### 2ac appeasement (l)

#### The entire aff is a link-turn- it boosts obama’s credibility and solves rogue regimes- that’s Dickerson

#### No cred turn to lifting the embargo – it’s consistent with US policy of engaging other human rights violators and it restores overall US influence

**Hanson, Batten, and Ealey, 13** – economic researcher AEI, affiliate of the UNC department of public policy, and a financial analyst (Daniel, Dayne, and Harrison, “It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba”, Forbes, 1/16/13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/)//eek

Since Fidel Castro abdicated power to his brother Raul in 2008, the government has undertaken more than 300 economic reforms designed to encourage enterprise, and restrictions have been lifted on property use, travel, farming, municipal governance, electronics access, and more. Cuba is still a place of oppression and gross human rights abuse, but recent events would indicate the 11 million person nation is moving in the right direction.

Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government Accountability Office, the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.

At the Miami International Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans. Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum.

At present, the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba despite the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during the Castro takeover have dropped their claims.

Moreover, since Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct business in Cuba unimpeded, the sanctions are rather toothless. The State Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it easy to conduct exchanges.

Yet, estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent.

What’s worse, U.S. sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in 2011, the country inked a deal with Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores.

Repealing the embargo would fit into an American precedent of lifting trade and travel restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all offered normal trade relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights practices. China, a communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the U.S.’s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty year history of genocide and human trafficking propagated by its military government.

Which, of course, begs the question: when will the U.S. see fit to lift the embargo? If Cuba is trending towards democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for the embargo to be rolled back?

The cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of an antiquated Cold War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of American charitable relief, business innovation, and tourism.

A perpetual embargo on a developing nation that is moving towards reform makes little sense, especially when America’s allies are openly hostile to the embargo. It keeps a broader discussion about smart reform in Cuba from gaining life, and it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.

#### Easing the embargo makes communism more easy to contain – comparatively better than any possible hit to US cred

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(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, <http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran>, google scholar)//KW

The continuance of the embargo has incited widespread international condemnation of the Untied States. The United Nations General Assembly has consistently denounced the imposition of the embargo almost unanimously on the basis of its illegitimacy and violation of internationally accepted humanitarian standards. (Herrera, 2003, 50) The United States has also recently had to relinquish its seats on the human rights commissions both in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States, which many analysts believe to be a form of retribution aimed at the United States in response to its continuation of the Cuban embargo in the midst of its unfathomable and deplorable effects on the Cuban populace. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Many leaders in the international community have expressed their distain for the U.S. embargo through international organizations based on the fact that the United States attempts to impose the sanctions it places on Cuba via “extraterritoriality,” or against the international community, thus clearly violating internationally-accepted standards of national sovereignty and international law (Herrera, 2003, 51). Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.

#### Influence leads to regional arms races and US-Russian war

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 The strategic alliance of Russia and China continues to develop, embracing an ever-widening circle of junior partners in the Western Hemisphere (including Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia and even Mexico). China and Mexico have congratulated themselves on a strategic partnership to the bafflement of those who are clueless about national resentments and historical grudges. For those who are internationally streetwise, a respectful silence regarding the main strategic inference is socially advisable. Last December Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met with Mexican President Vicente Fox, who said that Wen had chosen Mexico as his first foreign destination for a reason. The two countries were destined to strengthen their bilateral ties, striving together for a more equitable world. One may ask what is so inequitable as to require the strengthening of this particular partnership? The strategist and the historian will grasp the military-logistical significance, the territorial aspirations and the contribution of Imperial Germany’s late foreign minister, Arthur Zimmermann, and his famous telegram of 16 January 1917. We intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare, Zimmermann explained to the German Ambassador in Washington. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to re-conquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. Powerful undemocratic countries in Asia and Europe have long dreamt of dominating their respective regions. Since 1917 there has arisen a serious obstacle (i.e., the United States of America). The Japanese ran into this obstacle in 1941. The Russians, Chinese, Iraqis, North Koreans and North Vietnamese also have firsthand experience (along with the Germans and Italians). For over 100 years the United States preferred neutrality, as recommended by George Washington. But modern strategic reality the reality of U-boats, aircraft carriers, long range bombers and missiles dictates a policy of American engagement, if only to avoid the isolation of the United States by a combination of totalitarian powers. It was combination, to be sure, that Arthur Zimmermann was reaching for in 1917 when he wrote to his ambassador in Washington: You will inform the president [of Mexico] of the above most secretly, as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain, and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. The encirclement of prospective enemies is an old tactic. In the case of Mexico, an Asian alliance is a respectable proposal. But regrettably for Arthur Zimmermann, his idea was 89 years ahead of its time. The usefulness of Mexico to an aspiring Asian power was obvious in 1917. For this usefulness to become effective, however, special conditions were needed. It is not that Mexico would forever refuse an alliance against the United States. If Mexico had sufficient military power (or if America was otherwise on its knees), a Mexican invasion of the Southwest would be inevitable. But Mexico is a relatively weak military power, and America is very strong indeed. But new weapons in a new era, with newfound vulnerabilities to a precarious economic system that requires open borders to continue functioning, and you have several indications of a coming reversal of fortune. When a strategically important country like China extends itself to a strategically insignificant country like Mexico, in terms of a symbolic state visit, it should be asked whether or not the insignificant country has a significant future role. In his reply to Vicente Fox’s inference regarding Mexico’s newfound importance, the Chinese premier spoke of enhancing mutual trust and a deeper cooperation between the two countries. Our relations present us with a fine strategic opportunity, said the Chinese premier. The typical American businessman and politician will point to growing Chinese-Mexican trade. It is a quirk of social psychology that Americans cannot grasp that China regards trade as a strategic tool. And one must distinguish between the economic sphere and the strategic sphere. Mexico is to become a new tourist destination for Chinese nationals. The two countries are joining together, as well, to promote the interests of the developing countries and to promote world peace. China’s partnership with Mexico should be understood in terms of China’s partnership with Russia. Consider the following, relevant item: In Russia, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Vasilenko, chief of the 4th Central Scientific Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry, signaled Moscow’s desire to withdraw from the INF Treaty with the deployment of new medium range nuclear missiles. In a statement intended to prefigure a future Kremlin announcement, Col. Gen. Varfolomey Korobushkin, first vice president of Russia’s Academy of Military Sciences, said: The construction of a national missile defense in the United States will inevitably provoke a nuclear arms race. Why would the Russians be interested in medium range nuclear missiles? The shortest distance between two points is usually in the same hemisphere. China’s position in the Western Hemisphere, for example, has special importance. According to Gen. Bantz J. Craddock of the U.S. Southern Command, China is offering military support and training to Latin America. As Washington Times correspondent Bill Gertz put it in a March 15 column, The growing Chinese role [in Latin America] comes amid numerous high-level visits by its leaders and other activities aimed at building military and economic ties to leftist governments and other states in a strategic region long-considered within the U.S. sphere of influence. Besides its obvious readiness to train Cuban, Venezuelan and Bolivian soldiers, the Chinese are currently supplying military hardware to Latin American friends. The intensive training of Cuban artillery officers has led some observers to wonder whether Cuba intends to acquire its own medium-ranged missiles (from Russia, China or Iran). A recent visitor to Cuba was Lt. Gen. Peng Xiaofeng, commissar of China’s missile forces. According to Gen. Craddock, the U.S. knows almost nothing about the extent of Chinese military-intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere. Add to this the Chinese economic penetration and political subversion of Canada and a clearer picture of strategic encirclement emerges. From March 21-22 Russian President Vladimir Putin was in China. Employing a euphemistic formula, the Russians and Chinese say they want a diplomatic solution in the Middle East. Of course, a diplomatic solution means letting Islamic zealots have nuclear weapons something the Russians have encouraged for many years. Everything here is interconnected.

**Russia impact is wrong – *not a threat* and *miscalc risk’s exaggerated*.**

**Graham ‘7**

(Thomas, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### kashmir

#### The plan solves Kashmir conflict- that’s Dickerson.

#### Kashmir conflict causes extinction

\*Kashmir conflict causes extinction – war between India and Pakistan over the region escalates to nuclear war – embroils the entirety of South Asia into conflict – uniquely escalates because of all the countries which have nuclear weapons in the region

**Zargar 6/7** – Middle East reporter, Greater Kashmir News (Abdul Majid, “Kashmir Vs Global Community,” 6/7/13, http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jun/8/kashmir-vs-global-community-57.asp)//SJF

Normal relations between India and Pakistan offer tremendous benefits & incentives to the global community. But normalization is itself subject to settlement of core issue of Kashmir between them. Indo-Pak tensions are especially dangerous because they bring two nuclear states face to face and any conflict between the two countries sparked by the dispute could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. They distract Islamabad from the urgent task of combating terrorists and militants on its own soil; and they contribute to Pakistani suspicions about India's activities in Afghanistan. Thus, the long-standing dispute over Kashmir is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct implications for global community’s ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat posed by extremist groups in South Asia.

For Kashmir, the conflict has been a great tragedy and a disaster in all respects: a large death toll, unabated human rights abuses which in normal course qualify as crimes against humanity or war crimes, displacement of populations, a devastated economy, serious environmental damage, massive military buildup, and severe psychological distress. Above all peoples lack of trust & confidence in the local political system put in place by the New Delhi. And for India Kashmir has been a patient with incurable disease from day one which it manages by shifting alternatively between Intensive care unit (ICU) and general ward depending upon the seriousness of the situation at particular point of time and where the job of the Local attending doctors (Politicians) is limited only to report the situation and take instructions of medicines & diet from New-Delhi. No serious attempt is made for a permanent cure of this patient except throwing billions of rupees in a bottomless pit.

But the big question-Is global community doing enough to address the issue? While US and its surrogates are busy in creating new tensions & disorders in the world, existing long pending disputes like Kashmir & Palestine are hardly attended to. As far as Kashmir is concerned, though the US treats the territory as disputed but its State Department, reportedly treats the Indian repression there as “an internal Indian matter”. A former senior CIA officer, Robert Grenier, sometime back, called this posture by the Obama administration “craven”. When one contrasts this with the legitimate interest that the US showed in human rights in Arab states, and the consequent action it took, one loses all faith in protestations of moral concern underlying American policies and attitudes. And by the way what are the demands of the people of Kashmir for which they are brutalized day in & day out -a right to vote in a plebiscite promised long ago - The same right which the America claims to support in other parts of the world.

 But the recent discourse initiated by Norwegian parliament offers a new ray of hope. It has urged for an early solution to the Kashmir conflict. During discussions, Chairman of the Norwegian Parliamentary Kashmir Committee and Christian Democratic party leader Knut Arild Hareide referred to Kashmir as a regressive wound in the relationship between India & Pakistan and a continuing tragedy for the Kashmiri people. It surely is a comfort to know that the dispute has the attention of European nations.

A mention, in this context, also needs to be made of recent conference held in Islamabad where Mr. V.P.Vaidik an eminent journalist & political thinker (also chairman of Council for Indian Foreign Policy), mooted the idea of total demilitarization of both sides of Kashmir. “Pughwash” is also holding a two day conference in Islamabad starting on 4th July 2013. The event would be drawing regional and international conflict resolution experts, diplomats, besides political elite from both parts of Kashmir, from Pakistan, India, USA, and Britain. In Srinagar, a meaningful lecture was delivered by Praful Bidwai, a noted columnist and political analyst (Also Founder member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace)on the occasion of release of 10th Volume of Aina-Numa. In his assessment of the things, if India & Pakistan fail to find a solution to the Kashmir issue anytime soon and Indian repression & suppression continues in Kashmir, the whole of South Asia runs the risk of being turned into a nuclear dust because of a lurking danger of a nuclear war between two Countries. In his opinion the two Countries came very close to such a catastrophe twice during Kargil war. Recent reports also suggest that both the countries have increased their nuclear warheads in 2012 roughly by 10% over the previous year( see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report).

So India, Pakistan & the Global Community need to take a fresh look at Kashmir. Like a festering wound that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light. Injustice must be exposed and options of a final settlement discussed & explored. The global community can ignore the problem at its own peril. If Kashmiris have been suffering for decades, it may take only minutes for the whole world to suffer & suffer irretrievably.

#### multilateralism solves iran

Hinderdael, 11– M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>)//NG

Conclusion

The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.

In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52

At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Middle East war goes nuclear – outweighs every impact and rationality doesn’t check

\*Middle East war goes nuclear – strikes in Israel spike retaliatory action that escalate quickly in the unstable region, spurs Sunni versus Shia conflict and terrorist warfare

\*impact defense doesn’t apply –

a. technological improvements make it easier to transfer nuclear devices

b. climate change aggravates water scarcity which guarantees war absent credible dialogue to resolve geopolitical tensions, overwhelms their rationality checks arguments

**Beck 5/28** – Middle East Analyst at TheCommentator (Noah, “A nuclear Middle East is doomsday, 5/28/13, http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3633/a\_nuclear\_middle\_east\_is\_doomsday)//SJF

As the Obama administration tries to unbury itself from snowballing scandals, my apocalyptic thriller steadily crawls from fiction to fact. The Middle East is an insane place. And it's going nuclear. Yet, too many optimists, isolationists, and self-deluded analysts think that rationality will prevail and keep us all safe.

Is it rational to take out the organs of a man you just killed and eat them on camera, as a Syrian rebel recently did? How about a senior Palestinian Authority official who recently declared on Lebanese television that the PA would nuke Israel if it had nuclear weapons? Jibril Rajoub, the deputy secretary of the Fatah Central Committee and the chairman of the PA Olympics Committee, apparently doesn’t mind that the nuclear mushroom he wants over Israel would also kill millions of Palestinians, just miles away – the main goal is that Israel be nuked.

At best, one can say that there is a “twisted rationality” in the Middle East, as exemplified by Iran’s former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a December 2001 speech, Rafsanjani said, “If one day the Islamic world [acquires nuclear weapons], then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. Jews shall expect to be once again scattered and wandering around the globe the day when this appendix is extracted from the region and the Muslim world.”

Despite the above, Rafsanjani is considered such a “moderate” that regime hardliners disqualified him from running in Iran’s presidential election next month. So if Rafsanjani thinks that nuking Israel would be worth a few million Iranians killed by an Israeli retributive nuclear strike, what does that say about the rationality of the current, less “moderate” regime (the one regularly threatening to destroy Israel)?

Could the eschatology of Shia Islam further heighten the risk of Armageddon? If the regime under Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei genuinely believes that an apocalyptic war will hasten the advent of the Twelfth Imam (the Islamic messiah), doesn’t that make a nuclear first strike on Israel that much more tempting? Scholars may disagree about the potential impact of messianic ideology on nuclear decisions, but the mere possibility that geopolitical conflicts could be viewed through a theological lens hardly adds rationality to the Middle East.

To spread its radical ideology, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard finances, trains, and arms some of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations: Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. These organizations are collectively responsible for thousands of deaths from decades of terrorist attacks and wars in Israel, Lebanon, Europe, and Latin America. Iran has also provided support to the Taliban, Iraqi insurgents, and al-Qaeda. And the Islamic Republic supplies Syria with arms, training, and fighters to help President Basher Assad stay in power by massacring his own people every day.

If this is how the Iranian regime has behaved without the impunity conferred by a nuclear deterrent, what can be expected of the regime once it has nukes?

Equally troubling, if Iran’s large-scale and dispersed nuclear program continues, the regime will be able to produce dozens of nuclear bombs every year. Such massive production only increases the odds of intentional (or unauthorized) nuclear transfers to state or non-state actors, and spurs regional rivals into acquiring or developing a matching nuclear deterrent.

Three trends will make a nuclear Middle East even scarier: 1) technological improvements and miniaturization will make it easier to create and transfer small nuclear devices. 2) Climate change will aggravate water scarcity, which will only intensify generational conflicts in the Middle East. 3) Increasing technological interconnectedness will exacerbate sectarianism (as has been the case in Syria, where atrocities from the civil war are constantly recorded on video and shared, only further radicalizing the belligerents).

Once Iran has nukes, the potential catastrophes are manifold: a Middle East decimated by a far-reaching Sunni versus Shia conflict (sparked in Syria) and/or by a nuclear war between Israel and Iran; a nuclear arms race among other Mideast countries; the end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and terrorists who can target major cities with small nuclear devices. However it plays out, oil prices will skyrocket and many will die.

The Iranian nuclear threat is the most important global security issue of this generation. To focus public attention on it, I authored “The Last Israelis” in a breathless ten weeks, hoping to release the book in time to impact the May 2012 “P5+1” talks in Baghdad, when world powers tried yet again for a diplomatic solution. To continue raising awareness before Iran crosses the nuclear finish line, I just released a second edition, and added paperback and audiobook formats to reach more people with my book’s urgent message.

But what happens when it’s too late to stop Iranian nukes? “The Last Israelis” depicts the doomsday scenario resulting from a nuclear-armed Iran, as experienced by 35 ideologically divided and ethnically diverse Israelis aboard the Dolphin submarine. To write the apocalyptic thriller, I dropped everything in my life and secured interviews with veterans of Israel’s elite and secretive submarine force. Imagining 35 submariners confronting the unthinkable as World War III unfolds in their claustrophobic reality was bad enough; watching the world gradually move in the same direction, knowing that it’s not my imagination this time, is far worse.

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#### multilateralism solves north korea

Hinderdael, 11– M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>)//NG

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In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

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At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### The plan solves North Korean war actually causes extinction

**Hayes and Hamel-Green 10 –** Professor of International Relations, RMIT University AND Professor of Arts, Education, and Human Development at Victoria University (Peter AND Michael, “"The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia,", http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel\_Green/3267#sthash.AkKdViI5.dpuf)//NG

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, **miscalculation**, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.

But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view:

That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper **drop in temperature** than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater **decrease in grain production** than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4

These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12 nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium enrichment program - having announced publicly that it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 20097 in a communication with the UN Security Council - it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons. Although some may dismiss Korean Peninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result of its own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggest that this is imminent. If this were to happen, there would be the risk of **nuclear weapons falling into hands of non-state actors** in the disorder and chaos that would ensue. Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in either the near or longer term, North Korea has every financial incentive under current economic sanctions and the needs of its military command economy to export its nuclear and missile technologies to other states. Indeed, it has already been doing this for some time. The Proliferation Security Initiative may conceivably prove effective in intercepting ship-borne nuclear exports, but it is by no means clear how air-transported materials could similarly be intercepted.

Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be **destabilizing**, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both have the technical capability to do so very **rapidly**. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non-Nuclear Principles although recent confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non-nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads. Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global non-proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “the end of American nuclear hegemony.”8

### nuclear terror

#### Multilateralism solves nuclear terrorism

**Ikenberry and Kupchan 04 –** (John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, “Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy,” National Interest (Fall 2004))

First, Washington must embrace a strategy for combating terrorism that succeeds in keeping intact America's key partnerships. All components of the struggle against terrorism--including military operations, intelligence sharing, asset freezing and law enforcement--are more successfully pursued if the United States has its allies by its side. Achieving this goal will mean giving up a black-and-white world-view defined by the terrorist threat and making U.S. policy more responsive to the concerns of allies. An alliance has meaning only when its members adjust their policies to take into account their partners' interests.

Second, Washington would focus on the concrete threats to the United States posed by Al-Qaeda and other extremist networks and not be distracted by wars of choice, such as Iraq. Doing so would not only advance efforts to neutralize Al-Qaeda, but also help maintain the international legitimacy of U.S. leadership. It is important to keep in mind that the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan enjoyed widespread support, even in the Muslim world.

#### Nuclear terrorism escalates to major nuclear war – multilateralism facilitates cooperation over nuclear material transfers which are key

**Ayson 10 –** Robert – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington – “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, obtained via InformaWorld

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, FN 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. FN 40. One way of reducing, but probably not eliminating, such a prospect, is further **international cooperation** on the control of existing fissile material holdings.

### 2ac shutdown

#### Shutdown inevitable

**Scheiber, 9/15/13 -** senior editor at The New Republic(Noam, “This Time There Really Will Be a Government Shutdown And that's not all bad” New Republic, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114728/boehner-and-obama-cant-avoid-government-shutdown>)

Suffice it to say, it’s hard to do a deal when the only thing the other guy wants is the one thing you can’t give him. This null set scenario is, unfortunately, precisely where we find ourselves in the debate over funding the government beyond September 30th. House Republicans are insisting that any funding measure simultaneously de-fund Obamacare, while Democrats have rightly proclaimed this idea preposterous. And there appears to be no wiggle room in the GOP position. According to The Wall Street Journal, when Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid asked House Speaker John Boehner what else on the entire planet the GOP could accept—a lifetime supply of Slim Jims, say, or maybe a warehouse full of Kiefer Sutherland-autographed “24” box sets—Boehner told him there was nothing.

Even so, if this were the only obstacle to an agreement, we might still avoid a government shutdown. After all, we’ve been in situations before where the null-set logic looked ironclad, only to have one side or the other back down at the last minute. Back in 2011, Republicans agreed to a debt-ceiling increase in exchange for Obama’s embrace of the sequester, which averted a debt default that looked imminent. At the end of last year, Republicans allowed taxes to rise on the highest income earners to avoid going over the dreaded fiscal cliff.

What makes this time is different is that, in addition to having carved out hardline positions, neither side has an incentive to back down. In 2011, Obama was willing to give on his demand that revenue increases accompany spending cuts because he understood the apocalyptic consequences of failing to raise the debt ceiling. In late 2012, Republicans knew that the alternative to a small tax increase was for taxes to rise automatically by a much larger amount. This time, on the other hand, every party to the negotiation has reason to welcome the government shutdown that would result if they can’t reach a deal.

Start with the White House, which has been annoyingly open to concessions even when it has all the leverage. In my own conversations with White House officials (and people close to them) over the past few months, I’ve picked up a clear willingness to allow a shutdown if Republicans refuse to budge. This is unlike 2011, the last time the White House faced a shutdown situation. Back then, a well-connected former administration official told me recently, “the political strategists wanted a deal. [Senior adviser David] Plouffe wanted a deal . . . to increase our numbers with independents.” This time, according to this source, “There’s no constituency for caving.”

That jibes with the change of heart I’ve detected when speaking directly to White House officials. In 2011, they were queasy about the risks a shutdown posed to the rickety economy, which could ultimately hurt the president. This year, they believe a shutdown would strengthen their hand politically, which is almost certainly true given the public outrage that would rain down on Republicans. One official pointed out that the pressure for spending cuts has subsided with the deficit falling so rapidly on its own.

Of course, the president himself isn’t the toughest negotiator in the world. You can’t rule out the possibility that the White House will blink when the deadline gets close. At the very least, one can imagine Obama signing a short-term government funding measure (known as a continuing resolution) that leaves the automatic sequester cuts in place so long as it doesn’t touch Obamacare. But even if he were inclined to do this, Congressional Democrats seem less willing to support him than in the past. They believe they can demand much more in exchange for saving the GOP from a shutdown. “Our leadership thinks the time has come to draw a line in the sand, not do a short-term extension,” a senior Democratic Hill aide told Politico last week. “They’re ready for a flash and a pop.” Bottom line: Democrats across the board are more willing to broach a shutdown than at any other time during the past three years.

Next there are the Tea Partiers, who give every indication of wanting a shutdown, too. Unlike mainstream Republicans, who appreciate the damage a shutdown would inflict on their party, the Tea Partiers consider it win-win. A shutdown would mean they forced their leadership to stand up to Obama, which plays well in their districts and the various organs of the conservative movement. And when the GOP inevitably bowed to public opinion and sued for peace, the Tea Partiers would be able to accuse their weak-kneed leadership of caving, thereby enhancing their status within the party. Politico reports that the so-called Senate Conservative Fund, a group that successfully lobbied against Boehner’s attempted quashing of the Obamacare defunding idea, has plans to raise another $50,000 to stop any future deal. No surprise there.

That leaves the final and arguably most consequential player in this drama: Boehner himself. Throughout his tenure as speaker, Boehner has had to divine a path between the apocalyptic impulses of his members and the political disaster that would attend their preferred apocalypse (shutdown, debt default, fiscal cliff dive). All the criticism of him notwithstanding, I think he’s done a pretty masterful job at this.

His general m.o. has been to translate the will of his rank-and-file into a ludicrously extreme opening position, which promptly gets laughed off stage by either the Democrats who control the White House and Senate, or the public, which pans it.1 At that point, the White House opts to negotiate with Boehner’s Senate counterpart, Mitch McConnell. Once they agree to a deal, Boehner shuffles before his caucus to explain that House Republicans held out as long as they could, but the White House and Senate Republicans have backed them into a corner. This buys him enough sympathy to bring the White House-McConnell deal to the House floor, where it passes with help from Democrats and the tacit acceptance of conservatives.

The problem this time is that the White House hasn’t really been negotiating with Senate Republicans, partly because McConnell is facing a right-wing primary challenge and has no political interest in compromising, partly because McConnell’s Senate colleagues also worry about the wrath of the Tea Party, and partly because (as noted above) the White House doesn’t feel any particular urgency about reaching a deal. Unless this changes—and so far there’s been little indication that it will—there’s no way for Boehner to employ his usual theatrics. He can’t tell his troops that he fought hard for their position until the bitter end, when Senate Republicans isolated them, because Senate Republicans haven’t done anything.

Deprived of his usual cover story, Boehner is simply flailing. When a reporter asked Boehner last week if he has a new idea for getting the House out of its jam, he responded: “Do you have an idea? They’ll [conservatives will] just shoot it down anyway.” To date, he hasn’t even been able to persuade conservatives to delay the Obamacare fight until the debt ceiling showdown, where the terrain is marginally more favorable to the GOP.2

#### PC not key

**Gandelman, 9/18/13** – (Joe, “Republicans all in: government shutdown by Repubicans virtually certain” <http://themoderatevoice.com/186749/republicans-all-in-government-shutdown-by-repubicans-virtually-certain/>)

It’s going to happen. You can bet on it. Republicans now seem all in – despite some pesky noises from they-must-be-RINO websites such as the Wall Street Journal and the National Review about the dangers — to set the stage for a government shut down. And don’t be surprised if it then gets worse and House Republicans engineer a default on the debt ceiling as well:

House Republicans are moving forward with a government funding bill that would defund ObamaCare.

The legislation is a nod to House conservatives, some of whom quickly backed the plan.

But Senate Democrats and the White House have promised to reject any legislation that would defund the healthcare law, meaning the legislation won’t move farther than the House.

Unless the House and Senate can agree on legislation and get it to the White House by Oct. 1, the government will shut down at that time.

Basically, the GOP House leadership is politically twerking its powerful Tea Party sympathetic members. But the consquences to many Americans that even a brief shutdown would bring could be huge.

And who says this will necessarily be a brief shutdown?

The House measure would keep the government funded through Dec. 15 at the current $986 billion spending rate, rather than the lower $967 billion level called for in the 2011 Budget Control Act.

GOP leaders also announced Wednesday that they will condition a debt ceiling increase on a one-year delay of ObamaCare, approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and an outline for tax reform.

In other words:

Republicans are going to use political extortion — hurting the United States’s economy — if they can’t get policies that they are unable to get by winning elections or putting together coalitions in Congress. It’s a tough choice for Barack Obama and the Democrats: if this is allowed to happen it will fundamentally change the form of American democracy.

Republican Study Committee Chairman Steve Scalise (R-La.) said he was on board with the plan despite the higher spending level.

“This reflects the principles we’ve been pushing for,” he said. “We want to address ObamaCare directly in the CR. We want to address ObamaCare in the debt ceiling and this keeps both of those moving.”

Yes — in a way unprecedented in American democracy. And:

Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), who authored a one-year CR that would increase defense spending while defunding ObamaCare, said he would vote for the new Boehner plan.

“It’s a step in the right direction,” Graves said. “The American people should view this as a victory.”

I agree with Booman: there is a notable lack of adults in the Republican room, and a notably large number of conservative talk show host followers and Tea Party members. Booman:

It’s a two-pronged approach. On the continuing resolution (CR) to fund the government, the Republicans will limit the funding to December 15th. The funding level will be slightly above what the Budget Control Act of 2011 calls for. And it will defund ObamaCare.

On the debt ceiling, they will have a separate vote that will delay ObamaCare for a year, authorize the Keystone XL pipeline, and provide an outline for tax reform.

Their hope is that they can successfully pass the buck to Republican senators who will be expected to sustain a filibuster against any CR or debt ceiling hike that includes money for health care.

It really doesn’t matter whether the Senate Republicans go along with the plan or not, because the government will shut down either way and we will default on our debts either way.

The pressure on Republican senators will be intense, but they’d rather let the House take the blame for the catastrophe.

The fact that the Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, is facing a primary challenge from his right makes it unlikely that he will ride to the House’s rescue this time around. If we’re hoping for adult leadership in the Senate, it will have to come from a rump of moderate Republican senators that doesn’t seem to exist.

#### It’s temporary and empirically no impact

**Taylor, 9/19/13** (Andrew, Associated Press, “Here's the truth: The government doesn't shut down” <http://www.wtnh.com/news/politics/heres-the-truth-the-government-doesnt-shut-down-nd13-jgr>)

From a practical perspective, shutdowns usually aren't that big a deal. They happened every year when Jimmy Carter was president, averaging 11 days each. During President Reagan's two terms, there were six shutdowns, typically just one or two days apiece. Deals got cut. Everybody moved on.

In 1995-96, however, shutdowns morphed into political warfare, to the dismay of Republicans who thought they could use them to drag Clinton to the negotiating table on a balanced budget plan.

Republicans took a big political hit, but most Americans suffered relatively minor inconveniences like closed parks and delays in processing passport applications. Some 2,400 workers cleaning up toxic waste sites were sent home, and there were short delays in processing veterans' claims.

Under a precedent-setting memorandum by Reagan budget chief David Stockman, federal workers are exempted from furloughs if their jobs are national security-related or if they perform essential activities that "protect life and property."

#### Fiat solves the link- it bypasses timing considerations and allows us to envision immediate implementation. They still get politics disads because it doesn’t foreclose the political concessions necessary for the plan but timing links are not links.

#### New EPA regulations causing a Congressional backlash now

**Davenport, 9/20/13** (Carol, “White House Rolls Out Tough New Climate-Change Rules” National Journal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/white-house-rolls-out-tough-new-climate-change-rules-20130920>)

In his January State of the Union address, President Obama urged Congress to take action to stop global warming. But he warned, "If Congress won't act soon to protect future generations, I will."

He's following through on that pledge. Friday morning, the Environmental Protection Agency will release a draft regulation to limit carbon pollution from coal-fired power plants, the nation's chief source of global warming emissions.

The draft regulation is the first of four major regulatory steps the EPA will take to create a significant body of action on climate change before Obama leaves office. The president views these regulations as his global-warming legacy. The coal industry and its friends in Congress view them as a declaration of war.

The rule was met with cheers from environmental groups, but will encounter a barrage of legal, legislative and political attacks, chiefly from Republicans and coal supporters, who contend he climate regulations represent overreach by the executive branch, and that they will kill jobs, wage "war on coal," raise electricity costs, and damage the economy.

The draft rule requires that all new coal plants built in the U.S. limit their emissions to less than 1,100 pounds of carbon pollution per megawatt-hour—just over half the carbon pollution now produced by a typical coal-powered plant. The draft is an update of a proposal the EPA released in 2012, which was met with outrage by the coal industry. That rule required new coal and gas plants to maintain emissions levels of 1,000 pounds of carbon pollution per megawatt-hour. After meeting with power companies and coal groups and taking into account 2.5 million public comments, the Obama EPA's new draft rule allows coal plants to emit 10 percent more carbon emissions.

EPA lawyers also worked to legally bulletproof the rule, which coal industry lawyers intend to challenge in court. However, despite the slightly looser carbon limits of the new rule, owners of coal plants will still have to install expensive "carbon capture and sequestration" technology. While the technology, which traps carbon pollution and injects it underground before it spews out of smokestacks, is commercially available, it could cost power companies billions of dollars to install.

Instead, it's expected that power companies will simply invest in generating electricity from other, less-polluting forms of electricity, chiefly natural gas, which emits just half the carbon pollution of coal, but also wind, solar, and nuclear energy. As it happens, the climate rules coincide with a market shift from coal to natural gas. Thanks to the recent boom in production of cheap natural gas, electric utilities have stopped investing in new coal plants, and are already investing in building new natural-gas plants.

But electric utilities that rely heavily on coal are still uneasy about the new rule. American Electric Power, an Ohio-based utility that owns one of the nation's largest fleets of coal-fired power plants, stopped building new coal plants before the regulation came out. "We have no current plans to build any new coal-fueled power plants both because we don't need additional generation, and it would be difficult to make an economic case for coal with today's low natural-gas prices," wrote Melissa McHenry, a spokeswoman for the company, in an e-mail. But she added, "If we value maintaining fuel diversity as a nation, a proposed rule that effectively eliminates coal as an option for new power plants is a serious concern, particularly if today's plentiful supply of low-cost natural gas can't be maintained."

Meanwhile, Friday's action sets the stage for an increasingly aggressive set of EPA climate regulations on coal plants. Following this step, EPA will start drafting a far more controversial regulation, requiring cuts in carbon pollution from existing coal plant—a measure that could lead to closure of current plants. Obama has told the agency to propose that rule by June 2014. By June 2015, just six months before Obama leaves office, the EPA is expected to issue final versions of the regulations on new and existing plants. Those could, in the years that follow, freeze construction of new coal plants, lead to closures of existing plants, and further drive the electricity market toward lower-carbon forms of new electricity. So while today's draft rule is significant, it's just the first step in the administration's plan to issue the high-impact final rules in the waning months of the Obama administration.

The coal lobby and its allies in Congress have preemptively attacked the rule. On Thursday, Rep. Ed Whitfield, a Kentucky Republican and chairman of the House Energy and Commerce subcommittee that oversees energy and climate policy, called EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz before his panel, and slammed the climate rules.

#### Their link evidence is just rhetoric, and it’s out of date – it’s before the decision to cancel recess and time questions are premature

**Berman, 9/19/13** (Russell, The Hill, “Boehner challenges Senate GOP to 'get the job done' on defunding” Read more: http://thehill.com/homenews/house/323347-boehner-challenges-senate-gop-to-get-the-job-done-#ixzz2fPFcvm4e

Pressed on the point, an agitated Boehner added: “Guess what? We’re having the fight over here. We’re going to win the fight over here, and it’s time for them to pick up the mantle and get the job done.”

He would not say whether he would be willing to bring up a bill that lacked majority Republican support if the Senate returned the House measure with funding for ObamaCare restored.

The Speaker also strongly hinted Congress would have to remain in session next weekend to avert a shutdown. House Republicans have already canceled a recess scheduled for next week.

“It’s way too early for that,” he said in reference to discussion about the House’s next move. “We’ll have plenty of time next weekend to speculate.”

#### N/U – food stamps

**Nixon, 9/19/13** (Ron, House Republicans Pass Deep Cuts in Food Stamps, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/us/politics/house-passes-bill-cutting-40-billion-from-food-stamps.html?_r=0>)

House Republicans narrowly pushed through a bill on Thursday that slashes billions of dollars from the food stamp program, over the objections of Democrats and a veto threat from President Obama.

The vote set up what promised to be a major clash with the Senate and dashed hopes for passage this year of a new five-year farm bill.

The vote was 217 to 210, largely along party lines.

Republican leaders, under pressure from Tea Party-backed conservatives, said the bill was needed because the food stamp program, which costs nearly $80 billion a year, had grown out of control. They said the program had expanded even as jobless rates had declined with the easing recession.

“This bill eliminates loopholes, ensures work requirements, and puts us on a fiscally responsible path,” said Representative Marlin Stutzman, Republican of Indiana, who led efforts to split the food stamps program from the overall farm bill. “In the real world, we measure success by results. It’s time for Washington to measure success by how many families are lifted out of poverty and helped back on their feet, not by how much Washington bureaucrats spend year after year.”

But even with the cuts, the food stamp program would cost more than $700 billion over the next 10 years.

Republicans invoked former President Bill Clinton in their defense of the bill, saying that the changes were in the spirit of those that he signed into law in 1996 that set work requirements for those who receive welfare.

But Democrats, many of whom held up pictures of people they said would lose their benefits, called the cuts draconian and said they would plunge millions into poverty.

“It’s a sad day in the people’s House when the leadership brings to the floor one of the most heartless bills I have ever seen,” said Representative James McGovern, Democrat of Massachusetts. “It’s terrible policy trapped in a terrible process.”

The measure has little chance of advancing in the Senate, and Senator Debbie Stabenow, Democrat of Michigan and the chairwoman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, called it “a monumental waste of time.”

#### Benghazi

**Welna, 9/19/13** (David, “As Government Shutdown Looms, Benghazi Hearings Resume” Rhode Island Public Radio, http://ripr.org/post/government-shutdown-looms-benghazi-hearings-resume)

It was a day when most in Congress were obsessed with an increasingly likely government shutdown that would be of lawmakers' own making. But not the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. The GOP-controlled panel held a marathon six-hour hearing on what South Carolina Republican Trey Gowdy called the most important issue of all to the folks back home: the attack in Benghazi, Libya, that left four Americans dead just over a year ago.

### 2ac neolib

#### Alt can’t solve and neolib inevitable – Cuba government can’t be convinced to bail on neoliberalism

**Perez 12** – Yenisel Rodriguez Perez – lived in Cuba for his entire life until March 30, 2013. Currently a resident in the city of Miami. Writer for the Havana Times and holds a degree in socio-cultural studies –

“The Ideological Success of Neoliberalism in Cuba” – Havana Times – April 29, 2012

http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=68708#sthash.tWIio2fK.dpuf

Despite this, we know that the Cuban government has affected a neoliberal shift in its reform policies. Nonetheless, even today it’s difficult to find a direct connection between the socioeconomic “reforms” implemented by the government and fundamentals of international neoliberalism. The similarities, which clearly exist, fail to form a definite pattern of neoliberal-style economic and social policy. This is why it’s so difficult to follow the economic moves of the political elite in their desperate retreat toward the deregulation of the economy. However at the ideological level, this complicity is apparent. It’s at this level that **neoliberalism has become hegemonic in Cuba.** The ideological foundations of neoliberalism have achieved a tremendous success in the sphere of the government on the island. The authorities have proclaimed the deregulation of Cuba’s economy as inevitable, as they quietly accept the consolidation of inequality as well as decreased social spending and the renunciation of full employment as a goal. These are basic principles of neoliberalism, ones reflected by measures which they say should guide economic policy over the times to come .**The government is *convinced* that neoliberalism has won the ideological battle** on the field of international relations, despite its economic and social failures. Because of this they are paving the way for a future of the radicalized application of its principles of economic deregulation and social inequality.

#### Thus, alt causes oppression and won’t solve. Non-State Cuban resistance deflects attention and boosts structural violence

**Powell 08** – Kathy Powell. Lecturer, PhD Social Anthroplogy – National University of Ireland, Galway. Critique of Anthropology – Vol 28(2) p. 177–197 – Sage Database

The unequivocal ‘the people against the state’ discourses are characterized by a certain overstatement (as in the comments about the cows);again, here the state is homogenized and presented as a totalizing force, and qualifying counter-arguments dismissed, along with the importance of the broader political context. The responsibility for Cuba’s current ills is laid squarely at the door of the state, or of President Castro, while complaints about scarcity and the declining value of state rations reflect an outraged sense of entitlement, indicating the high expectations people have had of the allocative power of the state in the past. They are also, however, somewhat ‘overstated’ as well as contradictoryin regard to street solidarity; the same persons can one day extol its virtues,and the next, with equal conviction, describe street relations as a minefield of mistrust, envidia and self-interest. This uneasy coexistence of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sentiments (see also Fernández, 2000) serves as a reminder that while the ability to ‘invent’ and to ‘resolve’ during the crisis **in Cuba** has certainly been remarkable, the celebration of inventiveness and of resilience needs to be accompanied by some caution.In particular, caution is needed to avoid the misrecognized celebration of ‘the poor generating their own resources’ which characterizes some of the ‘social networks’ approaches to analysing the survival strategies of poorcommunities,17 and which is also redolent of recent enthusiasm for Putnamesque interpretations of ‘social capital’18 as both attribute and outcome of community relations and practices, promoted as central tocommunity development. This places much of the responsibility for development on poor communities themselves, and is particularly likely to do so when valorized as a ‘cultural characteristic’ of cubanidad – as indeed many ordinary Cubans do themselves. These approaches risk overlooking a number of things: first, that efforts to ‘invent’ solutions and resolve problems through informal networks **remain firmly constrained** by the structure, distribution andquality of resources available (see Menjívar, 2000), and that a focus on the poor ‘solving problems on their own’ **may deflect attention** from what people actually need and that they do not have (Bryceson, 2000). It overlooksthe fact that, although informality may present day-to-day solutions, **it remains a problem**; as Centeno points out, however functional it may bein the provision of a ‘safety net’, informality guarantees the reproduction of inequalities and an unprotected workforce who, despite their ‘successes’in evading state control, remain politically disempowered.19 Moreover, of particular significance to the value and practice of solidarity, celebrations of the capacity to invent ar, resolver, luchar overlook the **immense strain** on the very relations which underpin this economy of practices. Tales of thisstrain coexist uneasily alongside tales of the state and of street solidarity.The street economy needs solidarity to function; it depends on relations oftrust, complicity, cooperation and social obligations of reciprocity for theex change of information, favours, swapping and lending of materials, equipment and money, support in the ‘diversion’ of state resources and inthe evasion of state surveillance; it generates sentiments of solidarity‘against the odds’ of the mundane, exhausting difficulties of day-to-daysocial reproduction.

#### There’s no alternative- chinese fill-in ensures mercantilism

**Posen, 9** - Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,”<http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf>)

In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success.  These facts enabled the US to promote economic opennessand buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration.  With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, andunderpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries offollowing the American model and playing by American rules.   Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.  With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades.  The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order.  While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed.  In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come.    Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements.   First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia.  Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western Europe.  The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership.  The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions.  One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s.  This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven.  The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well.  This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice.  That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets.  Thus,American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-termby the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism.  This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge.  Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally).  Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West.  That would be premature.  The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation.  Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category.  A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption.   Though the relative rise ofthe major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being.  None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power.  These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation.  This last point is key.  In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative.The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism.  There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system.  While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another.  Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example.  Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths.  If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system.  That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years.  It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country's detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.

#### Free trade decreases poverty - prefer our evidence – it’s reverse-causal, their authors ignore statistics, and don’t assume other causes for poverty – this is Latin America specific

**Ganuza et al 5** (Enrique, resident representative of the United Nations in Santiago de Chile and was chief economist for Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) at the initiation of the project leading to the present publication, “Are Export Promotion and Trade Liberalization Good for Latin America’s Poor?,” May 2005, [http://www.oas.org/udse/english/documentos/IIgrupostrabajo/Chapt3Ganuza.pdf)//acjs](http://www.oas.org/udse/english/documentos/IIgrupostrabajo/Chapt3Ganuza.pdf%29//acjs) **ECLAC = Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean**

It is useful to begin the discussion of poverty and inequality with an overview of observed trends in those two variables. We have used the ECLAC estimations on household data to preserve comparability. ECLAC uses poverty lines that reflect the cost of a market purchased basket of necessities and they make a correction for underreporting of survey-based incomes and for income in kind, which was generally not done by our country authors. For these reasons the country level estimates shown in Annex Table A3.4 may differ from the poverty estimates in the country papers. That is of less concern to us here because what we want to determine are the trends in poverty over the 1990s rather than the levels of poverty. For that the estimates shown in the table are useful. For the region as a whole the total and extreme poverty incidence are presented in Table 5 for the period 1980-1999, including estimations for 2002.23 Overall, both in absolute and in relative terms, total poverty and extreme poverty worsened between 1980 and 1990.and then improved somewhat in the period before 1997. But even in the early 1990s the numbers in poverty continued to increase even though there was a decline in the headcount ratio. The table also suggests that after 1997 there was no further progress in reducing either poverty or indigence. Reducing current extreme poverty rates by half toward 2015 has been defined as the central objective of the United Nation’s Millennium declaration. Reaching this goal will require a major effort for many countries in the region (UNDP, ECLAC, IPEA, 2003). The region totals for the 1990s shown in Table 5 hide a great deal of heterogeneity among the different countries (see Annex Table A3.4). Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Uruguay all made significant progress in poverty reduction, particularly between 1990 and 1997, while Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Venezuela had large increases in poverty particularly after 1997. Because of its size, Brazil’s good performance makes the performance for the region seem better than it for most of the other countries. Between 1990 and 1999 Brazil cut its indigent population by 13 million people. Indigence in the rest of Latin America rose by nine million. Thus for most countries observed trends in poverty followed the performance of the economy. Countries in crisis after 1997 such as Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay of Mexico in 1995-96 had big increases in poverty whereas poverty fell rapidly in countries growing rapidly like Chile, the Dominican Republic and Mexico after 1996. The region did not manage to decrease inequality in per capita household income distribution during the 1990s, with the sub-continent remaining the world’s most unequal area (ECLAC, 2002). Measuring inequality by the Gini coefficient, the available evidence shows that inequality increased further in at least 11 out of 18 countries between 1990 and 1999 (see Annex Table A3.4). Two countries (Honduras and Uruguay) show decreasing inequality, while it is unchanged in four countries (Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama). 4.2 Effects of export-led economic strategies on poverty and inequality We have seen what happened to output, employment, and earnings differentials in the simulations reported in Section 3. What we now want to know is what these changes might mean for poverty and the distribution of income at the household level. As explained in Section 2, we do this by taking the CGE model simulation outcomes and applying these through the microsimulation approach as counterfactuals to the observed labor market parameters using the full distribution as given by household surveys of each country case. We report the comparative results of the microsimulations in two ways. First, the final two columns of Table 4 above report the poverty and income inequality effects as percentage changes from the base for each of the policy simulations using the countryspecific closures for the CGE models. Second, since the absolute changes in policy variables and the distribution of income differ across countries we also report the changes as elasticities, defined as the percentage change in poverty or inequality per percent change in a policy variable. To make the changes easier to visualize, for each policy simulation we have transferred the elasticities into four quadrant diagrams, and we have calculated the elasticity for both earned income and household income per capita (see Figures 4 and 5). The diagrams put poverty on the vertical axis and the Gini coefficient of per capita household income on the horizontal axis. Thus poverty increases in the two top quadrants, and inequality increases in the two right hand quadrants of each diagram. Poverty effects of trade liberalization Unilateral trade liberalization reduces poverty and raising tariffs increases it. There is only one point-source natural resource abundant country where that is not the case (Ecuador) and even in this case the increase in poverty is small as a consequence of a unilateral tariff cut. More generally, the poverty effects are not very big. Income inequality at the household level rises (slightly) in most natural resource abundant economies as predicted (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru), though Venezuela provides an exception to this rule. The small effects on poverty and inequality should not be surprising, as under this scenario we are cutting tariffs further from already low, post-reform levels. A key conclusion is though, that pre-reform counterfactual (raising tariffs) would enhance poverty suggesting that trade liberalization is indeed poverty-reducing. These results are broadly consistent with moving to completely free trade under the WTO or to a region-wide multilateral trade agreement under FTAA. Both of these changes also reduce poverty and inequality in most of the countries. However, poverty rises (modestly) under these scenarios in Costa Rica (only WTO), Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela, mainly due to the negative effects on the agricultural sectors in these countries which is not sufficiently picked up with employment and income growth in other sectors. Across-the-board increases in export subsidies are generally poverty reducing as well (in apparent contradiction with the WTO scenario), with a few exceptions. Under this scenario export production is stimulated in a broad sense and given the smalleconomy assumption is assumed not to affect world prices. In this sense it works alike a tariff cut stimulating aggregate employment as mostly more labor-intensive (e.g. agriculture) sectors benefit from subsidies that are increased in the scenario. These results have to be interpreted with some caution though. These are general equilibrium, comparative static results that do not take into account the costs of adjusting to a changed production structure. If the exchange rate is fixed, the simulation determines the impact of lowering the tariff rates and bringing in more foreign capital to permanently finance a bigger balance of payments deficit. In the previous section we saw that this change is expansionary (though growth is led by non-traded goods rather than exports). If foreign saving is fixed, the exchange rate has to depreciate to allow exports to expand enough to pay for additional imports. But total output and employment increase in both cases and poverty declines. The simulation results also suggest that if no poverty reduction was observed in practice after trade liberalization, it is either because a lot of other poverty-increasing factors were changing at the same time (most typically dealing with macro shocks; see Taylor and Vos 2002)or because the economies are still in the process of adapting their production structures**.** Poverty and external balance shifts As we saw in the previous section devaluation is contractionary and an increase in foreign saving is expansionary. These changes have the expected effects on poverty. Devaluation increases poverty, in some cases by quite large amounts and foreign saving reduces it. It is also clear that devaluation increases income inequality. Curiously enough however it does not increase earnings inequality. That suggests that traded goods are in most countries are not skill intensive. Thus while total output and employment go down with a devaluation (or a fall in foreign saving), for those who keep their jobs skillintensity falls. Productivity increases Far and away the largest amount of poverty reduction comes from increasing productivity. That is true whether the change is measured in absolute amounts or in elasticities. In most cases increasing productivity also reduces inequality. This quite clearly underlines the obvious and important role that economic growth plays in poverty reduction. Labor market adjustment and poverty impact As explained above, the study assumed that the labor markets are the main transmission channel of the impact of trade reforms on poverty and distribution. The effect of alteration of parameters of the labor market structure on poverty and inequality was analyzed in the country cases and is summarized in Annex Table A3.5. This table indicates, for each country, the labor market parameter which shows the largest change, in absolute terms, when explaining total changes in poverty and inequality for different simulations. The following stylized facts can be observed: • Mean wage (and other labor-earnings) adjustments (W1 as defined in section 2.4) tend to have the largest effect on the poverty incidence in most simulations. • Changes in the remuneration structure (W2) are also the most important variable explaining absolute changes in income inequality at the household level (rather than quantity shifts in the employment structure or reductions in unemployment) in most country cases. Unsurprisingly, this also applies to the simulated effects on the Gini coefficient of labor income inequality for the full distribution. • Quantity adjustment in the form of a falling rate of unemployment are key in explaining poverty reduction under trade liberalization in a few cases, most notoriously Brazil and Peru, as well as in Cuba and Venezuela in the FTAA scenario. 5. Conclusions The purpose of this project was to determine the impact of trade liberalization, external shocks and domestic policy responses on output, employment, poverty and the distribution of income. We found that trade liberalization increased output in almost every country in our sample. It also increased either wages or employment depending on the closure used in the country-specific models. Consistent with this, poverty declined in all but one country in the unilateral trade liberalization scenario. Rising labor inequality, particularly between skilled and unskilled workers, emerges in the larger number of cases, but does not necessarily translate into more inequality in per capita household incomes because of offsetting positive employment effects. These results are very different from the historical experience of most Latin American countries in the period after trade liberalization. This is partly due to the many other disturbances that affected the region during the period and partly because ours are comparative static equilibrium results that say nothing at all about the adjustment period during which the economy adjusts to changes in tariff protection. Two alternative trade liberalization scenarios, WTO and FTAA have exactly the same positive effects on output, employment and poverty as a uniform and unilateral tariff reduction case in most countries. In contrast, devaluation as an isolated policy measure is contractionary according to our results. It causes a decline in output and employment almost everywhere and an increase in poverty. The opposite is true for an increase in foreign borrowing. In both cases the simulation assumes a permanent change in the exchange rate or the inflow of foreign saving which is very different than the short run effect of devaluation on an economy out of equilibrium and in either a recession or a balance of payments crisis. The model results also do not consider likely negative effects of increased debt servicing following an increase in foreign borrowing neither do they take account of the possibility of emerging debt-solvency constraints. Subsidizing exports is expansionary in all but Brazil and Argentina (for the fixed exchange rate closure). Employment increases and poverty declines in most cases. Skilldifferentials however rise in some countries and fall in others. Thus one cannot say that choosing a more export-led growth strategy will in general favor either the skilled or the unskilled. This depends on the export structure of individual countries. In terms of results on poverty, the analysis confirms the main results of the macro CGE simulations showed under Section 3. Policy measures with contractionary effects on the level of economic activity have negative results on poverty, leading to increased poverty incidence in most of the countries. This is the case for nominal devaluation and increase in tariffs. On the other hand, tariff reductions, productivity increases, and trade and integration agreements in line with FTAA and WTO have positive effects on the level of economic activity and contribute to reduce the poverty incidence in a majority of the countries. If labor market parameters are crucial to explain poverty and inequality variations, and most of the evidence point in that direction, wages levels and relative wage structures seem to explain most of the variations in those welfare outcomes. Aggregate employment changes as a consequence of trade reforms are mostly not big enough to exercise a significant impact on poverty and inequality. In sum, export-led economic strategies have not been the panacea for welfare improvements, in the form of poverty and inequality reduction, many of its supporters expected when advocating these policy choices. But they have not been the devil its detractors predicted either. To reduce poverty and inequality from the severe levels most of the countries of the region are showing at the beginning of the new century may require policy mixes far more complicated and tailored to country specificities than the Washington medicine predicted a decade ago.

#### Neoliberalism is inevitable and sustainable

**Peck 2**—Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia. Former Honourary Professorial Fellow, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. PhD in Geography. AND—Adam Tickell—Professor of Geography, University of Bristol. PhD (Jamie, Neoliberalizing space, Antipode 34 (3): 380-404, AMiles)

In many respects, it would be tempting to conclude with a Ideological reading of neoliberalism, as if it were somehow locked on a course of increasing vulnerability to crisis. Yet this would be both politically complacent and theoretically erroneous. One of the most striking features of the recent history of neoliberalism is its quite remarkable transformative capacity

To a greater extent than many would have predicted, including ourselves, neoliberalism has demonstrated an ability to absorb or displace crisis tendencies, to ride—and capitalize upon—the very economic cycles and localized policy failures that it was complicit in creating, and to erode the foundations upon which generalized or extralocal resistance might be constructed. The transformative potential—and consequent political durability—of neoliberalism has been repeatedly underestimated, and reports of its death correspondingly exaggerated. Although antiglobalization protests have clearly disrupted the functioning of "business as usual" for some sections of the neoliberal elite, the underlying power structures of neoliberalism remain substantially intact. What remains to be seen is how far these acts of resistance, asymmetrical though the power relations clearly are, serve to expose the true character of neoliberalism as a political project. In its own explicit politicization, then, the resistance movement may have the capacity to hold a mirror to the process