# 1NC

### Dystopianism CP 1NC

#### The United States federal genocidal terrorist bureaucrats will substantially increase their economic engagement with Venezuela through an exchange of the smell of blood, sweat and urine, rotting flesh bred under a sea of blood that frames the world for sacrifice under a warlike satanical drive to conquer.

#### If the 1AC’s intent is to use the topic to stimulate wonder and creativity, our counternarrative exposes the dark underside of their argument. Magical realism should not be used to valorize economic engagement towards Latin America because US engagement policies have caused mass death and terror.

James Petras, Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, 12-30-11, “Imperialism and the “Anti-Imperialism of the Fools,”
 <http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=1886>

There is a long history of imperialist “anti-imperialism”, officially sponsored condemnation, exposés and moral indignation directed exclusively against rival imperialists, emerging powers or simply competitors, who in some cases are simply following in the footsteps of the established imperial powers. English imperialists in their heyday justified their world-wide plunder of three continents by perpetuating the “Black Legend”, of Spanish empire’s “exceptional cruelty” toward indigenous people of Latin America, while engaging in the biggest and most lucrative African slave trade. While the Spanish colonists enslaved the indigenous people, the Anglo-american settlers exterminated [indigenous people]….. In the run-up to World War II, European and US imperial powers, while exploiting their Asian colonies condemned Japanese imperial powers’ invasion and colonization of China. Japan, in turn claimed it was leading Asia’s forces fighting against Western imperialism and projected a post-colonial “co-prosperity” sphere of equal Asian partners. The imperialist use of “anti-imperialist” moral rhetoric was designed to weaken rivals and was directed to several audiences. In fact, at no point did the anti-imperialist rhetoric serve to “liberate” any of the colonized people. In almost all cases the victorious imperial power only substituted one form colonial or neo-colonial rule for another. The “anti-imperialism” of the imperialists is directed at the nationalist movements of the colonized countries and at their domestic public. British imperialists fomented uprisings among the agro-mining elites in Latin America promising “free trade” against Spanish mercantilist rule ;they backed the “self-determination” of the slaveholding cotton plantation owners in the US South against the Union;they supported the territorial claims of the Iroquois tribal leaders against the US anti-colonial revolutionaries … exploiting legitimate grievances for imperial ends. During World War II, the Japanese imperialists supported a sector of the nationalist anti-colonial movement in India against the British Empire. The US condemned Spanish colonial rule in Cuba and the Philippines and went to war to “liberate” the oppressed peoples from tyranny….and remained to impose a reign of terror, exploitation and colonial rule… The imperial powers sought to divide the anti-colonial movements and create future “client rulers” when and if they succeeded. The use of anti-imperialist rhetoric was designed to attract two sets of groups. A conservative group with common political and economic interests with the imperial power, which shared their hostility to revolutionary nationalists and which sought to accrue greater advantage by tying their fortunes to a rising imperial power. A radical sector of the movement tactically allied itself with the rising imperial power, with the idea of using the imperial power to secure resources (arms, propaganda, vehicles and financial aid) and, once securing power, to discard them. More often than not, in this game of mutual manipulation between empire and nationalists, the former won out … as is the case then and now. The imperialist “anti-imperialist” rhetoric was equally directed at the domestic public, especially in countries like the US which prized its 18th anti-colonial heritage. The purpose was to broaden the base of empire building beyond the hard line empire loyalists, militarists and corporate beneficiaries. Their appeal sought to include liberals, humanitarians, progressive intellectuals, religious and secular moralists and other “opinion-makers” who had a certain cachet with thelarger public, the ones who would have to pay with their lives and tax money for the inter-imperial and colonial wars. The official spokespeople of empire publicize real and fabricated atrocities of their imperial rivals, and highlight the plight of the colonized victims. The corporate elite and the hardline militarists demand military action to protect property, or to seize strategic resources; the humanitarians and progressives denounce the “crimes against humanity” and echo the calls “to do something concrete” to save the victims from genocide. Sectors of the Left join the chorus, finding a sector of victims who fit in with their abstract ideology, and plead for the imperial powers to “arm the people to liberate themselves” (sic). By lending moral support and a veneer of respectability to the imperial war, by swallowing the propaganda of “war to save victims” the progressives become the prototype of the “anti-imperialism of the fools”. Having secured broad public support on the bases of “anti-imperialism”, the imperialist powers feel free to sacrifice citizens’ lives and the public treasury ,to pursue war, fueled by the moral fervor of a righteous cause. As the butchery drags on and the casualties mount, and the public wearies of war and its cost, progressive and leftist enthusiasm turns to silence or worse, moral hypocrisy with claims that “the nature of the war changed” or “that this isn’t the kind of war that we had in mind …”. As if the war makers ever intended to consult the progressives and left on how and why they should engage in imperial wars.! In the contemporary period the imperial “anti-imperialist wars” and aggression have been greatly aided and abetted by well-funded “grass roots” so-called “non-governmental organizations” which act to mobilize popular movements which can “invite” imperial aggression. Over the past four decades US imperialism has fomented at least two dozen “grass roots” movements which have destroyed democratic governments, or decimated collectivist welfare states or provoked major damage to the economy of targeted countries. In Chile throughout 1972-73 under the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende, the CIA financed and provided major support – via the AFL-CIO–to private truck owners to paralyze the flow of goods and services .They also funded a strike by a sector of the copper workers union (at the El Tenient mine) to undermine copper production and exports, in the lead up to the coup. After the military took power several “grass roots” Christian Democratic union officials participated in the purge of elected leftist union activists. Needless to say in short order the truck owners and copper workers ended the strike, dropped their demands and subsequently lost all bargaining rights! In the 1980’s the CIA via Vatican channels transferred millions of dollars to sustain the “Solidarity Union” in Poland, making a hero of the Gdansk shipyards worker-leader Lech Walesa, who spearheaded the general strike to topple the Communist regime. With the overthrow of Communism so also went guaranteed employment, social security and trade union militancy: the neo-liberal regimes reduced the workforce at Gdansk by fifty percent and eventually closed it, giving the boot to the entire workforce.. Walesa retired with a magnificent Presidential pension, while his former workmates walked the streets and the new “independent” Polish rulers provided NATO with military bases and mercenaries for imperial wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2002 the White House, the CIA , the AFL-CIO and NGOs, backed a Venezuelan military-business – trade union bureaucrat led “grass roots” coup that overthrew democratically elected President Chavez. In 48 hours a million strong authentic grass roots mobilization of the urban poor backed by constitutionalist military forces defeated the US backed dictators and restored Chavez to power .Subsequently oil executives directed a lockout backed by several US financed NGOs. They were defeated by the workers’ takeover of the oil industry. The unsuccessful coup and lockout cost the Venezuelan economy billions of dollars in lost income and caused a double digit decline in GNP. The US backed “grass roots” armed jihadists to liberated “Bosnia” and armed the“grass roots” terrorist Kosova Liberation Army to break-up Yugoslavia.Almost the entire Western Left cheered as, the US bombed Belgrade, degraded the economy and claimed it was “responding to genocide”. Kosova “free and independent” became a huge market for white slavers, housed the biggest US military base in Europe, with the highest per-capita out migration of any country in Europe. The imperial “grass roots” strategy combines humanitarian, democratic and anti-imperialist rhetoric and paid and trained local NGO’s, with mass media blitzes to mobilize Western public opinion and especially “prestigious leftist moral critics” behind their power grabs. The Consequence of Imperial Promoted “Anti-Imperialist” Movements: Who Wins and Who Loses? The historic record of imperialist promoted “anti-imperialist” and “pro-democracy” “grass roots movements” is uniformly negative. Let us briefly summarize the results. In Chile ‘grass roots’ truck owners strike led to the brutal military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and nearly two decades of torture, murder, jailing and forced exile of hundreds of thousands, the imposition of brutal “free market policies” and subordination to US imperial policies. In summary the US multi-national copper corporations and the Chilean oligarchy were the big winners and the mass of the working class and urban and rural poor the biggest losers. The US backed “grass roots uprisings” in Eastern Europe against Soviet domination, exchanged Russian for US domination; subordination to NATO instead of the Warsaw Pact; the massive transfer of national public enterprises, banks and media to Western multi-nationals. Privatization of national enterprises led to unprecedented levels of double-digit unemployment, skyrocketing rents and the growth of pensioner poverty.The crises induced the flight of millions of the most educated and skilled workers and the elimination of free public health, higher education and worker vacation resorts. Throughout the now capitalist Eastern Europe and USSR highly organized criminal gangs developed large scale prostitution and drug rings; foreign and local gangster ‘entrepeneurs’ seized lucrative public enterprises and formed a new class of super-rich oligarchs Electoral party politicians, local business people and professionals linked to Western ‘partners’ were the socio-economic winners. Pensioners, workers, collective farmers, the unemployed youth were the big losers along with the formerly subsidized cultural artists. Military bases in Eastern Europe became the empire’s first line of military attack of Russia and the target of any counter-attack. If we measure the consequences of the shift in imperial power, it is clear that the Eastern Europe countries have become even more subservient under the US and the EU than under Russia. Western induced financial crises have devastated their economies; Eastern European troops have served in more imperial wars under NATO than under Soviet rule; the cultural media are under Western commercial control. Most of all, the degree of imperial control over all economic sectors far exceeds anything that existed under the Soviets. The Eastern European ‘grass roots’ movement succeeded in deepening and extending the US Empire; the advocates of peace, social justice, national independence, a cultural renaissance and social welfare with democracy were the big losers. Western liberals, progressives and leftists who fell in love with imperialist promoted “anti-imperialism” are also big losers. Their support for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia led to the break-up of a multi-national state and the creation of huge NATO military bases and a white slavers paradise in Kosova. Their blind support for the imperial promoted “liberation” of Eastern Europe devastated the welfare state, eliminating the pressure on Western regimes’ need to compete in providing welfare provisions. The main beneficiaries of Western imperial advances via ‘grass roots’ uprisings were the multi-national corporations, the Pentagon and the rightwing free market neo-liberals. As the entire political spectrum moved to the right a sector of the left and progressives eventually jumped on the bandwagon. The Left moralists lost credibility and support, their peace movements dwindled, their “moral critiques” lost resonance. The left and progressives who tail-ended the imperial backed “grass roots movements”, whether in the name of “anti-stalinism”, “pro-democracy” or “anti-imperialism” have never engaged in any critical reflection; no effort to analyze the long-term negative consequences of their positions in terms of the losses in social welfare, national independence or personal dignity. The long history of imperialist manipulation of “anti-imperialist” narratives has found virulent expression in the present day. The New Cold War launched by Obama against China and Russia, the hot war brewing in the Gulf over Iran’s alleged military threat, the interventionist threat against Venezuela’s “drug-networks”,and Syria’s “bloodbath” are part and parcel of the use and abuse of “anti-imperialism” to prop up a declining empire. Hopefully, the progressive and leftist writers and scribes will learn from the ideological pitfalls of the past and resist the temptation to access the mass media by providing a ‘progressive cover’ to imperial dubbed “rebels”. It is time to distinguish between genuine anti-imperialism and pro-democracy movements and those promoted by Washington, NATO and the mass media.

#### While wonder might be good, it DEFINITELY isn’t in the context of economic engagement—the basis for US exchanges with Latin America is the extermination of non-white bodies. Vote negative to use magical realism to see the topic for what it truly is.

Edgardo Lander, 2000 (Prof. of Sociology and Latin American studies at the Venezuelan Central University in Caracas , Nepantla: Views from South Volume 1, Issue 3, 2000, “Eurocentrism and Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nepantla/summary/v001/1.3lander.html :)

Political and social thought regarding Latin America has been historically characterized by a tension between the search for its specific attributes and an external view that has seen these lands from the narrow perspective of European experience. There has also been an opposition between the challenge of the rich potentialities of this New World and distress over its difference, which stands in contrast with the ideal represented by European culture and racial composition. Nonetheless, external colonial views and regrets because of the difference have been widely hegemonic. A brief revision of the texts of the first republican constitutions is enough to illustrate how liberals, in their attempt to transplant and install a replica of their understanding of the European or North American experience, almost completely ignore the specific cultural and historical conditions of the societies about which they legislate. When these conditions are considered, it is with the express purpose of doing away with them. The affliction because of the difference—the awkwardness of living in a continent that is not white, urban, cosmopolitan, and civilized—finds its best expression in positivism. Sharing the main assumptions and prejudices of nineteenth-century European thought (scientific racism, patriarchy, the idea of progress), positivism reaffirms the colonial discourse. The continent is imagined from a single voice, with a single subject: white, masculine, urban, cosmopolitan. The rest, the majority, is the “other,” barbarian, primitive, black, Indian, who has nothing to contribute to the future of these societies. It would be imperative to whiten, westernize, or exterminate that majority.

### Anti-Blackness K 1NC

#### Their silence on the issue of race is not a neutral stance – it is a strategic silencing that denies white privilege and naturalizes white supremacy

Carrie Crenshaw, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, The University of Alabama, Summer 1997, “Resisting whiteness' rhetorical silence,” Western Journal of Communication 61.3, ebsco

In academic and political discourse, it is also rare for white people to explicitly reference their whiteness. The strictures of the "approved identity" in academic writing often prevent us from revealing our personal social locations and experiences (Blair, Brown and Baxter 402). Public political figures likewise avoid mentioning whiteness in their discourse (Nakayama and Krizek 297) even though the color of American politics is implicit in current debates about welfare, affirmative action, crime, and a host of other issues. Moreover, such discourse tends to ignore the ways in which race, gender, and class intersect with each other to perpetuate oppressive human hierarchies (Crenshaw, "Beyond"; Lorde). / Because discursive constructions of whiteness are typically unmarked and unnamed in personal, academic, and public discourse, they present a constellation of challenges for rhetorical scholars who are interested in the ideological role of whiteness in intersecting discourses about race, gender, and class. Previous rhetorical scholarship has focused on racist public discourse (e.g., Wander, "Salvation"; Wander, "The Savage"; Himelstein; Logue; Logue and Garner; Trank), but Nakayama and Krizek have recently taken our thinking a step further by mapping the terrain of whiteness. In a provocative study which names whiteness as a strategic rhetoric, they ethnographically "map" the "everyday" strategies of the spoken rhetoric of whiteness from a cultural studies perspective. They are "interested in ... the constructed space of whiteness, not the ways that it influences the margins" and "do[es] not address racism or racist ideology, although [they acknowledge that] these are closely aligned to many of the ways that whiteness is constructed" (306n). Their conclusion invites us to move beyond their initial topological project to investigate how the rhetoric of whiteness functions in the context of other social relations, particularly gender (303-305). In this essay, I accept their invitation and join the ongoing interdisciplinary conversation about whiteness (e.g., Allen; Dutcher; Dyer; Feagin and Vera; Frankenberg; Frye; Harris; hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek; Roediger). Because whiteness and its intersections with gender and class are steeped in silence (hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek), this essay argues that rhetoricians must do the critical ideological work necessary to make whiteness visible and overturn its silences for the purpose of resisting racism. / To do this, scholars must locate interactions that implicate unspoken issues of race, discursive spaces where the power of whiteness is invoked but its explicit terminology is not, and investigate how these racialized constructions intersect with gender and class. One such interaction was the debate between Carolyn Moseley Braun (D-IL) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) over the U.S. Senate's decision whether to grant a fourteen-year extension of the design patent for the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) insignia. Because the UDC insignia contains a representation of the Confederate flag, the debate centered on whether a Senate approval of the patent would commend a charitable patriotic organization or commemorate an historical symbol of racism. Accounts of this debate were widely disseminated in the national news media and described Moseley Braun's argument as a dramatic history-making challenge to racism in the U.S. Senate (e.g., Clymer; Lee; McGrory). "For once Senators changed their minds. Things that are usually decided in the cloakroom, were settled on the floor in plain sight" (McGrory A2). Helms spoke first and Moseley Braun responded. After Helms' second speech, the motion to table the amendment was rejected 52 to 48. However, Moseley Braun was ultimately victorious; after her final speech, the patent extension was denied on a 75 to 25 vote. / This debate is a uniquely interesting rhetorical artifact because it was a direct and public clash of arguments about race in political discourse. It constitutes an important example of how two public political actors' discourse about race and how the personal dimensions of race, gender, and class entered into their public argument. In the next section, I argue that ideological rhetorical criticism is an appropriate avenue for analyzing interactions like this one. / Ideological Rhetorical Criticism / There is nothing essential, "natural," or biological about whiteness. Because the overwhelming unity of our genetic makeup swamps any human differences that have historically been attributed to race (Appiah 21; Shipman 269), race itself has been called a biological fiction (Gates 4). It is the historically located rhetorical meaning of whiteness that assigns it social worth (Nakayama and Krizek 292). / Whiteness functions ideologically when people employ it, consciously or unconsciously, as a framework to categorize people and understand their social locations. Within this framework, whiteness as a social position has value and has been treated legally as property (Bell; Crenshaw "Race"; Feagin and Vera; Harris). The term "white privilege" denotes a host of material advantages white people enjoy as a result of being socially and rhetorically located as a white person (Crenshaw, "Race"; Mcintosh; Wellman). Even though many white people sense that privilege accompanies whiteness (Feagin and Vera), they do not overtly acknowledge their white privilege because they think of themselves as average, morally neutral non-racists. They do not see racism as an ideology that protects the interests of all white people; rather, they envision racism in the form of white hooded Klansmen engaged in acts of racial hatred (Mcintosh 34; Ezekiel 1). Because this ideology can be produced and reproduced through spoken discourse (van Dijk; Goldberg), whiteness and its privilege have both ideological and rhetorical dimensions. / Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals the vested interests protected by a particular rhetorical framework for understanding social order. It assists the search for alternatives to oppression and enables us to engage in right action for good reasons (Wander, "The Ideological" 2, 18). While cultural and ethnographic approaches that name the complexities of our racialized social locations make the rhetoric of whiteness visible and displace its centrality (Nakayama and Krizek), an ideological approach helps to uncover the alliance between the submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness and white material privilege. Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals how the public political rhetoric of whiteness relies upon a silent denial of white privilege to rationalize judicial, legislative, and executive decisions that protect the material interests of white people at the expense of people of color.[ 3] Beyond the realm of "everyday" discourse, public political actors often engage a submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness to protect white privilege, and their arguments are authorized by the powerful institutions from which they speak. Those authorized arguments in turn sanction the rhetorical frameworks through which white individuals make sense of and justify their privileged social status (van Dijk; Wellman). / Stuart Hall's work is useful for grasping the rhetorical nature of ideology in general and racist ideologies in specific. He defines ideology as "those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence" ("The Whites" 18). Ideological struggles are struggles over meaning. Meaning is a social production, a practice of making the world mean something, and this meaning is produced through language. Language is not a synonym for ideology because the same terms can be used in very different ideological discourses. However, language is the principle medium of ideologies, and ideologies are sets or chains of meaning located in language ("The Rediscovery" 67, 81; "The Whites" 18). / These chains of meaning are not the products of individual intention even though they are statements made by individuals. Instead, intentions are formed within pre-existing ideologies because individuals are born into them. Ideologies live within what we take-for-granted. They exist in our assumptions and descriptive statements about how the world is. "Ideologies tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted 'naturalised' world of common sense. Since (like gender) race appears to be 'given' by Nature, racism is one of the most profoundly 'naturalised' of existing ideologies" (Hall, "The Whites" 19). / To understand how racist ideologies operate, Hall draws upon the work of Antonio Gramsci. While Gramsci did not explicitly theorize about race, he did investigate the ideological and cultural implications of region and nation. Hall embraces Gramsci's argument that ideologies function hegemonically to preserve powerful interests. That is to say, ideologies are taken-for-granted frameworks that naturalize our descriptions of the way the world is, including its current power structures. This power is not achieved solely by coercive might; it also operates through the consent of those who are subjugated. Hegemony is the production of consent that determines what is taken-for-granted. So, our taken-for-granted, naturalized assumptions of what makes common sense produce and reinforce our consent to the current social order and its power structures. The advantage of Gramsci's position is that it makes room for an oppositional consciousness because it recognizes that hegemony is historically contingent. Because hegemony is never stable and is always an ongoing and fluid process of gaining consent, social transformation through the critical examination of current relations of power is possible. / Following Gramsci, Hall also believes that it is essential to analyze the historical specificity of racist ideologies in a non-reductive manner. He rejects the gross form of economism in which everything is seen to be determined by class structures, and instead he highlights the need to understand and conceptualize other oppressive forms of social differentiation including culture, region, nationality, and ethnicity. Doing so enables a productive reconceptualization of the "class subject." The class subject is not homogenous; there is never simple unity among people said to be of the same "class." Rather, hegemony is a dynamic process of the production of consent within and between different sectors and segments within classes. Thus, Gramsci's work can help us to understand how race and class intersect. We need not accept the false choice between class based explanations and race based explanations. In addition, Hall argues that Gramsci's notion of hegemony helps us to understand one of the most common, least explained features of 'racism': the 'subjection' of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideologies which imprison and define them. He reveals how different, often contradictory elements can be woven into and integrated within different ideological discourses; but also, the nature and value of ideological struggle which seeks to transform popular ideas and the 'common sense' of the masses. All of this has the most profound importance for the analysis of racist ideologies and for the centrality, within that, of ideological struggle. ("Gramsci's" 440) / A critical ideological approach to racialized discourse reveals the ongoing struggle over the meaning of race. It makes room for oppositional consciousness by helping us to "see" the meaning of racialized constructions and the vested interests they protect so that we can contest them. In addition, as the following analysis of the Braun-Helms debate illustrates, it enables our understanding of the intersections among racialized, gendered, and class discourses.

#### The 1AC is an attempt to escape into a fantasy world of language and magic in order to avoid the material issues of the status quo. This is a strategy of white supremacy which uses high theory to continually avoid the issue central to every debate—while they have fun reading their stupid stories, people of color continue to get shot.

George Yancy, 2008, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Duquesne University, Black bodies, white gazes: the continuing significance of race, p. 299

Although there are many while antiracists who do fight and will continue to fight against the operations of white power, and while it is true that the regulatory power of whiteness will invariably attempt to undermine such efforts, it is important that white antiracists realize how much is at stake. While antiracist whites take time to get their shit together, a luxury that is a species of privilege, Black bodies and bodies of color continue to suffer, their bodies cry out for the political and existential urgency for the immediate undoing of the oppressive operations of whiteness. Here, the very notion of the temporal gets racialized. My point here is that even as whites take the time to theorize the complexity of whiteness, revealing its various modes of resistance to radical transformation, Black bodies continue to endure tremendous pain and suffering. Doing theory in the service of undoing whiteness comes with its own snares and seductions, its own comfort zones, and reinscription of distances. Whites who deploy theory in the service of fighting against white racism must caution against the seduction of white narcissism, the recentering of whiteness, even if it is the object of critical reflection, and, hence, the process of sequestration from the real world of weeping, suffering, and traumatized Black bodies impacted by the operations of white power. As antiracist whites continue to make mistakes and continue to falter in the face of institutional interpellation and habituated racist reflexes, tomorrow, a Black body will be murdered as it innocently reaches for its wallet. The sheer weight of this reality mocks the patience of theory.

#### Conception of language as inevitably fluid leads to the denial of agency. This makes resistance to white supremacist power structures impossible

Will **Brooker**, 19**99** (“Agency,” http://faculty.washington.edu/cbehler/glossary/agency.html>:)

Agency A term referring to the role of the human actor as individual or group in directing or effectively intervening in the course of history. Liberal humanism sees the individual or subject as unified and self-determining. It therefore ascribes agency to this subject as a more or less unrestricted actor in shaping her/his own life and a more general social destiny. Marxism and other theories recognizing the influence of social and economic determinations beyond the individual offer a more qualified and complex view. 'Men make their own history,' Karl Marx famously declared, but 'do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves'. For Marx, the working class was denied agency and would only assume its role as actor in the world through the revolutionary transformation of economic and social relations inspired by class consciousness. Critics of this view, within Marxism and poststructuralism, see it as no more than a postponement of the humanist ideal. Non-humanist positions, developed for example by Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault, appear to deny agency altogether. For Foucault, for example, power is omnipresent and though exercised with aims and objectives has no presiding 'headquarters,’ no specific source in the decisions of groups or individuals (1979: 94-5). As Anthony Giddens comments, 'Foucault's history tends to have no active subjects at all. It is history with the agency removed' (1987: 98). For some, the anti-humanism of poststructuralism comes unnervingly close to a belief such as Margaret Thatcher's that 'there is no such thing as society': a view which surrenders agency to market forces. Nevertheless, poststructuralist arguments have challenged the traditional Marxist emphasis upon class and party as the agencies of radical change and significantly influenced models of the operation of power and ideology. They have proved relevant if problematic, too, for feminist and other oppositional theories interested in the strategies which would render women and other subjugated peoples the 'subjects' (i.e. agents) of their own rather than the 'objects' of an imposed history. Debating the implications of poststructuralist theory for political action, Michele Barrett highlights the problem posed by deconstruction: 'Feminists recognise that the "naming" of women and men occurs within an opposition that one would want to challenge and transform, yet political silencing can follow from rejecting these categories altogether' (1991: 166). To deconstruct existing relations of power, she implies, threatens to deconstruct the concept of agency itself and thus to undermine any counter-strategy.

#### White supremacy is a global modality of genocidal violence – slavery may have ended in name, but its operational logic continues to fester. Their project simply provides fuel for Whiteness.

**Rodriguez ’11** [Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “The Black Presidential Non-Slave: Genocide and the Present Tense of Racial Slavery”, Political Power and Social Theory Vol. 22, pp. 38-43]

To crystallize what I hope to be the potentially useful implications of this provocation toward a retelling of the slavery-abolition story: if we follow the narrative and theoretical trajectories initiated here, it should take little stretch of the historical imagination, nor a radical distension of analytical framing, to suggest that the singular institutionalization of racist and peculiarly antiblack social/state violence in our living era - the US imprisonment regime and its conjoined policing and criminalization apparatuses - elaborates the social logics of genocidal racial slavery within the American nation-building project, especially in the age of Obama. The formation and astronomical growth of the prison industrial complex has become a commonly identified institutional marker of massively scaled racist state mobilization, and the fundamental violence of this apparatus is in the prison's translation of the 13th Amendment's racist animus. By "reforming" slavery and anti-slave violence, and directly transcribing both into criminal justice rituals, proceedings, and punishments, the 13th Amendment permanently inscribes slavery on "post-emancipation" US statecraft. The state remains a "slave state" to the extent that it erects an array of institutional apparatuses that are specifically conceived to reproduce or enhance the state's capacity to "create" (i.e., criminalize and convict) prison chattel and politically legitimate the processes of enslavement/imprisonment therein. The crucial starting point for our narrative purposes is that the emergence of the criminalization and carceral apparatus over the last forty years has not, and in the foreseeable future will not build its institutional protocols around the imprisonment of an economically productive or profitmaking prison labor force (Gilmore, 1999).16 So, if not for use as labor under the 13th Amendment's juridical mandate of "involuntary servitude," what is the animating structural-historical logic behind the formation of an imprisonment regime unprecedented in human history in scale and complexity, and which locks up well over a million Black people, significantly advancing numbers of "nonwhite" Latinos as, and in which the white population is vastly underrepresented in terms of both numbers imprisoned and likelihood to be prosecuted (and thus incarcerated) for similar alleged criminal offenses?17 In excess of its political economic, geographic, and juridical registers, the contemporary US prison regime must be centrally understood as constituting an epoch-defining statecraft of race: a historically specific conceptualization, planning, and institutional mobilization of state institutional capacities and state-influenced cultural structures to reproduce and/or reassemble the social relations of power, dominance, and violence that constitute the ontology (epistemic and conceptual framings) of racial meaning itself (da Silva, 2007; Goldberg, 1993). In this case, the racial ontology of the postslavery and post-civil rights prison is anchored in the crisis of social meaning wrought on white civil society by the 13th Amendment's apparent juridical elimination of the Black chattel slave being. Across historical periods, the social inhabitation of the white civil subject - - its self-recognition, institutionally affirmed (racial) sovereignty, and everyday social intercourse with other racial beings - is made legible through its positioning as the administrative authority and consenting audience for the nation- and civilization-building processes of multiple racial genocides. It is the bare fact of the white subject's access and entitlement to the generalized position of administering and consenting to racial genocide that matters most centrally here. Importantly, this white civil subject thrives on the assumption that s/he is not, and will never be the target of racial genocide.18 (Williams, 2010) .Those things obtained and secured through genocidal processes - land, political and military hegemony/dominance, expropriated labor - are in this sense secondary to the raw relation of violence that the white subject inhabits in relation to the racial objects (including people, ecologies, cultural forms, sacred materials, and other modalities of life and being) subjected to the irreparable violations of genocidal processes. It is this raw relation, in which white social existence materially and narratively consolidates itself within the normalized systemic logics of racial genocides, that forms the condition of possibility for the US social formation, from "abolition" onward. To push the argument further: the distended systems of racial genocides are not the massively deadly means toward some other (rational) historical ends, but are ends within themselves. Here we can decisively depart from the hegemonic juridical framings of "genocide" as dictated by the United Nations, and examine instead the logics of genocide that dynamically structure the different historical-social forms that have emerged from the classically identifiable genocidal systems of racial colonial conquest, indigenous physical and cultural extermination, and racial chattel slavery. To recall Trask and Marable, the historical logics of genocide permeate institutional assemblages that variously operationalize the historical forces of planned obsolescence, social neutralization, and "ceasing to exist." Centering a conception of racial genocide as a dynamic set of sociohistorical logics (rather than as contained, isolatable historical episodes) allows the slavery-to-prison continuity to be more clearly marked: the continuity is not one that hinges on the creation of late-20th and early-list century "slave labor," but rather on a re-institutionalization of anti-slave social violence. Within this historical schema, the post-1970s prison regime institutionalizes the raw relation of violence essential to white social being while mediating it so it appears as non-genocidal, non-violent, peacekeeping, and justice-forming. This is where we can also narrate the contemporary racial criminalization, policing, and incarcerating apparatuses as being historically tethered to the genocidal logics of the post-abolition, post-emancipation, and post-civil rights slave state. While it is necessary to continuously clarify and debate whether and how this statecraft of racial imprisonment is verifiably genocidal, there seems to be little reason to question that it is, at least, protogenocidal - displaying both the capacity and inclination for genocidal outcomes in its systemic logic and historical trajectory. This contextualization leads toward a somewhat different analytical framing of the "deadly symbiosis" that sociologist Loi'c Wacquant has outlined in his account of antiblack carceral-spatial systems. While it would be small-minded to suggest that the emergence of the late-20th century prison regime is an historical inevitability, we should at least understand that the structural bottom line of Black imprisonment over the last four decades - wherein the quantitative fact of a Black prison/jail majority has become taken-for-granted as a social fact - is a contemporary institutional manifestation of a genocidal racial substructure that has been reformed, and not fundamentally displaced, by the juridical and cultural implications of slavery's abolition. I have argued elsewhere for a conception of the US prison not as a selfcontained institution or isolated place, but rather as a material prototype of organized punishment and (social, civil, and biological) death (Rodriguez, 2006). To understand the US prison as a regime is to focus conceptually, theoretically, and politically on the prison as a pliable module or mobilized vessel through which technologies of racial domin8ance institutionalize their specific, localized practices of legitimated (state) violence. Emerging as the organic institutional continuity of racial slavery's genocidal violence, the US prison regime represents a form of human domination that extends beyond and outside the formal institutional and geographic domains of "the prison (the jail, etc.)." In this sense, the prison is the institutional signification of a larger regime of proto-genocidal violence that is politically legitimized by the state, generally valorized by the cultural common sense, and dynamically mobilized and institutionally consolidated across different historical moments: it is a form of social power that is indispensable to the contemporary (and postemancipation) social order and its changing structures of racial dominance, in a manner that elaborates the social logics of genocidal racial slavery. The binding presence of slavery within post-emancipation US state formation is precisely why the liberal multiculturalist narration of the Obama ascendancy finds itself compelled to posit an official rupture from the spectral and material presence of enslaved racial blackness. It is this symbolic rupturing - the presentation of a president who consummates the liberal dreams of Black citizenship. Black freedom, Black non-resentment, and Black patriotic subjectivity - that constructs the Black non-slave presidency as the flesh-and-blood severance of the US racial/racist state from its entanglement in the continuities of antiblack genocide. Against this multiculturalist narrative, our attention should be principally fixated on the bottom-line Blackness of the prison's genocidal logic, not the fungible Blackness of the presidency. CONCLUSION: FROM "POST-CIVIL RIGHTS" TO WHITE RECONSTRUCTION The Obama ascendancy is the signature moment of the post-1960s White Reconstruction, a period that has been characterized by the reformist elaboration of historically racist systems of social power to accommodate the political imperatives of American apartheid's downfall and the emergence of hegemonic (liberal-to-conservative) multiculturalisms. Byfocusing on how such reforms have neither eliminated nor fundamentally alleviated the social emergencies consistently produced by the historical logics of racial genocide, the notion of White Reconstruction departs from Marable's notion of the 1990s as the "twilight of the Second Reconstruction" (Marable. 2007. p. 216)19 and points toward another way of framing and narrating the period that has been more commonly referenced as the "post-civil rights" era. Rather than taking its primary point of historical departure to be the cresting of the Civil Rights Movement and its legacy of delimited (though no less significant) political-cultural achievements. White Reconstruction focuses on how this era is denned by an acute and sometimes aggressive reinvention and reorganization of the structural-institutional formations of racial dominance. Defined schematically, the recent half-century has encompassed a generalized reconstruction of "classically" white supremacist apparatuses of state-sanctioned and culturally legitimated racial violence. This general reconstruction has (1) strategically and unevenly dislodged various formal and de facto institutional white monopolies and diversified their personnel at various levels of access, from the entry-level to the administrative and executive levels (e.g., the sometimes aggressive diversity recruitment campaigns of research universities, urban police, and the military); while simultaneously (2) revamping, complicating, and enhancing the social relations of dominance, hierarchy, and violence mobilized by such institutions - relations that broadly reflect the long historical, substructural role of race in the production of the US national formation and socioeconomic order. In this sense, the notion of White Reconstruction brings central attention to how the historical logics of racial genocide may not only survive the apparent disruption of classical white monopolies on the administrative and institutional apparatuses that have long mobilized these violent social logics, but may indeed flourish through these reformist measures, as such logics are re-adapted into the protocols and discourses of these newly "diversified" racist and white supremacist apparatuses (e.g.. the apparatuses of the research university, police, and military have expanded their capacities to produce local and global relations of racial dominance, at the same time that they have constituted some of the central sites for diversity recruitment and struggles over equal access). It is, at the very least, a remarkable and dreadful moment in the historical time of White Reconstruction that a Black president has won office in an electoral landslide while well over a million Black people are incarcerated with the overwhelming consent of white/multiculturalist civil society.

#### Ethics and freedom lie not in imagining a utopian world of US engagement, rather a rejection of the affirmative’s attempt to use wonder to ratify civil society—their politics of wonder renders us unable to account for anti-blackness

**Kokontis** 20**11** (Kate, PhD in Performance Studies from UC-Berkeley, “Performative Returns and the Rememory of History: genealogy and performativity in the American racial state,” Dissertation available on Proquest)

On one hand, she addresses the literal politics that the theological narratives espouse. There is a long tradition of deploying the Exodus narrative toward the pursuit of social reform. That is, instead of appealing to it in a way that focuses on the next world, “[t]hrough biblical typology, particularly uses of Exodus, African Americans elevated their common experiences to biblical drama and found resources to account for their circumstances and respond effectively to them. [...] Exodus history sustained hope and a sense of possibility in the face of insurmountable evil. The analogical uses of the story enabled a sense of agency and resistance in persistent moments of despair and disillusionment.”64 But even these efforts have – not exclusively, but often – relied on a particular iteration of the social gospel that presupposes a set of moral and institutional imperatives (for instance, the ideal of training racial, religious, sexual, social, or institutional “deviants” or outlyers to behave according to an ostensibly correct set of moral principles) that run counter to a radical critique of the underlying terms of the state and civil society which tend to ratify, naturalize, and invisibilize antiblackness and/or policies that adversely impact black people who are not part of the middle class, rather than to critique or subvert it. Hartman, on the other hand, does call for, and mount, a radical critique of the terms of the state and civil society: for her, they are inherently unethical rather than redeemable, having engendered centuries of black social death and historical unknowability, and thus any struggle toward freedom demands an unflinching critical analysis rather than an implicit or explicit ratification of these institutions and the terms on which they are predicated. But more fundamentally, she addresses the political implications of the assumptive logic of a theological teleology. I interpret Hartman to posit that there is a kind of freedom that can be predicated on not-knowing: if there is no predetermined future, there is no divine imperative that might encourage an investment in the moral prescriptions of a conservative social gospel: a toppled faith in the redemptive possibilities of the struggle has the potential to open the door to invention, speculation, refashioning, and cobbling together something from nothing, presence from absence. I interpret her to posit that a viable freedom dream necessitates the acknowledgment of loss and absence and the history of processes of dehumanizing antiblackness, the acknowledgement of the wound and its psychic, social, political, and ethical causes – as well as an acknowledgement of its persistence – rather than being deluded by tidy or optimistic but under-analyzed narratives of progress or redemption. Only then can any realistic stock be taken toward re-imagining the world and the possibilities and imperatives of a black freedom struggle. While Haley and Gates draw on narratives that say that the past, including its suffering, was meaningful, Hartman offers what might appear to be a much bleaker interpretation that insists that it is meaningless insofar as it is not folded into any sort of teleology. But in that is a kind of freedom/dream, because the subjects of her narrative are free from a predetermination of the terms on which liberation is possible, the structures around its enactment. What she calls for is a profound refashioning of the epistemology of the invisible, which is as fundamental a component of the black freedom struggle as is an epistemology of verifiable evidence of oppression. That is, she advocates the excavation of psychic structures and historical silences to replace an implicit or explicit faith in a divine logic in the (racial) order of things. Genealogy cannot connect with the unknown, so it becomes a ghost story, an excavation. The term might then be interpreted less as a means of accessing literal ancestors, and more as a process toward understanding. Hartman constructs, in her text, not a genealogy of anyone’s family, but a genealogy of the stranger, of the slave; a genealogy of loss, of the lost, of searching. Projects that make use of imaginative, performative, quasi-fictional or poetic devices can’t rest with not-knowing: the imaginative devices emerge, in fact, from attempts to piece together or construct/invent evidence from its lack. They all insist on the importance of knowing, whether because of some large-scale sense of collective responsibility, or because of personal yearning, or both. The imaginative devices don’t exist for the sake of being imaginative; they exist for the sake of survival. But in being imaginative, they allow for radical possibilities to emerge that literality forecloses. Part of what performance might offer the study of history is a) different keys to be able to fill in the gaps, that aren’t so heavily reliant upon explicit, legible empiricism, and b) not only permission for, but encouragement of what uncertainty can yield. Genealogy, broadly understood, is what furnishes evidence: it is the key to filling in blanks that are impossible to fill. One version of it is capable of being profoundly literal; of making reconstruction possible; it is used to fill in the blank that has been lost to us – whomever the ‘us’ is: the dispossessed, displaced, marginalized – providing an object to slip into a gaping negative space. This I would call genealogy as an object. A different version is used in order to understand the gaps, to underscore or illuminate the negative spaces and ask how they came to be, and filling in the context around the blank spaces, inheriting the loss, becomes the way to trace the relationship between the past, present, and future. This I would call genealogy as a process. What, then, is or could be critical or even radical in roots-seeking genealogy projects? There is something inherently conservative about nostalgia, according to most interpretations; but not if a notion of “radical nostalgia,” such as that offered by Peter Glazer, is pursued: such an enactment of notalgia engages in worldmaking and invention; the definition takes for granted that nostalgia is for worlds and times that never existed, and that therefore it is not conservative (i.e. about returning to an idealized past), but that it is creative and always seeking something new. Performative returns are inevitably projects of yearning, of wishing for a past that was imagined to be better than the present (which has devolved in some way) or a future that has promise and potential. The mythical Aztec homeland Aztlán that was made popular during the Chicano Movement is a very elegant example: it is a wished-for, utopian space, acknowledged as being impossible to realize, but always animating the spirit of the concrete efforts of its adherents toward social justice and structural change (see Anaya and Lomelí 1991). Hartman writes: “To believe, as I do, that the enslaved are our contemporaries is to understand that we share their aspirations and defeats, which isn’t to say that we are owed what they were due but rather to acknowledge that they accompany our every effort to fight against domination, to abolish the color line, and to imagine a free territory, a new commons. It is to take to heart their knowledge of freedom. The enslaved knew that freedom had to be taken; it wasn’t something that could ever be given to you. The kind of freedom that could be given to you could just as easily be taken back. [...] The demands of the slave on the present have everything to do with making good the promise of abolition, and this entails much more than the end of property in slaves. It requires the reconstruction of society, which is the only way to honor our debt to the dead. This is the intimacy of our age with theirs – an unfinished struggle. To what end does one conjure the ghost of slavery, if not to incite the hopes of transforming the present?” (Hartman 2007, 269-270). But performative return is not necessarily critical, and part of what I demonstrate throughout this dissertation is how such projects are always more complicated than they seem; they work to challenge and bolster the racial state; they are in some ways radical and in others extremely conservative. And this question of criticality has precisely to do with normativity: do genealogical practices, the conclusions they draw and the worldmaking they do, work to undo or to reinscribe oppressive patterns, habits, worldviews, available roles of and categories for historically marginalized groups of people? All three of these projects attempt to re-write the terms of America, such that the circumstances of African-Americans are configured as being integral instead of outside the dominant narrative; constitutive rather than an aberration. But they waver between trying to write that as a narrative of progress, in which we have left slavery behind and have ascended to a space of constitutive normativity; and trying to underline the fundamental and unending nature of slavery – a kind of rejoinder to uncritical narratives that not only attends to the subjective space of social death that it has yielded but the possibilities and necessities of invent ion that have flourished in its wake. What they have in common is that they present the necessity of grappling with the past instead of ignoring it, allowing African-Americans’ movements and reinscriptions of migration to trouble the waters of complacency, forging a broader awareness of the fraught position they have historically occupied. Each contains kernels of great possibility for an inclusive vision of the future as well as more or less significant red flags. Hartman’s vision, however, seems to espouse a particularly liberating articulation of freedom, because it does not try to deny or occlude the presence or significance of ongoing disparity and loss: while Gates’ and Haley’s subjects and implied audience have already succeeded, gained access to civil society, and have implicitly ratified the fundamental terms on which it is predicated, Hartman’s are still struggling to make something from nothing; they have an urgency in attending to disparities, and no investment in a status quo that excludes or violates their well-being. What she claims or advocates is not a victimized stance, but rather a staunch activist one that is inflected by a rigorous and unflinching structural analysis, and a sensitive and equally rigorous understanding of desire, yearning, and the possibilities for reinvention and reconstruction that emerge when faced with profound absence and loss.

#### Their romanticization of nomadic politics and mobility inexorably ties them to the power structures of Whiteness.

Caren **Kaplan**, January 9th, 20**04** (cultural studies @ University of California at Davis, “Mobility and War: The Cosmic View of ‘Air Power’,” word doc >:)

So I want to talk about war and the discourses of space and time that are at work in the current conflicts. Given the event we are all attending, I would like to focus specifically on war and mobility. Here the question of what might be new or an alternative in relation to what might be the same or unchanged throughout modernity comes right to the fore. Because mobility is, of course, at the heart of modern warfare. If mobility is one of the markers of the modern--and it must be because we cannot understand the dictionary definition of mobility as freedom of movement without understanding the history of the rise of the notion of “freedom” as liberty to move as deeply grounded in Euro-American Enlightenment thought and political practice--then the mobile war and the war for mobility is the war of our generation and of our time. Thus, there are two aspects of war and mobility that I want to address today--the mobility of war as an articulation of the Enlightenment notion of free subjects and the mobility of war as an articulation of military strategy and the contest of technologies, old and new. They go together, of course. But pulling these strands apart a bit can give us some new insights. I am not yet convinced that mobility offers much in the way of alternatives--but we can come back to that in discussion and I look forward to hearing your views, particularly from the vantage point of the UK. To begin, then, I want to look back to the 2nd World War but I do not want to stop there. Because the discourse of the 2nd World War is always already in dialogue with the world war that preceded it and with other armed conflicts from which it can be differentiated or to which it can be linked. And it can only be read through the lens of the present. [IMAGE 1] For example, on the day I was reading Alexander de Seversky’s 1942 appeal for aerial defense strategies to protect the United States from German and Japanese attack, my Yahoo homepage was offering me a news story about possible infiltration of Air France flight crews by Al Queda with the intent to destroy targets in the United States once again. As I am writing this paper, the entire US is subject to an “orange” alert--one step below the greatest level of danger, signalled by the color “red.” We go about our business of observing our holidays with an underlying sense of apprehension. Where I live, even the most cynical person has to think twice about the necessity of crossing the Golden Gate Bridge since the media continues to identify it as a prime target of unspecified “terrorists.” Never mind logic. We are living in a time of profoundly heightened emotions mixed with inadequate education and information. As a consequence, binary views become more common and more urgently “remembered” as timeless and meaningful. People who never thought about Iraq and who cannot locate it on a map now think of themselves as always and forever opposed to the nation and its tyrannical regime. Such thinking cannot accommodate any complexities (such as the long-standing US government support for Saddam Hussein across several presidential administrations and not to mention support for the Taliban, for the mujihadeen, and for any number of vicious and despicable rulers, governments, and thugs of all kinds who, once the political winds blow differently, no longer count as favored “friends” but serve as blood enemies). Perhaps most problematic for people in the US is the tight fit between nation and religion. Thus, the US is always already a symbol of religious tolerance and secular governmentality yet Christianity is the official and dominant expression of a religiosity that is articulated as organic to US national identity. Under this bizarre mindset of official secular tolerance combined with intense Christian dominance in public and governmental discourse, Islam is dealt with as an oppositional construct rather than a variant of what we already experience in the US and other Western countries (Moallem 1999). Thus, countries with Islamic majorities are viewed as anti-secular and anti-tolerant (despite varied histories in this regard in different periods). Under this ideological regime, Islamicism becomes viewed as a nationalist enterprise that operates the same way in each country in which it is the dominant religion rather than understood as a profoundly transnational network that is articulated differently across cultures, classes, genders, nations, etc. The disastrous consequences of this misreading are unfolding before our eyes in the wars of our generation. I am visiting you from a nation that is trying as hard as it can to forget that anything bad has or can happen; a nation that is bringing home soldiers from Iraq who have the largest numbers of amputations and severe burns seen since the old days of the war in Indochina; a nation whose media is unable apparently to follow war on two fronts and thus almost never focuses on Afghanistan; a nation in the midst of some kind of economic free fall; a nation that enacts racialized profiling in more and more venues; a nation whose historic racist paranoia about foreigners and leaky borders has now reached an apotheosis in the post 9-11 moment. Nothing seems good anymore. Maybe technology can help. The newer technologies of surveillance and tracking are a boon for the immigration and transport arms of the government. We hear a fair amount about scanning eyeballs, fingers, and other parts of the body. We hear about cross-referencing of data (we do not hear much about the effect of downsizing post WWII area studies and the paucity of language and culture experts who can decipher the difference between one “Ahmed” and another --right after 9-11, people were thrown into jail without benefit of a lawyer or any other means of defense under war powers acts simply because someone who knew nothing about their language or culture of origin misunderstood the spelling of their name--these kinds of inanities could, perhaps, be better addressed through spanking new forms of information science but let’s face it: if the people using this fancy stuff have no education, there isn’t much hope for the technologies in situ). We hear about global positioning system applications for “keeping track” of suspects. We hear about the success of new technologies in armaments and defense--the precision and accuracy of bombs and missiles, the tremendous destructive capacities of these bombs and missiles (ie. the “bunker busters”). With each point I make here I could digress with a long laundry list of what we do not hear as much about--the things that don’t work as well as advertised, the things that cannot work in certain situations, the lack of education and ability to use technological tools intelligently in any widespread way, etc.). I could also talk about the interesting role of technology in the emerging peace and anti-globalization movements or the way in which the internet interpellated subjects in Iraq and many other locations during the US invasion. My point here is that in the US, a nation that has invaded several other countries and killed countless civilians as well as official combatants within the last two years alone, we often look to technology as a sign of hope, as a signal that we can prevail, and especially as a marker of our ability to defend ourselves from the horror of war’s immediate violence and to keep anything unspeakable and unimaginable at bay. The discourses of new technologies do this kind of work in the present moment. They are almost like paid advertisements for US nationalism and militarism. But on September 11, 2001, something went wrong with this belief system. The United States was revealed to be exceedingly vulnerable in specific kinds of ways. It is hard to convey how shattering of national identity these attacks were and how fragile is the mending of national psyche in the aftermath. Hence the discourse “everything changed”--a classic trope of modern rupture. But those of us old enough to have lived through WWII (or those of us old enough to have parents who lived through WWII) were reminded immediately of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941--a date that President Roosevelt cemented in the public mind as “a day that will live in infamy.” Growing up in the 1950s and ‘60s, I learned about Pearl Harbor as the quintessential “sneak attack”--an action somehow apart from the “normal” conduct of war that signalled the almost inhumanly cruel “nature” of Japan. It’s a pretty short leap from that view to a form of virulent racism directed against Japanese people collectively and individually. And that dehumanization (with its accompanying incarceration of legal Japanese immigrants and US citizens of Japanese descent) itself cannot be separated from the violent revenge of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--no matter how often we are told it was more humane to drop an atomic bomb than prolong a war against an enemy who violated the values of civilization, it is tough to rationalize. But the threat was believed to be overwhelmingly great. It was the 1942 equivalent of “code orange.” [IMAGE 2] Here is an example of this discourse of threatened security --it’s a passage from Victory Through Air Power, a book published by Simon & Schuster in 1942 about a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor: From every point of the compass--across the two oceans and across the two Poles--giant bombers, each protected by its convoy of deadly fighter planes, converge upon the United States of America. There are thousands of these dreadnaughts of the skies. Each of them carries at least fifty tons of streamlined explosives and a hailstorm of light incendiary bombs. Wave after wave they come--openly, in broad daylight, magnificently armored and armed, surrounded by protective aircraft and equipped to fight their way through to their appointed targets. Aerial armadas now battle boldly and fiercely, just as great naval armadas used to do in the past, only with a destructive fury infinitely more terrifying. With the precision of perfect planning, the invading aerial giants strike at the nerve centers and jugular veins of a great nation. Unerringly, they pick their objectives: industrial centers and sources of power, government seats and fuel concentrations . . . The havoc they wreak is beyond description. New York, Detroit, Chicago, and San Francisco are reduced to rubble heaps in the first twenty four hours. Washington is wiped out before the government has a chance to rescue its most treasured records. A dozen crucial power plants . . . are wrecked, crippling a great section of American industrial life at a single blow. A thousand tons of explosives deposited expertly on a few great railroad depots like those at Chicago dislocate the country’s transportation system. . . (de Seversky 1942, 7-8) Thus does Alexander P. de Seversky, a Russian-born, commissioned major in the US Army Air Corps, describe the beginning of the end of the world--or, at least, the vanquishment of the United States of America. As a trope of national annihilation, this depiction of aerial attack is resonant with modern notions of enemies of the state. An overarching threat that can come from any and every direction will zero in on specific, fixed targets and, having made their coordinated attack without sufficient defense, conquer the subject of the attack. That the attack would come from the air was a key part of argument for the formation of a comprehensive aerial defense strategy. By 1942, the Nazi Blitzkrieg and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had signalled that air power was a force with which to contend. If we had more time today, we could explore the history of aerial bombardment in closer detail and think through a little more carefully the contest between land-based, sea-based, and air-borne technologies and strategies. As well, in the US, the rise of and dominance of the air force is closely tied to the militarization of so-called “outer space.” And information sciences and technologies are deeply entangled in the “space race” of the late 1950’s, ‘60’s and ‘70’s. We could talk more about when and where and how space is discerned as open territory and when it can be viewed as the property of states and governments and what “mobility” means vis a vis deep space. [IMAGE 3] But for today, I just want to remind us that the area above the earth--the sky and the first layers of outer space--have histories of representation that are, to a significant degree, constructed around military intentions and interests. Space is a zone of freedom. But like all aspects of freedom after the European Enlightenment, that zone is structured by property relations and contests between states and corporations for dominance and wealth. Seversky’s world view is, perhaps, understandably Hobbesian. His life was imbricated by war, politics, and industry (military school, the Russian Naval Academy, an ace flyer in the early days of WWI, emigré aeronautical engineer, US citizen and government consultant, designer of the world’s first fully automatic bombsight, founding director of an aircraft corporation, and the designer of many features of modern aircraft intended for military use). The print version of Victory Through Air Power was read “by millions,” promoted as it was by the widely subscribed to Book-of-the Month Club. In a special preface to the Book-of-the-Month Club edition signed by the club’s president and its distinguished editorial board, readers are warned that the first impact of the book “will be one of alarm” (Scherman et al. 1942, xi). In what seems like a remarkable effort to simultaneously heighten and assuage public concerns, the preface argues that Major de Seversky is a “prophet” and that unified, strategic air power is the only way for the US to win the war. To press their point, they link technological advances in warfare to a rationalized teleology that leads inexorably to aerial bombardment: The airplane has revolutionized war. It has done so as completely, this book shows, as gunpowder did in the fifteenth century; more so than the steel-clad Monitor revolutionized naval warfare seventy-five years ago. Just so this book will revolutionize all our thinking about the war. No informed person reading it will ever again read the morning’s news the same way” (Scherman et al 1942, xiv). Indeed. The force of the book’s polemic against conventional naval and land-based standing armies in favor of the flexibility and deadly force of stragetically deployed air power was underscored when Walt Disney, then in almost fulltime production of war and US government friendly propaganda films, produced an animated feature film of the same name in cooperation with Seversky. The film is difficult to see these days since it proposes the incineration of Japan under the rubric of “the best defense is a good offense,” offering a particularly graphic view of what was then still an imaginary future of fire, death, and destruction for that nation’s populace. The Disney corporation has pulled most of its more overtly racist and “controversial” film products out of circulation and one can only view these texts in their archives in Burbank (although Victory Through Air Power is about to be released on dvd along with other Disney animated “political” films--look for it this spring just in time to enjoy it along with other war-themed projects that are currently in production). Popular discourse holds that the combined effect of the book and film versions of Victory Through Air Power changed the minds of both Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, altering the course of the war and changing national military strategy forever after. As I am in the middle of researching this text, I’ll have to wait until another time to let you know whether or not that line of argument is apocryphal or not. I suspect that the combined reach of the book and film generated greater consensus towards air defense and offense along with other cultural products and forms of discourse. There were certainly powerful interests invested in promoting this line of argument. The spatial logic that gripped Seversky’s mind was one that could be best characterized as the bird’s eye view--that is from unlimited space on down to the earth’s surface. In another section of the longer work of which this talk is a part, I refer to this bird’s eye perspective as a cosmic view; that is, the unifying gaze of an omniscient viewer of the globe from a distance (Kaplan 2002). In his work on the history of images of the earth as a globe, Denis Cosgrove, identifies this phenomenon as the “Apollonian gaze;” as a logic of vision that “pulls diverse life on earth into a vision of unity” while maintaining an “individualized,” “divine and mastering view from a single perspective” (Cosgrove 2001, xi). [IMAGE 4] As Cosgrove reminds us, the Apollonian gaze is far older than the European Enlightenment, stretching back to classical Greek cosmologies and cultural practices. But in the last several centuries a specific intensification of this cultural tradition, corresponding with European colonization and Euro-American globalization, has created the context for the cosmic view I am concerned with here--the sight of the world from the air and the question of one’s location in relation to it as a marker of subjectivity. The kind of vision and perceptual logic that I am discussing today emerges in the modern age of travelers and is linked, therefore, to the modern discourse of mobility. As Michel Foucault has argued, 18th century European imaginary was structured around two fundamental tropes or perceptual structures. The first was the situation of a child who is born without powers of sight and then, later, becomes able to see--hence, the shock of the new in a dazzling moment of revelation. And the second example concerns the point of view of the European traveler who is shocked out of complacency and certainty by the situation of being thrust into an unknown country full of strange, new sights, sounds, and customs (Stafford 1984, 20). IT is argued that these “primal” experiences alter European consciousness in a profound way that can be traced throughout cultural production over the next several centuries. Light, sight, and travel become structuring concepts for this European Enlightenment subject, a subject that is arguably generically masculine, raced, propertied, and individualized in a legal as well as political, psychological, and philosophical sense. I am moving quickly through this cultural history in order to bring us to the question of ways of seeing as a result of this privileging of cosmopolitan mobility, particularly in relation to a specific logic of sight, what I am calling a “cosmic view.” In thinking about how the “cosmic view” works in the modernity generated by capitalist expansion and European imperialism, let’s consider the hot air balloon, which some consider to be the birth of “space” travel in more ways than one. [IMAGE 5] Throughout the mid-late 1700s, balloon flights were conducted in Europe for scientific research. Indeed, the French word for balloon flight “expérience--was synonymous with experiment” (Stafford 1984, 22). Although balloon flights were intended to provide new answers to long-standing questions about topography and weather, they quickly became thoroughly involved in military operations.

 Balloon invasions stirred the imaginations of many French commanders. Yet, although balloons were used for both surveillance and the launching of artillery at the turn of the 18th century, the problem of guidance and precision overcame the dream of “military aeronauts.” It is not until the invention of modern rockets and the airplane that aerial photography and guided missiles become integral to military strategy and that space becomes seen as the most effective arena for war. But if the hot air balloon was not the perfect weapon, it can be argued that it initiated a significant shift in modes of perception. Dovetailing with the emergence of views of nature as a separate realm apart from the newly despoiled industrial centers of capitalism, ballooning offered views of the “uncharted vastness of space” as a kind of sublime experience (Stafford 1984, 355). Floating above the earth as high as humans had yet been able to go, the gaze that ballooning made possible, was one in which distance is an advantage--that is, distant objects appear with the most clarity. It is a subjective or particular gaze, one that is associated with interior consciousness, but it is articulated as a universal aesthetic or episteme. [IMAGE 6] The belief that this personal eye can see almost limitlessly and, therefore, with extreme clarity, is one of the hallmarks of a culture that privileged exploration and industrial expansion during a century that led to an intensification of colonialism, nationalist ventures, and economic globalization in the form of imperialism. This “cosmic view” promises to link subjects in a unified gaze for the purpose of viewing and therefore mastering a world that had been hitherto unknown or unobserved. Such a view also poses as benign, perhaps, as an experiment, much as early ballooning did, and yet, it can be argued that the “cosmic view” is drawn upon for war as much as for anything else.

#### Thus we should focus our energies and points of attention on an unflinching paradigmatic analysis that calls for the end of America.

**Wilderson** 20**10** [Frank B., I told you he was on some guerilla shit, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pages ix-x]

STRANGE As it might seem, this book project began in South Africa. During the last years of apartheid I worked for revolutionary change in both an underground and above-ground capacity, for the Charterist Movement in general and the ANC in particular. During this period, I began to see how essential an unflinching paradigmatic analysis is to a movement dedicated to the complete overthrow of an existing order. The neoliberal compro-mises that the radical elements of the Chartist Move-ment made with the moderate elements were due, in large part, to our inability or unwillingness to hold the moderates' feet to the fire of a political agenda predi-cated on an unflinching paradigmatic analysis. Instead, we allowed our energies and points of attention to be displaced by and onto pragmatic considerations. Simply put, we abdicated the power to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all. Elsewhere, I have written about this unfortu-nate turn of events (Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid), so I'll not rehearse the details here. Suffice it to say, this book germinated in the many political and academic discussions and debates that I was fortunate ACKNOWLEDGMENTS enough to be a part of at a historic moment and in a place where the word revolution was spoken in earnest, free of qualifiers and irony. For their past and ongoing ideas and interventions, I extend solidarity and appreciation to comrades Amanda Alexander, Franco Barchiesi, Teresa Barnes, Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, Nigel Gibson, Steven Greenberg, Allan Horowitz, Bushy Kelebonye (deceased), Tefu Kelebonye, Ulrike K ismer, Kamogelo Lekubu, A ndile Mngxitama, Prishani Naidoo, John Shai, and S'bu Zulu.

### Case

#### Nomads are bad – their politics empirically gets reappropriated by da military to do bad stuff

**Weizman 06** (Eyal, Israeli journalist, “The Art of War,” Fireze Magazine Issue 99, May 2006, Online)

The attack conducted by units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the city of Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier-General Aviv Kokhavi, as ‘inverse geometry’, which he explained as ‘the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of micro-tactical actions’.1 During the battle soldiers moved within the city across hundreds of metres of ‘overground tunnels’ carved out through a dense and contiguous urban structure. Although several thousand soldiers and Palestinian guerrillas were manoeuvring simultaneously in the city, they were so ‘saturated’ into the urban fabric that very few would have been visible from the air. Furthermore, they used none of the city’s streets, roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved horizontally through walls and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as ‘infestation’, seeks to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares. The IDF’s strategy of ‘walking through walls’ involves a conception of the city as not just the site but also the very medium of warfare – a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux. Contemporary military theorists are now busy re-conceptualizing the urban domain. At stake are the underlying concepts, assumptions and principles that determine military strategies and tactics. The vast intellectual field that geographer Stephen Graham has called an international ‘shadow world’ of military urban research institutes and training centres that have been established to rethink military operations in cities could be understood as somewhat similar to the international matrix of élite architectural academies. However, according to urban theorist Simon Marvin, the military-architectural ‘shadow world’ is currently generating more intense and well-funded urban research programmes than all these university programmes put together, and is certainly aware of the avant-garde urban research conducted in architectural institutions, especially as regards Third World and African cities. There is a considerable overlap among the theoretical texts considered essential by military academies and architectural schools. Indeed, the reading lists of contemporary military institutions include works from around 1968 (with a special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Guy Debord), as well as more contemporary writings on urbanism, psychology, cybernetics, post-colonial and post-Structuralist theory. If, as some writers claim, the space for criticality has withered away in late 20th-century capitalist culture, it seems now to have found a place to flourish in the military. I conducted an interview with Kokhavi, commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, who at 42 is considered one of the most promising young officers of the IDF (and was the commander of the operation for the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip).2 Like many career officers, he had taken time out from the military to earn a university degree; although he originally intended to study architecture, he ended up with a degree in philosophy from the Hebrew University. When he explained to me the principle that guided the battle in Nablus, what was interesting for me was not so much the description of the action itself as the way he conceived its articulation. He said: ‘this space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. […] The question is how do you interpret the alley? […] We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. […] I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win […] This is why that we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing. […] I said to my troops, “Friends! […] If until now you were used to move along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls!”’2 Kokhavi’s intention in the battle was to enter the city in order to kill members of the Palestinian resistance and then get out. The horrific frankness of these objectives, as recounted to me by Shimon Naveh, Kokhavi’s instructor, is part of a general Israeli policy that seeks to disrupt Palestinian resistance on political as well as military levels through targeted assassinations from both air and ground. If you still believe, as the IDF would like you to, that moving through walls is a relatively gentle form of warfare, the following description of the sequence of events might change your mind. To begin with, soldiers assemble behind the wall and then, using explosives, drills or hammers, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Stun grenades are then sometimes thrown, or a few random shots fired into what is usually a private living-room occupied by unsuspecting civilians. When the soldiers have passed through the wall, the occupants are locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the operation is concluded, often without water, toilet, food or medicine. Civilians in Palestine, as in Iraq, have experienced the unexpected penetration of war into the private domain of the home as the most profound form of trauma and humiliation. A Palestinian woman identified only as Aisha, interviewed by a journalist for the Palestine Monitor, described the experience: ‘Imagine it – you’re sitting in your living-room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal, and suddenly that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders. You have no idea if they’re after you, if they’ve come to take over your home, or if your house just lies on their route to somewhere else. The children are screaming, panicking. Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, 12 soldiers, their faces painted black, sub-machine-guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall?’3 Naveh, a retired Brigadier-General, directs the Operational Theory Research Institute, which trains staff officers from the IDF and other militaries in ‘operational theory’ – defined in military jargon as somewhere between strategy and tactics. He summed up the mission of his institute, which was founded in 1996: ‘We are like the Jesuit Order. We attempt to teach and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John Forester, and other architects. We are reading Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz. Not myself, but our soldiers, our generals are reflecting on these kinds of materials. We have established a school and developed a curriculum that trains “operational architects”.’4 In a lecture Naveh showed a diagram resembling a ‘square of opposition’ that plots a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labelled with phrases such as ‘Difference and Repetition – The Dialectics of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Manoeuvre’, ‘Velocity vs. Rhythms’, ‘The Wahabi War Machine’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists’ and ‘Nomadic Terrorists’, they often reference the work of Deleuze and Guattari. War machines, according to the philosophers, are polymorphous; diffuse organizations characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of small groups that split up or merge with one another, depending on contingency and circumstances. (Deleuze and Guattari were aware that the state can willingly transform itself into a war machine. Similarly, in their discussion of ‘smooth space’ it is implied that this conception may lead to domination.) I asked Naveh why Deleuze and Guattari were so popular with the Israeli military. He replied that ‘several of the concepts in A Thousand Plateaus became instrumental for us […] allowing us to explain contemporary situations in a way that we could not have otherwise. It problematized our own paradigms. Most important was the distinction they have pointed out between the concepts of “smooth” and “striated” space [which accordingly reflect] the organizational concepts of the “war machine” and the “state apparatus”. In the IDF we now often use the term “to smooth out space” when we want to refer to operation in a space as if it had no borders. […] Palestinian areas could indeed be thought of as “striated” in the sense that they are enclosed by fences, walls, ditches, roads blocks and so on.’5 When I asked him if moving through walls was part of it, he explained that, ‘In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem. [...] Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and practice.’6

#### They also cause genocide

Barbrook 98 [Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at U of Westminster, The Holy Fools]

While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari’s dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the ‘grand narrative’ of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The ‘line of flight’ from Stalin had led to Pol Pot. [22]

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## Anti-Blackness

### AT: Multiculturalism

**Rodriguez 2009**  [Dylan Rodriguez, University of California, Riverside, “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition”*Critical Sociology*, Volume 36, Issue 1, 2009]

It thus is within the confines of Homeland Security as **white supremacist territoriality –** **a structure of feeling**

**that organizes the cohesion of racial and spatial entitlement** – that ‘multiculturalism’ is recognized as a fact of life, an empirical feature of the world that is inescapable and unavoidable, something to be tolerated, policed, and patriotically valorized at once and in turn. On the one hand,**white locality is a site of existential identification thatgenerates (and therefore corresponds to) a white supremacist materiality.** As **subjects** (including ostensibly ‘non-white’ subjects) **identify with this sentimental structure** –**a process that** **is not cleanly agential or altogether voluntary** – **they enter a relation of discomforting intimacy** **with embodied threats to their sense of the ‘local’.**Those**alien bodies and subjects,** **whose movement suggests the possibility of disruption and disarticulation, become objects** **of a discrete discursive labor as well as material/military endeavors.** Most importantly, **they** **become specified and particularized sites for white locality’s punitive performances:** **racialized** **punishment, capture, and discipline are entwined in the historical fabric of white supremacist** **social formations from conquest and chattel enslavement**onward, and **the emergence of** **white locality’s hypermobility has necessitated new technologies commensurate with the** **hyperpresence**– actual and virtual – **of white subjectivities.** As **white bodies and subjects** **exert the capacity to manifest authority and presence in places they both do and do not** **physically occupy** (call the latter ‘absentee’ white supremacy for shorthand), **the**old **relations** **of classical white supremacist apartheid are necessarily and persistently reinvented: racial subjection becomes a technology of *inclusion*that crucially accompanies** – and **is** radically **enhanced by** – **ongoing proliferations of racist state and state-sanctioned violence.** Further, this **logic of multiculturalist white supremacist inclusion** does not exclusively rely on strategies of coercion or punishment to assimilate others – such as in the paradigmatic examples of bodily subjection that formed the institutional machinery of Native American boarding and mission schools (Adams 1995; Smith 2005), but instead**builds** **upon the more plastic and sustainable platforms of consensus and collective identity formation.** I do not mean to suggest that either consensus building or identity formation are benign projects of autonomous racial self-invention, somehow operating independently of the structuring relations of dominance that characterize a given social formation. Rather, I am arguing that the s**ocial technologies of white supremacy are**, in this historical moment, **not reducible to discrete arrangements of institutionalized (and state legitimated)** **violence or strategies of social exclusion**(Da Silva 2007) but **are significantly** **altered and innovated through the crises of bodily proximity that white locality bears to** **its alien (and even enemy) populations**. It is in these moments of discomfort, when **white** **locality is internally populated by alien others who have neither immigrated nor invaded** **the space**, **but have in multiple ways become occupied by the praxis of white localityconstruction,** **that logics of incorporation and inclusion become crucial to the historical** **project of white supremacist globality.**

### AT: Black-White Binary

#### Foregrounding interlocking oppressions in a chain of equivalence denies the structuring force of anti-blackness – that dooms solvency of the aff and perm

Sexton ’10 [Jared, associate professor of African American studies and film and media studies at the University of California, Irvine, “People-of-Color-Blindness”, Social Text 2010 Volume 28, Number 2 103: 31-56]

If the oppression of nonblack people of color in, and perhaps beyond, the United States seems conditional to the historic instance and functions at a more restricted empirical scope, antiblackness seems invariant and limitless (which does not mean that the former is somehow negligible and short-lived or that the latter is exhaustive and unchanging). If pursued with some consistency, the sort of comparative analysis outlined above would likely impact the formulation of political strategy and modify the demeanor of our political culture. In fact, it might denature the comparative instinct altogether in favor of a relational analysis more adequate to the task. Yet all of this is obviated by the silencing mechanism par excellence in Left political and intellectual circles today: “Don’t play Oppression Olympics!” The Oppression Olympics dogma levels a charge amounting to little more than a leftist version of “playing the race card.” To fuss with details of comparative (or relational) analysis is to play into the hands of divide-and-conquer tactics and to promote a callous immorality. 72 However, as in its conservative complement, one notes in this catchphrase the unwarranted translation of an inquiring position of comparison into an insidious posture of competition, the translation of ethical critique into unethical attack. This point allows us to understand better the intimate relationship between the censure of black inquiry and the recurrent analogizing to black suffering mentioned above: they bear a common refusal to admit to significant dif ferences of structural position born of discrepant histories between blacks and their political allies, actual or potential. We might, finally, name this refusal people-of-color-blindness, a form of colorblindness inherent to the concept of “people of color” to the precise extent that it misunderstands the specificity of antiblackness and presumes or insists upon the monolithic character of victimization under white supremacy 73 —thinking (the afterlife of) slavery as a form of exploitation or colonization or a species of racial oppression among others. 74 The upshot of this predicament is that obscuring the structural position of the category of blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical opposition and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion. Every analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule and the machinations of the racial state without accounting for black existence within its framework—which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought—is doomed to miss what is essential about the situation. Black existence does not represent the total reality of the racial formation—it is not the beginning and the end of the story—but it does relate to the totality; it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, the whole range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this vantage point, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer. 75 What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack” paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffering and of the struggles—political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on—that have sought to transform and undo it. What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness. 76 This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them. Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross fire will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the magnification of state power. At the apex of the midcentury social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 classic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, that black freedom entails “the necessarily total revamping of the society.” 77 For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world: I knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without the possibility of flight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. There was no going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet another revolution. 78