=Advantage One– Mexican Collapse=

\*\*====Mexican state collapse is imminent without sufficient financial capital- needs a stable energy sector====\*\*

Vail 9 (Intelligence Analyst at Department of the Interior Intelligence Officer at US Air Force March 8, 2009 Oil Drum http://www.theoildrum.com/node/5172)//GV

It~’s been difficult to read a paper or watch the news recently without hearing about the growing troubles in Mexico. The US military~’s Joint Forces Command issued their Joint Operating Environment 2008 report recently that listed Mexico and Pakistan as the most likely states to collapse in the immediate future (PDF, see p.35 for analysis of Mexico). Even 60 minutes ran a segment about the rising drug violence. Of course, readers are probably already aware that a root cause of the problems in Mexico is the precipitous decline of Mexican oil production and an even faster decline in the level of oil exports. Add to that declining remittance incomes being sent home by migrant workers in America, declining tourist revenues, and lower revenue per barrel of oil exported, and the Mexican state is experiencing a severe financial crunch. While the fiscal stability of the Mexican state is impacted by continually declining oil production and oil exports that are declining even faster, this impact is mitigated to some extent because PEMEX hedged the majority of its oil production through 2009 at roughly %2470/barrel. Depending on the price of oil in 2010, Mexican oil revenues stand to drop off a cliff as PEMEX loses hedge coverage. Does this mean the Mexican state is finished? The current crack-down by the Mexican military and federal police is, I think, best seen as a last-ditch effort to save the state. But it is also evidence that, by the very existence of this pitched battle, the state retains enough viability to pose a threat, and therefore to be targeted. In military theory, pitched battles are only consciously joined by both sides when both have an incentive to risk the main body of their force—-either because they think they can win a decisive victory or because they are running out of the political, logistical, or economic ability to sustain their army in the field and must seek a decisive action while they can. Clearly the drug cartels smell blood—-and tactics like forcing the resignation of the Juarez police chief by killing one or more police officers every 48 hours demonstrate their desire for a decisive engagement. Additionally, the motivation behind a recent truce among rival drug cartels may be to facilitate~~[are in~~] a joint offensive against the government. In my opinion, the Mexican government is seeking a pitched battle for the second reason—with their oil hedges only in place through 2009, and with oil production, remittance income, and tourism dollars poised to continue a sharp decline, the state may not have much more than a year of financial viability in which to cripple the drug cartels. While a pitched battle may be politically expedient for the state, I think the cartels are too widespread and deeply ingrained to be defeated militarily. Salvation for the Mexican state will require regaining the long-term ability to compete with the cartels as a provider of social order and economic activity—-something that cannot be gained on the battlefield. At a minimum, in order to finance its ongoing viability, the state needs significantly higher oil prices to increase export revenue or a rapid recovery in the US to generate an increase in remittance income. Given the current economic climate, the occurrence of both of these seems highly unlikely—-there is simply no way of knowing where the tipping point lies, whether either one of these factors, or both, can save the Mexican state from eventual collapse. And without a renewed fiscal foundation, the eventual collapse of the Mexican state seems inevitable…

====US biofuel investment solves ====

\*\*McDonald 9\*\* – JD and MBA @ U Mississippi, LLM in International Legal Studies @ American (Jeff, "Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the United States," ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)

Additionally, Mexican agricultural resources are scant in comparison to its North American counterparts.113 In fact, only 12% of Mexico~’s land is considered arable, with less than 3% of that land being irrigated.114 Agriculturally, the country has been slow to modernize, failing to take advantage of the ethanol movement and other technological advancements such as genetically modified crops.115 Further, state operated granaries and distribution networks are withering, and agriculture cooperatives may be key to the survival of Mexican agriculture.116 Regardless, the future of Mexican agriculture depends on advances in irrigation, agricultural infrastructure, and mechanization, and these advances will likely only result from foreign direct investment. IV. A Possible Solution? Cooperative Advances in Agriculture and Infrastructure The devastation of Mexican agriculture post-NAFTA, while problematic, may have been an inevitable development.117 The resulting downfall of the Mexican ejido, while initially displacing Mexican farm workers and further weakening Mexican agricultural production, might be viewed as a market correction demanding efficient production and modernization while providing a better economic quality of life for rural Mexicans.118 However, because the Mexican economy may not be able to survive such a correction, the country might benefit from the help of its Northern neighbor. U.S. assistance should consist of both direct aid and investment in Mexico, and concurrent changes in domestic agricultural practices and subsidization. Under comparative trade theory, the U.S. should become Mexico~’s supplier of basic grains, and Mexico should supply most, if not all, of U.S. fruits and vegetables.119 However, special consideration should be given to the socio-economic conditions of the rural Mexican farmer, and Mexican producers of traditional varieties of maize must be protected from market intrusion.120 Part of any agreement must be an inherent interest in mutual socio-cultural preservation. In trade, nations must recognize the higher responsibility to protect vulnerable aspects of one another~’s culture and heritage. As this analysis will demonstrate, the effects of protecting Mexican farmers of white corn will be marginal to U.S. yellow corn farmers as inflated demand for U.S. corn will be eliminated, and any income lost in the Mexican market will be recouped by environmental credits, and the harvesting of biomass for domestic biofuel production. Notwithstanding the need to protect this sector of Mexican agriculture, recent land reforms in Mexico has given rise to increased U.S. interest in contract farming and marketing arrangements. 121 Permitting U.S. firms to operate on Mexican agricultural lands, and invest in its development, will likely enhance Mexican agricultural efficiency, productivity, and profitability, while facilitating land ownership for the Mexican farmer. With Mexican sugar production becoming ever-important in the establishment of a North American biofuel industry, FDI from the United States should focus on the supply and development of agricultural technology, the engineering of biofuel production facilities, and the infrastructure necessary to transport ethanol throughout both countries, and to points of export.

\*\*====Mexican state collapse is on the brink- now is key====\*\*

Hulsman et al 13 (Dr. John C. Hulsman is a successful global political risk consulting firm. A life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Teun van Dongen is an expert in the field of national and international security. He is a PhD candidate at Leiden University and is working on a dissertation about counterterrorism effectiveness. "Mexico between takeoff and collapse – and America~’s dilemma" 2/26/13 -https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/mexico-between-takeoff-and-collapse-%E2%80%93-and-america%E2%80%99s-dilemma)//GV

As if Mexico~’s exceedingly violent drug war wasn~’t disturbing enough, Human Rights Watch recently issued a report in which it brought to light the involvement of Mexican security forces in the "forced disappearances" of at least 149 civilians. It also highlighted cases of collusion of the police and the military with criminal networks, often in the extortion of the victims~’ families. If anything, this report should drive the final nail into the coffin of the Mexican government~’s disastrous, misguided and US-financed military approach in the fight against the country~’s drug cartels. And the report~’s fallout should by no means be limited to Mexico, as President Obama has to wake up to the basic reality of the Mexican crisis. First, the US has an important role to play in bringing about a shift to a more prudent strategy. Second, the US has a big stake in doing so, both because of Mexico~’s wholly unremarked-upon potential, as well as the grave peril the country currently finds itself in. On the plus side (and how many Americans know this?), Mexico is currently America~’s second largest export market, with much discussed China merely being third. After decades of failing to live up to glittering expectations, Mexico now stands a real chance of making it; it will soon have lower labor costs than Beijing. Already Mexican giant Cemex is America~’s largest cement maker, while Univision is presently the fifth largest network in television-obsessed America. Yet all these tantalizing economic possibilities are presently at grave risk, as Mexico is balanced on a knife~’s edge between transformational economic success and startling collapse. Let us be clear about the gravity of the problem: Mexico is being overrun by criminal networks to the point where it is becoming a failed state. The official body count for the period 2006-2011 stands at a staggering 47,515 drug-related deaths, which may well be an undercounting of the carnage (60,000 deaths is probably a better estimate). Entire regions are ruled by the cartels, and there is little to suggest that the Mexican government will soon regain the upper hand, with previous President Felipe Calderon mournfully admitting during his last days in office that given present conditions, it is "impossible to stop the drug trade."

====A Mexican collapse would drain US diplomatic capitol from Asia ====

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(Robert, "Now that would change everything," December 21, http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html)

There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little attention, namely the phenomenon of "rapid collapse." For the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico~~[~’s~~]. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That "perfect storm" of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Yes, the "rapid collapse" of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government, indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.

====Pullout means conflict = Senkaku conflict causes nuclear war====

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Chinese planes flew near Japanese airspace Monday to assert its claims to Japan~’s Senkaku islands (China calls them the Diaoyu islands).¶ The move came just as Japan announced its new prime minister.¶ Hugh White, a professor at Australian National University and a former Australian defense official, believes this is the latest sign the two countries are heading to war.¶ And the U.S. will be dragged in.¶ Writing in the Sydney Morning Herald, White says we are now witnessing the types of conditions that have historically led to war — despite conflict being in no one~’s interest.¶ THIS is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off over something intrinsically worthless. So don~’t be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China next year over the uninhabited rocks that Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyu islands. And don~’t assume the war would be contained and short.¶ ...¶ It seems almost laughably unthinkable that the world~’s three richest countries - two of them nuclear-armed - would go to war over something so trivial. But that is to confuse what starts a war with what causes it.¶ The conflict is really about China challenging the U.S. in the Pacific, White says. President Obama has vowed a Pentagon "pivot to Asia," itself a response to China~’s growing strength.¶ Claiming the Senkaku islands, a series of small outcroppings in the East China Sea, is China~’s way of testing America~’s new posture, White says.¶ And it~’s this kind of tit-for-tat that inevitably causes someone to open fire.¶ The risk is that, without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at some point shots are exchanged, and a spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side could win such a war, and it would be devastating not just for them but for the rest of us.¶ No one wants this, but the crisis will not stop by itself.

=Advantage Two– Agriculture=

====Mexican sugar-based biofuel production shifts the US away from corn ethanol ====

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(Jeff, "Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the United States," ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)

Producing ethanol from sugar, for many reasons, is simply a better option than current corn-based ethanol production.152 Sugar is a much more efficient producer of ethanol than corn, and converting surplus sugar production to ethanol does not put undue pressure on a global staple food. Sugar is also the most feasible ethanol food stock in Mexico, and production facilities can easily be constructed alongside current sugar mills.153 Finally, Mexico may hold a~~[n~~] comparative advantage in sugar production due to its geographical location which provides for more growing area and longer growing seasons than the United States. Notwithstanding the advantages of using sugar as a source for ethanol production, it must be acknowledged that without a further evolution to producing cellulosic ethanol, biofuels may not be the best way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.154 Current cellulosic biofuel technology makes fuel production from biomass, cost-prohibitive in the short-term. However, as the technology becomes economically viable, and as the North American ethanol industry begins to rely on sugar as its primary resource, surplus farmland—previously planted in corn—should be diverted to biomass through land retirement, subsidization, and the demands of the market. As the production of sugar-ethanol migrates to Mexico, the United States can also transition facilities currently devoted to corn-based ethanol to production of ethanol from biomass or cellulosic materials.155 Cellulosic biofuels might be produced from wood, crops or crop residues, or other specialty crops such as switchgrass; Cellulosic materials are generally considered better ethanol feed stocks, can be grown cheaply and efficiently, and do not strain food supplies.156 Diversification from single crop ethanol sources also avoids problems associated with monoculture production.157 Furthermore, the use of native species, or climate-tolerant alternatives offer many advantages. Such feed stocks are adaptable to local soil and water conditions, tend to be more blight resistant, and often require less irrigation, fertilization, tillage, and overall energy input.158 Finally, use of these non-food crops for energy production avoids adverse effects on local and global food markets,159 while contributing to the revitalization of farmland.

====This leads to sustainable framing – solves food-for-fuel tradeoffs====

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(Jeff, "Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the United States," ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)

The problems discussed above, like any potential solutions, are all cyclical and reinforcing in nature. Like many global political and economic issues, each one affects the other. Restoring prosperous farming conditions to Mexico will undoubtedly result in less immigration, as will the creation of industrial and transportation jobs. Conversion to sugar-based ethanol and the establishment of a Mexican and/or American ethanol industry in Mexico creates new jobs and drives production costs for ethanol down, simultaneously easing the pressure on U.S. corn crops, and reducing demand on a global food staple. Ideally, these changes will also be felt at the pump and in larger petroleum policy. Meanwhile, demand for sugar feedstock should alleviate high costs of farm support for domestic sugar, while providing a resurgent cash crop for Mexico. As demand for U.S. corn falls, farmers may have the opportunity to advance biofuel technology and implement sustainable practices, and with this a cycle of reinforcing solutions become more complete. Changes in agricultural practices stimulated by concurrent policy change completes the cycle, incentivizing conservative practices, reducing domestic subsidy payments, encouraging the shift in agricultural policy, and funding the new biofuel industry in Mexico. By paying corn farmers to grow biomass feedstock, essentially ensuring payments equal to the value of the corn harvest less profits from the biomass harvest, the U.S. saves money which would otherwise be spent on farm support. With that "saved" money, the environmental and sugar-ethanol movements can be funded, commencing yet another problem-solving cycle, creating economic growth, easing demands on world food supplies, and easing pressure on U.S. farmlands.

====The impact is global food shocks====

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(Timothy, "US corn ethanol fuels food crisis in developing countries,"http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210993632838545.html)

Record drought in the US farm belt this summer withered corn fields and parched hopes for a record US corn harvest, but US farmers may not be the ones most severely affected by the disaster. Most have insurance against crop failure. Not so the world~’s import-dependent developing countries, nor their poorest consumers. They are hurting. This is the third food price spike in the last five years, and this time the finger is being pointed squarely at biofuels. More specifically, the loss of a quarter or more of the projected US corn harvest has prompted urgent calls for reform in that country~’s corn ethanol programme. Domestically, livestock producers dependent on corn for feed have led demands for change in the US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which mandates that a rising volume of fuel come from renewable sources. Up to now that has been overwhelmingly corn-based ethanol. In November, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will rule on a request for a waiver of the RFS mandate to reduce pressures on US corn supplies. But US livestock producers aren~’t the only ones affected by shortages and high prices. The most devastating impact is on the poor in developing countries, who often use more than half their incomes to buy food. It also hurts low-income developing countries dependent on corn imports. As I showed in my recent study, "The Costs to Developing Countries of US Ethanol Expansion", the US ethanol programme pushed up corn prices by up to 21 per cent as it expanded to consume 40 per cent of the US harvest. This price premium was passed on to corn importers, adding an estimated %2411.6bn to the import bills of the world~’s corn-importing countries since 2005. More than half of that - %246.6bn - was paid by developing countries between 2005 and 2010. The highest cost was borne by the biggest corn importers. Mexico paid %241.1bnmore for its corn, Egypt %24727m. Besides Egypt, North African countries saw particularly high ethanol-related losses: Algeria (%24329m), Morocco (%24236m), Tunisia (%2499m) and Libya (%2468m). Impacts were also high in other strife-torn countries in the region - Syria (%24242m), Iran (%24492m) and Yemen (%2458m). North Africa impacts totalled %241.4bn. Scaled to population size, these economic losses were at least as severe as those seen in Mexico. The link between high food prices and unrest in the region is by now well documented, and US ethanol is contributing to that instability. Biofuel impacts on food prices The debate over biofuels has grown urgent since food prices first spiked in 2007-2008, ushering in a food crisis characterised by repeated jumps in global food prices. Prices for most staple foods doubled, fell when the bubble burst in 2009, then jumped again to their previous high levels in 2010-2011. After a brief respite in the first half of this year, the US drought triggered a new wave of price spikes, the third in just five years. Corn prices were particularly hard-hit, reaching record levels of more than %248.00/bushel, and more than %24300 per metric tonne. Before the first spikes, prices had languished around %24100/metric tonne. Experts have debated how much of the price increases should be blamed on global biofuels expansion. Few argue now that the contribution is small. A US National Academy of Sciences review attributed 20-40 per cent of the 2007-2008 price spikes to global biofuels expansion. Subsequent studies have confirmed this range for the later price increases. Why is the impact so large? Because so much food and feed is now diverted to produce fuel, and so much land is now used for biofuels feedstocks - corn and sugar for ethanol, soybeans, palm oil and a variety of other plants for biodiesel. This rapidly growing market was fuelled by a wide range of government incentives and mandates and by the rising price of petroleum. "That 40 per cent of the US corn crop being put into US cars represents an astonishing 15 per cent of global corn production." Nowhere is the impact clearer than in the diversion of US corn into ethanol production. Ethanol now consumes roughly 40 per cent of the US corn crop, up from just 5 per cent a decade ago. The biggest jump came after the US Congress enacted the RFS in 2005 then expanded it dramatically in 2007. A blending allowance of 10 per cent for domestic gasoline added to the demand, a level now potentially being raised to 15 per cent. These mandates for rising corn ethanol production combined with tax incentives to gasoline blenders and tariff protection against cheaper imports to create today~’s massive ethanol demand for corn. As corn prices rose farmers increased production, but not enough to accommodate the increased ethanol demand. So prices just kept rising and corn stocks just kept getting thinner and thinner. They were at dangerously low levels - about 15 per cent of global use - when the first price spikes happened in 2007-2008. They are at 14 per cent now.

There are two scenarios for shocks

====1^^st^^ are resource wars- they escalate and go all-out====

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(Michael, "The Hunger Wars in our Future," http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-215\_162-57489345/the-hunger-wars-in-our-future/?pageNum=1andtag=page)

The Great Drought of 2012 has yet to come to an end, but we already know that its consequences will be severe. With more than one-half of America~’s counties designated as drought disaster areas, the 2012 harvest of corn, soybeans, and other food staples is guaranteed to fall far short of predictions. This, in turn, will boost food prices domestically and abroad, causing increased misery for farmers and low-income Americans and far greater hardship for poor people in countries that rely on imported U.S. grains. This, however, is just the beginning of the likely consequences: If history is any guide, rising food prices of this sort will also lead to widespread social unrest and violent conflict. Food—affordable food—is essential to human survival and well-being. Take that away, and people become anxious, desperate, and angry. In the United States, food represents only about 13 percent of the average household budget, a relatively small share, so a boost in food prices in 2013 will probably not prove overly taxing for most middle—and upper-income families. It could, however, produce considerable hardship for poor and unemployed Americans with limited resources. "You are talking about a real bite out of family budgets," commented Ernie Gross, an agricultural economist at Omaha~’s Creighton University. This could add to the discontent already evident in depressed and high-unemployment areas, perhaps prompting an intensified backlash against incumbent politicians and other forms of dissent and unrest. It is in the international arena, however, that the Great Drought is likely to have its most devastating effects. Because so many nations depend on grain imports from the U.S. to supplement their own harvests, and because intense drought and floods are damaging crops elsewhere as well, food supplies are expected to shrink and prices to rise across the planet. "What happens to the U.S. supply has immense impact around the world," says Robert Thompson, a food expert at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. As the crops most affected by the drought, corn and soybeans, disappear from world markets, he noted, the price of all grains, including wheat, is likely to soar, causing immense hardship to those who already have trouble affording enough food to feed their families. The Hunger Games, 2007-2011 What happens next is, of course, impossible to predict, but if the recent past is any guide, it could turn ugly. In 2007-2008, when rice, corn, and wheat experienced prices hikes of 100 percent or more, sharply higher prices—especially for bread—sparked "food riots" in more than two dozen countries, including Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Senegal, and Yemen. In Haiti, the rioting became so violent and public confidence in the government~’s ability to address the problem dropped so precipitously that the Haitian Senate voted to oust the country~’s prime minister, Jacques-Édouard Alexis. In other countries, angry protestors clashed with army and police forces, leaving scores dead. Those price increases of 2007-2008 were largely attributed to the soaring cost of oil, which made food production more expensive. (Oil~’s use is widespread in farming operations, irrigation, food delivery, and pesticide manufacture.) At the same time, increasing amounts of cropland worldwide were being diverted from food crops to the cultivation of plants used in making biofuels. The next price spike in 2010-11 was, however, closely associated with climate change. An intense drought gripped much of eastern Russia during the summer of 2010, reducing the wheat harvest in that breadbasket region by one-fifth and prompting Moscow to ban all wheat exports. Drought also hurt China~’s grain harvest, while intense flooding destroyed much of Australia~’s wheat crop. Together with other extreme-weather-related effects, these disasters sent wheat prices soaring by more than 50 percent and the price of most food staples by 32 percent. Once again, a surge in food prices resulted in widespread social unrest, this time concentrated in North Africa and the Middle East. The earliest protests arose over the cost of staples in Algeria and then Tunisia, where—no coincidence—the precipitating event was a young food vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, setting himself on fire to protest government harassment. Anger over rising food and fuel prices combined with long-simmering resentments about government repression and corruption sparked what became known as the Arab Spring. The rising cost of basic staples, especially a loaf of bread, was also a cause of unrest in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. Other factors, notably anger at entrenched autocratic regimes, may have proved more powerful in those places, but as the author of Tropic of Chaos, Christian Parenti, wrote, "The initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread." As for the current drought, analysts are already warning of instability in Africa, where corn is a major staple, and of increased popular unrest in China, where food prices are expected to rise at a time of growing hardship for that country~’s vast pool of low-income, migratory workers and poor peasants. Higher food prices in the U.S. and China could also lead to reduced consumer spending on other goods, further contributing to the slowdown in the global economy and producing yet more worldwide misery, with unpredictable social consequences. The Hunger Games, 2012-? If this was just one bad harvest, occurring in only one country, the world would undoubtedly absorb the ensuing hardship and expect to bounce back in the years to come. Unfortunately, it~’s becoming evident that the Great Drought of 2012 is not a one-off event in a single heartland nation, but rather an inevitable consequence of global warming which is only going to intensify. As a result, we can expect not just more bad years of extreme heat, but worse years, hotter and more often, and not just in the United States, but globally for the indefinite future. Until recently, most scientists were reluctant to blame particular storms or droughts on global warming. Now, however, a growing number of scientists believe that such links can be demonstrated in certain cases. In one recent study focused on extreme weather events in 2011, for instance, climate specialists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Great Britain~’s National Weather Service concluded that human-induced climate change has made intense heat waves of the kind experienced in Texas in 2011 more likely than ever before. Published in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, it reported that global warming had ensured that the incidence of that Texas heat wave was 20 times more likely than it would have been in 1960; similarly, abnormally warm temperatures like those experienced in Britain last November were said to be 62 times as likely because of global warming. It is still too early to apply the methodology used by these scientists to calculating the effect of global warming on the heat waves of 2012, which are proving to be far more severe, but we can assume the level of correlation will be high. And what can we expect in the future, as the warming gains momentum? When we think about climate change (if we think about it at all), we envision rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, freakish storms, hellish wildfires, and rising sea levels. Among other things, this will result in damaged infrastructure and diminished food supplies. These are, of course, manifestations of warming in the physical world, not the social world we all inhabit and rely on for so many aspects of our daily well-being and survival. The purely physical effects of climate change will, no doubt, prove catastrophic. But the social effects including, somewhere down the line, food riots, mass starvation, state collapse, mass migrations, and conflicts of every sort, up to and including full-scale war, could prove even more disruptive and deadly. In her immensely successful young-adult novel, The Hunger Games (and the movie that followed), Suzanne Collins riveted millions with a portrait of a dystopian, resource-scarce, post-apocalyptic future where once-rebellious "districts" in an impoverished North America must supply two teenagers each year for a series of televised gladiatorial games that end in death for all but one of the youthful contestants. These "hunger games" are intended as recompense for the damage inflicted on the victorious capitol of Panem by the rebellious districts during an insurrection. Without specifically mentioning global warming, Collins makes it clear that climate change was significantly responsible for the hunger that shadows the North American continent in this future era. Hence, as the gladiatorial contestants are about to be selected, the mayor of District 12~’s principal city describes "the disasters, the droughts, the storms, the fires, the encroaching seas that swallowed up so much of the land ~~[and~~] the brutal war for what little sustenance remained." In this, Collins was prescient, even if her specific vision of the violence on which such a world might be organized is fantasy. While we may never see her version of those hunger games, do not doubt that some version of them will come into existence—that, in fact, hunger wars of many sorts will fill our future. These could include any combination or permutation of the deadly riots that led to the 2008 collapse of Haiti~’s government, the pitched battles between massed protesters and security forces that engulfed parts of Cairo as the Arab Spring developed, the ethnic struggles over disputed croplands and water sources that have made Darfur a recurring headline of horror in our world, or the inequitable distribution of agricultural land that continues to fuel the insurgency of the Maoist-inspired Naxalites of India. Combine such conflicts with another likelihood: that persistent drought and hunger will force millions of people to abandon their traditional lands and flee to the squalor of shantytowns and expanding slums surrounding large cities, sparking hostility from those already living there. One such eruption, with grisly results, occurred in Johannesburg~’s shantytowns in 2008 when desperately poor and hungry migrants from Malawi and Zimbabwe were set upon, beaten, and in some cases burned to death by poor South Africans. One terrified Zimbabwean, cowering in a police station from the raging mobs, said she fled her country because "there is no work and no food." And count on something else: millions more in the coming decades, pressed by disasters ranging from drought and flood to rising sea levels, will try to migrate to other countries, provoking even greater hostility. And that hardly begins to exhaust the possibilities that lie in our hunger-games future. At this point, the focus is understandably on the immediate consequences of the still ongoing Great Drought: dying crops, shrunken harvests, and rising food prices. But keep an eye out for the social and political effects that undoubtedly won~’t begin to show up here or globally until later this year or 2013. Better than any academic study, these will offer us a hint of what we can expect in the coming decades from a hunger-games world of rising temperatures, persistent droughts, recurring food shortages, and billions of famished, desperate people.

====2^^nd^^ is stability- the impact is extinction====

\*\*Brown 9\*\* – Founder of Worldwatch and EPI
(Lester R, founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute "Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?" Scientific American, May)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today~’s economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire—and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos—and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too%21 For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy—most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures—forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding ~~[see sidebar at left~~]. Many of their problem~’s stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy. Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world~’s leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six). Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases—such as polio, SARS or avian flu—breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

=Advantage Three– Economy=

\*\*====Economic growth is projected to decline- energy export expansion solves====\*\*

Lambro 8/9 (Mr. Lambro is a nationally syndicated columnist and former chief political correspondent for the Washington Times- Human Events."JOBS FIGURES AND GROWTH RATES SHOW ECONOMY IN DECLINE"http://www.humanevents.com/2013/08/09/jobs-figures-and-growth-rates-show-economy-in-decline/)//GV

WASHINGTON — Another weak jobs report came out last week, drawing yawns from Democrats, excuses from the White House, and shallow, incomplete reporting from the network news shows. President Obama has just finished a string of speeches on jobs and the economy, issues that pollsters say are the voters~’ biggest concerns, but failed to offer any new ideas about how to deal with them. He ~~[Obama~~] traveled around the country repeating the same old ideas he~’s pushed since 2009: public works spending for roads, bridges and other infrastructure. They are failed ideas that didn~’t work before and won~’t work now. The bleak reality is that the Obama economy, which was growing at a snail~’s-pace in his first term, is slowing down even more in his second. Economic growth, as measured by our gross domestic product, grew at a barely breathing 1.4 percent annualized rate in the first six months of this year. That~’s down from 2.5 percent over the same period in 2012. This isn~’t just a statistic: It~’s the falling pulse rate of the U.S. economy. The Labor Department~’s employment report last Friday showed the economy added a minuscule 162,000 jobs in July, out of a labor force of about 160 million Americans. A large number of these jobs were in temporary, part-time, low-paying work, and nowhere near levels needed to bring unemployment down to more normal levels. Left out of many network news stories was the fact that the government also reduced its job-creation estimates for the previous two months, and said that workers not only earned less but worked fewer hours, too. Obama has been saying for more than four and a half years that the economy~’s getting better, that it is "moving in the right direction." But the same could be said about a student who was getting F~’s on his report card and is now getting D~’s. The news media had been hyping the expected jobs number for weeks, pushing the administration~’s line — and that of independent forecasters — that July~’s figures could top 200,000. But the anemic, temp-heavy, 162,000 figure made all of those hyped jobs reports and claims that the U.S. was in a full recovery look ridiculous and even duplicitous. The Washington Post, which had called previous subpar job figures "solid" or "robust," now acknowledges the truth about the economy~’s weakening performance. It~’s that bad. "July was supposed to mark the starting point for an amped-up economy. Instead, data on Friday showed the recovery remains stuck in second gear," the Post said in a front-page story that ran beneath this headline: "Sluggish hiring in July reflects tepid recovery." The network news shows, which to a shameful degree have avoided any serious reporting about Obama~’s sorry economic performance, didn~’t give last week~’s jobs story the detailed coverage it deserved. NBC~’s Brian Williams reported that the unemployment rate fell to 7.4 percent, but did not explain this was largely due to 240,000 discouraged job-seekers who left the labor force because they could not find work. That~’s right — many more long-term unemployed workers dropped out of the work force than found jobs last month. When unemployed Americans are asked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics if they~’re still looking for work, and they answer no, they are not counted among the unemployed. And that lowers the unemployment rate. Most of the reduction in the jobless rate under Obama~’s presidency has been the result of people who have given up looking for work. And that~’s led to a fast-shrinking labor force, an ominous sign of an economy in long-term decline. "For most working families and recent college graduates the situation is grim," because the jobless rate is far worse than the government~’s 7.4 percent figure, says University of Maryland business economist Peter Morici. "Adding in discouraged adults and part-timers who want full-time employment, the unemployment rate becomes 14 percent," he says. The economy isn~’t producing enough jobs to keep up with population growth. We would need to create at least 360,000 jobs a month to lower the unemployment rate to 6 percent, which would require an economic growth rate of 4 to 5 percent. "Over the last four years, the pace has been a paltry 2.2 percent," Morici says. Obama~’s advisers dismiss the possibility of such higher economic growth rates, saying slower growth is %26quot;the new normal.%26quot; But four years into Reagan~’s swift recovery, which followed a deeper recession than Obama has had to deal with, the quarterly growth rates were 8.5, 7.9, 6.9 and 5.8 percent. What never gets mentioned in any of the network news stories about the economy is that slower growth and high unemployment are the result of Obama~’s anti-growth, anti-job creation policies. Among them: Energy policies that have boosted fuel costs, killed jobs and flattened family budgets; opposition to any new export expansion agreements to open emerging markets for U.S. goods and services; and higher tax rates on investors that have reduced new job-creating, start-up enterprises.

====Lack of US-Latin-American energy leadership is wrecking competitiveness ====

\*\*Farnsworth 13\*\* – MPA ~~[Master of Public Affairs~~] in IR @ Princeton, former State Department official, Vice President of the Council of the Americas and the Americas Society
(Eric, "ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN," House Testimony, Lexis)

As well, for the past several years the Council has organized our Energy Action Group, a public-private dialogue that seeks to focus on the strategic, policy, and commercial issues at the heart of hemispheric energy matters with a view to providing recommendations to policymakers on the Western Hemisphere energy agenda. We genuinely appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to provide testimony regarding energy security opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Mr. Chairman, if I may give you the bottom line first: energy security for the United States is of fundamental strategic importance. It underlies our ability to function as a modern society, and ensuring energy security has long been a critical component of U.S. foreign policy globally on a bipartisan basis. It is within this context that we firmly believe the nations of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada must be considered, leading to a new and abiding appreciation at the most senior levels of government of the strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere to the United States. The region cannot be an afterthought or taken for granted. Already, just over half of U.S. energy imports come from the Western Hemisphere, meeting approximately one quarter of our daily energy needs. Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela are three of our top suppliers worldwide. We receive more than twice as much energy from Canada, our top supplier, as from Saudi Arabia, our second largest supplier. Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil also contribute significant amounts. Even when political relations are troubled with certain countries, for example Venezuela and Ecuador, the United States continues to engage in energy trade on a commercial basis. At the same time, a dramatic expansion of new energy resources across the hemisphere made possible by new technologies including ultra-deep water drilling offshore and biofuel production and fracking onshore has created the possibility of a new, highly favorable paradigm for hemispheric energy. Herein lies the primary opportunity for regional partnership, if we are nimble enough, collectively, to grasp it: working together as a hemisphere to increase energy security for all parties in a manner that lowers costs through increased production and greater efficiencies, encourages sustainable economic growth, development, and job creation, and supports a clean energy matrix with appropriate environmental protections. In fact, energy partnership was one of the key initiatives at the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, at the insistence of Venezuela, and was one of the deliverables coming out of the 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. Changing sector dynamics make the vision truly compelling, to the extent that regional political challenges can be minimized or overcome. At the same time, the United States is not the only nation that sees the potential for cooperation in Latin American, Caribbean, and Canadian energy. China, which is now the world~’s top energy consumer, is a relatively recent but very active participant in the development of regional energy resources, as are other nations such as India and Russia, a trend that we expect will continue and also accelerate into the indefinite future. This is a region that is now in play and in my view, the United States must do a better job making the case for regional partnership because alternatives for the region exist today which simply did not exist a decade ago. A strategic approach to the hemisphere with energy at the core should be at the top of our agenda.

====Energy cooperation solves ====

\*\*Cardenas et al 12\*\* – \*Former US State Dept Official,  director with Vision Americas
("An action plan for US policy in the Americas," December, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/)

Key points in this Outlook: America~’s economic crisis and threats to US security have undermined its traditional global-leadership role and weakened its connections to Latin American nations that continue to modernize their economies.¶ The United States must recover its regional credibility by taking bold initiatives to restore its fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. ¶ The United States must then retool its strategy for its partners in the Americas by working with them to combat threats such as cross-border criminality and radical populism, encouraging dialogue with regional leaders, and ensuring law enforcement cooperation to develop a mutually beneficial relationship. ¶ ¶ A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. The region is home to three of the top four foreign sources of energy to the United States, as well as the fastest-growing destinations for US exports and investment. Clearly, geography and shared values predetermine a united destiny for the United States and its neighbors in the Americas. How positive and fruitful that destiny will be depends on whether US policymakers, private businesses, and civil society move with a greater sense of purpose toward seizing promising opportunities and meeting critical challenges.¶ Times have changed. The US fiscal crisis and preoccupation with two distant wars have distracted policymakers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the Americas. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits are highly valued by most countries in the Western Hemisphere, today, the United States is no longer the only major partner to choose from. Asia (principally China) and Europe are making important inroads. So, as US policymakers retool their strategy for the Americas, they must shelve the paternalism of the past and be much more energetic in forming meaningful partnerships with willing neighbors.¶ Of course, the United States must recover its credibility by making bold decisions to restore its own fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. Then, Washington will be better positioned to cultivate greater economic and political cooperation among its neighbors, beginning with an open and candid dialogue with the region~’s leaders about their vision, their challenges, and their priorities. Partnerships can thus be built on common ground.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by petrodollars and allied with dangerous extraregional forces pose daunting challenges. Although it is wise to prioritize a positive socioeconomic and political agenda, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable prerequisite to achieving US security and regional leadership.¶ To make the most of their united destiny, the United States and its partners in the Americas should:¶ Promote and defend democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and private property as the building blocks of just societies, accountable governments, and prosperous economies;¶ Advocate and support the empowerment of individuals through the development of strong free-market economies, healthy private sectors, and free trade among nations;¶ Assist neighbors in addressing their essential security needs so they can grow in peace and be more effective allies to prevent or confront common threats;¶ Incentivize capital markets and encourage new and innovative technology cooperation to develop a regional community that is interdependent in the production and distribution of a range of products and services—particularly energy;¶ Confront international organized crime in Mexico and Central America by supporting effective law-enforcement institutions and competent judicial systems;¶ Work with willing allies to restore the Organization of American States to its essential mission of promoting and defending common values and meeting common threats;¶ Address the role of China and Russia in the Americas by encouraging open and transparent regional investment and trade and rejecting exploitive policies that undermine local societies, regional security, and economic growth;¶ Combat threats posed by authoritarian regimes and their ties with Iran, Hezbollah, and transnational criminal organizations; ¶ Assist the Cuban people in transitioning to a post–Castro Cuba by helping to jump-start their private sector, rehabilitate their economy, and restore their political freedoms when the dictatorship collapses.¶ ¶ Maximizing Mutual Global Competitiveness¶ Expanding regional economic cooperation is crucial to US economic growth. An aggressive trade promotion and investment strategy in today~’s hypercompetitive, globalized economy is not a policy option; it is an imperative. Clearly, prosperity at home depends on success abroad. The economic opportunities in the Western Hemisphere are enormous, and US policy-makers and the private sector must recognize them as critical to US economic growth.¶ In 2011, US exports reached a record %242.1 trillion in total value, despite the fact that only 1 percent of US businesses export their products to foreign markets. The United States must expand on these opportunities. Exports benefit the US economy by offering companies opportunities to tap new markets, expand their production, and earn more consumer dollars. Today, 95 percent of the world~’s consumers live outside the United States, and the International Monetary Fund predicts that, through 2015, some 80 percent of economic growth will take place beyond US shores.¶ It is indisputable that an aggressive US trade policy—meaning selling US goods and services in as many markets as possible—is essential for the US economy to hone its competitive edge in the 21st century. In this sense, America~’s future is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbors in its own hemisphere. A prosperous hemisphere means a more prosperous United States.

====Best studies prove economic decline causes war====

\*\*Royal 10\*\* – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, "Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises," in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods ofeconomic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson~’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding thatrhythms in theglobaleconomy are associated withthe rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the oftenbloody transition from onepre-eminentleader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland~’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ~’future expectation of trade~’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access tothoseresources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) finda strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg %26 Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, %26 Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ~’rally around the flag~’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing thatperiods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political sciencescholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to otherperspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease inthe likelihood of externalconflict,such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence anddo notspecificallyconsider theoccurrence of andconditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

====These wars go nuclear====

Harris and Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC~’s Long Range Analysis Unit "Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis" http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf, AM)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe thatthe Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions(think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which thepotential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environmentas they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism~’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world~’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groupsin 2025willlikely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised thatbecome self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran~’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensityconflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems alsowill produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China~’s and India~’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East,cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Plan
The Export Import Bank of the United States should offer substantial financing for non-corn biofuels in Mexico.

=Solvency=

====Mexico is key for biofuel commercialization- geographically and technologically ready====

Felix 8 (Raul Felix, coordinator of the Climate Change 26 Renewable Energy Practice in Mexico for Baker 26 McKenzie, 2008, Biomass Magazine, "Assessing the Impact of Mexico~’s Biofuels Law," http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/1678/assessing-the-impact-of-mexico~~~’s-biofuels-law-http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/1678/assessing-the-impact-of-mexico~’s-biofuels-law, Accessed 11/20/13, JC)

Energy companies that have already developed the know-how and technology abroad or in Mexico for biofuel production and commercialization could clearly expand their horizons and consider Mexico as a viable market for mass commercialization, distribution or production of biofuels. Further, Mexico will grant companies privileged access to the North American, European, Japanese and Latin American markets. Prior to a regulation of biofuels in Mexico, the greatest fear among players in this sector was the potential re-interpretation of the existing norms for fossil fuels to expand their scope to incorporate biofuels. This was particularly important, because prior to the enactment of the biofuels law, PEMEX, as the preponderant player in the national energy market, could easily hinder the marketing of biofuels substitutes to its traditional fuel portfolio. Under this independent legal structure, other energy companies and start-ups could directly participate in the development of the biofuel market as long as their product proves to be competitive compared with the current fossil fuels offered in Mexico. Mexico has a wide array of topographic and climatic conditions that range from tropical forests in the southern part of the country, vast coastal areas, a mild climate in the central part of the country, and mountainous areas and arid regions that will allow the adaptation of several varieties of crops that have been used in other latitudes for successful biofuel projects. In addition, Mexico has already issued a law that will regulate the use of genetically modified organisms (the Biosafety Law for Genetically Modified Organism) that may potentially open the door for the use of specific types of energy crops under controlled conditions. Mexico~’s current administration has established as part of its National Strategy on Climate Change the need to diversify its fuel alternatives and to introduce the use of biofuels. It has also evidenced that, due to the fact that biofuels do not have a constitutional limitation for the participation of private investment, it wishes to open this sector to both national and foreign investment.

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Mexican-US border biofuels are more green than current production====

\*\*GNEB 11\*\* – Good Neighbor Environmental Board, Environmental Protection Agency by Executive Order 12916 on May 13, 1994
("The Potential Environmental and Economic Benefits of Renewable Energy Development in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region," http://www.epa.gov/ofacmo/gneb/gneb14threport/English-GNEB-14th-Report.pdf)

Unlike for much of the United States, bioenergy potential along the border rarely contemplates growing and harvesting biomass (e.g., corn) specifically for use as an energy stock or fuel (e.g., ethanol). Thus, many of the negative implications associated with full life-cycle impacts of agriculture for biofuels (nutrient and pesticide use, runoff, etc.) are not as prevalent along the border. One social concern with certain biomass to energy programs is that extensive use of vegetable oils as a feedstock could contribute to food shortages in developing nations73 or cause domestic food prices to rise, putting stress on poorer populations. Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, the biomass sources with the most potential for energy production are based primarily on feedstocks that originate from waste products (i.e., municipal solid waste, wastewater treatment sludge), landfill gas, or more recently, algae farms. Based on these potential feedstock sources, positive impacts may include, indirectly, decreased reduction of air emissions such as less methane emissions from diverted "waste" from landfills or agriculture waste, and reduced carbon dioxide, sulfur oxides, and nitrogen oxides emissions in biofuels

====Only the US solves====

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(Eric, "ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN," House Testimony, Lexis)http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-FarnsworthE-20130411.pdf

More broadly, the United States has a strategic interest in working with willing nations in the hemisphere to develop their own energy resources effectively, while promoting models that reduce the negative if unintended consequences of regional energy development, including a lack of transparency and official corruption, the distorting impact of consumption subsidies, an over-reliance on a single commodity or sector, environmental concerns, and a concentration of wealth and political power around the sector. In order to develop their respective industries, nations need U.S. technology, management expertise, and investment dollars. They need our education system to develop their engineers and seismologists, they need help to understand regulatory, tax, and policy models that work, they need to be exposed to best practices in environmental mitigation, and they need our technical assistance to improve the investment climate and the rule of law.

====Prefer empirical validity—ontological approaches to IR lead to policy paralysis====

Owen 2(David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3)

Commenting on the ~’philosophical turn~’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ~’~~[a~~] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn~’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterize (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritize issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognize that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgment of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgment, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritization of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ~’theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program~’ in that it ~’dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory~’.5The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterize the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ~’whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry~’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ~’the Highlander view~’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritization of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.