**This year, the resolution has posed a crucially important question “Should the US continue its economic embargo on Cuba.” In response, debaters have taken and defended countless different positions. For some, the embargo keeps Cuba marginalized and economically stagnant, harming an innocent people. For others, the same embargo enacts justified retribution on a dictatorial regime responsible for endless suffering. For others, the embargo is best understood as a strategic tool wielded by the United States to serve its international interests.**

**Yet from each of these discussions, something profound is missing. We all know what the embargo is, what it does, and think we know what we should do about it. But as the year closes we still lack a nuanced historical and cultural understanding of why the embargo still exists. This is not a merely descriptive question to be answered objectively, but depends itself on our positionality within modern American society.**

**Instead of treating the embargo like a problem to be solved, we begin with the embargo as a cultural artifact to be understood. Lars Schoultz, Professor of Political Science at UNC explains:**

**Schoultz, 10** – Professor of Political Science at UNC Chapel Hill (Lars, “Benevolent Domination: The Ideology of US Policy Towards Cuba”)

The United States and Cuba have not had normal diplomatic relations since January 3, 1961, eleven U.S. presidents ago. In contrast, the U.S. refusal to recognize both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China lasted for only ﬁve presidents, sixteen and twenty-two years, respectively. And the United States has not simply declined to have normal diplomatic relations with Havana: Washington has also spent most of the past half century in an open attempt to overthrow the island’s government. There is nothing like Cuba in the history of United States foreign policy. This long-standing estrangement is the product of several concrete concerns related to U.S. security, to U.S. economic interests, and to U.S. domestic politics. But underlying these concerns and governing the policies of the past eleven administrations is an ideology based **above all else on a belief**, widespread in the United States, **that Cubans, like most Latin Americans, are a stunted branch of the human species**. Our euphemism for these people and their societies is ‘‘underdeveloped.’’1

This ideology is not a facade masking selﬁsh interests and, in particular, a selﬁsh interest in eliminating challenges to U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean. Rather, it is most useful to think of this ideology toward Latin America as the software Washington has created to take a keystroke from the environment—a revolution, for example—and process it through the policymaking computer and onto the monitor as policy. Working quietly in the background, this software is difﬁcult to examine because it is politically incorrect to hint at its intellectual core: a ﬁrm belief that, in any hierarchy of peoples, Latin Americans are beneath the United States. Or as the minutes of a February 1959 National Security Council meeting have the CIA director warning: ‘‘Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the new Cuban ofﬁcials had to be treated more or less like children. They had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they were capable of doing almost anything.’’ As one U.S. diplomat reported in the mid-nineteenth century, ‘‘Were it not for the civilizing inﬂuence of the United States, this country would by degrees revert to the aboriginal state in which Alvarado the Spaniard found it.’’2

The best way to begin—but only begin—to explain U.S. policy toward revolutionary Cuba is not with this ideology, but with a frank recognition that senior U.S. ofﬁcials are extremely busy, all but overwhelmed by an endless array of pressing issues, some of them matters of life and death; it would take both time and political capital to terminate today’s complex embargo that has been cobbled together over half a century. Then, after acknowledging the im- portance of inertia, the next step is to observe that the United States has im- portant interests to protect in Latin America, and the estrangement that began a half century ago was largely a response to the Cuban government’s reluctance to address these interests to Washington’s satisfaction. Correctly or incorrectly, wisely or unwisely, the United States came to perceive Cuba’s revolutionary government as a threat to its interests.

For three of the past ﬁve decades, roughly from 1960 to 1990, the most important of these interests was to protect U.S. security. Although **small Caribbean nations** lack the power to threaten the United States, their territory **can serve other major powers as a launching pad**. And so the ﬁrst statement of U.S. policy toward Latin America, the 1811 No-Transfer Resolution, was aimed to stop the British from securing a toehold in Spanish Florida, and **the 1823 Monroe Doctrine was based on the same** bedrock **principle**: prudent people keep potential adversaries as far away as possible, and Cuba is close.

‘‘We will bury you,’’ Nikita Khrushchev boasted in 1956, just as Cuba’s revolutionary leaders were planning their campaign to seize power.3 Then in early 1960, a year after the rebels’ victory, he sent the ﬁrst deputy chair of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, to open a scien- tiﬁc, cultural, and technical exhibition in Havana. Before leaving the island, Mikoyan signed an agreement to purchase about 20 percent of Cuba’s sugar crop for each of the following ﬁve years, and within three weeks, President Dwight Eisenhower had authorized preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. **A Soviet-friendly government in Cuba was** an **unacceptable** challenge to the primordial U.S. interest in security.

**The Cuban Revolution** also **attacked substantial economic interests**. **The U.S. government lost** some of its own **property**, principally Cuba’s Nicaro nickel facility, which the U.S. General Services Administration had built during World War II; remaining U.S. government owned, it was operated by a private contractor, Freeport Sulphur Company, which had been developing is own nickel and cobalt mine at Moa Bay, forty miles to the east. Freeport lost that, too, and other U.S. investors suffered losses valued at about $2 billion at a time when a billion was more than pocket change. **More than six thousand** of those **investors ﬁled claims** with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, **and some were extremely well-connected** corporate leaders, such as Robert Kle- berg, the president of King Ranch in Texas, which lost its forty-thousand-acre ranch in Cienfuegos. With help from his representative in Congress, the Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson, Kleberg promptly marched into the Oval Ofﬁce, demanded President Eisenhower’s help, and got it—a full-court press by U.S. diplomats.

**But most investors of Robert Kleberg’s generation wrote off their losses decades ago, and in the post–Cold War era, they have been replaced by a new set of powerful economic interests seeking to reopen trade** with the island. Agri- business, the single most powerful lobbying force in Washington, has been key. **It took U.S. farmers almost a decade, but in 2000, they ﬁnally pushed through a law that permits the sale of food to Cuba**. At ﬁrst Cuba declined to buy, insisting on normal two-way trade, but then it reconsidered after a devastating hurricane in 2001; and the year ended with a boatload of U.S. poultry sailing into Havana’s harbor. It was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant trade with Cuba since 1963.

**Cubans** apparently **liked what they bought, and** soon **the invisible hand** of supply and demand—combined with low shipping costs—**began to work its magic. In** early **2002, six House Democrats visited the island**, including the Arkansas moderate Vic Snyder, touting the rice and pork his constituents pro- duced. **Then came a delegation of California producers** led by Senator Barbara Boxer, **and a North Dakota delegation led by Republican governor** John **Hoeven** followed her. The North Dakotans left Havana only hours before two more members of Congress arrived with a delegation featuring a former secretary of agriculture, and this congressional delegation overlapped with a visit by Tam- pa’s mayor Richard Greco, who was shepherding ﬁfteen local business leaders hoping to convince Cubans to use their port for food shipments.

**These visits were but a prelude to the main event in 2003: a privately organized food exhibition** in Havana featuring 933 representatives of 288 U.S. vendors from thirty-three states and Puerto Rico, plus the agriculture commis- sioners from ten states, all eager to tap into the Cuban market. More than seventy U.S. ﬁrms signed more than $92 million in sales contracts, and North Carolina’s agriculture commissioner drafted an op-ed article on her ﬂight home: ‘‘**With our economy on the skids**, state budgets in shambles and our farmers going bank- rupt, **does it make any sense to continue a 40-year-old embargo** with Cuba **when there is so much to be gained** by both countries? **I don’t think so**.’’ What was the result? In 2008, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that U.S. farmers had become ‘‘Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural products. Cuba has consistently ranked among the top ten export markets for U.S. soybean oil, dry peas, lentils, dry beans, rice, powdered milk and poultry. Cuba also has been a major market for U.S. corn, wheat and soybeans.’’4

**So here we are, at a time when national security ofﬁcials no longer have a signiﬁcant interest in Cuba and economic interests are no longer a negative**. **Why does the estrangement continue?** **Enter the Cuban American community** in Florida, which holds part—but only part—of the answer: **a third interest, domestic politics** or, more concretely, the interest politicians have in winning elections. As a former chief of the U.S. interests section pointed out in 2005: **‘‘Ninety-eight percent of U.S. citizens never think of Cuba; the only people who think Cuba is important are** the **Cubans in Miami**.’’5 No one would have paid these 1.2 million immigrants much attention if they had settled in Ver- mont, which has only three votes in the U.S. electoral college; but two-thirds chose to settle in booming Florida, which has twenty-seven votes, today’s fourth-largest prize in the quadrennial electoral college sweepstakes, and after the 2010 census, Florida could move into a tie for third with New York, with twenty-nine (New York now has thirty-one but will likely lose two; Florida has twenty-seven and will probably gain two).

**At ﬁrst, Cuban immigrants were politically impotent, but soon** they began to take out citizenship papers, and then in the 1970s, they **started to elbow their way into politics**, initially at the local level, where they competed for school boards and similar community councils. Then they set out to elect members of the state legislature, and they also started to form interest groups, capped in 1981 by the creation of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which moved Cuban Americans up the political food chain to the national level. Primarily, **CANF spoke for wealthy** ﬁrst-wave **immigrants** who were **largely uninterested in** the **pork-barrel politics** that typically characterize ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants; **instead, CANF’s goal was to inﬂuence U.S. policy toward Cuba, and it did so the old-fashioned way, with campaign contributions and bloc voting**.6

And CANF did this at a propitious moment: it had spent the 1980s honing its political skills on legislation creating Radio and TV Martí. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the foundation was a recognized force in Washington, perfectly positioned to move into the vacuum left by exiting national security ofﬁcials. With its focus on tightening the embargo, **CANF was responsible for** both **the 1992** Cuban Democracy **(Torricelli) Act**, passed by a Democratic Con- gress and signed by a Republican president, and then for initiating the campaign against third-country investors in Cuba that led to the Cuban Liberty and Demo- cratic (LIBERTAD) Solidarity Act of 1996 (**the Helms-Burton Act**), passed by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democratic president.7 Helms-Burton prompted the frustrated chief executive ofﬁcer of the agribusiness heavyweight Archer Daniels Midland, eager to reopen an old market, to complain that ‘‘every presidential candidate is invited to Miami to make a speech to a handful of rich Cubans, and the candidate says, ‘I will never speak to Castro.’ The result is that we look to the rest of the world like idiots.’’8

**Then came Elián González**, the ﬁve-year-old boy found clinging to an inner tube off Fort Lauderdale on Thanksgiving Day in 1999. Since his mother had drowned after their rickety boat had capsized, and sending Elián back to live with a loving father in Cuba had been the right thing to do, President Bill Clinton wrote in his memoir: ‘‘**I was still concerned that it could cost Al Gore Florida in November**.’’9 The charges of fraud in Florida’s 2000 election were multiple and centered on the exclusion of more than ﬁfty thousand African American voters, but anyone who had followed Elián’s prolonged ordeal could reasonably con- clude that his return had aroused intense anger in Little Havana. And **although it is important not to overstate Cuban American voting clout, one thing is certain: when the dust settled** in 2000, **the Democrats had lost the state by 537 votes**, handing all of Florida’s electoral votes to the Republicans and giving George W. Bush the presidency with a ﬁve-vote electoral college margin.

**Yet even the preceding explanation is missing something – the complex network of interests that ensures the continuance of the embargo cannot be reduced to discrete dimensions of rational self-interest, but is instead grounded in a ideology that dismisses Cuban and Latin America people as racially inferior and subhuman.**

**Schoultz continues**

Schoultz, 10 – Professor of Political Science at UNC Chapel Hill (Lars, “Benevolent Domination: The Ideology of US Policy Towards Cuba”)

We should not make too much of this off-the-cuff response, but it suggests that something more than three pedestrian interests—security, economics, and domestic politics—underlies U.S. policy. It suggests the existence of a peculiar mind-set, a way of thinking about Cuba that may point to the direction of U.S. policy in the years immediately ahead. The foundation of this uplifting mind- set is an obvious power disparity: the United States, unlike Cuba, is wealthy, and it has used a substantial portion of its wealth to create the most powerful military in the history of the human race. That raw power, in turn, has given politicians such as Richard Nixon the ability to tell voters that ‘‘the United States has the power, and Mr. Castro knows this, to throw him out of ofﬁce,’’ and it has given cabinet members such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig the ability to ask President Ronald Reagan for a simple green light: what he said to the President, according to Nancy Reagan, is: ‘‘You just give me the word and I’ll turn that f—— island into a parking lot.’’11

What would seem puzzling to a visitor from another planet is why, when the Cubans refused to behave as Washington insisted, their leaders were not thrown out of ofﬁce and their island was not turned into a parking lot. How have they managed to get away with it? There are several answers. Initially, Cuba balanced U.S. power by enlisting the support of a rival superpower, but that answer takes us only to about 1990, when the Soviet Union withdrew its support. Since then, much of Washington’s forbearance can be attributed to the fact that no one has much time or political capital to spend on any Caribbean island. A simple list of all the other issues confronting senior ofﬁcials is sufﬁ- cient to explain why Nixon largely ignored Cuba when he ﬁnally claimed the presidency, why Reagan declined to endorse Haig’s parking-lot solution, and why presidential adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. had this to say about the one president who seemed to spend more time than any other on Cuba: ‘‘Castro was not a major issue for Kennedy, who had much else on his mind.’’12

And this combination of awesome power and globe-girding responsibilities helps explain why, once Eisenhower- and Kennedy-era leaders had decided to overthrow the island’s revolutionary government, they planned to do it on the cheap, with a covert operation that, like the overthrow of Guatemala’s left- leaning Jacobo Árbenz government in 1954, would take only a couple of days. The CIA predicted a cakewalk, telling Kennedy that ‘‘less than 30 percent of the population is still with Fidel,’’ and ‘‘in this 30 percent are included the negroes, who will not ﬁght.’’13 Then three months later, when Kennedy administration ofﬁcials discovered at the Bay of Pigs that the Cubans would ﬁght back, they had to decide what to do next. Certainly Cubans could be subdued, but not by a couple of thousand exiles; Washington would have to use the Marines, who might have to turn the island into a parking lot. Imagine what that would cost in the currency that might matter most: world opinion.

So what was plan B? First, there were a few years of what we today would call state-sponsored terrorism—Operation Mongoose, which focused on sabo- taging power plants, torching sugar ﬁelds, and arming assassins. But when that low-cost covert activity proved unsuccessful, the consensus opinion was that Cuba was not sufﬁciently important to require costly, decisive action. What happened is that Lyndon Johnson, inexperienced in foreign affairs, waited only a few days after inheriting the White House to seek advice from the widely respected chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J. William Fulbright. In their telephone conversation, Fulbright began to warn against anything dramatic but had barely completed a sentence before the new presi- dent interrupted to agree: ‘‘I’m not getting into any Bay of Pigs deal. No, I’m just asking you what we ought to do to pinch their nuts more than we’re doing.’’14

Nut pinching—an embargo—has been U.S. policy ever since. During the Kennedy era, ‘‘I used to get a call from McGeorge Bundy or one of his assis- tants every day about something,’’ recalled the State Department’s principal Cuba ofﬁcer; but ‘‘under Johnson, the calls dropped down to probably once a week, and then maybe once every two weeks or once a month.’’15 Why? Because even a superpower has limited resources, and President Johnson, like every one of his successors, had better ways to spend his political capital. Instead of ramping up Operation Mongoose, Johnson initially chose to focus on domestic issues—a month after consulting with Fulbright, he went before a joint session of Congress to declare the War on Poverty and to press for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Completely absorbed in pursuing these domes- tic initiatives, he had little time for Cuba, especially as his administration’s foreign policy eyes began to focus on Indochina. Soon, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy was encouraging everyone to face reality. ‘‘The chances are very good that we will still be living with Castro some time from now,’’ he said; ‘‘we might just as well get used to the idea.’’16

But tugging U.S. policy toward greater involvement is domestic politics— Cuban American votes—augmented by a ﬁrmly established conviction that the United States is responsible for taking care of Cuba or, as the ﬁrst President Bush told that reporter in 1991, if Fidel Castro would relax his grip on power, ‘‘then you’ll see the United States do exactly what we should: Go down and lift those people up.’’ This idea was close to what candidate Barack Obama told his Cuban American campaign audience in May 2008: the embargo had to be retained as leverage because ‘‘the United States must be a relentless advocate for democracy.’’17 So far, Obama has given Cuba almost none of his attention, but at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, he repeated his campaign-trail commitment, emphasizing that ‘‘the Cuban people are not free. And that’s our lodestone, our North Star, when it comes to our policy in Cuba.’’ Like its predecessor, the Obama administration is committed to uplifting Cuba.

Like the two post–Cold War presidents sandwiched between them—Bill Clinton and George W. Bush—both the ﬁrst President Bush and President Obama were simply continuing a century-old tradition of uplifting, which has now become a controlling component of Washington’s Cuba ideology. The origin of this uplifting tradition can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, a time of rapid U.S. territorial expansion. But let us not expand southward, argued one member of the House of Representatives, reacting to a proposal that the United States purchase the island from Spain. His winning argument was, ‘‘We have enough of inferior races in our midst without absorbing and not assimilating the Creoles and blacks of Cuba.’’18 The consensus at the time, in 1869, was that the outright incorporation of Cuba would harm rather than help the United States. But some uplifting could still occur, wrote the U.S. consul in Havana a few years later, urging a reduction of trade barriers so that American merchants could ‘‘extend to the country and its inhabitants the advantages of contact with the higher civiliza- tion, the greater energy, the purer morality of America.’’19

Today’s uplifting effort, which focuses on promoting democracy, carries on a tradition established immediately after the Spanish-American War in the late nineteenth century. The congressional resolution authorizing the war said nothing about the type of government to be established in Cuba once the Spanish had been ousted, but self-rule was explicit in the war resolution’s promise that the United States would ‘‘leave the government and control of the island to its people’’—the demos. This suggested a democracy, but creating one was easier said than done. ‘‘We are going ahead as fast as we can,’’ Governor- General Leonard Wood wrote President William McKinley in 1900, more than a year after the war ended, ‘‘but we are dealing with a race that has steadily been going down for a hundred years into which we have got to infuse new life, new principles and new methods of doing things. This is not the work of a day or of a year, but of a longer period.’’20

**As white Americans, a failure to understand and appreciate this history would not be abnormal but rather expected – the social structures and institutional contexts within which we live operate to purge us of our critical faculties and inculcate aa dogmatic devotion to orthodox neoliberal ideology. Similarly, as white Americans it is our responsibility to investigate the realities behind such ideologies.**

**The history of the embargo must directly inform our understanding of its present function and durability – retracing its continuity through time is a useful pedagogical intervention.**

Lamrani 03 – (2003, date from latest citation, Salim, Doctor of Iberian and Latin American Studies at the University Paris-Sorbonne Paris-IV, member of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Contemporary Iberian worlds (CRIMIC) from the University of Paris-Sorbonne Paris IV , and the Interdisciplinary Group on Hispanic Caribbean and Latin America (GRIAHAL) at the University of Cergy Pontoise, “U.S. Economic sanctions against Cuba: objectives of an imperialist policy,” http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Caribbean/USEconomicSanctions\_Cuba.html)

The economic sanctions imposed on Cuba by the United States are unique in view of their longevity and of their complexity but they are consistent with the real objectives of the first world power. In order to show this, it is necessary to base this analysis on the following postulate: the blockade is part of a scheme designed not to promote democratic values, as the administration in Washington would have us believe, but to control the natural resources of Third World nations through subjugation. And the history of the United States ­ characterized mainly by violent and bloody conquest of new territories ­ proves this unequivocally.

As far back as the middle of the 19th century, U.S. expansionist William Gilpin announced: "The destiny of the American people is to subdue the continent." The primary goal of the United States is to make sure that the resources of the countries of the South remain at hand of the capital of the masters of the universe. The case of Cuba is exceptional because it is the only country that has dared to refuse to follow the orders set by their northern neighbor, designing its political, economic and social system, at once sovereign and independent, despite the unilateral constraints imposed by Washington. The enmity Cuba is a victim of reflects a historical continuity whose broad lines must be retraced. And by the way, it would be widely-known if something like a sense of respect for obvious historical truisms existed. This topic would not be controversial if the society we live in was intellectually free.

**The rhetoric and ontology of national insecurity that undergirds the status quo’s justification for the embargo is an existential threat – generates environmental destruction, endless enemy creation and structural violence, and massive economic inequality – engaging with history to break down our assumptions about the way decisions are made and the way the world works is imperative.**

Burke 07 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: **ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained** as it is.

I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form.

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: **a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning**, **that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here **we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state)**. When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to **quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation** either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context **violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion**, at limited cost and with limited impact -- **it permeates being.**

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which **humans are merely utilitarian instruments** for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather **turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction**. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21

What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.

The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, **instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning**. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. **The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time**, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State

**The United States federal government should remove its economic embargo on Cuba.**

**The 1AC and the plan represent an instance of critical ethnography in the context of the Cuban Embargo. Consciously making connections between the micro-level of individual beliefs and the macro-level of social structures that actualize those beliefs in the form of education is academically and pedagogically valuable. Directing anthropology inward toward American security culture allows us to deploy unique methodological tactics currently lacking from academic work on security.**

Goldstein 10 – (2010, Daniel, Associate Professor of Anthropology at Rutgers University, “Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security,” Current Anthropology Volume 51, Number 4, August 2010)

Despite the ubiquity of public security–related concerns— both in the United States and Europe, where so many an- thropologists live, and “abroad” in the global South, where they tend to work—anthropological research with an explicit security dimension has mostly been focused on the U.S. context and (most publicly, at least) on matters of disciplinary collaboration with the U.S. security establishment. While some have willingly donned the mantle of “security anthropologists” (McFate 2005; Selmeski 2007), others, understand- ably reluctant to put their knowledge of other societies to work in the security economy, have been inwardly focused, concerned largely with the ethical and political implications of lending anthropological expertise to government in pros- ecuting its military and security campaigns (Goldstein 2010). Resisting the call to provide expert knowledge on enemy “cul- ture” so that military operations can be more effectively car- ried out and foreign-policy objectives realized, some anthro- pologists have emerged as vocal critics of “human terrain systems” and other forms of intelligence gathering, denounc- ing efforts to use ethnographic knowledge of other parts of the world to advance security campaigns (Gonza ́lez 2007; Gusterson 2005; Members of the Network of Concerned An- thropologists 2007; Packer 2006; Price 2008; Sterpka 2007).3 Other anthropologists have directed their attention to U.S. historical ethnography and the emergence of what might be called a “security culture” in the United States, providing a powerful cultural critique of American life and its contemporary politics (Gusterson and Besteman 2009; Lakoff 2007, 2008; Low 2003; Lutz 2001; Masco 2006; Wilson 2005).4

Meanwhile, anthropology of the non-Western world, even when concerned with issues that might be considered within a broader “security” rubric, has generally not been framed in these terms. While other disciplines have dedicated journals, programs of study, and entire schools of thought to the se- curity “problem,” anthropology has largely refrained from joining the conversation, even as other global phenomena (e.g., human rights) have been prominent foci of anthropo- logical scrutiny. The result has been that the analysis of a truly global reality played out in local contexts—a conjuncture that is perhaps anthropology’s most distinctive me ́tier—has not benefited from sustained anthropological attention and that the insights drawn from ethnographic research have not been systematically brought to bear on the theorization of security. This is not to say that anthropologists have been inattentive to issues with a clear “security” dimension; indeed, many anthropologists and anthropologically minded social scientists are at work in various locations worldwide, studying, for ex- ample, the criminalization of “dangerous” populations (Cal- deira 2000; Valverde and Cirak 2002; Waterston 1997); the fortification of urban spaces (Caldeira 1996; Davis 1992; Low 1997, 2003); the production of public fear (Green 1999; Rob- ben 1996; Skidmore 2003); migration and the “securitization” of national spaces in an age of globalization (Bigo 2002; Ca- lavita 1998; Cornelius 2004; Coutin 2007; De Genova 2002; Menjı ́var 2006); and topics in psychiatry, illness, and medical “risk” (Metzl 2010; Owczarzak 2009), among other issues, all of which make clear and significant contributions to under- standing security in situated contexts.5 This work suggests the potential of a broader comparative ethnography of security, one that would place security at the center of global society and its contemporary problematics, revealing the important ways in which “security” in its many forms is operative in the daily lives and communities of the people with whom anthropologists work. The ongoing research of individual an- thropologists within this ethnographic and conceptual do- main indicates the emergence of an as yet inchoate “anthro- pology of security,” a movement that I endorse and attempt to foster.6

In this article, then, I argue for the importance of what I call a critical security anthropology, one that recognizes the centrality of security discourses and practices to the global and local contexts in which cultural anthropology operates. I contend that many issues that have historically preoccupied anthropology are today inextricably linked to security themes and that anthropology, even when not explicitly concerned with security per se, expresses a characteristic approach to topics that today must be considered within a security frame- work. Global security discourse and practice shape the con- texts in which anthropologists both live and work, providing the conditions within which anthropological research and pedagogy are imagined, approved, funded, and implemented. And for the people and societies that anthropologists study— that “human terrain” on which some would suggest we op- erate—issues of security and insecurity are critical matters with which ethnographic subjects must contend as they at- tempt to forge a life in a complex, conflictive, and often violent and dangerous social and political-economic milieu. Anthropology, I argue, is particularly well suited to offer a critical take on global security questions, given the discipline’s long-standing modus operandi of situating local realities within broader national and transnational contexts to ex- amine the mutually constitutive effects of each on the other. Anthropology’s concern with global/local articulations as well as its case-study approach, cross-cultural comparative en- gagement, and emphasis on the intersections of discourse and practice in specific historicized contexts remain disciplinary hallmarks that uniquely position anthropology to contribute to a critical study of security.

Nothing points more clearly to the need to incorporate “security” within the standard ethnographic tool kit than the question of human rights. A central concern of scholars in- terested in the local effects of global phenomena, human and social or civil rights and their concomitants (e.g., citizenship, democracy, multiculturalism, social movements), have been broadly and deeply studied by anthropologists, nowhere more so than in Latin America, the ethnographic focus of this ar- ticle. Less concerted anthropological attention has been paid to security in these same contexts, even where an understand- ing of (in)security is fundamental to a full comprehension of rights as both a global and local reality, rife with conflicts and contradictions. While most of us are familiar with recent rights abuses committed in the name of security in such lo- cales as Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the detention facilities at Guantanamo, Cuba, the clash between security and rights is not limited to these contexts or to the U.S. “war on terror” but is part of an emergent global phenomenon (Greenhouse 2005). Security and rights intersect in particularly troubling ways in Latin America today, as subordinated groups increas- ingly call into question the legitimacy of states caught up in the contradictions of neoliberal political economy and for- merly hegemonic classes grasp for the instruments to maintain their traditional authority and privileges. An ethnography of rights in this context cannot be considered adequate without attention to the “security crisis” facing the indigenous poor, and such an analysis cannot be adequately undertaken without an understanding of the security/rights conflict as a distinctly neoliberal phenomenon.7

In the next section of this article, I attempt to delineate this relationship with a particular emphasis on the apparent contradiction between security and rights in contemporary neoliberal society. I then go on to explore this intersection in the specific geographical context of Latin America, drawing on the work of a few scholars whose research exemplifies the kind of critical anthropology of security that these circum- stances demand. Finally, as a more detailed case study, I offer a reflection on security concerns as they have emerged from my own fieldwork in Bolivia, indicating the ways in which a globalized security discourse is put into practice in the violence of daily life in marginalized urban communities. The Bolivian case calls attention to the ways in which “security” plays out on the ground, deployed not only by states but by citizens and community groups as well. It demonstrates the complex interconnections that exist between security and other global-local phenomena that are frequently the objects of anthropological concern, especially the idea of “rights,” and it suggests the important contributions of ethnography to understanding the security/rights conjuncture. This analysis further points to some common themes that link the subjects of anthropological inquiry with its practitioners as we all labor within a global security culture that threatens to destabilize the rule of law, the workings of justice, and the bases of democratic society in countries around the world.

**States in Latin America are uniquely affected by the intersection of security and neoliberalism – a critical anthropological approach is critical to take advantage of local knowledge in the region and connect it to broader structures of oppression.**

Goldstein 10 – (2010, Daniel, Associate Professor of Anthropology at Rutgers University, “Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security,” Current Anthropology Volume 51, Number 4, August 2010)

By the time of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the inevitable outcomes of the neoliberal model were already becoming realized, especially in the “de- veloping world,” where this model did not emerge organically but was imported and imposed by forces from without.12 In these societies, the individualizing and responsibilizing strat- egies of neoliberal governmentality have brought immense difficulties for citizens and states alike. Having dismantled the welfare state (or, as in Bolivia, the patronage state) over the course of the last 20 or so years while relaxing many of the barriers to the movement and operations of transnational capital, many national governments have recently had to contend with rising doubts about their defense of national sov- ereignty and the rights and security of national citizens in a context of political and economic globalization. In Latin America, for example, where the prescriptions of the so-called Washington Consensus (including deregulation of transna- tional industries, removals of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and the reduction of government involvement in the national economy and social service provision) have failed to deliver on their promises of trickle-down economic improve- ment, organized social movements have launched powerful challenges to the state and its claims to be working to provide security to all. Even as more and more nation-states in Latin America explicitly renounce the neoliberal paradigm, the ef- fects of several decades under this approach continue to be felt within Latin American society with consequences for na- tional prosperity and citizens’ rights. The various struggles in the region between competing understandings of security— what it is meant to entail, how it might best be achieved, and how it relates to rights claims in a variety of contexts—clearly illustrate some of the basic themes of this essay, and the work of some Latin Americanist anthropologists provides a model for how the discipline can approach the study of security and rights in the ashes of neoliberalism.13

Who or what is the proper object of security in a neoliberal context is a matter of some debate, as recent conflicts in Latin America have revealed. Under the neoliberal regimes of the last few decades in Latin America, as elsewhere around the world, national states have increasingly been required (by the burden of debt and the repayment schedules imposed by mul- tinational lenders such as the International Monetary Fund) to adopt the role of security providers for global capital, often forcing these states to adopt an oppositional stance to the security (economic, physical, and otherwise) of their own citizens. Nations that cannot provide guarantees of “security” to transnational corporations risk an investment downturn, as foreign companies and financiers may refuse to do business there, depriving those states of the capital they require to maintain themselves in power and service their national debt. By “security” here is meant both a guarantee of a stable eco- nomic environment for foreign investors, with minimal state intervention in business or finance (e.g., in the form of taxes or laws that attempt to regulate industrial activity and so impose unacceptable costs on investors), and a guarantee of political stability, with popular challenges to industry being limited and suppressed by the state. States find themselves caught between the dictates of various foreign bosses and national citizens who expect that in a democratic context, the duly elected authorities will work to serve the interests of the electorate. The inability to manage this evident contradiction has led to a crisis of legitimacy for democratically elected governments unable to reconcile the security demands of transnational corporations and lenders with the demand for rights from national citizens.

**This is uniquely valuable in the context of educational context – breaking down the neoliberalization and securitization of the public sphere is key.**

Giroux 4/23 – (2014, Henry, PhD, Director of the McMaster University Center for Research in the Public Interest, Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University in Toronto, Ontario, interview with Victoria Harper, “Neoliberalism, Democracy and the University as a Public Sphere,” http://zcomm.org/znetarticle/neoliberalism-democracy-and-the-university-as-a-public-sphere/)

In what ways does neoliberalism threaten higher education?

Higher education is one of the few public spheres left where students can learn to think, engage in critical dialogue, be self-reflective about their relationship to themselves, others and the larger world, all the while steeping themselves in the best ideas, values and skills that various modes of science, history, culture, literature and other traditions can teach them. Under neoliberalism, any public sphere that educates young people to be critical and engaged citizens is seen as dangerous to the established order. This is one of the reasons that the right hates the legacy of the ’60s, because it reminds them of the power of students to question the established order and make power accountable while demanding that education function as a democratic public sphere. Moreover, education provides opportunities for those multiracial and working-class individuals previously unable to get a decent education. This is viewed as a threat to a largely white dominated public sphere.

These are some of the reasons why education is being massively defunded while students are trapped into tuition increases that decrease the possibility of poor students from going to college, while forcing existing students into a intellectual and morally dead zone that robs them of their imagination and forces them to think about their lives and careers solely in terms of survival tactics – how to pay off their loans as quickly as possible in order to be free of debt. The current assault threatening higher education and the humanities in particular, cannot be understood outside of the crisis of disposability, public values, ethics, youth, and democracy itself.

What is distinct about the current threat to higher education and the humanities in particular is the increasing pace of the corporatization and militarization of the university, the squelching of academic freedom, the rise of an ever-increasing contingent of part-time faculty, the use of violence to squelch peaceful student dissent, and the view that students are basically consumers and faculty providers of a saleable commodity such as a credential or a set of workplace skills.

Particularly disturbing here is the war on faculty and the ongoing attempts to impose modes of governance based on a business model, one that reduces faculty to part-time help with no power or security. Faculty are being turned into a labor forces that mimics Walmart workers while the managerial class is expanding, draining off funds from faculty and students, and governing the university as if it were a branch of General Motors and Disneyland.

More striking still is the slow death of the university as a center of critique, vital source of civic education, and crucial public good. Many faculties are now demoralized as they increasingly lose their rights and power. Many now find themselves staring into an abyss, either unwilling to address the current attacks on the university or befuddled over how the language of specialization and professionalization has cut them off from not only connecting their work to larger civic issues and social problems but also developing any meaningful relationships to a larger democratic polity. As an adjunct of the academic-military-industrial complex,