## Anthro

### 2ac - fw

**Pragmatism first – the alternative is utopianism**

Erik Olin **Wright 2007**, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. **The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values**, **but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values.** **Institutional proposals which have an all-or-nothing quality to them are both less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented**. **The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem.** Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because **there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes**. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. **What we ideally want**, therefore, **are intermediate reforms that have two main properties:** first, **they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable;** and second, **they enhance the capacity for action of people, increasing their ability to push further in the future**. **Waystations that increase popular participation and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard**. **This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”**: **reforms that are possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.**

**Rational choice theory is best for environmental policy issues – their emphasis on theory is reductionist and prevents effective problem solving**

David **Owen. 2002**. Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. **The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former.** But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), **it is by no means clear that it is,** in contrast, **wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, **one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded**. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, **for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind**. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘**theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’**.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because **the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.**

### 2ac – k proper

#### Perm – Do Both

#### Perm solves best – only way to address both long and short term impact

**NORTON 03**

Bryan Norton, Prof. of Philosophy, Science, and Technology at School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, Fall 2003, Environs, 27 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 81

The sidestream group proposes that we "start where we are," recognizing that there is no single, monistic framework that is widely enough accepted to provide a "foundation" for policies unified by serving a single principle or theory of value. The sidestreamers accept that our society embodies multiple ways of valuing nature, multiple theories for explaining such value, and even very different ways of identifying aspects of natural systems as valuable. The sidestreamers set as their goal the crafting of policies consistent with as many of these diverse values as possible and the development of coalitions to take advantage of win-win situations and encourage negotiation when conflict is intractable. At this point, **it is possible to suggest a rapprochement between the pragmatists and the non-anthropocentrists: a division of environmental philosophy into "external" and "internal" questioning, the "external" addressing proposals for major changes in our society's worldviews and value positions and the "internal" for day-to-day negotiations within communities** attempting to improve the lot of current and future people based upon values advocated today. **These tasks are clearly philosophical. The one unfolds on the multi-generational scale while the other responds to the current situation,** encouraging productive dialogue, clarification of concepts, and improved cooperation. **The non-anthropocentrists and the pragmatists address different philosophical tasks and need not be viewed as competitive**. While this rapprochement may alleviate some of the disagreements between the foundationalists and the pragmatists, it also suggests that **the exclusivism** of Regan and Callicott, who dismiss all human-centered arguments as falling outside of environmental ethics, **is unacceptable**. Once it is admitted that the external questions are unlikely to be resolved in our generation, **there are surely reasonable questions to be asked about how we should behave and what we should do in the short and medium term**. If the goal of environmental policy discourse is cooperation in actual situations despite uncertainty about physical models and in the face of a broad diversity of opinion about value systems, then the sidestreamers are right to question the usefulness of the "foundational" arguments that occupy most environmental ethicists.

#### REJECTING HUMANITY IN FAVOR OF BIOCENTRISM IGNORES THE VALUE OF THE SENSUOUS HUMAN EXISTENCE – THIS RADICALLY DEVALUES LIFE.

BEST AND KELLNER 01

Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Adventure, Guilford Press, 2001, 268, google books

**Extreme positions invite extreme responses. The erroneous rejoinder to anthropocentrism has been radical biocentric positions that are misanthropic. mystical, and apolitical, and that go so far as to grant equal rights to all life- forms. including deadly viruses** (see Eltrenfeld 1981). Baudrillard (1993) en- joins us to abandon our long-held. illusory subject positions and surrender to the object world. Taking this idea one step further, Paul and Cox (1996) and Moravec (1988) heap scorn on the flesh, proclaim the obsolescence of the body in a cybernetic world, and urge us to transfer our consciousness to machines in order to advance to the next stage in the evolution of intelligence. We don't just "jack in" to cyberspace, as in William Gibsons vision, rather we are cyberspace in our new brain state. In this vein, Kurzweil (1999) announces the coming of “the Age of Spiritual Machines" marked by neural implants. sell'-aware machines ("a new form of intelligence on earth"}. and a growing importance of computers over human beings. **Most extremely, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement” invites the human species to initiate its own demise so that the natural world can regenerate. We find no rationality in leaping from the false sovereignty of the Cartesian ego to the disembodied brai**n tape vividly portrayed in lluckers robot novels (see Chapter 4)- of Paul and Cox or Moravec. With Hayles (1999). **we hold that the value of human existence is inseparably bound up with embodiment and sensuous existence. and that the radical posthumanist vision would lead to a life as meaningless and abstract** as that of Byron the talking lightbulb in Pynchon’s surreal fable [see Chapter I). Moreover-and here’s the worst part-we would never die and could not even scream in frustration. On the mechanistic assumption that the brain is a machine, Paul and Cox treat human identity as a simple matter and claim that it would be transferred whole and intact from flesh to machine (1996: 184, 190). In their cosmic cybertopia., no negative political or psychological dynamics transfer into cyberspace; there is a complete continuity of human identity and yet somehow there is a total break from the power politics of past human history, as if minds could avoid the struggle for recognition.

#### Anthropocentrism key to survival - understanding the importance of ecosystems to future generations solves environmental destruction but radical biocentrism causes extinction

**Hwang 03**

(Kyung-Sig, professor in the department of philosophy at Seoul National university, "Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism," Asian Bioethics in the 21st century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm)

**While our ability to affect the future is immense, our ability to foresee the results of our environmental interventions is not**. I think that our moral responsibility grows with foresight. And yet, paradoxically in some cases grave moral responsibility is entailed by the fact of one's ignorance. If the planetary life-support system appears to be complex and mysterious, humble ignorance should indicate respect and restraint. However, as **many life scientists** have complained, these virtues have not been apparent in these generations. Instead they **point out, we have boldly marched ahead, shredding delicate ecosystems and obliterating countless species,** and with them the unique genetic codes that evolved through millions of years; we have altered the climate and even the chemistry of the atmosphere, and as a result of all this-what?[18] A few results are immediately to our benefit; more energy, more mineral resources, more cropland, convenient waste disposal. Indeed, these **short-term payoffs motivated us to alter our natural environment**. But by far the larger and more significant results, the permanent results, are unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nature, says poet, Nancy Newhall, "holds answers to more questions than we know how to ask." And we have scarcely bothered to ask.[19] Year and year, the natural habitants diminish and the species disappear, and thus our planetary ecosystem (our household) is forever impoverished. It is awareness of ecological crisis that has led to the now common claim that we need transvaluation of value, new values, a new ethic, and an ethic that is essentially and not simply contingently new and ecological. Closer inspection usually reveals that the writer who states this does not really mean to advance such a radical thesis, that all he is arguing for is the application of old, recognized, ethical values of the kind noted under the characterization of respect for persons, justice, honesty, promotion of good, where pleasure and happiness are seen as goods. Thus, although W. T. Blackstone writes; "we do not need the kind of transvaluation that Nietzsche wanted, but we do need that for which ecologists are calling, that is, basic changes in man's attitude toward nature and man's place in nature, toward population growth, toward the use of technology, and toward the production and distribution of goods and services." We need to develop what I call the ecological attitude. The transvaluation of values, which is needed, will require fundamental changes in the social, legal, political and economic institutions that embody our values. He concludes his article by explicitly noting that he does not really demand a new ethic, or a transvaluation of values. A human being is a hierarchical system and a component of super-individual, hierarchical system of sets. **What is needed is not the denial of anthropocentrism**, the placing of the highest value on humans and their ends and the conceiving of the rest of the nature as an instrument for those ends. **Rather what is needed is the explicit recognition of these hierarchical systems and an ecological approach to science and the accumulation of scientific knowledge in which the myriad casual relationships between different hierarchical systems are recognized and put to the use of humanity.** The freedom to use the environment must be restricted to rational and human use. If there is irrational use - pollution, overpopulation, crowding, a growth in poverty, and so on - people may wipe out hierarchies of life related to their own survival and to the quality of their own lives. This sort of **anthropocentrism is essential even to human survival and a radical biotic egalitarianism would undermine conditions for that survival**.[20] Rational anthropocentrism, one that recognizes the value of human life "transcends our individual life" and one in which we form a collective bond of identity with the future generations is essential is the process of human evolution.

#### Humanism is inescapable – and giving up on it dooms the planet to extinction

**Davies 97**

Tony Davies, English Prof @ Birmingham, 1997, Humanism, p. 130-132

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. **The several humanisms** – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – **are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern**. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses m`ust, to impose its own answer to the question of ‘which is to be master’. Meanwhile, **the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained.**  Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like ‘the destiny of man’ or ‘the triumph of human reason’ without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. **All humanisms, until now, have been imperial.** They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. **Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore.** The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. **At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, it would be unwise simply to abandon the ground occupied by the historical humanisms. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that** the Baconian ‘Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things’, harnessed to an **overweening rationality** and an unbridled technological will to power, **has enlarged the bounds** of human empire **to the point of endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. **But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of ‘enlightened self-interest’ even, can that danger be turned aside?**

### 1ar – animals aren’t people

#### Animals can’t have rights -- lack the capability to have the same moral judgment as humans

**Cohen 86**, professor at the University of Michigan Medical School, New England Journal of Medicine (Carl, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research” 314:865-869, http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf)//dodo

A right, properly understood, is a claim, or potential claim, that one party may exercise against another. The target against whom such a claim may be registered can be a single person, a group, a community, or (perhaps) all humankind. The content of rights claims also varies greatly: repayment of loans, nondiscrimination by employers, noninterference by the state, and so on. To comprehend any genuine right fully, therefore, we must know who holds the right, against whom it is held, and to what it is a right. Alternative sources of rights add complexity Some rights are grounded in constitution and law (e.g., the right of an accused to trial by jury); some rights are moral but give no legal claims (e.g., my right to your keeping the promise you gave me); and some rights (e.g., against theft or assault) are rooted both in morals and in law. The differing targets, contents, and sources of rights, and their inevitable conflict, together weave a tangled web. Notwithstanding all such complications, this much is clear about rights in general: they are in every case claims, or potential claims, within a community of moral agents. **Rights** arise, and **can be** intelligibly **defended, only among beings** who actually do, or can, **make moral claims against one another**. Whatever else rights may be, therefore, they are necessarily human; their possessors are persons, human beings. The attributes of human beings from which this moral capability arises have been described variously by philosophers, both ancient and modem: the inner consciousness of a free will (Saint Augustine); the grasp, by human reason, of the binding character of moral law (Saint Thomas); the self-conscious participation of human beings in an objective ethical order (Hegel); human membership in an organic moral community (Bradley); the development of the human self through the consciousness of other moral selves (Mead); and the underivative, intuitive cognition of the rightness of an action (Prichard). Most influential has been Immanuel Kant's emphasis on the universal human possession of a uniquely moral will and the autonomy its use entails. Humans confront choices that are purely moral; humans--but certainly not dogs or mice-- lay down moral laws, for others and for themselves. Human beings are self-legislative, morally autonomous. **Animals** (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that word) **lack** this **capacity for free moral judgment**. They are not beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals therefore have no rights, and they can have none. This is the core of the argument about the alleged rights of animals. The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty, governing all including themselves. In applying such rules, the holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked. Humans have such moral capacities. They are in this sense self-legislative, are members of communities governed by moral rules, and do possess rights. Animals do not have such moral capacities. They are not morally self-legislative, cannot possibly be members of a truly moral community, and therefore cannot possess rights. In conducting research on animal subjects, therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they have none to violate. To animate life, even in its simplest forms, we give a certain natural reverence. But the possession of rights presupposes a moral status not attained by the vast majority of living things. We must not infer, therefore, that a live being has, simply in being alive, a "right" to its life. The assertion that all animals, only because they are alive and have interests, also possess the "right to life" is an abuse of that phrase, and wholly without warrant. It does not follow from this, however, that we are morally free to do anything we please to animals. Certainly not. In our dealings with animals, as in our dealings with other human beings, we have obligations that do not arise from claims against us based on rights. Rights entail obligations, but many of the things one ought to do are in no way tied to another's entitlement. Rights and obligations are not reciprocals of one another, and it is a serious mistake to suppose that they are. Illustrations are helpful. Obligations may arise from internal commitments made: physicians have obligations to their patients not grounded merely in their patients' rights. Teachers have such obligations to their students, shepherds to their dogs, and cowboys to their horses. Obligations may arise from differences of status: adults owe special care when playing with young children, and children owe special care when playing with young pets. Obligations may arise from special relationships: the payment of my son's college tuition is something to which he may have no right, although it may be my obligation to bear the burden if I reasonably can; my dog has no right to daily exercise and veterinary care, but I do have the obligation to provide these things for her. Obligations may arise from particular acts or circumstances: one may be obliged to another for a special kindness done, or obliged to put an animal out of its misery in view of its condition--although neither the human benefactor nor the dying animal may have had a claim of right. Plainly, the grounds of our obligations to humans and to animals are manifold and cannot be formulated simply. Some hold that there is a general obligation to do no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures (the principle of nonmaleficence); some hold that there is a general obligation to do good to sentient creatures when that is reasonably within one's power (the principle of beneficence). In our dealings with animals, few will deny that we are at least obliged to act humanely--that is, to treat them with the decency and concern that we owe, as sensitive human beings, to other sentient creatures. To treat animals humanely, however, is not to treat them as humans or as the holders of rights.

#### Impossible to evaluate all forms of life equally -- benefits of speciesism outweigh -- cures diseases, saves lives

**Cohen 86**, professor at the University of Michigan Medical School, New England Journal of Medicine (Carl, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research” 314:865-869, http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf)//dodo

I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible; it is essential for right conduct, because those who will not make the morally relevant distinctions among species are almost certain, in consequence, to misapprehend their true obligations. The analogy between speciesism and racism is insidious. Every sensitive moral judgment requires that the differing natures of the beings to whom obligations are owed be considered. If all forms of animate life--or vertebrate animal life?--must be treated equally, and if therefore in evaluating a research program the pains of a rodent count equally with the pains of a human, we are forced to conclude (1) that neither humans nor rodents possess rights, or (2) that rodents possess all the rights that humans possess. Both alternatives are absurd. Yet one or the other must be swallowed if the moral equality of all species is to be defended. Humans owe to other humans a degree of moral regard that cannot be owed to animals. Some humans take on the obligation to support and heal others, both humans and animals, as a principal duty in their lives; the fulfillment of that duty may require the sacrifice of many animals. If biomedical investigators abandon the effective pursuit of their professional objectives because they are convinced that they may not do to animals what the service of humans requires, they will fail, objectively, to do their duty. Refusing to recognize the moral differences among species is a sure path to calamity. (The largest animal rights group in the country is People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; its co-director, Ingrid Newkirk, calls research using animal subjects “fascism” and “supremacism.” “Animal liberationists do not separate out the human animal,” she says, “so there is no rational basis for saying that a human being has special rights. A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy. They’re all mammals.”) Those who claim to base their objection to the use of animals in biomedical research on their reckoning of the net pleasures and pains produced make a second error, equally grave. Even if it were true--as it is surely not--that the pains of all animate beings must be counted equally, a cogent utilitarian calculation requires that we weigh all the consequences of the use, and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research. Critics relying (however mistakenly) on animal rights may claim to ignore the beneficial results of such research, rights being trump cards to which interest and advantage must give way. But an argument that is explicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all over the long run must attend also to the disadvantageous consequences of not using animals in research, and to all the achievements attained and attainable only through their use. The sum of the benefits of their use is utterly beyond quantification. The elimination of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, the avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and the improvement of the quality of lives (for humans and for animals) achieved through research using animals is so incalculably geat that the argument of these critics, systematically pursued, esablishes not their condusion but its reverse: to refrain from using animals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, morally wrong. When balancing the pleasures and pains resulting from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to place on the scales the terrible pains that would have resulted, would be suffered now, and would long continue had animals not been used. Every disease eliminated, every vaccine developed, every method of pain relief devised, every surgical procedure invented, every prosthetic device implanted-- indeed, virtually every modern medical therapy--is due, in part or in whole, to experimentation using animals. Nor may we ignore, in the balancing process, the predictable ,gains in human (and animal) well-being that are probably achievable in the future but that will not be achieved if the decision is made now to desist from such research or to curtail it. Medical investigators are seldom insensitive to the distress their work may cause animal subjects. Opponents of research using animals are frequently insensitive to the cruelty of the results of the restrictions they would impose. Untold numbers of human beings--real persons, although not now identifible-would suffer grievously as the consequence of this well-meaning but short-sighted tenderness. If the morally relevant differences between humans and animals are borne in mind, and if all relevant considerations are weighed, the calculation of long-term consequences must give overwhelming support for biomedical research using animals.