# 2AC

## Race

### 2AC AT: Race K (Crenshaw)

#### **Framework – we should weigh the aff against the alternative – constant changes in the political sphere means only plan focused debate can allow for active engagement with Latin America**

Thomas E. Keller et al, James K. Whittaker and Tracey K. Burke, Spring/Summer 2001 (Thomas E. Keller is assistant professor, School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, James K. Whittaker is professor, and Tracey K. Burke is a doctoral student, School of Social Work, University of Washington, Council on Social Work Education, “Student Debates in Policy Courses: Promoting Policy Practice Skills and Knowledge through Active Learning,” jstor >:)

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruc tion of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue. Debates and Active Learning Dewey theorized that learning and re flective thinking are based on active engagement with a specific problem or issue (Baker, 1955; Dewey, 1939). This prin ciple underlies contemporary and widely held notions that students learn more effectively by actively analyzing, discuss ing, and applying content in meaningful ways rather than passively absorbing in formation through a lecture (Bean, 1996; Bonwell & Eison, 1991; Lewis & Williams, 1994; Meyers & Jones, 1993). Experien tial education immerses students in an experience so that they may learn by doing. Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key ele ment in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in politi cal or policy oriented practica. In a sur vey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practice in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/de velopment (BSW=15%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the larg est representation at a single school be ing 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learn ing in the classroom: • Students are involved in more than listening. • Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students' skills. • Students are involved in higher-order think ing (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). • Students are engaged in activities. • Greater emphasis is placed on students' exploration of their own attitudes and val ues. (p. 2) Experiential learning in the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage stu dents to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situa tions, and to consider new ways of think ing in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer (Meyers&Jones, 1993). Educational Effectiveness of Debates Since its origins in classical times, aca demic debate has been recognized as one of the best methods of learning and applying the attributes of critical think ing (Freeley, 1996). Recent empirical studies of students participating in com petitive interschool forensics societies illustrate the link between debating and proficiency in critical thinking. Colbert (1987) found that students involved in intercollegiate debating for one year showed a larger pretest to posttest gain on a critical thinking test than a nondebating control group. Likewise, Shinn (1995) discovered that, after sta tistically controlling for intelligence, high school students who engaged in two years of competitive debating exhibited higher levels of critical thinking than a compari son group of nondebaters. Debates have been recommended as a strategy to engage students in active learn ing in the classroom (Bean, 1996; Bonwell &Eison, 1991; Schroeder&Ebert, 1983). The use of in-class debates has been re ported in subjects as diverse as sociology and dentistry (Huryn, 1986; Scannapieco, 1997). Nevertheless, a search of the lit erature revealed no reference to student debates within social work education, despite evidence that debates have been assigned in some social work courses (Zlotnik, Rome,& DePanfilis, 1998). Fur thermore, the authors discovered only two studies, both by Combs and Bourne (1989, 1994), which provide empirical evidence of the value of debates in a classroom context. In their initial report, Combs and Bourne (1989) presented findings on the use of debates in two upper level business courses with a com bined enrollment of 59 students. Nearly 80% of the students (n=47) believed the debates provided them with a better un derstanding of both sides of the issues than a standard lecture format would have. Likewise, 66% (n=39) felt they had learned more than if the course material had been presented in a lecture. Another important finding was that students' con fidence in their public speaking skills increased following the debates. In gen eral, there was satisfaction with the de bates. At the beginning of the course only 57% of the students (n=35) looked forward to the upcoming debates, but by the end of the course 85% (n=50) stated that they enjoyed the debates, and 71% (n=42) wished debates were used in other courses. Combs and Bourne (1994) ex tended their initial study to cover a five year period with a combined sample of over 500 students. The results were even stronger in favor of using debates, per haps reflecting improvement in the in structors' application of the debate format over time.

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative – the net benefit is the case

#### Pragmatism in context of racism is necessary – the state is key

Dussel 11[2011, Enrique Dussel, Professor of Philosophy at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, “From Critical Theory to the Philosophy of Liberation: Some Themes for Dialogue”, Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production,<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/59m869d2>]

 We should proceed in politics in the very same manner that Marx proceeded in economics: working on the level of macro-institutional feasibility. The “dissolution of the state” should be defined as a **political postulate**. To seek to bring this about empirically leads to the “anti-institutional fallacy,” and the impossibility of a critical, transformative politics. To say that we need to transform the world without exercising power through institutions – including the state (which we need to radically transform, but not eliminate) – is the fallacy into which Negri and Holloway fall. The presently given institutions, and even the particular state as a political macro-institution, are never perfect and always require transformation. But there are moments in which institutions become diachronically repressive in the extreme, in their final entropic moment. *Hegemony* – the consensus exercised over the “obedient” à la Weber's legitimate domination91 – gives rise to *domination* in the Gramscian sense. The state machinery, in the service of the economic interests of the dominant classes in the postcolonial metropolitan nations, become definitively repressive. The popular masses go on gaining consciousness in proportion to level of their oppression. This accumulation of power-to (*potentia*),93 which takes place partially in the exteriority of the structures of the particular state but within the “bosom of the people” (which is not without its contradictions), confronts the political institutions currently in force. It does so to “trans-form” them (not necessarily for reforms94, but only rarely for revolution95), not necessarily to destroy them (though it could if required by the postulates), but to use them and transform them according to its ends and according to the degree of correspondence to the permanence and extension of life and symmetrical democratic participation of the oppressed people. The anti-institutionalist believes that the destruction of the state represents an important victory on the path to revolution. This sort of destruction is irrational. They have confused the “dissolution of the state” as a postulate (empirically impossible, but functioning as a principle for strategic orientation) with its empirical negation. How are we to understand the postulate of the “dissolution of the state”? Right-wing anarchism – like that of Nozick – proposes the dissolution of the state or something close to it under the guise of the “minimal state.” The unhindered market produces equilibrium, especially in Hayek's formulation; for this, the minimal state needs only to destroy the monopolies that impede the free movement of the market. A union seeking a wage increase is a monopoly, because it places demands on the market that do not emanate from free competition. The duty of the state is therefore to dissolve the union. In the service of this total market definition, the process of globalization as controlled by transnational industrial and financial capital (not with *hegemony*, because this was lost in the move to the last-instance use: the violent coercion of military power), equally proposes the dissolution or weakening of the particular states in postcolonial peripheral nations. The postcolonial state – however much it may be dominated by the private bureaucracies of the transnational corporations which impose their own members onto the political bureaucracies of those states (and we see, for example, a Coca-Cola distributor as president96) – still represents the last possible resistance for oppressed peoples. To dissolve or substantially weaken their states is to take away their only possible defense. The second Iraq War represents a war against a particular postcolonial state that, however corrupt and dictatorial, nevertheless had a certain degree of sovereignty and self-determination which interposed some resistance to the appropriation of its petroleum by foreign companies. For all of this, it is tragic that a sector of the left coincides with the North American Empire – the home-state97 of the transnationals and the ultimate example of power based on its economicpolitical- *military* complex – in dissolving the particular peripheral state. If Europeans alongside Habermas seemed as though they were dissolving the old particular state, it is for the strategic fortification of a Confederation of States in the European Union. In Latin America, if it were possible to proceed to organize a Confederation of Latin American States98 without American or Spanish influence, such a weakening of the particular state would be equally useful. But for the moment, this is not the situation. Any struggle for the real, effective dissolution of a particular postcolonial state is a reactionary project. It is an entirely different thing to struggle to transform the particular postcolonial state in view of a political postulate of the “dissolution of the state” as such. This would mean that in the creation of any new institution, in every exercise of institutional power, or in the transformation of all of the institutions (the transformation of the state), one would have the “dissolution of the state” as an orienting principle. However, this cannot take the form of the objective, empirical negation of these institutions, but rather must take the form of a responsible, democratic, popular, social, and participatory subjectivization of institutional functions, in which representation proceeds by *approaching* (to use a Kantian word) the represented. In this situation, the symmetrical participation of all those affected would become flesh in all political actions to such a degree that the state will cease to weigh so heavily, becoming lighter, more transparent, and more public and democratic. This would not be a “minimal state” (which leaves everything to the market or to the impossibility of perfect citizens99), but more accurately a “subjectivized state” in which the citizens will participate to such a degree that the existing institutional sphere will shift toward transparency, the bureaucracy will be the minimum necessary, while its efficacy and instrumentality when it comes to the permanence and extension of human life will nevertheless be at a *maximum*. I do not believe that it makes sense to attempt to transform political institutions without the state, without exercising power which is communicative, democratic, legitimate, participatory, socialized, and popular. It is, however, possible to declare a postulate which could never be realized, but which functions like the “North Star” that helped the Chinese navigators to sail at night. Despite all that I have expounded, I think that the postulate of the “dissolution of the state” is a strategic orienting principle that functions as a regulative horizon.

#### First, the plan leads to sustainable regional cooperation over alternative energy – this destroys status quo racist engagement that the US currently has with those countries and allows for genuine dialogue when oil is taken out of the picture – that’s ALVARADO.

#### Second, the plan allows for alternative energy development and prevents the US from juggernauting around the globe for oil – this prevents further human rights abuses and destroys the North South divide

Champain 11 [Phil, Director of Programs at the peacebuilding NGO International Alert, “Changing energy provision – a peacebuilding opportunity?” January]

There is one thing about which we can be certain - efforts to adjust energy provision in ways which maximize the potential for peace and development will fail if the consumer does not become more discerning of the sources and methods of energy provision which most of us take for granted. Over the coming decades, a growing worldwide middle class will undoubtedly put increasing demands and strain on energy provision, which will simultaneously create pressure for innovation into new technologies. And with the expansion of new technologies, the costs of new ways of generating energy will fall. However, removing the political barriers to equitable access to energy provision will not be so straightforward. This must also be part of the new, emerging energy discussion. Fossil fuels, energy provision and conflict Consider the conflict management challenges inherent within the system of energy provision based on oil and gas, as depicted in the flow diagram below. The chart illustrates the difficulties involved in managing energy provision in ways which do not lead to tension and violence. The system creates price hikes in electricity and other oil based products for example, preventing access for many; elite capture of oil and gas revenues keeps power in the hands of an unaccountable few; the withholding of oil and gas supplies enables some states to manipulate others; and the extraction of resources is sometimes only possible if large numbers of people are forcibly moved from their homes. These and other factors can lead to violence and instability, inhibiting development and security for vulnerable communities. Of course, global development and the dynamics of our industrialised society are based on fossil fuels and the model of energy provision which they generate. There are, therefore, many social and economic benefits and the purpose of this paper is not to somehow challenge the whole industrial revolution. Much is being done to improve the governance of this system (for example, Alert’s work on Conflict Sensitive Business Practice) and fossil fuels will remain a major part of the energy mix for decades to come. With this in mind it is important to think about the links between managing conflict and violence and the development of new oil and gas exploration, as states continue to pursue oil, gas and coal as part of their energy security policies. Despite warnings from organisations such as Global Witness, campaigning for world leaders to stop burying their heads in the sand and wake up to the realities of the ‘oil crunch’, oil companies continue to drill for ever deeper oil and gas supplies and states continue to compete for access to these supplies, including in countries with questionable human rights records. The challenge for the fossil fuel energy industry seems to be to ‘clean up’, both in terms of CO2 emissions and in terms of propensity to deepen corruption and injustice. A ‘doubled headed’ challenge you might say. Europe’s thirst for imported oil and gas for example (driven by continued increase in energy demand and the decline in indigenous fossil fuel production) is pushing its member states to strengthen relationships with energy rich but human rights poor countries in Central Asia, arguably cutting across aspects of the EU’s neighbourhood policy and its democratic posture. Meanwhile, on the CO2 front, technology is improving the efficiency of fossil fuel burning and the coal industry (which currently fuels 41% of the world’s electricity) in particular is making strides to become a clean and environmentally friendly resource by supporting new technology enabling carbon capture and storage (a set of technologies to collect CO2 from fossil fuel power plants, transport it, and store it under the land or seabed for hundreds if not thousands of years). The risk carried by this double headed ‘clean up’ agenda is that the ability to develop environmentally friendly technology will drown out the need to support better governance practices. Renewables, energy provision and conflict So what of renewables? Do they fare any better when it comes to questions of access, resilience to political manipulation and elite capture? By comparison with fossil fuels, the renewables market is the ‘new kid on the block.’ Rather than ‘clean up’, the challenge here is to ‘scale up’, with little track record to mark the copybook. Policy is currently orientated towards investment in new technologies which will enable oil to be replaced by renewables but large scale grid systems to remain. Let’s keep the system but put renewables into it instead of fossil fuels. An example of this approach is the Desertec project in North Africa. The Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII) aims to build a renewable energy 'belt' (see map below) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to provide 15% of Europe's electricity by 2050 as well as a portion of the producer countries' energy needs. In addition to being a vast petroleum repository, the Middle East is also the heart of the most potentially productive region on the planet for renewables. It is in this environment Desertec is being developed. But although the project seems to promise part of the answer to Europe’s increasing energy insecurity, there are a number of issues that suggest similar management challenges to those of fossil fuels when it comes to tension and conflict. For example, there is concern about whether the project would be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. MENA is considered largely unstable, (an anti-Western regime in Iran, Shia and Sunni separatist movements in Iraq, rebellions in Yemen, etc.), threatening the distribution of energy both locally and internationally. Furthermore, the energy industry in MENA is either wholly or majority state-owned. This does not necessarily mean Desertec will be too, but the initiative is vulnerable to the involvement of corrupt state institutions, a regional energy industry which is neither transparent nor competitive, and to the absence of a consistent regulatory framework. Desertec is, perhaps, not as controversial as another large scale renewables project however – the Grand Inga Hydro in conflict affected Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Both projects will generate significant energy for export to Europe, but it is the Grand Inga Hydro which is most exposed to the charge of exploiting natural resources of the southern hemisphere for export to the north. This huge hydro scheme, on the site of the world’s largest waterfall, has been touted as a potential solution to Africa’s ongoing energy crisis. With the number of Africans without access to electricity expected to grow between now and 2030, the Grand Inga Project, with a price tag of $80bn, is seen by many as an answer to Africa’s development needs. However, opponents of the Grand Inga project argue that most of the electricity generated will go to South Africa, Europe and the Middle East. As a result, most ordinary Africans will not benefit from the project, any more than they did from previous projects aimed at rehabilitating the existing Inga dams. In fact, these previous, somewhat smaller hydro projects on the Congo River have been noted for the high levels of corruption involved amongst government officials, contracting companies and other profiteers, and for the lack of care shown towards those displaced by the dams. Given the $80bn price tag of the Grand Inga project, its critics fear continued practices of these kinds – which the vulnerable, conflict affected DRC will find hard to prevent - will lead to the further exclusion of African populations from the benefits of electricity and development, to the benefit of small and powerful elites. It is this kind of conflict-insensitive development which can weaken governance institutions, widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots, erode the relationship between the governors and the governed and ultimately lead to conflict and violence. It is by no means certain therefore, that these new, large scale renewable projects will benefit the peace and development prospects of countries already exposed to vulnerability, conflict and weak governance. There are, by comparison, small-scale renewable energy projects, from farm biogas to mini-hydro to thermal solar power. Supporters of these models point out that solar power in its broadest sense of including plant matter, winds and tides is essentially limitless and so, in a concentrated form under local control with falling costs, becomes affordable, accessible, and likely to reduce pressures which give rise to violence. However, the relationship between small scale models of energy provision and the ability of states and communities to manage tension and violence also needs further research and exploration. Now is the time to explore these links – between different models of energy provision and conflict management. As climate change and diminishing supplies of fossil fuels force us to think about where we get our energy from, it is also important to consider how it is provided. Large scale projects such as Desertec and the Grand Inga Hydro are essentially extractive, and arguably continue the practice of contractual arrangements between often unaccountable elites and international buyers and companies. This tends to be to the detriment of local politics and relationships, and the exclusion of local populations. As we are forced to consider a major shift from fossil fuels to renewables there is an opportunity to think about how we manage energy provision in ways which build and sustain peace and development - to go beyond environmental concerns to consider governance ones. Local realities – the case of Mindanao (Southern Philippines) The challenges inherent in developing ways of meeting energy demand in the face of climate change, dwindling fossil fuels, and vulnerability to violence can be illustrated by looking at the case of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The gap between demand for energy and its supply is widening rapidly in this resource rich region. By 2014 it is estimated that this gap will be -14%, resulting in rolling power cuts of up to six hours a day. Most energy is provided by hydro power and in particular from the Agus and Pulangi hydro power stations which are located in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM is the focus of continued fighting and dispute between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) demanding autonomy for the predominantly Muslim ARMM which sits within a predominantly Catholic Philippines. In addition, strong local clans compete violently for the control of economic resources. One of the larger energy companies operating in Mindanao is Davao Energy and Light. This company is proposing to build a 200MW coal fired power station in the South of Mindanao (outside the ARMM) which would go some way towards closing the energy gap. Under pressure from environmentalists and climate change campaigners the company has developed ‘clean coal’ technology which, says the company, would keep omissions within legal limits and deliver energy at competitive prices - one aspect of the ‘clean up’ approach. A site for the plant is being inspected and plans to the council will follow. However, what remains uncertain is the impact such a power station will have on the dynamics of conflict in Mindanao. Being outside the ARMM may make it less vulnerable to attack by the MILF. But on the other hand, it may be seen as being in the control of the rich South, controlled by local political interests, with those in the ARMM losing out on access. Furthermore, whilst the company and the local council are pushing for large scale power plants to impact on the widening gap between demand and supply of energy, there has been limited exploration of increasing the use of small scale hydro schemes, though sites for these are plentiful. What is encouraging is that the company is engaging with local groups and ideas are being generated. There seems to be space for discussion about how this response to the energy question in Mindanao can be linked to peacebuilding efforts. Such discussion will need to involve those with a stake in Mindanao and the ARMM, including civil society, local government and business. If ways can be found to govern Mindanao’s energy provision in ways which take account of the needs and interests of different groups then local governance capacities will be strengthened and improved levels of access to energy as well as security will follow. Conclusion The energy debate is changing in a number of ways. Oil is becoming vulnerable as the primary source of energy. This is due to both (a) dwindling supplies – although the notion of ‘peak oil’ is contested, there is no argument about the fact that oil is a finite resource, and (b) its propensity to produce CO2 at a time when there is growing consensus amongst the international community, the extractives industry itself and the general public on the need to tackle climate change. The long term trend in oil price is upwards, as this finite resource becomes scarcer, carbon taxes are added, and unconventional deposits become more difficult to extract. In response, renewable energy projects (and nuclear energy – which this paper has not touched upon - as a way of both reducing our dependence upon oil and reducing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions) are scaling up, where cost and technology allow. As technology develops ever faster and attention shifts to the huge potential of renewable energy, the possibility of harnessing large quantities of hydro and solar power is viewed by many as both feasible and desirable. The Desertec condensed solar power scheme in North Africa and the Grand Inga Hydro project in the DRC are two leading examples. As one line of thought expands the notion of scaling up, another is taking the energy debate in the opposite direction. With the prospect of no longer being able to secure sufficient supplies of oil, gas and coal to meet increasing energy demand, many are exploring small scale models of energy provision based on renewables. At the same time, the challenge of effective regulation of the energy industry is becoming more pronounced. As some states become more anxious about energy provision, others eye opportunity. The trade-off between human rights/conflict sensitivity/environmental concerns and access to energy resources, for example, is likely to become more common as the need for energy outweighs questions about how this energy is secured and who benefits. The job of energy companies tasked with securing energy resources is becoming more complex. And the energy consumer is caught between need and the increasing risks involved in securing traditional energy sources. In this context there is a need for the consumer, particularly in the northern hemisphere, to become more discerning of how energy is sourced and provided. Changes to the ways in which energy provision is governed (rather than how it is sourced) may emerge as these shifts gather momentum, but this is by no means a foregone conclusion, despite the opportunity and need. The links between energy provision and conflict, particularly in vulnerable regions with weak governance institutions, need to be better understood. As we are forced to change the way we think about energy there is an opportunity to consider how the emerging new pathway towards a different mix of energy sources can also be a path towards greater levels of peace and development. The cost of not taking this opportunity is likely to be a continuation of systems of energy provision which privilege the northern hemisphere over the south, which deny large sections of the world’s population access to electricity and other forms of energy, which leave the populations of conflict affected countries vulnerable to authoritarian masters, unenlightened energy companies and the increasingly energy hungry states of the north, and which make little contribution to the governance challenges the world faces. This despite the key role energy plays in the development of our societies.

#### Moral tunnel vision justifies evil

Issac 2 [Jeffrey, professor of political science at Indiana University, Dissent Magazine, Spring, ebsco]

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Links of omission are absurd

Richard Rorty, Professor of Comparative Literature @ Stanford, 2002, Peace Review 14(2)

I have no quarrel with Cornell's and pivak's claim that "what is missing in a literary text or historical narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion." For that seems simpl ty o say that any text will presuppose the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "Expulsion," however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer all possible questions about its own background and its own presuppositions. Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly "expelling" Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. Spivak has her own fish to fry and her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such texts and narratives should not always be read as disingenuous exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and should be told, in many other ways.

## Appeasement

### 2AC AT: Appeasement DA

Appeasement now

USAT 06/19/13 (USA Today, "The United States and Cuba have agreed to resume talks in immigration issues next month.", http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/06/19/cuba-immigration-talks/2439915/ )

HAVANA (AP) — The United States and Cuba have agreed to resume bilateral talks on migration issues next month, a State Department official said Wednesday, the latest evidence of a thaw in chilly relations between the Cold War enemies. Havana and Washington just wrapped up a round of separate negotiations aimed at restarting direct mail service, which has been suspended since 1963. Both sets of talks have been on hold in recent years in a dispute over the fate of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, who is serving a 15-year jail sentence in Havana after he was caught bringing communications equipment onto the island illegally. The migration talks will be held in Washington on July 17. The State Department official, who was not authorized to discuss the matter publically, spoke on condition of anonymity. "Representatives from the Department of State are scheduled to meet with representatives of the Cuban government to discuss migration issues," the official said, adding that the talks were "consistent with our interest in promoting greater freedoms and respect for human rights in Cuba." Word of the jump-started talks sparked an angry reaction from Cuban-American Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, who blasted the Obama administration for what she saw as a policy of appeasement. "First we get news that the Obama State Department is speaking with a top Castro regime diplomat. Then comes the announcement that the administration is restarting talks with the dictatorship regarding direct mail between both countries," Ros-Lehtinen said. "Now we hear that migration talks will be restarted. It's concession after concession from the Obama administration." Since taking office, Obama has relaxed travel and remittance rules for Cuban Americans and made it far easier for others to visit the island for cultural, educational and religious reasons. But Obama has continued to criticize the government of President Raul Castro for repression of basic civil and human rights, and his senior aides have offered little praise for a series of economic and social reforms the Cuban leader has instituted in recent years. A nascent effort at rapprochement between Washington and Havana has stalled since Gross's arrest, and the resumption of the two sets of bilateral talks is sure to raise speculation that there could be movement on his case. Gross was working on a USAID democracy building program at the time of his arrest in December 2009. Washington has said repeatedly that no major improvement in relations can occur until he is released. His family has complained that he has lost a lot of weight in jail and suffers from various ailments. Cuba reportedly has agreed to allow a U.S. doctor to visit him in detention, and has also granted him conjugal visits and made him available to high-level American delegations. Cuba, for its part, is demanding the release of four of its intelligence agents serving long sentences in the United States. A fifth agent, Rene Gonzalez, returned home to Havana earlier this year after completing his sentence and agreeing to renounce his U.S. citizenship.

Plan is NOT appeasement – they check back for miscalc – empirically proven

Mataconis 12 (Doug is an attorney in private practice in Northern Virginia. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University and J.D. from George Mason University School of Law., "The GOP’s Ridiculous Appeasement Argument" http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/the-gops-ridiculous-appeasement-argument/)

This harkens back, of course, to the argument that many on the right made during the 2008 campaign that then-candidate Obama would, if elected, immediately begin to negotiate personally, as opposed to formal and informal discussions via diplomats, with adversaries like the Iranians and North Koreans “without preconditions.” Throughout the 2008 campaign, both John McCain and Sarah Palin said repeatedly that Senator Obama would meet personally with the President of Iran without any preconditions. In fact what the Obama had said is that he favored direct talks between representatives of the U.S. and Iran regarding the nuclear program, a position that was supported at the time by several former Secretaries of State who had severed in Republican Administrations. That was just one example, though, of this odd idea that Republicans seem to have developed that there’s something wrong with diplomacy, at least when the other guy does it. If anything, it’s more important that we have open lines of communication with our adversaries than our friends, if only to prevent misunderstandings and mistakes that could lead to a crisis that doesn’t need to happen. More broadly, though, the suggestion that being willing to talk to ones adversaries under the right conditions is in and of itself appeasement is simply absurd. History is full of examples where that precise thing occurred, to the benefit of all parties involved. Kennedy met with Kruschev. Nixon met with Mao. Reagan met with Gorbachev (and said he would have met with Brezhnev, Andropov, or Chernenko if Russian leaders in the early 1980s hadn’t developed the inconvenient habit of dying every 18 months). Heck, we’ve sent Secretaries of State to North Korea and have diplomatic relations with the Vietnamese now. For years, we didn’t have diplomatic relations with the Libyans and yet the Bush Administration made contact with them and successfully negotiated the dismantling of the Libyan chemical weapons program. And before all that happened there were lower-level meetings going on for years between the United States and regimes that posed a far greater threat to our security, and their own citizens, than a mad-man like Ahmenijad does today. And that’s the part of this that Republicans can’t explain — if it’s okay to talk to the Soviets, the Red Chinese, the North Koreans, the Vietnamese, the Cubans, and the Libyans then what’s so bad about suggesting the possibility of diplomatic contact with Iran ? Diplomacy is a good thing, as Winston Churchill himself recognized. Since Sir Winston seems to be the only European that conservatives like, perhaps they’d listen to what he has to say about the matter.

#### We are more cred – alavarado says that Cuba assuages anti-America sentiment and makes it look like Obama is willing to work with Latin America good card

#### Cuba legislation makes Obama look awesomeSweig, 12(Julia E., The National Interest, Getting Latin America Right, 1/2/12, http://nationalinterest.org/article/getting-latin-america-right-7880?page=6)//LA

With serious initiatives on Cuba and guns, backed up by his now-stated interest in pursuing a major second-term move on immigration, the president can free up considerable diplomatic capital in the region to focus on issues that really matter. The Obama administration seems to recognize that the major regional issues are not problems Washington can fix alone but rather transnational challenges that the United States faces with other nations of the Americas—whether energy security, education, social inclusion, global competitiveness, climate change, citizen security, or China’s political and economic rise. Paradoxically, at a moment when Latin Americans have never been more cognizant of their human ties to booming Latino populations in the United States, most of the resilient democracies and growing economies of the region prize their autonomy and do not—with the exception of Haiti—expect big-ticket assistance packages Washington cannot afford. Thus, by choosing to slay the domestic political dragons that bedeviled his first term, Obama can create the running room to align his analysis with policies that finally reflect new regional realities as well as his country’s national interest.

#### Reef destruction collapses Indonesia economy.

Jamaluddin Jompa, xx-xx-2009\*\*, Ph.D, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia, a Professor and Director of the Center for Coral Reef Research at Hasanuddin University in Makassar, Indonesia, one of Indonesia's prominent coral reef scientists and in 2007 established the Indonesian Coral Reef Society of which he is currently the Secretary, In addition to conducting research on coral reef ecology and management, especially in Eastern Indonesia, he has also been involved in helping the Indonesian Government as the Executive Secretary of one of the biggest coral reef management projects, the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP II), has also played important roles in the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) at both national and regional levels, editor-in-chief, JICoR, “Welcome,” http://www.coastal-unhas.com/incres/

\*\*Latest date cited; no date of publication for page itself

Indonesian coral reefs comprise the largest and most diverse coral reef ecosystem on the planet, but at the same time, they are among the most threatened due to mounting human- and climate change-related stressors. In the last few decades, many coral reefs in the region have been significantly degraded by a range of activities and disturbances, including destructive fishing, coral mining, sedimentation, and recently, by warm temperature anomalies causing coral bleaching. For Indonesia, whose population is spread across an archipelago of islands, and where millions of people depend on coral reefs for food and livelihood, the degradation of coral reefs represents a serious threat to the economy of the nation. In recognition of the significant economic value of Indonesian coral reefs and the high dependency of Indonesian people on reef resources, several management efforts involving a variety of programs, especially the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP), have been ongoing since 1998. A new regional program called the CTI-CFF (Coral Triangle Initiative for Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security) emerged in 2009 and is also focused on protecting our invaluable resources. Despite these and other management efforts, ongoing and emerging challenges relating to the protection and sustainable use of these resources remain to be resolved, and will require strategic management actions based on strong scientific research and principles. Recognizing the urgent need to provide and share scientific data and information to improve coral reef management, the Indonesian Coral Reef Society (INCRES), in collaboration with the Research & Development Center for Marine, Coastal, and Small Islands (MaCSI), Hasanuddin University, have joined forces to jointly publish the Journal of Indonesian Coral Reefs (JICoR). This is the first journal especially dedicated to and focused on publishing interdisciplinary research related to Indonesian coral reefs.

#### Indonesian econ is make-or-break for ASEAN.

Osamu Watanabe, 3-01-2005, Chairman and CEO of Japan External Trade Organization, “Indonesia in the Era of East Asian Economic Integration,” http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/jetro/profile/speeches/2005/mar01.pdf

I believe that the future of Indonesia depends on how much work it can do in the coming few years. It is time for the whole of ASEAN to become truly united and work closely together to enhance its overall competitiveness and strengthen the region’s industries. Whether or not ASEAN can become stronger very much depends on Indonesia’s development. I am confident that the government and the private sector have the motivation to achieve this goal. And I assure you that Japan will spare no effort in supporting your endeavors. Indeed, it is my sincere hope that Indonesia will soon regain its position as the leader of ASEAN, and that ASEAN as a whole will achieve prosperous growth while maintaining its competitiveness. Japan, China and the Republic of Korea cannot alone maintain the peace and stability of East Asia; a stable ASEAN is essential.

#### ASEAN solves multiple nuclear conflicts.

Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, 1-xx-2003, executive department of the Philippine government tasked to contribute to the enhancement of national security and the protection of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty, to participate in the national endeavor of sustaining development and enhancing the Philippines' competitive edge, to protect the rights and promote the welfare of Filipinos overseas and to mobilize them as partners in national development, to project a positive image of the Philippines, and to increase international understanding of Philippine culture for mutually-beneficial relations with other countries, Press Release No. 036, “ASEAN: Focal Point for Asia-Pacific Cooperation,” http://www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/pr2003/jan/pr036.htm

ASEAN is in a unique position to lead cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region and between the Asia-Pacific and other regions of the world. This was the message conveyed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas F. Ople to the gathered ministers of ASEAN and the European Union. Secretary Ople made this assertion when he lead the discussions on Agenda Item 5(c) : International Issues - Developments in the Asia Pacific, including the Korean Peninsula, during the 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Brussels which was held on 27-28 January 2003. In his statement (copy attached) during the meeting, he pointed out that some of the top flashpoints in the world are to be found in the Asia-Pacific, which he said were : the tensions in Korean peninsula, the Taiwan straits, the South China Sea and South Asia -- all of which, according to Secretary Ople, all pre-date our preoccupation with terrorism and all have a decidedly nuclear dimension. “In all this, ASEAN finds itself not only in the geographic heart of the Asia-Pacific, but also at its political core and center. Unlike other continents, the Asia-Pacific has not gone far in terms of integration. There is no organization of Asian states or Asian unity or an Asian union. What we do have is the ASEAN. ASEAN brings together not only the states in the region but also those outside. Our Post-Ministerial process and our ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF provide unique opportunities found nowhere else. And until the Asia-Pacific reaches the level of integration seen in other parts of the world, ASEAN, that organization of ten Southeast Asian states, will have to do” Secretary Ople said in his statement. Secretary Ople said that ASEAN has succeeded in helping diffuse tensions in the South China Sea and that the ASEAN Regional Forum provides a venue through which security issues throughout the Asia-Pacific can be discussed.

#### Nuclear prolif is stabilizing – prevents conventional conflict and miscalc.

Peter N Madison, Mar 2006, US Navy Lieutenant, “THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: REGIONAL REACTION TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445779

Owing to the vast destruction nuclear weapons can generate, they have ironically guaranteed security for the nations that possess them. Any attack against a nuclear state carries the risk of provoking a devastating response. Consequently, the benefits and dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation have been debated for decades. Perhaps the most debatable point is whether more nuclear states advance or weaken world security. Naturally, this issue remains moot. Yet, one must concede that the world has judiciously avoided the use of nuclear weapons for sixty years, suggesting the avoidance is attributable to more than luck. Professor Jan Breemer of the Navy War College asserts that at some point, luck loses its random nature and reflects skill.10 / 1. Nuclear Optimists: “More May Be Better”11 / Nuclear Optimists advocate a gradual increase in the number of nuclear states. They argue that a cautious increase does not correspond to an increased likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. They further contend that this gradual spread is far better than if it were rapid or nonexistent.12 Supporters point to over sixty years in which deterrence helped prevent nuclear conflict. According to Professor Kenneth Waltz of the University of California at Berkeley, “The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than had been known in modern history.”13 Indeed, there has been no general war in this period, in spite of a variety of confrontations that could lead to rapid escalation and conflict.14 Instead nuclear weapons made nuclear war an unlikely possibility.15 / Professor Waltz argues that if deterrence produces the ideal, then the opposite must be correct: not having a clear balance of terror preventing a misstep leads to uncertainty of action by a state. He states that defeated countries like Germany following World War II, which fought conventionally, will at the very worst survive with limited suffering. Nuclear deterrence assures a totality of defeat; therefore, no rational actor will risk destruction.16 Instead of instability and uncertainty, nuclear weapons increase stability and certainty, making “miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent predictions easy.”17

#### Iran miscalc inevitable without nuclear weapons – they will respond to the US conventional forces nearby – nuclear weapons stabilize their decision-making and prevent lash out.

Peter N **Madison**, Mar 200**6**, US Navy Lieutenant, “THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: REGIONAL REACTION TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445779

With India being Pakistan’s one, and apparently only foe, Pakistan faces a conventionally superior enemy, in both numbers and sophistication of weapons. Nevertheless, to date, Islamabad’s nuclear deterrent has proven suitable to defending that state from an otherwise more powerful enemy. / States acquiring nuclear weapons one at a time and with significant time between them may seem fraught with danger and uncertainty. However, Iran, as the most populous state in the region and the historical hegemon of the Arabian Gulf has lost its previous standing as regional arbiter to the United States. Detracting further from Iran’s image, the United States has rapidly removed two bordering regimes. Tehran cannot help but notice the capabilities of America’s armed forces and worry it could be next. This concern could lead Iran to behave irrationally, causing its decision making to become unstable. Nuclear weapons, with a clear C2 doctrine and regional deterrent relationships can garner Iran respect, domestic security, and the chance to add stability. Stability, for the purpose of this thesis, is considered to be the removal of the threat of conflict and its corresponding devastation.

## Politics

### 2AC AT: Syria Politics DA

#### **Won’t pass-both GOP and democrats reject strikes**

Korte and Singer 13 (Gregory and Paul-writers for USA TODAY; 09/02/13; “The six key players in Congress' Syria debate”; <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/02/syria-congress-guide-obama-pelosi-mccain/2754963/>, [JJ])

WASHINGTON — A week ago, it seemed the question of whether to take military action against Syria rested solely on the shoulders of President Obama. But he has turned to Congress to authorize military airstrikes against Syria for using chemical weapons, setting up the most consequential foreign policy vote since the 2002 authorization of the Iraq War. Obama and his supporters on Capitol Hill will have to overcome broad skepticism about the merits of military strikes and navigate the political divisions that have left Congress largely paralyzed. The vote also cast a spotlight on key lawmakers who will be critical in determining whether or not Congress authorizes Obama to use military force. Congress is still on recess, but the arm-twisting has begun and the Syria resolution will be the first order of business in both the House and Senate when they return Sept. 9. STORY: McCain, Graham express optimism on Obama Syria plan MORE: Latest development on the crisis in Syria The debate will pit Obama and House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi against both Republicans and Democrats skeptical of foreign military intervention. The White House will need support from Republican leaders such as Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, and Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., but it is not clear how much influence they will have over their own party.

#### 2014 election means that Democrats won’t get on board

Evan McMorris Santoro, 9-6-13 BuzzFeed Reporter, “Vulnerable Democrats Keep Their Distance From Obama On Syria,” <http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/vulnerable-democrats-keep-their-distance-from-obama-on-syria>

WASHINGTON — Some of the Democrats least interested in lining up behind the president on Syria are the Democrats most likely to face a tough reelection campaign next year. President Obama acknowledged Friday that convincing Congress to authorize a military strike on Syria has been “a heavy lift” for the White House so far. The normal anti-war coalition of liberals and libertarians is falling into place, and a more unlikely coalition partner of Republican hawks is [joining them](http://www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray/hawks-and-doves-team-up-to-oppose-syria-strikes-in-congress). For now, though, most members are on the fence. None more so than vulnerable Democrats, according to a study by the Republican opposition research firm America Rising. Using the venerable nonpartisan Cook Political Report [ratings](http://cookpolitical.com/house/charts/race-ratings) of House races, the GOP group compiled a chart of undecided Democrats and found many on the fence are the same ones the Cook Report says are facing tough elections next year. A couple already oppose strikes. Only one, West Virginia Rep. Nick Rahall (who Cook places in a “Lean Democratic” race next year), has pledged to support congressional authorization for strikes. America Rising’s chart includes whether the vulnerable Democrats signed onto either of the two bipartisan letters sent to Obama last month calling for Congress to weigh in on Syria. One was authored by Virginia Republican Rep. [Scott Rigell](http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=21FD010D-5656-4E8D-BFFD-CA6F1864937C), and the other was written by California Democratic Rep. [Barbara Lee](http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=1753AFD4-272B-4E12-B486-2598EC2B18F0). Obama gave the signatories what they wanted when he called on Congress to authorize his plan to strike Syria. But only a few of the vulnerable Democrats signed either of the letters, per the America Rising study. Some Democrats have hinted they’ll wait to hear what Obama has to say in his [White House address](http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-to-address-american-people-on-syria-tuesday) on Syria next week before making up their minds, but the Republicans at America Rising say the fact that Obama hasn’t already earned the support of so many vulnerable members of his own party shows that they think his war will be a drag on them next year. “Democrats who are facing tough reelections in 2014 are either in hiding or trying to run away from a president whose agenda is wildly unpopular with voters in their districts,” said Tim Miller, executive director of America Rising.

#### Pol cap ain’t real

Hirsh 2/7 Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek. Hirsh has appeared many times as a commentator on Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, and National Public Radio. He has written for the Associated Press, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s, and Washington Monthly, and authored two books. “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital,” 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207?page=1

Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.

#### Obama push fails – can’t convince Democrats

Michael Falcone, 9-6-13, ABC News Reporter, “Obama Losing The War At Home,” <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/obama-losing-the-war-at-home-the-note/>

‘IT DOESN’T MATTER WHO SLEEPS IN THE WHITE HOUSE’: Rep. Emanuel Cleaver, a Missouri Democrat who has been deeply skeptical of a military strike against Syria, said he would listen to his constituents before making a decision. And at a town meeting Thursday night in Kansas City, he got an earful, ABC’s JEFF ZELENY reports. For two hours Cleaver stood at the front of a crowded room and listened to one person after another urge him to oppose military action. He heard from the liberal left and the Tea Party right — all with the same message, which one man summed up succinctly: “My short answer to this is not no, but hell no.” So what will Cleaver do? As of now, he’s one of many House Democrats poised to vote no. Has anything in the administration’s argument been persuasive? “No,” he told ABC News after the meeting. “I listened to an official from the administration yesterday and while he was certainly powerful in his statements about why we should go alone, in terms of striking targets in Syria, I don’t think he said anything compelling.” When it comes to Syria, Cleaver ultimately said he has to treat President Obama like he would President Bush: “It doesn’t matter who sleeps in the White House,” he said.

#### Obama has no pol cap anyways

Kilgore, 9/5/13 (Ed Kilgore is a contributing writer to the Washington Monthly. He is managing editor for The Democratic Strategist and a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, “Obama’s ‘political capital,’” Washington Monthy, September 5, 2013, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2013\_09/obamas\_political\_capital046735.php#;)

An even hoarier meme than the no-win-war complaint is naturally emerging in Washington as everyone recalibrates his or her assumptions about how the year will end: Obama’s limited “political capital” that he might have used on the fiscal front will now be “spread thin” or “stretched to the breaking point” by the need to make a case for military action against Syria. Politico’s Brown and Sherman give it a full airing today:¶ President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform.¶ Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities.¶ A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval.¶ Now this may be true with respect to congressional Democrats if Obama ultimately needs them to swallow hard and accept some fiscal deal to avoid a government shutdown or debt default. But seriously, what sort of “political capital” does the president have with congressional Republicans? They committed to a policy of total obstruction from the day he became president and picked up right where they had left off the day he was re-elected. Obama’s only options in dealing with the GOP are to offer them cover for compromise when he must and hand them an anvil to speed their self-destruction when he can. But he has no “political capital” to spend.

#### Plan doesn’t go through congress

Sweig, ’13 [July/August 2013, [Julia E. Sweig](http://www.cfr.org/experts/latin-america-brazil-cuba/julia-e-sweig/b4230), Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island”, <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>]

The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana. In the short term, the two countries have numerous practical problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. Most of the policy steps Obama should take at this stage -- removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there, and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain with Havana. Although it might be politically awkward in the United States for a president to be seen as helping Castro, on the island, such measures would strengthen the case that Cuba can stand to become a more open, democratic society without succumbing to external pressure or subversion. Deeper commercial ties, moreover, could have repercussions beyond the economic realm, giving internal reformers more leeway and increasing support on the island for greater economic and political liberalization.

#### Kerry pushes the plan.

Aho 13 (Matthew Aho, Matthew Aho is a consultant in the Corporate Practice Group. He has significant international affairs experience working on issues throughout Latin America, with a focus on Cuba, Venezuela, Central America, Peru, and Mexico. Matthew has particular experience with legal and regulatory frameworks comprising the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba, as well as with region-wide projects on issues ranging from insecurity and violence prevention to energy and policies affecting labor-markets. Previously, Matthew was Manager of the Policy Department at the New York headquarters of Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS/COA) and editor of Americas Quarterly, “What Does Obama's Second Term Hold for U.S.-Cuba Relations?”, cuba study group, January 23, 2013, <http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/our-opinions?ContentRecord_id=c20ad778-24cd-46df-9fb2-3ebc664ed58d&ContentType_id=15d70174-0c41-47c6-9bd5-cc875718b6c3&Group_id=4c543850-0014-4d3c-8f87-0cbbda2e1dc7>)

While John Kerry's views on U.S.–Cuba relations have favored engagement over isolation, ultimate authority rests with a White House that has proceeded cautiously on Cuba during President Obama's first term. Aside from easing some travel restrictions, there have been only two emergent themes on Cuba policy: support for private-sector efforts to increase the flow of information to the Cuban people; and support for private economic activity on the island. Cuba policy changes still require expenditures of political capital disproportionate to the island's strategic and economic importance. Barring game-changing developments—such as release of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross—executive action during Obama's second term will likely focus on furthering goals laid out during his first. Here, however, John Kerry's leadership could prove vital and create new opportunities for U.S. business.

#### **Strikes causes regional conflict**

Barnard and Rubin 13 (Anne Barnard reported from Beirut, and Alissa J. Rubin from Kabul, Afghanistan.; “Experts Fear U.S. Plan to Strike Syria Overlooks Risks”; 08/30/13

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/middleeast/experts-fear-us-plan-to-strike-syria-overlooks-risks.html?_r=0>, [JJ])

Supporters of the president’s proposal contend that a limited punitive strike can be carried out without inflaming an already volatile situation. But a number of diplomats and other experts say it fails to adequately plan for a range of unintended consequences, from a surge in anti-Americanism that could bolster Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to a wider regional conflict that could drag in other countries, including Israel and Turkey. “Our biggest problem is ignorance; we’re pretty ignorant about Syria,” said Ryan C. Crocker, a former ambassador to Syria and Lebanon, who has served in Iraq and Afghanistan and is dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. The American strike could hit President Assad’s military without fundamentally changing the dynamic in a stalemated civil war that has already left more than 100,000 people dead. At the same time, few expect that a barrage of cruise missiles would prompt either side to work in earnest for a political settlement. Given that, the skeptics say it may not be worth the risks. “I don’t see any advantage,” said a Western official who closely observes Syria. In outlining its plans, the Obama administration has left many questions unanswered. Diplomats familiar with Mr. Assad say there is no way to know how he would respond, and they question what the United States would do if he chose to order a chemical strike or other major retaliation against civilians. That would leave the United States to choose between a loss of credibility and a more expansive — and unpopular — conflict, they said. “So he continues on in defiance — maybe he even launches another chemical attack to put a stick in our eye — and then what?” Mr. Crocker said. “Because once you start down this road, it’s pretty hard to get off it and maintain political credibility.” For the United States, the challenge is to deliver the intended message to Mr. Assad without opening the door to a takeover by rebels linked to Al Qaeda, the collapse of state institutions, or a major escalation by Syria’s allies. Skeptics doubt that the United States — or anyone else — has the information to calibrate the attack that precisely. That is partly because the United States is preparing to inject itself into a conflict that is no longer just about Syria, but has become a volatile regional morass that pits Iran and Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group in Lebanon, against Qaeda affiliates backed by Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf benefactors. Iran’s and Syria’s defense ministers threatened on Friday to unleash attacks on Israel if Mr. Assad was in danger. While Hezbollah has said it would wait to see the scale and nature of the attacks before responding, in practice, analysts close to the organization said, it is probably prepared for any contingency. There is also concern that Shiite-led Iraq could send thousands more militants to help Mr. Assad if it believed he was truly threatened, and that such a step would in turn further rally and embolden Sunni jihadists on both sides of its border with Syria. Many diplomats and analysts consider retaliation unlikely, but the consequences could be grim. Israel has vowed that if Hezbollah attacks it again, it will respond forcefully, drawing Lebanon into war. And if Syria lobbed missiles into Israel and it responded with airstrikes through Lebanese airspace that threatened Mr. Assad further, Hezbollah would consider that further justification to attack Israel. Even without such a direct entanglement, Lebanon could be very vulnerable. It has recently suffered its worst sectarian violence in years: a car bomb in Shiite Hezbollah territory in the Beirut suburbs, and two at Sunni mosques in the northern city of Tripoli. Lebanese authorities accused Syria on Friday of involvement in the Tripoli attacks, and intelligence officials fear such bombings could increase. Within Syria, there is also the prospect of civilian casualties, either from errant American missiles or among people near the target sites. The Syrian government has put some military bases in populated areas, and thousands of political and other prisoners are held in security buildings. Although the strikes are said to be aimed at elite units involved in chemical weapons use, Reuters reported Friday that many Sunni conscripts have been effectively imprisoned on bases because they are not trusted, leaving them vulnerable, too. Significant casualties among the very people American officials say they are protecting could be exploited by the government. “That will completely empty any justification for this” in the eyes of many, the Western official said. Some likely targets are in areas that up to now have remained relatively secure, including the corridor from western suburbs of Damascus to the Lebanese border. And in Damascus itself, a bubble of relative security, residents have expressed fear that in the aftermath, clashes could erupt. That could create a new humanitarian crisis and new refugee flows to Syria’s already burdened neighbors. American officials say they do not expect a refugee crisis because of the strikes’ limited nature, but Human Rights Watch has called on them to plan for the unexpected. “We haven’t received any indication that plans for beefed-up humanitarian response are under way,” said Lama Fakih, the group’s deputy director in Beirut. Anger over American involvement could also undo one of the major benefits to American interests from the Arab uprisings by restoring the alliance against Israel that Iran, Syria and Hezbollah had with the Sunni Palestinian group Hamas. The conflict in Syria has sorely tested that alliance, with Hamas supporting the Sunni-led Syrian rebellion. Verifying information in Syria is extraordinarily hard, and another risk, however remote it may seem to American officials, is that it turns out that the Assad government was not responsible for the chemical attack. In any case, in a region where many have their doubts after the faulty intelligence that led to war in Iraq, wide sectors of the public may remain unconvinced. That would allow Mr. Assad to paint himself as the victim of an unjust American intervention and draw more supporters back to his fold. All that said, no one is suggesting that the United States or other countries should turn a blind eye to the use of chemical weapons or the suffering of civilians. The problem, Mr. Crocker said, is to figure out a response that leaves the Syrians, the region and the United States in a better position rather than entangled in another messy conflict with an uncertain outcome.

#### **US Strikes perpetuate terrorism**

BBC 9-2 (Syria minister: US strike on Syria 'would benefit al-Qaeda'; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23925037>; [JJ])

Speaking to the BBC's Jeremy Bowen, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said terrorism would flourish everywhere if the US attacked Syria Continue reading the main story Any US military action against Syria would amount to "support for al-Qaeda and its affiliates," Damascus has said. Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad also told the BBC that armed groups backed by America - not Syrian troops - had used chemical weapons.

#### In the charged atmosphere after a terrorist attack we would retaliate against Russia – causes all-out war

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weaponsbetween two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thoughtordiscovered that the fissile material used in the actof nuclear terrorismhad come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack,how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

No impact-bombing doesn’t solve conflict

King 9-1 (Bernie; “Latest on Syria: 10 Ways Bombing Syria Would Be Bad For the U.S., and Syrians”; <http://www.policymic.com/articles/61819/latest-on-syria-10-ways-bombing-syria-would-be-bad-for-the-u-s-and-syrians>, [JJ])

On the eve of Obama’s military response to allegations that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons on his own people, the latest on Syria suggests there are at least ten reasons why the President should reject a bombing campaign. 1. Bombing is not the most effective way to bring peace to the Syrian people If you are perplexed by the idea that we can bring peace to the Syrian people with a volley of Tomahawk cruise missiles, you are not alone. A majority of Americans are firmly opposed to military intervention in Syria. Even setting aside the substantial risks, Americans realize that bombing will do little to help the Syrian people. Considering the ostensibly “humanitarian” motives of the White House, I am surprised no one has suggested other alternatives for achieving peace. The single-most effective step we can take to bring peace to Syria is to stop funding and arming the rebel army, while pressuring our Arab allies to do the same. It is no secret that this civil war has survived on the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. Foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been battling the regime for months, while al Qaeda backed jihadists have joined the fight from Iraq. In Damascus, Syrian rebels report that the Saudis are paying them to fight. Other reports have the CIA paying rebel fighters $150 per month. For over a year, the CIA has been helping its Arab allies funnel weapons to the rebel forces and train rebel soldiers. As explained in this report by Michael Kelley and Geoffrey Ingersoll from Business Insider, substantial evidence suggests the CIA was shipping Libyan weapons out of Benghazi to Syrian rebels, via Turkey. 2. Assad’s regime presents no national security threat to the United States Assad’s regime in Syria has not attacked the United States. It has not attacked an ally of the United States. It is not threatening to attack the U.S. or our allies. As Senator Rand Paul cogently observed, “The war in Syria has no clear national security connection to the United States and victory by either side will not necessarily bring in to power people friendly to the United States.” This fact alone weighs heavily against the President’s proposed military intervention.

Strikes fail—congressional delays means Assad will have more than a month to prepare

Boyle 9-5 (Michael is an assistant professor of political science at La Salle University; “Obama's 'pass the buck' policy on Syria”; <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/obama-pass-the-buck-policy-syria>, [JJ])

Beyond the politics of the matter, the decision to turn to Congress for authorization will have a number of negative strategic consequences. On the most basic level, the cost will be measured in time: Assad will have had over three weeks to prepare his defenses and hide assets before Congress will even votes on the measure. Every day that passes makes the chances of a successful strike even more remote. At this point, it may be possible to degrade some of his key assets, and even destroy some of his missiles or aircraft; but the element of surprise, so crucial to effective military operations, has been lost. Moreover, this delay has given Assad's allies, such as Iran and Hezbollah, time to decide what reprisals they will use against the US or its allies in the event of a strike. It has also given time for some of Assad's backers, such as Russia, to launch a public relations campaign designed to damage the US and blunt the political impact of the strike. Second, the delay is strengthening Assad's sense of resolve and convincing him that he can withstand whatever the US chooses to do. For this reason, he has stepped up his rhetoric against the United States, and begun to privately tell his allies that it will be nothing but a cosmetic strike. All the normal requirements of an effective act of coercion – a sense of urgency, a signal of credibility or resolve, and a willingness to escalate – are absent from the administration's proposal to strike. Assad can be certain that the Obama administration is not contemplating regime change and will not put "boots on the ground" in Syria. If the administration launches a limited, three-day strike campaign, similar to the "Desert Fox" operation against Iraq in 1998, Assad can wait it out, bluster that he remains unbowed when it finishes, and continue the war against the rebels in the days that follow. Like Saddam Hussein after Desert Fox, Assad may even emerge temporarily stronger in the region for having stood up to the United States in the face of its indecision, rather than being humbled by the scale of the punitive strikes. Third, the frantic politicking in Congress has effectively signaled to the enemies of the United States that the country is war-weary and reluctant to use force. This is, doubtless, true, and the caution of the American people is warranted – especially given the history of Afghanistan and Iraq. But a strategic ambiguity about what you might do, and what cost you might bear, is always a good idea for a great power facing a range of different enemies, from terrorist groups to rising regional powers. This is something that Putin knows well, which is why he has offered only the cryptic "we have our plans" when asked how Russia will respond. Yet, the Obama administration has ignored this consideration by repeatedly signaling to the American people its war-weariness and reluctance to act. The result is that current and future opponents of the United States will now have a measure of its intentions and of its unwillingness to bear costs, and they will behave accordingly – either in thwarting its plans (as Russia and China are seeking to do today) or testing other "red lines" in the future. Because the administration has prioritized domestic politics over the strategic logic of the strike, they have almost guaranteed that it will be ineffective. It is possible that if Obama had sought congressional authorization for a strike immediately following the attack, and struck before Assad had a chance to prepare himself, that an American air operation might have been successful in deterring future chemical attacks. But by handing off the decision to the Congress and producing such a substantial delay, and by telegraphing his reluctance to the American electorate so obviously, Obama has all but guaranteed that this attempt to "lead from behind" will be unsuccessful.

## Oil

### 2AC AT: Middle East Oil DA

#### Prices low and falling

David Bird, 8-21-13, Wall Street Journal, “Crude-Oil Futures Drop for Third Day in a Row,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324619504579026132108728184.html>

Light, sweet crude for October delivery fell 1.2%, or $1.26, to $103.85 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The third consecutive day of declines put oil at its lowest settlement since Aug. 8."The market made its move before the Fed," said Gene McGillian, a broker and analyst at Tradition Energy in Stamford, Conn. "There is still uncertainty about when [the Fed will] act." The market has settled into a $103-to-$108 range for U.S. crude-oil futures and "it looks like we've got a lot of volatility ahead" until more clarity comes from the Fed, said Gene McGillian, a broker and analyst at Tradition Energy in Stamford, Conn.

#### US not key – China solves price fluctuations

Herberg 9 (Mikkal, BP Foundation Senior Research Fellow for International Energy at the Pacific Council on International Policy, as part of the national researcher conference report, October 2009, “The New Energy Silk Road: Implications for the United States,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/68545544/The-New-Energy-Silk-Road-The-Growing-Asia-Middle-East-Energy-Nexus)

But as Asia’s dependence on Gulf energy inexorably grows over the next decade and the Gulf states increasingly see their energy market and investment future growing in Asia, it seems likely that this “new silk road” is sowing the seeds of significant change in the underlying terrain on which the United States has been operating for the past 40 years. The implications span both the global energy markets and the future of regional and global geopolitics. For energy markets, while the Gulf has been and will remain the “swing producer” for world oil supplies; developing Asia, and especially China, have now become the global “swing consumer,” replacing the United States in this role. This is fundamentally changing the outlook for global energy investment, resource access, oil prices, and the role of national oil companies (NOC), particularly in an era likely to be characterized by much higher energy prices and intense competition to access supplies. In particular, China’s enormous and fast-growing demand for oil and petrochemicals and its burgeoning investment capacity, combined with the growing competitiveness and capabilities of the Chinese NOCs and oil services industry, suggest that China’s future energy investment role and impact in the Gulf will far outweigh any role in the past played by Japan or Korea. Chinese as well as Indian NOCs are likely to be far more successful and competitive than Japan’s NOCs and more ambitious in scale than Korean energy companies. This converges closely with the Gulf’s, particularly Saudi Arabia’s, long-term vision of transforming into a global energy and petrochemical superpower—a new stage of Saudi ambition and growth strategy in which China and India are key huge growth markets. The energy convergence between these states and the Gulf seems therefore destined to grow enormously in scale and scope, which suggests that both China and India are likely to focus progressively more assertively on their vital interests in the Gulf. At the same time, the energy security policies of China and India are not nearly as aligned with the United States as are those of Japan and Korea. Particularly in the case of China, it seems unlikely that Beijing will be content to follow Washington’s strategic lead in the Gulf in ten to twenty years, given the sharp policy differences that exist over Iran, U.S. dominance in Iraq, competitive energy diplomacy and markets, and overall Middle East policy.

#### Oil prices don’t hurt Saudi Arabia – they just lower dependence – imports and exports also guarantee spending from the government

Arab News 7/10/12 (Arab News is Saudi Arabia's first English-language newspaper. It was founded in 1975 by Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz. Today, it is one of 29 publications produced by Saudi Research & Publishing Company (SRPC), a subsidiary of Saudi Research & Marketing Group (SRMG). “Saudi Arabia’s economy healthy enough to sustain low oil prices: Samba”, 7/10/12, Propel Consult, http://www.propelconsult.com/saudi-arabias-economy-healthy-enough-to-sustain-low-oil-prices-samba/ ;)

Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues are expected to drop this year. Brent price is likely to reach $100/barrel in 2012 and $98/barrel in 2013 from $118/b in April this year. However, for Saudi Arabia, the consequences of lower oil prices are likely to be slight, according to a report by Samba. Samba projected the Kingdom’s oil earnings at $324 billion, a 16 percent decline. Earnings are comfortably above the five-year average of $225 billion. Moreover, despite this year’s reduced earnings, a current account surplus of $148 billion, or 25 percent of GDP is in prospect. For 2013, Samba expects a surplus of some 18 percent of GDP. By the end of 2013 total net foreign assets are expected to total $827 billion, equivalent to 135 percent of GDP. The report said, government’s fiscal position also remains robust. Whereas previously Samba expected a surplus of 20 percent of GDP, but now this will come in at 13 percent of GDP. Saudi Arabia is aiming to use this period of high oil prices to lessen dependence on oil itself. The report said value of nonoil exports have grown by an annual average of 17 percent over the past decade, increasing their share of total exports from 14 percent to 17 percent. Most of these are derived from hydrocarbons (petrochemicals, refined products, steel), but they are sufficiently far up the value chain to soften the direct dependence on oil prices.

# 1AR

## Oil

### 1AR – AT: Russia Impact

#### Low prices don’t kill Russia’s economy

RIA Novosti 11 (“Russian economy can survive low oil prices – Kudrin” September 09 11 http://en.rian.ru/business/20110926/167139562.html)

The Russian economy will be able to function normally for a year, if global oil prices fall to $60 per barrel, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Monday in an interview with Russia Today international news TV channel. "We expect this fall will certainly cause a decrease in our economic growth down to nearly zero or below zero, but in terms of the budget policy we'll be able to cope with this for up to a year," Kudrin said. Russia's finance minister said on Saturday he expected world oil prices to fall to $60 per barrel in the next one and a half to two years and stay at this level for about six months. After this, "we'll have to adjust policy and reduce expenditure. As a whole, however, we are ready to provide stability for a year or two and fulfil all our commitments," Kudrin said. Russia's federal budget for the next three years is based on a forecast of Urals average yearly oil price at $100 per barrel in 2012, $97 per barrel in 2013 and $101 per barrel in 2014. Russian Deputy Finance Minister Tatiana Nesterenko said last week that a fall in global oil prices to $60 per barrel could force the Russian government to cut the 2012 budget spending but added that this scenario was unlikely. The average price of Urals blend, Russia's key export commodity, stood at $109.2 per barrel in January-August 2011

#### Drop in oil prices is good for Russia – diversifies their economy and makes the Russian economy sustainable

Mark Kopinski, 1-19-11, Chief Investment Officer, International Equity, “Russia’s Push for Economic Diversification and Modernization,” <http://americancenturyblog.com/2011/01/russia%E2%80%99s-push-for-economic-diversificationand-modernization/>

 “One of the biggest problems facing Russia, however, is its lack of economic diversification and overreliance on revenues from oil and gas exports.” Since the collapse of the Soviet Union two decades ago, Russia has transformed itself from a centrally planned to a market-based economy. Along the way, however, the country’s push for economic diversification and modernization hasn’t been easy. Russia is contending with a host of issues, including a crumbling infrastructure, an aging workforce and inadequate pension system, and the development of new gas and oil fields to replace depleting current ones. Property rights remain weak and state interference in the private sector is also problematic. One of the biggest problems facing Russia, however, is its lack of economic diversification and overreliance on revenues from oil and gas exports. During the Great Recession, Russia’s economic dependence on oil and gas exports manifested itself more than the country’s leaders expected. As a result of plunging commodity prices, the country was among the hardest hit by the global economic crisis and the central government’s budget went from a surplus of 4.1% in 2008 to a deficit of 6.3% in 2009. In addition, real gross domestic product1 (GDP) growth dropped by 7.8% in 2009— the biggest decline on record. Consequently, the government is hoping to break its economic dependency on commodity export revenues and at the same time reduce its budget deficit. While economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most of Russia’s industrial base, the notable exceptions were the oil and gas sectors, where mismanagement and an exceptionally high rate of taxation has impeded growth and left them chronically underinvested. The good news for investors is that it is looking more likely that the government will relax its taxation of the sector and provide more incentives for exploration and development. The government is also selling stakes in a number of large state-owned companies to private investors. Another point is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has fallen behind the West in the development of computer technology. In 2007, Russia launched an initiative to reinvigorate its tech sector, while reducing its economic reliance on commodity exports. Russian leaders are currently looking to build their own version of California’s Silicon Valley. In March 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that his country would build a high-tech hub outside Moscow for the research and development of five priority sectors: energy, information technology, telecommunications, biomedical technology, and atomic technologies. The Russian economy is also underdeveloped in a number of areas, including food, retail, and banking. For instance, only 30% of food is purchased through organized retail companies. The other 70% is distributed by “open-air” farmers markets, which are inefficient and where product quality can be questionable. The increasing penetration of organized retailers is providing opportunities for investors. Another area that holds investment potential is the banking sector. Russia currently has the second fastest growing banking sector in the world behind China. Economic Diversification Is Critical for Future Growth About 25% of the government’s operating budget is linked to oil and gas revenues, so Russia’s goal of economic diversification will not be an easy task. Yet its leadership is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that it must endure some short-term pain—weaning itself off the windfalls from commodity exports—to ensure long-term economic growth and prosperity. In the meantime, however, Russia is trying to improve its investment climate by fostering better relations with the West, becoming more cognizant of property and intellectual rights, and reducing the state’s influence in the economy.

#### Diversification leads to sustainable long term growth in Russia

Glazov et al 4 (Jamie, Ph.D. in History with a specialty in Soviet Studies, Ion Mihai Pacepa, former acting chief of Communist Romania’s espionage service, James Woolsey, director of the CIA from 1993-95, Vladimir Bukovsky, former leading Soviet dissident, “Symposium: KGB Resurrection,” April 30 , http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=13210)

Our oil dependence is an even more salient issue than when our percentage of imports was much less during the two oil shocks of the 1970's. The Russian economy is heavily influenced by the price of oil. Saudis, controlling at least half of the world's swing production capacity, dropped the bottom out of the oil market in 1985 and the Soviets never really recovered. We will never have that kind of control, but we can to a great extent reduce our dependence, give ourselves more leverage over the oil market, make it more difficult for the Saudis and others to raise prices to our economic and political disadvantage, and lead the Russian regime to realize that it may need to re-assess its direction. I used to believe that anything, including a strong oil market, that bolstered the Russian economy and produced prosperity would be likely to cause the growth of a middle class and, in time, more pressure for economic and political liberalization. The events of the last eighteen months or so have convinced me that such is not correct. Putin has used the economic prosperity produced by a strong oil market to consolidate his power and lead Russia toward a form of fascism -- oil prices have given him the idea that he can do anything he wants. Oil can tend to centralize power in any society except in a mature democracy such as Norway. It now seems to me that it is in our interest both in terms of our dealings with Russia and with the Middle East to do as much as possible to reduce our reliance on oil. To do this we would need to move toward alternative fuels, especially those produced from waste, that can be used in the existing infrastructure and toward more fuel efficient vehicles, such as hybrids, that are available now -- not wait on the hydrogen economy. In spite of their very high levels of oil production the Russians can't bring new production on- and off-line quickly as the Saudis can due to weather, location, etc. So if the Russians see us moving steadily toward reducing our oil use and thus their ability to make money from their high-cost production they may become far more reasonable than they are now. Today they have the bit in their teeth and, to mix a metaphor, they feel as if they have the world by the tail more and more firmly with each dollar the price of oil increases. They need to be shown that their prosperity is not assured without some fundamental changes and that it would be good for their economy and society if they diversified their economy. For more reasons than one it is in our interest for them to be worried about the possibility that oil prices could fall.

## Appeasement

### 1AR – Iran Prolif Good

#### Nuclear fear scenarios cloud calculation.

Jonathan Tepperman, 8-29-2009, Newsweek International's Deputy Editor, was Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs and wrote frequently on international affairs for Newsweek, The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, The Jerusalem Post and The Forward, and is a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html

Put this all together and nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening. So why have so few people in Washington recognized this? Most of us suffer from what Desch calls a nuclear phobia, an irrational fear that's grounded in good evidence—nuclear weapons are terrifying—but that keeps us from making clear, coldblooded calculations about just how dangerous possessing them actually is. The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad—conventional war—won't happen. This may well be a rational bet to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it's a tough case to make to the public.

#### Deterrence works in every possible instance.

Kenneth Waltz Interview by Harry Kreisler, 2-10-2003, Professor, Political Science, UC Berkeley, “Theory and International Politics,” http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Waltz/waltz-con6.html

One of the striking things about nuclear deterrence is that it has worked, no matter what country we're talking about, no matter what kind of government the country has, no matter what kind of ruler the country has had. The most striking case, of course, is Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. It lasted from 1966 to 1976 in China, where China was in seemingly unheard-of chaos. And yet China, a country with a fair number of nuclear weapons at the time, managed to take care of those weapons very well indeed! The government separated foreign policy to a certain extent, and nuclear policy completely, from the Cultural Revolution. / The one thing about those governments -- millenarian or whatever they may be like -- is that they almost surely will want to stay in power. If they come to power, they will be deterrable. The difficulty is if irregular groups, terrorists, get control of weapons of mass destruction. Something like biologicals are much more of a worry (and chemicals to a certain extent, but biologicals, especially) than nuclear weapons, I think. Then they are not deterrable. We've always known that deterrence does not cover this kind of situation.