### 2ac – restitutions cp

#### Condo is a voting issue –

#### a) Skew – condo allows them to arbitrarily kick arguments destroying effective 2ac strategy

#### b) Decision-making – the need to concede is an important skill to understand arg interaction – allowing them to arbitrarily kick positions prevents this skill

#### c) C/I – One condo allows them to pick their best offense before the round and is reciprocal

#### d) Reject the team to deter abuse and rejecting the arg links to all our offense

#### Cuba says no – their author

**(also the subtext of this author’s conclusion is “I was too lazy to address these big issues in my big hypothetical essay and here is my excuse for it”)**

**Mowry 1999** – neg author (David, Law Student at Brooklyn Law School; “Note: Lifting The Embargo Against Cuba Using Vietnam As A Model: A Policy Paper For Modernity”; Brooklyn Journal of International Law; 25 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 229; Lexis; JRS)

IX. Conclusion Admittedly, the resolution presented above takes a simplistic view of the diplomatic and political processes necessary before the steps to lifting the Cuban embargo are taken by either nation. There is no discussion of the anti-Castro lobby in the United States and the ramifications faced by politicians who appear to support the normalization of relations with Cuba. There also is not a discussion of Castro's repeated statements regarding his refusals to "deal" with the United States. The reason for censoring the debate in this way is not to water down issues that are politically important to both sides, but rather to present an argument in the context of hindsight, looking at the relations between the United States and Vietnam without the seemingly requisite accompanying political rhetoric.

#### Conditions counterplans are a voting issue- justifies perm do the counterplan

#### a- Annihilates aff ground— they result in doing 100% of the plan—which ruins the debate and biases it towards the neg because it forces us to generate offense against an external mechanism instead of reading defenses of the plan. They get to chose what to condition on where the literature is on their side which destroys predictability.

#### b- Kills education- conditions gives negatives an incentive to avoid topic research because they can always just change the process of the plan—learning the depth of a specific policy and rigorous examination of the literature instead of generic conditions debates is critical to better policy advocacy skills and every other benefit to debate.

#### **Doesn’t solve gradualism or ag- crushes cuba’s economy**

**Peñalver 2006** (Eduardo M., visiting law prof at Yale, JD Yale, MA Oxford, BA Cornell; Dec. 9, 2006; “Cuban Property Claims”; <http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2006/12/cuban_property_.html>; JRS)

I participated in a conference yesterday at Yale on the political future of Cuba. Panels covered the situation in Cuba today as well as the likely future of US policy towards Cuba after Castro's death. I spoke on the property disputes that might surface in a transitional Cuban society and the possible responses of a post-Castro government.

About 6000 people who were US citizens at the time of Castro's ascension to power in 1959 have registered claims with the U.S. government for property they lost during the first years of the Cuban revolution. Their claims have an estimated value of $8 billion. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of Cubans who lost property under the Castro government. Large agricultural land-owners had their properties nationalized under a series of agrarian reforms. Landlords lost property occupied by tenants, who were given the right to purchase the properties at low, fixed prices. Mortgages were canceled. And anyone who fled the island had their property confiscated and redistributed. By the end of 1968, virtually all private enterprise on the island had been confiscated, including 57,000 small and medium-sized, and mostly Cuban-owned, businesses. Estimates of the possible property claims by Cuban-Americans range from $25 billion up to nearly $100 billion, although the latter figure strikes me as wildly inflated (it's several times larger than the Cuban GDP).

#### Perm: do both

#### Doesn’t solve multilat

**Solis 1997** Anthony M., J.D. candidate, Loyola Law School, 1998; M.A., Int’l Affairs, American U, Washington, D.C.; B.A., UCLA; “The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act”; Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review; 4-1-1997; 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 709; 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 709; <http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1426&context=ilr>; JRS

The Helms-Burton Act purports to advance liberty and democracy in Cuba by hastening the end of the Castro regime. It¶ thus appears to be little more than an extension of the decades-old¶ U.S. embargo aimed at bringing down the Castro government. Although this aim is not new-the United States has been trying to¶ topple the Cuban dictator for over thirty-five years6¶ -the means currently chosen depart from previous tactics. Historically, the¶ United States has placed restrictions on the activities of U.S. citizens and companies in Cuba, including commercial restrictions on¶ U.S. companies operating in Cuba.¶ The irony of this latest U.S. initiative is that it runs counter to¶ two significant trends. First, as a result of the end of the Cold War¶ between the United States and the Soviet Union, countries feel¶ less compelled to follow the U.S. lead in many ventures from political to military.7 Second, the international trade system has become increasingly interdependent. 8 The former suggests that the¶ United States should act in a way that induces foreign countries to¶ follow its lead in international affairs. The latter counsels against¶ taking bold unilateral actions in foreign and trade policy matters at¶ a time when nations are moving toward more interdependent¶ trade arrangements and relying on bilateral and multilateral trade¶ cooperation rather than unilateral mechanisms such as quotas and¶ tariffs.

At first glance, the Helms-Burton Act is nothing more than a¶ U.S. foreign policy limited to Cuba. Upon deeper inspection,¶ however, the Act affects various countries,9 business interests,10 international trade agreements,1¶ " and ultimately, international law¶ itself.12 Indeed, countries around the world-many of which are U.S. allies-denounce the Helms-Burton Act as an extraterritorial¶ extension of U.S. law and have vowed to fight its implementation.13 Some of these countries, including those which comprise¶ the European Union, as well as Canada and Mexico, have enacted¶ retaliatory or blocking legislation and have charged that the Act¶ violates international trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)14 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which created the World¶ Trade Organization (WTO). 15¶ This Comment argues that, although the United States uses¶ international legal principles to support its efforts against Cuba,¶ the Helms-Burton Act is less consistent with international law and¶ more a codification of U.S. foreign policy. This distinction is important because the former operates within a delicate regime that¶ depends largely on the volition of its followers, while the latter is a¶ function of U.S. hegemony and the resources-political, economic,¶ and military-that the United States can bring to bear to effectuate its policies. But, when U.S. power is brought to bear to enforce¶ a law whose legality among the international community is as least¶ suspect, if not firmly rejected, the legitimacy of both U.S. power¶ and international law are threatened.

#### Perm: do the cp

#### Perm – do the aff and include restitution as part of the negotiations to normal trade.

**Ashby 2009** (Dr. Timothy Ashby, attorney, worked for U.S. Commerce Department and was involved in discussions with Cuban government on issues such as compensation for expropriated U.S. assets, technical assistance in developing offshore oil deposits, telecommunications, and airline overflight and landing rights; advises companies on sanctions administered by OFAC; member of the original negotiating team for NAFTA, JD from Seattle U Law School, PhD U of Southern Cal, MBA from U of Edinburgh, Scotland,; “U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and Likely Settlement Mechanisms”; Inter-American Law Review; Vol. 40; <http://cubatradeexpo.com/img/Speakers/Ashby%20Article.pdf>; JRS)

XI. CONCLUSION The precedent of U.S. claims programs suggests that the federal government will eventually enter into bilateral settlement negotiations with Cuba as part of a broader diplomatic effort to normalize relations. While Helms-Burton and other sanctions legislation would present a legal impediment for the Cuban government (which will probably not be “democratic” in the U.S. sense, but will likely follow the Vietnamese or Chinese model of a one party, officially socialist state with a market economy), such laws could be repealed or amended.

Cuba has no realistic means of paying cash compensation to settle U.S. claims unless the negotiated amount was a mere pittance to achieve an accord and satisfaction under international law. According to Ambassador Stuart Eisenstat, former U.S. Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, and Special Envoy for Property Claims in Central and Eastern Europe, who was President Clinton’s special envoy on Cuba: “Settling the thousands of claims pending against Cuba should not be much of an obstacle to normalization -when that day finally comes. Given Cuba’s poor economic state, any compensation received by claimants may be little more than token payments.”

In the end, owners of U.S. Certified Claims against Cuba (including corporate successors in interest and grandchildren of the original private claimants) will probably receive Cuban bonds of minimal value in compensation whether they pursue the time and expense of litigation in a Cuban court, or wait for the U.S. government to settle on their behalf.

#### Your counterplan is the squo

http://uscodebeta.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section6065&num=0&edition=prelim

**22 USC 6065: Requirements and factors for determining transition government**

Text contains those laws in effect on October 31, 2013

**From Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE**CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD)SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

§6065. Requirements and factors for determining transition government

(a) Requirements

For the purposes of this chapter, a transition government in Cuba is a government that-

(1) has legalized all political activity;

(2) has released all political prisoners and allowed for investigations of Cuban prisons by appropriate international human rights organizations;

(3) has dissolved the present Department of State Security in the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response Brigades; and

(4) has made public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new government-

(A) to be held in a timely manner within a period not to exceed 18 months after the transition government assumes power;

(B) with the participation of multiple independent political parties that have full access to the media on an equal basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or other telecommunications media) in terms of allotments of time for such access and the times of day such allotments are given; and

(C) to be conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers, such as the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other election monitors;

(5) has ceased any interference with Radio Marti or Television Marti broadcasts;

(6) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) establishing an independent judiciary;

(B) respecting internationally recognized human rights and basic freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory nation;

(C) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of independent social, economic, and political associations;

(7) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro; and

(8) has given adequate assurances that it will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban people.

(b) Additional factors

In addition to the requirements in subsection (a) of this section, in determining whether a transition government in Cuba is in power, the President shall take into account the extent to which that government-

(1) is demonstrably in transition from a communist totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy;

(2) has made public commitments to, and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) effectively guaranteeing the rights of free speech and freedom of the press, including granting permits to privately owned media and telecommunications companies to operate in Cuba;

(B) permitting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to Cuba;

(C) assuring the right to private property; and

(D) taking appropriate steps to return to United States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for such property;

(3) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United States all persons sought by the United States Department of Justice for crimes committed in the United States; and

(4) has permitted the deployment throughout Cuba of independent and unfettered international human rights monitors.

(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §205, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 811.)

#### No link – Cuba will negotiate private claims outside of a settlement

Ashby 2009 (Dr. Timothy Ashby, attorney, worked for U.S. Commerce Department and was involved in discussions with Cuban government on issues such as compensation for expropriated U.S. assets, technical assistance in developing offshore oil deposits, telecommunications, and airline overflight and landing rights; advises companies on sanctions administered by OFAC; member of the original negotiating team for NAFTA, JD from Seattle U Law School, PhD U of Southern Cal, MBA from U of Edinburgh, Scotland,; “U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and Likely Settlement Mechanisms”; Inter-American Law Review; Vol. 40; <http://cubatradeexpo.com/img/Speakers/Ashby%20Article.pdf>; JRS)

In March 1964 Fidel Castro made a secret offer to the U.S. government via the Swiss ambassador to pay $1 billion in compensation for expropriated American properties and to release all political prisoners in exchange for restoring the Cuban sugar quota.

While this offer made it as far as the White House, it was dismissed without any acknowledgment to the Cuban government. Despite the fact that the offer followed both the failed Bay of Pigs Operation and the Cuban Missile Crisis (which resulted in a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba), the U.S. government’s internal position was “Castro won’t last,” and thus settling the claims would prevent the restitution of U.S. assets when the Cuban government was toppled.

During the author’s service with the U.S. Commerce Department from 1987 to 1990 he regularly met with Cuban government representatives on official business. During these sessions the Cuban government expressed its interest in negotiating a settlement of U.S. claims for nationalized assets. These gestures were reported to and discussed with the National Security Counsel and the Department of State, but were deemed not worthy of an official response.

In the 1990s several private owners of U.S. Certified Claims visited Cuba under licenses from the U.S. Treasury Department to negotiate compensation with the Cuban government. While the Cubans reportedly negotiated in good faith, the deals were aborted due to political pressure from the U.S. government. These negotiations support the proposition that the Cuban government is willing to negotiate with private claims owners outside of a state-to-state bilateral settlement mechanism.

#### Links to all th

#### It’s not a “taking” – the Doctrine of Espousal trumps their impact scenario

**Ashby 2009** (Dr. Timothy Ashby, attorney, worked for U.S. Commerce Department and was involved in discussions with Cuban government on issues such as compensation for expropriated U.S. assets, technical assistance in developing offshore oil deposits, telecommunications, and airline overflight and landing rights; advises companies on sanctions administered by OFAC; member of the original negotiating team for NAFTA, JD from Seattle U Law School, PhD U of Southern Cal, MBA from U of Edinburgh, Scotland,; “U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and Likely Settlement Mechanisms”; Inter-American Law Review; Vol. 40; <http://cubatradeexpo.com/img/Speakers/Ashby%20Article.pdf>; JRS)

Under Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the President has the authority to settle U.S. Certified Claims with the Republic of Cuba on behalf of any American claimant, for any amount and under any terms whatsoever.

Federal courts have held this “Doctrine of Espousal” to effectively supersede the Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking of private property without due process of law or just compensation, to be binding upon the claimants, and to be the sole remedy even when the amount is a fraction of the certified value.

#### Turn – Helms-Burton is what creates the avalanche of claims – the aff repeals it and the CP strengthens it

**Solis 1997** Anthony M., J.D. candidate, Loyola Law School, 1998; M.A., Int’l Affairs, American U, Washington, D.C.; B.A., UCLA; “The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act”; Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review; 4-1-1997; 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 709; 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 709; <http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1426&context=ilr>; JRS

Another area in which the Helms-Burton Act is at odds with¶ existing international legal principles is the change in the definition of who may bring claims before U.S. courts. Over thirty years¶ ago, the FCSC found: "The principle of international law that eligibility for compensation requires [U.S.] nationality at the time of¶ loss is so widely understood and universally accepted that citation¶ of authority is scarcely necessary." 93¶ The Helms-Burton Act changed this principle by eliminating¶ the requirement that claimants be U.S. nationals at the time of the¶ seizure of their property.94 As a result, the number of potential¶ suits jumped from thousands under the old definition to hundreds¶ of thousands under the new definition.95 The inclusion of claimants who were Cuban nationals at the time of the confiscation of¶ their property, coupled with the expansive definition of "traffic,"¶ translates into a veritable deluge of potential suits under the¶ Helms-Burton Act. The number of potential claimants is, however, simply being used for its deterrent effect on foreign invest ment in Cuba.96¶ Clearly, by breaking with the established practice of requiring¶ that claimants be U.S. nationals at the time their property was¶ confiscated, the United States has done two things. First, it evidently hopes that by greatly increasing the number of potential¶ claimants, foreign investors will think long and hard before investing in Cuba. Second, it has essentially invited more Cubans to¶ seek U.S. citizenship in order employ the power of U.S. courts to¶ recover damages for their expropriated property. Neither case¶ justifies the perversion of established international legal principles.¶

### 2ac – gradualism

#### We control uniqueness on multiple levels–

#### a. Diez-Canal won’t reform

Bremmer 13 - American political scientist (Ian, Foreign Policy, “Will Miguel Diaz-Canel lead post-Castro Cuba?”, Feb 27, 2013, <http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/27/will_miguel_diaz_canel_lead_post_castro_cuba>)//EK

Still, there is no guarantee that Diaz-Canel will be Cuba's next leader. Other would-be heirs -- most notably Carlos Lage and Felipe Perez Roque -- have been groomed for succession in the past only to fall from grace after demonstrating an excess of personal ambition or clashing with Raul and Fidel. Moreover, though Diaz-Canel has the legitimacy that comes with Raul's backing, his last name is not Castro, and any transition will likely be challenging, particularly given Cuba's deep economic troubles, tensions within the ruling party, and intense pressure from the international community to implement political reforms.

#### b. party repression- even if there are some reforms, they won’t be effective- only the plan solves, that’s Ashby

**c. fast reforms are inevitable because of the cascade effect- it’s a question of stabilizing cuba during the transition**

**Ravsberg 6/20-** staff writer for the BBC Mundo

(Fernando, “Cuba’s Economic System: Reform or Change?” Havana Times, June 20, 2013, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95012)//HA

HAVANA TIMES — Marino Murillo, Vice-Chairman of Cuba’s Council of Ministers and architect of the island’s recent economic reforms, has urged the country to aim for growth by eliminating “all of the obstacles that the current economic model places in the way of the development of the productive forces.” The problem is that the greatest obstacle could be the model itself, which is based on relations of production that hinder the country’s economic development, slow down changes, interfere with reforms and bring about discontent among the population. By implementing this socialist model, which dates back to Stalin’s time, Cuba obtained the same results seen in all other countries which copied it: agricultural production crises, industrial stagnation, shortages and a disaffected citizenry. Murillo invoked socialism’s theoretical forefathers, who said that the new, socialist society would need to nationalize only the “fundamental means of production”, a prescription that wasn’t exactly followed by a model which placed even junk food stands in State hands. To be at all effective, every economic change essayed in the country today, no matter how small, invariably demands a whole series of subsequent reforms. And it is precisely there where the model, and its defenders, prevent the reform from becoming effective or yielding its best results.

#### The plan solves– allows for increased cash flows and stabilizes the regime through the transition- that’s Ashy and Piccone

#### Additionally, more moderate approaches *comparatively fail* to stabilize Cuba

Koenig 10 – Lance is a US Army Colonel. This is a paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College. (“Time for a New Cuba Policy”, March 11, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130)

The United States requires a policy that will lead to better relations between the United States and Cuba, increase the soft power of the United States in the Latin American world, and pull the Cuban government towards a more representative form of governance. These conditions will contribute to the national security of the United States as well as to the western hemisphere. So with this in mind, what are our likely options? Options

• Path of least resistance, stay the course. The United States can continue with the current policy of trade embargo, travel restrictions, and limited diplomatic relations. The United States will not likely choose this path, but will rather go down it because it is easier politically to not change the status quo. This policy requires a long-term commitment and continuing patience. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 provides the way ahead that the Cuban government must follow in order to gain normalized relations with the United States. This option follows the path of the last forty nine years and no significant change is required on the part of the United States. Politically, this avoids the problems generated by going against the Cuban voters of Florida that have been strong supporters of the current policy. The risk is that the United States will miss a window of opportunity to make fundamental positive changes to our relationship with Cuba. Additionally, Cuba could attain economic prosperity in spite of the United States’ actions. Cuba would be forced to continue to look towards China and Venezuela for trade and security relationships. Additionally, for both trade and tourism, Cuba will continue to develop relationships with Canada and the European Union, while the United States’ influence will continue to wane.

**• Strengthen the current policy**. Eliminate the billions of dollars per year in remittances from Cuban-Americans to relatives within Cuba. Work multilaterally with other countries to increase the effectiveness of the current embargoes on trade and travel. Fully implement the “Powell Commission Report” recommendations to end the Castro dictatorship and undermine the succession strategy.31 The Powell Commission Report seeks to reverse the recent economic gains to put added pressure on the government of Cuba. 32 Additionally, pressure the European Union to stop trading with Cuba and restrict the ability of EU citizens to travel to Cuba. The EU nations provide a great opportunity to make up for lost trade with the United States and have a large population of potential tourists for Cuban beaches. The United States must deter actions by the Organization of American States to work closer with Cuba. The Organization of American States should also warn its members to limit the scope of bilateral relations with Cuba in order to support the efforts of the United States. The United States must use Radio and TV Marti to inform the Cuban people of the true cause of their economic difficulty, the dysfunctional communist centrally controlled economy vice economic sanctions. And finally, tighten the noose around the economy and government of Cuba to attempt to bring down the government in a shorter period of time. This option assumes that our current policy is the correct policy, but needs to be strengthened. It eliminates half measures and contradicting policies to produce a more powerful embargo with devastating effect on the Cuban dictatorship. The risk is that the United States will become further isolated from the world in regards to its Cuba policy and will create additional sympathy for Cuba. This could result in open disregard for the embargo by the European Union and other countries interested in trade with Cuba, with a **collapse of** the **effectiveness** of the embargo. The soft power of the United States would suffer with possibly no gain. The United States could lose all possible influence over the future direction of the Cuban government as the Castro regime is replaced.

**• Limited easing of** economic and travel **sanctions.** Engage the Cuban government and reward concessions by easing sanctions. Engage the Cuban government and use a carrot and stick program to encourage the Cuban leadership to transition from a dictatorship towards a more representative form of government, with more emphasis on the stick and less on the carrot. Reward concessions on human rights and moves toward democratization with increased levels of trade and travel. Use the enticement of increased revenue to the government through higher levels of trade as well as the income generated when Americans (of both Cuban descent and nonCuban descent) visit the island and spend dollars. This approach should be less threatening to the Cuban government as they have a level of control over the pace of change. The risk is that the government of Cuba would have the opportunity to adjust to the gradual changes and maintain control while conditions for the Cuban people improve, removing the pressure for a change towards market reforms and a more democratic form of government.

• Support the Cuban people, but not the government. This option would completely and unilaterally lift the embargo on trade and travel.33 Reestablish normal diplomatic relations with Cuba. Engage the Cuban government and use a carrot and stick program to encourage the Cuban leadership to transition from a dictatorship towards a more representative form of government, with more emphasis on the carrot and less on the stick. Included in the carrots are: military to military exchanges and exercises; observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS); and provide assistance transitioning the economic and financial aspects of the economy towards a free market system. Use the economic element of power to demonstrate the superior qualities of a free market economy. Encourage Cuba to allow United States businesses to operate in Cuba without the restrictions of government ownership and government collection of wages for labor. Help Cuba develop an economy that takes advantage of their educated workforce (literacy rate of 99.8%) 34 to move away from low value added products to high value added products with the goal of improving the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and thus the quality of life for the average Cuban citizen. This option has risk politically, as Cuban voters in Florida have traditionally supported isolating the Cuban government and economic sanctions. There are recent indications that Cuban-American opinions are shifting towards more engagement with Cuba. The recent poll conducted by the Brookings Institution, in collaboration with Florida International University and the Cuba Study Group, found that over 55% of Cuban-Americans oppose continuing the embargo and seems to indicate that this risk has lessened recently.35 But, with a viable economy that improves the standard of living for the population of Cuba, their government will feel less pressure to change from a dictatorship into a more representative form of government.

Recommendations

The option with the **greatest possibility of success and reward** for the United States **is to** support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. The United States should take the following actions unilaterally • **Lift completely the economic embargo.** Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries.

• Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.

• Next, the United States should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to **achieve normal trade relations** between the two countries.

This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.36 The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the “Cinco Heroes” and their plight is well known.37 So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative form of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. “The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.” The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base. Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. “Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.” These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights. The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world. There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government. From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook.” 40 The United States needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome. One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.” 41 Conclusion This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat. The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy. The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.42 The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can’t stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas.

#### The embargo collapses the economy and Raul’s reforms will collapse Cuba by widening inequality and cutting social programs

**Bowie, 11/1/13** - Nile Bowie is a political analyst and photographer currently residing in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Russia Today, “Isolated & discredited: Intransigent US policy impedes Cuba’s reforms” <http://rt.com/op-edge/us-cuba-economic-benefits-089/>)

Despite the mutual economic benefits of normalizing ties with Cuba, the unceasing and immoral embargo further emboldens the Obama administration’s diplomatic incompetence.

It is no exaggeration to say that the world is opposed to the crippling economic embargo unilaterally imposed on Cuba by the United States. 188 nations approved a resolution calling for an end to the blockade at this year’s annual vote on the issue at the UN General Assembly, with only 2 countries opposing – the United States and Israel. The outcome was unsurprising, as Washington has refused to waver from its policy for over five decades, despite immense opposition from the international community that it so often claims to represent. As a result of the embargo, Cuba cannot sell its products on the US market and cannot use dollars in its transactions, hindering foreign trade, the establishment of joint ventures, and international investment. Third countries have been aggressively fined and pursued by the US to stop them from trading with Cuba, while fines against embargo violators have risen totaling $2.5 billion to date. Cuba is also prevented from accessing medical and surgical equipment, and drugs needed for the effective treatment of tumors, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and cancer.

According to Havana, the cost of the embargo to the Cuban economy is estimated at $1.1 trillion dollars. China and Venezuela railed against the US for its reactionary stance following the recent vote, while Russia criticized Washington’s policy as being “reminiscent of the Cold War.” The rationale behind the US embargo has remained essentially unchanged since the 1960s, and is best described by Lester D. Mallory, former deputy assistant Secretary of State. “The majority of the Cuban people support Castro. There is no effective political opposition… The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection and hardship… every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba… a line of action which… makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government,” wrote Mallory, during the height of the Cold War. The stance of every US president since Kennedy has effectively been, “give it time.”

Perestroika in Havana

In an apparent justification of Washington’s defiant policy on Cuba, US envoy Ronald Godard slammed Havana as for maintaining "one of the most restrictive economic systems in the world." It is wholly insincere of the US to maintain this position when it refuses to scale back the decades-long climate of economic hostility, which remains a critical obstacle to Cuba’s own reform process.

President Raúl Castro, who is seen to be more pragmatic and less ideological than his brother Fidel, unveiled an ongoing series of reforms in 2010 aimed at moving the island’s stagnant Soviet-style economy toward a mixed economy, with market functions similar to that of China or Vietnam. In an effort to reduce dependency on a bloated state-bureaucracy, Havana laid off some 500,000 state workers, while significantly relaxing prohibitions on small business activity and the individual hiring of labor. Former state-employees were encouraged to go into business for themselves by driving taxis, opening barbershops, clothing shops and restaurants. Farmers were allowed to sell their goods for a profit, while state-owned companies were permitted to keep 50 percent of their after-tax income to reinvest in productivity, indicating measures to attract foreign investment capital.

Recent reforms are bolder, aimed at establishing a tax-free special development zone just west of Havana where foreign companies will be able to transfer tariff-free profits abroad; contract lengths will be extended to 50 years, while full ownership will be allowed for firms operating in the zone. The zone will allow foreign companies to import raw materials, relying on cheap Cuban labor to assemble finished products for export. Companies operating in the zone will pay salaries directly to the Cuban government rather than to workers themselves. Labor will be sold at market rates, while workers are paid on a Cuban scale, allowing the state to appropriate the difference.

Critics see this as a closer integration with an exploitive capitalistic business model that will widen existing income disparities. Income inequality between those employed in the party bureaucracy or tourism sector and those who struggle to earn enough to buy goods in state-run shops has deepened in recent times. If the government is perceived as being the biggest benefactor of foreign investment without earnings being adequately channeled to efforts to foster nascent entrepreneurialism and social welfare programs, it will have negative social – and political – ramifications.

No shock therapy – we promise!

Another significant development is the announcement of an ambitious currency reform that would unify Cuba’s two-currency system. Cuba uses low-valued national pesos alongside convertible pesos tied to the US dollar, introduced for use in the tourism sector and foreign trade to protect the domestic economy from cash influxes, although many would argue these measures had the opposite effect – enriching those who had access to foreign capital while emboldening the shadow economy. State-run shops sell goods in convertible pesos, while most salaries are paid in national pesos – valued at 24 to a convertible peso – which offers much weaker purchasing power. Havana is attempting to converge the exchange rate gradually between the two peso currencies, and the government – acknowledging the potential for volatility in light of the task’s complexity – and promised to avoid imposing "shock therapy" on Cubans.

President Raúl has confirmed plans retire at the end of his current term in 2018, and these policies can be interpreted as his efforts to establish a bridge between Fidel’s central planning and the hybrid socialist-market economy that a new generation of Cuba’s Communist Party will inherit. The success of that transition depends on how effectively these experimental new policies are implemented. Raúl’s socialist-austerity policies will come to find more enemies than proponents of a privatized growth model undermines socialized health and education services – the jewels of Fidel’s revolution – and produces oligarchs who have more loyalty to foreign investors than to the values of egalitarianism promoted by the state for so long.

Despite severe sanctions and scant resources, Cuba has achieved 99.8% literacy levels through free universal education, and is one of the world’s leading exporters of teachers and doctors. Cuba’s universal health-care is among the best in the developing world; services are freely provided to citizens, and public health indicators surpass that of the United States in many areas.

The resilience of the Cuban people is astounding, and if reform policies are sensibly implemented, there will be much room for optimism. A rapprochement between Washington and Havana is not unthinkable, and would foster significant economic benefits, the beginnings of which can be seen through informal trade between Cuban-Americans in south Florida and their families in Havana.

#### No impact to democracy

Errol Henderson 2, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 14-15

To my mind, the empirical evidence in support of both the dyadic and the nomadic DPP is problematic for several reasons. The most recent studies alluded to earlier, which indicate that democracies are less likely to fight each other and are more peaceful, in general, than non-democracies, are beset by research design problems that severely hinder their reliability (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal and Ray, 1997; Russett and Oneal, 2001). For example, many of them rely on a questionable operationalization of joint democracy that conflates the level of democracy of two states with their political dissimilarity. Only by teasing out the effects of each factor are we in a position to confi­dently argue that shared democracy, rather than other factors, is actually the motivating force driving democratic states toward their alleged­ly more peaceful international relations. In addition, the findings used to support monadic DPP claims also rely on questionable research designs that exclude whole categories of international war—namely, extrastate wars, which are usually imperialist and colonial wars. The exclusion of these wars from recent tests of the DPP leaves us unable to determine the actual applicability of the DPP to the full range of international war. In addition, given that some scholars suggest that the DPP is applicable to civil wars (Krain and Myers, 1997; Rummel, 1997), it is important to determine to what extent we observe a “domes­tic democratic peace” for the most civil war prone states—the post­colonial, or third world, states. Previous work has not tested the DPP for this specific group of states, and it is important that our research design address this omission.

### 2ac – apocalyptic rhetoric

#### Framework – the k must prove that the whole plan is bad – weighing the AFF is vital to fair and predictable engagement – allowing the neg to negate only small parts doesn’t disprove the desirability of the plan – the ballot should simulate the plans enactment and test whether it’s better than the status quo or competitive alternative

#### Reps don’t affect reality – material structure are more important and they cede the political

**Tuathail 96 –** [Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is **inadequate** by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Perm: do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### Predictions are inevitable – must use them productively

Fitzsimmons ‘7

(Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ- ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

#### No link- the epistemology of the 1ac is true- default to specific scenarios

#### Even if we use apocalyptic rhetoric, scenario planning is important to deal with future nuclear threats

**Han 10** – Dong-ho Han, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 26, 2010, “Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished\_manuscript&file\_index=1&pop\_up=true&no\_click\_key=true&attachment\_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=3e890fb59257a0ca9bad2e2327d8a24f

How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? If the problem of uncertainty in future world politics is increasing and future international relations are hard to predict, then it is necessary to devise a useful tool to effectively deal with upcoming events so that policy makers can reduce the risks of future uncertainties. In this paper, I argue that the scenario methodology is one of the most effective methods to connect theory to practice, thereby leading to a better understanding of future world events. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the scenario methodology to the field of IR in a more acceptable fashion and to explore its implications for a real policy world. To achieve this goal, I will explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. More specifically, I will clarify what the scenario method is and what its core components are and explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in IR by analyzing existing IR literature with an emphasis on security studies that primarily provide the prospect of future security issues. 1. Introduction How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? Given various theoretical ideas for predicting and analyzing future events in the field of international relations (IR), to understand these events properly it is important both to cast out all plausible outcomes and to think through a relevant theory, or a combination of each major theory, in connection with those outcomes. This paper aims to explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. After clarifying the scenario methodology, its core components, and its processes and purposes, I will explore other field’s use of this methodology. Then I will explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in the field of IR. I will conclude with summarizing the advantage of the scenario method in a real world of policy making. 2. What is the Scenario Methodology? This section begins with one major question – what is the scenario methodology? To answer this, some history regarding the development of this method should be mentioned.1 Herman Kahn, a pioneer of the scenario method, in his famous 1962 book Thinking about the Unthinkable, argued that the decision makers in the United States should think of and prepare for all possible sequences of events with regard to nuclear war with the Soviet Union.2 Using scenarios and connecting them with various war games, Kahn showed the importance of thinking ahead in time and using the scenario method based upon imagination for the future.3 According to Kahn and his colleagues, scenarios are “attempts to describe in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged.”4 Similarly, Peter Schwartz defines scenarios as “stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment.”5 Given a variety of definitions of scenarios,6 for the purpose of this research, I refer to the scenario-building methodology as a means by which people can articulate different futures with trends, uncertainties, and rules over a certain amount of time. Showing all plausible future stories and clarifying important trends, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make an important decision at the present time. Key Terms in the Scenario Methodology The core of the scenario method lies in enabling policy makers to reach a critical decision at the present time based on thinking about all plausible future possibilities. Key concepts in the scenario method include: driving forces, predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, wild cards and scenario plot lines.7 Driving forces are defined as “the causal elements that surround a problem, event or decision,” which could be many factors, including those “that can be the basis, in different combinations, for diverse chains of connections and outcomes.”8 Schwartz defines driving forces as “the elements that move the plot of a scenario, that determine the story’s outcome.”9 In a word, driving forces constitute the basic structure of each scenario plot line in the scenario-making process. Predetermined elements refer to “events that have already occurred or that almost certainly will occur but whose consequences have not yet unfolded.”10 Predetermined elements are “givens” which could be safely assumed and understood in the scenario-building process. Although predetermined elements impact outcomes, they do not have a direct causal impact on a given outcome. Critical uncertainties “describe important determinants of events whose character, magnitude or consequences are unknown.”11 Exploring critical uncertainties lies at the heart of scenario construction in the sense that the most important task of scenario anaysts is to discover the elements that are most uncertain and most important to a specific decision or event.12 Wild cards are “conceivable, if low probability, events or actions that might undermine or modify radically the chains of logic or narrative plot lines.”13 In John Peterson’s terms, wild cards are “not simple trends, nor are they byproducts of anything else. They are events on their own. They are characterized by their scope, and a speed of change that challenges the outermost capabilities of today’s human capabilities.”14 Wild cards might be extremely important in that in the process of scenario planning their emergence could change the entire direction of each scenario plot line. A scenario plot line is “a compelling story about how things happen” and it describes “how driving forces might plausibly behave as they interact with predetermined elements and different combinations of critical uncertainties.”15 Narratives and/or stories are an essential part of the scenario method due to the identical structure of analytical narratives and scenarios: “both are sequential descriptions of a situation with the passage of time and explain the process of events from the base situation into the situation questioned.”16 Process and Purpose of Scenario Analysis Scenario analysis begins with the exploration of driving forces including some uncertainties. However, scenario building is more than just organizing future uncertainties; rather, it is a thorough understanding of uncertainties, thereby distinguishing between something clear and unclear in the process of decision making.17 As Pierre Wack has pointed out, “By carefully studying some uncertainties, we gained a deeper understanding of their interplay, which, paradoxically, led us to learn what was certain and inevitable and what was not.” In other words, a careful investigation of raw uncertainties helps people figure out more “critical uncertainties” by showing that “what may appear in some cases to be uncertain might actually be predetermined – that many outcomes were simply not possible.”18 Exploring future uncertainties thoroughly is one of the most important factors in scenario analysis. Kees van der Heijden argues that in the process of separating “knowns” from “unknowns” analysts could clarify driving forces because the process of separation between “predetermineds” and uncertainties demands a fair amount of knowledge of causal relationships surrounding the issue at stake.19 Thus, in scenario analysis a thorough understanding of critical uncertainties leads to a well-established knowledge of driving forces and causal relations.20 Robert Lempert succinctly summarized the scenario-construction process as follows: “scenario practice begins with the challenge facing the decisionmakers, ranks the most significant driving forces according to their level of uncertainty and their impact on trends seemingly relevant to that decision, and then creates a handful of scenarios that explore different manifestations of those driving forces.”21

#### Predictions to spur trust – solves action and bias arguments

**Kurasawa 04 –** assistant professor of Sociology at York University and Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University (Fuyuki Kurasawa, Constellations, 2004 “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention,” Vol. 11 No. 4)//CC

In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the ‘warners,’ who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors’ messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully-fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational “strong publics” with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that “weak publics” with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the ‘inside’ and pressuring them from the ‘outside,’ as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into “risk communities” that transcend geographical borders. Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of **preventive foresight** consists of **forging ties between citizens**; **participating in the circulation of flows of** claims, images, and **information** across borders; **promoting an ethos of far sighted cosmopolitanism**; and forming and **mobilizing weak publics** that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally-minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics.7

### 2ac – iran sanctions

#### Uniqueness overwhelms the link and Obama will veto if we’re wrong

**Kaplan, 11/24/13** – fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Fred, Slate, “We Have a Deal With Iran. A Good One.” <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/11/_iran_nukes_this_is_exactly_the_deal_that_obama_hoped_to_achieve_in_geneva.html?wpisrc=burger_bar>)

In exchange for these restraints, the P5+1 nations agree to free up about $6 billion of Iran’s long-frozen foreign assets. This amounts to a very small percentage of the sanctions imposed on Iran’s energy and financial sectors. Meanwhile, all other sanctions will remain in place and continue to be vigorously enforced; the agreement doesn’t affect those sanctions at all. The U.S. Congress does have to agree not to impose additional sanctions in the next six months. If it imposes them anyway, they must know that this agreement—and the international coalition holding the sanctions in place—will collapse. Even this Congress is likely to hold off. If it does go ahead and passes a bill imposing new sanctions, Obama will certainly veto it.

#### Don’t evaluate the disad- it’s not a logical opportunity cost

#### Deal fails – breakout inevitable - history

**Tobin, 11/21/13** –senior editor of Commentary Magazine(Jonathan, “Why the Deal Is Bad: Iran Nuke Breakout” Commentary, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/11/21/why-the-deal-is-bad-iran-nuke-breakout/

To term such a response to hate speech by a world leader seeking nuclear weapons as spineless would be an understatement, especially when the same administration is so fearful that actions by Congress could spook the Iranians away from the talks. But the main problem here isn’t so much the obsequious manner with which President Obama and Kerry are breathlessly pursuing a deal with Iran. It is that the deal they are seeking to entice the Iranians into signing would ensure that Tehran would have the chance to get the weapons the U.S. is seeking to deny them.

That conclusion flies in the face of the spin emanating from the administration and its defenders who continue to claim that their proposed deal with Iran will make this scenario less likely. But as Reuters pointed out in an analysis of the current situation, the best Kerry and company can claim is that they will “reduce” the threat of an Iranian nuclear breakout, not eliminate it.

What this means is that the deal Kerry is advocating as saving the world from Iranian nukes will preserve Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium and allows them to hold onto all of their centrifuges and the rest of the nuclear infrastructure they have created during a decade of stalling futile talks with the West. That means that they will still possess enough nuclear fuel to build bombs and the capacity to “break out” and, within a relatively short period of time, take their non-weapons grade uranium and bring it up to the level needed for military use.

Supporters of the deal are unfazed by this possibility because they assume the West will always have time to react to an Iranian breakout. But this is a convenient fallacy for those whose main object appears to be to end the dispute with Iran rather than actually ending the threat of an Iranian bomb. Once an accord is signed and the U.S. can transition away from focusing on Iran and sanctions are lifted, the chances are that any shift to cheat by Iran will be dismissed by Western leaders who will not wish to be drawn back into a confrontation. Nor will there be any appetite to re-impose sanctions that neither President Obama nor Europeans desperate for Iranian oil and business wanted to enforce in the first place. Like the North Koreans who laughed at the West as they violated signed agreements to create their own nuclear breakout, Iran will have little trouble deceiving the West and will not worry much about a response from an administration that is more concerned about the Israelis than the ayatollahs.

#### Obama doesn’t push the plan

**Fiedler, 13–** WLS web writer (Christine, “Bobby Rush pushes for better trade relations with Cuba”, <http://www.wlsam.com/common/page.php?pt=Bobby+Rush+pushes+for+better+trade+relations+with+Cuba&id=37263&is_corp=0>, NG)

Congressman Bobby Rush is trying to lift trade restrictions on Cuba. He reintroduced legislation to lift the embargo, travel, and parcel restrictions, normalize trade relations, and it would take Cuba off of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Rush says the U.S. has "shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance" and that "Cuba is no longer a threat" to the U.S.

His bill also asks for the release of Alan Phillip Gross. Gross was working as a U.S. government contractor when he was arrested and prosecuted in 2011 for bringing phones and computer equipment to Cuba's Jewish community without a permit. He is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba.

Improving U.S.-Cuba relations has been a goal of Rush; this follows his United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act in 2009.

#### Filibuster reform came in like a wrecking ball- nothing’s going to pass

**Berger, 11/22/13** (Judson, “Filibuster Fallout: Reid maneuver could send ‘wrecking ball’ through talks on key legislation” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/11/22/filibuster-fallout-reid-maneuver-could-send-wrecking-ball-through-talks-on-key/>)

Democrats who claimed victory -- including President Obama -- in stripping the Senate minority of its power to block nominations may have done so at the sacrifice of the president's legislative agenda.

Before Thursday, trust on Capitol Hill was frayed yet there was tentative hope following the bruising fight over the partial shutdown that Republicans and Democrats could find some spectrum of common ground for the rest of Obama's term. Maybe pass a few budgets, maybe do something lasting about that pesky deficit.

But the move to use a rare parliamentary tactic and overhaul Senate procedure making it easier for the majority party to approve presidential nominees has poisoned an already tainted well. Any prospect for compromise on big-ticket items ranging from immigration legislation to a fiscal deal to tax reform is now that much fainter.

"There's no question that the move by Harry Reid will make it much tougher to get anything done between now and 2014," GOP strategist and former long-time Senate aide John Ullyot told FoxNews.com.

"In the short-term, it's a wrecking ball through any efforts that were underway previously to have both parties work together on key bills."

Because of the rule change, non-Supreme Court judicial nominees and executive-office nominees can now be approved with just 51 votes, as opposed to 60.

In the first test of Senate relations following the filibuster change, Republicans united to block a critical defense policy bill. The bill failed in a vote late Thursday, nine votes short of the number needed to advance.

#### Health care wrecked Obama’s capital and the rest of his agenda is finished – he’s losing now

**Shear, 11/14/13** (Michael, “Health Law Rollout’s Stumbles Draw Parallels to Bush’s Hurricane Response” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/us/politics/parallels-to-bush-in-toxic-political-mix-threatening-obama.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0>)

WASHINGTON — Barack Obama won the presidency by exploiting a political environment that devoured George W. Bush in a second term plagued by sinking credibility, failed legislative battles, fractured world relations and revolts inside his own party.

President Obama is now threatened by a similar toxic mix. The disastrous rollout of his health care law not only threatens the rest of his agenda but also raises questions about his competence in the same way that the Bush administration’s botched response to Hurricane Katrina undermined any semblance of Republican efficiency.

But unlike Mr. Bush, who faced confrontational but occasionally cooperative Democrats, Mr. Obama is battling a Republican opposition that has refused to open the door to any legislative fixes to the health care law and has blocked him at virtually every turn. A contrite-sounding Mr. Obama repeatedly blamed himself on Thursday for the failed health care rollout, which he acknowledged had thrust difficult burdens on his political allies and hurt Americans’ trust in him.

“It’s legitimate for them to expect me to have to win back some credibility on this health care law in particular and on a whole range of these issues in general,” Mr. Obama said. The president did not admit to misleading people about whether they could keep their insurance, but again expressed regret that his assurances turned out to be wrong.

“To those Americans, I hear you loud and clear,” Mr. Obama said as he announced changes intended to allow some people to keep their insurance.

But earning back the confidence of Americans, as he pledged to do, will require Mr. Obama to right more than just the health care law. At home, his immigration overhaul is headed for indefinite delay, and new budget and debt fights loom. Overseas, revelations of spying by the National Security Agency have infuriated American allies, and negotiations over Iran’s nuclear arsenal have set off bipartisan criticism.

For the first time in Mr. Obama’s presidency, surveys suggest that his reserve of good will among the public is running dry. Two polls in recent weeks have reported that a majority of Americans no longer trust the president or believe that he is being honest with them.

“When you start losing the trust and confidence, not only of Congress, but the American people, that makes it even more difficult,” said Senator Joe Manchin III, Democrat of West Virginia. “You can work yourself out. But you have to be sincere, and you have to be honest.”

The difficulties have put Mr. Obama on the defensive at exactly the moment he might have seized political advantage in a dysfunctional Washington. If not for the health care disaster, the two-week shutdown of the government last month would have been an opportunity for Mr. Obama to sharpen the contrast with Republicans. Democratic lawmakers expressed growing frustration on Thursday with the opportunities the party had missed to hammer home the ideological differences between the two parties. The lawmakers say there is intensifying anxiety within the Democratic caucus that the poor execution of the health care law could bleed into their 2014 re-election campaigns.

Republicans readily made the Hurricane Katrina comparison. “The echoes to the fall of 2005 are really eerie,” said Peter D. Feaver, a top national security official in Mr. Bush’s second term. “Katrina, which is shorthand for bungled administration policy, matches to the rollout of the website.” Looking back, he said, “we can see that some of the things that we hoped were temporary or just blips turned out to be more systemic from a political sense. It’s a fair question of whether that’s happening to President Obama.”

The president’s top aides vehemently reject the comparison of Mr. Obama’s fifth year in office to the latter half of Mr. Bush’s second term. They say Americans lost confidence in Mr. Bush because of his administration’s ineptitude on Hurricane Katrina and its execution of the war in Iraq, while Mr. Obama is struggling to extend health care to millions of people who do not have it. Those are very different issues, they said.

“I’m always very leery of these apocalyptic predictions,” said David Axelrod, a former senior adviser to Mr. Obama.

Senior White House officials are nonetheless in crisis mode over the failure so far of what was supposed to be the president’s most significant legislative achievement. “We get that it is a big deal for him, for the law, for the Democrats who voted for him,” said Jennifer Palmieri, the White House communications director. “We are taking it deathly seriously.”

#### Low approval ratings wreck PC

**Sullivan, 11/13/13** – political blogger for the Washington Post (Sean, “In Obama we trust? Americans don’t see it that way anymore — in two charts” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/11/13/in-obama-we-trust-americans-dont-see-it-that-way-anymore-in-two-charts/>

New polling data released this week show that one of Obama’s long-held political assets is looking more like a liability these days. Americans’ trust in the president has eroded to record low levels amid a torrent of criticism about the rollout of the federal health-care law, including the revelation that his long-standing refrain that all Americans can keep their health plans if they want isn’t accurate.

Two charts tell the story.

The first is from Gallup, which found Americans are now split over whether the label “is honest and trustworthy” applies to Obama or not. Fifty percent say it does, while 47 percent say it doesn’t.

It wasn’t always this way. Throughout most of his presidency, Obama had no trust problem to speak of. In fact, for much of his first term, Obama had a surplus of trust. From 2009-2012, the percentage of Americans saying “honest and trustworthy” applied to Obama hovered around 60 percent. The dissenters, meanwhile, mostly stayed below 40 percent.

The Gallup findings are mirrored by a new Quinnipiac University poll that shows by 52-44 percent margin, voters say Obama is not honest and trustworthy. The poll also shows Obama declining along another key metric: job approval rating. He’s reached a record low 39 percent/54 percent approve/disapprove split.

During his first term, the level of trust in Obama outpaced his approval rating on average by a much wider margin than it has this year, according to Quinnipiac’s polls. Gallup’s trend, meanwhile, shows that Obama’s trust has continued to outpace his approval rating by double-digits. Below is a chart that tracks how Obama’s trust numbers have stacked up against his approval rating dating back to 2009.

The latest numbers come on the heels of Obama apologizing to Americans who are losing their health insurance plans as Obamacare is implemented despite his assurances they would not have to give them up. It also comes as the health-care law’s rollout continues to be plagued by technical problems related to HealthCare.gov.

But health-care doesn’t appear to be to sole cause of the dip in trust for the president. The percentage of Americans who told Gallup “honest and trustworthy” doesn’t apply to Obama climbed to 44 percent in June, as the president dealt with revelations about the broad scope of government surveillance programs. And even before that time, trust in him was already starting to fade.

Generally speaking, presidents have experienced a drop in popularity in modern era. So Obama’s declining numbers may also be symptomatic of a broader and expected decline in the way the public perceives him overall.

Still, it’s striking that yet another of Obama’s former strengths is not anywhere near what is used to be. His personal likability — once a reliably buoyant – has also taken a hit in recent months.

If Obama’s decline continues, there will be little incentive for the president’s allies to come to his defense on various policy fronts. And heading into the 2014 midterm elections, he will be handing fodder to Republicans eager to tie vulnerable Democrats to him as a campaign tactic.

Obama may have run his last campaign, but there is still a lot riding for his agenda on the way he is perceived. And right now, the way he is perceived isn’t good.

#### PC fails

Dickinson 9 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, 5/26, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” [http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/](http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/21/keeping_libya_in_context))

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

#### Sanctions increase Iranian prolif and no impact

**Waltz, 12–** Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-get-the-bomb>, NG)

The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms.

It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.

POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED

The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent.

The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice.

Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard-liners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended.

The United States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.

The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less.

Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge.

Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.

UNFOUNDED FEARS

One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise.

Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear.

Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities

 (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.

Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold.

As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed.

Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now. Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now.

REST ASSURED

In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today.