## 1ac glenbrooks

### 1ac – multilat

**CONTENTION 1 IS MULTILATERALISM**

#### Anti-americanism and unilateral military policies are decimating US legitimacy, threating the American international system – that causes excess interventions and great power wars

\*unilateralism fails –

a. power dilution – arms trade has fallen to NGOs, international organizations are too cumbersome and beaten by small regional alliances, GONGOs are resulting in proxy soft-power competition

b. small state backlash – international norms created by unipolarity cause diffusion of power to smaller states with vetoes that they can use to control us in international institutions

c. economic multipolarity – strong economic globalization means other countries have enough influence to American goals

\*unilateralism causes great power wars via aggressive intervention – military power creates the temptation of policymakers to use it—hegemons are inevitably more aggressive and that leads to adventurism – policymakers have incentives to engage in threat construction and greatly exaggerate threats that allow intervention – Iraq proves

**Kupchan 12** – Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford, Associate Professor of International Relations @gtown, Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Charles Kupchan, “Sorry, Mitt: It Won't Be an American Century”, FEBRUARY 6, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/06/it\_won\_t\_be\_an\_american\_century?page=0,2)

In an election season, such talk rolls easily off the tongue. But Romney's hackneyed rhetoric is woefully out of step -- both with an American electorate hungry for a less costly brand of foreign policy and with a world in the midst of tectonic change. A sharp **economic downturn** and **expensive, inconclusive conflicts** in Iraq and Afghanistan have left Americans ready for a focus on the home front. Abroad, the charge for the next U.S. president can hardly be to stick his head in the sand and deny that the global distribution of power is fast changing. On the contrary, it is to react soberly and steadily to the implications of such change and ensure that the United States remains secure and prosperous even as economic and military strength spreads to new quarters.

President Barack Obama is on the correct path. Leaving Iraq and overseeing a paced withdrawal from Afghanistan will bring U.S. commitments back into line with U.S. interests. Special operations and drone strikes have proved far more effective in fighting al Qaeda than has occupying countries in the Middle East and South Asia, and an offshore posture in the Persian Gulf is the best way to deal with Iran. Amid **China's rise** and the **economic dynamism** building in its neighborhood, Obama is right to downsize the U.S. presence in Europe and orchestrate a strategic "pivot" to East Asia. The move constitutes a necessary hedge against Chinese ambition and ensures that American workers will benefit from expanding markets in the Pacific Rim. These policies will enable the United States to simultaneously adjust to a shifting global landscape, husband its resources, and grow its economy -- facilitating the president's pledge to focus on "nation-building here at home."

Romney has already denigrated Obama's pragmatism, charging that "our president thinks America is in decline." Obama shot back in his State of the Union address on Jan. 24 that "anyone who tells you that America is in decline … doesn't know what they're talking about." Obama decidedly has the upper hand in this back-and-forth. He recognizes that, the country's strengths notwithstanding, U.S. strategy must adjust to a world in which power will be more broadly distributed. And his focus on rebuilding the American economy speaks directly to an electorate yearning for more equity and prosperity at home.

According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, **46 percent of Americans** want the United States to "mind its own business," and 76 percent think the country should "concentrate more on our own national problems" than on foreign challenges. These are high numbers by historical standards -- a clear indication that the **electorate** is hurting economically and wary of **strategic overreach**. Romney should take note. His chest-thumping talk of a new American century still plays well in some quarters. But Obama's commitment to nation-building at home will play even better.

Even if Romney's rhetoric were to get more domestic traction, it would still bear no resemblance to the new global landscape that is fast emerging. The United States is indeed an exceptional nation -- in its prized geographic location, commitment to freedom and democracy, and brand of international leadership. But the country's exceptionalism should not be used as an excuse to hide from global realities.

China's GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. The World Bank predicts that the dollar, euro, and China's renminbi will become co-equals in a "multi-currency" monetary system by 2025. Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing countries -- Brazil, China, India, and Russia -- to match that of the G-7 countries by 2032. The United States will no doubt exit the current slump and bounce back economically in the years ahead. Nonetheless, a more level global playing field is inevitable.

To be sure, America's military superiority will remain second to none for decades to come. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made amply clear, though, military primacy hardly ensures effective influence. And with the **U.S. defense budget poised to shrink** in the service of restoring the country's fiscal health, the United States will have to pick its fights carefully. Shrewd and judicious statecraft will be at least as important as raw power in ensuring the country's security.

To acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not, as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial.

Adjusting to the rise of the rest requires, for starters, making more room at the table for newcomers. That process is already well under way. The G-20 has supplanted the G-8, widening the circle for global consultations. In the aftermath of reforms adopted in 2010, developing countries now have enhanced weight at the World Bank and IMF. The enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, though currently bogged down in wrangling, is also in the offing.

But making international institutions more representative is the easy part. More challenging will be managing the ideological diversity that will accompany the coming realignment in global power. Precisely because the United States is an exceptional nation, its version of liberal democracy may well prove to be the exception, not the rule.

In China, Russia, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, state-led brands of capitalism are holding their own -- and may well do so for the foreseeable future. The Arab Spring could finally bring democratic rule to at least some countries in the Middle East, but it is also breeding political Islam; democratization should not be mistaken for Westernization. Even emerging powers that are already democracies, such as India, Brazil, and Turkey, are charting their own paths. They regularly break with the United States and Europe on trade, Middle East diplomacy, military intervention, the environment, and other issues, preferring to side with other ascending states, whether democratic or not. Romney's paeans to American power are no excuse for his silence on how he plans to manage these complexities.

Promoting international stability will grow more demanding as rising powers bring to the table their differing conceptions of order and governance. The United States has a key role to play in managing such diversity and channeling it toward cooperative ends. Overheated proclamations of American preeminence, however, will do more harm than good. If a new, consensual international order is to emerge, rising powers must be treated as stakeholders in that order, not merely as objects of American power.

Shepherding the transition to this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership."

Obama should welcome this debate and refuse to let his opponents hide behind the veil of American exceptionalism. Democrats no longer need to feel vulnerable on national security; Obama has demonstrated smarts and strength on many issues, including the degradation of al Qaeda, the pivot to Asia, and the isolation of Iran. He understands that agile, firm diplomacy backed by American power will do much more for the United States than congratulatory talk of American primacy.

A smarter, more selective, and less costly U.S. role in the world would not only help the United States get its own house in order, but also give rising powers the wider berth they seek. And good policy would also be good politics; Americans are keen to share with others the burdens and responsibilities of international engagement. The world desperately needs a brand of U.S. leadership that focuses not on ruling the roost, but on guiding a more diverse and unwieldy globe to consensus and cooperation.

#### Multilateralism is a credible alternative – it promotes band-wagoning and international coalitions among US allies, strengthening the US-led system and reviving legitimacy

\*only multilateralism solves global problems, unilateralism fails for several reasons –

a. technology – the internet and instant communications makes small states and non-state actors immune to hard power – even rogue states can shape public opinion against America through state-run news agencies

b. threats – terrorism, disease and the private arms trade cannot be addressed via unilateralism – they are global problems that demand local solutions which only multilateralism resolves

c. facilitates state-sponsored backlash – creates bloated international institutions that delay successful solutions – the failures of Kyoto, Copenhagen and every global trade treaty for the past 20 years prove that hard power doesn’t result in global cooperation – multilateralism results in joint-info sharing that solves

**Ikenberry and Kupchan 04 –** (John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, “Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy,” National Interest (Fall 2004))

It is misguided, however, to assume that America's preponderant power, when combined with an assertive unilateralism, promotes stability as a matter of course. As the record of the past four years makes clear, the unfettered exercise of U.S. primacy has not led to deference and bandwagoning, but to resentment and incipient balancing. The problem is not unipolarity per se, but changes in the exercise of U.S. power that have in turn changed foreign perceptions of U.S. intentions and how the United States will use its preponderant strength. A dominant America that reassures others and deploys its power to secure public goods induces systemic stability; unfettered primacy deployed in the exclusive pursuit of national self-interest does the opposite.

The Bush Administration's grand strategy rests on a second geopolitical misconception: that U.S. primacy is durable. To be sure, America's economic and military might ensures that it will remain the world's leading nation for decades to come. But current power asymmetries will inevitably diminish in the years ahead. The European Union's wealth already rivals that of the United States, and it may well forge a more independent and unified security policy as this decade proceeds. Over the course of the next decade, Japan may tire of always following America's lead, China will emerge as a major power, and Russia, India and Brazil are poised to become stronger and more assertive players. It will be impossible for the United States to sustain current power, asymmetries. Indeed, if America seeks to preserve unipolarity and its attendant sway over global affairs, it will only ensure that other centers of power, as they rise, array their strength against the United States.

Finally, the Bush Administration has overestimated the advantages of military superiority and mistaken brute strength for influence, producing adverse consequences on a number of fronts. In Iraq, Washington was correct that Saddam Hussein's regime would crumble under the U.S. onslaught, but it failed to appreciate that the invasion would spawn a dangerous mix of nationalism and religious extremism, leaving the United States struggling against a guerrilla insurgency that effectively neutralized America's military might. In similar fashion, the Bush Administration is aware that its unilateralist bent has provoked **anti-American sentiment** in many quarters, but it has discounted the discontent because countries opposed to U.S. policy do not have the military wherewithal to stand in America's way.

Although it is correct that other countries are not forming alliances against the United States, Washington is overlooking the more subtle forms of balancing that are occurring--with potent geopolitical consequence. The broad coalition that blocked UN authorization of the Iraq War denied the United States the legitimacy of international approval, substantially raising the economic and political costs of the war. Allies bore **90 percent of the costs** of the Gulf War, but the American taxpayer has financed most of the current operation, and Washington has been unable to convince key allies to send troops to Iraq. If the United States continues on its current course, it will enjoy military supremacy, but little else.

FROM THE perspective of liberal realism, management of the global balance of power would be based on three propositions. First, the United States must wield its superior strength in concert with others to ensure that it forestalls rather than invites balancing behavior. Re-establishing America's bona tides as a benign hegemon necessitates resuscitating the alliances, institutions and consultations that have eroded under Bush's watch. The United States should of course reserve the fight to act alone as a last resort, hut Washington must rediscover that the costs of unilateral action usually far exceed the costs of seeking consensus.

Second, liberal realism entails moving with--rather than against--the secular diffusion of global power. The scope of American primacy will wane as this century progresses; the ultimate objective should be to channel rising centers of strength into cooperative partnerships with the United States. Furthermore, strength elsewhere, even if it comes at the expense of America's relative power, need not come at the expense of its influence and security. If rising centers of power are integrated into a rule-based order, they promise to be net contributors to international stability. Americans would benefit substantially from a Europe that is capable of projecting power outside its neighborhood and sharing risks and responsibilities with the United States. China is emerging as one of Asia's dominant states; what is in question is not whether its power will rise, but the ends to which it will use its growing strength.

Third, liberal realism rests on a multidimensional understanding of power, sensitive to the fact that America's military supremacy, although a vital element of national strength, is not sufficient to safeguard American security. The United States should continue to invest in its armed forces and maintain its pronounced military advantage, but absent respect for U.S. leadership abroad, U.S. primacy does more to **divide the world** than to unite it. Washington needs to renew the non-military dimensions of its global influence, working to reclaim its moral authority abroad and to make disaffected allies again feel like stakeholders in the international system.

#### Independently, rising powers are challenging the international system – legitimacy is critical to bring them safely into the international system

Fujimoto 12 – (Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>)

The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict that argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the **U**nited **S**tates to adopt a **multilateral doctrine** whichavoidsthe precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18 Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

#### Otherwise, the consensus of hegemonic stability theorists agree that unstable power transitions cause Asian wars which go global

\*great power war goes nuclear, mutually assured destruction can’t check – best power transition experts conclude based off decades of demographic and economic research that inevitable transition wars from collapse of unilateralism causes retrenchment wars spurring lash-out drawing in China and India – only multilateralism solves by persuading Chinese leaders to maintain the status quo

**Kugler 06 –** Professor of World Politics at Claremont Graduate University (Jacek, “The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?”, <http://sobek.colorado.edu/~lewiso/Kugler%20-%20The%20Asian%20Ascent.pdf>)//NG

Given the fundamental importance of demographic and economic forces in establishing the roster of states capable of fundamentally affecting the structure of world politics, whatever resolution there might be to the Global War on Terror will not alter the major challenge faced by the United States. In the long run, China’s demographic and hence economic power cannot be denied. By the same reasoning, the Middle East has no long-run demographic or economic power. The U.S. courts long-term peril by being obsessively distracted by short-term objectives. To ensure real peace, the U.S. would be much better advised to preserve strong links with the EU, maintain and improve cordial relations with Russia, and most importantly, open a sincere dialogue with India and China designed to maximize their support for the existing status quo. To be sure, positive, but limited, steps have been taken by the United States. American support for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization was important because it helps integrate China’s growing economy more fully into the capitalist world economy. Similar recognition for India, not to mention support for Indian membership on the United Nations Security Council, would also be beneﬁcial. Because Taiwan and Korea have replaced the Cold War’s Berlin as focal points for potential Great Power conﬂict, ﬁnding an accommodation that meets the desires of the main parties with respect to them is central to the preservation of long-term peace. The economic, demographic, and political science research summarized above suggests that American foreign policy attention must center on China and India as the major future contenders for global leadership. Although China retains a political ideology inconsistent with democracy, there are good reasons to expect and thus to work toward change to a participatory system based on increasing prosperity (Feng 2003; Feng and Zak 2003). India is the largest democracy in the world, but like China it is still not a major partner of the Western world. While these relationships may develop and prosper on their own, the relative amount of attention paid to these rising giants compared with the Global War on Terror is simply insupportable. Neither convergence arguments nor power transition theory suggests that future Great Power war between Asia and the West is inevitable. The research described here offers evidence about probabilistic relationships between parity and status quo evaluations on the one hand, and war on the other. Thus, while China’s overtaking of the U.S. may be relatively certain, the result of that overtaking is not. Power transition research supports claims that overtakings are dangerous when policy makers fail to accommodate them. A conﬂict between China or India and the United States as the Asian giants emerge from the shadows of underdevelopment is **not inevitable**. Rather, the political negotiations among contenders determine whether potential challengers can be made satisﬁed with the rules and norms governing world politics. If the declining dominant state is able to engineer a satisfactory compromise between the demands of the rising state and its own requirements (as Britain and the U.S. did when peacefully passing the mantle of international leadership), war is not expected. If the two sides remain intransigent, **war is expected**. It is clear that such a war in the twenty-ﬁrst century would have a **very high probability** of involving **nuclear weapons**. A clear counterexpectation can be drawn from classical nuclear deterrence arguments. They involve a fundamental assumption that as the costs of war increase, the probability of war decreases. Nuclear weapons are then alleged to alter calculations substantially because they raise the expected costs of war so high that war becomes unthinkable. According to this logic, a global war between a newly predominant China and a declining U.S. will never occur thanks to the pacifying inﬂuence of the balance of terror. A new Cold War is anticipated by this nuclear deterrence argument. Consistent with this theory, various scholars have advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons as one method to prevent wars (Intriligator and Brito 1981; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982). An odd paradox is raised by the fact that many world leaders accept nuclear deterrence claims, such as that about the stability of mutual assured destruction (MAD), while rejecting the logical concomitant that proliferation of nuclear weapons to more and more states is desirable. What follows logically has stubbornly resisted practical implementation. Thus, using some other logic, leaders of nuclear nations seem to agree that deterrence is stable under MAD but nevertheless also agree that nuclear proliferation must be prevented in order to preserve peace. If decision makers really believed MAD is stable, it is impossible to understand why they would oppose nuclear proliferation to Iran, thereby creating stable nuclear parity in the Middle East. This inconsistency was noted years ago by Rosen (1977), but subsequently conveniently overlooked. Theory and policy may frequently be at odds, but seldom when the costs of such logical inconsistency are so high. Power transition theorists are inherently suspicious of MAD arguments about nuclear stability because they essentially resurrect traditional balance of power arguments. Rather than focusing on conventional balance as a pacifying inﬂuence, nuclear deterrence proponents of MAD suggest that a nuclear balance will maintain the peace. Given a fortuitous absence of wars among nuclear states thus far, it is impossible to test arguments such as that about MAD. But what we can observe is not promising. It is not only policy makers who doubt the veracity of MAD when they deny the logical consequence of ‘‘beneﬁcial’’ proliferation. Recent formal presentations of deterrence arguments strongly suggest that a preponderance of nuclear capabilities specifically in the possession of satisﬁed states is more amenable to peace than is MAD (Zagare and Kilgour 2000). Power transition theorists, informed by their own as well as by **decades** of demographic and economic research, strongly doubt that nuclear parity between the U.S. and a risen but dissatisﬁed China could preserve the peace. Conclusions It is entirely reasonable to anticipate that Asia will dominate world politics by the end of the century. The most important issue facing American decision makers is how to handle the anticipated overtaking. The research summarized here indicates that the one element of Asia’s ascent that Western decision makers can manipulate is Asia’s relative acceptance of the international system’s existing norms and values. War is not an inevitable certainty. The opportunity for peace is at hand. If Western decision makers can persuade Chinese and Indian leaders through word and deed to join with the current global status quo, peace and prosperity should endure. If, on the other hand, China and India cannot be persuaded to join the existing structure of relations, then the chances for conﬂict increase around mid-century. The research summarized here suggests this is true even in the face of the enormous costs that reasonably would be anticipated from a nuclear war.

#### It also leads to greater power-sharing and international cooperation, resolving conflict

\*multilateralism solves global problems –

a. fosters great power sharing – increased multilateral dialogue devises similar analytics lenses that make policies more readily adopted on a large scale

b. increases international cooperation – lends legitimacy to policies by virtue of debate and increases efficient implementation of joint programs because actors feel invested in solutions – creates a self-reinforcing dynamic which creates new focal points for strategic interaction

**Pouliot 11** — Professor of Political Science at McGill University (Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26)//NG

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the **drive to cooperate**. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable [and] patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of **common frameworks** for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global **cooperation, and power-sharing** in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of **moderation** in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to **avoid radical solutions** in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share **similar analytical lenses** that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related, multilateralism lends **legitimacy** to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more **efficient implementation**, because actors feel **invested** in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates **self-reinforcing dynamics** and new focal points for strategic interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

#### The plan solves–

#### First, repeal would represent a commitment to multilateralism for the international community by bolstering human rights credibility – that refocuses global institutions

\*plan spreads multilateralism – only the removal of the embargo carries the symbolic weight of revoking previous unilateral efforts to backlash against other countries in votes during conferences in the UN

\*overwhelms alternative causes – removing the embargo signifies an endorsement of international law that overwhelms human rights violations in Guantanamo and Iraq – prefer comparative evidence

**Burgsdorff 09 –** Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, <http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>)//NG

In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation which was severely damaged by US engagements in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The perception that the US does not do its utmost to fully respect international law is an issue that renders difficult joint efforts to make the UN a meaningful instrument for acting decisively against human rights violations.2 If the US wants to act more effectively in multilateral forums in general on human rights matters, Washington, as a matter of priority, needs to restore US credibility, thus making human rights a more defendable key priority in international relations. Together, the EU and US stand a far better chance of furthering democratic change and sustainable improvement of the living conditions in Cuba. It is also then that other foreign partners, notably from Latin America, could be more easily approached to engage on Cuba along commonly agreed upon agendas. A realistic scenario, however, has to consider that political change in Cuba will probably take longer and most likely be preceded by economic reform measures coming from the regime itself. Foreign actors wishing to assist in this process in a meaningful manner, are well advised to pursue a long term, incentives-based approach to both the Cuban authorities and Cuba’s emerging civil society, including the human rights defenders. Outlook: Will President Obama radically change US policy towards Cuba? An answer to that question requires reviewing three important factors: first, constraints and opportunities in the political environment in the US, i.e. power constellations in the Congress and in Florida; second, interests in Cuba, i.e. Cuba’s elite and the domestic opposition; and third, likely reactions in the international community, i.e. within the Latin American and Caribbean region; in Europe; with respect to Cuba’s allies; and last but not least, at multilateral level. 6.1 What are the key considerations in today’s political environment in the US? During the electoral campaign Obama promised to undo the restrictions on travel and remittances imposed by the first Bush administration. He called the embargo a “complete fiasco” but shied away from suggesting the lifting of the economic sanctions or revoking Helms-Burton, saying that he would maintain the embargo as long as no substantial political reform and release of political prisoners would take place on the island. In essence, Obama’s proposed measures would correspond to a policy similar to the one enacted during the second term of President Clinton. This was during the campaign. Is it reasonable to assume that Obama’s resounding victory nation-wide and in Florida provide a more conducive domestic platform for overhauling for good the failed and discredited embargo policy? Most observers would give a negative answer, at least during President Obama’s first two years in office, and this for the following reasons: First, Cuba and Latin America are not among the top foreign policy concerns at this juncture. Second, while US business is clearly interested in strengthening trade and developing investment ties with Cuba strong pressure, so far, has only come from the agribusiness sector which succeeded in exporting US goods despite the embargo since 2002. Moreover, Cuban demand is still crippled by rather modest purchasing power and the overall business and regulatory environment is certainly not conducive to foreign investment. Third, despite a change in the electoral map overall and a slow generational change within the Cuban-American community, a clear majority of registered Cuban-American voters actually participating in elections leans towards the Republican party and can still be mobilized around the single issue of taking a principled stance against the Castro regime (e.g. all three Republican incumbents in Miami Dade county have re-won their seats; moreover, in 2010 Senator Mel Martinez’ seat comes up for election – if the Democrats were to take his seat they could come close to gaining a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate). Few commentators, on the other hand, think that the new president should and could lift the embargo during his first year in office, arguing that he enjoys at present and for a limited period only, a unique window of opportunity because of the high rate of approval at home and abroad (including in Cuba among the Afro-Cuban community). Lifting the embargo unconditionally would be widely heralded as the dawning of a new era in the Western Hemisphere and beyond, with immediate positive repercussions on bilateral relations with all major Latin American and Caribbean countries. Pressure to lift the embargo, or parts of it, may also come from the powerful US oil lobby if commercially viable finds are discovered in Cuba’s exclusive economic zone, with Cuba actively courting US investments in the remaining off-shore blocks. It would make little sense for the US to prohibit off-shore oil exploration in Florida’s continental shelf when a few miles further down South numerous international companies exploit Cuba’s oil and gas reserves. Moreover, the argument goes, President Obama does not need to ‘pander’ to the conservative Cuban-American vote in South Florida (i.e. those 65% having voted for McCain) because this part of the electorate will remain an anti-Obama constituency no matter what he does. As a matter of fact, the democrats could actually loose Latino votes in Florida in the next elections among the nonCuban Latino community and among those 35% of Cuban-Americans having supported Obama in 2008 (according to exit polls 75% of whom are reported to be against the embargo) if his Cuba policy changes remain largely symbolic, i.e. simply undoing what has been established under President Bush, while maintaining the embargo. As far as the 2010 Florida senate seat is concerned seasoned political analysts recall that, traditionally, any incumbent president’s party tends to loose seats in mid-term elections, thus making the prospect of getting closer to the 60 seat majority a rather difficult task (especially if former governor Jeb Bush were to run for the vacant post). 6.2 How about the political environment in Cuba? Since coming to power in August 2006 Raul Castro has reiterated on several occasions that Cuba is willing to discuss with the US ways and means to improve bilateral relations and bring an end to the policy of confrontation. The only requisite would be to conduct these talks on the basis of equality and without any political pre-conditions. These statements did not contain much of a political risk for Havana since they were unlikely to be heeded by the Bush administration. If, however, the Obama administration were to take them at face value, it is fair to say that Cuba’s government appears to be ill-prepared for commencing meaningful discussions with the US. For the past 50 years the official dogma was based on the premise that US policy is hostile, interventionist and imperialist. A fundamental overhaul of the US approach towards Havana would make it difficult for the Cuban government to continue propagating the David-versus-Goliath myth, considering that the new US president, as an Afro-American, shares with two-thirds of Cubans a similar ethnic background. Obama may indeed be perceived by many in Cuba as the personification of a different, less fearful and certainly better America. In this context it is interesting to note that Armando Hart, former Minister of Culture and one of the chief ideologues of the Communist party, published an article in Granma in October 2008 where he underlined the need for defending the Cuban Revolution against the erosive power of a non-embargo centered, i.e. open door US policy towards Cuba. Havana might, indeed, not be ready yet to engage with Washington under a non-embargo scenario. The present situation, with the embargo being nominally in place (yet discredited internationally and in Cuba, in addition to being undermined in its impact because of direct commercial links with US business and the massive flow of remittances without the ‘danger’ of millions of visiting Americans pouring into the island), seems to be the best of both worlds for Cuba: while Havana can blame US hostility for domestic development problems, which serves the regime well politically both abroad and at home, the embargo does not do any major economic and financial damage that would jeopardize the survival of the regime. Furthermore, Cuba’s illegal political opposition strongly disagrees with the embargo because the continuation of a coercive policy framework is used by the authorities as a pretext to discredit those opposing the regime as ‘puppets’ and ‘counterrevolutionary agents’ at the service of the US. The Cuban opposition would clearly prefer Washington to conduct an open door policy addressing all sectors of the Cuban society, including, of course, concrete measures supporting directly the emerging dissident movement and providing high-profile visibility to human rights defenders. 6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

#### Second, the plan sends a clear signal of cooperation to Latin America, creating new partnerships and bolstering relations

\*plan sends a signal of Latin American cooperation to reinvigorate the OAS – even though Cuba’s suspension was revoked in 2009, there exists a disconnect between their reenlistment and the continuation of the embargo – corrupts the OAS agenda by delegitimizing US credibility

\*solves Latin American relations – choice statements from leaders of the Bolivarian Alliance prove Cuba is the nexus point of increased relations which solves multilateralism by enlisting support of developing countries who bandwagon with Latin America

**White 13** – Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times, 3/7/13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all)//TL>

FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America.

Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.

Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.

An **end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America** that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas.

I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century.

Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even naïve, but Kennedy’s focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations.

Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism.

During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service.

The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes.

After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, “we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.”

Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chávez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative.

At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.”

Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor.

Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.

Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.

After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero.

And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.)

Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?

The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help.

Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments.

If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.

#### Increased regional standing bolsters influence in international institutions through the creation of voting blocs, allowing the US to lead multilateral forums

\*plan boosts influence in international institutions – re-integrates Latin American as a regional ally to counterbalance emerging economic powers and improves US diplomacy with their support

\*the internal link is perception based – the perception of America lacking regional allies encourages increasing economic powers to diametrically oppose the US in multilateral institutions to crush our agenda

**Sabatini and Berger 12 –** Christopher Sabatini is editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas. Ryan Berger is a policy associate at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas(Christopher/Ryan, "Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America" 6/13/12, CNN/Global Public Square, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/)//AD>

Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called Latin America “a region on the move,” one that is “more important to the prosperity and security of the United States than ever before.” Somebody forgot to tell the Washington brain trust. The Center for a New American Security, a respected national security think tank a half-mile from the White House, recently released a new series of policy recommendations for the next presidential administration. The 70-page “grand strategy” report only contained a short paragraph on Brazil and made only one passing reference to Latin America. Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability. But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it. Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations: 1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies. Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S. when it comes to matters of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention. Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.” At a time of (**perceived**) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with **regional allies** that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them. If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights. 2. Latin America is becoming more international. It’s time to understand that the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America. For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate, politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region. It’s also clear that countries such as Brazil and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in the region and even on the world forum. The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba. 3. There are security and strategic risks in the region. Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border. FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government. At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central America. In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north. Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states. There are many other reasons why Latin America is important to U.S. interests. It is a market for more than 20% of U.S. exports. With the notable exception of Cuba, it is nearly entirely governed by democratically elected governments — a point that gets repeated ad nauseum at every possible regional meeting. The Western Hemisphere is a major source of energy that has the highest potential to seriously reduce dependence on Middle East supply. And through immigration, Latin America has close personal and cultural ties to the United States. These have been boilerplate talking points since the early 1990s. But the demands of the globe today are different, and they warrant a renewed engagement with Latin America — a strategic pivot point for initiatives the U.S. wants to accomplish elsewhere. We need to stop thinking of Latin America as the U.S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.

### 1ac – plan

**PLAN –**

The United States federal government should normalize trade relations with Cuba.

### 1ac – transition

**CONTENTION 2 IS TRANSITION**

#### Cuba’s current reforms are *slow*, *contradictory*, and *insufficient*—the plan is key

Shifter et al 10/15 – Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. Matthew Aho is a consultant in the corporate practice group of Akerman Senterfitt in New York. Collin Laverty is the founder and president of Cuba Educational Travel. Kirby Jones is the president of Alamar Associates in Arizona. Carmelo Mesa-Lago is a professor emeritus of economics and Latin American studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Archibald Ritter is a distinguished research professor emeritus of economics and international affairs at Carleton University. (“Are Raul Castro’s Reforms Helping Cuba’s Economy, 10/15/13, *Latin America Adviser*, pdf)

\*This card is from pages 1,3, and 4 of the pdf. Page two contains a wholly different article. “Are Raúl Castro's Reforms Helping Cuba's Economy?” is published on pages 1, 3 and 4 of the PDF. Our evidence is the entirety of the article. We will provide you the PDF if you are curious\*

In late September, Cuba's government¶ announced the legalization¶ of 18 new categories of private¶ employment, including real¶ estate agents, bringing the total number of¶ approved types of independent employment¶ to 199. While Raúl Castro's government¶ has issued more than 430,000 private¶ employment licenses since 2010, the latest¶ employment legalization effort also¶ included bans on certain economic activities,¶ including the reselling of imported¶ goods. Are Cuba's newest economic¶ reforms likely to bear fruit? How much has¶ the state ceded control of the economy to¶ market forces in recent years? What surprises¶ might lie in store for Cuba's economy¶ and its business climate?¶ AMatthew Aho, consultant in the¶ corporate practice group of¶ Akerman Senterfitt in New York:¶ "The decision to legalize new categories¶ of private employment is yet¶ another incremental step that—combined¶ with other changes since 2010—clearly¶ indicates a shift away from total state control¶ and toward a 21st-century mixed market¶ economy. Other recent examples¶ include the September publication of new¶ rules governing foreign investment at the¶ Mariel Export Processing Zone and the¶ Oct. 9 decision to allow state tourism agencies¶ to do business with private enterprises,¶ such as bed and breakfasts and restaurants.¶ The Cuban state will remain the economy's¶ dominant player, but the space it has yielded¶ so far was inconceivable five years ago.¶ And it's paying off: visitors to Havana¶ report a never-before-seen economic¶ vibrancy transforming the urban landscape,¶ as black-market businesses leave the¶ shadows and new, remittance-fueled ventures¶ arise. What's more, the recent loosening¶ of migration restrictions and the passage¶ (likely in 2014) of new foreign investment¶ laws signal that policymakers are¶ preparing for infusions of foreign investment¶ and remittance capital in the medium-¶ to-long terms. There is a bevy of potential surprises, foreign and domestic.¶ At home, the recent ban on reselling¶ imported goods met swift and unusually¶ vocal opposition from entrepreneurs¶ vowing to disobey the rules. In the¶ months ahead, the government must¶ decide how to engage 430,000 private¶ economic actors (and those dependent¶ on them) as a rising political force on the¶ island. Abroad, President Obama will¶ decide whether to support the Cuban people in their pursuit of greater economic¶ self-determination through¶ proactive policies or do nothing—thereby¶ **clinging to decades of failed sanctions**—¶ because he sees no political¶ upside. 2014 could be a real tipping¶ point in U.S.–Cuba relations, but only if¶ both sides seize the moment. That,¶ unfortunately, would be the biggest surprise¶ of all."¶ ACollin Laverty, founder and¶ president of Cuba Educational¶ Travel: "Time will tell how far¶ and how fast the reforms go,¶ which will determine their economic,¶ political and social impact. Up until now,¶ the government has been very cautious—¶ prioritizing stability while also¶ making drastic changes within the context¶ of the last five decades of communist¶ rule. Legalizing small-scale enterprise,¶ expanding cooperatives and creating a¶ housing market are important steps,¶ affecting the psychology of Cubans and¶ how they see and operate in the market.¶ However, **these important reforms will**¶ **not result in significant improvements** in¶ the overall performance of the economy.¶ Larger, more controversial and difficult¶ reforms will need to be implemented in¶ order to fundamentally change the¶ makeup and output of the economy,¶ such as currency reform, increased foreign¶ investment, legalization of more¶ private enterprises, including those of¶ medium-scale, the organic creation of¶ cooperatives, an end to excessive subsidies¶ to inefficient state-owned enterprises¶ and increased access to telecommunications.¶ The government's decision in late September to expand private enterprise but simultaneously restrict the sale of imported goods shows contradictions¶ in the process. Official discourse is to¶ remove the state from non-essential¶ areas of the economy, but **the forces that be are unwilling to relinquish their monopoly** in the retail sector. A better¶ approach would be to remove luxury¶ taxes on goods sold at dollar stores and¶ focus on currency reform and economywide¶ pricing adjustments, which would¶ allow it to compete with the private sector.¶ Albeit slowly, the process continues¶ to be two steps forward, a half step backwards,¶ and demographics and economic¶ necessity should keep it that way."¶ AKirby Jones, president of¶ Alamar Associates in Arizona:¶ "The numbers speak for themselves:¶ the reforms in Cuba are¶ real, will continue and have already¶ changed the face of Cuba. If you had¶ asked me just a few years ago whether I¶ would expect what is going on in Cuba¶ today, I would say a resounding no. But¶ the reforms have already borne fruit.¶ The Batistianos like Rep. Ileana Ros-¶ Lehtinen and Sen. Robert Menendez can¶ question the reforms all they want, but¶ their criticisms do not change the reality¶ on the ground. And now we hear of pilot¶ projects with only one currency. Facts¶ speak for themselves. And through all of¶ this, the United States is on the outside¶ clinging to a policy rooted in the last¶ century. The Cuban government has¶ ceded some control on economic matters,¶ and true market forces are at work.¶ Is that not what the United States wants? These reforms are like toothpaste that¶ cannot be put back into the tube. There¶ will be problems as well as starts and¶ stops along the way. The United States¶ could be helping this process instead of¶ **trying to stop it**. Meanwhile Brazil,¶ China and many others are part of the¶ change, realize that it is real, are investing¶ in Cuba and are making money in¶ the process. The United States should do¶ the same." Carmelo Mesa-Lago, professor¶ emeritus of economics and¶ Latin American studies at the¶ University of Pittsburgh: "The¶ re-authorization/extension of selfemployment¶ is a key of Raúl's reform to¶ enlarge the private sector and dismiss 1.8¶ million workers unneeded in the state sector.¶ Currently, 22 percent of the labor¶ force is in the non-state sector. It should¶ jump to around 40 percent by 2015 and¶ account for a rising percentage of GDP.¶ But self-employment is obstructed by several¶ constraints: 1.) The large majority of¶ occupations are unskilled or require little¶ skills, whereas most of the state employees to be fired are professionals or skilled¶ workers. 2.) University graduates (badly¶ needed in the private sector, such as managers,¶ engineers and architects) can't practice as self-employed, hence they may¶ work as taxi drivers or food sellers but not¶ in their professions. 3.) Taxes are quite a burden. For instance, the tax rates on the¶ labor force gradually increase with the¶ number of employees hired, therefore¶ penalizing those self-employed that hire¶ more employees, which is a disincentive¶ for the self-employed and counterproductive¶ in the state quest to get rid of surplus¶ labor. 4.) The government sends contradictory signals, such as raids to shut down self-employed Cubans who have stands¶ under Havana porches, or the government¶ first taxes and then bans the sale of¶ imported goods. Currently the reforms are insufficient to solve the many economic and social problems accumulated under half a century of centralized, inefficient socialism. There is a wide consensus¶ inside and outside Cuba that they **must be deepened and accelerated** to accomplish¶ that task, but Raúl has little time left to do¶ so before he retires in 2018."¶ AArchibald Ritter, distinguished¶ research professor emeritus of¶ economics and international¶ affairs at Carleton University:¶ "Major changes have been implemented¶ already, and further reforms are in the¶ works or on the horizon. The reforms will¶ continue to orient economic policy and¶ lead to substantial improvements in the¶ Cuban economy and in citizens' living¶ standards. The market-oriented component¶ of the Cuban economy has expanded¶ and now includes about 27.5 percent¶ of the employed labor force. It will¶ expand dramatically if the pseudo-cooperative¶ state farms and non-agricultural¶ state enterprises become authentic cooperatives.¶ Registered micro-enterprises¶ now include 430,000 people, 8.6 percent¶ of the employed labor force. The marketoriented¶ joint foreign/state enterprises¶ employ about 1 percent of the labor¶ force. The market-oriented underground¶ economy provides full- or part-time first¶ or second jobs for maybe 10 percent of¶ the labor force. Under September 2012¶ legislation, the Unidades Básicas de¶ Producción Cooperativa should become¶ real cooperatives, increasing the mainly¶ private sector in agriculture to approximately¶ 11.6 percent of the labor force.¶ Non-agricultural cooperatives in time¶ should include most of the goods- and¶ services-producing state sector. They are¶ to be worker-managed and under the¶ forces of supply and demand. The new¶ Mariel Export Processing Zone may¶ attract major investments, especially¶ from China and Brazil, and provide a¶ strong market-propelled stimulus. The transformation of state enterprises into authentic market-oriented cooperatives would constitute a change and improvement of historic dimension. Cuba could¶ become a country of 'worker ownership¶ and management' and continue to be¶ unique in the world. In contrast to the¶ ideology-based policy impetuosity and¶ vacillation of President Fidel Castro over¶ 47 years, the approach of President Raúl¶ Castro has been cautious, gradual, pragmatic,¶ stable and 'evidence-based.' There¶ are downside risks. Bureaucratic footdragging¶ may slow the reforms. The 'special¶ relationship' with Venezuela may falter¶ with political change and changed¶ economic priorities in that country. But¶ the economic surprises are more likely to¶ be positive, and there may even be some¶ positive political surprises—I never cease¶ to hope. **A most welcome surprise would**¶ **be a normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations**¶ during the presidency of Barack Obama."

#### The embargo ruins Cuba’s economy – six warrants

\*embargo crushes Cuba’s economy – hampers development of services and exportations, crushes commercial flows, limits growth on goods and services, restricts monetary flows, incentivizes emigration and creates social damages

**CETIM 03** – independent research and political organization working at the UN (Centre Europe Tiers Monde, THE EFFECTS OF THE US EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA AND THE REASONS OF THE URGENT NEED TO LIFT IT, http://www.cetim.ch/oldsite/2003/03js04w4.htm)

**The harmful economic effects of the embargo** From an official Cuban source, the direct economic damages caused to Cuba by the US embargo since its institution would exceed 70 billion dollars. The damages include: 1) the loss of earnings due to the obstacles to the development of services and exportations (tourism, air transport, sugar, nickel; 2) the losses registered as a result of the geographic reorientation of the commercial flows, (additional costs of freight, stocking and commercialization at the purchasing of the goods…); 3) the impact of the limitation imposed on the growth of the national production of goods and services (limited access to technologies, lack of access to spare parts and hence early retirement of equipment, forced restructuring of firms, serious difficulties sustained by the sectors of sugar, electricity, transportation, agriculture…); 4) the monetary and financial restrictions (impossibility to renegotiate the external debt, interdiction of access to the dollar, unfavourable impact of the variation of the exchange rates on trade, "riskcountry", additional cost of financing due to US opposition to the integration of Cuba into the international financial institutions…); 5) the pernicious effects of the incentive to emigration, including illegal emigration (loss of human resources and talents generated by the Cuban educational system…); 6) social damages affecting the population (concerning food, health, education, culture, sport…). ! If it affects negatively all the sectors, **the embargo directly impedes** - besides the exportations - **the driving forces of the Cuban economic recovery**, at the top of which are tourism, foreign direct investments (FDI) and currency transfers. Many European subsidiaries of US firms had recently to break off negotiations for the management of hotels, because their lawyers anticipated that the contracts would be sanctioned under the provisions of the "Helms-Burton law". In addition, the buy-out by US groups of European cruising societies, which moored their vessels in Cuba, cancelled the projects in 2002-03. The obstacles imposed by the United States, in violation of the Chicago Convention on civil aviation, to the sale or the rental of planes, to the supply of kerosene and to access to new technologies (e-reservation, radio-localization), will lead to a loss of 150 million dollars in 2003. The impact on the FDI is also very unfavourable. The institutes of promotion of FDI in Cuba received more than 500 projects of cooperation from US companies, but none of them could be realized - not even in the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry, where Cuba has a very attractive potential. The transfer of currencies from the United States is limited (less than 100 dollars a month per family) and some European banks had to restrain their commitment under the pressure of the US which let them know that indemnities would be required if the credits were maintained. In Cuba, the embargo penalizes the activities of the bank and finance, insurance, petrol, chemical products, construction, infrastructures and transports, shipyard, agriculture and fishing, electronics and computing…, but also for the export sectors (where the US property prevailed before 1959), such as those of sugar, whose recovery is impeded by the interdiction of access to the fist international stock exchange of raw materials (New York), of nickel, tobacco, rum.

#### And it’s on the brink – two reasons—

First, geopolitical trends catalyze economic instability and make collapse inevitable  
\*economic instability inevitable – monetary growth will outstrip supply causing build-up of inflationary pressures – causes a fiscal crisis that jeapordises reform – lack of financing and status quo dependency on Venezuela crushes growth

**Morris, 11** – London Metropolitan University (Emily, FORECASTING CUBA’S ECONOMY: 2, 5, AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium “Cuba Futures: Past and Present,” organized by The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

**Risks in the short term** Political risks arise from th e process of transferring leadership from the old guard to a new generation. Evidently conscious of the hazards, the old guard are seeking to closely manage the generational handover, but their control will diminish. So far signs of dissent within the government have been rare and weak, but in 2011 the situation will begin to change radically. At the special conference of the PCC that will take place after the sixth PCC congress in April 2011, it seems likely that a new set of leaders will take up their posts. None of them will have the authority of the Castro brothers, and so for the first time for fifty years there is a possibility of the emergence of factionalism. In the TABLE 5. Two year forecast 2010 2011 2012 Real GDP (% growth) 2.1 3.5 4.2 Inflation (year-end, %)a a. This inflation figure is based on an estimated average household cost of living index that takes into account a reduction in the amount of basic goods available at heavily subsidised prices on the ration. The impact of the shift from subsidised consumption to market prices will vary widely between households, with the percentage rise in the cost of living being greater for those at the lower end of the income scale, who spend a higher proportion of their income on basic goods. 6.3 7.2 5.5 Average labour productivity (% growth) 4.2 5.9 4.5 Government spending/GDP ratio (%) 66.5 63.8 60.4 Investment/GDP ratio (%) 10.5 11.1 12.5Forecasting Cuba’s Economy: 2, 5, and 20 Years 13 context of the rapid changes taking place in the economic sphere, 2012 is likely to be a testing year. Despite its efforts to dampen expectations, there is a sense among the Cuban public that they should see material benefits from the economic reforms. If these hopes are dashed, **the government could face a serious crisis** of public confidence. In the economic sphere, **there are many hazards** arising from the process of transformation. There are risks that monetary growth will outstrip that of supply so that inflationary pressures could build, at a time when the government is losing its power to directly control prices. The extent to which the government will be able to manage the fiscal challenge it has set itself—to achieve sufficient savings and raise sufficient tax revenue to maintain welfare provision whilst phasing out the existing apparatus of social protection—will depend on its ability to respond quickly to difficulties as they arise. A major fiscal crisis would jeopardise the reform process, and hamper the government's ability to respond to social pressures created by the extensive realignment of relative incomes that will result from the changes. External **risks are heightened by Cuba’s lack of access to emergency financing** in the case of unanticipated shocks. **The largest** single **risk** **comes from Cuba’s** high degree of **dependency on Venezuela**, and in particular on earnings from the export of professional services. Hugo Chávez, on whom the relationship rests, does not face re-election until 2012 but if anything were to befall him before then, the Cuban economy would suffer. The high degree of uncertainty about the global economy also presents risks, with the recovery in OECD countries fragile and signs of strain within the economies of the growth leaders, China and India. 14 C

#### Second, Chavez’s death and the election of Maduro undermines stability

\*Chavez’s death – Cuba depended on Venezuela and election of Maduro created uncertainty in markets – economic restructuring has been ineffective – Maduro’s reforms caused Cuban leaders to speed up reforms

**French 13** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note, has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya Landau, “Can Cuba Survive the Loss of Chavez”, 3/6/13, http://thehavananote.com/node/1067) MDM

At the same time, it became clear to any honest observer inside or outside Cuba that the nation was headed for serious trouble; relying **so singularly** on the largesse of Hugo Chavez could have perilous consequences. When Raul Castro took the reins from his ailing older brother provisionally in 2006 and then formally in 2008, he focused, for the first time publicly, on the need for deep changes. The economic downturn of 2008, coming as it did with soaring world food prices and a punishing hurricane season (in which Cuba was walloped by four major storms that wipes out food stores and hundreds of thousands of homes), brought the reality starkly home. The younger Castro’s rhetoric has been consistent and tough on economic mismanagement and corruption, but his apparent desire for consensus building (and avoiding destabilizing shocks that could jeopardize power) coupled with his inability to rein in a reluctant bureaucracy meant that Cuba’s economic restructuring has been slow and largely ineffectual – so far. Key reforms in real estate and migration, which offer many Cubans unprecedented potential economic empowerment and mobility, and also leverage an increasingly reconnected diaspora, offer hope of more and deeper reform, but other reforms, such as in expanding the non-state sector and reforming the tax code, have been too piecemeal or conservative so far. Not unsurprisingly, many in and out of Cuba now wonder if the loss of Chavez is the death knell of the Castros’ Revolution, or, perhaps could it inject urgent momentum into Raul Castro’s reform agenda, just in the nick of time? In some ways, the loss of Hugo Chavez, on its face so devastating for Cuba, might actually be a good thing for the island. With Nicolas Maduro a favorite to win the special presidential election a month from now, Cuba will likely retain significant influence. But **Maduro is no Chavez**. He’ll have to focus on building up his own political capital, without the benefit of Chavez’s charisma. While he surely won’t cut Cuba off, to maintain power he will almost certainly need to respond to increasing economic pressures at home with more pragmatic and domestically focused economic policies. And that likelihood, as well as the possibility that the Venezuelan opposition could win back power either now or in the medium term, should drive Cuban leaders to speed up and bravely deepen their tenuous economic reforms on the island. And if there was any hesitancy among Cuba's leaders to open more space between the island and Chavez, they now have the opportunity to do so. Under Raul Castro, Cuba has mended and expanded foreign relations the world over. Particularly if it shows greater pragmatism in its economic policies, countries such as China will no doubt increase economic engagement of the island.

#### Normalized relations with Cuba are key to resolving structural issues in Cuba’s economy

\*plan solves structural issues with Cuba’s economy – provides more capital and expertise to corporations in Cuba to better facilitate an economic restructuring

**Ashby 13** – Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Timothy, “Commentary: Presercing stability in Cuba after normalizing relations with the US”, Caribbean News Now, 4/1/13, http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/headline-Commentary%3A-Preserving-stability-in-Cuba-after-normalizing-relations-with-the-US-15197.html) MDM

Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for US policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for US national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned. The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: • Avoid one or more mass migrations; • Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; • Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; • Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2] All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba. US policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector – including 300,000 agricultural producers – or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to US interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5] A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. **Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability** and fostering the growth of a middle class – both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs. Cuban SOEs are in a state of gradual transition like other parts of the economy. In December 2012, the Cuban government authorized a wide range of co-ops that will allow workers to collectively open new businesses or take over existing SOEs in construction, transportation, and other industries. Considered a pilot program that is a prime candidate for an expansion, the co-ops “will not be administratively subordinated to any state entity.” [6] Many Cuban officials, well aware of the limits to small-scale entrepreneurism, appear to harbor hope that co-ops could shift a large portion of the island’s economy to free-market competition from government-managed socialism. In other transitional states, particularly in post-socialist economies, co-ops have served as commercial bridges between state-owned and privatized business. Of the 300 largest co-ops in the world, more than half are in United States, Italy, or France. [7] Ironically, the outputs of such co-ops, including agricultural products which could find strong demand in the American market, are barred by short-sighted federal regulations, thus hampering, if not defeating, what could be a major US policy goal. The United States has been actively trading with foreign SOEs for years. China, a one party, communist state, is the United States’s second largest trading partner, and Chinese SOE’s account for a large percentage of the nearly $400 billion USD in goods exported to America each year. Venezuela is in the top fifteen of US trading partners, and the bulk of that country’s exports are petroleum products deriving from the state-owned PDVSA (which in turn owns Houston-based CITCO oil company). Another communist country, Vietnam – which initially was the subject of a US economic embargo similar to that imposed on Cuba – is the second largest source of US clothing imports and a major manufacturing source for footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery. [8] On these matters, the Cuban government has said that it wants to “replicate the paths of Vietnam and China.” [9] Of relevance to Cuban trade relations, Vietnam has formally requested to be added to the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program as a “beneficiary developing country,” which authorizes the US president to grant duty-free treatment for eligible products. The statute also provides the president with specific political and economic criteria to use, when designating eligible countries and products. “Communist” countries are not eligible for GSP membership unless the president determines that certain conditions have been met, including whether the applicant is “dominated or controlled by international communism.” Furthermore, countries that fail to recognize “internationally accepted workers’ rights” are excluded. [10] US statutes do not provide a general definition of a “communist” country, and the Obama administration is expected to declare that Vietnam is no longer “communist” in terms of its economic system. The argument will be that even if Vietnam is a “communist” country (hard to deny, considering it has one party government that is officially titled the Communist Party of Vietnam), it is “not dominated or controlled by international communism” because no such entity exists following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar arguments may be applied to Cuba in considering normalized relations with the United States. At the request of the US Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted detailed reviews of the frameworks for seven key statutes that govern Cuban sanctions. [11] The resulting reports concluded that (i) the president still maintains “broad discretion” to make additional modifications to Cuban sanctions; and (ii) prior measures, implemented by the executive branch have had the effect of easing specific restrictions of the Cuba sanctions and have been consistent with statutory mandates as well as within the discretionary authority of the president. [12] Some legal scholars assert that absence of such explicit statutory provisions in other areas suggests that Congress did not intend to prohibit the executive branch from issuing general or specific licenses to authorize certain transactions with Cuba when “such licenses are deemed to be appropriate and consistent with US policies.” [13] Although a complex variety of federal statutes have re-stated the regulatory prohibition on importation of Cuban goods under 31 CFR § 515.204, enabling legislation to codify the restriction, has not been passed. For example, 22 USC § 6040(a) “notes” that 31 CFR § 515.204 prohibits the importation of goods from Cuba, but does not codify or expressly prohibit such activity, and 22 USC § 7028 acknowledges that Congress did not attempt to alter any prohibitions on the importation of goods from Cuba under 31 CFR § 515.204. [14] The complete dismantling of the Cuban economic embargo will undoubtedly **require congressional legislation**; however, the president has broad powers to modify policy towards Cuba, particularly in an emergency situation that could affect US national security. [15] For example, imports of Cuban origin goods are prohibited under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations (“CACRS”) except as “specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses or otherwise.” [16] Such authority could allow the president to argue for the modification of 31 C.F.R. § 204’s complete prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods by stating that Cuban exports to the United States help the Cuban people by creating employment and thereby maintaining the island’s social stability. Considering the domestic political constituency and the political obduracy of US Congress, a more realistic presidential rationale for allowing Cuban imports from all types of enterprises could be the protection of US borders during an era of grave concerns about homeland security. Some policy analysts suggest that bilateral trade with Cuba should be restricted to businesses and individuals engaged in certifiably independent (i.e. non-state) economic activity. [17] While well-intentioned, such a policy would likely have a negligible impact on Cuba’s economic development and fails to recognize that commercial enterprises that the US government would classify as SOEs are actually co-ops or other types of quasi-independent entities that are in the early stages of privatization. Restrictions such as this also fail to address larger national and regional security concerns which are the primary responsibility of the president. Although ultimately the Cuban people must freely choose their own political and economic systems, President Obama should be seen as having legal authority to support the transition taking place on the island by opening US markets to Cuban imports. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people and help to provide economic and social stability that is in turn vital to US national and regional security. Such trade must include both the island’s small, yet growing, private sector and State-Owned Enterprises. In this regard, it would be both unfair and strategically unwise to treat Cuba differently from its stated models, China and Vietnam.

#### And, it entrenches long-term economic stability – current reform process is failing

\*plan entrenches long-term economic stability – current reforms fails, the embargo handcuffs the US and prevents expertise to manage a transition – current policy gives Cuban officials to demonize the US to veto reforms

**Piccone, 13** – Brookings Institute Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy (Joseph, “Opening to Havana”, 1/17/13, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana>)

Under Raul Castro, the Cuban government has continued to undertake a number of important reforms to modernize its economy, lessen its dependence on Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, and allow citizens to make their own decisions about their economic futures. The process of reform, however, is gradual, highly controlled and short on yielding game-changing results that would ignite the economy. Failure to tap new offshore oil and gas fields and agricultural damage from Hurricane Sandy dealt further setbacks. Independent civil society remains confined, repressed and harassed, and strict media and internet controls severely restrict the flow of information. The Castro generation is slowly handing power over to the next generation of party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process. These trends suggest that an inflection point is approaching and that now is the time to try a new paradigm for de-icing the frozen conflict. **The embargo** — the most complex and strictest embargo against any country in the world — has **handcuffed the U**nited **S**tates **and has prevented it from having any positive influence** on the island’s developments. It will serve American interests better to learn how to work with the emerging Cuban leaders while simultaneously ramping up direct U.S. outreach to the Cuban people. I recommend that your administration, led by a special envoy appointed by you and reporting to the secretary of state and the national security advisor, open a discreet dialogue with Havana on a wide range of issues, without preconditions. The aim of the direct bilateral talks would be to resolveoutstanding issues around migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, the environment, and trade and investmentthat are important to protecting U.S. national interests. Outcomes of these talks could include provisions that normalize migration flows, strengthen border security, break down the walls of communication that hinder U.S. ability to understand how Cuba is changing, and help U.S. businesses create new jobs. In the context of such talks your special envoy would be authorized to signal your administration’s willingness to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, pointing to its assistance to the Colombian peace talks as fresh evidence for the decision. This would remove a major irritant in U.S.-Cuba relations, allow a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce, and free up resources to tackle serious threats to the homeland from other sources like Iran. We should also consider authorizing payments for exports to Cuba through financing issued by U.S. banks and granting a general license to allow vessels that have entered Cuban ports to enter U.S. ports without having to wait six months. You can also facilitate technical assistance on market-oriented reforms from international financial institutions by signaling your intent to drop outright opposition to such moves. Under this chapeau of direct talks, your administration can seek a negotiated solution to the thorny issue of U.S. and Cuban citizens serving long prison sentences, thereby catalyzing progress toward removing a major obstacle to improving bilateral relations. You should, in parallel, also take unilateral steps to expand direct contacts with the Cuban people by: • authorizing financial and technical assistance to the burgeoning class of small businesses and cooperatives and permitting Americans to donate and trade in goods and services with those that are certified as independent entrepreneurs, artists, farmers, professionals and craftspeople; • adding new categories for general licensed travel to Cuba for Americans engaged in services to the independent economic sector, e.g., law, real estate, insurance, accounting, financial services; • granting general licenses for other travelers currently authorized only under specific licenses, such as freelance journalists, professional researchers, athletes, and representatives of humanitarian organizations and private foundations; • increasing or eliminating the cap on cash and gifts that non- Cuban Americans can send to individuals, independent businesses and families in Cuba; • eliminating the daily expenditure cap for U.S. citizens visiting Cuba and removing the prohibition on the use of U.S. credit and bank cards in Cuba; • authorizing the reestablishment of ferry services to Cuba; • expanding the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including items like school and art supplies, athletic equipment, water and food preparation systems, retail business machines, and telecommunications equipment (currently allowed only as donations). The steps recommended above would give your administration the tools to have a constructive dialogue with the Cuban government based on a set of measures that 1) would engage Cuban leaders in high-level, face-to-face negotiations on matters that directly serve U.S. interests in a secure, stable, prosperous and free Cuba; and 2) allow you to assert executive authority to take unilateral steps that would increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. To take this step, you will have to contend with negative reactions from a vocal, well-organized minority of members of Congress who increasingly are out of step with their constituents on this issue. Your initiative should be presented as a set of concrete measures to assist the Cuban people, which is well within current congressional mandates, and as a way to break the stalemate in resolving the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross (his wife is calling for direct negotiations). Those are winnable arguments. But you will need to be prepared for some unhelpful criticism along the way. **Conclusion:** Current U.S. policy long ago outlived its usefulness and is counterproductive to advancing the goal of helping the Cuban people. Instead it gives Cuban officials the ability to demonize the United States in the eyes of Cubans, other Latin Americans and the rest of the world, which annually condemns the embargo at the United Nations. At this rate, given hardening attitudes in the region against U.S. policy, the Cuba problem may even torpedo your next presidential Summit of the Americas in Panama in 2015. It is time for a new approach: an initiative to test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively alongside an effort to empower the Cuban people.

#### Additionally, more moderate approaches *comparatively fail* to stabilize Cuba

Koenig 10 – Lance is a US Army Colonel. This is a paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College. (“Time for a New Cuba Policy”, March 11, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130)

The United States requires a policy that will lead to better relations between the United States and Cuba, increase the soft power of the United States in the Latin American world, and pull the Cuban government towards a more representative form of governance. These conditions will contribute to the national security of the United States as well as to the western hemisphere. So with this in mind, what are our likely options? Options

• Path of least resistance, stay the course. The United States can continue with the current policy of trade embargo, travel restrictions, and limited diplomatic relations. The United States will not likely choose this path, but will rather go down it because it is easier politically to not change the status quo. This policy requires a long-term commitment and continuing patience. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 provides the way ahead that the Cuban government must follow in order to gain normalized relations with the United States. This option follows the path of the last forty nine years and no significant change is required on the part of the United States. Politically, this avoids the problems generated by going against the Cuban voters of Florida that have been strong supporters of the current policy. The risk is that the United States will miss a window of opportunity to make fundamental positive changes to our relationship with Cuba. Additionally, Cuba could attain economic prosperity in spite of the United States’ actions. Cuba would be forced to continue to look towards China and Venezuela for trade and security relationships. Additionally, for both trade and tourism, Cuba will continue to develop relationships with Canada and the European Union, while the United States’ influence will continue to wane.

**• Strengthen the current policy**. Eliminate the billions of dollars per year in remittances from Cuban-Americans to relatives within Cuba. Work multilaterally with other countries to increase the effectiveness of the current embargoes on trade and travel. Fully implement the “Powell Commission Report” recommendations to end the Castro dictatorship and undermine the succession strategy.31 The Powell Commission Report seeks to reverse the recent economic gains to put added pressure on the government of Cuba. 32 Additionally, pressure the European Union to stop trading with Cuba and restrict the ability of EU citizens to travel to Cuba. The EU nations provide a great opportunity to make up for lost trade with the United States and have a large population of potential tourists for Cuban beaches. The United States must deter actions by the Organization of American States to work closer with Cuba. The Organization of American States should also warn its members to limit the scope of bilateral relations with Cuba in order to support the efforts of the United States. The United States must use Radio and TV Marti to inform the Cuban people of the true cause of their economic difficulty, the dysfunctional communist centrally controlled economy vice economic sanctions. And finally, tighten the noose around the economy and government of Cuba to attempt to bring down the government in a shorter period of time. This option assumes that our current policy is the correct policy, but needs to be strengthened. It eliminates half measures and contradicting policies to produce a more powerful embargo with devastating effect on the Cuban dictatorship. The risk is that the United States will become further isolated from the world in regards to its Cuba policy and will create additional sympathy for Cuba. This could result in open disregard for the embargo by the European Union and other countries interested in trade with Cuba, with a **collapse of** the **effectiveness** of the embargo. The soft power of the United States would suffer with possibly no gain. The United States could lose all possible influence over the future direction of the Cuban government as the Castro regime is replaced.

**• Limited easing of** economic and travel **sanctions.** Engage the Cuban government and reward concessions by easing sanctions. Engage the Cuban government and use a carrot and stick program to encourage the Cuban leadership to transition from a dictatorship towards a more representative form of government, with more emphasis on the stick and less on the carrot. Reward concessions on human rights and moves toward democratization with increased levels of trade and travel. Use the enticement of increased revenue to the government through higher levels of trade as well as the income generated when Americans (of both Cuban descent and nonCuban descent) visit the island and spend dollars. This approach should be less threatening to the Cuban government as they have a level of control over the pace of change. The risk is that the government of Cuba would have the opportunity to adjust to the gradual changes and maintain control while conditions for the Cuban people improve, removing the pressure for a change towards market reforms and a more democratic form of government.

• Support the Cuban people, but not the government. This option would completely and unilaterally lift the embargo on trade and travel.33 Reestablish normal diplomatic relations with Cuba. Engage the Cuban government and use a carrot and stick program to encourage the Cuban leadership to transition from a dictatorship towards a more representative form of government, with more emphasis on the carrot and less on the stick. Included in the carrots are: military to military exchanges and exercises; observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS); and provide assistance transitioning the economic and financial aspects of the economy towards a free market system. Use the economic element of power to demonstrate the superior qualities of a free market economy. Encourage Cuba to allow United States businesses to operate in Cuba without the restrictions of government ownership and government collection of wages for labor. Help Cuba develop an economy that takes advantage of their educated workforce (literacy rate of 99.8%) 34 to move away from low value added products to high value added products with the goal of improving the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and thus the quality of life for the average Cuban citizen. This option has risk politically, as Cuban voters in Florida have traditionally supported isolating the Cuban government and economic sanctions. There are recent indications that Cuban-American opinions are shifting towards more engagement with Cuba. The recent poll conducted by the Brookings Institution, in collaboration with Florida International University and the Cuba Study Group, found that over 55% of Cuban-Americans oppose continuing the embargo and seems to indicate that this risk has lessened recently.35 But, with a viable economy that improves the standard of living for the population of Cuba, their government will feel less pressure to change from a dictatorship into a more representative form of government.

Recommendations

The option with the **greatest possibility of success and reward** for the United States **is to** support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. The United States should take the following actions unilaterally • **Lift completely the economic embargo.** Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries.

• Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.

• Next, the United States should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to **achieve normal trade relations** between the two countries.

This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.36 The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the “Cinco Heroes” and their plight is well known.37 So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative form of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. “The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.” The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base. Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. “Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.” These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights. The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world. There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government. From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook.” 40 The United States needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome. One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.” 41 Conclusion This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat. The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy. The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.42 The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can’t stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas.

#### Two impacts–

#### First, Cuban economic collapse crushes U.S. deterrence and exacerbates hotspots

\*Cuban economic collapse cause refugee crisis siphons US resources and attention away from crisis “hotspots” around the globe – prevents effective crisis management – most likely scenario for nuclear use, because the only resolution to the power vacuum is the rise of radical non-state groups that threaten direct strikes on unstable regimes in the region

**Gorrell 05** – Lieutenant Colonel (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for **instability and civil war**. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses **anarchy is a strong possibility** if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, **thousands will flee the island.** During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be **several hundred thousand flee**ing to the U.S., creating a **refugee crisis**. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increasesa. If these groups can **export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere** then **the war against this extremism gets more complicated**. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, **threatening the stability of the fragile democracies** that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, **creating the conditions for another insurgency**. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a **failed state** 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that **Africa and the Caucasus** region are potential **hot spots** for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. **North Korea** will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore **China**. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, **Iran** could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These6 are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

#### Hotspot escalation goes nuclear

**Bosco 06** – senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine (David, “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_>)

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark **global conflagration** is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. Consider the following scenarios: Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored. But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang? Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II. True, China is a rapidly rising power -- an often destabilizing phenomenon in international relations -- but it appears inclined to focus on economic growth rather than military conquest (with the possible exception of Taiwan). Russia is resentful about its fall from superpower status, but it also seems reconciled to U.S. military dominance and more interested in tapping its massive oil and gas reserves than in rebuilding its decrepit military. Indeed, U.S. military superiority seems to be a key to global stability. Some theories of international relations predict that other major powers will eventually band together to challenge American might, but it's hard to find much evidence of such behavior. The United States, after all, invaded Iraq without U.N. approval and yet there was not even a hint that France, Russia or China would respond militarily.

#### Second is disease (thank you gbs :))

#### The impact is the *Cuban health care sector*—it depends upon a *democratic* and *market-based* transition

Ullmann 05 – Steven G. Ullmann is a Professor and Director, Programs in and Center for Health Sector Management and Policy at U of Miami. This article is part of the Cuba Transition Project, part of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at Miami. (“The Future of Health Care in a Post-Castro Cuba”, 2005, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research\_Studies/StevenUllman.pdf)

As a transition occurs, further deterioration of medical care services and, in turn, the public’s health is likely to take place. Indeed, often during transitions, a reallocation of funds occurs to meet other needs of the changing state. Health care services are at risk under such a real location. This is what countries in Eastern Europe experienced subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union (WHO Regional Office 1998). Further, when changes occur in economic, political, and/or social conditions, there appear to be greater incidences of heart disease and suicide due to stress, especially among the young and middle-aged male population (“UNICEF Warns” 1994). When socioeconomic pressures manifest themselves in these ways, they add further strains on an already overburdened health care system. Transition may open up additional important roles for NGOs. The influence of NGOs to date has been limited in Cuba, due to distrust regarding their political motivations (Gonzalez and Coil 1997) and the role of a centralized government in making services available independently of NGOs. In other countries during transitions, NGOs have had a strong track record of providing assistance to restore infrastructure and provide basic food, shelter, and health care needs. Their role may be of great importance in Cuba’s transition. One area of focus would be in rural regions, where indications are that infrastructure has deteriorated and health problems have been even more prominent than in urban areas. NGOs may also be involved in assessing the continued provision of basic medical services and blood bank services, as they did once before when Castro first came to power and a health care personnel exodus caused a crisis (Claudio 1999). Indeed, one of the many functions that NGOs can have during a period of transition is the tracking of medical data. Even if a transition is smooth with insignificant changes in political processes, blood supply and vaccination programs nonetheless will be put at risk. NGOs can help to ensure the continuation of global immunizations and the safety of the blood supply. These programs will have to be monitored closely, as a breakdown would be very problematic for the country. Depending upon the openness of the new regime. NGOs will have a strong or a minimal role. The needs, however, that could be served by NGOs will be diverse and significant. **The nature of regime change will be instrumental** in determining the future focus of Cuban society as well as the level of openness to the growth of NGO involvement, private sector participation, and the provision of health care. With all that could potentially occur, there are certain indications that opportunities for development of a private sector, including the medical private sector, may be limited, even though there is so much potential. The actual outcome is a **function of the type of political system that emerges** after Castro is no longer on the scene. Several writers have been developing theories relating to democratization and emergence of a market-based economy. Edward Gonzalez of the RAND Corporation argues that a number of potential scenarios exist in a post-Castro Cuba (Gonzalez and ColI 1997). These scenarios would, in turn, impact the health care delivery system in the country. Gonzalez argues that the probability of a reformist or a coalition government. focused on democratic reform and the development of market systems, is quite limited He indicates that as Castro passes on, a strong possibility is that the military, under the direction of Raúl Castro, Fidel’s brother, would retain power with a possible allowance for minimal market opportunities. A second scenario reflects the establishment of a coalition government, although Gonzalez claims that the possibility of an open coalition is not great. Gonzalez suggests that there is so much invested in the underlying concepts of the Fidelistas and so much distrust of any reform movement, either from within or from outside the country by the Cuban exile community, that this is not a viable option. As such, the opportunities for a market-based health care system layered upon the current public health care system may also be limited in scope. As Alberto Coil indicates in his paper. The Future of US-Cuban Relations, the importance of social security cannot be overestimated (Gonzalez and Coil 1997). Fear of the impact of market reform on distribution of wealth is of great concern. Further, the advent of capitalism is not without consequences. Full employment, zero inflation, and perceived egalitarianism have been mainstays of the Castro communist system (putting aside the strong black market that exists in the country). Fears of loss of jobs, security, and homes, and reduced access to a perceived high-quality health care system are some of the concerns that would accompany any market reforms. Policy changes will have to be introduced very carefully, smoothly, and incrementally in a post-Castro Cuba, even though, as indicated, elements of it already exist. The implication, however, from these studies is that there may be only limited prospects for real market-based health care reform in the near term. More widespread reforms may only be forthcoming over time. With the end of the Fidel Castro regime, negligible changes in the politics within Cuba and in foreign relations and trade between Cuba and the United States are indeed a possibility. Recent moves to strengthen the military infrastructure within the country seem to indicate this. If little political change occurs after a regime change, U.S. frustration will cause, if anything, increased U.S. restraints on trade with Cuba. If this scenario occurs, then it is quite possible that there will be more of the same, namely, continued deterioration of the economic situation within Cuba with carryover to the health care sector. One can assume that the medical infrastructure, operating under compromised conditions within hospitals and clinics, would continue to deteriorate, with even more constraints on technology and equipment and fewer basic sanitary supplies. Housing and food shortages and current nutritional concerns would not be alleviated; vulnerable populations would continue to be at risk, and their health care problems would become worse. This would put increased strains on the already stressed medical care system. It is reasonable to expect that aggregate mental health would also continue to decline with resultant increases in murder and suicide rates. The government of Cuba would attempt to counter this situation by generating revenues with increased tourism, a factor already discussed as one of the major causes of an increased incidence of STDs and AIDS and a variable affecting the high rate of abortion in the country. More efforts to trade doctors and medications for oil will result from continued political processes, as Cuba will seek markets that are not foreclosed to trade. With this situation, however, will come continued frustration on the part of medical professionals. A combination of an oversupply of medical personnel, poor working conditions. and very poor remuneration will only reduce the morale of the medical care workforce even further. Ultimately, all these stresses will have consequences in terms of stress on the political system. The period of transition post-Castro will be an extremely critical period in the lives of Cubans. So far, we have discussed issues associated with changes inside the country. What about the potential for investment of foreign capital in medical and health care from external sources? Again, concerns relate to the concept of significant market opportunities in Cuba after the fall of Castro. These opportunities may actually be more limited than has been anticipated by the exile community, not only for political reasons but also for economic reasons. Pointing out the large amount of foreign debt Cuba owes to numerous Western and Eastern Bloc countries and the fact that the economy has been handicapped over the last 10 to 15 years, Jaime Suchlicki indicates that these circumstances reinforce the concept that Cuba is now a poor country without the near-term resources to rebuild (1997). Until the economy improves and at least some of the debt is repaid or resolved, there may be fewer opportunities for investment in Cuba than many anticipate. If there are to be any major opportunities for investment and potential growth, they may be found in the health care industry. As discussed, Cuba has developed its own pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries out of necessity. The country has highly trained scientific and medical talent and has invested in an infrastructure to meet domestic needs. Further, Cuba has sold pharmaceutical supplies and biotechnology in foreign markets, but it has been essentially foreclosed from selling to less developed countries, as they do not necessarily have the financial resources to afford products produced by Cuban firms. Given that Cuba’s talented and experienced professionals are paid minimally and that the appropriate infrastructures for production, research, and development are in place, partnerships with U.S. and other foreign-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms may present worthwhile opportunities for all parties. Foreign pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms would have access to relatively inexpensive professional labor and capital. The potential for scientists’ brain drain, just as for medical personnel, could be lowered by offering professionals financial incentives to remain in the country. Partnerships like these would stimulate an infusion of new capital into Cuba, and the participation of foreign firms would allow for the **expansion of output into the international marketplace**, currently foreclosed to Cuban producers. With an infusion of capital, additional technology, necessary inputs, and know- how, these firms will be able to meet the pharmaceutical needs of the domestic economy as well. Such partnerships will also encourage imports of other necessary pharmaceuticals: hence, a wide selection of medications would be available. **Such opportunities hinge upon the** post-Castro **administration’s degree of openness and disposition toward the rest of the world.** Transition, by its very nature, brings about instability. This is especially true when transitions rarely occur, offering few patterns associated with change. As Fidel Castro leaves power, whether voluntarily, by force, or by death, there will be many unknowns. This monograph has attempted to provide insights into how health care systems may react and adjust to change. Ultimately, we will not know the outcome until a change actually occurs. What is certain, however, is the fact that the health care system in Cuba will be an extremely important component of any political, economic, and social transition in the country as well as in this active region of the world.

#### That model stops disease spread worldwide

Cooper et al 06 – Richard S. Cooper is in the Department of Preventive Medicine and Epidemiology at Loyola University – Stritch School of Medicine, Maywood, IL, USA. (“Health in Cuba”, International Journal of Epidemiology, May 4, 2006, <http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/4/817.full.pdf+html>)

Infectious diseases The combination of high levels of community participation, access to primary care and an aggressive public health approach has made the Cuban campaign against epidemic infectious diseases particularly successful.58–60 A number of common illnesses have been eliminated altogether, often for the first time in any country [poliomyelitis (1962), neonatal tetanus (1972), diphtheria (1979), measles (1993), pertussis (1994), rubella and mumps (1995)]. In 1962, against the advice of external health officials, ‘vaccination days’ were established with the goal of reaching the entire population. When this method quickly proved to be effective in eliminating polio it was subsequently adopted elsewhere as the primary strategy.58 After dengue was introduced in 1981 Cuba adopted a campaign of community mobilization, focusing on elimination of mosquito breeding sites, which lead to prompt control.20,58,59 International attention for infectious disease control in Cuba has focused primarily on HIV/AIDS.10,20,61–63 Among 300 000 military personnel returning from Africa in the 1980s 84 were found to be infected with the virus [Ref. (20), p. 85]. A nation-wide screening programme which began in 1987 reached 80% of the sexually active population (~3.5 million people) and identified 268 HIV-positive individuals.20 In the initial phases, the Cuban HIV/AIDS strategy provoked controversy, some of which was negative.20,64 While assessing the public health impact of this unknown epidemic, persons infected with HIV were quarantined in health facilities where they received supplemental nutrition and available medical care.20,61,62 Treatment is now provided in the outpatient setting; domestically produced triple therapy has been provided free to all paediatric patients since 1998 and to adults with HIV or AIDS since 2000.62 With the rapid increase in foreign tourists, and the development of a local sex trade, the HIV incidence has risen in the past 5 years, although it remains the lowest in the Americas.23 Increased integration into the global economy may continue to pose challenges which Cuban public health has not previously had to address. Cuba’s role in global health assistance Given its limited economic resources, Cuba can only rarely afford direct aid.20 Instead it has adopted a strategy that relies on human resources. First targeted to Africa, the programme has now placed physicians, nurses, dentists, and other professionals in 52 countries.20,65,66 The most prominent episodes involved sending doctors to post-apartheid South Africa, providing long-term care for Chernobyl victims, and giving disaster aid to Central America after hurricane Mitch. Cuban personnel also staffed a new hospital in Gonaives, Haiti, which had been constructed with the Japanese aid; this facility was subsequently destroyed during the anti-Aristide strife in 2004 although the Cuban physicians have remained.67 To move from emergency assistance to a sustainable programme, a multicountry collaborative plan has recently been developed to improve health services in poor Latin American countries.66 A medical school was established in Havana in 1999 and more than 6000 students, primarily from Africa and Latin America, are currently being given a medical education at no expense.7,68,69 In the past 3 years more than 14 000 physicians and dentists have been placed in slums and rural communities in Venezuela as part of the new the partnership between Cuba and the Chavez government, and this number is set to rise to 20 000.68 Cuba has also agreed to educate 40 000 new physicians for Venezuela over the next several years.69 Cuba’s medical assistance campaign has a number of dimensions. Like all foreign aid programmes, it assumes that some political benefits will be forthcoming in return. However, most of the countries that have been assisted, for example, Ethiopia, The Gambia, and Haiti, have nothing to offer in return. Unlike many donor programmes, placing physicians where none have practiced before has been overwhelmingly well received by the local communities.69 Thus, while the arrangement with Venezuela has direct economic benefit to Cuba, it has also transformed the health system by giving large segments of the Venezuelan population access to modern medical care.69 The special character of health sector development in Cuba can perhaps be best appreciated by considering the challenge any other society would face if it tried to send tens of thousands of physicians to live in slum communities in a foreign country for 2 years. While a range of incentives and motivating factors unique to the Cuban social context are operating, these assignments are accepted as a professional obligation by the vast majority of the Cuban practitioners and they perform effectively in the host communities. Much like the experience of military personnel on long tours of duty, the Cuban programme of assistance does nonetheless require extraordinary sacrifice and the hardship is not always borne lightly. Furthermore, the mobilization for assistance to Venezuela has meant that many Cuban neighbourhoods must share facilities. These sacrifices must, of course, be balanced against the conditions of desperate need in the communities on the receiving end. Many of these countries, particularly in Africa, have watched helplessly as the majority of their health professionals emigrate to the US and Europe.70 Offhand dismissal by observers in industrialized countries of the Cuban medical aid programme, which has such a powerful impact on these marginalized communities, is a clear indication of how perilously divided the discourse over global development has become. Does Cuba’s experience have broader significance? The history of science is replete with stories of the delayed acceptance of unpopular or unfashionable ideas. The approach to improving global health taken by the donor community and academic medicine in rich countries is no exception. While criticisms of the basic approach are voiced—as in the recent assertion that the external measures of development have no meaning for the general population71,72—these critical voices have little influence on the practice of large international agencies. It is not the intent of this article, however, to summarize and make a judgment on economic assistance and progress in global public health. Instead, based on the weight of the evidence presented on the Cuban experience, we pose the following question: ‘Why has the debate on solving the most urgent challenges in public health in poor countries ignored the experience of success?’ Traditionally, whether the experience is derived from randomized trials, high survival rates in clinical series, or favourable trends in vital statistics, biomedicine embraces the winner and seeks to imitate it. Precisely the opposite has happened in this instance. There is, of course, no shortage of historical and ideological reasons why a debate on the ‘Cuban question’ has never reached maturity. Blind optimism is thought to have discredited the sympathetic scholarship about the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent China, in an earlier era.73–75 Some observers are too concerned about putative restraints on civil liberties and the independent character of its foreign policy to develop any enthusiasm for the objectively more successful aspects of Cuban society. None of these concerns, however, undermine the force of the question, why have we ignored what works? Before recommending components of the Cuban model for use in other settings, a thorough and balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of those components would be required. That assessment would require a very different study of the health system’s organization, capacity, and services. Our intent here is to demonstrate that sufficient cause exists to undertake that assessment. For an objective evaluation of the Cuban experience to succeed, an acceptance of certain ground rules would be required. First, this evaluation cannot be undertaken with the goal of winning a political argument. Although the trajectory of social development in Cuba over the past 50 years is both complex and controversial, as in all other countries, the public health experience should be subjected to judgment on the basis of the usual rules of science. Second, this judgment cannot be permanently postponed by skepticism about the validity of the data or concern over unrelated broader social questions. Ongoing, careful scrutiny of Cuban public health data is justified and to be welcomed; however, sufficient data now exist in several key areas to demonstrate that skepticism can no longer be the basis for a refusal to engage the question. Likewise, many societies embrace domestic and foreign policies that are questioned and even condemned by broad segments of the world community, yet the attempt to evaluate progress in improving the health of their populations is not thereby condemned as illegitimate or unnecessary. Third, the apparent successes recorded by Cuba should be seen as consequences of a well-defined strategy; the value of these underlying principles, not the accumulation of better numbers, is what holds implications for other poor countries, and not a few well-resourced societies. Two aspects of the Cuban experience serve as reasonable demonstrations of the value of that strategic approach. In the area of infectious disease, for example, the operative principles are particularly straightforward: once a safe and effective vaccine becomes available the entire at-risk population is immunized; if a vaccine is not available, the susceptible population is screened and treated; where an arthropod vector can be identified, the transmission pathway is disrupted by mobilizing the local community which in turn requires effective neighbourhood organization and universal primary health care. The joint effect of these strategic activities will result in the elimination or control of virtually all serious epidemic infectious conditions. In terms of child survival, a ‘continuum of care’ that provides for the pre-conceptional health of women, prenatal care, skilled birth attendants, and a comprehensive well-baby programme can quickly reduce infant mortality to levels approaching the biological minimum. Many observers will regard these propositions as reasonable, yet hopelessly too ambitious for the poorer nations of the world. It must be recognized, however, that these principles have been successfully implemented in Cuba at a cost well within the reach of most middle-income countries. Although other aspects of society, such as education and housing obviously make independent contributions to the success of public health campaigns, the Cuban strategy outlined here serves as a model that should be thoroughly evaluated. Needless to say, its implementation would face many challenges specific to the geography and politics of a region. Other models that dictate public health strategies face the same gamut of uncertainties and challenges, however, and none can be said to have met with similar success.76 The World Health Organization, for example, promulgated a set of principles in the Alma Ata ‘Health for All’ Declaration of 1978, many of which were incorporated into the Cuban approach.77 In recent years, however, international agencies have favoured privatization and reduction in state support for health systems.78 The record of achievement with privatized systems in poor countries has often been very limited.79 A debate which can use as a point of departure extensive empirical evidence of progress would provide a healthy reorientation in a discipline distracted by controversy and divided over political aims. The health professions have little opportunity to intervene directly on historical events. However, in the conduct of our science we have both choice and responsibility. Challenging the acquiescence of the scientific community to ostracism of some of its members in an earlier era, Einstein remarked, ‘Political considerations, advanced with much solemnity, prevent... the purely objective ways of thinking without which our great aims must necessarily be frustrated’ [Ref. (80) p. 80]. If the accomplishments of Cuba could be reproduced across a broad range of poor and middle-income countries **the health of the world’s population would be transformed**. This fact creates an obligation for health scientists. We should debate the merits of the principles embedded in the Cuban attempts to improve the health of populations.

#### Global pandemics are coming and direct US intervention fails

Weber 06 – Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. (“How Globalization Went Bad”, Foreign Policy, December 27, 2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/12/27/how\_globalization\_went\_bad?page=0,2)

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American power. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases -- exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today -- will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don't want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won't let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What's needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. As long as the United States remains the world's lone superpower, we're not likely to get any help. Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can't change that alone.

#### Zoonotic diseases specifically lead to extinction

Casadevall 12 – Prof @ Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division of Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Arturo. (“The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, p. 584-5)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided **unequivocal evidence** for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and **have no need for a host**, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

### 1ac – obama cred

#### **Hardline approaches to the Cuban regime comparatively fail– only a policy of cooperation solves**

Walt 9/24 – Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (“Talking to Our Adversaries Should Be Routine (updated)”, September 24, 2013, Foreign Policy, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/24/talking_to_our_adversaries_should_be_routine>)

We don’t like ableist language

If you wanted yet more evidence of how unserious the United States is in its conduct of diplomacy, I'd nominate the breathless "will they, won't they?" attention paid to whether U.S. President Barack Obama and Iranian President Hasan Rouhani will actually meet during the U.N. General Assembly meeting. If they do meet, will they shake hands? Will it be an impromptu sidebar or a sit-down conversation? What color tie will Obama be wearing? Will they drink coffee or tea? Boxers or briefs?

For all I know, these and other truly vital questions will have been resolved by the time this gets posted. My main point is that Americans attach too much significance to these sorts of meetings -- mostly because we are too fond of not talking to countries we dislike -- and **this reticence cripples our diplomacy**. Refusing to talk to people or countries with whom we differ is really just a childish form of spite and one the United States indulges in mostly because we can get away with it. But it also makes it more difficult to resolve differences in ways that would advance U.S. interests. In short, it's dumb.

Did it really help U.S. diplomacy when we refused to recognize the Soviet Union until 1934? Were U.S. interests really furthered by our refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China for more than two decades after Mao's forces gained control there? **Has keeping Fidel Castro's Cuba in the deep freeze since 1961**-- that's nearly 53 years, folks -- **brought his regime crashing down, helped the lives of Cubans, or even advanced the political goals of Cuban-American exiles?** Has our refusal to conduct direct talks with Iran slowed the development of its nuclear research program and helped us explore possible solutions to the problems in Afghanistan, Syria, or the Persian Gulf itself?

Obviously not. But because the United States is so powerful and so secure, it can usually afford to snub people or governments it doesn't like. Despite what you keep hearing from various threat-mongers, Iran isn't a very powerful country and it isn't an existential, looming threat to vital U.S. interests. To the extent that its behavior does impinge on certain U.S. interests -- such as the maintenance of a balance of power in the Gulf -- we have lots of tools for addressing that problem. If our various clients in the region don't think we are doing enough for their security, **they are welcome to look for other patrons** (good luck with that!).

Because the United States is so much stronger, we really shouldn't be afraid to talk to Iranian officials, especially when they are not mouthing offensive nonsense like Iran's previous president was fond of doing. Unfortunately, our strength and favorable geographic position also makes it possible for the United States to ostracize hostile governments without paying any immediate price. But once we do that, then it becomes a BIG DEAL when we finally do contemplate talking, and presidents have to spend political capital just to start the conversation. The result: Our own ability to explore solutions with rivals is crippled.

Hawks at home and abroad are always harping about U.S. credibility and the need for presidents to show their strength. But refusing to talk to those with whom we differ isn't a sign of confidence and strength; it's actually a sign of **timidity and weakness**. It tells the world that we're afraid that shaking hands, sitting down, and talking with someone might rock the foundations of our power. Are we really so worried? Having a conversation with an adversary doesn't require us to agree with them; indeed, sometimes talking exposes just how sharp the differences are and reveals that compromise isn't possible at that time. By itself, talking to another sovereign government gives away nothing, especially when it is just a normal part of one's diplomatic practice.

#### We control academic consensus- military credibility is dumb and guarantees inevitable conflict- only a shift towards cooperation solves.

Christopher Fettweis, Winter 2007-2008. Assistant professor of national security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College. “Credibility and the War on Terror,” Political Science Quarterly, 122.4.

The war in Vietnam marked the beginning of the current debate over the importance of credibility, and the point of divergence between scholars and practitioners. Despite dire warnings from many of its leaders, the United States not only withdrew its forces from Southeast Asia but also cut back on its aid and watched North Vietnamese troops overrun Saigon in 1975. Since this "cut-and-run" and subsequent loss of an ally were undoubtedly unmitigated disasters for the credibility of the United States, presumably a string of foreign policy setbacks should have followed. If international actions are truly interdependent, as policymakers believe, then the 1970s would prob- ably have seen evidence of allies beginning to question U.S. commitments, dominoes falling where the reputation of the United States maintained the status quo, and increased levels of Soviet activity in the third world. The conventional wisdom suggests that the humiliating rooftop helicopter evacua- tion of the U.S. embassy in Saigon should have heralded a dark period for U.S. foreign policy. However, no such string of catastrophes took place. Perhaps most ob- viously, there is no evidence that any allies of the United States were sig- nificantly demoralized, or that any questioned the wisdom of their allegiance. If anything, many of Washington's closest alhes seemed relieved when the war ended, since many of them had doubted its importance in the first place and had feared that it distracted the United States from other, more pressing issues.^^ Certainly no state, not even any "client" states in the third world, changed its geopolitical orientation as a result of Vietnam. The damage to U.S. credibility also did not lead to the long-predicted spread of communism throughout the region, as even Kissinger today grudgingly acknowledges.^' On the contrary, in the ten years that followed the fall of Saigon, the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia enjoyed a period of unprecedented prosperity.^" The only dominoes that fell were two countries that were even less relevant than Vietnam to the global balance of power— Cambodia and Laos, both of which were hardly major losses for the West, especially given the tragedies that followed. Nationalism proved to be a bul- wark against the spread of communism that could not be overcome by any loss of confidence in U.S. commitments. Most importantly, the Soviet Union apparently failed to become em- boldened by the U.S. withdrawal, and did not appreciably increase its "adventurism" in the third world, compared to the 1950s and '60s, when U.S. credibility was high.^^ In an important and convincing study, Ted Hopf ex- amined over 500 articles and 300 leadership speeches made by Soviet policy- makers throughout the 1970s, and found that their public pronouncements did not show evidence of a belief that U.S. setbacks in the third world signaled a lack of resolution. "The most dominant inference Soviet leaders made after Vietnam," concluded Hopf, "was not about falling regional dominoes or bandwagoning American allies, but about the prospects of detente with the United States and Western Europe."^^ Soviet behavior did not change, despite the perception of incompetence that many Americans feared would inspire increased belligerence. Kissinger has referred to Soviet decisions to intervene in Angola and Ethiopia as evidence of the negative effect of Vietnam, but Hopf found no evidence that perceptions of U.S. credibility affected Soviet decision makers. It appears as if those interventions—which, of course, were in strategically irrelevant countries anyway—were indepen- dent events that probably would have occurred no matter what had happened in Vietnam. Other negative events in the 1970s, such as the fall of the Shah, seem even more independent of the catastrophe, despite half-hearted efforts to link them together." As it turns out, Vietnam was all but irrelevant to international politics, which is of course exactly what critics of the war had maintained all along. The immediate post-Vietnam era actually contains a good deal of evidence to bolster a conclusion opposite to the presumptions of deterrence theorists. Robert Jervis has argued that states often act more aggressively in periods of "low" credibility following a reversal, or in response to the perception of irresolution. The Soviets might well have expected the United States to act like a wounded animal, perhaps even more willing to defend its interests than before the withdrawal from Vietnam. "A statesman's will- ingness to resist," Jervis argued, "may be inversely related to how well he has done in the recent past."^'' Indeed, U.S. policymakers, believing that the national credibility had been damaged, seemed eager to reverse such perceptions abroad. The seizure of the Mayaguez, which occurred imme- diately after the fall of Saigon, provided the opportunity to do so. The re- sponse of the administration of Gerald Ford was rapid, decisive, and belligerent. As the President said at the time, "I have to show some strength in order to help us ... with our credibility in the world." Kissinger had told reporters off the record that "the United States must carry out some act somewhere in the world which shows its determination to continue to be a world power." He wanted to react rapidly, arguing that "indecision and weakness can lead to demoralized friends and emboldened adversaries." Even though a rapid military response might have put the captured crew at risk, their lives were unfortunately a "secondary consideration," argued Kissinger, since the "real issue was international credibility and not the safe return of the crew."^Âs will be argued below, the credibility imperative rarely supports negotiated solutions. This was by no means an isolated inci- dent. The invasion of Grenada, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the perceived loss of credibility that followed the removal of troops from Lebanon after the bombings of the embassy and Marine bar- racks. The intervention in Somalia was in large part a response to and cover for U.S. inaction in Bosnia.^\* Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The short- term aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived rever- sal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."^' Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a de- termined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point—but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."^\* The reasser- tion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is com- monly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.^' While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irreso- lution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.\* Mercer's larger conclusions were that states cannot control their reputa- tions or level of credibility, and that target adversaries and alhes will ultimately form their own perceptions. Sending messages for their consideration in future crises, therefore, is all but futile. These arguments echoed some of the broader critiques of the credibility imperative that had emerged in response to the war in Vietnam, both by reahsts hke Morgenthau and Waltz and by so-called area specialists, who took issue with the interdependence beliefs of the generahsts. As Jervis observed, a common axis of disagreement in American foreign policy has been between those who focus on the specific situation and the particular nations involved (often State Department officials or area experts), and those who take a global geopolitical perspective (often in the White House or outside foreign pohcy generalists). The former usually believe that states in a region are strongly driven by domestic concerns and local rivalries; the latter are pre- disposed to think that these states look to the major powers for their cues and have little control over their own fates."" Throughout most of the Cold War, since those who argued that events are interdependent won most of the pohcy debates, U.S. foreign policy was obsessed with credibility. A series of other studies have followed those of Hopf and Mercer, yielding similar results. The empirical record seems to suggest that there have been few instances of a setback in one arena influencing state behavior in a second arena. Daryl Press began his recent study expecting to find that perceptions of the opponent's credibility would be an important variable affecting state behavior.''^ He chose three cases in which reputation would presumably have been vital to the outcome—the outbreak of the First World War, the Berlin Crisis of the late 1950s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis—and found, to his surprise, that in all three cases, leaders did not appear to be influenced at all by prior actions of their rivals, for better or for worse. Crisis behavior appeared to be entirely independent; credibility, therefore, was all but irrelevant. Mercer's conclusions about reputation seem to have amassed a good deal more sup- porting evidence in the time since he wrote. Today the credibility imperative's academic defenders are small in number and influence.'\*'' In the policy world, however, the obsession with credibility lives on undiminished, and doubters are clearly in the minority. Shiping Tang considers the continued existence of the credibility impera- tive in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary to be evidence of almost cultish behavior among policymakers.''^ The longevity of this cult seems to derive from a couple of foundations. First, since foreign policy is by necessity a worst-case-scenario business, prudence often counsels leaders to hedge against the most negative potential outcomes.''^ Since a loss of credibility offers a presumably plausible route to national ruin, the sagacious policymaker will often be very wary of damage to the reputation of the state, no matter what logic and the empirical evidence suggest. After all, while incorrect academics face virtually no consequences, missteps by leaders can be catastrophic. Second, the current academic conventional wisdom is counterintui- tive, and in some senses contradictory to normal daily experience. Indi- viduals certainly develop reputations in their daily lives that influence the way that others treat them. Parents understand that they must carry through on their threats and promises if they want their children to take their future instructions seriously, and we all have friends whose repeated fail- ures to deliver on past promises make us skeptical of their future assur- ances."' However, international relations differ drastically from interper- sonal. As Press explains, Children use past actions when they evaluate their parents' credibility to punish them, and perhaps we all use past actions to assess whether a friend will show up at the movies. But there is no logical basis to generalize from these mundane situations to the most critical decisions made by national leaders during crises. In fact it would be odd—even irrational—if people relied on the same mental shortcuts that they use to make unimportant split-second decisions of daily life when they confront the most important decisions of their lives—decisions on which their country's survival depends."\*^Press argues that national capabilities and interests—not past behavior— provide the foundation for the formation of perceptions. However, the credi- bility imperative has a powerful intuitive logic behind it, based upon lifetimes of interpersonal experience. There are therefore significant impediments in front of those who would challenge the wisdom of the pohcymaker's obsession with reputation. This divergence in conventional wisdom between policy and scholarship would not be a major issue for twenty-first-century international politics if policies that are primarily based upon the need to appear credible were not often counterproductive, costly, and dangerous. The imperative has clear effects upon policy, and is employed in debates in predictable, measurable, and uniformly unhelpful ways.

#### The plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model which prevents conflict in the Middle East, Kashmir, and North Korea– status quo policies risk disengagement

\*plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model – increases diplomatic negotiations with Cuba which even if they fail garner international support for America in multilateral negotiations – also increase Cuban relations which spreads democratic efforts worldwide giving the US a hedge in multilateral institutions

\*solves Kashmir conflict – plan fosters international momentum and credibility to leverage international dialogue in resolving human rights abuses, military buildup and Indo-Pakistan tensions in the region – solves the root cause of the problem

\*solves Middle East conflict – increased credibility allows Obama to leverage his international reputation with rogue nations like Iran to control fissile material and international leverage allows us to de-escalate Middle East tensions

**Dickerson 10** – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf>)//SJF

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a **powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba**. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations.

While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba.

On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. **If negotiations break down** and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, **international support would be easier to garner**.

Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy.

Policy and National Interest

Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years.

From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7

The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress.

As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained.

The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15

By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.

The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.

A History of Anger and Distrust

After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations.

Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba.

The embargo itself remains a **perpetual albatross** that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20

Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26

Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries.

It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro.

Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and **economic engagement** in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba.

To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations.

As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.

Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement.

The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.

How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.

Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security.

In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.

Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?

Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems.

While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.

Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow.

The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate.

Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these.

We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government.

If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections.

The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.

While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected.

Conclusion

Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.

If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could **afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir**. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

#### That conflict model bolsters Obama’s credibility and convinces other countries to negotiate with the United States

Hinderdael, 11– M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>)//NG

Conclusion

The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.

In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52

At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Now the impacts–

#### First, Kashmir war causes extinction

Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting\_us\_security\_strategy\_in\_south\_asia

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out warthat could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respondin an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalateuntil one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal. A nuclear conflict in the subcontinentwould havedisastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussionsof a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union wouldresult in acatastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter,which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead toglobal cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that couldquickly escalate.

#### Escalation uniquely likely now – no impact defense

Overdorf, 8/15/13 [Jason, Overdorf covers India for GlobalPost. Overdorf has spent most of the past 15 years living and working in Asia. He worked as an editor with Dow Jones Newswires in New York, Singapore and Hong Kong before moving to New Delhi and becoming a freelance writer in 2002. He was a frequent contributor to the Far Eastern Economic Review until 2004, covering Indian politics, society and business. Since 2004, he has been a special correspondent at Newsweek International, where he writes on a wide range of topics. He has covered Sonia Gandhi's surprising electoral victory, the ongoing problem of Hindu fundamentalism, the simmering conflict with Maoist rebels, and societal changes resulting from India's meteoric economic growth. He's written for the Atlantic Monthly and the Asian Wall Street Journal. His travel articles, personal essays and political commentary have appeared in Smithsonian Magazine, Departures, Travelers' Tales and other publications. He has degrees in English literature and creative writing from Columbia University, Washington University and Boston University.“Analysis: Are India and Pakistan headed for war? Under heavy shelling, Kashmir is again set to stymie the Indo-Pak peace process. And the risks are mounting” Citing Experts at the Woodrow Wilson Center, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/war/conflict-zones/130814/analysis-are-india-and-pakistan-headed-war>]

“This is a sad reality of India-Pakistan relations — whenever things are looking up, a saboteur tries to send all progress up in smoke.” The region has been on the boil **since** the **five** Indian **soldiers were killed** in an ambush in the Poonch sector of India-administered Kashmir last week. India said Pakistani soldiers were to blame, and Pakistan disavowed the attack. More from GlobalPost: 7 graphs that prove America is overrated The incident prompted a series of cross-border skirmishes that each country has accused the other of starting. It has all-but scuttled hopes that Sharif and his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, will be able to resume peace negotiations anytime soon. The so-called composite dialogue dates back to January 2004. It was called off following the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, which India believes were perpetrated with the aid of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency. Until this week, the formal talks had been set to resume this month. Now even an informal meeting between Singh and Sharif on the sidelines of the September UN General Assembly is at risk. **The situation is scary, experts say**. Kashmir — a divided territory that both India and Pakistan claim as their own — was the cause of two of the three wars the two countries have fought since they attained independence from Britain in 1947. Now both New Delhi and Islamabad control numerous nukes; Pakistan has the world’s fastest growing arsenal. As the tit-for-tat bombardment continues, the shelling already marks the heaviest exchange since the ceasefire began in 2003, raising fears that the repeated violations will result in a complete breakdown of the truce. Signaling their concern about further escalation, both Washington and the UN have appealed for calm. But which side is responsible for starting the fire? What is the endgame? And how far will the flames spread before cooler heads prevail? Indian analysts remain convinced that Pakistan uses such shelling to provide cover for jihadi militants crossing the border to attack installations in India-administered Kashmir. By India's tally, there have already been 42 such ceasefire violations in 2013, compared with 28 in 2012, according to India Today. Meanwhile, this year 40 members of India's security forces in the area have been killed, compared with 17 the year before. For Indians looking to explain who broke the truce this time, that's a smoking gun. “If you just take the common sensical point of view, India has no interest [in breaking the ceasefire], because we are not sending in infiltrators under cover of fire,” said former Indian foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal. “We have no reason to fire unilaterally because what do we then hope to achieve? We don't score any points either bilaterally or internationally.” Pakistan-watchers, however, argue that its army no longer provides such support for jihadi groups, and hint that the ambush story may have been a ploy by India, or a local Indian commander, to trigger hostilities. Admitting that Pakistani generals “may have” helped jihadis cross into India in the past, for instance, Pakistan-born Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council, said that policy was ended under former president General Pervez Musharraf, and it would be “surprising if it is being activated again.” Nawaz also questioned why India first called the alleged ambush an attack by “persons dressed in Pakistani uniforms” – only later referring to it as an army assault — and why top military officials allowed tempers to flare for two days before activating a hotline intended to defuse these situations. “What is surprising is that the Director General Military Operations did not activate the hotline till two days [after the alleged ambush]. Why?” said Nawaz. Experts agree it’s not likely that Sharif's civilian government officially sanctioned the alleged ambush of Indian soldiers. But it may well have had the active or tacit support of the military-intelligence combine, or “deep state,” that holds the real power in Pakistan. Moreover, though the ceasefire is expected to hold, the ambush and subsequent saber rattling in Pakistan certainly establishes that its new prime minister — for all his talk of peace — must overcome enormous obstacles in his own country before he can think of negotiating with India. “Overarching all this is the fact that during the election campaign, [Sharif] spoke about his desire to improve relations with India, and there was an exchange of special envoys pretty quickly,” said India's Sibal. “There was hope that he might be able to begin turning a new page. But under his watch all the wrong things are happening... Jihadi organizations [and] what they call the ‘deep state’ in Pakistan [i.e. the army and intelligence apparatus] seem to be at work.” While Sharif has continued to preach peace since his June election, his army and spy agency don't seem to be listening. That's because both have vested interests in stoking fears of an Indian attack — lest they face a sustained drive to curtail their powers, or, worse, a deep cut to the defense budget. On August 3, terrorists whom India claims have links to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) attacked the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Islamabad allowed alleged terrorist Hafiz Saeed to lead Eid prayers before a massive throng at the Gaddafi stadium in Lahore on August 9. India and the US accuse him of leading of Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Indians accuse of masterminding the 2008 attacks on Mumbai; Washington DC has a $10 million bounty on his head. The Eid prayers were not a one-off. Saeed also led several thousand supporters in a Lahore parade on August 14, to mark Pakistan’s independence day. And amidst the shelling this week, Pakistan's finance minister announced that a plan to grant India “most favored nation” status – once viewed an easily attained step that would be good for both countries – is now off the table. “Neither side wants war nor does either profit from a conflict escalating beyond [Kashmir’s Line of Control]. Local commanders, especially newly posted ones to the region, flex their muscles. But this is a dangerous game,” said the Atlantic Council's Nawaz. Worse still, the game is set to grow more perilous with the approach of 2014 – when the rules will change, according to the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kugelman. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan will leave India and Pakistan contending for influence there, while the exit of US troops will again make India and Kashmir the number one target for Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Meanwhile, in the face of continued provocations since the 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India's capacity for restraint may have reached its limits, Kugelman worries. And the election slated for May 2014 will put added pressure on Singh's government to take a hard line. “As India's election grows closer, any consequent LoC hostilities could conceivably lead to escalation,” Kugelman said. “And that's a scary thought.”

#### Second, middle East war goes nuclear – outweighs every impact

\*Middle East war goes nuclear – strikes in Israel spike retaliatory action that escalate quickly in the unstable region, spurs Sunni versus Shia conflict and terrorist warfare

\*impact defense doesn’t apply –

a. technological improvements make it easier to transfer nuclear devices

b. climate change aggravates water scarcity which guarantees war absent credible dialogue to resolve geopolitical tensions, overwhelms their rationality checks arguments

**Beck 5/28** – Middle East Analyst at TheCommentator (Noah, “A nuclear Middle East is doomsday, 5/28/13, <http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3633/a_nuclear_middle_east_is_doomsday>, SJF)

As the Obama administration tries to unbury itself from snowballing scandals, my apocalyptic thriller steadily crawls from fiction to fact. The Middle East is an insane place. And it's going nuclear. Yet, too many optimists, isolationists, and self-deluded analysts think that rationality will prevail and keep us all safe.

Is it rational to take out the organs of a man you just killed and eat them on camera, as a Syrian rebel recently did? How about a senior Palestinian Authority official who recently declared on Lebanese television that the PA would nuke Israel if it had nuclear weapons? Jibril Rajoub, the deputy secretary of the Fatah Central Committee and the chairman of the PA Olympics Committee, apparently doesn’t mind that the nuclear mushroom he wants over Israel would also kill millions of Palestinians, just miles away – the main goal is that Israel be nuked.

At best, one can say that there is a “twisted rationality” in the Middle East, as exemplified by Iran’s former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a December 2001 speech, Rafsanjani said, “If one day the Islamic world [acquires nuclear weapons], then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. Jews shall expect to be once again scattered and wandering around the globe the day when this appendix is extracted from the region and the Muslim world.”

Despite the above, Rafsanjani is considered such a “moderate” that regime hardliners disqualified him from running in Iran’s presidential election next month. So if Rafsanjani thinks that nuking Israel would be worth a few million Iranians killed by an Israeli retributive nuclear strike, what does that say about the rationality of the current, less “moderate” regime (the one regularly threatening to destroy Israel)?

Could the eschatology of Shia Islam further heighten the risk of Armageddon? If the regime under Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei genuinely believes that an apocalyptic war will hasten the advent of the Twelfth Imam (the Islamic messiah), doesn’t that make a nuclear first strike on Israel that much more tempting? Scholars may disagree about the potential impact of messianic ideology on nuclear decisions, but the mere possibility that geopolitical conflicts could be viewed through a theological lens hardly adds rationality to the Middle East.

To spread its radical ideology, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard finances, trains, and arms some of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations: Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. These organizations are collectively responsible for thousands of deaths from decades of terrorist attacks and wars in Israel, Lebanon, Europe, and Latin America. Iran has also provided support to the Taliban, Iraqi insurgents, and al-Qaeda. And the Islamic Republic supplies Syria with arms, training, and fighters to help President Basher Assad stay in power by massacring his own people every day.

If this is how the Iranian regime has behaved without the impunity conferred by a nuclear deterrent, what can be expected of the regime once it has nukes?

Equally troubling, if Iran’s large-scale and dispersed nuclear program continues, the regime will be able to produce dozens of nuclear bombs every year. Such massive production only increases the odds of intentional (or unauthorized) nuclear transfers to state or non-state actors, and spurs regional rivals into acquiring or developing a matching nuclear deterrent.

Three trends will make a nuclear Middle East even scarier: 1) technological improvements and miniaturization will make it easier to create and transfer small nuclear devices. 2) Climate change will aggravate water scarcity, which will only intensify generational conflicts in the Middle East. 3) Increasing technological interconnectedness will exacerbate sectarianism (as has been the case in Syria, where atrocities from the civil war are constantly recorded on video and shared, only further radicalizing the belligerents).

#### Third, North Korean conflict goes nuclear

**Hayes and Hamel-Green 10 –** Professor of International Relations, RMIT University AND Professor of Arts, Education, and Human Development at Victoria University (Peter AND Michael, “"The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia,", http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel\_Green/3267#sthash.AkKdViI5.dpuf)//NG

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, **miscalculation**, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.

But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view:

That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper **drop in temperature** than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater **decrease in grain production** than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4

These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12 nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium enrichment program - having announced publicly that it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 20097 in a communication with the UN Security Council - it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons. Although some may dismiss Korean Peninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result of its own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggest that this is imminent. If this were to happen, there would be the risk of **nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors** in the disorder and chaos that would ensue. Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in either the near or longer term, North Korea has every financial incentive under current economic sanctions and the needs of its military command economy to export its nuclear and missile technologies to other states. Indeed, it has already been doing this for some time. The Proliferation Security Initiative may conceivably prove effective in intercepting ship-borne nuclear exports, but it is by no means clear how air-transported materials could similarly be intercepted.

Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be **destabilizing**, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both have the technical capability to do so very **rapidly**. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non-Nuclear Principles although recent confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non-nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads. Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global non-proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “the end of American nuclear hegemony.”8

## 2ac glenbrooks

### 2ac – gradualism

**Castro behind the scenes makes reform impossible**

**Maestas, 13** – holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of California, Irvine and a master’s degree in public policy from Claremont Graduate University (Adriana, “Raul Castro to retire in 2018, ending Castro era in Cuba”, Politic365, [http://politic365.com/2013/02/25/raul-castro-to-retire-after-term/)//EX](http://politic365.com/2013/02/25/raul-castro-to-retire-after-term/)/EX)

On Sunday, Raul Castro announced that he would step down as President of Cuba in 2018 when his second full term is up and when he is 86 years old. Raul Castro assumed the role of head of government in 2006 when his brother Fidel Castro became ill. Since the 1959 revolution, the island nation has been led by Fidel or Raul Castro. Raul Castro is noted for making key economic and social changes in Cuba. Some political prisoners have been released, some business has been encouraged, and travel restrictions have been lifted making it easier for Cuban citizens to travel abroad. Castro’s second in line to the presidency is now Miguel Diaz-Canel, who at 52 years of age is a heartbeat away from the presidency. Diaz-Canel, the first vice president, is too young to have participated in the revolution that brought Fidel Castro into power. Despite the announced changes, there is still skepticism in the U.S. about the announcement and what it may mean in terms of foreign relations with the island. The U.S. has imposed an embargo on Cuba for 53 years. Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Cuban American who represents South Florida, issued a statement last week about the rumored retirement of Raul Castro saying, “It’s not a matter of if, but when, the Castro brothers ultimately vacate power – but the real change in Cuba involves much more than the Castro brothers. If dictator Raul Castro states that he will retire in five years, there will still be no real change for the Cuban people so long as the Castro brothers remain in any form of leadership position, even behind the scenes. The whole system crafted by the Castro brothers is corrupt and must be totally replaced. Shifting the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic won’t produce positive changes. The U.S. should not change its policy of isolation of the Cuban regime until, according to US law, there are free, fair and internationally supervised elections, all the political prisoners are released and human rights are finally respected.”

**Gradualism is dumb –**

1AC Ashby indicates Raul is seeking reforms in the status quo but only US assistance makes it effective. Waiting forever will inevitably fail because geopolitical and structural factors ensure rapid collapse now. That's Morris, French and Ashby.

#### No internal link- fast reforms defuse tensions

Lopez-Levy 13 – PhD candidate at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, coauthor of “Raul Castro and the New Cuba” (Arturo, The National Interest, April 10, 2013, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-ready-post-castro-cuba-8316>)//EK

If Cuba implements the type of mixed economy proposed by the last Congress of the Communist Party—a new, more vital relationship with its diaspora and the world—it may also experience a political transformation. As the economy and society change, the political status quo cannot hold. The rise of market mechanisms and an autonomous non-state sector will reinforce the newly open flows of information, investment and technology. These new sectors will seek representation in the political arena. Citizens will have greater access to the Internet, and will be able to associate more horizontally. For at least the next five years, this does not imply a transition to multiparty democracy. But economic liberalization will force an expansion of the current system. Economic and migration opportunities will channel some of the energy in the direction of new businesses and travel, but it will not be enough. The party system will be reformed in order to remain at the helm of social and economic life. Political liberalization will probably start in the lower rungs of government, allowing citizens to vent their frustrations at that level. Raúl Castro’s decision to limit leadership positions to two terms, at a time when the older generation is leaving power by attrition, will result in a more institutionalized leadership that promotes younger leaders in an orderly fashion

#### The plan fosters democratic liberalization- bolsters the middle class that’s Koenig

**Gradual reforms cause rising expectations – internal link turns the turn**

**Ravsberg 6/20-** staff writer for the BBC Mundo

(Fernando, “Cuba’s Economic System: Reform or Change?” Havana Times, June 20, 2013, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95012)//HA

HAVANA TIMES — Marino Murillo, Vice-Chairman of Cuba’s Council of Ministers and architect of the island’s recent economic reforms, has urged the country to aim for growth by eliminating “all of the obstacles that the current economic model places in the way of the development of the productive forces.” The problem is that the greatest obstacle could be the model itself, which is based on relations of production that hinder the country’s economic development, slow down changes, interfere with reforms and bring about discontent among the population. By implementing this socialist model, which dates back to Stalin’s time, Cuba obtained the same results seen in all other countries which copied it: agricultural production crises, industrial stagnation, shortages and a disaffected citizenry. Murillo invoked socialism’s theoretical forefathers, who said that the new, socialist society would need to nationalize only the “fundamental means of production”, a prescription that wasn’t exactly followed by a model which placed even junk food stands in State hands. To be at all effective, every economic change essayed in the country today, no matter how small, invariably demands a whole series of subsequent reforms. And it is precisely there where the model, and its defenders, prevent the reform from becoming effective or yielding its best results.

#### The plan changes elite calculus – it removes the fear of regime change and creates buy in for economic and political reform

**Lopez-Levy 11** – PhD candidate at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, coauthor of “Raul Castro and the New Cuba” (Arturo, New America Foundation, May 2011, <http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf_all_cuba_reform_final.pdf)//EK>

Diplomacy, not sanctions, must be the primary tool for resolving differences with Havana and advancing U.S. interests. It is worth remembering that since the 2008 presidential campaign in which President Obama proclaimed the value of negotiating with countries like Cuba, without preconditions, engagement was never defended on the basis of sympathy for the interlocutors but rather, on how best to promote American values and interests. American repudiation of the Castros’ conduct may or may not be well earned, but it should not be an excuse for constraining American influence with Cuban society and elites. Sanctions, if used, should be “smart”, with the objective of influencing Cuban policy (particularly when such policies are under serious debate and transformation), not affecting regime change. While Cuba’s elite do harbor disagreements about how extensive the reform process should be, all factions are united against changes that would render Cuba in any way vulnerable to external efforts at regime change. Different from the model of “Fidel in Command”, the emerging model of bureaucratic politics under Raul is not insulated from elite sensitivities. To the extent that postrevolutionary elites are threatened by U.S. policy (The conditions of the Helms-Burton Act, for instance), they are going to oppose policy changes. To the extent that their interests in a market-oriented reform are advanced by political concessions such as the release of the political prisoners, they will advocate for them. The processes of marketization and political liberalization create an opportunity for the U.S. to initiate actions that could lead to a proliferation of meaningful changes in Cuba. American support for both a democratic and an economically stable Cuba are far from mutually exclusive. As the experience of other countries demonstrates, economic and political reforms are intertwined. Democracy in the long run tends to produce stable governments but the process of getting there is inherently destabilizing. Multiparty elections, for instance, in the absence of a stabilizing economic and social environment tend to be destabilizing and often violent. A growing, market-oriented Cuban economy that enjoys substantial participation from the Cuban Diaspora will be a **major deterrent against violence**. There are numerous examples, world-wide, of the positive repercussions a transition to a market economy (the Cuban non-state sector would jump from 15% of GDP today to 35% in 2015) has for the independence of civil society. The United States should support such a course in Cuba.

### 2ac – appeasement

#### Zero theoretical basis for appeasement

Paul Huth, Autumn 1997. Director of Research at CIDCM as well as a professor in the Government and Politics Department at the University of Maryland. “Reputations and Deterrence: a Theoretical and Empirical Assessment,” Security Studies 7.1.

THE NUMBER of studies which have either focused on reputations as an explanatory variable, or treated reputations as one of several causal variables in tests of deterrence theory, is limited. These studies have employed both comparative case-study methods as well as statistical analyses of larger datasets, and the predominant focus has been on reputations for resolve as opposed to reputations for military strength. 20 A number of conclusions can be drawn from these studies: 1) Lack of Support for Schelling. There is weak support for the strong interdependence-of-commitments argument that potential attackers infer reputations for defender states based on the latter's prior behavior in disputes with other states across a broad range of geographic locations. Huth and Russett in their statistical analysis of fifty-four cases of extended deterrence from 1900 to 1980, found that the past behavior of the defender in disputes with other states had no significant impact on deterrence outcomes. 21 Mercer, in his analysis of the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 as well as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908—9 did not find a clear or consistent pattern of European leaders inferring reputations from previous crisis outcomes. 22 Ted Hopf, in his study of U.S. foreign policy victories and defeats in the Third World from 1965 to 1990, concluded that Soviet assessments of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrent commitments in Europe and Asia were essentially unaffected by U.S. behavior in the Third World.

#### Syria thumps the link- Obama gave concessions to a rogue regime that he had previously took a stance against

**Obama’s appeasing cuba**

**Diaz-Balart ‘12** (Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart represents the 21st congressional district in South Florida; August 21, 2012; “Mario Diaz-Balart: Obama has Pursued Policy Appeasement”; Fox News Latino; http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/08/21/mario-diaz-balart-obama-has-pursued-policy-appeasement-toward-castro-regime/)

These compliments – and the fact that they were not disavowed by the White House – come as no surprise, given President Obama’s appeasing stance regarding anti-American totalitarian regimes. Since he took office in January 2009, President Obama has pursued a policy of appeasement toward the totalitarian Cuban dictatorship. Despite the Castro brothers’ harboring of international terrorists and their increasingly relentless oppression of the Cuban people, President Obama weakened U.S. sanctions and has increased the flow of dollars to the dictatorship. In response, the Castro brothers amped up their repression of the Cuban people and imprisoned American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross for the “crime” of taking humanitarian aide to Cuba’s small Jewish community. Clearly, President Obama is not concerned about the threat posed by the Cuban dictatorship, nor has he manifested genuine solidarity with the pro-democracy aspirations of the Cuban people. - U.S. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. The Cuban people are protesting in the streets and demanding freedom. But rather than supporting the growing, courageous pro-democracy movement, President Obama instead has chosen to appease their oppressors. While President Obama claims that his policies aim to assist the oppressed Cuban people, his actions betray that he is not on their side. You cannot credibly claim to care about the oppressed while working out side deals with their oppressors and welcoming the oppressors’ elite into the United States with open arms. And you cannot claim to support political prisoners while increasing the flow of dollars to their jailers. The failures of the Obama administration in Cuba are not an isolated foreign policy failure. Around the world, President Obama has taken an approach of appeasement when it comes to some of our most virulent enemies. In addition to Cuba, from Iran to Syria to Venezuela, President Obama has shown an unwillingness to stand firm when anti-American forces threaten our interests, and his weakness has emboldened America’s enemies. If we are going to reassert our position in the world, we need a change at the top.

#### Appeasement is better- the plan convinces rogue regimes to negotiate by showing the US is willing to follow through- that’s Hinderdael and Dickerson

#### No link- the plan bolsters United States anti-communist cred

Safran 2012 -Master of Science in Global Affairs (with distinction) at New York University

(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, <http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran>, google scholar)//KW

The continuance of the embargo has incited widespread international condemnation of the Untied States. The United Nations General Assembly has consistently denounced the imposition of the embargo almost unanimously on the basis of its illegitimacy and violation of internationally accepted humanitarian standards. (Herrera, 2003, 50) The United States has also recently had to relinquish its seats on the human rights commissions both in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States, which many analysts believe to be a form of retribution aimed at the United States in response to its continuation of the Cuban embargo in the midst of its unfathomable and deplorable effects on the Cuban populace. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Many leaders in the international community have expressed their distain for the U.S. embargo through international organizations based on the fact that the United States attempts to impose the sanctions it places on Cuba via “extraterritoriality,” or against the international community, thus clearly violating internationally-accepted standards of national sovereignty and international law (Herrera, 2003, 51). Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.

#### No retaliation and airgapping checks

**Bailey 11 –** [Ronald is Reason's science correspondent. “Cyberwar Is Harder Than It Looks: Internet vulnerability to attacks exaggerated, says new report.” 1/18/2011, <http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/18/cyberwar-is-harder-than-it>]

Brown and Sommer conclude, “It is **unlikely** that there will ever be a true cyberwar.” By cyberwar, they mean one fought solely over and with information technologies. Why? Because it takes a lot of effort to figure out new vulnerabilities in already protected critical systems and the effects of an attack are difficult to predict, including blowback on the perpetrators. More importantly, they note, “There is no strategic reason why an aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.” In a real war, cyberattacks would be an adjunct to conventional efforts to blow up critical infrastructure. Because attacks can be launched from any set of computers, attackers can remain hidden. Consequently, a strategy of deterrence will not work in cyberwarfare because the target for retaliation is unknown. This means that **resilience** is the **main defense** against cyberweapons, a combination of preventive measures and contingency plans for a quick post-attack recovery. If cyberwarfare against infrastructure was easy, terrorists like Al Qaeda would have already tried the tactic against us and our NATO allies. Brown and Sommer observe that the Internet and the physical telecommunications infrastructure were designed to be robust and self-healing, so that failures in one part are routed around. “You have to be cautious when hearing from people engaging in fear-mongering about huge blackouts and collapses of critical infrastructures via the Internet,” says University of Toronto cyberwarfare expert Ronald Deibert in the January/February 2011 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “There is a lot of **redundancy** in the networks; it’s not a simple thing to turn off the power grid.” In addition, our experience with current forms of malware is somewhat reassuring. Responses to new malware have generally been found and made available within days and few denial of service attacks have lasted more than a day. In addition, many critical networks such as those carrying financial transactions are not connected to the Internet requiring insider information to make them vulnerable. While not everyone uses up-to-date malware detection, most government agencies, major businesses, and many individuals do, which means that would-be attackers must take the time and effort to find new flaws and develop new techniques. For example, the success of the Stuxnet worm that attacked and disabled Iranian nuclear centrifuges required very extensive intelligence gathering and knowledge of specific software flaws as well as someone able to walk into the facilities with an infected USB drive. Brown and Sommers urge governments to ratify the CyberCrime Convention. The chief treaty holdouts are Russia and China, countries from which many recent cyberattacks appear to have originated. “We should not forget that many of the countries that are havens for cybercrime have invested billions in domestic communications monitoring to supplement an already extensive set of police tools for political control,” notes James Lewis. “The notion that a cybercriminal in one of these countries operates without the knowledge and thus tacit consent of the government is difficult to accept. A hacker who turned his sights from Tallinn to the Kremlin would have only hours before his service were cut off, his door was smashed down and his computer confiscated.” Another fruitful way to address emerging cyber threats suggested by the authors is to strengthen connections between national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). CERT experts operate as a kind of early warning system who also devise software fixes to stop the spread of new malware. And they think that public policy, including procurement, can be used to encourage the development of properly tested hardware and software. While blowing up the Internet probably won't happen, espionage, hacking, and malware will be with us always. Whatever we do to defend against them, will also defend against the threat of cyberwarfare

### 2ac – china soi

#### US influence resilient- they don’t assume structural factors that guarantee cooperation

**Ben-Ami, 13**– former Israeli foreign minister, Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace (Shlomo, “Is the US losing Latin America?”, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami>, NG)

Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America’s broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century.

A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis.

The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US’s fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is America’s second-largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors.

This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy – one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran’s nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama’s recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show.

Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Piñera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.

Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran.

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### Zero internal link- Latin America isn’t key to global Chinese soft power

#### Cuba isn’t zero sum– aff bolsters cooperation

**Hearn 9** –research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Sydney, (Adrian, “Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States”, <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf>, NG)

For the United States, the value added by the above process lies in its promotion of trilateral cooperation. Both China and the United States favor more open markets in Cuba, and considering the attempts of Chinese enterprises to build Cuba’s export capacities and develop its transport, manufacturing, and resource sectors, the United States is a logical source of management services and marketing expertise. Building on existing U.S. activities in agriculture, medicine, and telecommunications, expansion into these sectors would bring both economic benefits for U.S. firms and opportunities for harmonizing approaches to governance and information sharing. Indeed, the Obama administration’s relatively conciliatory stance toward Cuba could lay the foundation of a much-needed “mutually reinforcing diplomacy” with China in the region (Wilder 2009:4). A defining challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century will be the development of mutually beneficial partnerships with China. With sensible diplomacy, Chinese projects in Latin America could become a source of deeper cooperation, for as Daniel Erikson concisely put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “trade is not a zero sum game” (2008:3). Hu Jintao’s proposal at the 2009 G-20 to jointly develop financial monitoring mechanisms reflects China’s desire for cooperative relations with the United States. With legal authorization, Cuba could become a platform for advancing responsibly governed trilateral projects that demonstrate awareness of regional diversity and a commitment to international cooperation. Accommodating diversity is critical to effective diplomacy, for although Confucius may have stated, “have no friends not equal to yourself”, in his pragmatic wisdom he also taught his followers to be “firm in the right way, and not merely firm.

#### Case turns the disad- chinese soft power causes asian war, that’s Kugler- only the plan brings them safely into the international system that’s Fujimoto

### 2ac – china econ

#### No internal link- their 1nc evidence just says that Latin America has exports to China, and makes no connection to the overall Chinese economy

#### No impact to the Chinese economy and the response measures check

**Coonan, 08** (10/25, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, “China's stalling boom has globe worried,” http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html)

All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however, writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's €1.43 trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn*.* The currency is stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's influence has been somewhat oversold*.* It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States with a muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.

#### Turn- chinese growth causes military adventurism

Copley News Service, **‘5** “Daily Editorials Bombs and Butter” 7/25/05 Lexis [KSutt]

As China gains economic clout, its government's brand of touchy, saber-rattling nationalism becomes more worrisome. That touchiness is rooted in the memory of humiliation inflicted by foreigners, from the Western colonial concessions of the 19th century, and it is rooted in the more recent memory of Japanese atrocities during the World War II occupation.

That wounded pride explains the orchestrated national spleen-venting over Japanese textbooks, the 2001 U.S. spy plane collision and the mistaken U.S. bombing of China's embassy during the Kosovo campaign. It has much to do with China's oft-repeated threats to attack Taiwan, which seem extreme to everyone except the Chinese.

As China gains power, that nationalism becomes more worrisome. China's authoritarian government lacks the natural restraint of voters or of dissenters free to challenge government assumptions that can lead to war.

The Pentagon recently reported that China is rapidly building its military with a goal of extending its influence across Asia. In the future, its leaders "may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests or resolve disputes," the report concluded. If more muscle combined with nationalist passions tempt Chinese leaders to attack Taiwan, the United States and the world would be faced with a crisis more serious than any since at least the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union. The United States would feel compelled to come to Taiwan's aid, resulting in a war between heavily armed countries that possess nuclear arsenals.

### 2ac – senkaku

#### Chinese influence in Mexico will spur Senkaku conflict

**Gertz 13** -Bill Gertz is an American editor, columnist and reporter for The Washington Time, (“HOMENEWSSECURITYRADIOLOG INE-MAIL ALERTSSUBSCRIBECLASSIFIEDSE-EDITION

Rising Red tide: China encircles U.S. by sailing warships in American waters, arming neighbors”, June 7, 2013, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/7/china-encircles-us-arming-western-hemisphere-state/?page=all)//sawyer>

A joint Mexico-China statement said Mexico pledged not to interfere in China’s affairs on Taiwan and Tibet, a reference to the previous government of Mexican President Felipe Calderon who in 2011 invited exiled Tibetan leader the Dalia Lama, a move that angered Beijing. U.S. officials say there are **concerns that the pro-Beijing shift by the current government of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto**, who visited China in April, will be exploited by China for such political goals, and could be used to generate support for China’s claims to Japan’s Senkaku Islands. U.S. officials said there are growing fears that [some type of military confrontation](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/7/china-helps-anti-piracy-effort-it-harries-japans-c/) could break out between China and Japan over the disputed islands that are said to contain large underwater gas and oil reserves.

#### great power war

**Richardson 13** - Michael is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, February 5, 2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/02/05/commentary/no-winners-in-a-conflict-over-the-senkaku-islands/#.UdsbTPlvOQg)//sawyer>

The answer should be a resounding “no.” Such a war, with no guarantees that it could be contained, would have unpredictable but potentially catastrophic consequences. The major protagonists in these disputes — the U.S., China and Japan — are respectively the world’s three largest economies, with a strong mutual interest in maintaining peace to boost their trade, growth, investment and jobs. The other economies in Northeast and Southeast Asia are closely tied to those of the major players. They would also suffer badly from military conflict, even if it was confined to the region. The shock to business confidence in Asia, a driver of recovery in the still-fragile global economy, would be shattering. In the South China Sea, where Beijing’s territorial claims are most extensive, an increasingly assertive and militarily powerful China is challenging the right of other nations to occupy atolls and reefs it claims. The rival claimants include U.S. ally the Philippines, as well as Vietnam and Malaysia. Beijing is also seeking to enforce controls on fishing in the South China Sea, and bans on developing energy and mineral resources in the waters, seabed and subsoil it claims, unless they are done with Chinese approval. But it is in the East China Sea that maritime tensions are currently most acute. There, U.S. ally Japan is trying to fend off a **Chinese challenge to its administrative control of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands**, which lie about midway between Taiwan and Okinawa in southern Japan, where the U.S. has important military bases. Both sides have recently scrambled jet fighters and confronted each other’s patrol boats in waters surrounding the islands. The commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Adm. Cecil D. Haney, warned recently that conflicting sovereignty claims in the East and South China seas, which inflame nationalism, are especially troublesome “friction points” and can be “ripe for miscalculation.” With the Asia-Pacific area anxious about a clash — either accidental or intentional — Japan, encouraged by the U.S., has made some diplomatic efforts to ease tensions with China. It sent an envoy to Beijing and proposed a summit or high-level talks. However, in calling for calm, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that there was “no room for negotiations” over the sovereignty of the Senkakus, something Beijing insists must take place with Tokyo. Both sides appear to be staking out their vital or “core” national interests, while building their military strength. China will “never give up” its core territorial and security interests, said Xi Jinping on Jan. 28 in his first formal presentation of foreign policy since taking over as leader of both the ruling Chinese Communist Party and the armed forces in November. A summary of his speech was published in state media. He seemed to take a noticeably tougher approach than his predecessor Hu Jintao. In an evident reference to rival claimants in East and South China seas, Xi said that “no country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harming our sovereignty, security or development interests.” He said that China would “stick to the road of peaceful development but never give up our legitimate rights and never sacrifice our national core interests.” How will China’s new military and political leadership reconcile these two seemingly contradictory positions: advancing peaceful development while maintaining rigid adherence to sweeping maritime claims that are either opposed or not recognized by virtually all of China’s Asian neighbors? It depends how China defines national core interests that **must be defended at all costs, even by the threat or use of force**. So far, these interests have been linked to quelling independence movements in Tibet and the far western region of Xinjiang, and eventually bringing Taiwan under China’s rule. But China regards the Senkakus as part of Taiwan and is increasingly acting as though its claimed sovereignty over the islands is a core interest. Those member states of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, that are wary of China’s push into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia fear Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea will have similar core-interest status. In such a fraught atmosphere, the U.S. must strike the right balance between deterring and engaging China. As Beijing’s policy hardens, this is an increasingly difficult balance to maintain. **The U.S. has an impressive array of naval, air and marine forces ready to defend Japan should Tokyo request assistance in the event of an armed conflict with China over the Senkakus.** Whether, where, and under what circumstances, the U.S. would actually use them against China is still shrouded in strategic ambiguity. However, in one of her last major official meetings, on Jan. 18, before stepping down as U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton assured Japan’s visiting Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida that “although the United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the (Senkaku) islands, we acknowledge they are under the administration of Japan and we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration.” She added that the U.S. urged “all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means.” The leaders of Japan and the U.S. are to hold a summit meeting in Washington later this month. Preventing a military conflict with China will be high on the agenda. Should the unthinkable occur and a military clash erupts with China as the U.S. and Japan struggle with weak economies and uncertain domestic politics, the two allies will need a plan for effective response. Without it, the U.S. alliance system in Asia and the Pacific will be shown to be nothing more than a “paper tiger” and hopes of finding ways to counterbalance China’s assertive rise and preserve peace will be illusory.

### 2ac counterplan

#### Condo is a voting issue –

#### a) Skew – condo allows them to arbitrarily kick arguments destroying effective 2ac strategy

#### b) Decision-making – the need to concede is an important skill to understand arg interaction – allowing them to arbitrarily kick positions prevents this skill

#### c) C/I – One condo allows them to pick their best offense before the round and is reciprocal

#### d) Reject the team to deter abuse and rejecting the arg links to all our offense

#### Framework – the k must prove that the whole plan is bad – weighing the AFF is vital to fair and predictable engagement – allowing the neg to negate only small parts doesn’t disprove the desirability of the plan – the ballot should simulate the plans enactment and test whether it’s better than the status quo or competitive alternative

#### Alt causes oppression and won’t solve- Non-State Cuban resistance deflects attention and boosts structural violence

**Powell 08** – Kathy Powell. Lecturer, PhD Social Anthroplogy – National University of Ireland, Galway. Critique of Anthropology – Vol 28(2) p. 177–197 – Sage Database

The unequivocal ‘the people against the state’ discourses are characterized by a certain overstatement (as in the comments about the cows);again, here the state is homogenized and presented as a totalizing force, and qualifying counter-arguments dismissed, along with the importance of the broader political context. The responsibility for Cuba’s current ills is laid squarely at the door of the state, or of President Castro, while complaints about scarcity and the declining value of state rations reflect an outraged sense of entitlement, indicating the high expectations people have had of the allocative power of the state in the past. They are also, however, somewhat ‘overstated’ as well as contradictoryin regard to street solidarity; the same persons can one day extol its virtues,and the next, with equal conviction, describe street relations as a minefield of mistrust, envidia and self-interest. This uneasy coexistence of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sentiments (see also Fernández, 2000) serves as a reminder that while the ability to ‘invent’ and to ‘resolve’ during the crisis **in Cuba** has certainly been remarkable, the celebration of inventiveness and of resilience needs to be accompanied by some caution.In particular, caution is needed to avoid the misrecognized celebration of ‘the poor generating their own resources’ which characterizes some of the ‘social networks’ approaches to analysing the survival strategies of poorcommunities,17 and which is also redolent of recent enthusiasm for Putnamesque interpretations of ‘social capital’18 as both attribute and outcome of community relations and practices, promoted as central tocommunity development. This places much of the responsibility for development on poor communities themselves, and is particularly likely to do so when valorized as a ‘cultural characteristic’ of cubanidad – as indeed many ordinary Cubans do themselves. These approaches risk overlooking a number of things: first, that efforts to ‘invent’ solutions and resolve problems through informal networks **remain firmly constrained** by the structure, distribution andquality of resources available (see Menjívar, 2000), and that a focus on the poor ‘solving problems on their own’ **may deflect attention** from what people actually need and that they do not have (Bryceson, 2000). It overlooksthe fact that, although informality may present day-to-day solutions, **it remains a problem**; as Centeno points out, however functional it may bein the provision of a ‘safety net’, informality guarantees the reproduction of inequalities and an unprotected workforce who, despite their ‘successes’in evading state control, remain politically disempowered.19 Moreover, of particular significance to the value and practice of solidarity, celebrations of the capacity to invent ar, resolver, luchar overlook the **immense strain** on the very relations which underpin this economy of practices. Tales of thisstrain coexist uneasily alongside tales of the state and of street solidarity.The street economy needs solidarity to function; it depends on relations oftrust, complicity, cooperation and social obligations of reciprocity for theex change of information, favours, swapping and lending of materials, equipment and money, support in the ‘diversion’ of state resources and inthe evasion of state surveillance; it generates sentiments of solidarity‘against the odds’ of the mundane, exhausting difficulties of day-to-daysocial reproduction.

#### No internal link- the plan is a drop in the bucket compared to 200 years of neoliberalism in Latin America

#### Neoliberalism is inevitable and sustainable

**Peck 2**—Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia. Former Honourary Professorial Fellow, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. PhD in Geography. AND—Adam Tickell—Professor of Geography, University of Bristol. PhD (Jamie, Neoliberalizing space, Antipode 34 (3): 380-404, AMiles)

In many respects, it would be tempting to conclude with a Ideological reading of neoliberalism, as if it were somehow locked on a course of increasing vulnerability to crisis. Yet this would be both politically complacent and theoretically erroneous. One of the most striking features of the recent history of neoliberalism is its quite remarkable transformative capacity. To a greater extent than many would have predicted, including ourselves, neoliberalism has demonstrated an ability to absorb or displace crisis tendencies, to ride—and capitalize upon—the very economic cycles and localized policy failures that it was complicit in creating, and to erode the foundations upon which generalized or extralocal resistance might be constructed. The transformative potential—and consequent political durability—of neoliberalism has been repeatedly underestimated, and reports of its death correspondingly exaggerated. Although antiglobalization protests have clearly disrupted the functioning of "business as usual" for some sections of the neoliberal elite, the underlying power structures of neoliberalism remain substantially intact. What remains to be seen is how far these acts of resistance, asymmetrical though the power relations clearly are, serve to expose the true character of neoliberalism as a political project. In its own explicit politicization, then, the resistance movement may have the capacity to hold a mirror to the process

#### Primacy fills in for powerless institutions—key to solve genocide and mass violence globally

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 51-52, WEA)

The United States possesses the military and economic means to act assertively on a global basis, but should it do so, and if so, how? In short, if the United States conducts itself in this way, will the world be safer and more stable, and is such a role in America’s national interest? Here, the anarchy problem is especially pertinent. The capacity of the United Nations to act, especially in coping with the most urgent and deadly problems, is severely limited, and in this sense, the demand for “global governance” far exceeds the supply. Since its inception in 1945, there have only been two occasions (Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1991) when the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force, and in both instances the bulk of the forces were provided by the United States. In the most serious cases, especially those involving international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic cleansing, civil war, and mass murder, if America does not take the lead, no other country or organization is willing or able to respond effectively. The deadly cases of Bosnia (1991–95) and Rwanda (1994) make this clear. In their own way, so did the demonstrations by the people of Liberia calling for American intervention to save them from the ravages of predatory militias in a failed state. And the weakness of the international reaction to ethnic cleansing, rape, and widespread killing in the Darfur region of Western Sudan provides a more recent example.

### 2ac – generic

#### Filibuster reform came in like a wrecking ball- nothing’s going to pass

**Berger, 11/22/13** (Judson, “Filibuster Fallout: Reid maneuver could send ‘wrecking ball’ through talks on key legislation” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/11/22/filibuster-fallout-reid-maneuver-could-send-wrecking-ball-through-talks-on-key/>)

Democrats who claimed victory -- including President Obama -- in stripping the Senate minority of its power to block nominations may have done so at the sacrifice of the president's legislative agenda.

Before Thursday, trust on Capitol Hill was frayed yet there was tentative hope following the bruising fight over the partial shutdown that Republicans and Democrats could find some spectrum of common ground for the rest of Obama's term. Maybe pass a few budgets, maybe do something lasting about that pesky deficit.

But the move to use a rare parliamentary tactic and overhaul Senate procedure making it easier for the majority party to approve presidential nominees has poisoned an already tainted well. Any prospect for compromise on big-ticket items ranging from immigration legislation to a fiscal deal to tax reform is now that much fainter.

"There's no question that the move by Harry Reid will make it much tougher to get anything done between now and 2014," GOP strategist and former long-time Senate aide John Ullyot told FoxNews.com.

"In the short-term, it's a wrecking ball through any efforts that were underway previously to have both parties work together on key bills."

Because of the rule change, non-Supreme Court judicial nominees and executive-office nominees can now be approved with just 51 votes, as opposed to 60.

In the first test of Senate relations following the filibuster change, Republicans united to block a critical defense policy bill. The bill failed in a vote late Thursday, nine votes short of the number needed to advance.

#### Don’t evaluate the disad- it’s not a logical opportunity cost

#### Health care wrecked Obama’s capital and the rest of his agenda is finished – he’s losing now

**Shear, 11/14/13** (Michael, “Health Law Rollout’s Stumbles Draw Parallels to Bush’s Hurricane Response” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/us/politics/parallels-to-bush-in-toxic-political-mix-threatening-obama.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0>)

WASHINGTON — Barack Obama won the presidency by exploiting a political environment that devoured George W. Bush in a second term plagued by sinking credibility, failed legislative battles, fractured world relations and revolts inside his own party.

President Obama is now threatened by a similar toxic mix. The disastrous rollout of his health care law not only threatens the rest of his agenda but also raises questions about his competence in the same way that the Bush administration’s botched response to Hurricane Katrina undermined any semblance of Republican efficiency.

But unlike Mr. Bush, who faced confrontational but occasionally cooperative Democrats, Mr. Obama is battling a Republican opposition that has refused to open the door to any legislative fixes to the health care law and has blocked him at virtually every turn. A contrite-sounding Mr. Obama repeatedly blamed himself on Thursday for the failed health care rollout, which he acknowledged had thrust difficult burdens on his political allies and hurt Americans’ trust in him.

“It’s legitimate for them to expect me to have to win back some credibility on this health care law in particular and on a whole range of these issues in general,” Mr. Obama said. The president did not admit to misleading people about whether they could keep their insurance, but again expressed regret that his assurances turned out to be wrong.

“To those Americans, I hear you loud and clear,” Mr. Obama said as he announced changes intended to allow some people to keep their insurance.

But earning back the confidence of Americans, as he pledged to do, will require Mr. Obama to right more than just the health care law. At home, his immigration overhaul is headed for indefinite delay, and new budget and debt fights loom. Overseas, revelations of spying by the National Security Agency have infuriated American allies, and negotiations over Iran’s nuclear arsenal have set off bipartisan criticism.

For the first time in Mr. Obama’s presidency, surveys suggest that his reserve of good will among the public is running dry. Two polls in recent weeks have reported that a majority of Americans no longer trust the president or believe that he is being honest with them.

“When you start losing the trust and confidence, not only of Congress, but the American people, that makes it even more difficult,” said Senator Joe Manchin III, Democrat of West Virginia. “You can work yourself out. But you have to be sincere, and you have to be honest.”

The difficulties have put Mr. Obama on the defensive at exactly the moment he might have seized political advantage in a dysfunctional Washington. If not for the health care disaster, the two-week shutdown of the government last month would have been an opportunity for Mr. Obama to sharpen the contrast with Republicans. Democratic lawmakers expressed growing frustration on Thursday with the opportunities the party had missed to hammer home the ideological differences between the two parties. The lawmakers say there is intensifying anxiety within the Democratic caucus that the poor execution of the health care law could bleed into their 2014 re-election campaigns.

Republicans readily made the Hurricane Katrina comparison. “The echoes to the fall of 2005 are really eerie,” said Peter D. Feaver, a top national security official in Mr. Bush’s second term. “Katrina, which is shorthand for bungled administration policy, matches to the rollout of the website.” Looking back, he said, “we can see that some of the things that we hoped were temporary or just blips turned out to be more systemic from a political sense. It’s a fair question of whether that’s happening to President Obama.”

The president’s top aides vehemently reject the comparison of Mr. Obama’s fifth year in office to the latter half of Mr. Bush’s second term. They say Americans lost confidence in Mr. Bush because of his administration’s ineptitude on Hurricane Katrina and its execution of the war in Iraq, while Mr. Obama is struggling to extend health care to millions of people who do not have it. Those are very different issues, they said.

“I’m always very leery of these apocalyptic predictions,” said David Axelrod, a former senior adviser to Mr. Obama.

Senior White House officials are nonetheless in crisis mode over the failure so far of what was supposed to be the president’s most significant legislative achievement. “We get that it is a big deal for him, for the law, for the Democrats who voted for him,” said Jennifer Palmieri, the White House communications director. “We are taking it deathly seriously.”

#### Obama doesn’t push the plan

**Fiedler, 13–** WLS web writer (Christine, “Bobby Rush pushes for better trade relations with Cuba”, <http://www.wlsam.com/common/page.php?pt=Bobby+Rush+pushes+for+better+trade+relations+with+Cuba&id=37263&is_corp=0>, NG)

Congressman Bobby Rush is trying to lift trade restrictions on Cuba. He reintroduced legislation to lift the embargo, travel, and parcel restrictions, normalize trade relations, and it would take Cuba off of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Rush says the U.S. has "shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance" and that "Cuba is no longer a threat" to the U.S.

His bill also asks for the release of Alan Phillip Gross. Gross was working as a U.S. government contractor when he was arrested and prosecuted in 2011 for bringing phones and computer equipment to Cuba's Jewish community without a permit. He is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba.

Improving U.S.-Cuba relations has been a goal of Rush; this follows his United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act in 2009.

#### **Oil lobby pushes the plan**

Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW

ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. 35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes.3126 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures. 37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply."38

This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates.39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation. 41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." 42

THE BP DISASTER ADDS TO CONCERNS Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing environmental concerns about Cuba's drilling plans.43 These concerns are undoubtedly more poignant in the wake of British Petroleum's ("BP") historically tragic Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 44 Currently, there is no agreement between the United States and Cuba to deal with oil spills. 45 The embargo would prevent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S. companies to aid any cleanup efforts. 46 In addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies designed to prevent or contain oil spills from being sold to Cuba.47 David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington Ocean Foundation punctuated the United States' concerns over the potential impacts of Cuba's drilling by remarking that "the Gulf isn't going to respect any boundaries when it comes to oil spills." 48 This statement was recently exemplified by Cuba's own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach its shores. 49 The Deep Horizon oil spill's threat was enough that several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba's own plan to extract oil off its shores.50 Nonetheless, Cuba's oil exploration plans seem unfazed.5'

#### Winners win

**Milbank, 10/18/13** – Washington Post Opinion Writer (Dana, “Now, lead from the front” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-now-lead-from-the-front/2013/10/18/56c1fd42-37fe-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html>)

Obama got out in front of the shutdown and debt-ceiling standoff. He took a firm position — no negotiating — and he made his case to the country vigorously and repeatedly. Republicans miscalculated, assuming he would again give in. The result was the sort of decisive victory rarely seen in Washington skirmishes.

On Wednesday, Republicans surrendered. They opened the government and extended the debt limit with virtually no conditions. On Thursday, Obama rubbed their noses in it.

“You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position. Go out there and win an election,” Obama taunted from the State Dining Room. “Push to change it, but don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building.”

Obama said “there are no winners” after the two-week standoff, but his opponents, particularly his tea party foes, clearly lost the most; seven in 10 Americans thought Republicans put party ahead of country. These “extremes” who “don’t like the word ‘compromise’ ” were the obvious target of Obama’s demand that we all “stop focusing on the lobbyists and the bloggers and the talking heads on radio and the professional activists who profit from conflict.” (He did not mention newspaper columnists, so you are free to continue reading.)

The gloating was a bit unseemly, but the president is entitled to savor a victory lap. The more important thing is that Obama now maintain the forceful leadership that won him the budget and debt fights. In that sense, the rest of Obama’s speech had some worrisome indications that he was returning to his familiar position in the rear.

The agreement ending the shutdown requires Congress to come up with a budget by Dec. 13 . It’s a chance — perhaps Obama’s last chance — to tackle big issues such as tax reform and restructuring Medicare. The relative strength he gained over congressional Republicans during the shutdown left him in a dominant negotiating position. If he doesn’t use his power now to push through more of his agenda, he’ll lose his advantage. George W. Bush adviser Karl Rove called it the “perishability” of political capital.

But instead of being forceful, Obama was vague. He spoke abstractly about “the long-term obligations that we have around things like Medicare and Social Security.” He was similarly elliptical in saying he wants “a budget that cuts out the things that we don’t need, closes corporate tax loopholes that don’t help create jobs, and frees up resources for the things that do help us grow, like education and infrastructure and research.”

Laudable ideas all — but timidity and ambiguity in the past have not worked for Obama. The way to break down a wall of Republican opposition is to do what he did the past two weeks: stake out a clear position and stick to it. A plan for a tax-code overhaul? A Democratic solution to Medicare’s woes? As in the budget and debt fights, the policy is less important than the president’s ability to frame a simple message and repeat it with mind-numbing regularity.

If there’s going to be a big budget deal, the president eventually will have to compromise, perhaps even allowing some changes to his beloved Obamacare, which he didn’t mention while on his victory lap Thursday. Even then, forceful leadership may not be enough to prevail.

But he has a much better chance if he remains out in front. Otherwise, he’ll soon be knocked back on his behind.

#### Low approval ratings wreck PC

**Sullivan, 11/13/13** – political blogger for the Washington Post (Sean, “In Obama we trust? Americans don’t see it that way anymore — in two charts” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/11/13/in-obama-we-trust-americans-dont-see-it-that-way-anymore-in-two-charts/>

New polling data released this week show that one of Obama’s long-held political assets is looking more like a liability these days. Americans’ trust in the president has eroded to record low levels amid a torrent of criticism about the rollout of the federal health-care law, including the revelation that his long-standing refrain that all Americans can keep their health plans if they want isn’t accurate.

Two charts tell the story.

The first is from Gallup, which found Americans are now split over whether the label “is honest and trustworthy” applies to Obama or not. Fifty percent say it does, while 47 percent say it doesn’t.

It wasn’t always this way. Throughout most of his presidency, Obama had no trust problem to speak of. In fact, for much of his first term, Obama had a surplus of trust. From 2009-2012, the percentage of Americans saying “honest and trustworthy” applied to Obama hovered around 60 percent. The dissenters, meanwhile, mostly stayed below 40 percent.

The Gallup findings are mirrored by a new Quinnipiac University poll that shows by 52-44 percent margin, voters say Obama is not honest and trustworthy. The poll also shows Obama declining along another key metric: job approval rating. He’s reached a record low 39 percent/54 percent approve/disapprove split.

During his first term, the level of trust in Obama outpaced his approval rating on average by a much wider margin than it has this year, according to Quinnipiac’s polls. Gallup’s trend, meanwhile, shows that Obama’s trust has continued to outpace his approval rating by double-digits. Below is a chart that tracks how Obama’s trust numbers have stacked up against his approval rating dating back to 2009.

The latest numbers come on the heels of Obama apologizing to Americans who are losing their health insurance plans as Obamacare is implemented despite his assurances they would not have to give them up. It also comes as the health-care law’s rollout continues to be plagued by technical problems related to HealthCare.gov.

But health-care doesn’t appear to be to sole cause of the dip in trust for the president. The percentage of Americans who told Gallup “honest and trustworthy” doesn’t apply to Obama climbed to 44 percent in June, as the president dealt with revelations about the broad scope of government surveillance programs. And even before that time, trust in him was already starting to fade.

Generally speaking, presidents have experienced a drop in popularity in modern era. So Obama’s declining numbers may also be symptomatic of a broader and expected decline in the way the public perceives him overall.

Still, it’s striking that yet another of Obama’s former strengths is not anywhere near what is used to be. His personal likability — once a reliably buoyant – has also taken a hit in recent months.

If Obama’s decline continues, there will be little incentive for the president’s allies to come to his defense on various policy fronts. And heading into the 2014 midterm elections, he will be handing fodder to Republicans eager to tie vulnerable Democrats to him as a campaign tactic.

Obama may have run his last campaign, but there is still a lot riding for his agenda on the way he is perceived. And right now, the way he is perceived isn’t good.

#### PC fails

Dickinson 9 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, 5/26, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” [http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/](http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/21/keeping_libya_in_context))

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

### 2ac – iran prolif

#### Sanctions increase Iranian prolif and no impact

**Waltz, 12–** Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-get-the-bomb>, NG)

The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms.

It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.

POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED

The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent.

The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice.

Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard-liners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended.

The United States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.

The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less.

Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge.

Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.

UNFOUNDED FEARS

One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise.

Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear.

Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.

Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold.

As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed.

Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now.

REST ASSURED

In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today.