# Pennsbury—Round 2

# 2AC

## Case

### AT: Zapatistas Bad

#### Here’re more contextual ev

Manuel Callahan, Professor of Race relations at Humboldt State University, 2005, “Why not share a dream? Zapatismo as Political and Cultural Practice,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263123

While we should not abandon the responsibilities and challenges of sincere solidarity work, taking our cues from the EZLN, we might suggest that Zapatismo invites people to become part of "the struggle" in their own manner, at their own pace, and without being measured by any specific model of "conscientization" or a political program specified by "the organization." However, the effort at encuentro challenges us to interrogate the limitations and contradictions of more traditional solidarity activism. Zapatismo reveals the political tensions of building a movement based only on single issue campaigns, on behalf of a specific constituency, and relying on short-lived fragile coalitions often over-determined by the most immediate crisis. In many cases those solidarity efforts that fail to escape a liberal mold can unwittingly promote possessive individualism, celebrating a single leader, often considered the best and the brightest of the group, who is expected to state the group's issues, history, strategies and goals. The result is a single model, plan, or program dominated by an elite. Consequently, a narrowly defined solidarity effort can easily reproduce paternalism and hierarchy within the organization and between the organization and the constituency being "served." Echoing Holloway's warning in this volume, traditional solidarity projects fall into the trap of defining, representing, and speaking for the struggle(s) of others, while at the same moment insisting on "the progress" of those being aided, making solidarity efforts resistant to modifications and slow to adapt to shifting contexts. Solidarity projects that represent, define and speak for the struggle (s) of others presuppose the progress of those being aided and not the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Moreover, aide workers operating in a narrow solidarity mode are less likely to acknowledge or celebrate the transformations that have already taken place in "targeted" com munities, inadvertently facilitating an insidious imperialism. Professional well-funded NGOs, for example, "can become shadow bureaucracies parallel to Southern nation state administrations."30 Ultimately, a bureaucratic model of social change will not be able to prioritize and promote the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Although there may be valid concerns we must interrogate regarding the challenges of "solidarity," the political practice examined here does not seek to impose a rigidly defined alternative practice. The Zapatistas have been consistent in keeping with what they have argued is the task of an armed movement: to "present the problem, and then step aside."31 As critical catalysts in posing problems they have deliberately not posed solutions on other groups or spaces. "But it is already known that our specialty is not in solving problems, but in creating them. 'Creating them?' No, that is too presumptuous, rather in proposing. Yes, our specialty is proposing problems."32 The Zapatista provocation insists that rights emerge from collective identities and communal needs expressing collectively articulated obligations and not the competing interests of individual need.33 Rather than emphasize networks as our only organizing objective, we might also imagine the movement in solidarity with the Zapatistas as an imagined community, a collective effort to define obligations that are rooted in a locally placed culture generating knowledge about what works across generations. The very act of provocation undertaken has been a bridge manifest in a new international, not an international based on rigid party doctrines or dogmas of competing organizations but "an international of hope." The new international is defined by dignity, "that nation without nationality, that rain bow that is also a bridge, that murmur of the heart no matter what blood lives it, that rebel irreverence that mocks borders, customs and wars."34 "Instead of a new bureaucratic apparatus, for the world coordination of a political movement expressing universal ideals and proposals," Esteva explains, "the International of Hope was created: a web constituted by innumerable differentiated autonomies, without a center or hierarchies, within which the most varied coalitions of discontents can express themselves, to dismantle forces and regimes oppressing all of them."35 The process of creating political space for dialogue between a diverse number of constituencies occupying a particular space suggests that community is neither homogenous nor static. Rather than speak of "the community," Zapatismo strives for a notion of community embodying a multiplicity of histories, experiences, resources, and obligations. The pursuit of new political relationships underscores the need to re-discover strategies to collectively define obligations of and within a community through dialogue based on respect. Political projects and proposals need to emerge organically—not imposed either by an individual (caciquismo) or a cabal (protagonismo). As the Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) have warned, people organizing themselves must begin "with the situation in which they find themselves, not in the one which we might desire to be found."36 In new political spaces all voices, all proposals must be responded to with respect. Democracy, as Marcos suggests, is a gesture "to decide upon the dominant social proposal." Liberty implies the freedom necessary to pursue one action over another, the expression of desire for the fulfillment of hope and dignity. Free from oppression, fear or persecution liberty sustains diversity and the choice, "to subscribe to one or another proposal."37 "It is," writes Marcos, "the same desire: democracy, liberty, and justice. In the heroic delirium of the Mexican southeast, hope implies a name: Tachicam, the unity of long ing for a better future."

## Zupancic

### 2AC—Zupancic

#### Perm solves – Zapatismo can link up with other struggles effectively

Jeffery Popke, East Carolina University Professor, 06-xx-04, “The face of the other: Zapatismo,

responsibility and the ethics of deconstruction,” <http://myweb.ecu.edu/popkee/social%20and%20cultural.pdf>

Although it is undoubtedly important to assess, and support, the reform process in the domain of ‘political realism’, I want to focus my attention here on the messianic tenor of Zapatista discourse, on what Huntington (2000) has called their ‘politics of poetic resistance’ (see also Evans 1999; Higgins 2000). I do so because the discursive intervention of Zapatismo represents, in its aims, strategies and composition, a challenge to modern ethical ideals in a manner consistent with what I have argued thus far: ﬁrst, they articulate a form of ethical subjectivity that transcends both cultural difference and borders; and second, they argue for an alternative conception of politics, in which the future is open to construction in the absence of certainty. This ethical discourse is important in part because it has produced effects that resonate far beyond the immediate context of southern Mexico. The Zapatistas are ‘awakening, moving and stimulating the creative imagination of many others, who are already involved in similar concerns and struggles but often found themselves at a dead end’ (Esteva and Prakash 1998: 36). In this sense, I believe that the writings of Marcos and the EZLN are more than simply interventions in a regional struggle over indigenous rights and autonomy. They also both reﬂect and contribute to, through their broader engagement with global civil society, the development of a new conception of social and cultural agency, within which a different form of ethics and politics is at stake (Couch 2001; Stahler-Sholk 2001).

#### Debate good

Dana Roe Polson, former debate coach and Co-Director, teacher, and founder of ConneXions Community Leadership Academy, 2012 “Longing for Theory:” Performance Debate in Action,” <http://gradworks.umi.com/3516242.pdf>

I think the Talented Tenth is actually the wrong metaphor for leadership in the performance debate community. Du Bois, later in his life, sharply criticized and disavowed a reliance on the Black elite to lead, believing that they were more preoccupied with individual gain than with group struggle, and willing to work within current structures rather than calling for radical change. They were becoming Americanized, Du Bois believed, and deradicalized. This deradicalization “occurs when more privileged African Americans (re) align themselves to function as a middle class interested in individual group gain rather than race leadership for mass development” (James, 1997, p. 24). Instead of his youthful belief in the Black elite, “Gradually, black working-class activists surpassed elites in Du Bois’s estimation of political integrity and progressive agency. He democratized his concept of race leaders through the inclusion of the radicalism of nonelites” (James, 1997, p. 21). The young people who have emerged as leaders in the performance debate community were definitely not those Du Bois would have identified as the Talented Tenth in 1903. Du Bois was talking to and about the Black elite, the educated middle class. Earlier in Du Bois’s life, he assumed that those people, college-educated, were the natural leaders. My participants who might be seen as potential leaders do not come from such backgrounds. Many do end up going to college and becoming potential leaders, but they are privileged through this process rather than prior to it. In addition, their focus is most definitely political as opposed to cultural. Nowhere in my research did I hear a Bill Cosby-esque injunction for Black people to shape up and work harder. Instead, the critique is focused on “uplift as group struggle” for continued liberation. Finally, these young leaders are most definitely radicalized as opposed to interested in incremental change that rocks no boats. From CRT and their open critique of white supremacy to their willingness to call for change openly in debate rounds, these young leaders are contentious and bold. Two of my participants, and many of their former debate peers, are involved with a Baltimore group called Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (LBS). The website of the LBS establishes their identity: We are a dedicated group of Baltimore citizens who want to change the city through governmental policy action. Our purpose is to provide tangible, concrete solutions to Baltimore’s problems and to analyze the ways that external forces have contributed to the overall decline of our city. (“Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle,” n.d.) As we see in this statement of identity, then, LBS as one model of leadership is focused on the political and on an analysis of external influences; this focus is very different from a racial uplift position, and their model of leadership very different from the Talented Tenth. LBS has developed platforms regarding jobs, education, incarceration, and many other issues facing Black people in the city. They hold monthly forums for discussion of these topics, inviting guests and discussing the topics themselves. Further, one of the LBS members ran for City Council this year. He lost, but plans to run again. The training my participants discuss, therefore, is not in the abstract: it is training for the real world, for their own empowerment and that of their communities. This work is extending into local high schools, as well, and Paul Robeson High School now has students involved in LBS. They attend events and meetings not only to help out but as a form of leadership training.

#### Only the ballot forces teams to confront the racial privilege that is upheld now – Louisville movement proves

Dr. Shanara Reid Brinkley, 2008, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF ‘ACTING BLACK’: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,”

Zompetti’s fears are fairly reasonable. The Louisville Project has not convinced the debate community to change its normative practice. Given the adversarial nature of tournament competition, opposing teams seem most concerned with developing viable strategies to beat Louisville inside the tournament round. Such a competitive atmosphere may not allow a resolution of conflict between the Louisville team and other community members. Yet, it seems that attempts to engage the structural barriers that maintain the lack of community diversity seems to not have substantially increased racial and ethnic inclusion. That the Louisville team shifts the discussion on racial inclusion into actual debate competition forces the broader debate community to significantly increase its discussion of the problem. In other words, the Project may not directly result in sweeping changes in the policy debate community, it did create a rhetorical controversy that forced the issue of racial exclusion and privilege onto the community’s agenda. Thus, I argue that the tournament round is a critical plateau from which to force a reflexive conversation about the normative practices of debate that might operate to maintain racial exclusion and privilege.

#### People can’t just forget suffering

Victor Frankl, Holocaust survivor; M.D., PH.D.; Visiting Professor, Harvard University; received over 29 honorary doctorate degrees, 2K, “Man’s Search for Meaning.”

Let us first ask ourselves what should be understood by "a tragic optimism." In brief it means that one is, and remains, optimistic in spite of the "tragic triad," as it is called in logotherapy, a triad which consists of those aspects of human existence which may be circumscribed by: (1) pain; (2) guilt; and (3) death. This chapter, in fact, raises the question. How is it possible to say yes to life in spite of all that? How, to pose the question differently, can life retain its potential meaning in spite of its tragic aspects? After all, "saying yes to life in spite of everything,"

 to use the phrase in which the title of a German book of mine is couched, presupposes that life is potentially meaningful under any conditions, even those which are most miserable. And this in turn presupposes the human capacity to creatively turn life's negative aspects into something positive or constructive. In other words, what matters is to make the best of any given situation. "The best," however, is that which in Latin is called optimum—hence the reason I speak of a tragic optimism, that is, an optimism in the face of tragedy and in view of the human potential which at its best always allows for: (1) turning suffering into a human achievement and accomplishment; (2) deriving from guilt the opportunity to change oneself for the better; and (3) deriving from life's transitoriness an incentive to take responsible action. / It must be kept in mind, however, that optimism is not anything to be commanded or ordered. One cannot even force oneself to be optimistic indiscriminately, against all odds, against all hope. And what is true for hope is also true for the other two components of the triad inasmuch as faith and love cannot be commanded or ordered either. / To the European, it is a characteristic of the American culture that, again and again, one is commanded and ordered to "be happy." But happiness cannot be pursued; it must ensue. One must have a reason to "be happy." Once the reason is found, however, one becomes happy automatically. *As we see, a human being is not one in pursuit of happiness but rather in search of a reason to become happy*, last but not least, through actualizing the potential meaning inherent and dormant in a given situation.

#### Ontology of Freedom. Seeking to better the world is the best reason – it articulates a fresh way of being.

Todd May, Ph.D.; Professor of Philosophy @ Clemson University, 2005, Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (5-6)

This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 hat are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And *to seek* one aspect without the other – *life-celebration without world-changing*, world-changing without life-celebration – *is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both.* If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.

#### AND – this ontology solves life-affirmation even in the face of total failure to reduce suffering.

Mitchell Smolkin, M.D., 1989, Understanding Pain: Interpretation and Philosophy, p. 75-9

For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and to find meaning in living. They desire to feel at home in the universe. Despite these natural needs, man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He is surrounded by irrational destructiveness, and by the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He [Humanity] hears his “nights and days filled always, everywhere with the eternal cry of human pain.”56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and how does one avoid merely “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy?. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. Camus criticizes “Nietzsche, at least in his theory of super-humanity, and Marx before him, with his classless society, [who] both replace The Beyond by the Later On.”62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder in the name of vague future goals. “Revolution consists in loving[those] a man who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] men who do exist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering. Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people] man needs to exert all his effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers in the world. Killing existing men for a questionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with the sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by stoical acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to renounce murder completely and work for justice and for a decrease in suffering. Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, one should take the victim’s side and “share with his fellow citizens the only certitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.”68 What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus’ goals are modest. He realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”69 in that death, finitude and suffering will always conquer him.

 He realizes that after [humanity] man has mastered everything in creation that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society. Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. He who dedicates himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, to the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed and sustains the world again and again. Those whose desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. *Society must be arranged to limit* injustice and *suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to pursue his own search for meaning.* Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”74 “It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] men. The rebel must “reject divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”75 Redemption is impossible. Human dignity and love can intermittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague bacillus that “never dies or disappears for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76

#### Your Western K is privileged and colorblind

Monique Roelofs, Prof @ Hampshire College and teaches and writes at the intersection of European, analytical, and postcolonial philosophies with a special focus on aesthetics and the philosophy of art and culture, feminist philosophy, and critical race theory, 2006, “The Veiled Presence of Race in the Philosophy of Art:  Reclaiming Race for Aesthetics”

Race is a conceptual blind spot in philosophical aesthetics and the philosophies of the arts. While compelling avenues of philosophical thought reveal the intertwinements of conceptions of the state, the public, and the individual with racial constructions, that is to say, with lived realities that are organized with the help of racialized categories, aestheticians tend to bypass such entanglements or to insulate their premises and inquiries from their relations to racial formations. Philosophical investigations of common and prominent themes in aesthetics by and large proceed in ostensibly colorblind terms. I have in mind here, for example, discussions of art’s cognitive, imaginative, and affective dimensions, the relationship between aesthetics and ethics, everyday and environmental aesthetic systems, the politics of art and criticism, the nature of art’s situatedness in culture, capital, history, and modernity, and the analysis of art’s gendered and class-inflected workings-in short, numerous areas of concentration at the heart of the field. There are exceptions, especially at points where critical race theory intersects with aesthetics and, more narrowly, in the study of beauty, cross-cultural aesthetics, and artistic practices marked in terms of cultural “Others.” But characteristically the discipline-its theoretical paradigms, central preoccupations, institutionalized self-understandings, standards of quality-shuns exposing its structural principles to the workings of racial difference. In the context of asymmetrical power relations, many have argued, colorblind policies give carte blanche to the racial forces that be, whether intended or not. Colorblindness not only fails to contest racial domination, but assists also in its maintenance and reaffirmation against perceived breaches. Within a racialized social and conceptual system, what may seem to be race-neutral methodologies in fact typically reassert white privilege. The field of aesthetics is not exempted from this well-documented phenomenon. The inattention to race shores up the aesthetic pillars of whiteness and bolsters the whitening supports of aesthetics. Racialization and aestheticization (which concerns, among other things, aesthetic contributions to the shaping of identities, relations of power, and formations of knowledge and culture) stand in complex historical interconnections. These must be studied and worked through in order to create more tenable social, economic, cultural, political, environmental, and aesthetic constellations.

#### This silence sustains racism – reject them

Carrie Crenshaw, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University of Alabama, Summer 1997, “Resisting whiteness' rhetorical silence,” Western Journal of Communication 61.3, ebsco

\*\*Yellow Highlighting – sorry about that

In academic and political discourse, it is also rare for white people to explicitly reference their whiteness. The strictures of the "approved identity" in academic writing often prevent us from revealing our personal social locations and experiences (Blair, Brown and Baxter 402). Public political figures likewise avoid mentioning whiteness in their discourse (Nakayama and Krizek 297) even though the color of American politics is implicit in current debates about welfare, affirmative action, crime, and a host of other issues. Moreover, such discourse tends to ignore the ways in which race, gender, and class intersect with each other to perpetuate oppressive human hierarchies (Crenshaw, "Beyond"; Lorde). / Because discursive constructions of whiteness are typically unmarked and unnamed in personal, academic, and public discourse, they present a constellation of challenges for rhetorical scholars who are interested in the ideological role of whiteness in intersecting discourses about race, gender, and class. Previous rhetorical scholarship has focused on racist public discourse (e.g., Wander, "Salvation"; Wander, "The Savage"; Himelstein; Logue; Logue and Garner; Trank), but Nakayama and Krizek have recently taken our thinking a step further by mapping the terrain of whiteness. In a provocative study which names whiteness as a strategic rhetoric, they ethnographically "map" the "everyday" strategies of the spoken rhetoric of whiteness from a cultural studies perspective. They are "interested in ... the constructed space of whiteness, not the ways that it influences the margins" and "do[es] not address racism or racist ideology, although [they acknowledge that] these are closely aligned to many of the ways that whiteness is constructed" (306n). Their conclusion invites us to move beyond their initial topological project to investigate how the rhetoric of whiteness functions in the context of other social relations, particularly gender (303-305). In this essay, I accept their invitation and join the ongoing interdisciplinary conversation about whiteness (e.g., Allen; Dutcher; Dyer; Feagin and Vera; Frankenberg; Frye; Harris; hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek; Roediger). Because whiteness and its intersections with gender and class are steeped in silence (hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek), this essay argues that rhetoricians must do the critical ideological work necessary to make whiteness visible and overturn its silences for the purpose of resisting racism. / To do this, scholars must locate interactions that implicate unspoken issues of race, discursive spaces where the power of whiteness is invoked but its explicit terminology is not, and investigate how these racialized constructions intersect with gender and class. One such interaction was the debate between Carolyn Moseley Braun (D-IL) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) over the U.S. Senate's decision whether to grant a fourteen-year extension of the design patent for the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) insignia. Because the UDC insignia contains a representation of the Confederate flag, the debate centered on whether a Senate approval of the patent would commend a charitable patriotic organization or commemorate an historical symbol of racism. Accounts of this debate were widely disseminated in the national news media and described Moseley Braun's argument as a dramatic history-making challenge to racism in the U.S. Senate (e.g., Clymer; Lee; McGrory). "For once Senators changed their minds. Things that are usually decided in the cloakroom, were settled on the floor in plain sight" (McGrory A2). Helms spoke first and Moseley Braun responded. After Helms' second speech, the motion to table the amendment was rejected 52 to 48. However, Moseley Braun was ultimately victorious; after her final speech, the patent extension was denied on a 75 to 25 vote. / This debate is a uniquely interesting rhetorical artifact because it was a direct and public clash of arguments about race in political discourse. It constitutes an important example of how two public political actors' discourse about race and how the personal dimensions of race, gender, and class entered into their public argument. In the next section, I argue that ideological rhetorical criticism is an appropriate avenue for analyzing interactions like this one. / Ideological Rhetorical Criticism / There is nothing essential, "natural," or biological about whiteness. Because the overwhelming unity of our genetic makeup swamps any human differences that have historically been attributed to race (Appiah 21; Shipman 269), race itself has been called a biological fiction (Gates 4). It is the historically located rhetorical meaning of whiteness that assigns it social worth (Nakayama and Krizek 292). / Whiteness functions ideologically when people employ it, consciously or unconsciously, as a framework to categorize people and understand their social locations. Within this framework, whiteness as a social position has value and has been treated legally as property (Bell; Crenshaw "Race"; Feagin and Vera; Harris). The term "white privilege" denotes a host of material advantages white people enjoy as a result of being socially and rhetorically located as a white person (Crenshaw, "Race"; Mcintosh; Wellman). Even though many white people sense that privilege accompanies whiteness (Feagin and Vera), they do not overtly acknowledge their white privilege because they think of themselves as average, morally neutral non-racists. They do not see racism as an ideology that protects the interests of all white people; rather, they envision racism in the form of white hooded Klansmen engaged in acts of racial hatred (Mcintosh 34; Ezekiel 1). Because this ideology can be produced and reproduced through spoken discourse (van Dijk; Goldberg), whiteness and its privilege

 have both ideological and rhetorical dimensions. / Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals the vested interests protected by a particular rhetorical framework for understanding social order. It assists the search for alternatives to oppression and enables us to engage in right action for good reasons (Wander, "The Ideological" 2, 18). While cultural and ethnographic approaches that name the complexities of our racialized social locations make the rhetoric of whiteness visible and displace its centrality (Nakayama and Krizek), an ideological approach helps to uncover the alliance between the submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness and white material privilege. Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals how the public political rhetoric of whiteness relies upon a silent denial of white privilege to rationalize judicial, legislative, and executive decisions that protect the material interests of white people at the expense of people of color.[ 3] Beyond the realm of "everyday" discourse, public political actors often engage a submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness to protect white privilege, and their arguments are authorized by the powerful institutions from which they speak. Those authorized arguments in turn sanction the rhetorical frameworks through which white individuals make sense of and justify their privileged social status (van Dijk; Wellman). / Stuart Hall's work is useful for grasping the rhetorical nature of ideology in general and racist ideologies in specific. He defines ideology as "those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence" ("The Whites" 18). Ideological struggles are struggles over meaning. Meaning is a social production, a practice of making the world mean something, and this meaning is produced through language. Language is not a synonym for ideology because the same terms can be used in very different ideological discourses. However, language is the principle medium of ideologies, and ideologies are sets or chains of meaning located in language ("The Rediscovery" 67, 81; "The Whites" 18). / These chains of meaning are not the products of individual intention even though they are statements made by individuals. Instead, intentions are formed within pre-existing ideologies because individuals are born into them. Ideologies live within what we take-for-granted. They exist in our assumptions and descriptive statements about how the world is. "Ideologies tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted 'naturalised' world of common sense. Since (like gender) race appears to be 'given' by Nature, racism is one of the most profoundly 'naturalised' of existing ideologies" (Hall, "The Whites" 19). / To understand how racist ideologies operate, Hall draws upon the work of Antonio Gramsci. While Gramsci did not explicitly theorize about race, he did investigate the ideological and cultural implications of region and nation. Hall embraces Gramsci's argument that ideologies function hegemonically to preserve powerful interests. That is to say, ideologies are taken-for-granted frameworks that naturalize our descriptions of the way the world is, including its current power structures. This power is not achieved solely by coercive might; it also operates through the consent of those who are subjugated. Hegemony is the production of consent that determines what is taken-for-granted. So, our taken-for-granted, naturalized assumptions of what makes common sense produce and reinforce our consent to the current social order and its power structures. The advantage of Gramsci's position is that it makes room for an oppositional consciousness because it recognizes that hegemony is historically contingent. Because hegemony is never stable and is always an ongoing and fluid process of gaining consent, social transformation through the critical examination of current relations of power is possible. / Following Gramsci, Hall also believes that it is essential to analyze the historical specificity of racist ideologies in a non-reductive manner. He rejects the gross form of economism in which everything is seen to be determined by class structures, and instead he highlights the need to understand and conceptualize other oppressive forms of social differentiation including culture, region, nationality, and ethnicity. Doing so enables a productive reconceptualization of the "class subject." The class subject is not homogenous; there is never simple unity among people said to be of the same "class." Rather, hegemony is a dynamic process of the production of consent within and between different sectors and segments within classes. Thus, Gramsci's work can help us to understand how race and class intersect. We need not accept the false choice between class based explanations and race based explanations. In addition, Hall argues that Gramsci's notion of hegemony helps us to understand one of the most common, least explained features of 'racism': the 'subjection' of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideologies which imprison and define them. He reveals how different, often contradictory elements can be woven into and integrated within different ideological discourses; but also, the nature and value of ideological struggle which seeks to transform popular ideas and the 'common sense' of the masses. All of this has the most profound importance for the analysis of racist ideologies and for the centrality, within that, of ideological struggle. ("Gramsci's" 440) / A critical ideological approach to racialized discourse reveals the ongoing struggle over the meaning of race. It makes room for oppositional consciousness by helping us to "see" the meaning of racialized constructions and the vested interests they protect so that we can contest them. In addition, as the following analysis of the Braun-Helms debate illustrates, it enables our understanding of the intersections among racialized, gendered, and class discourses.

#### Your philosophers sustain traditional enlightenment views and do nothing for poor people of color

Siskanna Naynaha, composition coordinator at Lane Community College and teaches courses on African American and Latino literature, May 2006, “RACE OF ANGELS: XICANISMA, POSTCOLONIAL PASSIONS, AND RHETORICS OF REACTION AND REVOLUTION,” <https://research.wsulibs.wsu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2376/492/s_naynaha_050306.pdf?sequence=1>

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Laclau entered into a critical discussion with cultural theorist Judith Butler and Slovenian psychoanalyst and theorist Slavoj Žižek in their collaborative Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues in the Left. Using the theoretical lenses provided by Gramsci, Derrida, and Lacan, the three debate the failure of the Left in contemporary politics and, if there has indeed been a failure, its causes. The major contribution of this work to the field of democratic theory is the ways the authors problematize current watchwords deployed in the cultural rhetoric of US democracy such as “multicultural,” “pluralistic,” and “politically correct.” Ultimately, however, the theorists of so-called radical democracy tend to become bogged down in discussions of the discursivity of democracy; what they neglect here is the material, economic realities of poor people of color in the US and around the globe. Kalyan K. Sanyal elaborates on this critique in his “Postmarxism and the Third World: A Critical Response to the Radical Democratic Agenda.” “By emphasizing the discourse of the right,” he argues, the radical democrats link their multiple struggles to the state because it is the state that endows every citizen with right, and the process of realization of the right must refer to the state rather than to any other form of collectivity . . . [but] what are the implications of the radical democratic agenda for the global order, economic and political? (128) In the end Sanyal finds that the implications are devastating. The most salient is that the “Third World” “has to bear a large part of the cost of accommodating rights in the [First World]. To the extent that these rights impinge on the logic of profit and accumulation, capital has a tendency to move to greener pastures in the Third World where such rights hardly exist” (128). In fact, the rhetoric of democracy in the US has grown out of a Eurocentric obsession with “Western” foundations which inspire and perpetuate an obsessive possessive individualism through constant appeals to Enlightenment era thinking and ideals. The deployment of such rhetoric has long obscured the problems of racism, poverty, patriarchal oppression, and heterosexism within the US, and now, given the global expansion of US domination under the logic of late capitalism, that same rhetoric of democracy obfuscates the historical and material realities of US colonialism and imperialism around the world. Debates about individual “rights” and appropriate “procedures” rage on in the US while suffering rages on in poor neighborhoods populated disproportionately by people of color in the US and enrages the devastated Two-Thirds World. It is a travesty that demands a sustained intervention, one that historicizes the political and economic dimensions of the rhetoric of democracy in the US.

#### While they forget about suffering, people die on the streets

 George Yancy, 2008, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Duquesne University, Black bodies, white gazes: the continuing significance of race, p. 299

Although there are many while antiracists who do fight and will continue to fight against the operations of white power, and while it is true that the regulatory power of whiteness will invariably attempt to undermine such efforts, it is important that white antiracists realize how much is at stake. While antiracist whites take time to get their shit together, a luxury that is a species of privilege, Black bodies and bodies of color continue to suffer, their bodies cry out for the political and existential urgency for the immediate undoing of the oppressive operations of whiteness. Here, the very notion of the temporal gets racialized. My point here is that even as whites take the time to theorize the complexity of whiteness, revealing its various modes of resistance to radical transformation, Black bodies continue to endure tremendous pain and suffering. Doing theory in the service of undoing whiteness comes with its own snares and seductions, its own comfort zones, and reinscription of distances. Whites who deploy theory in the service of fighting against white racism must caution against the seduction of white narcissism, the recentering of whiteness, even if it is the object of critical reflection, and, hence, the process of sequestration from the real world of weeping, suffering, and traumatized Black bodies impacted by the operations of white power. As antiracist whites continue to make mistakes and continue to falter in the face of institutional interpellation and habituated racist reflexes, tomorrow, a Black body will be murdered as it innocently reaches for its wallet. The sheer weight of this reality mocks the patience of theory.

## Civilization K

### Civilization stuffz

#### Placing nuclear war within a doomsday frame allows privilege to side-step issues of racism and oppression – people of color have lost their culture for centuries and live in constant war every day

Barbara Omolade 1984 Calvin College’ first dean of multicultural affairs [“Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust”, Women’s Studies Quarterly vol. 12, No. 2]

To raise these issues effectively, the movement for nuclear disarmament must overcome its reluctance to speak in terms of power, of institutional racism and imperialist military terror. The issues of nuclear disarmament and peace have been mystified because they have been placed within a doomsday frame which separates these issues from other ones, saying. "How can we talk about struggles against racism, poverty, and exploitation when there will be no world after they drop the bombs?" The struggle for peace cannot be separated from, nor considered more sacrosanct than, other struggles concerned with human life and change In April. 1979. the US Aims Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the United States and The Soviet Union. 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World. The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war. as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation's crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people And the housing of people of color throughout the world's urban areas are already blighted and inhumane, families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets, even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago. Our world. with its Own languages, customs and ways, ended And we are only now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for It, and rebuild it in our own image The "death culture" we live in has convinced many to be more concerned with death than with life. more willing to demonstrate for "survival at any cost" than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands. As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people's wars in China, in Cuba. In Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement. The women's movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but The only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people

#### Kato DA – the notion that nuclear war causes “extinction” ignores the on-going nuclear war conducting against indigenous nations – delocalizes catastrophe

**Kato 93** (Masahide, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Alternatives 18, 339-360) jl

Nuclear criticism finds the likelihood of "extinction" as the most fundamental aspect of nuclear catastrophe. The complex problematics involved in nuclear catastrophe are thus reduced to the single possible instant of extinction. The task of nuclear critics is clearly designated by Schell as coming to grips with the one and only final instant: "human extinction—whose likelihood we are chiefly interested in finding out about"35 Deconstructionists, on the other hand, take a detour in their efforts to theologize extinction. Jacques Derrida, for example, solidified the prevailing mode of representation by constituting extinction as a fatal absence: Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or text. At least today apparendy.36 By representing the possible extinction as the single most important problematic of nuclear catastrophe (posing it as either a threat or a symbolic void), nuclear criticism disqualifies the entire history of nuclear violence, the "real" of nuclear catastrophe as a continuous and repetitive process. The "real" of nuclear war is designated by nuclear critics as a "rehearsal" (Derrik De Kerkhove) or "preparation" (Firth) for what they reserve as the authentic catastrophe." The history of nuclear violence offers, at best, a reality effect to the imagery of "extinction." Schell summarized the discursive position of nuclear critics very succincdy, by stating that nuclear catastrophe should not be conceptualized "in the context of direct slaughter of hundreds of millions people by the local effects."38 Thus the elimination of the history of nuclear violence by nuclear critics stems from the process of discursive "derealization" of nuclear violence. Their primary focus is not local catastrophe, but delocalized, unlocatable, "global" catastrophe. The elevation of the discursive vantage point deployed in nuclear criticism through which extinction is conceptualized parallels that of the point of the strategic gaze: nuclear criticism raises the notion of nuclear catastrophe to the "absolute" point from which the fiction of extinction" is configured. Herein, the configuration of the globe and the conceptualization of "extinction" reveal their interconnection via the "absolutization" of the strategic gaze. In the same way as the fiction of the totality of the earth is constructed, the fiction of extinction is derived from the figure perceived through the strategic gaze. In other words, the image of the globe, in the final instance, is nothing more than a figure on which the notion of extinction is being constructed. Schell, for instance, repeatedly encountered difficulty in locating the subject involved in the conceptualization of extinction, which in turn testifies to its figural origin: "who will suffer this loss, which we somehow regard as supreme? We, the living, will not suffer it; we will be dead. Nor will the unborn shed any tears over their lost chance to exist; to do so they would have to exist already."39 Robert Lifton attributed such difficulty in locating the subject to the "numbing effect" of nuclear psychology. In other words, Lifton tied the difficulty involved here not to the question of subjectivity per se but to psychological defenses against the overwhelming possibility of extinction. The hollowness of extinction can be unraveled better if we locate it in the mode of perception rather than in nebulous nuclear psychology: the hollowness of extinction is a result of "confusing figure with the object"40 This phenomenon, called "the delirium of interpretation" by Virilio, is a mechanical process in which incorporeal existence is given a meaning via the figure.41 It is no doubt a manifestation of technosubjectivity symptomatic of late capitalism. Hence, the obscurity of the subject in the configuration of extinction results from the dislocation of the subject by the technosubject functioning as a meaning-generating machine. Technosubjectivity deployed in configuring "extinction" is the product of interfaces among the camera's eyes, photo (or video) image, the ultimate speed materialized by rockets and satellite communications, and nuclear warheads. Carol Cohn persuasively analyzed one such aspect of the interface in shaping and structuring the discourse of defense intellectuals: in the discourse, of nuclear war, national security, and nuclear criticism, it is the bomb that is the subject of discourse.42 The satellite communications, rockets, camera's eye, nuclear warheads, and other technostrategic gadgets, which are rendered subject in the field of discourse and perception, are essentially a fixed capital. Therefore, although the problem of technosubjectivity seems to be a new phenomenon in the age of high technology, it remains part of an ongoing process of subject-object inversion inherent in the very concept of capital. Having established the link between the disqualification (or derealization) of the history ("real") of nuclear catastrophe on the one hand and the mode of Nuclear criticism offers preservation of self and matter as a solution to its own imaginary/ideological construct of extinction (as manifested in the buzzword "freeze"). Accordingly, preservation of self and matter as an alternative to the inertia of the "unthinkable" cannot be anything but an imaginary/ideological construct It is in this fantasy that one can find the ideological content of globalism. The proposition of preservation as a solution to the imagined extinction at the same time involves redefinition of the notion of "humanity." The image of extinction drove even a Marxist, namely, E. E Thompson, to abandon "class" analysis, embracing humanity instead: "exterminism itself is not a 'class issue': it is a human issue."43 In this sense, nuclear criticism recreates the Renaissance in the late capitalist era in its reinvention of humanity through technosubjectivity. Robert Lifton defined the collectivity in danger by comparing the threat of extinction with the hostage-taking, which I turn entails a very revealing redefinition of humanity: But unlike ordinary hostage taking, nuclear terror encompasses everyone. Precisely for that reason it throws us back on our collective humanity. In calling into question the idea of human future, it raises equally ultimate questions about our evolutionary equipment for shaping that threatened future.” <CONTINUED> But what does "humanity" designate? Who are "we"? Sontag also encountered this obscure notion of humanity created by the photo images, and she deciphered it as "a quality things have in common when they are viewed as photographs."45 Again we cannot escape from finding the figural origin (i.e., photo image of the globe) of the construction of "humanity." Herein the "interpretative delirium" proceeds with the disguise of "universalism," establishing a total "deregulation" in exchanges among what are reconstructed as objects by way of figure. The regime of the "absolute" subject (i.e., technosubject) governs this deregulated image economy where heterogeneous existence of subjectivity (whose epistemological basis is anchored in locality) is reduced to one of many objects. The notion of humanity is thus a reification of the regime of the absolute technosubject cloaked in pseudo-universality.

#### Their apocalyptic rhetoric makes war inevitable

Peter Coviello, Assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, 2k “Apocalypse From Now On”

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

# 1AR

## Zupancic

### 1AR—Life-Affirmation

#### Group their turns – they just prove their failure to affirm ordinary life.

Ofelia Schutte, Professor of Philosophy, 1984, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks, p. 189-90

The main problem that appears to delimit Nietzsche’s philosophical affirmation of life is his failure to value human life as much as life in its totality. His advances over nihilism are rooted in the notion that there is no need to invent a more perfect form of life (as in the notion of an afterlife) since life already has sufficient meaning and value. The Dionysian struggle against the Socratic approach to existence is based on the view that reason has exceeded its role when it purports to define the meaning of life in terms of reason itself. And yet, the same opportunity that Nietzsche would like to see given to life is denied to human life. There is an irresistible tendency on Nietzsche's part to deny the value of human life as such and to accept it as valuable only if it is perfect, noble, or strong.

The dualism between good and evil is maintained as a measure of human worth. The fact that the dualism remains, however, means that the broader project of the affirmation of life in its totality is blocked. Zarathustra's position serves as an illustration of this dilemma. His love of life is stifled by the torture he experiences at the thought that "small" human beings will recur eternally. Human weakness and failure elicit in Zarathustra a sense of nausea for the whole of existence. His perception and appraisal of reality appear to be out of balance. Even though Zarathustra finally accepts the idea of the recurrence, he makes his choice at the cost of his separation from humanity. He drops all human contact and stays in the mountains, desiring intercourse with eternity atone. There is an important split between his desire to affirm life and his inability to affirm human life. Human life still appears to be too small, too insignificant and wretched to Nietzsche. Thus he constantly seeks grandeur. Nietzsche noted that human life has dwindled because human beings lack opportunities for integrated and creative activities. It is a mistake, however, to link creativity and international with the quality of greatness. The demand for greatness involves a value judgment against anything that is not exceptionally powerful or distinguished. This involves a devaluation of the ordinary aspects of human life. If these aspects do not count toward making human life meaningful, however, then one is still exhibiting a nihilistic attitude toward human existence. Nietzsche is right in claiming that nihilism must be overcome in order for human beings to lead creative and resourceful lives. On the other hand, when he associates the latter values with the creation of a strong and majestic culture. he delimits the meaning of creativity. The expectations he places upon it are nihilistic as long as creativity is made to it under a paradigm of domination.