#### 1

#### Economic engagement includes trade, grants and loans, and investment

GAO 13

(United States Government Accountability Office, Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement, February 2013 <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-199>)

Since 2001, China has rapidly increased its economic engagement with sub-Saharan Africancountries. The United States has increased aid to sub-Saharan Africa and in 2010 provided more than a quarter of all U.S. international economic assistance to the region. According to some observers, China’s foreign assistance and investments in Africa have been driven in part by the desire for natural resources and stronger diplomatic relations. Some U.S. officials and other stakeholders also have questioned whether China’s activities affect U.S. interests in the region.GAO was asked to review the nature of the United States’ and China’sengagementin sub-Saharan Africa. This report examines (1) goals and policies in sub-Saharan Africa; (2) trade, grants and loans, and investment activities in the region; and (3) engagement in three case-study countries—Angola, Ghana, and Kenya. GAO obtained information from, among others, 11 U.S. agencies, U.S. firms, and host-government officials. GAO was not able to meet with Chinese officials. GAO did not include U.S. and Chinese security engagement in the scope of this study

#### Violations: The aff does not increase trade, they just increase the amount of AVAILABLE visas for Mexicans

#### Limits: they unlimit the topic, by simply expanding an existing policy and not actually increasing trade, they make it unpredictable which is bad for education and affects our decision making skills

Voter for fairness education

## 2

#### The President of the United States should

**Observation 1: Competition**

**A. The federal government includes all three branches -- prefer a definition from legal code**

**US Code no date** (“United States Federal Government Law & Legal Definition,” [http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/](http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US **and** iii) Judiciary.

**B. Resolutional – Resolved means legislative action**

**Lousiana House of Representatives 5** (http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House  Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

**Observation 2: Solvency**

**The CP solves**

**Hsu 12** (David T. Hsu - Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Browne Center for International Politics, “Executive Discretion, Domestic Constraints, and Patterns of Post-9/11 U.S. Foreign Economic Policy”, September 2012, Pg 6, <http://davidthsu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/hsu-patterns-of-post911-us-foreign-economic-policy-september-2012.pdf>) MaxL

The specific empirical puzzle, how to explain the pattern of U.S. foreign economic engagement in the context of post-9/11 security pressures, relates to the broader theoretical debate about the politics of foreign economic policy (Krasner 1978; Ikenberry, et al. 1988). Much of the previous research maintains that the president has strategic advantages in controlling foreign policy. Informational advantages enable the president to mobilize pressure in favor of a preferred policy agenda with greater knowledge of strategic imperatives and alternative relative to legislators. 11 In tandem with the ability to exercise unilateral powers (via executive order, memorandum, and other directives), presidents are in a “unique position to lead” at “the front-end of the policy-making process.”12 This reasoning justifies an analytical focus on the president’s strategic motivations for manipulating foreign economic policies.

**XOS Shape American Policy – they are key to prez powers**

**McCormick 10** (James M. McCormick, , “American Foreign Policy and Process,” <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m_MOrBfBEmYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=executive+orders+quick+process&ots=HTAhZJp2qW&sig=7FfCHf0qgQRvKqDAEbGC_c-Dmw0#v=onepage&q=eecutive%20order&f=false>)

Other executive orders in the past sent American foreign policy in a new direction. Most notably, perhaps, was President Ford’s 1976 executive order outlawing the use of political assassination by the United States. A few years later, President Reagan issued an executive order defining and setting limits on America’s “special activities,” or covert actions, abroad that remains in effect today**. Executive orders clearly deal with significant foreign policy matters.** Political scientists Kenneth Mayer and Kevin Price’s analysis of such orders from 1936 through 1999 demonstrates their importance. Based on stringent criteria, they found that 149 out of the 1,028 executive orders sampled were “significant” in their effect on policy and society. Of those 149, moreover, we estimated that 58(or 39 percent) dealt with foreign policy. Importantly, then, executive orders afford presidents yet another avenue of influence on foreign affairs.

**Strong presidential powers are key to solve terrorism**
**Sulmasy 9** (Glenn, on the law faculty of the United States Coast Guard Academy, 30 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 1355, ANNIVERSARY CONTRIBUTIONS: USE OF FORCE: EXECUTIVE POWER: THE LAST THIRTY YEARS, Lexis)

Since the attacks of 9/11, the original concerns noted by Hamilton, Jay, and Madison have been heightened. Never before in the young history of the United States **has the need for an energetic executive been more vital to its national security**. The need for quick action in this arena requires an executive response - particularly when fighting a shadowy enemy like al Qaeda - not the deliberative bodies opining on what and how to conduct warfare or determining how and when to respond. The threats from non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, make the need for dispatch and rapid response even greater. Jefferson's concerns about the slow and deliberative institution of Congress being prone to informational leaks are even more relevant in the twenty-first century. The advent of the twenty-four hour media only leads to an increased need for retaining enhanced levels of executive  [\*1362]  control of foreign policy. This is particularly true in modern warfare. In the war on international terror, intelligence is vital to ongoing operations and successful prevention of attacks. Al Qaeda now has both the will and the ability to strike with the equivalent force and might of a nation's armed forces. The need to identify these individuals before they can operationalize an attack is vital. Often international terror cells consist of only a small number of individuals - making intelligence that much more difficult to obtain and even more vital than in previous conflicts. The normal movements of tanks, ships, and aircrafts that, in traditional armed conflict are indicia of a pending attack are not the case in the current "fourth generation" war. Thus, the need for intelligence becomes an even greater concern for the commanders in the field as well as the Commander-in-Chief.

**Terrorism causes global nuclear war**

**Sid-Ahmed 04** (Mohamed, Egyptian Political Analyst, Al-Ahram Newspaper, 8/26, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

## 3

#### Plan creates labor drain, triggering Mexican economic collapse

**Bishop 13** (Marlon, The World, PRI's The World is a one-hour, weekday radio news magazine offering a mix of news, features, interviews, and music from around the globe; High-Tech Manufacturing Driving Economy in Mexico, [http://www.theworld.org/2013/02/mexico-manufacturing/](http://www.theworld.org/2013/02/mexico-manufacturing/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Volkswagen first came to Mexico in 1967, when it opened a plant in Puebla, a few hours drive from Mexico City. For decades, the Bug was the biggest-selling car in the country. Today, the Puebla plant has expanded to become the largest auto factory in North America, employing 18,000 people. It’s a state-of-the-art facility full of industrial robots and blinking computer equipment. The plant has the capacity to produce 2,500 cars a day, in popular models such as the Jetta and Golf. After rolling off the line, the cars are packed into trains and shipped off to retailers. Most of them are sold abroad. Mexico is now the eighth biggest auto producer in the world, as well as the world’s fourth biggest exporter, according to the Mexican Automotive Industry Association. In 2012, the country produced almost 3 million cars, a national record. Expertssay those numbers are on track to keep growing. “Mexico is becoming quite an automotive powerhouse,” says Thomas Karig, a vice president at Volkswagen Mexico. Karig says Mexico is an attractive place for car companies to set up shop for several reasons: a great location for exporting to North and South America, an open trade policy, and experience in the work force. Last September, Audi, a Volkswagen subsidiary, announced the construction of a new plant nearby. They’ll be assembling the luxury Q5 SUV. Eduardo Solís, president of the Mexican Automotive Industry Association, says it’s a watershed moment for the country. “There is an important element here where Mexico is, currently in the automotive industry, associated with good quality, with good products,” says Solís. “We have been scaling up in the value chain.” VW Factory in Puebla, Mexico (Photo: VW Mexico) VW Factory in Puebla, Mexico (Photo: VW Mexico) Until recently, Mexico’s economy was based on low-paying, labor-intensive industries like textiles. About a decade ago, those industries started fleeing to China or Central America, where it’s even cheaper to operate. But now, Mexico is growing big-time in better-paying industries, like autos, aerospace, and technology, which require better-educated workers. Hector Muñoz, a 48-year-old technician at Volkswagen, is a living example of that change. Muñoz comes from a family of street vendors, and scored a job at Volkswagen after an uncle got him interested in fixing up cars. After 20 years working on the VW line, he makes 12,000 pesos a month. That comes out to only about $30 US a day, but its six times minimum wage in Mexico, putting him squarely in the country’s middle class. Thanks to this job, he’s been able to put his kids through college. Two of them are now engineers, a fact he’s really proud of. “Before there weren’t as many opportunities as there are now,” says Muñoz. In my case, being at Volkswagen has really encouraged me to push my kids to learn more, to get better educations.” There are a lot of others like Muñoz. According to the World Bank, 17 percent of Mexico’s population joined the middle class between 2003 and 2009,now making up almost a quarter of the population. But there’s a long way to go – half of Mexico still lives below the poverty line. Victor Piz, editor of Mexico’s chief financial newspaper El Financiero, says those people are being left out this high-tech boom. “I think the main problem in Mexico is the distribution of revenue coming into the country,” says Piz. “None of it goes into the pockets of Mexico’s poor. This wealth doesn’t matter to them because they’re not receiving any benefit from it.” Piz *also* warns that Mexico could have a problem sustaining its recent growth*– almost 4 percent for two straight years –*because it relies too heavily onone trading partner, the US.Mexico has free trade agreements like NAFTA with 44 countries, but still overwhelminglyexports to its neighbor to the North. “When the United States turns off its engines, inevitably, Mexico also has to turn off its engines as well,” says Piz. Today, Mexico City traffic is no longer a sea of VW Bugs. There are the gleaming Lexuses of the wealthy, and the Nissans of the country’s middle class – not to mention the mini-buses that transport the working poor. But taxis are still being made in Mexico. New York City’s brand new taxi fleet is currently in production at a Nissan plant in Cuernavaca.

#### That allows drug wars and state collapse

**Barnes 11** – Bonner Means Baker Fellow at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (Joe, 4/29/11, “Oil and U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations,” <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf>)

In summary, the slow decline of Mexican oil production, in and of itself, is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on international petroleum markets or prompt any dramatic response from the United States. There is, however, one set of circumstances which this decline would capture Washington's attention. That is the extent to which it contributes to significant instability in Mexico. There is already a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico. As noted, the country is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence. Even if the Mexican governmenteventually succeeds in its efforts to suppress this violence, the process is likely to be expensive, bloody, and corrosive in terms of human rights. A period of feeble economic growth, combined with a fiscal crisis associated with a drop in revenues from Pemex, could create a "perfect storm" south of the border. If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond. In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.4 There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico's aid in an economic emergency. In 1994, the United States extended USS20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole.5 Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States. To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive. It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome. Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex's development into something like Norway's Statol would mark an important improvement.36

#### This results in U.S. isolationism

**Haddick 08** – Advisor to the State Department and the National Intelligence Council on irregular warfare issues; Editor of the Small Arms Journal; Former Director of Research at the Fremont Group; former Marine Corps Officer; published in the New York Post and The Wall Street Journal (Robert, 12/21/2008, “Now that would change everything,” <http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html>)

There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse:Pakistan andMexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexicanpossibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns outover the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state.Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Yes, the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security environment.Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government, indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.

#### Great Power War

**Zhang and Shi 11** – Both MA candidates at Columbia University. \*Yuhan, researcher @ Carnegie Endowment for international peace and \*\*Lin, consultant for the World Bank. (1/22/2011, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>)

Paul Kennedy was probably right: the US will go the way of all great powers — down. The individual dramas of the past decade — the September 2001 terrorist attacks, prolonged wars in the Middle East and the financial crisis — have delivered the world a message: US primacy is in decline. This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisationbarriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Mexican state failure triggers escalating wars—draws in the US

Debusmann 9 – senior World Affairs columnist (Bernd, “Among top U.S. fears: A failed Mexican state” New York Times, January 9 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/americas/09iht-letter.1.19217792.html>)

What doPakistan and Mexicohave in common? They figure in the nightmares of U.S. militaryplanners tryingtopeer into the future and identify the next big threats.¶The two countries are mentioned in the same breath in ajust-published studyby the United States Joint Forces Command, whose jobs include providing an annual look into the future to prevent the U.S.military from being caught off guardby unexpected developments.¶ "In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico," says the study - called Joint Operating Environment 2008 - in a chapter on "weak and failing states." Such states, it says, usually posechronic, long-term problems that can be managed over time.¶ But the little-studied phenomenon of "rapid collapse," according to the study, "usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems." Think Yugoslavia and its disintegration in 1990 into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities and bloodshed on a horrific scale.¶ Nuclear-armed Pakistan, where Al Qaeda has established safe havens in the rugged regions bordering Afghanistan, is a regular feature in dire warnings. Thomas Fingar, who retired as the chief U.S. intelligence analyst in December, termed Pakistan "one of the single most challenging places on the planet."¶ This is fairly routine language for Pakistan, but not for Mexico, which shares a 2,000-mile, or 3,200-kilometer, border with the United States.¶Mexico's mentionbeside Pakistan in a study by an organization as weighty as the Joint Forces Command, which controls almost all conventional forces based in the continental United States, speaks volumes aboutgrowing concernover what is happening south of the U.S.border.¶Vicious and widening violence pitting drug cartels against each other and against the Mexican state have left more than 8,000 Mexicans deadover the past two years. Kidnappings have become a routine part of Mexican daily life. Common crime is widespread. Pervasive corruption has hollowed out the state.¶ In November, in a case that shocked even those (on both sides of the border) who consider corruption endemic in Mexico, the former drug czar NoéRamírez was charged with accepting at least $450,000 a month in bribes from a drug cartel in exchange for information about police and anti-narcotics operations.¶ A month later, a Mexican army major, Arturo González, was arrested on suspicion that he sold information about President Felipe Calderón's movements for $100,000 a month. González belonged to a special unit responsible for protecting the president.¶ Depending on one's view, the arrests are successes in a publicly declared anticorruption drive or evidence of how deeply criminal mafias have penetrated the organs of the state.¶ According to the Joint Forces study, a sudden collapse in Mexico is less likely than in Pakistan, "but the government, its politicians, police, andjudicialinfrastructureareall undersustained assault and pressureby criminal gangs and drug cartels. Howthat internalconflictturns outover the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state."¶It added: "Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implicationsforhomeland securityalone."

#### Illegal immigration is down

Nasser 12 [Haya el Nasser; USA Today; More Mexicans returning home, fewer immigrating to U.S.; <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-04-23/mexican-immigration-united-states/54487564/1>; Demographic reporter for USA Today]

The influx of Mexicans, which has dominated U.S. immigration patterns for four decades, began to tumble in 2006 and 2007 as the housing bust and recession created a dearth of jobs. At the same time, the number of Mexicans returning to their native country along with their U.S.-born children soared.¶ Stricter border enforcement, more deportations and tough state immigration laws such as the Arizona statute being challenged before the Supreme Court on Wednesday probably also contributed to the shift, says Jeffrey Passel, lead author of the report. The study analyzed data from censuses and a variety of other sources in both countries.¶ STORY: Supreme Court weighs fate of immigration law¶ "There was a suspicion that people were going back" but results of the Mexican census confirmed it, he says. "They point to a fairly large number of people going back to Mexico."¶From 2005 to 2010, 1.4 million Mexicans came to the USA— down by more than half from the 3 million who came from 1995 to 2000. From 2005 to 2010 ,the number of Mexicans who moved from the USA to Mexico rose to 1.4 million, roughly double the number who had done so 10 years before.¶ Passel says the data suggest that the return flow to Mexico probably surpassed the incoming flow in the last two years

#### Turn – Guest worker program boosts illegal immigration – empirics prove

Matthews 1/30 [Dylan Matthews; January 30, 2013; We’ve tried guest worker programs before. They don’t work.; Dylan Matthews is a reporter for the Washington Post specializing in data and number analysis; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/30/weve-tried-guest-worker-programs-before-they-dont-work/>]

So whatever Obama’s position ends up being this time around, which one is right? Are guest worker programs a workable alternative to a pathway to citizenship for some low-skill workers? Most experts argue no. “I find it slightly amazing that the phrase ‘guest worker program’ still gets used with a straight face in Washington,” remarks Boston College political scientist Peter Skerry, who specializes in immigration policy and the politics around it. The two most-studied guest worker programs are the Bracero Program — a program for Mexican workers coming to the U.S. that was in place from 1942 to 1964 — and the West German “Gastarbeiter” program in the 1960s and ’70s, which allowed in workers from Italy, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Portugal. The latter program was mimicked, usually at a smaller scale, in the Netherlands and Belgium as well as in East Germany (whose workers generally came from Vietnam). Living under Bracero Workers in the Braceros Program. (Source: University of California — Santa Cruz) The most common analysis holds that the programs were far less temporary than initially intended. “Most students of the Bracero Program would argue that they were, in great part, the beginning of our illegal immigrant problem,” Skerry explains. Before then, many Mexicans didn’t have the information or means to get to the U.S. Bracero both made emigration desirable and provided a ready means.“They were started in 1942, at a time when Mexico wasn’t that developed, and it wasn’t so easy to get here, in terms of roads and railroads and means of transportation,” Skerry continues. “It’s something that has to get opened up, so [Bracero] had the effect of kind of exposing this opportunity to lots of Mexican workers and peasants, and that really helped build these kinds of networks and patterns where people came and moved north to come here and work.” Some of those people bolted into the U.S. and never returned. While the public reputation of the Bracero Program holds that it led to employer abuse, Michael Snodgrass, a Latin American historian at Indiana University who has studied the program, has a slightly more optimistic take. “The more the program has been studied, we’re finding it was not as exploitative as has often been portrayed,” he explains. In the early going, in fact, employer abuses were fairly rare due to rigorous enforcement on the part of Mexican consular officials in the United States, who advocated on behalf of the program’s participants. It didn’t hurt, Snodgrass adds, that many Bracero participants got their spots as a result of patronage from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ran the Mexican government from 1929 to 2000 (and regained power in last year’s elections). PRI had an incentive to make sure its people were treated well. And it used what powers it had. “They had the right to blacklist entire U.S. counties if it was found that growers there were violating the provisions of the initial agreement,” Snodgrass tells me. “There are cases of counties from the Delta region of Mississippi, and Arkansas and Oregon being kicked out of the program.” But that only worked when relatively few people were coming across the border. After World War II, their ranks swelled and enforcement of labor standards waned. There just weren’t enough Mexican officials to protect that many people.”The biggest complaint I’ve heard is that once they got into the United States, the one right they did not have is to leave their employers,” Snodgrass continues. “You were assigned to a growers’ association, you didn’t know if you’d harvest cotton in Texas or tomatoes in California. If it was a bad harvest you could make no money, so some decided I’m not going to use the program because of these limitations or I’ll use it to get in and then skip out.” How many stuck around? Gastarbeiter program participants in Frankfurt, 1959. (Bildarchiv Prussian Cultural Heritage / AbisagTüllmann Archives) Snodgrass notes that many Mexicans used the program exactly as intended, returning home after their stint ended. Some would go to the U.S. for a few months and then return, living off their much higher American wages for the rest of the year. But he concedes, as Skerry says, that some used the program as a way to get in permanently.That also happened in Germany. JagdishBhagwati, an economist at Columbia and the Council on Foreign Relations who has studied the German program, quotes the Swiss-German writer Max Frisch: “We asked for workers. We got people instead.” As with Bracero, it proved hard to ensure that all participants used the program in the intended temporary fashion. “Even though the contracts said these people could be sent back, when it came to the crunch, it was impossible to do that,” Bhagwati continues. “Even if it was called temporary, it would turn into de facto permanent.” Skerry agrees. “People came in on temporary work visas in Germany, and they didn’t go back, like they were supposed to,” he tells me. The current system isn’t immune to this kind of gaming. People overstay their visas all the time. And some of those cases end in people going legit, even without a “path to citizenship” along the lines being discussed in Congress. Bhagwati cites a study by GuillerminaJasso, Douglas Massey, Mark Rosenzweig and James Smith that found that about 32 percent of immigrants who were granted legal status in 1996 were previously illegal residents. What’s more, 19 percent had entered illegally too, while just 12 percent were overstaying a visa (another 2.22 percent or so were otherwise illegally here; the numbers don’t add up perfectly due to rounding). But a guest worker program will, in all likelihood, push that number even higher.

#### Mexican border not key – US-Canada border is vastly less secure

Mora, 11 (Edwin Mora, a economist, professor and pro-independence leader in Puerto Rico, “Canadian Border Bigger Terror Threat Than Mexican Border, Says Border Patrol Chief”, May 18 2011, CNS News, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/canadian-border-bigger-terror-threat-mexican-border-says-border-patrol-chief, //nikp)

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency has apprehended more suspected terrorists on the nation’s northern border than along its southern counterpart, CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin said Tuesday. “In terms of the terrorist threat, it’s commonly accepted that the more significant threat” comes from the U.S.-Canada border, Bersin told a hearing of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security. Bersin attributed the situation, in part, to the fact that the U.S. and Canada do not share information about people placed on their respective “no-fly” lists. As a result, individuals deemed a threat who fly into one country may then cross the land border into the other. “Because of the fact that we do not share no-fly [list] information and the Canadians will not, we are more than we would like confronted with the fact where a [person designated as a] no-fly has entered Canada and then is arrested coming across one of our bridges into the United States,” he said. As it screens air travelers, the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration places individuals who are considered a threat to aviation on a no-fly list, which is a subset of the terrorist watchlist. Bersin’s comments came after the subcommittee’s ranking Republican, Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, asked him about the relative numbers of people apprehended along the northern and southern borders. He responded that the detentions and arrests along the border with Canada were “a small, small fraction” when compared to the number apprehended in the south. 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Last March, the senator told a conference on border security that of those 59,000 people, 663 came “from special-interest countries like Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen and from countries that have been designated by the U.S. Department of State as state-sponsors of terror – Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan.” Speaking to reporters after Tuesday’s hearing, Bersin said his agency has recorded more cases of people with suspected terrorist backgrounds or links to terror organizations entering the U.S. from Canada than from Mexico. “That doesn’t mean that we’re not looking for it on both borders, south and north,” he said. Bersin said people who are on the no-fly list for a variety of reasons may enter Canada, “because they’re entitled under Canadian laws to do so, and then they attempt to cross into the United States” by way of bridge or tunnel border crossings. “CBP officers have stopped that,” he said, but without quantifying the number of suspected terrorist arrests by CBP. Bersin told reporters Canadian authorities do not act on no-fly list information provided by the U.S. government if it affects a Canadian citizen. This, he said, creates a security gap. “Under the Canadian charter – as that’s been interpreted to me – they do not believe that they can accept information that would affect Canadian citizens, and therefore don’t. “But we’re constantly working with our Canadian partners to develop mechanism and modes of information exchange [so] that, as far as legally possible, we can close that gap. And we’ll continue to do that.” ‘Known presence of terrorist organizations’ A December 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that “the risk of terrorist activity is high” on the northern border. The report noted that according to the assessment of the U.S. Border Patrol – a component of CBP – only 32 of the nearly 4,000 miles of the U.S.-Canada border “had reached an acceptable level of control” in 2010. The rest, it said, were “defined as vulnerable to exploitation due to issues related to accessibility and resource availability and, as a result, there is a high degree of reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone.” The GAO report also noted that in the Blaine sector – the Border Patrol sector that includes Oregon and the western half of Washington state – there is a “known presence of terrorist organizations” near the border. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton, who testified alongside Bersin Tuesday, told the Senate panel that his agency has about 1,500 enforcement and removal officers on the northern border – the “largest law-enforcement footprint of any U.S agency in Canada.” “We removed about 47,000 illegal aliens from the northern border region, roughly half of whom are criminal offenders,” added Morton. The issue of drug-smuggling over the northern border also came up during the hearing. In his prepared remarks, Bersin said that CBP interdicts around 40,000 pounds of illegal drugs each year at and between points of entry along the northern border.

#### Aff can’t solve border security – border patrol is bad

Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)

The ambiguity and expansiveness of the new border security mission is paralleled by the Border Patrol’s apparent inability to evaluate the threats and risks to border security and to assess the degree to which the border is secure. The Border Patrol has squandered much of the goodwill, trust and credibility that resounded to its border control mission after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The billions of dollars wasted in flawed high-tech projects, and the agency’s unwillingness to subject its many new border-security initiatives to cost-benefit evaluations and risk-based assessments, have given rise to new skepticism about border policy. The Border Patrol rightly links its security mission to an assessment of risks and threats and to a new risk-management commitment. Yet, as has been the practice of the Border Patrol both before and after 9/11, there is no evidence that the agency has instituted rigorous risk-based strategies for its operations and resource distributions. The Border Patrol implicitly equates numbers and threats. In the post-9/11 lexicon, all illegal entries are defined as threats. Rather than undertaking traditional threat assessments, the Border Patrol has dumbed down its definitions of threats and risks. Its risk-based, intelligence-driven strategy, therefore, identifies the areas of highest risk as the areas of the border with the highest number of illegal entries. \*Securing the Border Against Foreign Terrorists\* \* \*The Border Patrol asserts that its main mission is to protect the homeland against terrorists and terrorist weapons. The joint mission of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol states: We are the guardians of our Nation’s borders. We are America’s frontline. We safeguard the American homeland at and beyond our borders. We protect the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror. Inexplicably, the agency has never included terrorism protection as a performance indicator.Nor has the Border Patrol offered any evidence that its “intelligence-driven” border security programs actually focus on terrorists and terrorist networks.

#### Border security is fine now – tech and deterrence

Alden 12 (Edward, Winter 2012, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow- writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, CATO institute.“Immigration and Border Control”

http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/1/cj32n1-8.pdf)

For the past two decades the United States, a country with a strong tradition of limited government, has been pursuing a widely popular initiative that requires one of the most ambitious expansions of government power in modern history: securing the nation’s borders against illegal immigration. Congress and successive administrations— both Democratic and Republican—have increased the size of the Border Patrol from fewer than 3,000 agents to more than 21,000, built nearly 700 miles of fencing along the southern border with Mexico, and deployed pilotless drones, sensor cameras, and other expensive technologies aimed at preventing illegal crossings at the land borders. The government has overhauled the visa system to require interviews for all new visa applicants and instituted extensive background checks for many of those wishing to come to the United States to study, travel, visit family, or do business. It now requires secure documents—a passport or the equivalent—for all travel to and from the United States by citizens and noncitizens. And border officers take fingerprints and run other screening measures on all travelers coming to this country by air in order to identify criminals, terrorists, or others deemed to pose a threat to the United States. The goal is to create a border control system that ensures that only those legally permitted by the government to enter the territory of the United States will be able to do so, and that they will leave the country when required. The ambition of such an undertaking is little appreciated. For most of its history, the United States had only the loosest sort of border controls. Scrutiny of most visa applicants was cursory; few checks were done on incoming airline passengers; and it was possible to walk freely across almost any portion of the more than 7,500 miles of land borders with Mexico or Canada (Alden 2008). That began to change gradually in the 1980s with the increase in illegal immigration from Mexico, and then more rapidly in the early 1990s following a political outcry from U.S. border states, especially California. The border control effort was greatly accelerated after the 9/11 attacks, becoming the primary mission of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created in 2003. Yet some two decades along, border control remains a work in progress. Most Americans remain unconvinced that border security is improving; a Rasmussen poll taken in May 2011 found that two-thirds of the public believe the border with Mexico is not secure. While budget constraints will slow the extraordinarily rapid growth of border enforcement, the Obama administration and Congress are determined to continue tightening border control and further reducing illegal entries An in-depth stocktaking of the costs and benefits of this effort to date is long overdue. But at least three interim conclusions can be reached. First, the U.S. borders are far harder to cross illegally than at any time in American history, and the number of people entering illegally has dropped sharply. Evading border enforcement has become more difficult, more expensive, and more uncertain than ever before. But border control will always remain imperfect; it is not possible for the United States to create a perfectly secure border, and that should not be the goal.

#### Illegal immigration is down

Nasser 12 [Haya el Nasser; USA Today; More Mexicans returning home, fewer immigrating to U.S.; <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-04-23/mexican-immigration-united-states/54487564/1>; Demographic reporter for USA Today]

The influx of Mexicans, which has dominated U.S. immigration patterns for four decades, began to tumble in 2006 and 2007 as the housing bust and recession created a dearth of jobs. At the same time, the number of Mexicans returning to their native country along with their U.S.-born children soared.¶ Stricter border enforcement, more deportations and tough state immigration laws such as the Arizona statute being challenged before the Supreme Court on Wednesday probably also contributed to the shift, says Jeffrey Passel, lead author of the report. The study analyzed data from censuses and a variety of other sources in both countries.¶ STORY: Supreme Court weighs fate of immigration law¶ "There was a suspicion that people were going back" but results of the Mexican census confirmed it, he says. "They point to a fairly large number of people going back to Mexico."¶From 2005 to 2010, 1.4 million Mexicans came to the USA— down by more than half from the 3 million who came from 1995 to 2000. From 2005 to 2010 ,the number of Mexicans who moved from the USA to Mexico rose to 1.4 million, roughly double the number who had done so 10 years before.¶ Passel says the data suggest that the return flow to Mexico probably surpassed the incoming flow in the last two years

#### Turn – Guest worker program boosts illegal immigration – empirics prove

Matthews 1/30 [Dylan Matthews; January 30, 2013; We’ve tried guest worker programs before. They don’t work.; Dylan Matthews is a reporter for the Washington Post specializing in data and number analysis; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/30/weve-tried-guest-worker-programs-before-they-dont-work/>]

So whatever Obama’s position ends up being this time around, which one is right? Are guest worker programs a workable alternative to a pathway to citizenship for some low-skill workers? Most experts argue no. “I find it slightly amazing that the phrase ‘guest worker program’ still gets used with a straight face in Washington,” remarks Boston College political scientist Peter Skerry, who specializes in immigration policy and the politics around it. The two most-studied guest worker programs are the Bracero Program — a program for Mexican workers coming to the U.S. that was in place from 1942 to 1964 — and the West German “Gastarbeiter” program in the 1960s and ’70s, which allowed in workers from Italy, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Portugal. The latter program was mimicked, usually at a smaller scale, in the Netherlands and Belgium as well as in East Germany (whose workers generally came from Vietnam). Living under Bracero Workers in the Braceros Program. (Source: University of California — Santa Cruz) The most common analysis holds that the programs were far less temporary than initially intended. “Most students of the Bracero Program would argue that they were, in great part, the beginning of our illegal immigrant problem,” Skerry explains. Before then, many Mexicans didn’t have the information or means to get to the U.S. Bracero both made emigration desirable and provided a ready means.“They were started in 1942, at a time when Mexico wasn’t that developed, and it wasn’t so easy to get here, in terms of roads and railroads and means of transportation,” Skerry continues. “It’s something that has to get opened up, so [Bracero] had the effect of kind of exposing this opportunity to lots of Mexican workers and peasants, and that really helped build these kinds of networks and patterns where people came and moved north to come here and work.” Some of those people bolted into the U.S. and never returned. While the public reputation of the Bracero Program holds that it led to employer abuse, Michael Snodgrass, a Latin American historian at Indiana University who has studied the program, has a slightly more optimistic take. “The more the program has been studied, we’re finding it was not as exploitative as has often been portrayed,” he explains. In the early going, in fact, employer abuses were fairly rare due to rigorous enforcement on the part of Mexican consular officials in the United States, who advocated on behalf of the program’s participants. It didn’t hurt, Snodgrass adds, that many Bracero participants got their spots as a result of patronage from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ran the Mexican government from 1929 to 2000 (and regained power in last year’s elections). PRI had an incentive to make sure its people were treated well. And it used what powers it had. “They had the right to blacklist entire U.S. counties if it was found that growers there were violating the provisions of the initial agreement,” Snodgrass tells me. “There are cases of counties from the Delta region of Mississippi, and Arkansas and Oregon being kicked out of the program.” But that only worked when relatively few people were coming across the border. After World War II, their ranks swelled and enforcement of labor standards waned. There just weren’t enough Mexican officials to protect that many people.”The biggest complaint I’ve heard is that once they got into the United States, the one right they did not have is to leave their employers,” Snodgrass continues. “You were assigned to a growers’ association, you didn’t know if you’d harvest cotton in Texas or tomatoes in California. If it was a bad harvest you could make no money, so some decided I’m not going to use the program because of these limitations or I’ll use it to get in and then skip out.” How many stuck around? Gastarbeiter program participants in Frankfurt, 1959. (Bildarchiv Prussian Cultural Heritage / AbisagTüllmann Archives) Snodgrass notes that many Mexicans used the program exactly as intended, returning home after their stint ended. Some would go to the U.S. for a few months and then return, living off their much higher American wages for the rest of the year. But he concedes, as Skerry says, that some used the program as a way to get in permanently.That also happened in Germany. JagdishBhagwati, an economist at Columbia and the Council on Foreign Relations who has studied the German program, quotes the Swiss-German writer Max Frisch: “We asked for workers. We got people instead.” As with Bracero, it proved hard to ensure that all participants used the program in the intended temporary fashion. “Even though the contracts said these people could be sent back, when it came to the crunch, it was impossible to do that,” Bhagwati continues. “Even if it was called temporary, it would turn into de facto permanent.” Skerry agrees. “People came in on temporary work visas in Germany, and they didn’t go back, like they were supposed to,” he tells me. The current system isn’t immune to this kind of gaming. People overstay their visas all the time. And some of those cases end in people going legit, even without a “path to citizenship” along the lines being discussed in Congress. Bhagwati cites a study by GuillerminaJasso, Douglas Massey, Mark Rosenzweig and James Smith that found that about 32 percent of immigrants who were granted legal status in 1996 were previously illegal residents. What’s more, 19 percent had entered illegally too, while just 12 percent were overstaying a visa (another 2.22 percent or so were otherwise illegally here; the numbers don’t add up perfectly due to rounding). But a guest worker program will, in all likelihood, push that number even higher.

#### Mexican border not key – US-Canada border is vastly less secure

Mora, 11 (Edwin Mora, a economist, professor and pro-independence leader in Puerto Rico, “Canadian Border Bigger Terror Threat Than Mexican Border, Says Border Patrol Chief”, May 18 2011, CNS News, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/canadian-border-bigger-terror-threat-mexican-border-says-border-patrol-chief, //nikp)

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#### Aff doesn’t boost legal immigration – Mexican economy is doing too well

O’Neill 12 [Shannon O’Neill; February 20, 2012; Mexico's Burgeoning Economy Amid Drug Violence; Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at Council on Foreign Relations; http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-burgeoning-economy-amid-drug-violence/p27386]

Despite an escalation in drug violence and thousands of people killed in drug-related murders in Mexico in recent years, Mexico's economy and the tourism industry are thriving, says CFR's Mexico expert, Shannon K. O'Neil. "Mexico was the hardest hit in Latin America" as a result of the global financial crisis, she says, "but it's recovered quite quickly, and in part it's been due to a huge boom in manufacturing along the border tied to U.S. companies and to U.S. consumers." On the contentious issue of Mexican immigrants in the United States, she says fewer Mexicans are immigrating to the United States because of a burgeoning economy and a demographic shift. More broadly, one reason the two countries have failed to find a solution, she says, is because while Mexicans see immigration as a foreign policy issue, the United States continues to treat it as a domestic one.There have been reports about Mexico's thriving economy amid continuing drug violence. Does this sort of ambivalence truly exist in Mexico right now?It is true. Mexico is a place that's seen a huge escalation in violence. Under President Felipe Calderon over the last five years, we've seen almost 50,000 people killed in drug-related murders. But at the same time, Mexico's economy has actually been doing quite well since the end of the global recession. Mexico was the hardest hit in Latin America but it's recovered quite quickly, and in part it's been due to a huge boom in manufacturing along the border tied to U.S. companies and to U.S. consumers. We've seen a boom in tourism. There have been record levels of tourists over the last year in Mexico--to its beaches, to its colonial cities, and to Mexico City. And we've also seen the benefit of high oil prices as Mexico still produces a good amount of oil and much of it for the United States.

#### It doesn’t matter what the Aff does – the agriculture worker shortage is a result of a rich Mexico

Plumer 13 [Brad Plumer; January 29, 2013; We’re running out of farm workers. Immigration reform won’t help; Brad Plumer is a writer for the Washington Post and he cites Edward Taylor a agricultural economist at UC Davis; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/brad-plumer/2011/07/28/gIQAPrqSfI_page.html>]

For years, one of the groups pushing hardest for immigration reform has been the U.S. food industry. Farmers have long grumbled about a shortage of labor, and they’ve asked for policies that make it easier to hire foreign workers from places like Mexico. Getting harder and harder to find. (John Moore – Getty Images) But looser immigration laws may not be able to keep our food cheap forever. A recent study suggests that U.S. farms could well face a shortage of low-cost labor in the years ahead no matter what Congress does on immigration. That’s because Mexico is getting richer and can no longer supply as many rural farm workers to the United States. And it won’t be nearly as easy to import low-wage agricultural workers from elsewhere.

#### Ag labor shortage is because of a good Mexican economy – immigration reform is irrelevant

Plumer 13 [Brad Plumer; January 29, 2013; We’re running out of farm workers. Immigration reform won’t help; Brad Plumer is a writer for the Washington Post and he cites Edward Taylor a agricultural economist at UC Davis; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/brad-plumer/2011/07/28/gIQAPrqSfI_page.html>]

For decades, farms in the United States have relied heavily on low-wage foreign workers — mainly from Mexico — to work their fields. In 2006, 77 percent of all agricultural workers in the United States were foreign-born. (And half of those foreign workers were undocumented immigrants.) All that cheap labor has helped keep down U.S. food prices, particularly for labor-intensive fruits and vegetables. But that labor pool is now drying up. In recent years, we’ve seen a spate of headlines like this from CNBC: “California Farm Labor Shortage ‘Worst It’s Been, Ever’.” Typically, these stories blame drug-related violence on the Mexican border or tougher border enforcement for the decline. Hence the call for new guest-worker programs. But a new paper from U.C. Davis offers up a simpler explanation for the labor shortage. Mexico is getting richer. And, when a country gets richer, its pool of rural agricultural labor shrinks. Not only are Mexican workers shifting into other sectors like construction, but Mexico’s own farms are increasing wages. That means U.S. farms will have to pay higher and higher wages to attract a dwindling pool of available Mexican farm workers. “It’s a simple story,” says Edward Taylor, an agricultural economist at U.C. Davis and one of the study’s authors. ”By the mid-twentieth century, Americans stopped doing farm work. And we were only able to avoid a farm-labor crisis by bringing in workers from a nearby country that was at an earlier stage of development. Now that era is coming to an end.” Taylor and his co-authors argue that the United States could face a sharp adjustment period as a result. Americans appear unwilling to do the sort of low-wage farm work that we have long relied on immigrants to do. And, the paper notes, it may be difficult to find an abundance of cheap farm labor anywhere else — potential targets such as Guatemala and El Salvador are either too small or are urbanizing too rapidly.

#### Can’t fill labor void—Mexico is getting richer and labor pool is shrinking

Washington Post 1/29

(“We’re running out of farm workers. Immigration reform won’t help.” 2013 pg online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/29/the-u-s-is-running-out-of-farm-workers-immigration-reform-may-not-help///sd)

For years, one of the groups pushing hardest for immigration reform has been the U.S. food industry. Farmers have long grumbled about a shortage of labor, and they’ve asked for policies that make it easier to hire foreign workers from places like Mexico. Getting harder and harder to find. (John Moore – Getty Images) But looser immigration laws may not be able to keep our food cheap forever. A recent study suggests that U.S. farms could well face a shortage of low-cost laborin the years ahead no matter what Congress does on immigration. That’s because Mexico is getting richer and can no longer supply as many rural farm workers to the United States. And it won’t be nearly as easy to import low-wage agricultural workers from elsewhere. For decades, farms in theUnited Stateshave relied heavily on low-wage foreign workers — mainly from Mexico — to work their fields. In 2006, 77 percent of all agricultural workers in the United States were foreign-born. (And half of those foreign workers were undocumented immigrants.) All that cheap labor has helped keep down U.S. food prices, particularly for labor-intensive fruits and vegetables. But that labor pool is now drying up. In recent years, we’ve seen a spate of headlines like this from CNBC: “California Farm Labor Shortage ‘Worst It’s Been, Ever’.” Typically, these stories blame drug-related violence on the Mexican border or tougher border enforcement for the decline. Hence the call for new guest-worker programs. But a new paper from U.C. Davis offers up a simpler explanation for the labor shortage. Mexico is getting richer. And, when a country gets richer, its pool of rural agricultural labor shrinks.Not only areMexican workersshifting into other sectors like construction, but Mexico’s own farms are increasing wages. That means U.S. farms will have to pay higher and higher wages to attract a dwindling pool of available Mexican farm workers. “It’s a simple story,”says Edward Taylor, an agricultural economist at U.C. Davis and one of the study’s authors. ”By the mid-twentieth century, Americans stopped doing farm work. And we were only able to avoid a farm-labor crisis by bringing in workers from a nearby country that was at an earlier stage of development. Now that era is coming to an end.” Taylor and his co-authors argue that the United States could face a sharp adjustment period as a result. Americans appear unwilling to do the sort of low-wage farm work that we have long relied on immigrants to do. And, the paper notes, it may be difficult to find an abundance of cheap farm labor anywhere else — potential targets such as Guatemala and El Salvador are either too small or are urbanizing too rapidly. So the labor shortages will keep getting worse. And that leaves several choices. American farmers could simply stop growing crops that need a lot of workers to harvest, such as fruits and vegetables. Given the demand for fresh produce, that seems unlikely. Alternatively, U.S. farms could continue to invest in new labor-saving technologies, such as “shake-and-catch” machines to harvest fruits and nuts. “Under this option,” the authors write, “capital improvements in farm production would increase the marginal product of farm labor; U.S. farms would hire fewer workers and pay higher wages.” That could be a boon to domestic workers — studies have found that 23 percent of U.S. farm worker families are below the poverty line. In the meantime, however, farm groups are hoping they can fend off that day of reckoning by revamping the nation’s immigration laws. The bipartisan immigration-reform proposal unveiled in the Senate on Monday contained several provisions aimed at boosting the supply of farm workers, including the promise of an easier path to citizenship. Taylor, however, is not convinced that this is a viable long-term strategy. “The idea that you can design a guest-worker program or any other immigration policy to solve this farm labor problem isn’t realistic,” he says. “It assumes that there’s a willingness to keep doing farm work on the other side of the border. And that’s already dropping off.”

#### US immigration policy isn’t key – Mexicans don’t want to come to the US any more

Siegler 4/30 [Kirk Siegler; April 30, 2013; Why An Immigration Deal Won't Solve The Farmworker Shortage; Siegler is a correspondent for NPR specializing in immigration policy <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/04/30/180053057/why-an-immigration-deal-wont-solve-the-farmworker-shortage>]

Agriculture economist Ed Taylor at the University of California, Davis, says that decline has little to do with U.S. immigration policy.Taylor's research suggests that declining birth rates in rural Mexico, where the economy has also improved in recent years, is the reason why fewer migrants are coming to the U.S. And since farms in Mexico have also expanded to meet the year-round produce demands north of the border, why risk going north?"Many [American] farmers also have this sense that, if Washington can just get its house in order and pass immigration reform, their problems will be over, and that isn't what our research is showing," Taylor says. Farms here are going to have to learn how to do more with less immigrant labor, Taylor says. That means switching to less labor-intensive crops, or mechanization.

#### No solvency—demographics means Mexicans won’t migrate

Duleep 13 (Harriet Orcutt Duleep is a Professor of Policy @ the College of William & Mary; ‘U.S. Immigration Policy at a Crossroads’ [http://ssrn.com/abstract=2203326](http://ssrn.com/abstract%3D2203326) // LShen
Mexican immigrants are typically poorly educated; they are much more likely than U.S. natives, and almost all other immigrant groups, to lack a high-school degree. Within the Mexican immigrant population in the U.S., illegal immigrants have lower levels of schooling than legal immigrants (e.g. Rivera-Batiz, 1999). One could thus surmise that the problem of illegal immigration—and more generally the immigration of poorly educated individuals—stems from our shared border with Mexico, and that these issues would disappear with demographic and economic changes in our south-of-the-border neighbor. A country’s age distribution is a potent predictor of streams of potential immigrants;1 most adult immigrants are young.2 Another key predictor of migratory streams is a country’s level of economic development.At the very lowest levels of economic development, people do not migrate: When a certain economic threshold is passed, migration from poor to rich regions begins.3 Once started, the migration persists, following the networks and paths of earlier migrants. As the source-country/destination-country differential in economic development narrows, migration decreases.