## 1

#### The USfg should substantially increase its economic engagement towards Mexico by investing in renewable energy after consultation with the People’s Republic of China

#### China will say yes – they have a stake in the game and already have a memorandum

Business Mexico Online 13 [BMO, Credible news outlet on Mexican economics, <http://business-mexico-online.com/mexico-and-china-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-cooperate-on-renewable-energy-eu-imposes-anti-dumping-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels/>, 1/10/13, CW]

The Mexican Secretary of Energy and the Chinese head of the National Development and Reform Commission agreed to cooperate on renewable energy programs, just as the European Union slaps tariffs on China for dumping solar panels. Mexican Secretary of Energy Pedro Joaquín Coldwell and Xu Shaoshi, President of the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission signed a memorandum of understanding making cooperation on renewable and clean energy programs, such as solar energy and carbon dioxide recovery, a priority between the two countries, according to a press release issued by the Secretariat of Entergy. The memorandum of understanding, signed during the state visit to Mexico of Chinese President Xi Jinping, calls for working groups to meet in China in the second half of this year to determine areas in which China and Mexico can cooperate on energy projects. The announcement comes just as the European Union placed 11.8 percent anti-dumping tariffs on the importation of Chinese solar panels, accusing China of selling solar panels in the EU below cost, the European Commission announced this week. The alleged dumping in Europe threatens 25,000 jobs in the European solar industry, according to the Commission. The tariffs of 11.8 percent that go into effect today are a temporary measure designed to encourage China to negotiate with the Commission and will last two months. If no further agreement with China is reached, those tariffs will go up to an average of 47.6 percent in August. The move by the European Commission is widely seen a measure that could provoke retaliatory measures by China in European exports to that country.

#### GENUINE CONSULTATION ON REGIONAL HOTSPOTS NECESSARY TO BUILD A FRAMEWORK OF TRUST NECESSARY TO SAVE US-SINO RELATIONS, IMPACT IS WORLD PEACE

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 12

[Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun at the Eighth Lanting Forum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stay committed to peaceful development and win-win cooperation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: 28 December 2012 Westlaw]

China and the United States, one the world's largest developing country and the other the biggest developed one, are also the two largest economies in the world. That makes their relationship one of the most important yet complex in the world. Whether the two countries will live amicably with each other is an issue whose significance goes far beyond the bilateral scope and which concerns peace, stability and prosperity of the whole world. Some regard it a law of history that there have always been fierce clashes, at times, conflicts and wars, between an established power and an emerging power. But we reject such fatalism. In our view, in this globalized era when countries are inter-dependent with their interests closely linked, there has been a major shift in international relations. In the face of frequent global challenges, all countries would want to stick together to meet challenges together and pursue common development. This is an unstoppable historic trend. Those who go along with it will prosper and those against it perish. We are sober-minded on this and it is from this perspective that we view and approach China-US relations. We are committed to seeking new answers to old problems and are determined to foster a new major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

What has happened in China-US relations shows that both sides stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Shanghai Communique and the resumption of contact between the two countries. China-US relations have entered a stage where they should no longer have doubts about further growth of this relationship. Over the past 40 years, great progress has been made in China-US relations. In particular, the two presidents have reached important agreement to build a new type of major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, heralding a new, historic starting point for China-US relations. Two-way trade has surged from nearly zero at the time of resumption of contact to 446.6 billion US dollars last year and is expected to exceed 500 billion US dollars this year. The two sides, once in estrangement and confrontation, now engage in dialogue and cooperation. We have had the Strategic and Economic Dialogues (SandED), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange and a total of more than 90 consultation mechanisms covering political, economic, trade, security, defense, scientific, technological, people-to-people, cultural, energy, the environment and many other fields. This is not commonly seen in major-country relations and speaks volumes about the dynamism and potential of China-US relations. More than 3.5 million visits are taking place between the two countries every year, nearly 10,000 every day on average. The two countries have maintained close communication and coordination on counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and regional hotspot issues.

That being said, China and the United States still differ significantly in social system, development stage, history, culture and tradition and still face major and sensitive issues including Taiwan and Tibet-related issues. These issues, if not handled properly, will upset or even seriously damage the bilateral relationship.

To dispel strategic mistrust and build a new type of major-country relationship is a demanding task which calls for unflinching efforts from both sides. At the current stage, I believe it is important for the two countries to do the following:

First, they need to have candid and in-depth communication so as to avoid strategic misjudgment. China and the United States have maintained close high-level contacts and exchanges through quite a number of mechanisms of dialogue and communication including the SandED, the Strategic Security Dialogue and the Consultation on Asia-Pacific Affairs. Given the profoundly changing and complex international and regional landscape and the growing destabilizing factors and uncertainties, to have in-depth, candid discussions to find solutions and to strengthen coordination and cooperation will help reduce mutual suspicion and boost strategic mutual trust. Apart from increasing dialogue, coordination and cooperation on global issues and international and regional hotspot issues, it is also important that the two sides truly follow the principle of mutual respect, understand each other's national condition and public opinion, respect each other's choice of social system and development path, and refrain from imposing one's own will on the other side.

#### THESE REGIONAL HOTSPOTS INCLUDE LATIN AMERICA

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Xinhua: 1st Round Sino-US Strategic, Economic Dialogue Concludes in Washington World News Connection July 29, 2009 Westlaw]

IV. On Sino-US Cooperation on International and Regional Issues The two sides discussed the common international challenges facing the two countries. They were resolved to maintain close communication and coordination and work together with the rest of the international community for the settlement of conflicts and reduction of tension that trigger regional and global instability. The two sides noted that traditional and nontraditional security threats are intertwined, and situations in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and African require combined efforts. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of the Six-Party Talks, the continuing efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the maintaining of peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. They emphasized the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1874 and resolving the nuclear issue on the Peninsula through peaceful means. The two sides agreed to exert greater efforts for the early realization of the aforementioned goals. The two countries also pledged to increase coordination to jointly promote stability and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They agreed that senior officials from both countries with responsibilities for Iran and the Middle East should continue to consult closely on these issues. The two sides expressed their willingness to increase coordination and consultation on the issue of Sudan to jointly seek an early and enduring political settlement of the Darfur issue and promote the peace process between the north and the south of Sudan.

BOTh sides pointed out their shared opposition to terrorism and pledged to work collaboratively to strengthen global non-proliferation and arms control regimes. They reiterated their respective nuclear policies and discussed the upcoming 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference and the Conference on Disarmament. The two sides also exchanged views on the Global Nuclear Security Summit proposed by the US side and reiterated the importance of existing dialogues on security, arms control, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism issues. The two sides intend to further enhance dialogue and cooperation to combat transnational challenges, such as cross-border crimes, terrorism, the illegal drug trade and piracy.

The two sides agreed to enhance consultation on policy planning, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America within the Strategic Dialogue framework, with a view to broadening and deepening cooperation on issues of mutual concern.

V. On Mechanism for China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue

The two sides expressed their shared view that the SED will continue to advance China-US relations in tandem with other existing bilateral mechanisms. The Dialogue represents a major initiative to further develop China-US relations in the new era, and offers an important platform for the two countries to deepen understanding, enhance mutual trust, and promote cooperation. In order to more fully explore shared solutions on a wide range of common challenges, the Chinese and US delegations look forward to further discussions on specific matters raised at the dialogues through special representatives of the two presidents, working groups, and existing bilateral dialogues.

#### OUR IMPACT IS THE BIGGEST – EVERY IMPACT SCENARIO CAN BE SOLVED BY SINO-US RELATIONS

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Beijing Xinhua in English China's official news service for English-language audiences (New China News Agency)] Xinhua 'Commentary': World Has Every Reason To Closely Watch Obama's China Visit 11/17/09 Westlaw]

As American geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski said at a January seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the two countries' diplomatic ties, China and the United States have become important forces in global political and economic stability.

Since the ice-breaking visit by late U.S. President Richard Nixon to China in 1972 against the backdrop of the Cold War, bilateral cooperation has expanded to the areas of politics, economy, military and culture.

BOTh countries are aware of the importance of their relations.

Though Obama won the presidential election under the banner of "Change," he decided to keep the U.S.' China policy of communications and cooperation unchanged, according to Harry Harding, a leading China specialist in the United States who has advised several presidents.

President Hu Jintao also stressed more than once that healthy development of Sino-U.S. relations is not only in the fundamental interests of both countries, but is also conducive to peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

Given the interwoven relations that China and the United States share in a global village, both nations see huge potential in seeking their common interests through expanded cooperation.

And major challenges, such as the global economic downturn, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change, cannot be tackled by a single country on its own. Instead, they need the joint efforts of the international community, where the United States and China, as two influential countries, should play exemplary roles.

Obama's visit to China offered an opportunity for China and the United States to reach understandings and agreements and seek solutions to a variety of global issues.

China served as an important engine to drive forward global economic recovery while the United States saw its economy reverse the trend of recession in the third quarter of this year.

To reinforce the positive economic momentum and promote global development in a steady, orderly manner, the United States and China need to join hands in the spirit of mutual support.

Among all of the issues, global warming is a problem of immediate consequence. Earlier this month in Barcelona, representatives from more than 40 small-island countries warned during a five-day convention on climate change that any delay in a solution to the problem would increase the possibility of their homes being flooded.

As the world's two major greenhouse gas emitters, how the United States and China will cooperate and assume responsibility is a concern with global ramifications.

Undoubtedly, China and the United States still, and will always, have disagreements, especially in the fields of trade, currencies, greenhouse gas emissions, and political and military trust.

But disagreements provide room for talks, improved communications and enhanced cooperation.

## 2

#### The narrative of progress structures us foreign policy; it reduces complex social issues to simple technical linear problem/solutions – aff harms aren't true, they can't solve, and it turns case

Escobar 1995 [Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Communications, UNC-Chapel Hill Fellow, Institute of Arts and Humanities, UNC Fellow, Center for Urban and Regional Research, UNC Facilitator, World Anthropologies Network / Red de Antropologías Mundiales Research Associate, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Bogotá, “Encountering Development THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD” 1995, page 52-53]

CONCLUSION The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a ﬁeld of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to inﬁnity. Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualiﬁed them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies ﬁt a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers’ apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality. At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an inﬁnite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, ﬁnally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulﬁlling the promises that development seemed to be making. After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, reﬁne its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a speciﬁc conﬁguration of factors and forces in which the new language of development ﬁnds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artiﬁcial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced. To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories. The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World.26 Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identiﬁed by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signiﬁers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a ﬁxity as signiﬁeds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### Specifically, the aff invokes the narrative of progress:

#### Their Gardner 7 card says “The biggest carrot is to have the U.S. to take a leadership role”. **This is the thesis of American exceptionalism – they think that the US needs to have the leadership role.**

#### Our impact is the biggest – the narrative of progress locks us into ignoring pressing economic, environmental, nuclear, and social issues that risk extinction because we believe our exceptionalism

Loewen 07(James W. "Jim" Loewen, American sociologist, historian, and author, University of Vermont, “Lies My Teacher Told Me”, page 285 – 286, 2007, RLA)

This is the America in which most textbook authors grew up and the America they still try to sell to students today. Perhaps textbooks do not question the notion that bigger is better because the idea of progress conforms with the way Americans like to think about education: arneliorative, leading step by step to opportunity for individuals and progress for the whole society. The ideology of progress also provides hope for the future. Certainly most Americans want to believe that their society has been, on balance, a boon and not a curse to mankind and to the planet. History textbooks go even further to imply that simply participating in society. Americans contribute to a notion that is constantly progressing and remains the hope of the world. As Boorstein and Kelley put it, near the end of A History of the United States, “ Americans – makers of something out of nothing – have delivered a new way of life to the far corners of the world.” Thus, the idea of American exceptionalism – the United States as the best country in the world – which starts in our textbooks with the Pilgrims, gets projected into the future. Faith in progress has played various functions in society and in American history textbooks. The faith has promoted the status quo in the most literal sense, for it proclaims that to progress we must simply do more of the same. This belief has been particularly useful to the upper class, because Americans would be persuaded to ignore the injustice of the social class if they thought the economic pie kept getting better for all. The idea of progress also fits in with social Darwinism, which implies that lower class lower owing to its own fault. Progress as an ideology has been intrinsically antirevolutionary: because things are getting better all the time, everyone should believe in the system. Portraying America so optimistically also helps textbooks with stand attacks by unpatriotic critics in Texas and other textbook adaptation states. Internationally, referring to have not countries as “developing nations” has helped the “developed nations” avoid facing the injustice of worldwide stratification. In reality “development” has been making Third World Nations poorer, compared to the First World. Per capita income in the First World was five times that in the Third Word in 1850, ten times in 1960, and fourteen times by 1970. It’s tricky to measure these ratios, partly because a dollar buys more in the Third World than in the First, but per capita income in the First world is now twenty to sixty times that in the Third World, The vocabulary of progress remains relentlessly hopeful, however, with regard to the “undeveloped.” As economist E.J. Mishan put it, “Complacency is suffused over the globe, by referring to these destitute and sometimes desperate countries by the fatuous no – menclature of ‘develiping nations.’ In the nineteenth century, progress provided an equally splendid rational for imperialism. Europeans and Americans saw themselves as performing government services for utilizing natural resources of natives in distant lands who were to backward to do it themselves. ¶ Almost every day brings new reasons for ecological concerns, from deforestation to the equator to ozone holes at the poles. Cancer rates climb and we don’t know why. We have no way to measure the full extend of human impact on earth . The average sperm count in healthy human males around the world has dropped nearly 50 percent over the past fifty years. If environmentally caused, this is no laughing matter, for sperm have only to decline in a straight line for another fifty years and we will have wiped out human kind without knowing how we did it. We Were similarly unaware for years that killing mosquitoes with DDT was wiping out birds of prey around the globe. Our increasing power makes it increasingly possible that humankind will make the earth uninhabitable by accident. Indeed, we almost have on several occasions. In the early 1990s, for example nations around the planet agreed to stop production of CFGs that damaged the ozone in the upper atmosphere. In 2006 Washington Post writer Joel Achenbach noted, “Scientists are haunted by realization that if CFCs had been made with a slightly different type of chemistry they’d have destroyed much of the ozone layer over the entire planet. We were simply lucky. All these considerations imply that more of the same economic development and nation state governance that brought us this far may not guide us to a livable planet in the long run. We do not simply face an energy crisis that might be solved if we only develop low – cost energy that does not pollute or cause global warming. On the contrary, if we had cheaper energy, imagine the havoc we might cause! Scientists have already envisioned how we could happily use it to decrease salinity of the seas, increase our arable Land, and in other ways make our planet nicer for us – in the short run. Instead, we must start treating the earth as if we plan to stay here. At some point in the future, perhaps before readers of today’s high school textbooks pass their fifteenth birthdays. Industrialized nations, including the United States may move towards steady state economies in their consumption of energy and raw materials. Thus, our oil crisis can best be viewed as a wake up call to change our ways. Second our use of oil (and all other fossil fuels) has a serious worldwide impact: global warming, As everyone knows, except some high school history textbook authors, this warming melts the polar ice caps, causing sea levels to rise. Oceans rose one foot in the last century. The most conservative estimates, embraced by the George W Bush Administration, predicts they will rise another three feet in this century. Around the world --- from Mexico to Venace to much of Bangladesh – hundreds of millions of people live close enough to sea level that this rise will endager their lives and occupations. The resulting dislocation will constitute the biggest crisis mankind has faced since the beginning a recorded history. And this is the most pleasant estimate. If the Greenland Ice Sheet Ricses the ocean may rise twenty three feet. Scientists James Lovelock in 1970 famously invented the “Gaia Hypothesus,” the idea that the earth acts as a homeostatic system. Recently Lovelock has pointed out that as Earth’s equilibrium gets disturbed, some disequilibrium processes may cause even faster warming. As the polar ice cap melts, for example , they no longer reflect the son’s rays, so the earth absorbs more heat. Lovelock predicts the death of billions of people before the equilibrium is established once more. Global warming also increases other weather problems: the average windspeeds of hurricanes have doubled in the past thirty years, and they are also more frequent. That’s not all. Evidence shows that carbon dioxide, a normal result of burning oil or coal, also makes oceans more acidic. Scientists warn that, by the end of the century, this acididty could decimate coral reefs and kill of creates that undergurd the sea’s food chain. “It’s the single most profound environmental change I’ve ever learned about in my entire career,” said Thomas Lovejoy, author of Climate Change and Biodivdersity. What we’re doing in the next decade will affect our oceans for millions of years,” said Ken Caldeira, oceanographer at Stanford University. In addition to our energy and global warming crises we face other severe problems. Thousands of species face imminent extinction. One list of likely canidadates includes a third of all amphibians, a fourth of the world’s mammals, and an eight of its birds. Wilson thinks the foregoing is optimistic and believes two thirds of all species will perish before the end of the century. Nuclear proliferation poses another threat. In 1945 only one country – the United States had the know how and economic means to build nuclear weapons. Since then, Great Britian, the USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and apparently North Korea have joined the nuclear club. If Pakistan and North Korea can do it, clearly almost every nation on earth – and some private organizations, including terrorist groups has the capacity. The United States cam uncomfortably close to using nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1969, and India and Pakistan came uncomfortably close to using them against each other in 2002. In the long run just keeping to the old paths regarding all these new problems is unlikely to work. “From the mere fact that humanity has survived to the present, no hope for the future can be salvaged,” Mushan noted. “The human race can only perish once.¶

#### Vote neg – refusing the narrative of progress is necessary to allow Latin American movements to rise up to check dominant narratives of exceptionalism

Rosenberg ‘6**,** (Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies and Comparative Literature at Brandeis (Fernando J., The Avant-garde and Geopolitics in Latin America, Google Books, p. 1-6, njw)

THIS BOOK is about the avant-gardes of Latin America and their critique of modernity.1 Rather than engaging in the construction of an alternative modernity or attempting to renegotiate the modern in relation to the traditional, these vanguardists, I contend, sought to produce a critique of the modern as a global project.¶ From the perspective of a narrative of progress, Latin America seems to be cast either as a relic from the primitive past or as an unrealized but promising future. The linear temporality of the Judeo-Christian tradition— "ascending, descending, progressive or regressive," as Gianni Vattimo (1992, 87) characterizes it—and its modern varieties—evolution, decadence, revolution, and novelty—were as deeply embedded in the Latin American discourses of emancipation as they were in every project of modernity. But the difference that the avant-gardes opened to inquiry, a difference that cannot be reduced to the contours of "cultural difference" in the traditional anthropological sense, is that at both ends of the foundational narrative—the promise of the future and redemption through and of the past—Latin American discourse reencountered itself as subject to a larger order. It is as if the various futurisms and primitivisms that European movements displayed in an attempt to articulate a reaction against a bourgeois, conservative order (to express it in blatantly vanguardistic terms) were untenable from the Latin American position. For the Latin American avant-gardes, these alternatives kept referring back to the subaltern situation of Latin Americans themselves vis-a-vis the idea of the West, a concept that neither clearly included nor excluded Latin America.-¶ From this position, Latin American avant-gardes could undertake a critique of modernity and its narratives, including those of "international"1 modernism and its avant-gardes, but along a different axis, not through rushing the temporalities of progress forward or through a return to primitive origins. Instead, they developed narratives of space that articulated the Latin American situation in a shifting world order. Some European avant-gardes movements (cubism, dadaism, surrealism, etc.) attempted to undermine the legacy of the Enlightenment and its foundation in the white man as the model of rationality and historical agency under the direction of universal, abstract progress. Because of their investment in modernity and their peripheral position in its foundational narratives, however, Latin Americans were forced to level their criticism through and with a particular attentive-ness to spatial issues that addressed this problematic inclusion but that were repressed by the same idea of progress that they embraced.¶ This is not to say that Latin American avant-gardes were at any point more "advanced" than their European counterparts. While they tried to unravel European cultural supremacy, European avant-gardes usually remained attached to an assumption of their own universality. Artistic flights overseas were one way in which this was expressed, as the search for non-Western ways of life and perception became an exploration into the repressed soul of the universal human. For Latin American avant-gardists, (many times, no doubt, inspired by the Europeans), that position was untenable because the process of "discovery" was carried out under the suspicion of reproducing colonial dynamics. Therefore, tracking down influences and assessing the degree to which Latin American movements followed or did not follow European movements, as has been done repeatedly, misses the point and reproduces a colonial logic of unilinear development that, as we will see, Latin American avant-gardes tried to destabilize.¶ Vicky Unruh rightly argues in her seminal book Latin American Vanguards (1994) that these movements overcame an idea of national and/or continental identity as rooted in an original nature and landscape.4 What Peter Burger in his Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984) called the nonorganic character of the work of art, that is, the possibility of assembling different components with no final resolution of the internal tensions, is akin to this moment in which identity was conceived as a collage (Unruh, chapter 3). The connection Unruh makes between the collagelike constitution of the work of art and issues of national and continental identity is compelling, since ideas of hybridism, transculturation, and cultural anthropophagy or cannibalization—conceptual tools that the avant-gardes favored—traversed the twentieth-century Latin American discussion. But to what degree did the vanguards represent only another step in the constitution of national or regional identities? No doubt, the different movements and writers are inevitably embedded in national traditions. But some texts of the vanguards, I propose, suggest that the question of identity is intertwined with a redefinition of the location of discourses about it in the context of a global negotiation. In these texts, the problem of loci of enunciation—that is, the conditions of possibility for Latin American artists and writers to intervene in the larger debate about modernity—takes precedence and redefines the problem of identity.¶ As part of a geopolitical shift that, with the advent of World War I, shook loose the assumptions of nineteenth-century liberal culture, the avant-gardists in Latin America explored the limits of a national, culturalist response to crisis of the universality of civilization. The concern of the national Creole elite in the constitution of its hegemony—namely, how to organize the nation (or Latin America, for that matter) so as to inscribe its culture more firmly in the annals of universal history—was for the first time left in suspense, owing to the war that put an end to the nineteenth century's faith in the rationality of European history and the worldwide projection.¶ Since literary criticism in Latin America was by and large engaged in the travails of the national cultural elite, I intend to open up the vanguard texts to this different set of concerns, shedding light by the same token on the makeup of that critical tradition. I am interested in the moments of interruption when vanguard experiments called attention to contemporary places of identification and symbolic production that were neither national cultures nor reducible to them. Such interruptions occurred as literary discourses exhibited an openness to planetary concerns that resulted in an exploration of vanguardistic ambition. As a result, the vanguards were led to recognize the indebtedness of literary discourses to the reproduction of colonial perspectives and to occupy positions of utterance that they imagined to dislodge this coloniality.¶ "From 1922 (the date is tentative, it is a situation of consciousness that has been defining itself little by little) all that has ended," writes Jorge Luis Borges (1926,15), the vanguardist, in reference to the sea change that set in motion a Latin American artistic and intellectual field that would no longer voice "our longing for Europe."5 Without attempting to reduce cultural production to a set of contextual conditions, I want to point out certain major historical trends that framed this alternative imaginary. The 1920s and 1930s were decades when the political order was reconfigured as the consequence of an ongoing change in the global geopolitical balance following World War I. It was a time of increasing democratization in the Latin American social space, but it was also an era of new pacts between conservative forces in different national arenas. The upheavals and revolutions that provoked regime changes in more than one national context at the end of the 1920s differed in character, yet they shared a common soil, as historian Tulio Halperin Donghi (1996, 371) makes clear:¶ The world crises that erupted in 1929 had an immediate and devastating impact in Latin America, the loudest sign of which was the collapse, between 1930 and 1933, of the majority of the political situations that had consolidated during the good times that came before. What was not immediately evident was that the crash differed from previous complications along the way not only in terms of its unprecedented intensity; this crisis ushered in a new era in which the painful solutions that had allowed the continent to incorporate itself into an increasingly global economy proved ineffectual. 6¶ We are not referring to a discrete event but to a broad historical pattern that subtly undermined faith in the viability of national autonomy as a way to frame, understand, and localize the production of culture. The question of what might constitute Latin Americas possibilities, its conditions of cultural production in this "increasingly global economy," was at stake in many avant-garde texts of the early 1920s.¶ A parallel demographic change touched on the imaginary of positive modernity and its inception in foundational national narratives. The rural-urban balance of power on which modernity as spatial conquest was carried out (that is, the city as a model of govern mentality whose effects were to be projected onto the rest of the territory) was unsettled with the formation of what the historian Jose Luis Romero (1986, chapter 7) called the "massified city." Major demographic changes were already occurring in many Latin American cities and had produced an overall change in the cultural landscape at the end of the nineteenth century. But the vanguard movements were the first artistic enterprises of the cultural elite that didn't react to this shift with strategies of domination, separation, or rejection. Instead, in an effort to cross the "great divide" between mass culture and elite culture, they integrated with and accommodated themselves to the logic of mass production and consumption.' The well-studied phenomena of unabashed promotion of artistic movements, the circulation of ideas through magazines, the interest in new media, and the political engagement with increasingly visible nonelite subjects can all be traced back to the vanguards' attempts to break through the narrowly conceived boundaries of literary culture.¶ This change of cultural practices entailed a broader concern with what I will call positionality. At a time when the hierarchies embedded in a notion of a progress that promised to spread from center to periphery and from city to countryside were being questioned, some cultural actors found themselves needing to gauge new configurations of production, circulation, and consumption within an expanded horizon, a world-system of attribution of cultural value and meaning. Countering modernity as a merely expansionist force, to the unilinearity of universal history, Latin American artistic movements would continue to posit places of resistance to anchor their identities in the midst of historical flows. Consequently, the elemental refuge of the baroque rain forest that magically eschews Western categories or the boundary-less hinterlands that haunt the gaze of the observer, though refractory of positivist discourse, would continue to be revamped (by early travelers of the nineteenth century, regional writers of the early twentieth century, and practitioners of magic realism) as a cornerstone of cultural formation. But the avant-gardes opened the possibility of a different strategy. Amid so much praise and condemnation of speed and transportation as icons of the universalized, homogeneously modern abolition of spatial constraints, the vanguards elaborated, for the first time, their own loci of enunciation imbricated in the circulation of goods, discourses, and peoples. Two seminal manifestos of the early 1920s—one Argentinean, the other Brazilian—are exemplary in that regard:¶ A single struggle—the struggle for the way. Lets divide it up: poetry for import. And Brazilwood poetry for export. (Schwartz 1991, 138)¶ Martin Fierro accepts the consequences and responsibilities of situating oneself. . . . Instructed on his antecedents, his anatomy, the meridian on which he walks, he consults the barometer, the calendar, before stepping into the street in order to live it with the nerves and mentality of nowadays... .8 To accentuate and to expand to the rest of the intellectual activities, the independent movement in language initiated by [poet] Ruben Dario doesn't mean .. . that we will renounce, much less pretend not to recognize, that every morning we use Swiss tooth paste, French towels, and English soap (Schwartz 1991, H3-I4)-9¶ Two native, national products, one commercial ("Brazilwood," the first Brazilian export to the metropolis and the source of the regions name) and one cultural (Martin Fierro, the mythic character in the epic poem about an autochthonous gaucho as a founder of Argentinean nationality) are not only the anchor for a renewed nationalism, as has been argued widely, but also become vantage points from which to understand an expanded geopolitics. The map projected to elaborate this position needs to be altogether different from the one inherited from the period of nation-state formation. The modern and the new, so the "Manifesto Martin Fierro" seems to claim, necessarily come from an elsewhere that also has the power to define modernity and its others, whereas the "Brazilwood manifesto" foregrounds the fact that what stands as artistically new also depends on a sort of validation that is not at all foreign to a global circulation of commodities.

## 3

#### U.S.-Mexico engagement counters Brazil influence and China support for Brazil

**Brzezinski 12** – former National Security Adviser (Zbigniew, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power”, 2012, pp. 108-109)

A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico’s democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico’s ability to become a regional leader with a proactive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of an American decline: a weaker, less stable, less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. In that context, China could also begin to play a more significant role in the post-American regional politics of the Western Hemisphere. As part of China’s slowly emerging campaign for greater global influence, the PRC has initiated large-scale investments in both Africa and Latin America. For example, Brazil and China have long been trying to forge a strategic partnership in energy and technology. This is not to suggest that China would seek to dominate this region, but it obviously could benefit from receding American regional power, by helping more overtly anti-American governments in their economic development.

#### U.S. influence directly trades off with Brazil influence in the region

Crandall 11 – Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College; Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009; Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11 (Russell Crandall, May-June 2011, *Foreign Affairs* “Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America,” *90.3*,

POWER PLAYS Latin America's economic growth and political stability are driving an unprecedented power shift within the region. Countries are reassessing their interests and alliances, and the more confident among them are flexing their muscles. Instead of looking to Washington for guidance, Latin American countries are increasingly working among themselves to conduct diplomacy, pursue shared objectives, and, at times, even spark new rivalries. Brazil's emergence as a serious power is a direct result of the increasing absence of U.S. influence in the region. Sensing an opportunity to gain the regional stature that has long eluded it, the country has begun to act more assertively. But complicating Brazil's power play is the reaction from its fellow Latin American nations. Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian officials, among others, talk privately about their dislike of Brazil's arrogant diplomacy. In some quarters, Brazil's responses to developments such as Chavez's ongoing assault on Venezuela's democracy and even the 2009 coup in Honduras have undermined its credibility as a serious leader. (Brasilia's reluctance to speak out for hemispheric democracy is particularly inexcusable for a government that includes many officials who suffered under the successive military regimes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.) Many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they are not eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemisphere's hegemon. As one diplomat recently put it, "The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese."

Brazil soft power solves global free trade

**Bodman, Wolfensohn, and Sweig, 11** – ScD from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Former Secretary of Energy, Former Deputy Secretary, US Treasury Department, AND MBA from Harvard University, Former President, World Bank, AND PhD, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin American Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (Samuel W., AND James D., AND Julia E., July 2011, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations: Independent Task Force No. 66,” Council on Foreign Relations

¶ International Trade¶ ¶ Brazil aims to restructure global trade architecture to advance both trade liberalization and more equitable access to markets while also providing a degree of protection to its domestic markets and participants. Brazil, along with India, spearheaded the creation of the G20 developing nations in Cancún in 2003 to strengthen their negotiating power within the WTO. (Brazil’s role in the financial G20 is addressed below.)¶ ¶ As a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, Brazil alternately compromises on its commitment to liberalization and its solidarity with developing nations, which, like Brazil itself, are at times inclined toward industrial and farm protectionism. For example, Brazil has supported exceptions from tariff limits for “special products” in developing countries confronted by a surge of imports. On the other hand, in 2008, Brazil broke from Argentina, China, and India to endorse a proposal that would lower the ceiling on U.S. agricultural subsidies in exchange for cuts to industrial tariffs.¶ ¶ The Task Force expects that near-term agreement on the Doha Development Agenda is unlikely; in the meantime, Brazil— within the G20 and independently— will likely continue to balance its free trade interests with its persistent desire to elevate the influence and interests of developing nations within trade negotiations. This duality of interests reflects the duality within Brazil as both a developed and developing country.

#### Protectionism will cause global wars – risks extinction

**Panzner 8** – faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” p. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to **full-scale military encounters,** often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while **Iran may embark on** overt **colonization** of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles **soaked in blood**. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

## Warming

#### The USfg should substantially increase its economic engagement towards Mexico by investing in renewable energy after consultation with China

#### China will say yes – they have a stake in the game and already have a memorandum

Business Mexico Online 13 [BMO, Credible news outlet on Mexican economics, <http://business-mexico-online.com/mexico-and-china-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-cooperate-on-renewable-energy-eu-imposes-anti-dumping-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels/>, 1/10/13, CW]

The Mexican Secretary of Energy and the Chinese head of the National Development and Reform Commission agreed to cooperate on renewable energy programs, just as the European Union slaps tariffs on China for dumping solar panels. Mexican Secretary of Energy Pedro Joaquín Coldwell and Xu Shaoshi, President of the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission signed a memorandum of understanding making cooperation on renewable and clean energy programs, such as solar energy and carbon dioxide recovery, a priority between the two countries, according to a press release issued by the Secretariat of Entergy. The memorandum of understanding, signed during the state visit to Mexico of Chinese President Xi Jinping, calls for working groups to meet in China in the second half of this year to determine areas in which China and Mexico can cooperate on energy projects. The announcement comes just as the European Union placed 11.8 percent anti-dumping tariffs on the importation of Chinese solar panels, accusing China of selling solar panels in the EU below cost, the European Commission announced this week. The alleged dumping in Europe threatens 25,000 jobs in the European solar industry, according to the Commission. The tariffs of 11.8 percent that go into effect today are a temporary measure designed to encourage China to negotiate with the Commission and will last two months. If no further agreement with China is reached, those tariffs will go up to an average of 47.6 percent in August. The move by the European Commission is widely seen a measure that could provoke retaliatory measures by China in European exports to that country.

## Case

### Warming

AT: Warming– No Modeling – China

#### No modeling in China – it’s structurally impossible

Downs 8

Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813\_china\_downs.aspx

China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance. The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative measures to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do – and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – to enhance international energy security and combat climate change. If China falls short of our expectations it may not reflect a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will.

AT: Warming – Alt Caus – China

#### Can’t solve warming without China

Chen et al 10Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” [http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int\_10121001a.pdf)//DR](http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf%29//DR). H

As discussed at the beginning of this report, if China and the world are to avoid the worst consequences of climate change, then China’s rapid growth in total carbon dioxide emissions— though approaching only the world’s average level on a per capita basis—must be curtailed and begin to decrease within the next two decades. This process must happen in parallel with deep emissions reductions by industrialized countries, starting now, in order to save the world from dangerous climate change. Based on what the world currently knows and is capable of achieving, CCS will likely be a necessary strategy, in concert with other measures, to realize critically needed emissions abatement in China and other large fossil fuel consuming countries. Because CCS involves largescale systems engineering and geologic expertise, international collaboration will be indispensable for accelerating CCS development and deployment in the countries that need the technology. For China, which still faces daunting development needs and has relatively limited technological, financial and regulatory capacities in some areas, international collaboration and assistance are all the more critical.

No Solvency – Mexico Won’t Adopt

#### Doublebind – either Mexican renewable energy is cheap and doesn’t qualify for state funding, or it’s expensive and never gets adopted

Lokey 11 (Elizabeth Lokey, Environmental Studies, University of Colorado, “Barriers to clean development mechanism renewable energy projects in Mexico”, Renewable Energy Vol. 34 Issue 3, 504-508, Science Direct | JJ)

The most significant hurdle to renewable energy development is that CFE, which controls most of the country's generation, currently cannot build renewable energy projects because the levelized cost of all types of renewable energy in the country is more expensive than conventional energy. According to federal law, CFE must develop new capacity additions that will provide the cheapest electricity for citizens. Currently, there are no regulatory mandates like domestic renewable energy targets or financial incentives like feed-in tariffs, which offer generators a fixed price for renewable energy based on installed capacity or energy produced, or production tax credits, which provide extra revenue per kWh of renewable energy produced, to make this type of generation competitive with fossil-fuel based generation. Also, in the planning process for new capacity additions, there is no incorporation of a future carbon tax, which would make renewables more competitive with conventional energy. The revenue that can be derived from the CDM for renewable energy projects is also not a part of the economic analysis made when considering new capacity additions [16]. If a project does not pass the financial analysis and get selected as the least-cost technology, then it is not published in the long-term planning process book that is presented before Congress and passed yearly. Capacity additions that are not in this book will not be considered for CFE development. However, if renewable energy is found to be the least-cost option and published in the long-term planning book, then this renewable energy would most likely not qualify for CDM revenues because it would fail both financial and regulatory additionality tests, which require that the project cause emission reductions beyond what would have occurred in a business-as-usual scenario [16].

No Solvency – Long Time-Frame

#### Long time-frame

Lokey 11 (Elizabeth Lokey, Environmental Studies, University of Colorado, “Barriers to clean development mechanism renewable energy projects in Mexico”, Renewable Energy Vol. 34 Issue 3, 504-508, Science Direct | JJ)

Oaxaca = wah-**ha**-kah

CFE – state department responsible for electricity distribution in Mexico

kWh – kilowatt hour

Because of these barriers for CDM participation from the state-run generation company, privately-owned generation comprises the sector with the most potential for utilization of the CDM. The mere fact that private generation makes up only 17.73% of the country's portfolio limits the number of projects that can be developed [18]. A multitude of barriers to renewable energy development in Mexico for independent power producers (IPPs) have also caused this market to move slowly. For an IPP to begin generating electricity over .5 MW in Mexico, the company must not only apply for a generation permit, but also obtain land and/or water leases for the site of generation. Because there are few land deeds that show legal ownership of property, IPPs sometimes have to go through an arduous process of having the local inhabitants first apply for their land deed before the IPP can legally lease it. Some companies have had the experience of purchasing land from the legal owner and later finding that people are living illegally on the land but claim it as their own. Relocating these people has been problematic and time-consuming [19]. Siting a project that is near a surrounding community can also be a difficult process. COMEXHIDRO had to convince locals that the power plant they planned on building near farmers’ fields would not electrify crops and that the dam would not take any water away from the irrigation efforts. At the proposed Benito Juarez COMEXHIDRO site in Oaxaca, locals are barring the construction of the dam because they think preventing the project will provide them with the leveraging power to oust the current Governor of Oaxaca [19]. Fuerza Eólica contracted a person to act as a community liason in Baja California to handle the land leasing and community relations, only to find that he was working for another company and started a land bidding war that raised the price of the land for wind project development [20]. In general, project developers have found that locals, officials, and even ornithologists, who study the impact wind turbines could have on birds and bats, often demand illegal payouts in order to allow the project to be completed [20]. The next stage in the process for the IPP to begin operations is for it to negotiate a price for transmission and firming capacity with CFE. The transmission charge is what CFE charges the IPP to use the excess capacity on the lines and the firming charge is the amount charged to provide back-up energy for the investors in case what they use is more than what the renewable generator produces over a monthly period. The tariffs charged by CFE constitute between 15 and 30% of the price per kWh that the customer eventually pays to the IPP [19] and [20]. The next stage of the process requires the IPP to complete a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) under one of the five schemes provided by the 1992 Electric Energy Public Service Law (Ley de Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica). Most renewable generators opt for the self-supply scheme, which entails an agreement between project investors and the IPP. Investors must purchase at least one share of the project company and then sign a long-term PPA [21]. In most cases, the price offered by the IPP must be less than what investors currently pay CFE to be competitive. However, to some in energy-intensive sectors, a long-term, fixed electricity price is attractive as it acts as a hedge against upward fluctuations in hydrocarbon markets. Then, the IPP is allowed to feed the amount of electricity into the grid as their customers use. If more energy is produced than the investors can use, then CFE buys the electricity from the IPP at 85% of their avoided costs. If less electricity is produced than determined by the initial capacity calculation, then higher capacity charges can apply in the next contract between CFE and the IPP. An Environmental Impact Statement assessing the potential environmental ramifications of the project must be prepared, and usually costs several thousand dollars. Only after all of these hurdles have been overcome can the project begin to consider applying for CDM revenues and undergo the lengthy CDM process.

No Solvency

#### Latin America will never adopt renewables – fossil fuels are too economically viable and oil lobby.

Meisen and Krumpel 09– President of the Global Energy Network Institute / Research-Associate at GENI (Peter and Sebastian, “Renewable Energy Potential of Latin America”, December 2009; < http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-potential-of-latin-america/Potential%20of%20Renewables%20in%20Latin%20America-edited-12-16%20\_Letter\_.pdf>)//Beddow

In reality the situation of renewable energies in Latin America is not as positive or optimistic as we might want to think, or as certain statistical data lead us to believe. There are many problems associated with the implementation of renewables as well as their impact on the environment and society. In this context, the main problem for renewable energies in Latin America is in the way energy and development policies have been construct ed. In most cases, energy policies and strategies in Latin America have excluded renewables and other alternatives as being too costly and technologically unfeasible, or by arguing that the country does not have the capabilities to implement them. The easiest explanation for this, and one which is usually mentioned, is the lack of incentive and foresight. **Since the region has an abundance of resources such as oil, gas, and hydro, it is in general easier, cheaper and more technically feasible to keep exploiting conventional energy resources than to in vest in renewable energies or create appropriate renewable energy policies**. Another common explanation is that **the development of renewable energies clash wi th the interest of powerful players, particularly large energy companies, and, therefore, there are few incentives to promote them.**

#### Renewables can’t solve warming – they supplement, not replace, dirty energy. (Good turn on the cap K – see: last few lines)

Angus 12– ecosocialist advocate, citing an extensive study by Richard York, professor at the University of Oregon with an MS in Environmental Studies from Bemidji State University (Iran, “Green energy won’t save the earth without social change”, 3/21/12; < http://climateandcapitalism.com/2012/03/21/green-energy-alone-wont-save-the-earth/>)//Beddow

The most popular techno-fix for global warming is green energy. If energy companies would only deploy wind, hydro, solar, geothermal or nuclear, then emission-intensive fossil fuels will eventually disappear. But will that actually work? A new study by Richard York of the University of Oregon shows that it isn’t that simple. **Rather than displacing fossil fuels, green energy sources have proven to be mostly additive.** “Do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels?” published this month in Nature Climate Change, discusses what happened when alternative energy sources were introduced in countries around the world, over the past fifty years. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that new green energy replaces fossil-fuel use, York found that on average each unit of energy use from non-fossil-fuel sources displaced less than a quarter of a unit of energy use from fossil-fuel sources. The picture is worse with electricity, where **each new unit generated from green sources displaced less than one-tenth of a unit of fossil-fuel-generated electricity.** York writes: “Based on all of the results presented above, the answer to the question presented in the title of this paper – do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels? – is yes, but only very modestly. **The common assumption that the expansion of production of alternative energy will suppress fossil-fuel energy production in equal proportion is clearly wrong**.” Why don’t the new sources replace the old? York identifies two key reasons: the inertia of a huge existing fossil-fuel infrastructure, and the power and influence of the coal and oil corporations. **“The failure of non-fossil energy sources to displace fossil ones is probably in part attributable to the established energy system where there is a lock-in to using fossil fuels as the base energy source because of their long-standing prevalence and existing infrastructure and to the political and economic power of the fossil-fuel industry**.” In other words, eliminating fossil-fuel as an energy source is at least as much a social and political problem as a technical one. “Of course all societies need energy. So, obviously, if societies are to stop using fossil fuels they must have other energy sources. However, the results from the analyses presented here indicate that the shift away from fossil fuel does not happen inevitably with the expansion of non-fossil-fuel sources, or at least in the political and economic contexts that have been dominant over the past fifty years around the world…. “The most effective strategy for curbing carbon emissions is likely to be one that aims to not only develop non-fossil energy sources, but also to find ways to alter political and economic contexts so that fossil-fuel energy is more easily displaced and to curtail the growth in energy consumption as much as possible. “A general implication of these findings is that polices aimed at addressing global climate change should not focus principally on developing technological fixes, but should also take into account human behaviour in the context of political, economic and social systems.” The evidence shows that simply introducing green energy isn’t enough: the introduction must be accompanied by “explicit policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions.” The article is published in a scientific journal, where political and social conclusions can only be expressed in muted form. But Richard York’s research and conclusions reinforce the argument that he and his co-authors (John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark) made more explicitly in their recent book, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Planet. “We are confronting the question of a terminal crisis, threatening most life on the planet, civilization, and the very existence of future generations. … attempts to solve this through technological fixes, market magic, and the idea of a ‘sustainable capitalism’ are mere forms of ecological denial, since they ignore the inherent destructiveness of the current system of unsustainable development – capitalism.”

#### Renewables won’t catch on– low efficiency, high cost, low reliability, land scarcity, lack of storage capacity. It’s a double-bind: either market forces will drive innovation absent the aff, or the plan can’t stimulate investment.

**Taylor and Van Doren 11** – critic of federal energy and environmental policy, Wall Street Journal Contributor, served on congressional advisory bodies, member of International Association for Energy economics, writer for *The Energy Journal,* testified in Congress / editor of the quarterly journal *Regulation* and expert in the regulation of energy and environment, taught at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, School of Organization and Management at Yale University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, former postdoctoral fellow in political economy at Carnegie Mellon University (Jerry and Peter, “The Green Energy Economy Reconsidered” 4/25/11; < http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/green-energy-economy-reconsidered>)//Beddow

Let’s assume, however, that we could afford that. Have we ever seen such a “green economy”? Yes we have; in the 13th century. Renewable energy is quite literally the energy of yesterday. Few seem to realize that we abandoned “green” energy centuries ago for five very good reasons. First, green energy is diffuse, and **it takes a tremendous amount of land and material to harness even a little bit of energy**. Jesse Ausubel, director of the Program for the Human Environment and senior research associate at Rockefeller University, calculates, for instance, that the entire state of Connecticut (that is, if Connecticut were as windy as the southeastern Colorado plains) would need to be devoted to wind turbines to power the city of New York. Second, **it is extremely costly.** In 2016 President Obama’s own Energy Information Administration estimates that onshore wind (the least expensive of these green energies) will be **80% more expensive than combined cycle, gas-fired electricity.** And that doesn’t account for the costs associated with the **hundreds of billions of dollars worth of new transmission systems that would be necessary to get wind and solar energy — which is generally produced far from where consumers happen to live — to ratepayers. Third, it is unreliable. The wind doesn’t always blow and the sun doesn’t always shine when the energy is needed**. We account for that today by having a lot of coal and natural gas generation on “standby” to fire-up when renewables can’t produce. Incidentally, the cost of maintaining this backup generation is likewise never fully accounted for in the cost estimates associated with green energy. But in a world where fossil fuels are a thing of the past, we would be forced — like the peasants of the Dark Age — to rely upon the vagaries of the weather. Fourth, it is scarce. While wind and sunlight are obviously not scarce, **the real estate where those energies are reliably continuous and in economic proximity to ratepayers is scarce.** Finally, **once the electricity is produced by the sun or wind, it cannot be stored because battery technology is not currently up to the task**. Hence, we must immediately “use it or lose it.” **Fossil fuels are everything that green energy is not.** Approximately 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas (which cost approximately $4.00) can generate the same amount of electricity as running an average rooftop solar system for 131 days. It is comparatively cheap. It is reliable; it will burn and produce energy whenever you want it. It is plentiful (we use only a tiny bit of oil in the electricity sector). And you can store fossil fuels until you need them. Proponents of green energy argue that if the government can put a man on the moon, it can certainly make green energy economically attractive. Well, notice that government was not trying to get a man to the moon profitably, which is more akin to the challenge here. Even before the Obama presidency began, about half the production costs of wind and solar energy were underwritten by the taxpayer to no commercial avail. There’s little reason to think that a more sustained, multi-decade commitment to subsidy would play out any differently. After all, the federal government once promised that nuclear energy was on the cusp of being “too cheap to meter.” That was in the 1950s. Sixty-one billion dollars of subsidies and impossible-to-price regulatory preferences later, it’s still the most expensive source of conventional energy on the grid. The fundamental question that green energy proponents must answer is this: if green energy is so inevitable and such a great investment, why do we need to subsidize it? If and when renewable energy makes economic sense, profit-hungry investors will build all that we need for us without government needing to lift a finger. But **if it doesn’t make economic sense, all of the subsidies in the world won’t change that fact.**