institutional abstraction – such as **the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives** and the lives of our children **in** the **collective** **madness** of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” **One of** **the** many adverse **consequences** of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions **is our loss of** control over not only the **meaning** and direction **in our lives, but** of the manner in which we can be efficacious in **our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us**.We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The **state** has **trained** **us** to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies **in** **pursuit** **of** the **enemy** du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. **Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being**. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. **We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us** – without division and conflict – **to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.**

#### 3. Discourse shapes reality – star this card. *(read yellow).*

Whisnant 12 Associate Professor of EuropeanHistory (Clayton, November 10, 2012, “Foucault & Discourse,” http://webs.wofford.edu/whisnantcj/his389/foucault\_discourse.pdf)//DR. H

Discourse creates a world. By shaping our perceptions of the world, pulling together chains of associations that produce a meaningful understanding, and then organizing the way we behave towards objects in the world and towards other people, one might say that discourse generates the world of our everyday life. After all, even though science teaches us that the “real world” is the material world made up of atoms and energy, in a real way the world for most of us is a world of colors, emotions, ideas, and life. It is a kind of virtual world generated by our minds, but not by us alone—we construct this world socially through a complex interaction between experience, upbringing, and education. Discourses, as chains of language that bind us social beings together, play a key role in the social construction of reality.

 Discourse generates knowledge and “truth.” Discourse constitutes not only the world that we live in, but also all forms of knowledge and “truth.” Knowledge for Foucault (as for most other structuralists and poststructuralists) was not something that existed independently of language. In other words, knowledge is not simply communicated through language; all knowledge is organized through the structures, interconnections, and associations that are built into language. Foucault would even go so far as to say that discourse generates truth—or what some have called truth-effects. Certain discourses in certain contexts have the power to convince people to accept statements as true. This power can have no relation to any objective correctness of the statement. The medical practice of leeching was accepted in the eighteenth century as helpful despite the harmful affects that we recognize today because it was embedded in a network of ancient medical discourses that many accepted as “true.” Likewise, many medical practices commonly accepted today might have seemed like madness or even barbaric because they had no discursive support.

 Discourse says something about the people who speak it. Discourse communicates knowledge not only about the intended meaning of the language, but also about the person speaking the discourse. By analyzing the discourse a speaker uses, one can often tell things about the speaker’s gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class position, and even more specifically the speaker’s implied relationship to the other people around him. Medical discourse, for example, gives doctors the authority to speak, thereby placing them in a position of power over their patients. Foucault was particularly interested in looking at modes of discourse that not everyone had a right to use, or that require specific locations to gain authority. 11

A sermon that would be right at home behind a church lectern might produce only an awkward silence if given at a party. And a certified lawyer acquires a certain right to speak legal discourse in a courtroom setting through a complex system of education, a series of exams, and network of state controls.

 Discourse and Power. This brings us to the fourth way that discourse operates, namely by being intimately involved with socially embedded networks of power. Because certain types of discourse enable specific types of individuals to “speak the truth,” or at the very least to be believed when speaking on specific subjects, discourses also give these individuals degrees of social, cultural, and even possibly political power. Doctors are generally believed when they talk about physical or mental illnesses, and this gives them an authority to recommend courses of action or patterns 11 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 50. of behavior. In many societies, and for long stretches of Western history, religious authorities wielded tremendous social and political power because they had the power to speak about the divine. This power was caught up with their specific position, but was also based on the fact that religious discourse suffused all of life, shaping social organization and influencing how people interpreted the world.

#### 4. Discursive severance doesn’t solve – the damage has already been done.

Gorham, 99 (University of Wisconsin, Bradley, Howard Journal of Communications, Spring, ebsco)

Given this theoretical framework, the answer to the ‘‘So what ?’’ question goes something like this: Racial stereotypes in the media can influence our interpretations of media content in a way that supports dominant racial myths. By automatically priming racial stereotype-congruent interpretations of subsequent media texts, and by doing so repeatedly and consistently, stereotypes in the media can maintain unjust, harmful, and dominating understandings of race by influencing the way individuals interpret media texts. Such automatic **priming can occur whether or not the individual involved necessarily endorses the stereotype, and although people can subsequently argue against the** automatically primed **constructs,** in a sense **the damage has already been done**. **The linguistic labels have been strengthened yet again, ready to move interpretation in the direction of dominant understandings whenever one’s guard is down**. What to do ? Well, such a framework suggests that for those of us who have already been socialized into automatically engaging the racial stereotypes, **we have to be** ever vigilant to **realize that this is going on and take the time and effort to** consciously **rework our interpretations** of media content into an interpretation that is less stereotypical. This demands a critical and active reader of media texts. And sin**ce consistent and repeated exposure leads to automaticity, we can attempt to dilute our myth-congruent associations by consistently and repeatedly engaging in more critical** media **interpretations**. At the same time, such a framework suggests that we should try to foster critical and active reading in the next generation of media consumers, so that they may be less likely to develop automatic stereotype-congruent interpretations. Such fostering of critical media reading skills needs to work hand in hand with ways of reducing the amount of stereotyping-congruent depictions in the media. This issue, of course, is a sticky wicket, as the demands of fostering a less racially stereotypical media can easily come up against First Amendment principles of free speech. Clearly some kind of compromise between these two socially desirable principles needs to be worked out. The theoretical framework outlined in this paper suggests that curbing the negative effects of stereotypical images in the media will be a difficult task but not an impossible one. It is clearly a difficult task since so many stereotypical images are present and so many of us may be automatically primed by them. Battling racism is a difficult enough challenge as it is without having to constantly battle the cognitive inner workings of our own brains. This is not an impossible task, however. By reducing the presence of stereotypical images and fostering critical media skills, we can begin to attack the infrastructure that supports the development of mythical thinking. And, more importantly, by realizing our own fallibility and our own susceptibility to stereotypical thinking, and by ‘‘catching’’ ourselves in the act of stereotypical thinking as often as possible, we can begin to build alternative cognitions that attack, rather than support, dominant conceptions of race. Thus, perhaps the question to ask concerning stereotypes in the media is no longer ‘‘So what ?’’ but rather ‘‘What’s next ?’’

# 1nr

**4. Limits are key to education.**

**Bukatko and Daehler 12** – (Danuta Bukatko, Marvin W. Daehler, workers at Gengage learning center in Canada citing work done by Robbie Case- professor emeritus of education and a highly respected researcher in the field of child cognitive development director of the University of Toronto's Institute of Child Study, “Child Development:A Thematic Approach”, pg. 286)//JM

\*broader topics require increased processing of new information- that directly trades off with information retention

Other theorist in this field have advanced a limited-resource model of the cognitive system that emphasizes a finite amount of available genitive energy that can be deployed in numerous ways, but only with certain trade-offs. Limited-resource models emphasize the allocation of energy for various cognitive activities rather than the mental structures themselves. The basic assumption is that the pool of resources available for processing, retaining, and reporting information is finite (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger 1990). In one such model, Robbie Case proposes an inverse relationship between the amount of space available for operating on information and that available for storage (Case, 1985; Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982). Operations include processes such as identifying the stimuli and recognizing relations among them; storage refers to the retention of information for use at a later time. If a substantial amount of mental effort is expended on operations, less space is available for storage or retention. In the simple memory experiment we just examined, the effort used to identify the words and notice the categorical relationships among them will determine the space left over for storing those words. If we are proficient at recognizing words and their relationships, storage space will be available. If these tasks cost us substantial effort, however, our resources will be taxed and little will be left for the task of remembering. As children grow older, they can mentally

**Focusing on means not ends is a prerequisite to effective engagement policies**

**Resnick 1** (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)

Some scholars have excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining it according to the ends sought rather than the means employed. For example, Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order."(n17) Such **ends-based definitions hinder the study of engagement in two ways. First, because** **the act of policymaking consists of selecting** **from a variety of alternative** **means in the pursuit of a given end**(s), it stands to reason that **policy instruments are more effectively conceptualized in terms of means rather than ends. When defined as different means**, **policies can be more easily compared with one another across a whole spectrum of discrete ends**, **in order to gauge more accurately the circumstances under which each policy is relatively more or less effective**.(n18)

**Free Dictionary no date**—“offer”, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/offer) EL

v.tr.

1. To present for acceptance or rejection; proffer: offered me a drink. 2. a. To put forward for consideration; propose: offer an opinion. b. To present in order to meet a need or satisfy a requirement: offered new statistics in order to facilitate the decision-making process. 3. a. To make available; afford: The situation offers us the opportunity to learn more. b. To present for sale. c. To provide; furnish: a hotel that offers conference facilities. 4. To propose as payment; bid. 5. To present as an act of worship: offer up prayers. 6. To exhibit readiness or desire (to do something); volunteer: offered to carry the packages. 7. To put up; mount: partisans who offered strong resistance to the invaders. 8. To threaten: offered to leave without them if they didn't hurry. 9. To produce or introduce on the stage: The repertory group is offering two new plays this season.

**Huge number of NGOs prove**

**Department of State 12** (U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the United States”, January 12, 2012, http://www.humanrights.gov/2012/01/12/fact-sheet-non-governmental-organizations-ngos-in-the-united-states/, DTB)

Approximately **1.5 million** NGOs operate in the United States. These NGOs undertake a wide array of activities, including political advocacy on issues such as foreign policy, elections, the environment, healthcare, women’s rights, economic development, and many other issues. Many NGOs in the United States also operate in fields that are not related to politics. These include volunteer organizations rooted in shared religious faith, labor unions, groups that help vulnerable people such as the poor or mentally ill, and groups that seek to empower youth or marginalized populations. Indeed, NGOs exist to represent virtually **every cause imaginable.** Their sources of finance include donations from private individuals (American or foreign), private sector for-profit companies, philanthropic foundations, or grants from federal, state, or local government. Sources of finance may also include foreign governments. There is no prohibition in U.S. law on foreign funding of NGOs, whether that foreign funding comes from governments or non-government sources.

**4). Cuba is the Republic of Cuba**

**CIA World Factbook, 13** (updated on 6/5/13, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html)

Country name:

conventional long form: Republic of Cuba

conventional short form: Cuba

local long form: Republica de Cuba

local short form: Cuba

**2. Substantially means real at present time – that justifies any AFF.**

**Words and Phrases 64** – (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

**associated with could mean anything**

**Free Dictionary no date**—“as·so·ci·ate”, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/associated>) EL

as·so·ci·ate (-ssh-t, -s-) v. as·so·ci·at·ed, as·so·ci·at·ing, as·so·ci·ates v.tr. 1. To join as a partner, ally, or friend. 2. To connect or join together; combine. 3. To connect in the mind or imagination: "I always somehow associate Chatterton with autumn" (John Keats). v.intr. 1. To join in or form a league, union, or association. See Synonyms at join. 2. To spend time socially; keep company: associates with her coworkers on weekends. n. (-t, -t) 1. A person united with another or others in an act, enterprise, or business; a partner or colleague. 2. A companion; a comrade. 3. One that habitually accompanies or is associated with another; an attendant circumstance. 4. A member of an institution or society who is granted only partial status or privileges. 5. often Associate An associate's degree. adj. (-t, -t) 1. Joined with another or others and having equal or nearly equal status: an associate editor. 2. Having partial status or privileges: an associate member of the club. 3. Following or accompanying; concomitant.

**Toward means ‘in the direction of’**

**American Heritage, 9** (‘toward’, <http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/toward>)

to·ward (tôrd, trd, t-wôrd) KEY

PREPOSITION:

also to·wards (tôrdz, trdz, t-wôrdz) KEY

In the direction of: driving toward home.

**Prefer limiting definitions of engagement – other attempts are so vague that it hinders effective policy analysis and makes any positive action topical**

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO BROADLY

A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is **so vague** that essentially **any positive sanction** could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16)

As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options

 in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks **lumping together a variety of discrete actions** that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.