# Round 5---Lakeland

# 1NC

## 1NC—vs. ACORN AJ

### 1NC—Queer Negativity

I'm angry. I'm angry for being condemned to death by strangers saying, "You deserve to die" and "AIDS is the cure." Fury erupts when a Republican woman wearing thousands of dollars of garments and jewelry minces by the police lines shaking her head, chuckling and wagging her finger at us like we are recalcitrant children making absurd demands and throwing a temper tantrum when they aren't met. Angry while Joseph agonizes over $8,000 a year for AZT which might keep him alive a little longer and which does make him sicker than the disease he is diagnosed with. Angry as I listen to a man tell me that after changing his will five times he's running out of people to leave things to. All of his best friends are dead. Angry when I stand in a sea of quilt panels, or go to a candlelight march or attend yet another memorial service. I will not march silently with a f[uck]ing candle and I want to take that goddamned quilt and wrap myself in it and furiously rent it and my hair and curse every god religion ever created. I refuse to accept a creation that cuts people down in the third decade of their life. It is cruel and vile and meaningless and everything I have in me rails against the absurdity and I raise my face to the clouds and a ragged laugh that sounds more demonic than joyous erupts from my throat and tears stream down my face and if this disease doesn't kill me, I may just die of frustration. My feet pound the streets and Peter's hands are chained to a pharmaceutical company's reception desk while the receptionist looks on in horror and Eric's body lies rotting in a Brooklyn cemetery and I'll never hear his flute resounding off the walls of the meeting house again. And I see the old people in Tompkins Square Park huddled in their long wool coats in June to keep out the cold they perceive is there and to cling to whatever little life has left to offer them, and I think, ah, they understand. And I'm reminded of the people who strip and stand before a mirror each night before they go to bed and search their bodies for any mark that might not have been there yesterday. A mark that this scourge has visited them. And I'm angry when the newspapers call us "victims" and sound alarms that "it" might soon spread to the "general population." And I want to scream "Who the f[uck] am I?" And I want to scream at New York Hospital with its yellow plastic bags marked "isolation linen," "ropa infecciosa" and its orderlies in latex gloves and surgical masks skirt the bed as if its occupant will suddenly leap out and douse them with blood and semen giving them too the plague. And I'm angry at straight people who sit smugly wrapped in their self-protective coat of monogamy and heterosexuality confident that this disease has nothing to do with them because it only happens to "them." And the teenage boys who upon spotting my "Silence = Death" button begin chanting "Faggots gonna die" and I wonder, who taught them this? Enveloped in fury and fear, I remain silent while my button mocks me every step of the way. And the anger I feel when a television program on the quilt gives profiles of the dead and the list begins with a baby, a teenage girl who got a blood transfusion, an elderly Baptist minister and his wife and when they finally show a gay man, he's described as someone who knowingly infected teenage male prostitutes with the virus. What else can you expect from a faggot? I'm angry.

Queer Nation, 6-xx-1990, text of a manifesto originally passed out by people marching with the ACT UP contingent, “History Is a Weapon: The Queer Nation Manifesto,” http://ww.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/queernation.html \*\*parentheses used to modify for the sake of correct sentence structure

#### To be queer is to be a walking zombie, a living dead. They have it wrong—the dead no longer live amongst us, queerness is undergoing a process of constant death; their calls for “reanimation” and a better normal future are extensions of humanity’s project to annihilate difference. Any and all futurism is born out of the murder of the queer.

Allison Kafer, 5-16-2013, Associate Professor of Feminist Studies @ Southwestern, MA, PhD, Claremont Graduate University, BA @ Wake Forest University, “Feminist, Queer, Crip,” pg. 28-31, google books

No Future for Crips Lee Edelman has famously argued that queers and queer theory would be better off refusing the future altogether. (“Fuck the Future,” as Carla Freccero puts it.)“ Building on Lauren Berlant’s work on the ﬁgure of the child in American politics, Edelman argues that futurity—an investment in and attention to the future or futures—is almost always ﬁgured in reproductive terms: we cannot “conceive of a future without the ﬁgure of the Child." As a result, the Child serves as "the telos of the social order," the one for whom we all act, “the fantasmatic beneﬁciary of every political intervention.“ I-Ie offers as an example abortion rhetoric, noting that both pro-choice and antiabortion activists frame their ﬁght as on behalf of the children." Patrick McCreery traces a similar parallel among both opponents and supporters of gay marriage: depending on ones stance, gay mar- riage either destroys children's well-being or enhances it, but both sides agree that the future of children is what is at stake in the debate and therefore what should guide our decisions.“ For those in both ﬁghts, then, the struggle becomes no longer about rights or justice or desire or autonomy but about the future of “our” children. Both of these examples show the slipperiness of arguments based on the Child and reproductive futu- rity; one can mobilize the same rhetoric toward mutually opposing goals. What Edelman draws out is the coercive nature of such frames: it is not only that we can use the “future of our children” frame but that we should or must use it; politics itself is and can only be centered around the Child, foreclosing all other possibilities for action. Reading from a queer crip perspective, I can easily see the ways in which “the future," especially as ﬁgured through the “Child,” is used to buttress able-bodied/able- minded heteronormativity. First, the proliferation of prenatal testing, much of which presumes that all positive diagnoses will be “solved” through selective abortion, is a clear manifestation of compulsory able-bodiedness and able-mindedness. As we will see in the following chapters, pregnant women with disabilities and pregnant women whose fetuses have tested “positive” for various conditions are understood as threats to the future: they have failed to guarantee a better future by bringing the right kind of Child into the present." Thus the idealization of the Child as the frontier of politics, the framing that troubles Edelman, should concern crip readers as well; discourses of reproduction, generation, and inheritance are shot through with anxiety about disability. These sites of reproductive futurity demand a Child that both resembles the parents and exceeds them; “we” all want “our” children to be rnore healthy, more active, stronger and smarter than we are, and we are supposed to do everything in our power to make that happen. The Child through whom legacies are passed down is, without doubt, able-bodied/able-minded. Second, a politics based in futurity leads easily to an ethics of endless deferral. "We're held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself,” Edelman notes, and this deferment serves to consolidate the status quo.“ Focusing always on the better future, we divert our attention from the here and now; “We are rendered doc-ile,” in other words, “through our unwitting obedience to the future."“ This phrasing is telling: “held in thrall,” “rendered docile,” “unwitting obedience”—each phrase signals stagnation and acquiescence, an inability to move in any direction because of a permanently forward-looking gaze. This deferral, this ﬁrm focus on the future, is often expressed in terms of cure and rehabilitation, and is thereby bound up in nor- malizing approaches to the mind/body. Disability activists have long railed against a politics of endless deferral that pours economic and cultural resources into “curing” future disabled people (by preventing them from ever coming into existence) while ignoring the needs and experiences of disabled people in the present.” This kind of focus on futurity does disabled people no favors, yet it is one of the most common ways of framing disability: we must cure Ierry’s kids now so that there will be no more Ierry’s kids in the future. Moreover, everything from sterilization to institu- tionalization, from bone-lengthening surgeries to growth attenuation, has been jus- tiﬁed on the grounds that such acts will lead to better futures for the disabled person andlor for their communities. Within these discourses, disability cannot appear as anything other than failure. Third, eugenic histories certainly bear the mark of reproductive futurity. Even keeping only to the United States, and only to the past one hundred years or so, exam- ples abound of how concerns about the future of the “race” and the future of the nation (futures often depicted as intertwined) have been wrapped up in fears and anxieties about disability. Tens of thousands of people diagnosed with various “defects” were targeted by eugenic professionals and policies for the ﬁrst half of the twentieth cen- tury, classiﬁed. and managed in order to contain the alleged risks they posed to public health. The category of “defectives” included not only people with disabilities but also people from “suspect” racial, ethnic, and religious groups as well as poor people, sex- ual “delinquents,” and immigrants from the “wrong” countries. All were united under ﬂexible concepts of degeneracy, defect, and disability, with "feeble-minded” serving as one of the most eifective, and expansive, classiﬁcations of all. People placed into one or more of these categories might be tracked by family records oﬂices, institutionalized and segregated from the public, sterilized against their will, barred from entering the country, or, in extreme cases, euthanized. Schools and universities included the study of eugenics in their curriculum, both disseminating and reifying these concepts of degeneration and defect. In many states, sterilization came to be seen as a necessary means of protecting the health of the race and the nation from further degeneration; as Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted in the infamous 1927 Buck v. Bell decision uphold- ing Virginia's compulsory sterilization policies, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough."‘»' While many overtly eugenic policies began to wane in the 1930s and 1940s, eugenic ideologies and practices did not fully disappear but rather ﬂourished well into the Cold War and beyond." Virginia’s sterilization law was not repealed until 1974, and coerced or forced sterilization of women of color, poor women, indigenous women, and disabled women persisted throughout most of the twentieth century; even today, under cer- tain circumstances, disabled people can be sterilized without their consent, and poor women, immigrant women, and women of color continue to have their reproductive futures curtailed by the courts and the legislature.” Institutionalization remains a common response to disabled people, particularly those with "severe" disabilities; despite the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead, which aﬂirmed the right of disabled people to live in their home communities, many states continue to prioritize funding for institutions over funding community-based care.“ State governments across the country are responding to budget crises with cuts to health care and dis- ability services, especially in-home attendant care; given that many disabled people require such services in order to live independently, disability rights activists and health advocates note that even more disabled people, especially disabled people of color and low-income disabled people, are being forced into nursing homes or out onto the street. These trends do not bode well for the futures of disabled people, even as they are touted as necessary for preserving the future health of the state and the nation. Indeed, at one time or another, each of these practices—sterilization, segregation, exclusion, institutionalization—has been justiﬁed by concerns about “the future” and particularly future children. For example, Mary Storer Kostir, an assistant at the Ohio Bureau of luvenile Research, argued in a 1916 publication that "physically rigorous but mentally feeble persons are a social menace. . . . Their children threaten to overwhelm the civilization of the future. . . . [We] must also consider our children, and not burden the future with an incubus of mental deﬁciency?” In making her case for segregat- ing those labeled “feeble-minded,” Kostir weighs the futures of “our” children against those other children, the ones who are mentally deﬁcient, threatening, and burden- some. A 1933 pamphlet by the Human Betterment Foundation similarly warns against the “burden” of "feeble-minded” children, noting that the failure to practice “eugenic sterilization” produces effects that are “disastrous . . . in future generations.“ In these kinds of eugenic discourses, children serve as the sign of the future; the kind of future that awaits us will be determined by the kind of children we bear. Illness, “defect,” “deviance,” and disability are positioned as fundamentally damaging to the fabric of the community: polluting the gene pool, or weakening the nation, or destroying a fam- ily’s quality of life, or draining public services (or, often, some combination of the four). To put it bluntly, disabled people were—and often are—ﬁgured as threats to futurity. Whole books have been written about each of these practices, and this brief, sweeping history cannot begin to do justice to the material or, especially, to the bodies invoked by this material. Such broad summaries all too easily erase differences among people with disabilities, differences not only of race, class, sexuality, gender, and his- tory but also of impairment; there are many bodies falling through the cracks of this overview. And yet, it is imperative to establish a pattern, to demonstrate that we have long felt and acted on the belief that disability destroys the future, or that a future with disability must be avoided at all costs. It is this pattern, these histories, that makes the question of the future so vexed. I can see clearly how futurity has been the cause of much violence against disabled people, such that “fuck the future” can seem the only viable crip response.

#### Rhetorical silence normalizes heterosexuality as an invisible norm that leads to interpersonal and social violence

Afshar – ‘4 – Department of Political Science, Syracuse University (Ahoura Afshar, 2004, “The Invisible Presence of Sexuality in the Classroom,” Interrupting Heteronormativity, http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Heteronormativity.pdf, p. 33-37)

Should discussions of sexuality be included in the classroom?1 The easy answer might be no: it is not 'relevant' to the subject matter of most courses except perhaps to those that explicitly engage with human sexuality, such as Child and Family Studies, Sociology, or Women's Studies. Moreover, this reasoning might go, given estimates that within the general population less than ten percent identify as non-heterosexual, there's a good chance that in a class of sixty students everyone is straight. / It is this kind of perspective, however, that not only contributes to the invisibility of LGBT students, but it also constructs and reinforces heteronormativity in our classrooms and across campus.2 LGBT students (and teachers) ARE present in our classrooms—whether we choose to see them or not—and it is their very invisible presence that demonstrates the power of heteronormativity to mask that which does not conform, and to naturalize that which does. This is a problem for both LGBT and heterosexual students and teachers alike. Heteronormative assumptions and practices regulate the beliefs, behaviors, and desires of ALL of us, restricting the range of possibilities of identification and expression for ALL of us, to such an extent that even momentary and joyful expressions (e.g. the heterosexual man singing "I feel like a woman" in the Chevy commercial discussed by Susan Adams) become sources of discomfort and fear. / Practices of regulation and restriction are integral to creating and maintaining hierarchies of power, which in turn limit the kinds of learning and teaching that can happen in our classrooms. As responsible teachers, we know that our pedagogical theories and practices need to expand the kinds of learning opportunities we provide students, not restrict them. In fact, the administration of this university recognizes the importance of this by emphasizing the link between a rich intellectual climate and a diversity of perspectives and people: "[. . .] diversity in our student body, faculty, and staff has far-ranging and significant educational benefits for all non-minorities and minorities alike" (Syracuse University Academic Plan, 2001). Particular strategies to create more inclusive curricula have been developed and implemented in programs and departments university-wide because "[s]tudents in diverse learning environments learn more, and have higher levels of satisfaction and greater degrees of civic engagements. They are better able to appreciate the ideas of others and they are better prepared to enter the world they will lead" (SU Academic Plan, 2001). This diversity of students, faculty, and ideas includes: "race, ethnicity, gender, age, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and physical and mental ability" (Syracuse University Human Resources, emphasis added). / In principle, then, SU values diversity. Taking a closer look at what diversity means and how it is "practiced," however, exposes some gaps between these principles and actual, everyday classroom procedures, particularly when that "diversity" topic is sexual orientation. It's important to note that sexual orientation is a term that does not reference a particular set of people; it's not only about LGBT people, but also non-LGBT, or heterosexual, people. Why is this broader definition of sexual orientation important? Because the sexual orientation of heterosexuality is simultaneously institutionalized and naturalized to the extent that it becomes the invisible norm against which all other sexual orientations, identifications, or expressions are named "abnormal." The issue of "invisibility," then, isn't just about LGBT students and teachers; it's about the ways in which our assumptions about (hetero)sexuality are invisible to us. And we carry these assumptions into our classrooms. As a result, heteronormativity is reproduced, most often unconsciously, through our own everyday classroom practices. Rather than expanding the kinds of learning opportunities we create space for, we inadvertently reinforce a regulated and restrictive framework for understanding the complexity of human sexuality. / II. Ten years ago, research with Syracuse University LGBT students showed that one third of the respondents would have gone to another school had they had sufficient information on the circumstances surrounding LGBT issues on campus (Sherrill & Hardesty, 1994). Although the situation has changed since then, this statistic may still be accurate to some degree. Bias against those who are perceived to bend the rules of heteronormative behavior pervades SU's campus climate. There are still cases of verbal abuse and physical attacks against LGBT students on this campus: instances of name-calling, of derogatory comments written on doors, dry-erase boards, or computer desktops in residence halls and on campus, and even of physical assault on the basis of perceived sexual orientation (Syracuse University Public Safety, 2004; see also Byrnes, 2003; Wightman, 2003). "Fifty-one percent of bias-related incidents reported last fall [2003] had to do with sexual orientation, while 27 percent concerned gender" (Moritz, 2004). These statistics show that many LGBT students face problems that their straight peers do not. Non-straight students often experience a complex process that involves questioning their sexual orientation, achieving a comfortable sexual identity, coming out, and self-acceptance. They often experience loneliness, isolation, and exclusion in this process. And, they are often targets of homophobia simply because the heterosexual majority claims an exclusive version of sexuality and morality due to the regulative powers of heteronorms. Despite these facts, there is silence in our classrooms when it comes to sexuality. It appears as if no one wants to recognize this silence as a problem, let alone discuss ways of addressing it. Why? / One reason there are so many misconceptions about sexuality is that it is not talked about in U.S. educational systems. It is not generally included in primary schools because, it is argued, it is too early for children to learn about sexuality (Fine, 1988). It is often not included in high school curricula because, the argument goes, adolescents are at a crucial age and should not be exposed to the "promotion of sexuality," especially non-heterosexuality. It is not included in college since it is not 'relevant' to the subject matter in most courses. But, sexuality is relevant: it is not just about sex; it is a critical aspect of life, a primary means through which we identify ourselves, though this identification is usually unconscious for people who identify as "heterosexual" because heterosexuality is the assumed norm, and thus invisible as a "marker" of identity. For LGBT-identified people, however, sexuality is a conscious "marker" of identity; describing oneself in terms such as "gay," "lesbian," "bisexual," "transgender," or "queer" is fundamental to the process of "coming out." Thus, sexuality is not simply a "private" aspect of individuals, but is intimately connected with power relations in our culture, and influences much of our social experiences. There is much misinformation and bias regarding matters of sexuality. There are students with "non-traditional" sexual identities whose needs are not usually met. Only a tiny fraction of the entire student body may take courses that directly address sexuality and the privileges it awards, denies, and limits access to, and hence the majority of students will never discuss the politics of sexuality in any classroom. But it is a mistake to think that this is a problem only for LGBT students. / A social stigma has been attached to sexualities other than heterosexuality, bred out of the myths and misinformation this volume is trying to "interrupt." Hence, some people find moral justification in being violent towards non-straights. Emphasizing the shamefulness of same-sex desire, this logic simply ignores the fact that most people have some sort of "non-heterosexual" fantasy or experience at some point in their lifetime (Laumann et. al., 1994). One may have such experiences without having a LGBT orientation. Being unaware of such facts may cause heterosexuals to experience these fantasies with immeasurable anxiety, dreading that they might be gay. / Gay-bashing may also be seen as a way of proving one's masculinity. The pressure to "prove one's heterosexual manhood" can lead to the need to disparage gays in all ways. This kind of sexual stereotyping not only encourages violence against those who are perceived to be LGBT, but also causes psychological dissonance for straight youth, who are endeavoring to comply with rigid gender roles. It is because of these rigid gender roles that sexuality is an issue that all students face, regardless of their sexual orientation.

#### We don’t want a rebirth, we don’t want to celebrate death anymore, we are tired of the this ritualistic politics which only continues queer suffering—instead we should embrace queerness as a radical act of defiance.

Queer Nation, 6-xx-1990, text of a manifesto originally passed out by people marching with the ACT UP contingent, “History Is a Weapon: The Queer Nation Manifesto,” http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/queernation.html \*\*parentheses used to modify for the sake of correct sentence structure

I hate having to convince straight people that lesbians and gays live in a war zone, that we're surrounded by bomb blasts only we seem to hear, that our bodies and souls are heaped high, dead from fright or bashed or raped, dying of grief or disease, stripped of our personhood. I hate straight people who can't listen to queer anger without saying "hey, all straight people aren't like that. I'm straight too, you know," as if their egos don't get enough stroking or protection in this arrogant, heterosexist world. Why must we take care of them, in the midst of our just anger brought on by their fucked up society?! Why add the reassurance of "Of course, I don't mean you. You don't act that way." Let them figure out for themselves whether they deserve to be included in our anger. But of course that would mean listening to our anger, which they almost never do. They deflect it, by saying "I'm not like that" or "now look who's generalizing" or "You'll catch more flies with honey ... " or "If you focus on the negative you just give out more power" or "you're not the only one in the world who's suffering." They say "Don't yell at me, I'm on your side" or "I think you're overreacting" or "Boy, you're bitter."

#### They say that mourning should be used to create a transient zone of freedom and to alleviate suffering---we think that the 1NC’s counter-performance of mourning should be used to inform a critical quare rage and negativity that drives us to burn down the world. Turn yourself into a walking bomb and exist in absolute negation.

Kendra Langeteig, Winter-xx-1997, Instructor of English @ Indiana University, “Horror Autotoxicus in the Red Night Trilogy: Ironic Fruits of Burroughs's Terminal Vision,” pg. 135-169, muse

This connection between homosexuality and menacing contagion that Burroughs makes explicit in the erotic exhibitionism of the Red Night trilogy obviously goes beyond parody of homosexual adventure and fantasy taken to extremes. These activities have an explosive sexual politics that point, by their very extremity, to Burroughs's acute awareness of how society reads the homosexual body, and demonstrate his urgent need for vindication. Homosexuality is the toxic in the horror autotoxicus of the body politic, condemned to the margin along with society's other outlaws--its toxic waste (the drug addict, the schizophrenic); all are banished in the social project of preventing the transmission of social disorder and preserving the life of the body politic from collapse. Since the AIDS epidemic, this horror of homosexual contagion, more than a psychological threat ("homosexual panic" to be prosecuted in court), is supplied with tangible proof of its toxicity or "unnaturalness" for the reactionary thinker, actually fueling arguments to read this epidemic as a sign from an Old Testament God punishing acts contra natura with plagues. While Burroughs makes no reference to this cultural backlash in Cities--the Red Night plagues prefigure and can be only coincidentally connected with AIDS and its social fallout--his portrayal of homosexuality painfully emphasizes how culture's message about toxicity is inscribed on the gay male body. When the Red Night trilogy moves into the Age of AIDS, with Dead Roads (1983), Burroughs seemingly mocks the "fear of a queer planet" by continuing to align his homosexual heroes with the greatest "natural" disasters--plagues and death. 46 His strategy of affirming society's negative construction of homosexuality as disorder, rather than being victimized or overpowered by it, turns the cultural bias against the "outlaw" on its head--a fatal strategy that transforms the homosexual's mythic toxicity and problematic exile into a paradoxical means of empowerment and resistance. Burroughs forces this cultural analogy between toxicity and homosexuality to the limit, pushes the "needle to nova," by flaunting the kind of "degenerate" sexual activity that we see in the nightclubs described above, reinforced with casual references to fin-de-siècle decadence (Kim reads Rimbaud); and by allying his queer outlaws with the planet's most threatening and destructive powers. Banished to the margins of existence, they not only identify with civilization's toxic horror, its disease and corruption, they thrive on it. Kim and Audrey Carsons are described as "slimy morbid youths" who adore "abominations, unspeakable rites . . . [and] the reek of the terrible Red Fever" in the plagued cities along their journey (PDR, p. 16). In Burroughs's homosexual saga, the "excremental" elements (which pay tribute to Swift's satirical travelogue) are perversely central to his vision. 47 Figuring prominently at the head of Cities is the obscene "Invocation" that sets the tone for the trilogy's "escatology": 48

#### We must examine the intersections of oppression—the system of phallicized whiteness abjects blacks, queers and women---in the face of this, we must embrace a politics of no future

Winnubst 06 (Shannon, Phd, Associate Professor of Women’s Studies at Ohio State University, *Queering Freedom*, pg. 192-195)

To excavate these lost pasts erased from our consuming consciousness opens middle-class consciousness onto the actual scarcities at work in the fictional scarcity of our consumption practices. To **cultivate these ‘memories’ opens onto a queer consciousness of how desire perpetuates systems of domination.** It can also open onto possibilities that things could be otherwise: we could consume differently, buying and growing and exchanging locally; we could even enjoy our lives without the onslaught of cheap consumer goods that increasingly keep most of the world’s population trapped in economic dependency and political subordination, while also locking us into the endless cycle of anxious consumption and future satiety. And we could recognize that the alleged scarcity of goods that sends us into buying frenzies and their promise of a more secure future is nothing but another marketing tool, one that depends on our not remembering how or where or why or for whom these objects are made. Our senses of power and freedom change when we begin to think and act in these queer ways. **Power is not about one class wielding economic and political power over another; it is about a web of interlocking values that perpetuate the domination of the most privileged at the expense of all other lives, most often through the narrative of desire and its myth of scarcity**. And freedom is not to own as much as we desire; it is not to gain an illusory and impossible security in George W. Bush’s “Ownership Society.” Freedom is to recognize the lost pasts embedded in our everyday practices and to cultivate pleasures that do not perpetuate these violences. It is to stop ignoring and erasing these lost pasts in our idolatry of the (market’s) future, and thereby open onto different kinds of pleasures. These snapshots of different subject positions’ responses to living life without a concept of the future give us some sense of how cultures of phallicized whiteness perceive a call to a politics without a future. To halt the temporality of the future anterior as the dominant mode in which we live our lives is to resist these cultures and their values. It presents a way of interrupting and disrupting the domination of phallicized whiteness, decentering its grip on us. At the same time, to halt the temporality of the future calls us to **risk radical uncertainty** in the politics and erotics of our lives, to open ourselves to not-knowing and unknowing as viable modes of experience. For bodies in power, such a call to risk will likely affront our deepest senses of our selves and worlds: it will likely fall on deaf ears. For oppressed and dominated bodies, this may already be how we are living and to embrace it consciously may be experienced as a call to joy and creativity or, at a minimum, a profound relief. (I use “we” on both sides of this division to express the multiple subject positions I hold on the social map of power.) The call to a politics without a future strikes us in varying ways; it can be decentering, or even a relief, hilarious, and a sense of grounding for movements already underway, giving voice and a space in which to cultivate unimaginable pleasures. How we respond may tell us much about how queerly multiple our “I” of identity can become.

### Case

#### Resurrecting the author turns writing into confession and tyranny

Barthes – ’77 (Roland Barthes, 1977, “The Death of the Author,” Image, Music, Text, p. 143-148)

French rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the individual, of, as it is more nobly put, the ‘human person’. It is thus logical that in literature it should be this positivism, the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology, which has attached the greatest importance to the ‘person’ of the author. The author still reigns in histories of literature, biographies of writers, interviews, magazines, as in the very consciousness of men of letters anxious to unite their person and their work through diaries and memoirs. The image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire’s work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh’s his madness, Tchaikovsky’s his vice. The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author ‘confiding’ in us. / Though the sway of the Author remains powerful (the new criticism has often done no more than consolidate it), it goes without saying that certain writers have long since attempted to loosen it. In France, Mallarme was doubtless the first to see and to foresee in its full extent the necessity to substitute language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to be its owner. For him, for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author; to write is, through a prerequisite impersonality (not at all to be confused with the castrating objectivity of the realist novelist), to reach that point where only language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’. Mallarme’s entire poetics consists in suppressing the author in the interests of writing (which is, as will be seen, to restore the place of the reader). Valery, encumbered by a psychology of the Ego, considerably diluted Mallarme’s theory but, his taste for classicism leading him to turn to the lessons of rhetoric, he never stopped calling into question and deriding the Author; he stressed the linguistic and, as it were, ‘hazardous’ nature of his activity, and throughout his prose works he militated in favour of the essentially verbal condition of literature, in the face of which all recourse to the writer’s interiority seemed to him pure superstition. Proust himself, despite the apparently psychological character of what are called his analyses, was visibly concerned with the task of inexorably blurring, by an extreme subtilization, the relation between the writer and his characters; by making of the narrator not he who has seen and felt nor even he who is writing, but he who is going to write (the young man in the novel - but, in fact, how old is he and who is he? - wants to write but cannot; the novel ends when writing at last becomes possible), Proust gave modern writing its epic. By a radical reversal, instead of putting his life into his novel, as is so often maintained, he made of his very life a work for which his own book was the model; so that it is clear to us that Charlus does not imitate Montesquiou but that Montesquiou - in his anecdotal, historical reality - is no more than a secondary fragment, derived from Charlus. Lastly, to go no further than this prehistory of modernity, Surrealism, though unable to accord language a supreme place (language being system and the aim of the movement being, romantically, a direct subversion of codes-itself moreover illusory: a code cannot be destroyed, only ‘played off’), contributed to the desacrilization of the image of the Author by ceaselessly recommending the abrupt disappointment of expectations of meaning (the famous surrealist ‘jolt’), by entrusting the hand with the task of writing as quickly as possible what the head itself is unaware of (automatic writing), by accepting the principle and the experience of several people writing together. Leaving aside literature itself (such distinctions really becoming invalid), linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an empty functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be filled with the person of the interlocutors. Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing other than the instance saying I: language knows a ‘subject’, not a ‘person’, and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language ‘hold together’, suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it. / The removal of the Author (one could talk here with Brecht of a veritable ‘distancing’, the Author diminishing like a figurine at the far end of the literary stage) is not merely an historical fact or an act of writing; it utterly transforms the modern text (or - which is the same thing -the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all its levels the author is absent). The temporality is different. The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after. The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child. In complete contrast, the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now. The fact is (or, it follows) that writing can no longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, ‘depiction’ (as the Classics would say); rather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative a rare verbal form (exclusively given in the first person and in the present tense) in which the enunciation has no other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is uttered-something like the I declare of kings or the I sing of very ancient poets. Having buried the Author, the modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of his predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his thought or passion and that consequently, making a law of necessity, he must emphasize this delay and indefinitely ‘polish’ his form. For him, on the contrary, the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin-or which, at least, has no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins. / We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. Similar to Bouvard and Pecuchet, those eternal copyists, at once sublime and comic and whose profound ridiculousness indicates precisely the truth of writing, the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them. Did he wish to express himself, he ought at least to know that the inner ‘thing’ he thinks to ‘translate’ is itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely; something experienced in exemplary fashion by the young Thomas de Quincey, he who was so good at Greek that in order to translate absolutely modern ideas and images into that dead language, he had, so Baudelaire tells us (in Paradis Artificiels), ‘created for himself an unfailing dictionary, vastly more extensive and complex than those resulting from the ordinary patience of purely literary themes’. Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred. / Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty) beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is ‘explained’ – victory to the critic. Hence there is no surprise in the fact that, historically, the reign of the Author has also been that of the Critic, nor again in the fact that criticism (be it new) is today undermined, along with the Author. In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be disentangled, nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, ‘run’ (like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing beneath: the space of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would be better from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases [define hypostases: underlying reality or substance] – reason, science, law. / Let us come back to the Balzac sentence. No one, no ‘person’, says it: its source, its voice, is not the true place of the writing, which is reading. Another-very precise- example will help to make this clear: recent research (J.-P. Vernant) has demonstrated the constitutively ambiguous nature of Greek tragedy, its texts being woven from words with double meanings that each character understands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is exactly the ‘tragic’); there is, however, someone who understands each word in its duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters speaking in front of him-this someone being precisely the reader (or here, the listener). Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted. Which is why it is derisory to condemn the new writing in the name of a humanism hypocritically turned champion of the reader’s rights. Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only person in literature. We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.

#### Author creates ideology and limits meaning

Foucault – ’84 (Michel Foucault, 1984, “What is an Author?” The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow, p. 118-119)

Second, there are reasons dealing with the "ideological" status of the author. The question then becomes: How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world? The answer is: One can reduce it with the author. The author allows a limitation of the cancerous and dangerous proliferation of significations within a world where one is thrifty not only with one's resources and riches but also with one's discourses and their significations. The author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning. As a result, we must entirely reverse the traditional idea of the author. We are accustomed, as we have seen earlier, to saying that the author is the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations. We are used to thinking that the author is so different from all other men, and so transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to proliferate

, to proliferate indefinitely. / The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product, since we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function. When a historically given function is represented in a figure that inserts it, one has an ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC Cards

#### Their arguments about how they solve us are just another example of anti-queer liberalism.

Lee Edelman; 1-00-1998; Professor of English @ Tufts University; “The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive”; p. 22

The consequences of such a compulsory identification both of and with the child as the culturally pervasive emblem of the motivating end, albeit endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity, must weigh upon the consideration of a queer oppositional politics. For the only queerness that queer sexualities could ever hope to claim would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of the political—their opposition, that is, to the fantasmatic ambition of achieving symbolic closure through the marriage of identity to futurity in order to reproduce the social subject. Conservatives, of course, understand this in ways most liberals never can, since conservatism profoundly imagines the radical rupturing of the social fabric, while liberalism conservatively clings to a faith in its limitless elasticity. The discourse of the right thus tends toward a greater awareness of, and an insistence on, the figural logics implicit in the social relations we inhabit and enact, while the discourse of the left tends to understand better the capacity of the symbolic to accommodate change by displacing those figural logics onto history as the unfolding of narrative sequence.

#### AT: We do us, you do you---attempts to distinguish blackness from questions of sexuality centers analysis on black heterosexuals and white gays and lesbians, excluding all others from discussion.

Hutchinson – ‘99 – Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law (Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Winter, 1999, “Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,” 47 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, lexis)

In addition to placing anti-heterosexism beyond the domain of civil rights policy, Butler's analysis also disparages gay and lesbian equality by marginalizing gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color. Butler's attempt to "distinguish" blackness from "homosexuality," like the analogical approach employed by white gay and lesbian activists and theorists, treats blackness and "homo-sexuality" (and black subjugation and homophobia) as unconnected. As a result, Butler's framework erases black gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender experience and places black heterosexuals and white gays and lesbians at the center of analysis. Ironically, Butler criticizes white gay and lesbian activists for omitting "black homosexuals" from discussion through their use of the analogies. n173 His own analysis, however, makes the same omission. For example, after locating "distinctions" between "homosexuality" and blackness, Butler concludes that the "issue of social change relating to homosexuality must be divorced from issues relating to the history of blacks in America." n174 This conclusion essentializes black identity by ignoring the multiplicity of experiences within black communities. Black gay experiences, for example, cannot be "divorced" from black history. Furthermore, Butler, at various points in his analysis, explicitly limits his observations to white gays and lesbians and black heterosexuals. n175 By erasing black gays and lesbians, issues of their multidimensional oppression, the relevance of gay and lesbian equality to "black" liberation, and a discussion of what the repeal of the military's anti-gay policy might mean for gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color are excluded from discussion.

# 1NR

## Case

### AT: hooks

#### The Middle passage fundamentally changed the spectrum – negativity should be affirmed for blacks

**Wilderson** 20**10** [Frank B., Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pages 10-11]

Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on posting an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the US as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching “claims successfully made on the State” have come to pass. But that would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and/or public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way: no slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews it coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy, but on one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.

### AT: Self-Love

#### Unreflexive self-love is bad—it assuages white anti-racist “allies” of their guilt and makes them feel better about themselves while continuing to perpetuate oppressive structures.

Quintrospection, 7-20-2013, “The Discursive Feast of Privilege: Towards a Theory of Self-Abjection,” http://quintrospection.wordpress.com/2013/07/20/the-discursive-feast-of-privilege-towards-a-theory-of-self-abjection/

I’m going to call this scenario the “call out high.” It happens when the privileged “ally” feels empowered and “clean” from condemning the similarly privileged but pro-oppression folks around them. It happens in the classroom, on the Internet, in social justice organizations, on the street, across the dinner table, and everywhere else one finds white folks talking about race, middle-class and wealthy folks talking about class, men talking about sexism, cis folks talking about transphobia, straight folks talking about heterosexism, and so on. Though the “caller-outer” may mean perfectly well, they run the unique risk of losing their sense of self-reflexivity. You can shout “I am NOT Trayvon Martin” from the rooftops all day. If you are white, you still benefit from all the privileges attendant thereupon. Being “right” is not enough when you still use your privilege like a blunt weapon, crudely addressing complex issues of power and identity about which you have no first-hand experience and simultaneously silencing the population for whom you claim to speak. I believe that this phenomenon (and it most certainly is a phenomenon) ties very closely to the language of self-love. If all of us should love ourselves equally, and in an equally unqualified way, then those of us who society has granted significant privilege already start out with more love to lavish upon ourselves. As a white anti-racist “ally”, I gain significant psychic and social benefits from claiming this “status” in many contexts, and in those where it is not beneficial to me, I can hide it or ignore its immaterial consequences. In either case, I can feel a smug sense of self-righteousness from being “one of the good whites,” rather than one of those straightforward racists, or those liberals of the colorblind variety. But no matter how good I feel about myself, I have done little to either shift the consciousness of my white peers, or to deconstruct material or ideological systems of racist oppression.