# 1NC

#### The Affirmative regurgitates past pain and suffering to show themselves as a moral option in an immoral world. This action is a stimulant used to mask real pain with surplus enjoyment, creating charred men where we feel but are not alive.

**Zupancic 03** [alenka, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two,” 47-49]

It might seem that the notion of the ascetic ideal, as well as Nietzsche’s analysis and criticism of it, somehow belongs to the past, and has no particular relevance to our largely hedonistic “postmodern condition.” Yet this assumption could not be more erroneous. The hedonism of postmodern society, far from representing a step out of the framework of what Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideal, is deeply rooted in this framework. In order to see this, we must first understand that, for Nietzsche, the asceticism involved in the ascetic ideal does not simply involve a renouncement of enjoyment; it involves, above all, a specific mode or articulation of enjoyment. Moreover, one could even say that the ascetic ideal coincides with the very “invention” of enjoyment: enjoyment as different from pleasure, as something which lies—to use Freud’s term—beyond the pleasure principle. If, according to Nietzsche, all great religions are an answer to man’s feelings of displeasure and pain, they never treat the cause of this displeasure. Instead, they soothe the sensation of displeasure— they soothe it by providing an even stronger sensation. They literally “outscream” the displeasure (and the “depression”—this is Nietzsche‘s term—linked to it) with an even sharper and more acute feeling, on account of which we no longer feel the previous displeasure. The religious (and especially Christian) cure for “depressive discomfort” comes not in the form of an analgesic or a tranquilizer, but, rather, in the form of an “irritating drug” or “excitation-raiser,” a stimulant. The ascetic ideal, writes Nietzsche, is employed to produce orgies of feeling) 2 It is about immersing the human soul in terrors, ice, flames, and raptures to such an extent that it is liberated from all petty displeasure, gloom, and depression) 3 This is the very core of the ascetic ideal: Everywhere the bad conscience, that “abominable beast,” as Luther called it; everywhere the past regurgitated, the fact distorted, the “jaundiced eye” for all action; . everywhere the scourge, the hair shirt, the starving body, contrition; everywhere the sinner breaking himself on the cruel wheel of a restless morbidly lascivious conscience; everywhere dumb torment, extreme fear, the agony of the tortured heart, convulsions of an unknown happiness . . : awake, everlastingly awake, sleepless, glowing, charred, spent and yet not weary—thus was the man, “the sinner,” initiated into *this* mystery. This ancient mighty sorcerer in his struggle with displeasure, the ascetic priest—he had obviously won, his kingdom had come: one no longer protested against pain, one thirsted for pain; “more pain! more pain!”1” In a word, one could say that the thing the ascetic ideal employs in response to displeasure is jouissance, (surplus-) enjoyment: “morbidly lascivious conscience,” “convulsions of an unknown happiness,” and the fundamental imperative: More! Encore! It also invents the “second body”: a sublime body, sleepless and spent, as if charred, but never weary. Nietzsche repeats this insistently: the ascetic ideal is about excitement—it is, so to speak, a “passion diet”; it is not about moderation, it counters passions with a surplus of pure passion. It might be interesting to note that this problematic is very closely connected to the one discussed by Eric Santner in his book On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzwei. Santner starts from the notion that life—or, taken more narrowly, the psyche—is characterized by a constitutive “too-muchness” (the human mind is defined by the fact that it includes more reality than it can contain—it bears an excess, a “too-muchness” of pressure that is not merely physiological). This “too-muchness” of pressure cannot be done away with, but it can take two different forms or paths: it can be either the agent of our engagement “in the midst of life,” or a defense against such engagement. The line between the two, between the passions infusing our engagement in the world and our defenses against such engagement, is often a thin one. The common path is precisely the one that constrains our capacities “by burdening them with an uncanny sort of surplus animation. We are dealing here with a paradoxical kind of mental energy that constrains by means of excess that leaves us stuck and paralyzed precisely by way of a certain kind of intensification and amplification." This effect, which Santner calls “undeadening,” is generative of a disturbing surplus animation, and is not “unlike the king’s ‘second body’ posited by theorists of sovereignty.”16 What Nietzsche discusses under the name of the ascetic ideal is precisely this kind of passion, in which man is awake—supremely awake, animated and immersed in very strong sensations and feelings—but not alive. The word that Nietzsche uses to express this (a charred man) is very eloquent in itself. In this respect, Nietzsche’s diagnosis is quite contrary to Marx’s diagnosis: religion is not so much the opium of the people, a tranquilizer that constitutes an escape from (harsh) reality, as an “excitation-raiser” which binds us to this reality by activating some mortifying passion. Discomfort is soothed (or silenced) by crises and states of emergency in which a subject feels alive. But this “alive” is nothing other than “undeadness,” the petrifying grip of surplus excitation and agitation. Of course, Nietzsche also often talks about the “opium” dimension of religion: the fairytale about life after death, about the existence of another, better world, about the existence of a righteous judge who can make sense of the often senseless and unfortunate vicissitudes of our daily life. But he does not situate the core of religious mastery (the ascetic ideal) in this dimension. The power and strength of religion (in the form of the ascetic ideal) do not spring from the fact that it promises the suffering and the disappointed a better world in exchange for their faith, thus forcing them to accept and endure the miseries of this world (instead of rising against their causes). Pain and suffering are not simply burdens that a true Christian (who, in Nietzsche’s argument, can very well be an “atheist Christian”) stoically endures; they are, rather, something in relation to which a Christian comes to life as a subject. The core of the ascetic ideal lies in its articulation of the economy of enjoyment that—although it needs a reference to a beyond in order to be operative—operates in this “corporeal” world: it is that it mobilizes and motivates souls, and provides them with enjoyment

#### The desire to mask suffering with enjoyment is the ascetic ideal par excellence. the aff’s morals are employed to make one feel accomplished by their personal restraints.

**Zupancic 03** [alenka, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two,” 47-49]

The ascetic ideal places the Real of pleasure in enjoyment (and posits enjoyment of pain or suffering as the most vivd human experience – an experience in which the degree of self-sensation and self-presence attains its highest intensity, producing a kind of paralyzing wakefulness), and makes it a law. The specificity of this enjoyment-enjoining law—for this is precisely what this law is all about—is that **it** does not allow for any play of transgression: **it** does not capture us by means of arousing a transgressive desire to which we cling as to a promise of some secret enjoyment. It is not a law with which we could establish some kind of relationship, situating ourselves as subjects in relation to **it.** It is a law that leaves nothing outside it**,** for now, writes Nietzsche, a man is “like a hen imprisoned by a chalk line. He can no longer get out of this chalk cl7 He can, however, rotate in it to infinity: the limit and the infinite are not in contradiction here, since itis the limit itself that is infinite. It is tempting to say that something was in the air in that second half of the nineteenth century, something that brought Nietzsche to his conceptualization of the ascetic ideal and Freud to his theory of the superego. Lacan’s reading of the superego law in terms of the “imperative of enjoyment” is, of course, very significant in this context. Something has changed in the juncture of Law and enjoyment, in their nexus. Of course, Nietzsche recognizes this mode of enjoyment in the whole history of Christianity; he does not conceive of itas of something that has just recently occurred. Nonetheless, this is the fate (and the power) of most concepts: once they are forged, we can easily recognize their elements in past historical formations, or even in other, older concepts. This, however, does not contradict the fact that Nietzsche writes from the perspective of a certain shift or break that befell the history of Christianity (or, more broadly, of Western civilization as based on Christianity), and that **it** is only in this break that things that “were there all the time” became visible. With the term “ascetic ideal,” Nietzsche names the passage from one logic of the law to another, a passage from the law that forbids and regulates enjoyment to the law that commands (not pleasure, but) enjoyment, confronting us with an imperative of enjoyment. Actually, **it** would be more accurate to say that the two sides of the law—the prohibition of enjoyment and the surplus of enjoyment— were always linked together, mutually supporting each other. (Surplus-) enjoyment is not simply something that is suppressed or repressed by the law. The prohibition of enjoyment equals the creation of a “beyond” where surplus-enjoyment (although forbidden) finds its place. This “beyond” is the very thing from which the law draws its power to attach us, since the law really functions not when it manages to hold us simply by fear of its authority, but when we adhere to it through a specific mode of (our) enjoyment. The “shift” mentioned above concerns the fact that this other side of the law (its “back side”) becomes its front side. Or, perhaps more precisely: (surplus-) enjoyment is no longer a hidden support of the law; rather, it becomes one with the law, as if a kind of short circuit between the two had been established. This could also be expressed in terms of what, in his book *Homo* sacer, Giorgio Agamben develops at the political level: modern politics is characterized by the fact that the “state of emergency” (the state that is, at one and the same time, the exception to as well as the support of the rule of law) is itself becoming a rule of law. Thus, the crucial feature of the ascetic ideal does not consist in the fact that the law (as the imperative of duty and self-denial) constitutes a weapon with which we are to fight our passions and drives; the law does not exactly “suppress” the drives and the passions. The problem and power of the ascetic ideal lie in the fact that it is only through it that passion actually “runs wild,” and becomes limitless. In paragraph 229 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche designates the “fear of the ‘wild, savage beast” (i.e. the fear of what, in men, is supposed to be lawless and animal-like) as superstition. The belief according to which there is some primary “wildness” in man (a wildness that has to be transformed by means of culture and spirit) is an empty belief. If there is a “pure passion” to be found in the history of Christianity (as the essential bearer of the ascetic ideal), it is to be found on the side of the Law, on the side of the ascetic ideal itself. In the struggle against sensuality and corporeality, in the “dissection of conscience,” there is an “abundant, overabundant enjoyment [GenuB].”8 And “high culture” is based on the deepening and spiritualizing of cruelty: “that ‘wild beast’ has not been killed off at all, it lives and thrives, and it has only — made a divinity of itself...” It is only with the (Christian) law that sensuality as such gets invented. This was Kierkegaard’s thesis, but for Kierkegaard it basically means that, in contrast to the Greek individuality that strove for a balance between the spiritual and the sensual, Christianity, as the affirmation of the spiritual principle, also established its Other: it excluded the sensual, and thus merely granted it its autonomous existence.2° Nietzsche’s emphasis is slightly different: with the formation of the ascetic ideal, the sensual is not simply the Other of the law, but becomes the very thing that the law gives form to—it becomes one with the law. (The ascetic ideal “is employed to produce orgies of feeling,” as Nietzsche puts it.) The fundamental gesture of the ascetic ideal in relation to the sensual is not exclusion but, rather, something like a complete appropriation, an inclusion without any remainder. The sensual itself takes on the form of the law. If, on the one hand, the purely sensual or boundless passion is a fiction generated by the law (i.e. a fiction of an otherness sustained by the law), it is, on the other hand, the very Real of the law. Pure sensuality (passion, pleasure, voluptuousness) is nothing but the law itself. The law becomes the only Real (in the sense of the only source of excitation, passion, pleasure, and pain): the pleasures that remain outside (it) are, strictly speaking, “null” and “void” in relation to the (overabundant) pleasure that the law provides, gives body to, and enjoins. In this context, the assertion about the “nullity of pleasures” (outside the frame of the ascetic ideal) is not simply empty ideological talk, flatly contradicted by the Real of human experience. The triumph of the ascetic ideal consists precisely in the fact that, at some point, it conquers the very soil of “real human experience.” Before this, the pleasure might well have been dispersed, chaotic, without clear boundaries; yet this does not meant that it was infinite and boundless before the law set limits to it. On the contrary, the law (of the ascetic ideal) is the very name for limitless pleasure, for the enjoyment that became infinite and fathomless. In the ascetic ideal, the law is not something that sets limits to passion, restraining and regulating it. Instead, it is the very outlet of passion. It is the passion of the infinite or an infinite passion—even though it takes the form of an infinite passion to set limits, to purify, to narrow the circle around the pure. The only (now existing) infinite passion is the passion that takes on the form of the law. Precisely as the struggle against displeasure (in response to which it employs enjoyment), Christianity is also a struggle against pleasure, defined exactly as that which, in enjoyment, is not real (“fleeting pleasures,” “passing voluptuousness”) but “illusory.” And the genuine triumph of the ascetic ideal comes when people themselves (atheists included) actually and personally begin to feel that such pleasure is indeed “empty,” “null” and “illusory—that is to say, when it is no longer necessary for all kinds of church authorities to preach about it. This is why the ascetic ideal attains its climax (or becomes what it is) only after the “death of God.” I have already indicated the proximity of these arguments to some of Freud’s claims from Civilization and *Its* Discontents. What Nietzsche analyzes under the name of “ascetic ideal” corresponds, almost point by point, to what Freud calls the superego, the law of an insatiable passion. The more we obey it, the more we sacrifice to it—the more it wants, and the more it gains in strength and severity. We are dealing with the same image of vampirism that is also present in Nietzsche: the (superego) law literally feeds on the drives, devouring their “blood,” and ultimately becoming the only real locus of enjoyment. It could be said that the superego itself comes to be “structured like a drive.” It is common knowledge that Freud posits a kind of temporal paradox at the very core of the superego and the moral conscience linked to it: the renouncement of the drives creates conscience, and conscience demands the renouncement of the drives.2’ In this way, the very form of renouncing becomes a form of enjoyment, a mode of its organization. This is especially blatant in obsessional neurosis, in which Freud recognizes the paradigm of “religious” thinking.

#### Our alternative is to forget about the suffering in the 1ac. the pain cited by the 1ac is only attended to by the memory of the 1ac to further asceticism, only a break away from these memories solves.

**Zupancic 03** [alenka, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two,” 57-60]

This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”21 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure, In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”), Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the “historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion. It is precisely as an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28 Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous horizons, and this is precisely how it immobilizes us, forcing us into frenetic activity. Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness, nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being becomes properly human. Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes’ Looking backward he feels he is blind, listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way; so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and devalued;. . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through— is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every just deed as well; and no aftist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were otherwise incalculably great.3° If we read this passage carefully, we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion, we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion. It could also be interesting to relate Nietzsche’s reflections from the quoted passage to the story of Hamlet, in which the imperative to remember, uttered by Hamlet’s father’s Ghost, plays a very prominent role. Remember me! Remember me!, the Ghost repeats to Hamlet, thus engaging him in the singular rhythm that characterizes the hero of this play—that of the alternation between resigned apathy and frenetic activity or precipitate actions (his killing of Polonius, as well as that of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern; his engagement in the duel with Laertes . . .). This movement prevents Hamlet from carrying out the very deed his father’s Ghost charges him with. Many things have been said and written about the relationship between action and knowledge in this play, and about how knowledge prevents Hamlet from acting. Although the two notions are not unrelated, it might be interesting to consider this also in terms of memory (not only in terms of knowledge). It could be worthwhile to contemplate the role played by the imperative of memory. Could we not say that one of the fundamental reasons for the difficulty of Hamlet’s position is precisely the structural incompatibility of memory and action— that is to say, the fact that action ultimately always “betrays” memory? And do we not encounter something similar in the wider phenomenon of melancholy (in the play, Hamlet is actually said to be “melancholic”) as a never-ending grief that keeps alive, through pain, the memory of what was lost? Additionally, although we can recognize in this kind of melancholy a form of fidelity (for instance—to use Nietzsche’s words—fidelity to “a woman or a great idea”), this kind of fidelity, bound to memory, should be distinguished from fidelity to the very event of the encounter with this woman or idea. Contrary to the first form, this second form of fidelity implies and presupposes the power to forget. Of course, this does not mean to forget in the banal sense of no longer remembering the person or the idea in question, but in the sense that forgetting liberates the potential of the encounter itself, and opens up—precisely through its “closure”—the possibility of a new one.

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must advocate the resolution through an instrumental defense of economic engagement toward Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela.

#### “economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties

**Çelik 11** – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies **differ from other tools** in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of **deliberate expanding economic ties** with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.

#### “Substantial” must be at least 2%

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'Substantial" means "of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable." Bequest to charitable institution, making 1/48 of expenditures in state, held exempt from taxation; such expenditures constituting "substantial" part of its activities. Tax Commission of Ohio v. American Humane Education Soc., 181 N.E. 557, 42 Ohio App. 4.

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Turns the AFF – a predictable topic forces pre-round internal-reflective deliberation which is the only way to convince people of the legitimacy of the 1ac

**Goodin and Niemeyer 03 –** (Robert and Simon, Australian National University, “When Does Deliberation Begin, Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy” Political Studies, Volume 50, p 627-649, WileyInterscience)

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – **before** the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing **attention on a topic**, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to **internal-reflective deliberation**, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earl iest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally **organized group discussions** might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### That’s key to critical thinking which is a portable educational skill – outweighs your offense

**Harrigan 08 –** (Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp. 6-9)

Additionally, there are social benefits to the practice of requiring students to debate both sides of controversial issues. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. Like those who argue on behalf of the efficiency-maximizing benefits of free market competition, it is believed that arguments are most rigorously tested (and conceivably refined and improved) when compared to all available alternatives. Even for beliefs that have seemingly been ingrained in consensus opinion or in cases where the public at-large is unlikely to accept a particular position, it has been argued that they should remain open for public discussion and deliberation (Mill, 1975). Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1987, p.10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be 'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, "with such learning, we Americans could prepare...not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet" (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called "the highest educational goal of the activity" (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate's critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches "**conceptual flexibility**," where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p,290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt and Louden, 1999; Colbert, 2002, p.82).

#### political simulations are educationally valuable – deliberation is empowering and activates agency

**Hanghoj 08** – Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor (http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of **educational gaming** cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. **Dramatic rehearsal** The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by **projecting** and **choosing between** various scenarios for **future action**. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (**in imagination**) of various competing possible **lines of action**… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a **thought experiment**. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding **everyday rationality** (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “**crystallizing possibilities** and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “**thought experiment**” will be successful. But what it cando is make the **process** of choosing more **intelligent** than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a **valuable perspective** for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into **domain-specific scenarios**. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to **inquire into** and resolve **scenario-specific problems** (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a **striking difference** between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the **actual consequences** that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or **simulate** the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “**competing** possible **lines of action**” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the **contingent outcomes** and **domain-specific processes** of **problem-based scenarios**.

#### critical approaches can’t resolve real world problems like poverty, racism, war and doom their project to irrelevance – political pragmatism solves your advocacy

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(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm, JMP)

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me **hugely more irrelevant** than Habermas in their narrative attempts to **suggest policy prescriptions** (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who **actually want to be relevant**, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in **neological and multi-syllabic jargon.** These **elaborate theoretical remedies** are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left **retreats from activism** and adopts a **spectatorial approach** to the problems of its country. **Disengagement** from practice produces **theoretical hallucinations**"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action."

Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as **beyond reform** and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be **disastrous for our social hopes**, as I will explain.

Leftist American culture critics might put their **considerable talents to better use** if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help **forge public and political possibilities** in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of **public intellectual** who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to **move past high theory** to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

**The new public philosopher** might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our **quotidian social institutions,** into the **grimy pragmatic details** where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly **understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences.** This might help keep us from being **slapped down in debates by true policy pros** who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to **listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers** and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Guidelines for dialogue are intersubjectively possible and desirable---they are necessary to cultivate democratic habits and political judgment---the affirmative’s rejection of normative constraints goes too far

Heimonet 9—Professor of French, American Catholic U (JEAN-MICHEL, THE SACRED: MYSTICISM AND PRAGMATISM, THE MAJOR TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY, http://www.crvp.org/book/Series07/VII-6/chapter-6.htm)

Beginning with Foucault these were concerned with carrying out an archeology of knowledge with a view to deciphering the potential for restrictions native to, andreproduced by, Western culture since the classical age. Following the same movement, through the concept of différence, Derrida (and at the same time Lacan) pointed out the internal division of the subject between two contrary existential tendencies: the one, centrifugal and directed towards loss and death; the other, centripetal and directed towards conservation and power. Then, in introducing his Leçon at the Collège de France, Barthes proclaimed the explosive slogan: "All language is fascist." By this he meant that syntactical and grammatical conventions constitute a constricting structure from which the writer could escape only by "cheating the language" in order to go beyond orthodox usage. What is essential in the text is no longer the content or manifest sense, but the structure of musical and psychological associations which, like a slip of the tongue, manifest the deepest orientations of the writer — generally referred to as a Freudian or pleasure slip. This literary kamasutra or "science of the pleasures of language" — which Barthes already had developed in Le plaisir du texte — complements on the level of rhetoric the work of Deleuze and Guatari on the psychoanalytic level. Strongly influenced by the Nietzschean idea of "culture," the authors of L’Anti-Oedipe call "writing" that "terrible alphabet" or "cruel system of signs" engraved in the flesh of man who, by that very fact, loses his privileges as the ego scriptor and become a "Desiring machine."1 In this context Jean Baudrillard’s prediction of the subjection of man to the position of a thing gains in force. In Les strategies fatales Baudrillard writes: the subject was beautiful only in itspride andarbitrariness, its limitless willful power, its transcendence as subject of power and of history, or in the drama of its alienation. Without this one is pitiably deficient, the pawn of his own desires or image, incapable of forming a clear representation of the universe and sacrificing himself in an attempt to revive the dead body of history.2 In sum, the insight which would give birth to the revolt of May 1968 destroyed in one stroke the related ideas of conscience, will and autonomy which had constituted the contribution of the Enlightenment; that is, the ability of a subject, besieged by the irrational forces of myth and religion, to give focus to a world in terms of his understanding and will. It is this heritage of the Enlightenment which today is being reaffirmed. The urgency of this return to enlightened reason under the auspices of the Kantian philosophy of the subject provides the principal themes for the last books of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut. In La pensée 68: essai sur l’anti-humanisme contemporain3 and Heidegger et les modernes,4 the intention is to warn against the dangerously metaphysical process by which the thinkers of the last decade have practiced — often without being aware of it — a systematic anti-humanism. Ironically, under the pretext of eliminating once and for all the metaphysics of reason centered upon the subject, Foucault andDerrida have found themselves caught in the spiral of metaphysical hyperbole. For the a priori identity they suppose between knowledge and power leads them to place the human ideal beyond all kinds of meaning and in so doing to make it inaccessible, in relation to which the individual can only renounce his or her autonomy. In other words, in the end the excess of thought fascinated by the absolute becomes a form of regression. Dispossessed of his attributes as a subject (that is, of knowledge and will) on both the speculative and the practical levels, and thus incapable of acting upon "the world," the modern man is subjected to the transcendentalism of another lay, non theological religion, which leads him to search his salvation no longer in the truth or efficacity of a satisfying answer, but in the effort and tension of an endless questioning. It is as reaction to (in the chemical sense) and against (in the political sense) this metaphysical hyperbole that one should interpret the desire of Ferry and Renaut to search for the conditions of a "non-metaphysical humanism" capable of "conferring coherent philosophical status upon the promise of freedom contained in the requirements (of the term humanism)."5 In a parallel manner Jürgen Habermas wishes to restore to philosophy its true place and function as the "guardian of rationality." Rejecting the erroneous association between reason and power, the author of Morale et communication6 attempts to show that the normative rules of linguistic communication, inasmuch as they provide a universal basis for intersubjective exchanges, constitute the best defense against an abuse of power. Although Barthes deduces a fascist character for language from its normative function, Habermas tries to show that this same function is, on the contrary, presupposed intuitively by every subject who takes part in a process of communication. This permits him to state the ethical principle of dialogue: "only those norms can claim validity which are accepted . . . by all the persons participating in a practical discussion."7 Nonmetaphysical humanism and the ethics of communicative action agree that human activities and relationships must be perceived no longer in terms of an ideal of inaccessible purity, but from the pragmatic point of view where conditions of efficacity and utility are understood on the basis of results in daily life.

#### Text: The United States federal government should legalize marijuana, cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine and the United States should withdraw its involvement in the war on drugs.

#### Solves the violent drug war

Brewer 08(Stephanie Erin, 6/30/08, International Legal Officer at the Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center in Mexico City, “Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change Course in its Approach to Mexico’s Drug War,” American University Washington College of Law, pdf)//DR. H

The engine driving Mexican drug trafficking is demand for drugs in the United States, where wholesale illicit drug proceeds reach tens of billions of dollars each year.31 As long as this level of demand exists, drugs will continue to flow north regardless of the level of deterrence that the security forces deploy.32 In this regard, it is likely that the most efficient use of hundreds of millions of dollars annually is to keep most of this money in the United States and direct it to demand reduction through public health services and programs to reduce drug use, such as improved access to treatment for addiction. Another major reason for the United States to focus attention north of the border is that the military-style assault weapons that fuel Mexican drug violence (such as AK-47s) come from the United States. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) estimates that 90–95% of Mexican cartels’ weapons enter Mexico from the southern United States, where individual buyers, benefiting from gaping loopholes in U.S. gun laws, purchase multiple military weapons from gun sellers and then pass the weapons to drug cartels.33 There are signs that actors in Congress and the current administration recognize the need to step up efforts to address these domestic problems. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama recently announced a border security plan that will target the arms trade by deploying hundreds more ATF and other agents to the southwest U.S. border. The plan also contemplates measures to reduce drug demand, such as improving drug treatment within national healthcare systems.34 Also noteworthy is a letter to the President signed by more than 50 members of Congress asking for enforcement of the U.S. ban on imported assault weapons.35 While this measure alone will not correct underlying loopholes in U.S. gun laws, it would be a step in the right direction. Indeed, from its inception the Mérida Initiative has been billed by both governments as the embodiment of U.S. recognition of its “shared responsibility” to combat drug trafficking.36 Only recently, however, have U.S. officials begun to acknowledge clearly the need to address the factors within U.S. territory that generate drug-related violence in Mexico. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Mexico marked an important acknowledgement that, in Clinton’s words, “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs [in the U.S.] fuels the drug trade.”37

#### Focusing on representations is bad.

**Taft-Kaufman, 95** (Jill, professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, at Central Michigan University, Southern Communication Journal, Spring, proquest)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. **Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure**. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

#### US drug intervention is decreasing – Nieto’s rejecting the US.

Cave et al 13(Randal C. Archibold and Damien Cave reported from Mexico City, and Ginger Thompson from New York, 4/30/13, “Mexico’s Curbs on U.S. Role in Drug Fight Spark Friction,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//DR>. H

In their joint fight against drug traffickers, the United States and Mexico have forged an unusually close relationship in recent years, with the Americans regularly conducting polygraph tests on elite Mexican security officials to root out anyone who had been corrupted.

But shortly after Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December, American agents got a clear message that the dynamics, with Washington holding the clear upper hand, were about to change.

“So do we get to polygraph you?” one incoming Mexican official asked his American counterparts, alarming United States security officials who consider the vetting of the Mexicans central to tracking down drug kingpins. The Mexican government briefly stopped its vetted officials from cooperating in sensitive investigations. The Americans are waiting to see if Mexico allows polygraphs when assigning new members to units, a senior Obama administration official said.

In another clash, American security officials were recently asked to leave an important intelligence center in Monterrey, where they had worked side by side with an array of Mexican military and police commanders collecting and analyzing tips and intelligence on drug gangs. The Mexicans, scoffing at the notion of Americans’ having so much contact with different agencies, questioned the value of the center and made clear that they would put tighter reins on the sharing of drug intelligence.

There have long been political sensitivities in Mexico over allowing too much American involvement. But the recent policy changes have rattled American officials used to far fewer restrictions than they have faced in years.

#### Agamben’s biopower is over-simplified – takes out solvency.

Virno **02** (Paolo, PhD and Italian philosopher, “General intellect, exodus, multitude,” Archipelago No. 54, June 2002, <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm>)

\*becomes a buzzword that prevents us from confronting specific political circumstances

Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the

archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

#### No impact to modern biopolitics—modern power is more nuanced and responsible to the moral economy

Rabinow & Rose 03 (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @ the London School of Economics, “Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today,” December 10, 2003, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/ pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, accessed July 07, pg. 8-9)

The interpretation of contemporary biopolitics as the politics of a state modeled on the figure of the sovereign suits the twentieth century absolutisms of the Nazis and Stalin. But we need a more nuanced account of sovereign power to analyze contemporary rationalities or technologies of politics. Since these authors take their concept and point of reference from Foucault, it is worth contrasting their postulate of a origin and beneficiary of biopower to Foucaultís remarks on sovereignty as a form of power whose diagram, but not principle, is the figure of the sovereign ruler. Its characteristic is indeed ultimately a mode of power which relies on the right to take life. However, with the exception of certain ‘paroxysmal’ moments, this is a mode of power whose activation can only be sporadic and non-continuous. The totalization of sovereign power as a mode of ordering daily life would be too costly, and indeed the very excesses of the exercise of this power seek to compensate for its sporadic nature. Sovereignty, in this sense, is precisely a diagram of a form of power not a description of its implementation. Certainly some forms of colonial power sought to operationalize it, but in the face of its economic and governmental costs, colonial statecraft was largely to take a different form. The two megalomaniac State forms of the twentieth century also sought to actualize it, as have some others in their wake: Albania under Hoxha, North Korea. But no historian of pre-modern forms of control could fail to notice the dependence of sovereign rule in its non-paroxysmal form on a fine web of customary conventions, reciprocal obligations, and the like, in a word, a moral economy whose complexity and scope far exceeds the extravagance displays of the sovereign. Sovereign power is at one and the same time an element in this moral economy and an attempt to master it.

**Scenario building is the best pedagogical method to engage and develop alternatives to flawed social and political systems – empirical evidence proves it’s uniquely successful in the area of international relations – not role playing simulation so it avoids all their offense.**

**Mahnken and Junio 13** – (2013, Thomas, PhD, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Timothy, Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, PhD in Political Science expected 2013, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395, September 2013)

This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and **teaching**. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios.

In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz commented that “social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from ‘what if?’ questions and concentrate on ‘what was?’” (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios—less than 2% of the time—is surprising; the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a **common tool employed by the policymakers** whom political scientists study.

This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for **theory building and pedagogy**. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, **as critics might suggest**, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, **scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy**. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs.

Scenarios in the Discipline

What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which **high-consequence, low-probability** events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is **nuclear warfare**, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur:

During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region.

This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how **such stories**, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may **improve the study of IR**. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.

# Block

#### Resolved means enact policy

**Words and Phrases 64 –** (Permanent Edition) 1964

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Research – allowing non-economic engagement to be topical discourages research because it causes an overload in the neg burden – this encourages awful debates like process CPs and a generic disad – research outweighs – allows independent intelligence gathering and is a portable skill. Overburdening research loads also gut participation in debate.

Rowland 84(Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p. 53-4)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing both in scope and size. This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breadth. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. National debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change. The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process. Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske believes that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breath of the topic and experience “negophobia,” the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novice through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caught without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.” The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters who eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much time and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity. Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.” The final effect may be that entire programs wither cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.” In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

#### Dialogue – defending a topical advocacy allows argumentative roles on both sides – the aff’s interpretation allows monopolization of strategy and causes a one-sided discussion subverting any reason there’s a neg side in debate – that’s Galloway – that ruins any attempt to dismantle exclusionary practices of debate.

Gooding-Williams 03 Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy Robert Gooding-Wiliams Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies. IssueConstellations Volume 5, Issue 1, pages 18–41, March 1998

I begin with the assumption that fostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of public education in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes mutual understanding across cultural differences, thereby fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others" in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that deliberative debate of this sort is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences through cross-cultural dialogue and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that cross-cultural educational insights, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may alter and further complicate those persons' identities, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious.

#### Discourse doesn’t shape policymaking – material structure are more important

**Tuathail 96 –** [Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is **inadequate** by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Decision-making turns and outweighs their framework impacts

**Steinberg & Freeley 08** – \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg is a Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of **intense debate**, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps **equally difficult** for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. **Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made**. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. **Life demands decision making**. We make **countless individual decisions** every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. **Every profession** requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through **military invasion or diplomacy**? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? **And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others**. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. **We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it** and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

**Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us**. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Agonism is essential to critical thinking and preventing atrocity

**Roberts-Miller 03 –** Patricia Roberts-Miller 3 is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a **competitive space** in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**.** This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference.This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely).Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued…Eichmannperfectlyexemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorbing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slogans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarianism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated contemplation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" " (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and **by which one might be changed**. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 26263). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be enlarged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really matter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's opponents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered**. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipation and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompanied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of comments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism**. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system **could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarianism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

**Arguing that language determines reality is reductionist and simplistic—there are too many alternate factors that are more important—language is a trivial factor in constructing reality**

**Rodwell 05** (Jonathan, PhD student at Manchester Met. researching U.S. Foreign Policy, 49th parallel, Spring, “Trendy but empty: A Response to Richard Jackson”, <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm>)

However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[[ii]](http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm#_edn2) Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity.  Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the **complete lack of understanding** of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations.  Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a **footnote in our understanding** .

#### Changing representational practices hinders understanding of policy by overlooking questions of agency and material structures

**Tuathail 96** (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Reps don't influence reality—they're just descriptive

Hans **Mouritzen 97**, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies,cites Kenneth Waltz, father of structural realism and Ford Professor Emeritus of political science @ University of California (The Future of International Relations, edited by Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver. Page 70.)

The doctrine of metaphysical realism asserts that reality exists indepen­dently from our language and theories about it (contrast: idealism, relati­vism, instrumentalism)4 It is labelled 'metaphysical' by Popper, since it is not refutable as a scientific theory should be. Arguments can be given in its favour, however: 'human language is always essentially descriptive... and an unambiguous description is always of something of some state of affairs which may be real or imaginary...Rationality, language, description, argument, are all about some reality' (Popper 1973: 41). A corollary of realism is the correspondence theory of truth. 'I accept the commonsense theory... that truth is correspondence with the facts (or with reality)' (Popper 1973: 44) (contrast a coherence theory of truth, which tends to characterize idealists/relativists, and a pragmatic theory of truth, which tends to characterize instrumentalists5). Waltz obviously presupposes meta­physical realism, although this label is never used: A theory, while related to the world about which explanations are wanted, always remains distinct from that world. Theories are not de­scriptions of the real world; they are instruments that we design in order to apprehend some part of it. (1975: 8) This might for a second bring doubt to one's mind about Waltz's view: Are theories mere instruments that can be more or less useful in virtue of their ability of produce adequate predictions and, hence, guide our practice? The answer is no. They are instruments, but instruments that can make us apprehend some part of the world. Therefore, they are first and foremost about something, an independent real world (see the first sentence). Good theories reveal the causal mechanisms in this world.6 A further corrobora­tion of this interpretation appears from Waltz's occasional reference to the nature of 'subject-matter' as an argument: 'The attempt to follow the general-systems model has been a misfortune, for our subject matter does not fit the model closely enough to make the model useful—One must choose an appropriate to the subject matter' (Waltz 1975: 72). In other words, models/theories may be more or less useful, but that is because of some kind of relation (or lack of relation) with the segment of reality at stake.7

#### Ignore their Agamben Kritiks of the state – they’re contradictory.

Passavant 07, Paul, April, “The Contradictory State of Giorgio Agamben,” Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 147, JSTOR)//DR. H

I argue that Giorgio Agamben employs two, contradictory theories of the state in his works. Earlier works, such as The Coming Community and Means without End, suggest that the state today functions as an aspect of the society of the spectacle where spectacle is the logical extension of the commodity form under late capitalism. This part of Agamben's work attributes a determined character to the state and a determining power to the economic forces of capitalism that conditions particular forms of the state. Later work, such as Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life and State of Exception, are preoccupied with the logic of juridical sovereignty and the increased frequency of states of emergency. This part of Agamben's work attributes a determining strength to the state under current conditions. Although his earlier work provides a more coherent narrative of how it is possible to move from contemporary society to ideal community, it does not provide the theory of political action necessary to overcome the power of the state he describes when he theorizes the state in Homo Sacer and State of Exception. None of the three possibilities of political action present in his later works provides passage beyond state sovereignty without violating his philosophical commitments.

#### Agamben’s critique is too totalizing—accepting appeals to some sovereign power does not cause the negative impacts of sovereignty in every instance.

**Hussain, 2k** (Department of History at Berkeley Nasser, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 495, lexis).

Here once again we are forced to question Agamben's teleological mode of thought. Is this sovereign power represented in the concentration camps really a constitutive feature of sovereignty tout court? Even limiting ouselves to the remarks above, we can imagine a liberal critique of this position that asks from where come the limitations that Agamben concedes previous Weimar governments had observed. Surely, one does not have to accept in its entirety a normative liberal conception of sovereign power in order to appreciate that the demand for a factual accounting for the decision on the exception, and institutional checks upon the totalization of the space of exception, can nonetheless - at least in certain instances - be effective. Indeed, one could go further and suggest that a liberal theory of sovereign power understands full well the paradoxical relation between law and fact, norm and exception; and, precisely in light of such an understanding constructs an institutional system that cannot resolve the paradox but nonetheless attempts to prevent it from reaching an intensified and catastrophic conclusion. Given that Agamben is a nuanced and fair-minded thinker, one must wonder about why he largely ignores such a system. We think that one possible answer is that, just as for Agamben the source of the problem is not the institutional operation of sovereign power, but its object - bare life - so too the solution is not a proliferation of institutional safeguards but a rethinking of that mode of being. In this regard, we find his concluding musings on Heidigger to be suggestive.

#### Agamben’s methodology is flawed—his argument is a giant assertion with no proof.

**Lewis, 99** (Stephen, “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Review)”, *Modernism/Modernity* 6.3, p. 165, Project MUSE, Humanities Professor at Chicago,)

There are a number of objections one could raise to specific aspects of the book, particularly its premise that concepts such as "sovereign power" and "bare life" describe realities that remain more or less constant over twenty-four centuries of history. I will focus here, however, on what I think is the most fundamentally objectionable aspect of the book: its methodology, or the set of assumptions about what constitutes a good argument that governs its "historico-philosophical" approach to its subject matter. The best way to demonstrate these assumptions is by considering Agamben's adoption of the term "biopolitics." He takes up the term from Michel Foucault with the intent of moving beyond Foucault's thinking of the "double bind" exerted upon the political subject by, on the one hand, "subjective technologies" and, on the other, "political technologies" (5-6). Agamben's claim is that his approach to biopolitics clarifies the precise nature of this "point at which the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power" because he grounds it in an analysis of the juridico-institutional structure of sovereign power, a realm of political reality that Foucault refused to take seriously (119). Agamben's rhetoric when explaining why Foucault did not see the structural nature of modern power in the more complete and illuminating way that Agamben does is interesting. For Agamben, any failings in Foucault's thinking arise not from a problem with Foucault's methods of research or from deficits in his command of evidence, but, rather, from the assumption that Foucault could not have thought otherwise than as he did because he was thinking at the very limits then of Western thought. The "blind spot" in the "double bind" Foucault locates constitutes, says Agamben, "something like a vanishing point that the different perspectival lines of Foucault's inquiry (and, more generally, of the entire Western reflection on power) converge toward without reaching" (6). Unfortunately, yet perhaps unsurprisingly, Agamben intimates that he, too, is thinking at the very limits of current thought (presumably he finds himself able to think beyond Foucault's horizon because he is alive and thinking now, after Foucault). Agamben's use of what Thomas Pavel has called the "rhetoric of the end" calls attention to the problems that occur when a book is structured by apocalyptic claims about the end (and thus the inaccessibility) of certain modes of being or of thought rather than by empirically or historiographically grounded argument. [2](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modernism-modernity/v006/6.3lewis.html" \l "FOOT2#FOOT2) There is nothing inherently objectionable about claiming that the end of a certain era has occurred; the point is simply that, to my mind, the reader ought to be able to decide from evidence-based argumentation whether the claim is reasonable. [3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modernism-modernity/v006/6.3lewis.html" \l "FOOT3#FOOT3) Agamben says that his intent in describing the hidden connection between totalitarianism and democracy on an "historico-philosophical" plane rather than through detailed historiographical inquiry is not to "[level] the enormous differences that characterize [the] history and [. . .] rivalry" of democracy and totalitarianism (10). Instead, his intent is to make the structure of this hidden connection known so that it can one day be surpassed through a new form of politics. The problem, however, is that the rhetoric of the end he employs in lieu of historiographical argument prevents him from saying precisely what this new form of politics could be and thus makes its attainment seem mysteriously difficult. Indeed Agamben tends to fall back on impossible-to-prove categorical assertions rather than reasonable explanations when he tells why, for instance, the categories of classical politics, or, alternatively, religion-based ethical systems, cannot be "returned to" in any sense. Functioning hand-in-hand with such categorical assertions about the inaccessibility of the past are equally unsupported gestures towards a future politics articulated in what reads at times like a language of secularized apophatism, which in the present book Agamben tends to employ in conjunction with discussions of Benjamin's messianism.

#### Agamben ignores the actual differences between democracy and totalitarianism—his failure to engage in cost-benefit assessment means he’s a fanatic who only thinks in absolutes.

**Heins, 05** (Volker, visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May,

http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598)

Agamben is not interested in such weighing of costs and benefits because he assumes from the outset that taking care of the survival needs of people in distress is simply the reverse side of the modern inclination to ignore precisely those needs and turn life itself into a tool and object of power politics. By way of conclusion, I will indicate briefly how his view differs from two other, often no less shattering critiques of modern humanitarianism. Martti Koskenniemi warned that humanitarian demands and human rights are in danger of degenerating into "mere talk."[47] The recent crisis in Darfur, Sudan, can be cited as an example for a situation in which the repeated invocation of human rights standards and jus cogens norms, like those articulated in the Genocide Convention, might ultimately damage those norms themselves if states are unwilling to act on them.[48] This criticism implies that human rights should be taken seriously and applied in a reasonable manner. Both David Kennedy and Oona Hathaway have gone one step further by taking issue even with those who proved to be serious by joining treaties or engaging in advocacy. In a controversial quantitative study, Hathaway contended that the ratification of human rights treaties by sets of given countries not only did not improve human rights conditions on the ground, but actually correlated with increasing violations.[49] In a similar vein, David Kennedy radicalized Koskenniemi's point by arguing that human rights regimes and humanitarian law are rather part of the problem than part of solution, because they "justify" and "excuse" too much.[50] To some extent, this is an effect of the logic of legal reasoning: marking a line between noncombatants and combatants increases the legitimacy of attacking the latter, granting privileges to lawful combatants delegitimizes unlawful belligerents and dramatically worsens their status. On the whole, Kennedy is more concerned about the dangers of leaving human rights to international legal elites and a professional culture which is blind for the mismatch between lofty ideals and textual articulations on the one side, and real people and problems on the other side.[51] Whereas these authors reveal the "dark sides" of overly relying on human rights talk and treaties, the moral fervor of activists or the routines of the legal profession, Agamben claims that something is wrong with human rights as such, and that recent history has demonstrated a deep affinity between the protection and the infringement of these rights. Considered in this light, the effort of the British aid organization Save the Children, for instance, to help children in need both in Britain and abroad after World War I —faithful to George Bernard Shaw's saying, "I have no enemies under seven"—is only the flip side of a trend to declare total war on others regardless of their age and situation. This assertion clearly goes far beyond the voices of other pessimists. Agamben's work is understandable only against the backdrop of an entirely familiar mistrust of liberal democracy and its ability to cultivate nonpartisan moral and legal perspectives. According to Agamben, democracy does not threaten to turn into totalitarianism, but rather both regimes smoothly cross over into one another since they ultimately rest on the same foundation of a political interpretation of life itself.[52] Like Carl Schmitt, Agamben sees the invocation of human rights by democratic governments as well as the "humanitarian concept of humanity"[53] as deceptive manouvers or, at least, as acts of self-deception on the part of the liberal bourgeois subject. The difference between Agamben and Schmitt lies in the fact that Schmitt fought liberal democracy in the name of the authoritarian state, while Agamben sees democracy and dictatorship as two equally unappealing twins. Very much unlike Schmitt, the Italian philosopher confronts us with a mode of thinking in vaguely felt resemblances in lieu of distinctly perceived differences. Ultimately, he offers a version of Schmitt's theory of sovereignty that changes its political valence and downplays the difference between liberal democracy and totalitarian dictatorship—a difference about which Adorno once said that it "is a total difference. And I would say," he added, "that it would be abstract and in a problematic way fanatical if one were to ignore this difference."[54]

**Biopolitics is an empty term that is deployed in the place of actual analysis of material conditions—their impact representations block useful criticism.**

**Virno, 02** (Paolo, University of Cosenza, 'General intellect, exodus, multitude. Interview with Paolo Virno', Archipélago **number 54, published in English at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm)** professor of linguistic philosophy

Agamben is a problem. Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Thus, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitcal he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly the government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as it is transformed into a commodity the potential, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that mantains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - but that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with the exclamation point, a word that carried the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that has fear of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics some times is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

#### Not all biopolitics bring about genocide—

**Rabinow & Rose 03** (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @ the London School of Economics, “Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today,” December 10, 2003, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/ pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, pg. 8-9)

Agamben takes seriously Adorno’s challenge “how is it possible to think after Auschwitz?” But for that very reason, it is to trivialize Auschwitz to apply Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception and Foucault’s analysis of biopower to every instance where living beings enter the scope of regulation, control and government. The power to command under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical relations. But this is not to say that this form of power commands backed up by the ultimate threat of death is the guarantee or underpinning principle of all forms of biopower in contemporary liberal societies. Unlike Agamben, we do not think that : the jurist the doctor, the scientist, the expert, the priest depend for their power over life upon an alliance with the State (1998: 122). Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to analyze every contemporary instance of thanato-politics from Rwanda to the epidemic of AIDS deaths across Africa. Surely the essence of critical thought must be its capacity to make distinctions that can facilitate judgment and action.

#### Barelife impacts over-determine the power of the state.

**Cesarino & Negri 04** (Cesare, associate professor of cultural studies, Antonio, professor emeritus @ the Collège International de Philosophie, “It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy,” Cultural Critique, Vol. 57, Spring 2004, pg. 172-173)

I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to *Homo Sacer*, and I feel that this new work will be resolutive for his thought—in the sense that he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, this book is extremely learned and elegant; it remains, however, somewhat trapped within Pauline exegesis, rather than constituting a full-fledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus, to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. I believe that the concept of naked life is not an impossible, unfeasible one. I believe it is possible to push the image of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [*un povero Cristo*] is crushed, to conceive of that extreme point at which power tries to eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. But this is also the point at which this concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way actually ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology. Agamben, in effect, is saying that such is the nature of power: in the final instance, power reduces each and every human being to such a state of powerlessness. But this is absolutely not true! On the contrary: the historical process takes place and is produced thanks to a continuous constitution and construction, which undoubtedly confronts the limit over and over again—but this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and in which life becomes increasingly fuller. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute pow-erlessness, especially when it has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and reiterate? Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those who are not yet or not completely crushed by power, from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution, from the standpoint of power [*potenza*]?

#### Liberal democratic protections prevent military action and the slide to totalitarianism—Agamben ignores the actual practice of humanitarianism.

**Heins, 05** (Volker, visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May,

<http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598>)

According to this basic Principle of Distinction, modern humanitarian action is directed towards those who are caught up in violent conflicts without possessing any strategic value for the respective warring parties. Does this imply that classic humanitarianism and its legal expressions reduce the lives of noncombatants to the "bare life" of nameless individuals beyond the protection of any legal order? I would rather argue that humanitarianism is itself an order-making activity. Its goal is not the preservation of life reduced to a bare natural fact, but conversely the protection of civilians and thereby the protection of elementary standards of civilization which prevent the exclusion of individuals from any legal and moral order. The same holds true for human rights, of course. Agamben fails to appreciate the fact that human rights laws are not about some cadaveric "bare life", but about the protection of moral agency.[[33]](http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598#_ftn33) His sweeping critique also lacks any sense for essential distinctions. It may be legitimate to see "bare life" as a juridical fiction nurtured by the modern state, which claims the right to derogate from otherwise binding norms in times of war and emergency, and to kill individuals, if necessary, outside the law in a mode of "effective factuality."[[34]](http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598#_ftn34) Agamben asserts that sovereignty understood in this manner continues to function in the same way since the seventeenth century and regardless of the democratic or dictatorial structure of the state in question. This claim remains unilluminated by the wealth of evidence that shows how the humanitarian motive not only shapes the mandate of a host state and nonstate agencies, but also serves to restrict the operational freedom of military commanders in democracies, who cannot act with impunity and who do not wage war in a lawless state of nature. Furthermore, Agamben ignores the crisis of humanitarianism that emerged as a result of the totalitarian degeneration of modern states in the twentieth century. States cannot always be assumed to follow a rational self-interest which informs them that there is no point in killing others indiscriminately. The Nazi episode in European history has shown that sometimes leaders do not spare the weak and the sick, but take extra care not to let them escape, even if they are handicapped, very old or very young. Classic humanitarianism depends on the existence of an international society whose members feel bound by a basic set of rules regarding the use of violence—rules which the ICRC itself helped to institutionalize. Conversely, classic humanitarianism becomes dysfunctional when states place no value at all on their international reputation and see harming the lives of defenseless individuals not as useless and cruel, but as part of their very mission.[[36]](http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598#_ftn36) The founders of the ICRC defined war as an anthropological constant that produced a continuous stream of new victims with the predictable regularity and unavoidability of floods or volcanic eruptions. Newer organizations, by contrast, have framed conditions of massive social suffering as a consequence of largely avoidable political mistakes. The humanitarian movement becomes political, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt,[[37]](http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598#_ftn37) in so far as it orients itself to humanitarian states of emergency, the causes of which are located no longer in nature, but in society and politics. Consequently, the founding generation of the new humanitarian organizations have freed themselves from the ideals of apolitical philanthropy and chosen as their new models historical figures like the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Jews during the Second World War. In a different fashion than Agamben imagines, the primary concern in the field of humanitarian intervention and human rights politics today is not the protection of bare life, but rather the rehabilitation of the lived life of citizens who suffer, for instance, from conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. At the same time, there is a field of activity emerging beneath the threshold of the bare life. In the United States, in particular, pathologists working in conjunction with human rights organizations have discovered the importance of corpses and corporal remains now that it is possible to identify reliable evidence for war crimes from exhumed bodies.[[39]](http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598#_ftn39)

#### Nieto administration is strictly opposed to us intervention in the Mexican drug war.

Priest, 13 Dana, national security reporter for the Washington Post whose work focuses on intelligence and counterterrorism, Washington Post, 4/27, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-role-at-a-crossroads-in-mexicos-intelligence-war-on-the-cartels/2013/04/27/b578b3ba-a3b3-11e2-be47-b44febada3a8_print.html>, “U.S. role at a crossroads in Mexico’s intelligence war on the cartels,” ADM

MEXICO CITY — For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have put aside their tension-filled history on security matters to forge an unparalleled alliance against Mexico’s drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning. But now, much of that hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy. The December inauguration of President Enrique Peña Nieto brought the nationalistic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) back to power after 13 years, and with it a whiff of resentment over the deep U.S. involvement in Mexico’s fight against narco-traffickers. The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.-backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels, and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexico’s streets safe and calm, Mexican authorities said. Some U.S. officials fear the coming of an unofficial truce with cartel leaders. The Mexicans see it otherwise. “The objective of fighting organized crime is not in conflict with achieving peace,” said Eduardo Medina Mora, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States. Interviews with more than four dozen current and former U.S. and Mexican diplomats, law enforcement agents, military officers and intelligence officials — most of whom agreed to speak about sensitive matters only on condition of anonymity — paint the most detailed public portrait to date of how the two countries grew so close after so many years of distance and distrust, and what is at stake should the alliance be scaled back. U.S. officials got their first inkling that the relationship might change just two weeks after Peña Nieto assumed office Dec. 1. At the U.S. ambassador’s request, the new president sent his top five security officials to an unusual meeting at the U.S. Embassy here. In a crowded conference room, the new attorney general and interior minister sat in silence, not knowing what to expect, next to the new leaders of the army, navy and Mexican intelligence agency. In front of them at the Dec. 15 meeting were representatives from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the CIA, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other U.S. agencies tasked with helping Mexico destroy the drug cartels that had besieged the country for the past decade. The Mexicans remained stone-faced as they learned for the first time just how entwined the two countries had become during the battle against narco-traffickers, and how, in the process, the United States had been given near-complete entree to Mexico’s territory and the secrets of its citizens, according to several U.S. officials familiar with the meeting.