# Round 3---Lakeland

# 1NC

## 1NC—Queercripping

### 1

#### The world is structurally anti-queer and anti-disabled and the aff’s calls for the creation of a “better normal future” only extends humanity’s project to annihilate difference—any and all futurism is born out of the murder of the queer-crip.

Allison Kafer, 5-16-2013, Associate Professor of Feminist Studies @ Southwestern, MA, PhD, Claremont Graduate University, BA @ Wake Forest University, “Feminist, Queer, Crip,” pg. 28-31, google books

No Future for Crips Lee Edelman has famously argued that queers and queer theory would be better off refusing the future altogether. (“Fuck the Future,” as Carla Freccero puts it.)“ Building on Lauren Berlant’s work on the ﬁgure of the child in American politics, Edelman argues that futurity—an investment in and attention to the future or futures—is almost always ﬁgured in reproductive terms: we cannot “conceive of a future without the ﬁgure of the Child." As a result, the Child serves as "the telos of the social order," the one for whom we all act, “the fantasmatic beneﬁciary of every political intervention.“ I-Ie offers as an example abortion rhetoric, noting that both pro-choice and antiabortion activists frame their ﬁght as on behalf of the children." Patrick McCreery traces a similar parallel among both opponents and supporters of gay marriage: depending on ones stance, gay mar- riage either destroys children's well-being or enhances it, but both sides agree that the future of children is what is at stake in the debate and therefore what should guide our decisions.“ For those in both ﬁghts, then, the struggle becomes no longer about rights or justice or desire or autonomy but about the future of “our” children. Both of these examples show the slipperiness of arguments based on the Child and reproductive futu- rity; one can mobilize the same rhetoric toward mutually opposing goals. What Edelman draws out is the coercive nature of such frames: it is not only that we can use the “future of our children” frame but that we should or must use it; politics itself is and can only be centered around the Child, foreclosing all other possibilities for action. Reading from a queer crip perspective, I can easily see the ways in which “the future," especially as ﬁgured through the “Child,” is used to buttress able-bodied/able- minded heteronormativity. First, the proliferation of prenatal testing, much of which presumes that all positive diagnoses will be “solved” through selective abortion, is a clear manifestation of compulsory able-bodiedness and able-mindedness. As we will see in the following chapters, pregnant women with disabilities and pregnant women whose fetuses have tested “positive” for various conditions are understood as threats to the future: they have failed to guarantee a better future by bringing the right kind of Child into the present." Thus the idealization of the Child as the frontier of politics, the framing that troubles Edelman, should concern crip readers as well; discourses of reproduction, generation, and inheritance are shot through with anxiety about disability. These sites of reproductive futurity demand a Child that both resembles the parents and exceeds them; “we” all want “our” children to be rnore healthy, more active, stronger and smarter than we are, and we are supposed to do everything in our power to make that happen. The Child through whom legacies are passed down is, without doubt, able-bodied/able-minded. Second, a politics based in futurity leads easily to an ethics of endless deferral. "We're held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself,” Edelman notes, and this deferment serves to consolidate the status quo.“ Focusing always on the better future, we divert our attention from the here and now; “We are rendered doc-ile,” in other words, “through our unwitting obedience to the future."“ This phrasing is telling: “held in thrall,” “rendered docile,” “unwitting obedience”—each phrase signals stagnation and acquiescence, an inability to move in any direction because of a permanently forward-looking gaze. This deferral, this ﬁrm focus on the future, is often expressed in terms of cure and rehabilitation, and is thereby bound up in nor- malizing approaches to the mind/body. Disability activists have long railed against a politics of endless deferral that pours economic and cultural resources into “curing” future disabled people (by preventing them from ever coming into existence) while ignoring the needs and experiences of disabled people in the present.” This kind of focus on futurity does disabled people no favors, yet it is one of the most common ways of framing disability: we must cure Ierry’s kids now so that there will be no more Ierry’s kids in the future. Moreover, everything from sterilization to institu- tionalization, from bone-lengthening surgeries to growth attenuation, has been jus- tiﬁed on the grounds that such acts will lead to better futures for the disabled person andlor for their communities. Within these discourses, disability cannot appear as anything other than failure. Third, eugenic histories certainly bear the mark of reproductive futurity. Even keeping only to the United States, and only to the past one hundred years or so, exam- ples abound of how concerns about the future of the “race” and the future of the nation (futures often depicted as intertwined) have been wrapped up in fears and anxieties about disability. Tens of thousands of people diagnosed with various “defects” were targeted by eugenic professionals and policies for the ﬁrst half of the twentieth cen- tury, classiﬁed. and managed in order to contain the alleged risks they posed to public health. The category of “defectives” included not only people with disabilities but also people from “suspect” racial, ethnic, and religious groups as well as poor people, sex- ual “delinquents,” and immigrants from the “wrong” countries. All were united under ﬂexible concepts of degeneracy, defect, and disability, with "feeble-minded” serving as one of the most eifective, and expansive, classiﬁcations of all. People placed into one or more of these categories might be tracked by family records oﬂices, institutionalized and segregated from the public, sterilized against their will, barred from entering the country, or, in extreme cases, euthanized. Schools and universities included the study of eugenics in their curriculum, both disseminating and reifying these concepts of degeneration and defect. In many states, sterilization came to be seen as a necessary means of protecting the health of the race and the nation from further degeneration; as Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted in the infamous 1927 Buck v. Bell decision uphold- ing Virginia's compulsory sterilization policies, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough."‘»' While many overtly eugenic policies began to wane in the 1930s and 1940s, eugenic ideologies and practices did not fully disappear but rather ﬂourished well into the Cold War and beyond." Virginia’s sterilization law was not repealed until 1974, and coerced or forced sterilization of women of color, poor women, indigenous women, and disabled women persisted throughout most of the twentieth century; even today, under cer- tain circumstances, disabled people can be sterilized without their consent, and poor women, immigrant women, and women of color continue to have their reproductive futures curtailed by the courts and the legislature.” Institutionalization remains a common response to disabled people, particularly those with "severe" disabilities; despite the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead, which aﬂirmed the right of disabled people to live in their home communities, many states continue to prioritize funding for institutions over funding community-based care.“ State governments across the country are responding to budget crises with cuts to health care and dis- ability services, especially in-home attendant care; given that many disabled people require such services in order to live independently, disability rights activists and health advocates note that even more disabled people, especially disabled people of color and low-income disabled people, are being forced into nursing homes or out onto the street. These trends do not bode well for the futures of disabled people, even as they are touted as necessary for preserving the future health of the state and the nation. Indeed, at one time or another, each of these practices—sterilization, segregation, exclusion, institutionalization—has been justiﬁed by concerns about “the future” and particularly future children. For example, Mary Storer Kostir, an assistant at the Ohio Bureau of luvenile Research, argued in a 1916 publication that "physically rigorous but mentally feeble persons are a social menace. . . . Their children threaten to overwhelm the civilization of the future. . . . [We] must also consider our children, and not burden the future with an incubus of mental deﬁciency?” In making her case for segregat- ing those labeled “feeble-minded,” Kostir weighs the futures of “our” children against those other children, the ones who are mentally deﬁcient, threatening, and burden- some. A 1933 pamphlet by the Human Betterment Foundation similarly warns against the “burden” of "feeble-minded” children, noting that the failure to practice “eugenic sterilization” produces effects that are “disastrous . . . in future generations.“ In these kinds of eugenic discourses, children serve as the sign of the future; the kind of future that awaits us will be determined by the kind of children we bear. Illness, “defect,” “deviance,” and disability are positioned as fundamentally damaging to the fabric of the community: polluting the gene pool, or weakening the nation, or destroying a fam- ily’s quality of life, or draining public services (or, often, some combination of the four). To put it bluntly, disabled people were—and often are—ﬁgured as threats to futurity. Whole books have been written about each of these practices, and this brief, sweeping history cannot begin to do justice to the material or, especially, to the bodies invoked by this material. Such broad summaries all too easily erase differences among people with disabilities, differences not only of race, class, sexuality, gender, and his- tory but also of impairment; there are many bodies falling through the cracks of this overview. And yet, it is imperative to establish a pattern, to demonstrate that we have long felt and acted on the belief that disability destroys the future, or that a future with disability must be avoided at all costs. It is this pattern, these histories, that makes the question of the future so vexed. I can see clearly how futurity has been the cause of much violence against disabled people, such that “fuck the future” can seem the only viable crip response.

#### Rhetorical silence normalizes institutional marginalization of homodisabled bodies—denies the institutional natures of heteronormativity and ableism and causes erasure of queer-crip identity.

Santiago Solis, Winter-xx-2007, doctoral student, Learning Dis/abilities, Teachers College @ Columbia, “Snow White and the Seven ‘Dwarfs’—Queercripped,” pg. 117, jstor

A queercrip reading of "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" grants us the opportunity to deconstruct hetero-corporo-normative presumptions, stereo- types, and social structures that have predominated in classical fairy tales. Through silence and marginalization, stories such as "Snow White" have treated the homodisabled body as unseemly. By positioning homosexuality and disability at the center of our analysis of "Snow White," queercripping allows us to challenge the desexualization and infantilization of alternative sexual and bodily configurations in the story. It is important here to emphasize that whenever a homodisabled existence is denied, a code of surveillance is permitted to define social ideologies of sexual perversion. A queercrip analysis challenges this surveillance and helps us subvert simplistic classifications of appropriate and acceptable sexual acts. Before I begin my analysis, I want to emphasize the following: Queer theory and disability studies both have origins in and ongoing commitments to activism. Their primary constituen- cies, sexual minorities and people with disabilities, share a history of injustice: both have been pathologized by medicine; demonized by religion ... stereotyped in representation ... Perhaps the most significant similarity between these disci- plines, however, is their radical stance toward concepts of nor-malcy; both argue adamantly against the compulsion to observe norms of all kinds (corporeal, mental, sexual, social, cultural, subcultural, etc.). (Sandahl 2003, 26) Unfortunately, in Western societies, heterosexist and ableist assumptions rest on the beliefs that homosexuality and disability are personal misfortunes and tragedies, and that the social and environmental problems encountered by homosexual and disabled people stem mainly from their own bodies. From this perspective, rehabilitation, restoration, and normalization are the appro-priate goals. In this essay, however, I challenge these heterosexist and ableist Beliefs.

#### Rhetorical silence normalizes heterosexuality as an invisible norm that leads to interpersonal and social violence

Afshar – ‘4 – Department of Political Science, Syracuse University (Ahoura Afshar, 2004, “The Invisible Presence of Sexuality in the Classroom,” Interrupting Heteronormativity, http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Heteronormativity.pdf, p. 33-37)

Should discussions of sexuality be included in the classroom?1 The easy answer might be no: it is not 'relevant' to the subject matter of most courses except perhaps to those that explicitly engage with human sexuality, such as Child and Family Studies, Sociology, or Women's Studies. Moreover, this reasoning might go, given estimates that within the general population less than ten percent identify as non-heterosexual, there's a good chance that in a class of sixty students everyone is straight. / It is this kind of perspective, however, that not only contributes to the invisibility of LGBT students, but it also constructs and reinforces heteronormativity in our classrooms and across campus.2 LGBT students (and teachers) ARE present in our classrooms—whether we choose to see them or not—and it is their very invisible presence that demonstrates the power of heteronormativity to mask that which does not conform, and to naturalize that which does. This is a problem for both LGBT and heterosexual students and teachers alike. Heteronormative assumptions and practices regulate the beliefs, behaviors, and desires of ALL of us, restricting the range of possibilities of identification and expression for ALL of us, to such an extent that even momentary and joyful expressions (e.g. the heterosexual man singing "I feel like a woman" in the Chevy commercial discussed by Susan Adams) become sources of discomfort and fear. / Practices of regulation and restriction are integral to creating and maintaining hierarchies of power, which in turn limit the kinds of learning and teaching that can happen in our classrooms. As responsible teachers, we know that our pedagogical theories and practices need to expand the kinds of learning opportunities we provide students, not restrict them. In fact, the administration of this university recognizes the importance of this by emphasizing the link between a rich intellectual climate and a diversity of perspectives and people: "[. . .] diversity in our student body, faculty, and staff has far-ranging and significant educational benefits for all non-minorities and minorities alike" (Syracuse University Academic Plan, 2001). Particular strategies to create more inclusive curricula have been developed and implemented in programs and departments university-wide because "[s]tudents in diverse learning environments learn more, and have higher levels of satisfaction and greater degrees of civic engagements. They are better able to appreciate the ideas of others and they are better prepared to enter the world they will lead" (SU Academic Plan, 2001). This diversity of students, faculty, and ideas includes: "race, ethnicity, gender, age, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and physical and mental ability" (Syracuse University Human Resources, emphasis added). / In principle, then, SU values diversity. Taking a closer look at what diversity means and how it is "practiced," however, exposes some gaps between these principles and actual, everyday classroom procedures, particularly when that "diversity" topic is sexual orientation. It's important to note that sexual orientation is a term that does not reference a particular set of people; it's not only about LGBT people, but also non-LGBT, or heterosexual, people. Why is this broader definition of sexual orientation important? Because the sexual orientation of heterosexuality is simultaneously institutionalized and naturalized to the extent that it becomes the invisible norm against which all other sexual orientations, identifications, or expressions are named "abnormal." The issue of "invisibility," then, isn't just about LGBT students and teachers; it's about the ways in which our assumptions about (hetero)sexuality are invisible to us. And we carry these assumptions into our classrooms. As a result, heteronormativity is reproduced, most often unconsciously, through our own everyday classroom practices. Rather than expanding the kinds of learning opportunities we create space for, we inadvertently reinforce a regulated and restrictive framework for understanding the complexity of human sexuality. / II. Ten years ago, research with Syracuse University LGBT students showed that one third of the respondents would have gone to another school had they had sufficient information on the circumstances surrounding LGBT issues on campus (Sherrill & Hardesty, 1994). Although the situation has changed since then, this statistic may still be accurate to some degree. Bias against those who are perceived to bend the rules of heteronormative behavior pervades SU's campus climate. There are still cases of verbal abuse and physical attacks against LGBT students on this campus: instances of name-calling, of derogatory comments written on doors, dry-erase boards, or computer desktops in residence halls and on campus, and even of physical assault on the basis of perceived sexual orientation (Syracuse University Public Safety, 2004; see also Byrnes, 2003; Wightman, 2003). "Fifty-one percent of bias-related incidents reported last fall [2003] had to do with sexual orientation, while 27 percent concerned gender" (Moritz, 2004). These statistics show that many LGBT students face problems that their straight peers do not. Non-straight students often experience a complex process that involves questioning their sexual orientation, achieving a comfortable sexual identity, coming out, and self-acceptance. They often experience loneliness, isolation, and exclusion in this process. And, they are often targets of homophobia simply because the heterosexual majority claims an exclusive version of sexuality and morality due to the regulative powers of heteronorms. Despite these facts, there is silence in our classrooms when it comes to sexuality. It appears as if no one wants to recognize this silence as a problem, let alone discuss ways of addressing it. Why? / One reason there are so many misconceptions about sexuality is that it is not talked about in U.S. educational systems. It is not generally included in primary schools because, it is argued, it is too early for children to learn about sexuality (Fine, 1988). It is often not included in high school curricula because, the argument goes, adolescents are at a crucial age and should not be exposed to the "promotion of sexuality," especially non-heterosexuality. It is not included in college since it is not 'relevant' to the subject matter in most courses. But, sexuality is relevant: it is not just about sex; it is a critical aspect of life, a primary means through which we identify ourselves, though this identification is usually unconscious for people who identify as "heterosexual" because heterosexuality is the assumed norm, and thus invisible as a "marker" of identity. For LGBT-identified people, however, sexuality is a conscious "marker" of identity; describing oneself in terms such as "gay," "lesbian," "bisexual," "transgender," or "queer" is fundamental to the process of "coming out." Thus, sexuality is not simply a "private" aspect of individuals, but is intimately connected with power relations in our culture, and influences much of our social experiences. There is much misinformation and bias regarding matters of sexuality. There are students with "non-traditional" sexual identities whose needs are not usually met. Only a tiny fraction of the entire student body may take courses that directly address sexuality and the privileges it awards, denies, and limits access to, and hence the majority of students will never discuss the politics of sexuality in any classroom. But it is a mistake to think that this is a problem only for LGBT students. / A social stigma has been attached to sexualities other than heterosexuality, bred out of the myths and misinformation this volume is trying to "interrupt." Hence, some people find moral justification in being violent towards non-straights. Emphasizing the shamefulness of same-sex desire, this logic simply ignores the fact that most people have some sort of "non-heterosexual" fantasy or experience at some point in their lifetime (Laumann et. al., 1994). One may have such experiences without having a LGBT orientation. Being unaware of such facts may cause heterosexuals to experience these fantasies with immeasurable anxiety, dreading that they might be gay. / Gay-bashing may also be seen as a way of proving one's masculinity. The pressure to "prove one's heterosexual manhood" can lead to the need to disparage gays in all ways. This kind of sexual stereotyping not only encourages violence against those who are perceived to be LGBT, but also causes psychological dissonance for straight youth, who are endeavoring to comply with rigid gender roles. It is because of these rigid gender roles that sexuality is an issue that all students face, regardless of their sexual orientation.

#### Postmodern theorists sit in luxury as they discuss strategies for liberation of the object, but the victims of reality, in the periphery of postmodernists, know that these strategies can’t be eaten. Post modernism ignores the material reality of queers and blacks and paints a metanarrative that never actualizes change.

SISKANNA NAYNAHA - DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY -2006

[RACE OF ANGELS: XICANISMA, POSTCOLONIAL PASSIONS, AND RHETORICS OF REACTION AND REVOLUTION- WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY- Department of English May 2006 – Online- http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache%3A8oZmjXnNUpEJ%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fresearch.wsulibs.wsu.edu%3A8443%2Fdspace%2Fbitstream%2F2376%2F492%2F1%2Fs\_naynaha\_050306.pdf+%22postmodern%22%22ivory+tower%22%22material+reality%22%22people+of+color%22%22racism%22&hl=en&gl=us]

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Laclau entered into a critical discussion with cultural theorist Judith Butler and Slovenian psychoanalyst and theorist Slavoj Žižek in their collaborative Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues in the Left. Using the theoretical lenses provided by Gramsci, Derrida, and Lacan, the three debate the failure of the Left in contemporary politics and, if there has indeed been a failure, its causes. The major contribution of this work to the field of democratic theory is the ways the authors problematize current watchwords deployed in the cultural rhetoric of US democracy such as “multicultural,” “pluralistic,” and “politically correct.” Ultimately, however, the theorists of so-called radical democracy tend to become bogged down in discussions of the discursivity of democracy; what they neglect here is the material, economic realities of poor people of color in the US and around the globe. Kalyan K. Sanyal elaborates on this critique in his “Postmarxism and the Third World: A Critical Response to the Radical Democratic Agenda.” “By emphasizing the discourse of the right,” he argues, the radical democrats link their multiple struggles to the state because it is the state that endows every citizen with right, and the process of realization of the right must refer to the state rather than to any other form of collectivity . . . [but] what are the implications of the radical democratic agenda for the global order, economic and political? (128) In the end Sanyal finds that the implications are devastating. The most salient is that the “Third World” “has to bear a large part of the cost of accommodating rights in the [First World]. To the extent that these rights impinge on the logic of profit and accumulation, capital has a tendency to move to greener pastures in the Third World where such rights hardly exist” (128). In fact, the rhetoric of democracy in the US has grown out of a Eurocentric obsession with “Western” foundations which inspire and perpetuate an obsessive possessive individualism through constant appeals to Enlightenment era thinking and ideals. The deployment of such rhetoric has long obscured the problems of racism, poverty, patriarchal oppression, and heterosexism within the US, and now, given the global expansion of US domination under the logic of late capitalism, that same rhetoric of democracy obfuscates the historical and material realities of US colonialism and imperialism around the world. Debates about individual “rights” and appropriate “procedures” rage on in the US while suffering rages on in poor neighborhoods populated disproportionately by people of color in the US and enrages the devastated Two-Thirds World. It is a travesty that demands a sustained intervention, one that historicizes thepolitical and economic dimensions of the rhetoric of democracy in the US.

#### Heteronormativity outweighs—the drive to exterminate “impurity” in society amplifies structural violence and ensures omnicide.

Eve Sedgwick, xx-xx-1990, Professor of English @ CUNY, “Epistemology of the Closet,” p. 127-130

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorray, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing--the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist \*imaginaire\*. In our culture as in \*Billy Bud\*, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time \*after the homosexual\* is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time \*after the human\*; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there \*were\* homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time \*after the homosexual\* are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture [book published in 1990 -Alec]. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations.26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine lustre this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked--in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact. It might be worth making explicit that the use of evolutionary thinking in the current wave of utopian/genocidal fantasy is, whatever else it may be, crazy [sic]. Unless one believes, first of all, that same-sex object-choice across history and across cultures is \*one thing\* with \*one cause\*, and, second, that its one cause is direct transmission through a nonrecessive genetic path--which would be, to put it gently, counter-intuitive--there is no warrant for imagining that gay populations, even of men, in post-AIDS generations will be in the slightest degree diminished. Exactly \*to the degree\* that AIDS is a gay disease, it's a tragedy confined to our generation; the long-term demographic depredations of the disease will fall, to the contrary, on groups, many themselves direly endangered, that are reproduced by direct heterosexual transmission. Unlike genocide directed against Jews, Native Americans, Africans, or other groups [the disabled -Alec], then, gay genocide, the once-and-for-all eradication of gay populations, however potent and sustained as a project or fantasy of modern Western culture, is not possible short of the eradication of the whole human species. The impulse of the species toward its own eradication must not either, however, be underestimated. Neither must the profundity with which that omnicidal impulse in entangled with the modern problematic of the homosexual: the double bind of definition between the homosexual, say, as a distinct \*risk group\*, and the homosexual as a potential of representation within the universal.27 As gay community and the solidarity and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority potentials and universalizing ones by opened and opened and opened?

#### Negation is the only ethical act in the world of hetero-corporo-normativity. Empowerment and resistance for queer-disabled bodies is only possible through the affirmation of civil society’s negative construction of homodisability—this entails calling for the end of the world.

Kendra Langeteig, Winter-xx-1997, Instructor of English @ Indiana University, “Horror Autotoxicus in the Red Night Trilogy: Ironic Fruits of Burroughs's Terminal Vision,” pg. 135-169, muse

This connection between homosexuality and menacing contagion that Burroughs makes explicit in the erotic exhibitionism of the Red Night trilogy obviously goes beyond parody of homosexual adventure and fantasy taken to extremes. These activities have an explosive sexual politics that point, by their very extremity, to Burroughs's acute awareness of how society reads the homosexual body, and demonstrate his urgent need for vindication. Homosexuality is the toxic in the horror autotoxicus of the body politic, condemned to the margin along with society's other outlaws--its toxic waste (the drug addict, the schizophrenic); all are banished in the social project of preventing the transmission of social disorder and preserving the life of the body politic from collapse. Since the AIDS epidemic, this horror of homosexual contagion, more than a psychological threat ("homosexual panic" to be prosecuted in court), is supplied with tangible proof of its toxicity or "unnaturalness" for the reactionary thinker, actually fueling arguments to read this epidemic as a sign from an Old Testament God punishing acts contra natura with plagues. While Burroughs makes no reference to this cultural backlash in Cities--the Red Night plagues prefigure and can be only coincidentally connected with AIDS and its social fallout--his portrayal of homosexuality painfully emphasizes how culture's message about toxicity is inscribed on the gay male body. When the Red Night trilogy moves into the Age of AIDS, with Dead Roads (1983), Burroughs seemingly mocks the "fear of a queer planet" by continuing to align his homosexual heroes with the greatest "natural" disasters--plagues and death. 46 His strategy of affirming society's negative construction of homosexuality as disorder, rather than being victimized or overpowered by it, turns the cultural bias against the "outlaw" on its head--a fatal strategy that transforms the homosexual's mythic toxicity and problematic exile into a paradoxical means of empowerment and resistance. Burroughs forces this cultural analogy between toxicity and homosexuality to the limit, pushes the "needle to nova," by flaunting the kind of "degenerate" sexual activity that we see in the nightclubs described above, reinforced with casual references to fin-de-siècle decadence (Kim reads Rimbaud); and by allying his queer outlaws with the planet's most threatening and destructive powers. Banished to the margins of existence, they not only identify with civilization's toxic horror, its disease and corruption, they thrive on it. Kim and Audrey Carsons are described as "slimy morbid youths" who adore "abominations, unspeakable rites . . . [and] the reek of the terrible Red Fever" in the plagued cities along their journey (PDR, p. 16). In Burroughs's homosexual saga, the "excremental" elements (which pay tribute to Swift's satirical travelogue) are perversely central to his vision. 47 Figuring prominently at the head of Cities is the obscene "Invocation" that sets the tone for the trilogy's "escatology": 48

#### Thus, vote negative to queercrip the 1AC to death.

Santiago Solis, Winter-xx-2007, doctoral student, Learning Dis/abilities, Teachers College @ Columbia, “Snow White and the Seven ‘Dwarfs’—Queercripped,” pg. 114-131, jstor

Ultimately, in “Snow White,” fantasy has such a normalizing function that it is no longer about the reader using her or his imagination to conceptualize unfamiliar realities or unexplored possibilities; instead, the story attempts to restrict or regulate the reader’s imagination by producing its own vision and version of the ideal fantasy—one that negates the existence of homosexuality and disability. In this way, the story operates as a historical narrative as it mirrors what society considers objectionable, indecent, and immoral. Through subtle and open forms of marginalization and silencing, it reinforces and extends homophobia and ableism. Consequently, as the process of homogenization and normalization suppresses alternative sexual and bodily identities, the young female reader may begin to replicate privileged ways of being in the world. After all is said and done, Snow White herself is the embodiment of the classical beauty that girls (but not boys) are expected to reproduce. “Snow White” continues to be a popular fairy tale because it perpetuates sexual and bodily ideals that the mainstream values and sustains. The idealized virtuosity and desirable beauty of Snow White—her presumed feminine qualities (subservient, virginal, defenseless, dependent, delicate, refined, ablebodied, and heterosexual)—help produce the ideal image of how young girls should behave or what they should look like. In a society in which the male gaze dominates, the female body is already viewed as an object of desire, and Snow White’s objectification is not seen as problematic from that perspective. The female body, and the heterosexual and able-bodied female in particular, becomes a site for a specific kind of sexual desire. However, what is striking about the “Snow White” story is that rather than explicitly rejecting the undesirable homosexual and disabled body, it simply disqualifies them as nonexistent—insidiously—through omission. Furthermore, the rhetoric of infantilization that is used to represent the seven dwarfs serves multiple purposes. First, the physical shortcomings that the dwarfs presumably embody confirm ideas about manhood; their disabled bodies explicitly contradict normal conventions of masculinity (sexuality, virility, and so on). The dwarfs are represented as displaced children, and therefore not as real men. Second, the dwarfs are emasculated. Since the Prince is the only one who can view Snow White through the male gaze, it is only he, not the emasculated and infantilized dwarfs, who can claim sovereign authority over Snow White. And since society presumes everyone is heterosexual unless stated otherwise, the Prince is automatically assumed to be only and exclusively heterosexual and, therefore, he must fall in love with Snow White. Third, because of the masculine prowess the Prince displays, young boys (but not girls) are expected and even encouraged to identify with him. Since the Prince epitomizes heterosexual and able-bodied manliness—physical qualities that are recognized and admired by mainstream society—young boys quickly learn to emulate these bodily traits and behaviors. To reiterate, contemporary audiences continue to accept the fairy tale because the story extends idealized notions of social and sexual behaviors, which, as I have argued, are based on heterosexist and ableist apprehensions. I attempted to explore a range of conceivable responses that “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs” might provoke to ascertain how different authors and illustrators have negotiated the stigma and invisibility surrounding homosexuality and disability. Furthermore, I proceeded chronologically to determine if more recent publications progress toward affirmative representations. Unfortunately, even contemporary variations on the tale continue to produce a public imagery that supports hetero-corporo-normative desire and identity; none of them depart from or defy heterosexist and ableist norms. For this reason, I tried to pay attention to that which remains silenced or unsaid. In doing so, I discovered a number of discounted erotic possibilities (for example, between the dwarfs, between the dwarfs and the Prince, and between the dwarfs and Snow White). But what does it mean, after all, to suppress or negate queercrip representations? Why should future tellings incorporate or provide a queercrip perspective? In other words, What function would a queercrip approach serve? A queercrip reading of the story offers the potential to explore sexual fantasies that might inform and transform narrow images of desirability. The eroticization of the queercrip body, for example, can instill pride and foster public affirmation for queercripness. Queercripness is located “not so much in any specifically . . . [queercrip] practice but in a larger liberation of psychic and social life, one that gives defiantly corporeal form to the repressed materials and forbidden fantasies” 2002, 161). Through the lens of queercripness a fear of sexual fantasies that might be perceived as “deviant” is not only displaced, but fear itself is subsequently replaced by a desire for varied forms of corporeal lustfulness. In this way, each type of body, or body type, is seen as a new source of sexual inspiration. Queercripness, therefore, does not in itself promote homosexuality; instead, it seeks to generate new social conditions from which all types of people can be sexually expressive and passionately embodied. In short, queercripness undoes dichotomized distinctions between the normative and the non-normative. Ultimately, we must challenge rigid definitions of sexuality based on acceptable preferences and identities if picture books are ever to represent all of our corporeal functions and diversities. Hence, countering heterosexism and ableism demands more than “positive” representations requiring assimilation into the dominant culture; instead, representations need to draw upon ambiguities with the understanding that queercripness can never be fully captured, contained, mastered, or disciplined. It is something that is fluid, “since there is no law which can guarantee that things will have ‘one, true meaning,’ or that meanings won’t change over time” (Hall 2001, 9). What queercripness offers, therefore, is a critical stance with respect to heterosexism and ableism. So how can we use queercripness to think forward? Queercripness provides awareness and an urge to question and to problematize. For example, in the four versions of “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs” examined here, we witness time and again how the seven dwarfs play “a supporting role, serving as a marker for larger narratives about normalcy and legitimacy” (Davidson 2003, 57). However, as sexual fantasies are allowed to surface from the dwarfs’ bodies, spaces of dialogue emerge, spaces from which children can explore “humanizing possibilities” (Greene 1988). But how can teachers and parents transform newfound sexual fantasies into age-appropriate conversations? How can fairy tales like “Snow White” help initiate constructive dialogues? Is it preferable to talk openly about sexual fantasies, or should they continue to function as unacknowledged sexual perversions? These questions force us to consider what sexual practices are most valued in our culture as well as what sexual knowledge deserves to be validated and discussed. According to Jonathan Silin, “When innocence is defined by the absence of the experience presumed to characterize adulthood, the protection of childhood requires controlling access to the knowledge that would signal its loss” (1995, 122). From this perspective, the child is presumed to be unaware of her or his own sexual desires and therefore in constant need of supervision. Unfortunately, even though queercripness promotes multiple ways of knowing, controversial issues such as homosexuality and disability that fall outside the realm of the hetero-corporo-normative are often treated as beyond the child’s immediate intellectual understanding or conceptual scope. In this regard, we are uncomfortable whenever the child has too much knowledge or information about anything queercripped, which brings me back to my opening remarks. In retrospect, my innocence (or ignorance) of homosexuality as a child made me fearful of my homoerotic fantasies. For me, the presumption of hetero-corporo-normativity was extremely limiting in that I grew up feeling ashamed and socially ostracized. Because homosexuality was not part of my daily experience, I grew up with a great deal of self-hatred. I knew I was “different” and this “difference” impelled me into a world of darkness where I remained well into adulthood, for only then was I allowed the opportunity to express my sexuality. Hence the questions: If my sexuality was silenced as a child, how might homodisabled children feel about themselves? Do they feel valued and appreciated as they read different versions of “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs”? Fortunately, queercripness has made hetero-corporo-normativity questionable, a politically charged phenomenon to be problematized and challenged rather than presupposed or elided. This questioning has begun to unpack what it means to be a child seeking information about sexual identities. However, at what age is it appropriate to talk openly with children about queercripness? In other words, how young is too young before a child’s sexuality ceases to be suppressed or denied? How can a child’s sexual identity be incorporated into the child’s natural development? When, how, and why do we attempt to regulate the child’s sexual identity by reproducing hetero-corporo-normative practices that support “acceptable” feminine and masculine behaviors? And how do these social practices work to protract the institutionalization of homophobia and ableism? While we deliberate over such questions, one thing is certain: the concealment of sexual identities related to homosexuality and disability will only assure the continued isolation of children, especially homodisabled youths, who seek guidance and support. It is because of this group of children that I offer this analysis of “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,” in the hope that they will not have to grow up, as I did, in distress over their sexuality.

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC Cardz

#### Leftist discourse of ‘radical democracy’ exterminates queerness—fetishizes the ever-distant future and assimilates radical queer oppositionality.

Lee Edelman; 1-00-1998; Professor of English @ Tufts University; “The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive”; p. 22

The consequences of such a compulsory identification both of and with the child as the culturally pervasive emblem of the motivating end, albeit endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity, must weigh upon the consideration of a queer oppositional politics. For the only queerness that queer sexualities could ever hope to claim would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of the political—their opposition, that is, to the fantasmatic ambition of achieving symbolic closure through the marriage of identity to futurity in order to reproduce the social subject. Conservatives, of course, understand this in ways most liberals never can, since conservatism profoundly imagines the radical rupturing of the social fabric, while liberalism conservatively clings to a faith in its limitless elasticity. The discourse of the right thus tends toward a greater awareness of, and an insistence on, the figural logics implicit in the social relations we inhabit and enact, while the discourse of the left tends to understand better the capacity of the symbolic to accommodate change by displacing those figural logics onto history as the unfolding of narrative sequence.

#### Queerness is an antagonism

Leopold Lippert, xx-xx-2008, University Assistant in American Studies @ the University of Vienna, “Utopian Contemporaries: Queer Temporality and America,” jfs

Edelman opens his book with what he modestly terms “a simple provocation” (Future, 3), and what encapsulates the futility of an affirmative and assimilationist queer politics. He argues “that queerness names [...] the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (Future, 3), and reveals the implicitly homophobic discourse of all the Obamas and O’Sullivans who are fighting for the future of our children and our grandchildren. The futurist bias towards heteronormativity has been fueled, as Judith Butler points out, by “fears about reproductive relations” (“Kinship”, 21), by uncanny anxieties over the prospect that queer citizenship may interfere with a nation “imagined for fetuses and children” (Berlant, Queen, 1), and by the fundamental antithesis that the queer and the child embody. The principal concern of futurist America, then, is the fate of its offspring, expressed in a fearful inquiry: “What happens to the child, the child, the poor child, the martyred figure of an ostensibly selfish or dogged social progressivism?” (Butler, “Kinship”, 21). Edelman recognizes that the mythical child – as the epitome of a heteronormative future-oriented social – can only be saved by a “marriage of identity to futurity in order to realize the social subject” (Future, 14), which leads him to the ensuing claim that only the linear temporal process of “ever aftering” (“After”, 476, emphasis in the original) can keep “society alive” (“After”, 476). Heteronormative America, accordingly, is constituted through its own posterity, through a temporal operation to which queerness is inherently antagonistic. In an imagined community that relies on futurism as its life-giving engine, then, “the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form” (Edelman, Future, 4).

# 1NR

## K

### Labor Power Link

#### Their arguments about ‘reclaiming labor power’ presume an able-bodied locus of subjectivity

Carol Appadurai Breckenridge1 and Candace A Volger2, Fall-xx-2001, Associate Professor of History @ the New School for Social Research, PhD @ University of Wisconsin—Madison1, David B. and Clara E. Stern Professor of Philosophy and Professor in the College at the University of Chicago2, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism,” pg.—, muse

Disability studies teaches that an assumed able body is crucial to the smooth operation of traditional theories of democracy, citizenship, subjectivity, beauty, and capital. By assuming that the normative human is an able-bodied adult, for example, liberal theory can conflate political or economic interests with desires, political representation with having a voice in policy-making, social organization with voluntary association, and so on. Liberal theory naturalizes the political by making it personal. And the “person” at the center of the traditional liberal theory is not simply an individual locus of subjectivity (however psychologically fragmented, incoherent, or troubled). He is an able-bodied locus of subjectivity, one whose unskilled labor may be substituted freely for the labor of other such individuals, one who can imagine himself largely self-sufficient because almost everything conspires to help him take his enabling body for granted (even when he is scrambling for the means of subsistence). However, the mere possibility of a severely cognitively disabled adult citizen disrupts the liberal equations of representation and voice, desire and interest. Advocacy for the severely cognitively disabled is not a matter of voicing their demands. More generally, the intricate practical dialectics of dependence and independence in the lives of many disabled people unsettle ideals of social organization as freely chosen expressions of mutual desire.

### Postmodernism Link

#### Your Western K is privileged and colorblind

Monique Roelofs, Prof @ Hampshire College and teaches and writes at the intersection of European, analytical, and postcolonial philosophies with a special focus on aesthetics and the philosophy of art and culture, feminist philosophy, and critical race theory, 2006, “The Veiled Presence of Race in the Philosophy of Art:  Reclaiming Race for Aesthetics”

Race is a conceptual blind spot in philosophical aesthetics and the philosophies of the arts. While compelling avenues of philosophical thought reveal the intertwinements of conceptions of the state, the public, and the individual with racial constructions, that is to say, with lived realities that are organized with the help of racialized categories, aestheticians tend to bypass such entanglements or to insulate their premises and inquiries from their relations to racial formations. Philosophical investigations of common and prominent themes in aesthetics by and large proceed in ostensibly colorblind terms. I have in mind here, for example, discussions of art’s cognitive, imaginative, and affective dimensions, the relationship between aesthetics and ethics, everyday and environmental aesthetic systems, the politics of art and criticism, the nature of art’s situatedness in culture, capital, history, and modernity, and the analysis of art’s gendered and class-inflected workings-in short, numerous areas of concentration at the heart of the field. There are exceptions, especially at points where critical race theory intersects with aesthetics and, more narrowly, in the study of beauty, cross-cultural aesthetics, and artistic practices marked in terms of cultural “Others.” But characteristically the discipline-its theoretical paradigms, central preoccupations, institutionalized self-understandings, standards of quality-shuns exposing its structural principles to the workings of racial difference. In the context of asymmetrical power relations, many have argued, colorblind policies give carte blanche to the racial forces that be, whether intended or not. Colorblindness not only fails to contest racial domination, but assists also in its maintenance and reaffirmation against perceived breaches. Within a racialized social and conceptual system, what may seem to be race-neutral methodologies in fact typically reassert white privilege. The field of aesthetics is not exempted from this well-documented phenomenon. The inattention to race shores up the aesthetic pillars of whiteness and bolsters the whitening supports of aesthetics. Racialization and aestheticization (which concerns, among other things, aesthetic contributions to the shaping of identities, relations of power, and formations of knowledge and culture) stand in complex historical interconnections. These must be studied and worked through in order to create more tenable social, economic, cultural, political, environmental, and aesthetic constellations.

#### This silence sustains racism – reject them

Carrie Crenshaw, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University of Alabama, Summer 1997, “Resisting whiteness' rhetorical silence,” Western Journal of Communication 61.3, ebsco

\*\*Yellow Highlighting – sorry about that

In academic and political discourse, it is also rare for white people to explicitly reference their whiteness. The strictures of the "approved identity" in academic writing often prevent us from revealing our personal social locations and experiences (Blair, Brown and Baxter 402). Public political figures likewise avoid mentioning whiteness in their discourse (Nakayama and Krizek 297) even though the color of American politics is implicit in current debates about welfare, affirmative action, crime, and a host of other issues. Moreover, such discourse tends to ignore the ways in which race, gender, and class intersect with each other to perpetuate oppressive human hierarchies (Crenshaw, "Beyond"; Lorde). / Because discursive constructions of whiteness are typically unmarked and unnamed in personal, academic, and public discourse, they present a constellation of challenges for rhetorical scholars who are interested in the ideological role of whiteness in intersecting discourses about race, gender, and class. Previous rhetorical scholarship has focused on racist public discourse (e.g., Wander, "Salvation"; Wander, "The Savage"; Himelstein; Logue; Logue and Garner; Trank), but Nakayama and Krizek have recently taken our thinking a step further by mapping the terrain of whiteness. In a provocative study which names whiteness as a strategic rhetoric, they ethnographically "map" the "everyday" strategies of the spoken rhetoric of whiteness from a cultural studies perspective. They are "interested in ... the constructed space of whiteness, not the ways that it influences the margins" and "do[es] not address racism or racist ideology, although [they acknowledge that] these are closely aligned to many of the ways that whiteness is constructed" (306n). Their conclusion invites us to move beyond their initial topological project to investigate how the rhetoric of whiteness functions in the context of other social relations, particularly gender (303-305). In this essay, I accept their invitation and join the ongoing interdisciplinary conversation about whiteness (e.g., Allen; Dutcher; Dyer; Feagin and Vera; Frankenberg; Frye; Harris; hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek; Roediger). Because whiteness and its intersections with gender and class are steeped in silence (hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek), this essay argues that rhetoricians must do the critical ideological work necessary to make whiteness visible and overturn its silences for the purpose of resisting racism. / To do this, scholars must locate interactions that implicate unspoken issues of race, discursive spaces where the power of whiteness is invoked but its explicit terminology is not, and investigate how these racialized constructions intersect with gender and class. One such interaction was the debate between Carolyn Moseley Braun (D-IL) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) over the U.S. Senate's decision whether to grant a fourteen-year extension of the design patent for the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) insignia. Because the UDC insignia contains a representation of the Confederate flag, the debate centered on whether a Senate approval of the patent would commend a charitable patriotic organization or commemorate an historical symbol of racism. Accounts of this debate were widely disseminated in the national news media and described Moseley Braun's argument as a dramatic history-making challenge to racism in the U.S. Senate (e.g., Clymer; Lee; McGrory). "For once Senators changed their minds. Things that are usually decided in the cloakroom, were settled on the floor in plain sight" (McGrory A2). Helms spoke first and Moseley Braun responded. After Helms' second speech, the motion to table the amendment was rejected 52 to 48. However, Moseley Braun was ultimately victorious; after her final speech, the patent extension was denied on a 75 to 25 vote. / This debate is a uniquely interesting rhetorical artifact because it was a direct and public clash of arguments about race in political discourse. It constitutes an important example of how two public political actors' discourse about race and how the personal dimensions of race, gender, and class entered into their public argument. In the next section, I argue that ideological rhetorical criticism is an appropriate avenue for analyzing interactions like this one. / Ideological Rhetorical Criticism / There is nothing essential, "natural," or biological about whiteness. Because the overwhelming unity of our genetic makeup swamps any human differences that have historically been attributed to race (Appiah 21; Shipman 269), race itself has been called a biological fiction (Gates 4). It is the historically located rhetorical meaning of whiteness that assigns it social worth (Nakayama and Krizek 292). / Whiteness functions ideologically when people employ it, consciously or unconsciously, as a framework to categorize people and understand their social locations. Within this framework, whiteness as a social position has value and has been treated legally as property (Bell; Crenshaw "Race"; Feagin and Vera; Harris). The term "white privilege" denotes a host of material advantages white people enjoy as a result of being socially and rhetorically located as a white person (Crenshaw, "Race"; Mcintosh; Wellman). Even though many white people sense that privilege accompanies whiteness (Feagin and Vera), they do not overtly acknowledge their white privilege because they think of themselves as average, morally neutral non-racists. They do not see racism as an ideology that protects the interests of all white people; rather, they envision racism in the form of white hooded Klansmen engaged in acts of racial hatred (Mcintosh 34; Ezekiel 1). Because this ideology can be produced and reproduced through spoken discourse (van Dijk; Goldberg), whiteness and its privilege have both ideological and rhetorical dimensions. / Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals the vested interests protected by a particular rhetorical framework for understanding social order. It assists the search for alternatives to oppression and enables us to engage in right action for good reasons (Wander, "The Ideological" 2, 18). While cultural and ethnographic approaches that name the complexities of our racialized social locations make the rhetoric of whiteness visible and displace its centrality (Nakayama and Krizek), an ideological approach helps to uncover the alliance between the submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness and white material privilege. Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals how the public political rhetoric of whiteness relies upon a silent denial of white privilege to rationalize judicial, legislative, and executive decisions that protect the material interests of white people at the expense of people of color.[ 3] Beyond the realm of "everyday" discourse, public political actors often engage a submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness to protect white privilege, and their arguments are authorized by the powerful institutions from which they speak. Those authorized arguments in turn sanction the rhetorical frameworks through which white individuals make sense of and justify their privileged social status (van Dijk; Wellman). / Stuart Hall's work is useful for grasping the rhetorical nature of ideology in general and racist ideologies in specific. He defines ideology as "those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence" ("The Whites" 18). Ideological struggles are struggles over meaning. Meaning is a social production, a practice of making the world mean something, and this meaning is produced through language. Language is not a synonym for ideology because the same terms can be used in very different ideological discourses. However, language is the principle medium of ideologies, and ideologies are sets or chains of meaning located in language ("The Rediscovery" 67, 81; "The Whites" 18). / These chains of meaning are not the products of individual intention even though they are statements made by individuals. Instead, intentions are formed within pre-existing ideologies because individuals are born into them. Ideologies live within what we take-for-granted. They exist in our assumptions and descriptive statements about how the world is. "Ideologies tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted 'naturalised' world of common sense. Since (like gender) race appears to be 'given' by Nature, racism is one of the most profoundly 'naturalised' of existing ideologies" (Hall, "The Whites" 19). / To understand how racist ideologies operate, Hall draws upon the work of Antonio Gramsci. While Gramsci did not explicitly theorize about race, he did investigate the ideological and cultural implications of region and nation. Hall embraces Gramsci's argument that ideologies function hegemonically to preserve powerful interests. That is to say, ideologies are taken-for-granted frameworks that naturalize our descriptions of the way the world is, including its current power structures. This power is not achieved solely by coercive might; it also operates through the consent of those who are subjugated. Hegemony is the production of consent that determines what is taken-for-granted. So, our taken-for-granted, naturalized assumptions of what makes common sense produce and reinforce our consent to the current social order and its power structures. The advantage of Gramsci's position is that it makes room for an oppositional consciousness because it recognizes that hegemony is historically contingent. Because hegemony is never stable and is always an ongoing and fluid process of gaining consent, social transformation through the critical examination of current relations of power is possible. / Following Gramsci, Hall also believes that it is essential to analyze the historical specificity of racist ideologies in a non-reductive manner. He rejects the gross form of economism in which everything is seen to be determined by class structures, and instead he highlights the need to understand and conceptualize other oppressive forms of social differentiation including culture, region, nationality, and ethnicity. Doing so enables a productive reconceptualization of the "class subject." The class subject is not homogenous; there is never simple unity among people said to be of the same "class." Rather, hegemony is a dynamic process of the production of consent within and between different sectors and segments within classes. Thus, Gramsci's work can help us to understand how race and class intersect. We need not accept the false choice between class based explanations and race based explanations. In addition, Hall argues that Gramsci's notion of hegemony helps us to understand one of the most common, least explained features of 'racism': the 'subjection' of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideologies which imprison and define them. He reveals how different, often contradictory elements can be woven into and integrated within different ideological discourses; but also, the nature and value of ideological struggle which seeks to transform popular ideas and the 'common sense' of the masses. All of this has the most profound importance for the analysis of racist ideologies and for the centrality, within that, of ideological struggle. ("Gramsci's" 440) / A critical ideological approach to racialized discourse reveals the ongoing struggle over the meaning of race. It makes room for oppositional consciousness by helping us to "see" the meaning of racialized constructions and the vested interests they protect so that we can contest them. In addition, as the following analysis of the Braun-Helms debate illustrates, it enables our understanding of the intersections among racialized, gendered, and class discourses.