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### 2AC AT: OFAC CP

####  “Should” doesn’t require certainty

Black’s Law 79 (Black’s Law Dictionary – Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does.

#### OFAC sucks – inefficiencies, inaccurate info, can’t keep track of exchanges

Washington Times, 1-2-2004, “Freeze on Terror Cash Not working,” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jan/2/20040102-120053-3276r/?page=all>

The lawmakers also raised concerns about sloppy OFAC record keeping about people and financial transactions that have been blocked, and with special licenses for people who are given exemptions from certain financial sanctions. “Inaccurate information is not only inefficient, but impairs OFAC’s ability to aid other agencies,” the lawmakers said.

#### OFAC can’t do academic exchange – empirics

US Treasury, 3-19-2012, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/cuba_ppl_notice.aspx>

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has received inquiries concerning the advertising of travel to Cuba by organizations that have been granted licenses under section 515.565(b)(2) of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515 (the “Regulations”). These licenses authorize individuals to engage in travel-related transactions involving Cuba that are incident to engaging in educational exchanges not involving academic study pursuant to a degree program provided these exchanges take place under the auspices of an organization that sponsors and organizes such programs to promote people-to-people contact. OFAC does not prohibit persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from designing or accepting an advertisement related to licensed Cuba travel and publishing the advertisement in any medium, including providing a link to the website of the licensed organization (the “Licensee”) whose services are being advertised. For example, a Licensee may post information concerning the licensed activity on its Internet website or hire another entity to produce a brochure promoting the licensed Cuba travel program and send it to the public, including retail travel agents for further distribution. In addition, the advertiser also may engage in activities involving informational outreach, such as the promotion of the Licensee’s licensed travel program by phone or at a travel exposition.

## Politics

### 2AC AT: Syria Politics DA

#### **Won’t pass-both GOP and democrats reject strikes**

Korte and Singer 13 (Gregory and Paul-writers for USA TODAY; 09/02/13; “The six key players in Congress' Syria debate”; <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/02/syria-congress-guide-obama-pelosi-mccain/2754963/>, [JJ])

WASHINGTON — A week ago, it seemed the question of whether to take military action against Syria rested solely on the shoulders of President Obama. But he has turned to Congress to authorize military airstrikes against Syria for using chemical weapons, setting up the most consequential foreign policy vote since the 2002 authorization of the Iraq War. Obama and his supporters on Capitol Hill will have to overcome broad skepticism about the merits of military strikes and navigate the political divisions that have left Congress largely paralyzed. The vote also cast a spotlight on key lawmakers who will be critical in determining whether or not Congress authorizes Obama to use military force. Congress is still on recess, but the arm-twisting has begun and the Syria resolution will be the first order of business in both the House and Senate when they return Sept. 9. STORY: McCain, Graham express optimism on Obama Syria plan MORE: Latest development on the crisis in Syria The debate will pit Obama and House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi against both Republicans and Democrats skeptical of foreign military intervention. The White House will need support from Republican leaders such as Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, and Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., but it is not clear how much influence they will have over their own party.

#### 2014 election means that Democrats won’t get on board

Evan McMorris Santoro, 9-6-13 BuzzFeed Reporter, “Vulnerable Democrats Keep Their Distance From Obama On Syria,” <http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/vulnerable-democrats-keep-their-distance-from-obama-on-syria>

WASHINGTON — Some of the Democrats least interested in lining up behind the president on Syria are the Democrats most likely to face a tough reelection campaign next year. President Obama acknowledged Friday that convincing Congress to authorize a military strike on Syria has been “a heavy lift” for the White House so far. The normal anti-war coalition of liberals and libertarians is falling into place, and a more unlikely coalition partner of Republican hawks is [joining them](http://www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray/hawks-and-doves-team-up-to-oppose-syria-strikes-in-congress). For now, though, most members are on the fence. None more so than vulnerable Democrats, according to a study by the Republican opposition research firm America Rising. Using the venerable nonpartisan Cook Political Report [ratings](http://cookpolitical.com/house/charts/race-ratings) of House races, the GOP group compiled a chart of undecided Democrats and found many on the fence are the same ones the Cook Report says are facing tough elections next year. A couple already oppose strikes. Only one, West Virginia Rep. Nick Rahall (who Cook places in a “Lean Democratic” race next year), has pledged to support congressional authorization for strikes. America Rising’s chart includes whether the vulnerable Democrats signed onto either of the two bipartisan letters sent to Obama last month calling for Congress to weigh in on Syria. One was authored by Virginia Republican Rep. [Scott Rigell](http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=21FD010D-5656-4E8D-BFFD-CA6F1864937C), and the other was written by California Democratic Rep. [Barbara Lee](http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=1753AFD4-272B-4E12-B486-2598EC2B18F0). Obama gave the signatories what they wanted when he called on Congress to authorize his plan to strike Syria. But only a few of the vulnerable Democrats signed either of the letters, per the America Rising study. Some Democrats have hinted they’ll wait to hear what Obama has to say in his [White House address](http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-to-address-american-people-on-syria-tuesday) on Syria next week before making up their minds, but the Republicans at America Rising say the fact that Obama hasn’t already earned the support of so many vulnerable members of his own party shows that they think his war will be a drag on them next year. “Democrats who are facing tough reelections in 2014 are either in hiding or trying to run away from a president whose agenda is wildly unpopular with voters in their districts,” said Tim Miller, executive director of America Rising.

#### Pol cap ain’t real

Hirsh 2/7 Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek. Hirsh has appeared many times as a commentator on Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, and National Public Radio. He has written for the Associated Press, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s, and Washington Monthly, and authored two books. “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital,” 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207?page=1

Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.

#### Obama has no pol cap anyways

Kilgore, 9/5/13 (Ed Kilgore is a contributing writer to the Washington Monthly. He is managing editor for The Democratic Strategist and a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, “Obama’s ‘political capital,’” Washington Monthy, September 5, 2013, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2013\_09/obamas\_political\_capital046735.php#;)

An even hoarier meme than the no-win-war complaint is naturally emerging in Washington as everyone recalibrates his or her assumptions about how the year will end: Obama’s limited “political capital” that he might have used on the fiscal front will now be “spread thin” or “stretched to the breaking point” by the need to make a case for military action against Syria. Politico’s Brown and Sherman give it a full airing today:¶ President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform.¶ Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities.¶ A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval.¶ Now this may be true with respect to congressional Democrats if Obama ultimately needs them to swallow hard and accept some fiscal deal to avoid a government shutdown or debt default. But seriously, what sort of “political capital” does the president have with congressional Republicans? They committed to a policy of total obstruction from the day he became president and picked up right where they had left off the day he was re-elected. Obama’s only options in dealing with the GOP are to offer them cover for compromise when he must and hand them an anvil to speed their self-destruction when he can. But he has no “political capital” to spend.

#### Plan doesn’t go through congress

Sweig, ’13 [July/August 2013, [Julia E. Sweig](http://www.cfr.org/experts/latin-america-brazil-cuba/julia-e-sweig/b4230), Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island”, <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>]

The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana. In the short term, the two countries have numerous practical problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. Most of the policy steps Obama should take at this stage -- removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there, and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain with Havana. Although it might be politically awkward in the United States for a president to be seen as helping Castro, on the island, such measures would strengthen the case that Cuba can stand to become a more open, democratic society without succumbing to external pressure or subversion. Deeper commercial ties, moreover, could have repercussions beyond the economic realm, giving internal reformers more leeway and increasing support on the island for greater economic and political liberalization.

#### Kerry pushes the plan.

Aho 13 (Matthew Aho, Matthew Aho is a consultant in the Corporate Practice Group. He has significant international affairs experience working on issues throughout Latin America, with a focus on Cuba, Venezuela, Central America, Peru, and Mexico. Matthew has particular experience with legal and regulatory frameworks comprising the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba, as well as with region-wide projects on issues ranging from insecurity and violence prevention to energy and policies affecting labor-markets. Previously, Matthew was Manager of the Policy Department at the New York headquarters of Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS/COA) and editor of Americas Quarterly, “What Does Obama's Second Term Hold for U.S.-Cuba Relations?”, cuba study group, January 23, 2013, <http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/our-opinions?ContentRecord_id=c20ad778-24cd-46df-9fb2-3ebc664ed58d&ContentType_id=15d70174-0c41-47c6-9bd5-cc875718b6c3&Group_id=4c543850-0014-4d3c-8f87-0cbbda2e1dc7>)

While John Kerry's views on U.S.–Cuba relations have favored engagement over isolation, ultimate authority rests with a White House that has proceeded cautiously on Cuba during President Obama's first term. Aside from easing some travel restrictions, there have been only two emergent themes on Cuba policy: support for private-sector efforts to increase the flow of information to the Cuban people; and support for private economic activity on the island. Cuba policy changes still require expenditures of political capital disproportionate to the island's strategic and economic importance. Barring game-changing developments—such as release of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross—executive action during Obama's second term will likely focus on furthering goals laid out during his first. Here, however, John Kerry's leadership could prove vital and create new opportunities for U.S. business.

#### The plan is key to Obama credibility – failure to act kills it

French 10 (Anya, Director for the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the New America Foundation, “Stiffing Havana,” http://cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/stiffing\_havana\_38758)

In the high-stakes world of international diplomacy, bluffing is a seldom-seen practice -- the stakes are simply too high to risk getting called out. But, that's precisely what seems to have happened with the Obama administration's stated policy of détente toward Cuba. Havana is making concessions, but Washington seems incapable of responding in kind. The United States may be fumbling away its best chance at influencing Cuba in the way that it has claimed to have wanted for decades.¶ It was nearly one year ago that President Barack Obama delivered a message to President Raúl Castro via Spain's prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero: "We understand that change can't happen overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time, it should be clear that now is when those changes began," Obama said. "We're taking steps, but if they don't take steps too, it's going to be very hard for us to continue." If Cuba proved willing to improve relations with the United States, Obama seemed willing to reciprocate.¶ Obama's conciliatory message may have been on Castro's mind as the Cuban government began making improvements to its much maligned human rights record this summer. More than 40 Cuban political prisoners have been released from jail in recent months. Dozens more might soon follow as part of the government's unprecedented human rights dialogue with the Cuban Catholic Church; it's the first such dialogue of its kind for the church, an institution that previously had been treated with suspicion, if not hostility, by the Cuban government. The political changes have been paired with sweeping labor and economic reforms that have, however belatedly, begun to liberalize the moribund economy: 10 percent of Cuba's workforce will shift into the private sector by next year.¶ The ball, clearly, is now in the United States' court. But so far, the Obama administration has failed to respond to the very concessions Washington has long demanded, and very recently promised to reward. Rather than greet the changes, Obama has replied with mild skepticism. "I think that any release of political prisoners, any economic liberalization that takes place in Cuba is positive, positive for Cuban people, but we've not yet seen the full results of these promises," Obama told Hispanic media at the White House Tuesday.¶ Washington and Havana remain locked in their 50-year dispute. The U.S. trade and travel embargoes have only gotten tighter over the decades; under President George W. Bush, tensions threatened to reach a tipping point. Obama has called the inherited status quo a failure, but most of the Bush policies remain in place today. (Some in Washington argue that Obama has already made significant gestures to Havana by easing restrictions on Cuban-American families' travel and remittances to the island last year. But that change was more a gesture to Cuban-Americans in Miami -- where he campaigned on a promise to ease Bush's harsher restrictions on Cuban immigrant families -- than it was any significant political concession to Havana.)¶ The Obama administration should instead be honoring the changes in Cuba by taking considerable steps of its own: A bold response by Washington will put the spotlight back on Havana to continue with its reforms. Obama's choice isn't between the status quo and a wholesale abandonment of the embargoes: There are many ways to craft a foreign policy that could help spur the economic growth needed to support the half-million new workers in Cuba's fledging private sector. Only Congress can lift the Cuban travel ban entirely, but the president possesses broad authority to allow some Americans to travel freely to the island. Cultural and academic trips to Cuba by Americans are currently permitted under U.S. law, at the discretion of the federal government; the Obama administration could easily broaden the definition of such "people-to-people" trips. That policy would trace its roots to the successful citizen diplomacy with the Soviet Union that President Ronald Reagan championed during the Cold War. President Bill Clinton successfully enacted such a policy toward Cuba during his time in office, but it was rolled back by Bush.¶ But what if Obama chooses to do nothing or dithers so long that this historic opportunity to influence Cuban reforms passes? If the president fails to move now, after Cuba has apparently acted in good faith to the offer of an outstretched hand, his administration will lose credibility --not just in Havana, but among global allies that will see the president's reversal as a sign of weakness, incoherence, and even dishonesty.¶ No one can say for sure, of course, where Cuba's reforms will lead. But it's clear -- even to Fidel Castro in his most unguarded moments -- that the old model just doesn't work anymore. Raúl Castro's reforms, deeper and broader than the limited Cuban reforms of the 1990s, signal that Havana is in search of a new system. It may or may not be the model America would choose, but if Washington wants to have any influence at this pivotal moment, the time to engage Cuba is now.

#### **Strikes causes regional conflict**

Barnard and Rubin 13 (Anne Barnard reported from Beirut, and Alissa J. Rubin from Kabul, Afghanistan.; “Experts Fear U.S. Plan to Strike Syria Overlooks Risks”; 08/30/13

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/middleeast/experts-fear-us-plan-to-strike-syria-overlooks-risks.html?_r=0>, [JJ])

Supporters of the president’s proposal contend that a limited punitive strike can be carried out without inflaming an already volatile situation. But a number of diplomats and other experts say it fails to adequately plan for a range of unintended consequences, from a surge in anti-Americanism that could bolster Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to a wider regional conflict that could drag in other countries, including Israel and Turkey. “Our biggest problem is ignorance; we’re pretty ignorant about Syria,” said Ryan C. Crocker, a former ambassador to Syria and Lebanon, who has served in Iraq and Afghanistan and is dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. The American strike could hit President Assad’s military without fundamentally changing the dynamic in a stalemated civil war that has already left more than 100,000 people dead. At the same time, few expect that a barrage of cruise missiles would prompt either side to work in earnest for a political settlement. Given that, the skeptics say it may not be worth the risks. “I don’t see any advantage,” said a Western official who closely observes Syria. In outlining its plans, the Obama administration has left many questions unanswered. Diplomats familiar with Mr. Assad say there is no way to know how he would respond, and they question what the United States would do if he chose to order a chemical strike or other major retaliation against civilians. That would leave the United States to choose between a loss of credibility and a more expansive — and unpopular — conflict, they said. “So he continues on in defiance — maybe he even launches another chemical attack to put a stick in our eye — and then what?” Mr. Crocker said. “Because once you start down this road, it’s pretty hard to get off it and maintain political credibility.” For the United States, the challenge is to deliver the intended message to Mr. Assad without opening the door to a takeover by rebels linked to Al Qaeda, the collapse of state institutions, or a major escalation by Syria’s allies. Skeptics doubt that the United States — or anyone else — has the information to calibrate the attack that precisely. That is partly because the United States is preparing to inject itself into a conflict that is no longer just about Syria, but has become a volatile regional morass that pits Iran and Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group in Lebanon, against Qaeda affiliates backed by Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf benefactors. Iran’s and Syria’s defense ministers threatened on Friday to unleash attacks on Israel if Mr. Assad was in danger. While Hezbollah has said it would wait to see the scale and nature of the attacks before responding, in practice, analysts close to the organization said, it is probably prepared for any contingency. There is also concern that Shiite-led Iraq could send thousands more militants to help Mr. Assad if it believed he was truly threatened, and that such a step would in turn further rally and embolden Sunni jihadists on both sides of its border with Syria. Many diplomats and analysts consider retaliation unlikely, but the consequences could be grim. Israel has vowed that if Hezbollah attacks it again, it will respond forcefully, drawing Lebanon into war. And if Syria lobbed missiles into Israel and it responded with airstrikes through Lebanese airspace that threatened Mr. Assad further, Hezbollah would consider that further justification to attack Israel. Even without such a direct entanglement, Lebanon could be very vulnerable. It has recently suffered its worst sectarian violence in years: a car bomb in Shiite Hezbollah territory in the Beirut suburbs, and two at Sunni mosques in the northern city of Tripoli. Lebanese authorities accused Syria on Friday of involvement in the Tripoli attacks, and intelligence officials fear such bombings could increase. Within Syria, there is also the prospect of civilian casualties, either from errant American missiles or among people near the target sites. The Syrian government has put some military bases in populated areas, and thousands of political and other prisoners are held in security buildings. Although the strikes are said to be aimed at elite units involved in chemical weapons use, Reuters reported Friday that many Sunni conscripts have been effectively imprisoned on bases because they are not trusted, leaving them vulnerable, too. Significant casualties among the very people American officials say they are protecting could be exploited by the government. “That will completely empty any justification for this” in the eyes of many, the Western official said. Some likely targets are in areas that up to now have remained relatively secure, including the corridor from western suburbs of Damascus to the Lebanese border. And in Damascus itself, a bubble of relative security, residents have expressed fear that in the aftermath, clashes could erupt. That could create a new humanitarian crisis and new refugee flows to Syria’s already burdened neighbors. American officials say they do not expect a refugee crisis because of the strikes’ limited nature, but Human Rights Watch has called on them to plan for the unexpected. “We haven’t received any indication that plans for beefed-up humanitarian response are under way,” said Lama Fakih, the group’s deputy director in Beirut. Anger over American involvement could also undo one of the major benefits to American interests from the Arab uprisings by restoring the alliance against Israel that Iran, Syria and Hezbollah had with the Sunni Palestinian group Hamas. The conflict in Syria has sorely tested that alliance, with Hamas supporting the Sunni-led Syrian rebellion. Verifying information in Syria is extraordinarily hard, and another risk, however remote it may seem to American officials, is that it turns out that the Assad government was not responsible for the chemical attack. In any case, in a region where many have their doubts after the faulty intelligence that led to war in Iraq, wide sectors of the public may remain unconvinced. That would allow Mr. Assad to paint himself as the victim of an unjust American intervention and draw more supporters back to his fold. All that said, no one is suggesting that the United States or other countries should turn a blind eye to the use of chemical weapons or the suffering of civilians. The problem, Mr. Crocker said, is to figure out a response that leaves the Syrians, the region and the United States in a better position rather than entangled in another messy conflict with an uncertain outcome.

#### Middle East war causes nuclear and bioweapon use

Russell 9 James A. Russell, senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Spring 2009, http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### **US Strikes perpetuate terrorism**

BBC 9-2 (Syria minister: US strike on Syria 'would benefit al-Qaeda'; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23925037>; [JJ])

Speaking to the BBC's Jeremy Bowen, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said terrorism would flourish everywhere if the US attacked Syria Continue reading the main story Any US military action against Syria would amount to "support for al-Qaeda and its affiliates," Damascus has said. Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad also told the BBC that armed groups backed by America - not Syrian troops - had used chemical weapons.

#### In the charged atmosphere after a terrorist attack we would retaliate against Russia – causes all-out war

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weaponsbetween two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thoughtordiscovered that the fissile material used in the actof nuclear terrorismhad come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack,how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

## Nietzsche

### 2AC AT: Nietzsche

#### **Framework – we should weigh the aff against the alternative – constant changes in the political sphere means only plan focused debate can allow for active engagement with Latin America**

Thomas E. Keller et al, James K. Whittaker and Tracey K. Burke, Spring/Summer 2001 (Thomas E. Keller is assistant professor, School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, James K. Whittaker is professor, and Tracey K. Burke is a doctoral student, School of Social Work, University of Washington, Council on Social Work Education, “Student Debates in Policy Courses: Promoting Policy Practice Skills and Knowledge through Active Learning,” jstor >:)

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruc tion of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue. Debates and Active Learning Dewey theorized that learning and re flective thinking are based on active engagement with a specific problem or issue (Baker, 1955; Dewey, 1939). This prin ciple underlies contemporary and widely held notions that students learn more effectively by actively analyzing, discuss ing, and applying content in meaningful ways rather than passively absorbing in formation through a lecture (Bean, 1996; Bonwell & Eison, 1991; Lewis & Williams, 1994; Meyers & Jones, 1993). Experien tial education immerses students in an experience so that they may learn by doing. Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key ele ment in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in politi cal or policy oriented practica. In a sur vey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practice in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/de velopment (BSW=15%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the larg est representation at a single school be ing 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learn ing in the classroom: • Students are involved in more than listening. • Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students' skills. • Students are involved in higher-order think ing (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). • Students are engaged in activities. • Greater emphasis is placed on students' exploration of their own attitudes and val ues. (p. 2) Experiential learning in the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage stu dents to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situa tions, and to consider new ways of think ing in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer (Meyers&Jones, 1993). Educational Effectiveness of Debates Since its origins in classical times, aca demic debate has been recognized as one of the best methods of learning and applying the attributes of critical think ing (Freeley, 1996). Recent empirical studies of students participating in com petitive interschool forensics societies illustrate the link between debating and proficiency in critical thinking. Colbert (1987) found that students involved in intercollegiate debating for one year showed a larger pretest to posttest gain on a critical thinking test than a nondebating control group. Likewise, Shinn (1995) discovered that, after sta tistically controlling for intelligence, high school students who engaged in two years of competitive debating exhibited higher levels of critical thinking than a compari son group of nondebaters. Debates have been recommended as a strategy to engage students in active learn ing in the classroom (Bean, 1996; Bonwell &Eison, 1991; Schroeder&Ebert, 1983). The use of in-class debates has been re ported in subjects as diverse as sociology and dentistry (Huryn, 1986; Scannapieco, 1997). Nevertheless, a search of the lit erature revealed no reference to student debates within social work education, despite evidence that debates have been assigned in some social work courses (Zlotnik, Rome,& DePanfilis, 1998). Fur thermore, the authors discovered only two studies, both by Combs and Bourne (1989, 1994), which provide empirical evidence of the value of debates in a classroom context. In their initial report, Combs and Bourne (1989) presented findings on the use of debates in two upper level business courses with a com bined enrollment of 59 students. Nearly 80% of the students (n=47) believed the debates provided them with a better un derstanding of both sides of the issues than a standard lecture format would have. Likewise, 66% (n=39) felt they had learned more than if the course material had been presented in a lecture. Another important finding was that students' con fidence in their public speaking skills increased following the debates. In gen eral, there was satisfaction with the de bates. At the beginning of the course only 57% of the students (n=35) looked forward to the upcoming debates, but by the end of the course 85% (n=50) stated that they enjoyed the debates, and 71% (n=42) wished debates were used in other courses. Combs and Bourne (1994) ex tended their initial study to cover a five year period with a combined sample of over 500 students. The results were even stronger in favor of using debates, per haps reflecting improvement in the in structors' application of the debate format over time.

#### Case outweighs

#### A. Extinction requires rereading Nietzsche – he couldn’t have anticipated modern threats

Winchester ‘94

(James Winchester, Professor of Philosophy, Georgia State University, 1994, “Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Turn.”)

As uninformed as it is to assume that there is an easy connec­tion between his thought and National Socialism/ it is neither diffi­cult nor misguided to consider his lack of social concern. Nietzsche saw one danger in our century, but failed to see a second. His critique of herd mentality reads like a prophetic warning against the dicta­torships that have plagued and continue to haunt the twentieth cen­tury. But the context of our world has changed in ways that Nietzsche never imagined. We now have, as never before, the ability to destroy the planet. The threat of the destruction of *a* society is not new. From the beginnings of Western literature in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey,* the Western mind has contemplated the destruction that, for example, warfare has wrought. Although the Trojan war destroyed almost everyone involved, both the victors and the van­quished, it did not destroy the entire world. In the twentieth century, what has changed is the scale of destruction. If a few countries destroy the ozone layer, the whole world perishes, or if two countries fight a nuclear or biological war, the whole planet is threatened. This is something new in the history of the world. The interconnectedness of the entire world has grown dramatically. We live, as never before, in a global community where our actions effect ever-larger numbers of the world's population. The earth's limits have become more apparent. Our survival depends on working together to solve problems like global pollution. Granted mass movements have instituted reigns of terror, but our survival as a planet is becoming ever-more predicated on community efforts of the sort that Nietzsche's thought seems to denigrate if not preclude. / I do not criticize Nietzsche for failing to predict the rise of problems requiring communal efforts such as the disintegration of the ozone layer, acid rain, and the destruction of South American rain forests. Noting his lack of foresight and his occasional extrem­ism, I propose, in a Nietzschean spirit, to reconsider his particular tastes, without abandoning his aesthetic turn. Statements like "com­mon good is a self-contradiction" are extreme, even for Nietzsche. He was not always so radical. Yet there is little room in Nietzsche's egoism for the kind of cooperation and sense of community that is today so important for our survival. I am suggesting that the time for Nietzsche's radical individualism is past. There are compelling prag­matic and aesthetic reasons why we should now be more open to the positive possibilities of living in a community. There is nothing new about society's need to work together. What has changed is the level of interconnectedness that the technological age has pressed upon us.

#### . Cause for Joy. You can’t just order someone to be happy – it requires a reason.

Victor Frankl, Holocaust survivor; M.D., PH.D.; Visiting Professor, Harvard University; received over 29 honorary doctorate degrees, 2K, “Man’s Search for Meaning.”

Let us first ask ourselves what should be understood by "a tragic optimism." In brief it means that one is, and remains, optimistic in spite of the "tragic triad," as it is called in logotherapy, a triad which consists of those aspects of human existence which may be circumscribed by: (1) pain; (2) guilt; and (3) death. This chapter, in fact, raises the question. How is it possible to say yes to life in spite of all that? How, to pose the question differently, can life retain its potential meaning in spite of its tragic aspects? After all, "saying yes to life in spite of everything," to use the phrase in which the title of a German book of mine is couched, presupposes that life is potentially meaningful under any conditions, even those which are most miserable. And this in turn presupposes the human capacity to creatively turn life's negative aspects into something positive or constructive. In other words, what matters is to make the best of any given situation. "The best," however, is that which in Latin is called optimum—hence the reason I speak of a tragic optimism, that is, an optimism in the face of tragedy and in view of the human potential which at its best always allows for: (1) turning suffering into a human achievement and accomplishment; (2) deriving from guilt the opportunity to change oneself for the better; and (3) deriving from life's transitoriness an incentive to take responsible action. / It must be kept in mind, however, that optimism is not anything to be commanded or ordered. One cannot even force oneself to be optimistic indiscriminately, against all odds, against all hope. And what is true for hope is also true for the other two components of the triad inasmuch as faith and love cannot be commanded or ordered either. / To the European, it is a characteristic of the American culture that, again and again, one is commanded and ordered to "be happy." But happiness cannot be pursued; it must ensue. One must have a reason to "be happy." Once the reason is found, however, one becomes happy automatically. *As we see, a human being is not one in pursuit of happiness but rather in search of a reason to become happy*, last but not least, through actualizing the potential meaning inherent and dormant in a given situation.

#### B. Ontology of Freedom. Seeking to better the world is the best reason – it articulates a fresh way of being.

Todd May, Ph.D.; Professor of Philosophy @ Clemson University, 2005, Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (5-6)

This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 hat are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And *to seek* one aspect without the other – *life-celebration without world-changing*, world-changing without life-celebration – *is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both.* If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.

## Oil

#### Prices low and falling

David Bird, 8-21-13, Wall Street Journal, “Crude-Oil Futures Drop for Third Day in a Row,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324619504579026132108728184.html>

Light, sweet crude for October delivery fell 1.2%, or $1.26, to $103.85 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The third consecutive day of declines put oil at its lowest settlement since Aug. 8."The market made its move before the Fed," said Gene McGillian, a broker and analyst at Tradition Energy in Stamford, Conn. "There is still uncertainty about when [the Fed will] act." The market has settled into a $103-to-$108 range for U.S. crude-oil futures and "it looks like we've got a lot of volatility ahead" until more clarity comes from the Fed, said Gene McGillian, a broker and analyst at Tradition Energy in Stamford, Conn.

#### US not key – China solves price fluctuations

Herberg 9 (Mikkal, BP Foundation Senior Research Fellow for International Energy at the Pacific Council on International Policy, as part of the national researcher conference report, October 2009, “The New Energy Silk Road: Implications for the United States,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/68545544/The-New-Energy-Silk-Road-The-Growing-Asia-Middle-East-Energy-Nexus)

But as Asia’s dependence on Gulf energy inexorably grows over the next decade and the Gulf states increasingly see their energy market and investment future growing in Asia, it seems likely that this “new silk road” is sowing the seeds of significant change in the underlying terrain on which the United States has been operating for the past 40 years. The implications span both the global energy markets and the future of regional and global geopolitics. For energy markets, while the Gulf has been and will remain the “swing producer” for world oil supplies; developing Asia, and especially China, have now become the global “swing consumer,” replacing the United States in this role. This is fundamentally changing the outlook for global energy investment, resource access, oil prices, and the role of national oil companies (NOC), particularly in an era likely to be characterized by much higher energy prices and intense competition to access supplies. In particular, China’s enormous and fast-growing demand for oil and petrochemicals and its burgeoning investment capacity, combined with the growing competitiveness and capabilities of the Chinese NOCs and oil services industry, suggest that China’s future energy investment role and impact in the Gulf will far outweigh any role in the past played by Japan or Korea. Chinese as well as Indian NOCs are likely to be far more successful and competitive than Japan’s NOCs and more ambitious in scale than Korean energy companies. This converges closely with the Gulf’s, particularly Saudi Arabia’s, long-term vision of transforming into a global energy and petrochemical superpower—a new stage of Saudi ambition and growth strategy in which China and India are key huge growth markets. The energy convergence between these states and the Gulf seems therefore destined to grow enormously in scale and scope, which suggests that both China and India are likely to focus progressively more assertively on their vital interests in the Gulf. At the same time, the energy security policies of China and India are not nearly as aligned with the United States as are those of Japan and Korea. Particularly in the case of China, it seems unlikely that Beijing will be content to follow Washington’s strategic lead in the Gulf in ten to twenty years, given the sharp policy differences that exist over Iran, U.S. dominance in Iraq, competitive energy diplomacy and markets, and overall Middle East policy.

#### Low prices don’t kill Russia’s economy

RIA Novosti 11 (“Russian economy can survive low oil prices – Kudrin” September 09 11 http://en.rian.ru/business/20110926/167139562.html)

The Russian economy will be able to function normally for a year, if global oil prices fall to $60 per barrel, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Monday in an interview with Russia Today international news TV channel. "We expect this fall will certainly cause a decrease in our economic growth down to nearly zero or below zero, but in terms of the budget policy we'll be able to cope with this for up to a year," Kudrin said. Russia's finance minister said on Saturday he expected world oil prices to fall to $60 per barrel in the next one and a half to two years and stay at this level for about six months. After this, "we'll have to adjust policy and reduce expenditure. As a whole, however, we are ready to provide stability for a year or two and fulfil all our commitments," Kudrin said. Russia's federal budget for the next three years is based on a forecast of Urals average yearly oil price at $100 per barrel in 2012, $97 per barrel in 2013 and $101 per barrel in 2014. Russian Deputy Finance Minister Tatiana Nesterenko said last week that a fall in global oil prices to $60 per barrel could force the Russian government to cut the 2012 budget spending but added that this scenario was unlikely. The average price of Urals blend, Russia's key export commodity, stood at $109.2 per barrel in January-August 2011

#### Drop in oil prices is good for Russia – diversifies their economy and makes the Russian economy sustainable

Mark Kopinski, 1-19-11, Chief Investment Officer, International Equity, “Russia’s Push for Economic Diversification and Modernization,” <http://americancenturyblog.com/2011/01/russia%E2%80%99s-push-for-economic-diversificationand-modernization/>

 “One of the biggest problems facing Russia, however, is its lack of economic diversification and overreliance on revenues from oil and gas exports.” Since the collapse of the Soviet Union two decades ago, Russia has transformed itself from a centrally planned to a market-based economy. Along the way, however, the country’s push for economic diversification and modernization hasn’t been easy. Russia is contending with a host of issues, including a crumbling infrastructure, an aging workforce and inadequate pension system, and the development of new gas and oil fields to replace depleting current ones. Property rights remain weak and state interference in the private sector is also problematic. One of the biggest problems facing Russia, however, is its lack of economic diversification and overreliance on revenues from oil and gas exports. During the Great Recession, Russia’s economic dependence on oil and gas exports manifested itself more than the country’s leaders expected. As a result of plunging commodity prices, the country was among the hardest hit by the global economic crisis and the central government’s budget went from a surplus of 4.1% in 2008 to a deficit of 6.3% in 2009. In addition, real gross domestic product1 (GDP) growth dropped by 7.8% in 2009— the biggest decline on record. Consequently, the government is hoping to break its economic dependency on commodity export revenues and at the same time reduce its budget deficit. While economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most of Russia’s industrial base, the notable exceptions were the oil and gas sectors, where mismanagement and an exceptionally high rate of taxation has impeded growth and left them chronically underinvested. The good news for investors is that it is looking more likely that the government will relax its taxation of the sector and provide more incentives for exploration and development. The government is also selling stakes in a number of large state-owned companies to private investors. Another point is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has fallen behind the West in the development of computer technology. In 2007, Russia launched an initiative to reinvigorate its tech sector, while reducing its economic reliance on commodity exports. Russian leaders are currently looking to build their own version of California’s Silicon Valley. In March 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that his country would build a high-tech hub outside Moscow for the research and development of five priority sectors: energy, information technology, telecommunications, biomedical technology, and atomic technologies. The Russian economy is also underdeveloped in a number of areas, including food, retail, and banking. For instance, only 30% of food is purchased through organized retail companies. The other 70% is distributed by “open-air” farmers markets, which are inefficient and where product quality can be questionable. The increasing penetration of organized retailers is providing opportunities for investors. Another area that holds investment potential is the banking sector. Russia currently has the second fastest growing banking sector in the world behind China. Economic Diversification Is Critical for Future Growth About 25% of the government’s operating budget is linked to oil and gas revenues, so Russia’s goal of economic diversification will not be an easy task. Yet its leadership is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that it must endure some short-term pain—weaning itself off the windfalls from commodity exports—to ensure long-term economic growth and prosperity. In the meantime, however, Russia is trying to improve its investment climate by fostering better relations with the West, becoming more cognizant of property and intellectual rights, and reducing the state’s influence in the economy.

#### Diversification leads to sustainable long term growth in Russia

Glazov et al 4 (Jamie, Ph.D. in History with a specialty in Soviet Studies, Ion Mihai Pacepa, former acting chief of Communist Romania’s espionage service, James Woolsey, director of the CIA from 1993-95, Vladimir Bukovsky, former leading Soviet dissident, “Symposium: KGB Resurrection,” April 30 , http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=13210)

Our oil dependence is an even more salient issue than when our percentage of imports was much less during the two oil shocks of the 1970's. The Russian economy is heavily influenced by the price of oil. Saudis, controlling at least half of the world's swing production capacity, dropped the bottom out of the oil market in 1985 and the Soviets never really recovered. We will never have that kind of control, but we can to a great extent reduce our dependence, give ourselves more leverage over the oil market, make it more difficult for the Saudis and others to raise prices to our economic and political disadvantage, and lead the Russian regime to realize that it may need to re-assess its direction. I used to believe that anything, including a strong oil market, that bolstered the Russian economy and produced prosperity would be likely to cause the growth of a middle class and, in time, more pressure for economic and political liberalization. The events of the last eighteen months or so have convinced me that such is not correct. Putin has used the economic prosperity produced by a strong oil market to consolidate his power and lead Russia toward a form of fascism -- oil prices have given him the idea that he can do anything he wants. Oil can tend to centralize power in any society except in a mature democracy such as Norway. It now seems to me that it is in our interest both in terms of our dealings with Russia and with the Middle East to do as much as possible to reduce our reliance on oil. To do this we would need to move toward alternative fuels, especially those produced from waste, that can be used in the existing infrastructure and toward more fuel efficient vehicles, such as hybrids, that are available now -- not wait on the hydrogen economy. In spite of their very high levels of oil production the Russians can't bring new production on- and off-line quickly as the Saudis can due to weather, location, etc. So if the Russians see us moving steadily toward reducing our oil use and thus their ability to make money from their high-cost production they may become far more reasonable than they are now. Today they have the bit in their teeth and, to mix a metaphor, they feel as if they have the world by the tail more and more firmly with each dollar the price of oil increases. They need to be shown that their prosperity is not assured without some fundamental changes and that it would be good for their economy and society if they diversified their economy. For more reasons than one it is in our interest for them to be worried about the possibility that oil prices could fall.

# 1AR

## Oil

### 1AR – Prices Low

#### Prices are low and falling –

#### Syria

Jenny Gross, 9-08-2013, WSJ, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324123004579056931141640124.html>

Some Bet Oil Prices Will Fall if a U.S. Strike on Syria Is Quick As some investors clamber to buy oil before a potential U.S. strike in Syria, others are advocating what seems like a counterintuitive strategy: sell, sell, sell. Against common wisdom, some say military action in Syria is more likely to cause prices to fall because markets have already risen in anticipation of a U.S. intervention and there is little actual oil at risk in Syria.

#### Plunge is happening – will go past 100 dollars a barrel

Patterson 7-3 “Lower Oil Prices on the Horizon” <http://finance.yahoo.com/news/lower-oil-prices-horizon-040001205.html>

After nearly a decade of unrelenting gains, oil prices are poised for a drop. New sources of supply and slowing demand both at home and abroad will combine to push prices down by 20% to 30% by 2016. See Also: Our Full Energy Forecast The plunge will also lower gasoline prices, to around $3 a gallon, on average -- a welcome break for motorists, who will be able to spend the money they save at the pumps on other purchases, helping to boost the economy.

#### It’s hit a low

Saefong et al 13 <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-slips-as-dollar-gains-with-supply-data-ahead-2013-09-03>

Oil futures on Wednesday settled at a more than one-week low under $108 a barrel as traders weighed the likelihood of U.S. intervention in Syria and awaited this week’s updates on petroleum supplies.

## Nietzsche

### 1AR – Ontology of Freedom

#### Our ontology of freedom solves life-affirmation even in the face of total failure to reduce suffering.

Mitchell Smolkin, M.D., 1989, Understanding Pain: Interpretation and Philosophy, p. 75-9

For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and to find meaning in living. They desire to feel at home in the universe. Despite these natural needs, man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He is surrounded by irrational destructiveness, and by the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He [Humanity] hears his “nights and days filled always, everywhere with the eternal cry of human pain.”56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and how does one avoid merely “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy?. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. Camus criticizes “Nietzsche, at least in his theory of super-humanity, and Marx before him, with his classless society, [who] both replace The Beyond by the Later On.”62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder in the name of vague future goals. “Revolution consists in loving[those] a man who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] men who do exist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering. Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people] man needs to exert all his effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers in the world. Killing existing men for a questionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with the sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by stoical acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to renounce murder completely and work for justice and for a decrease in suffering. Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, one should take the victim’s side and “share with his fellow citizens the only certitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.”68 What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus’ goals are modest. He realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”69 in that death, finitude and suffering will always conquer him. He realizes that after [humanity] man has mastered everything in creation that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society. Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. He who dedicates himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, to the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed and sustains the world again and again. Those whose desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. *Society must be arranged to limit* injustice and *suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to pursue his own search for meaning.* Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”74 “It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] men. The rebel must “reject divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”75 Redemption is impossible. Human dignity and love can intermittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague bacillus that “never dies or disappears for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76