# Round 3---NDCA

# 2AC

## Pain Spectacle K

### AT: Visibility Bad

#### Status quo politics hides racism – only a risk that visibility makes things better – public recognition of the system is key

Charles Mills, 1997, The Racial Contract, p. 1-3

White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today. You will not find this term in introductory, or even advanced, texts in political theory. A standard undergraduate philosophy course will start off with Plato and Aristotle, perhaps say something about Augustine, Aquinas, and Machiavelli, move on to Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Marx, and then wind up with Rawls and Nozick. It will introduce you to notions of aristocracy, democracy, absolutism, liberalism, representative government, socialism, welfare capitalism, and libertarianism. But though it covers more than two thousand years of Western political thought and runs the ostensible gamut of political systems, there will be no mention of the basic political system that has shaped the world for the past several hundred years. And this omission is not accidental. Rather, it reflects the fact that standard textbooks and courses have for the most part been written and designed by whites, who take their racial privilege so much for granted that they do not even see it as political, as a form of domination. Ironically, the most important political system of recent global history—the system of domination by which white people have historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule over nonwhite people—is not seen as a political system at all. It is just taken for granted; it is the background against which other systems, which we are to see as political, are highlighted. This book is an attempt to redirect your vision, to make you see what, in a sense, has been there all along. / Philosophy bias remained remarkably untouched by the debates over multiculturalism, canon reform, and ethnic diversity racking the academy; both demographically and conceptually, it is one of the "whitest" of the humanities. Blacks, for example, constitute only about 1 percent of philosophers in North American universities—a hundred or so people out of more than ten thousand—and there are even fewer Latino, Asian American, and Native American philosophers.1 Surely this underrepresentation itself stands in need of an explanation, and in my opinion it can be traced in part to a conceptual array and a standard repertoire of concerns whose abstractness typically elides, rather than genuinely includes, the experience of racial minorities. Since (white) women have the demographic advantage of numbers, there are of course far more female philosophers in the profession than nonwhite philosophers (though still not proportionate to women's percentage of the population), and they have made far greater progress in developing alternative conceptualizations. Those African American philosophers who do work in moral and political theory tend cither to produce general work indistinguishable from that of their white peers or to focus on local issues (affirmative action, the black "underclass") or historical figures (W. E. B. Du Bois, Alain Locke) in a way that does not aggressively engage the broader debate. / What is needed is a global theoretical framework for situating discussions of race and while racism, and thereby challenging the assumptions of white political philosophy, which would correspond to feminist theorists' articulation of the centrality of gender, patriarchy, and sexism to traditional moral and political theory. What is needed, in other words, is a recognition that racism (or, as I will argue, global white supremacy) is itself a political system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties. The notion of the Racial Contract is, 1 suggest, one possible way of making this connection with mainstream theory, since it uses the vocabulary and apparatus already developed for contractarianism to map this unacknowledged system. Contract talk is, after all, the political lingua franca of our times.

#### This silence sustains racism – visibility is absolutely necessary

Carrie Crenshaw, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University of Alabama, Summer 1997, “Resisting whiteness' rhetorical silence,” Western Journal of Communication 61.3, ebsco

\*\*Yellow Highlighting – sorry about that

In academic and political discourse, it is also rare for white people to explicitly reference their whiteness. The strictures of the "approved identity" in academic writing often prevent us from revealing our personal social locations and experiences (Blair, Brown and Baxter 402). Public political figures likewise avoid mentioning whiteness in their discourse (Nakayama and Krizek 297) even though the color of American politics is implicit in current debates about welfare, affirmative action, crime, and a host of other issues. Moreover, such discourse tends to ignore the ways in which race, gender, and class intersect with each other to perpetuate oppressive human hierarchies (Crenshaw, "Beyond"; Lorde). / Because discursive constructions of whiteness are typically unmarked and unnamed in personal, academic, and public discourse, they present a constellation of challenges for rhetorical scholars who are interested in the ideological role of whiteness in intersecting discourses about race, gender, and class. Previous rhetorical scholarship has focused on racist public discourse (e.g., Wander, "Salvation"; Wander, "The Savage"; Himelstein; Logue; Logue and Garner; Trank), but Nakayama and Krizek have recently taken our thinking a step further by mapping the terrain of whiteness. In a provocative study which names whiteness as a strategic rhetoric, they ethnographically "map" the "everyday" strategies of the spoken rhetoric of whiteness from a cultural studies perspective. They are "interested in ... the constructed space of whiteness, not the ways that it influences the margins" and "do[es] not address racism or racist ideology, although [they acknowledge that] these are closely aligned to many of the ways that whiteness is constructed" (306n). Their conclusion invites us to move beyond their initial topological project to investigate how the rhetoric of whiteness functions in the context of other social relations, particularly gender (303-305). In this essay, I accept their invitation and join the ongoing interdisciplinary conversation about whiteness (e.g., Allen; Dutcher; Dyer; Feagin and Vera; Frankenberg; Frye; Harris; hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek; Roediger). Because whiteness and its intersections with gender and class are steeped in silence (hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek), this essay argues that rhetoricians must do the critical ideological work necessary to make whiteness visible and overturn its silences for the purpose of resisting racism. / To do this, scholars must locate interactions that implicate unspoken issues of race, discursive spaces where the power of whiteness is invoked but its explicit terminology is not, and investigate how these racialized constructions intersect with gender and class. One such interaction was the debate between Carolyn Moseley Braun (D-IL) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) over the U.S. Senate's decision whether to grant a fourteen-year extension of the design patent for the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) insignia. Because the UDC insignia contains a representation of the Confederate flag, the debate centered on whether a Senate approval of the patent would commend a charitable patriotic organization or commemorate an historical symbol of racism. Accounts of this debate were widely disseminated in the national news media and described Moseley Braun's argument as a dramatic history-making challenge to racism in the U.S. Senate (e.g., Clymer; Lee; McGrory). "For once Senators changed their minds. Things that are usually decided in the cloakroom, were settled on the floor in plain sight" (McGrory A2). Helms spoke first and Moseley Braun responded. After Helms' second speech, the motion to table the amendment was rejected 52 to 48. However, Moseley Braun was ultimately victorious; after her final speech, the patent extension was denied on a 75 to 25 vote. / This debate is a uniquely interesting rhetorical artifact because it was a direct and public clash of arguments about race in political discourse. It constitutes an important example of how two public political actors' discourse about race and how the personal dimensions of race, gender, and class entered into their public argument. In the next section, I argue that ideological rhetorical criticism is an appropriate avenue for analyzing interactions like this one. / Ideological Rhetorical Criticism / There is nothing essential, "natural," or biological about whiteness. Because the overwhelming unity of our genetic makeup swamps any human differences that have historically been attributed to race (Appiah 21; Shipman 269), race itself has been called a biological fiction (Gates 4). It is the historically located rhetorical meaning of whiteness that assigns it social worth (Nakayama and Krizek 292). / Whiteness functions ideologically when people employ it, consciously or unconsciously, as a framework to categorize people and understand their social locations. Within this framework, whiteness as a social position has value and has been treated legally as property (Bell; Crenshaw "Race"; Feagin and Vera; Harris). The term "white privilege" denotes a host of material advantages white people enjoy as a result of being socially and rhetorically located as a white person (Crenshaw, "Race"; Mcintosh; Wellman). Even though many white people sense that privilege accompanies whiteness (Feagin and Vera), they do not overtly acknowledge their white privilege because they think of themselves as average, morally neutral non-racists. They do not see racism as an ideology that protects the interests of all white people; rather, they envision racism in the form of white hooded Klansmen engaged in acts of racial hatred (Mcintosh 34; Ezekiel 1). Because this ideology can be produced and reproduced through spoken discourse (van Dijk; Goldberg), whiteness and its privilege have both ideological and rhetorical dimensions. / Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals the vested interests protected by a particular rhetorical framework for understanding social order. It assists the search for alternatives to oppression and enables us to engage in right action for good reasons (Wander, "The Ideological" 2, 18). While cultural and ethnographic approaches that name the complexities of our racialized social locations make the rhetoric of whiteness visible and displace its centrality (Nakayama and Krizek), an ideological approach helps to uncover the alliance between the submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness and white material privilege. Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals how the public political rhetoric of whiteness relies upon a silent denial of white privilege to rationalize judicial, legislative, and executive decisions that protect the material interests of white people at the expense of people of color.[ 3] Beyond the realm of "everyday" discourse, public political actors often engage a submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness to protect white privilege, and their arguments are authorized by the powerful institutions from which they speak. Those authorized arguments in turn sanction the rhetorical frameworks through which white individuals make sense of and justify their privileged social status (van Dijk; Wellman). / Stuart Hall's work is useful for grasping the rhetorical nature of ideology in general and racist ideologies in specific. He defines ideology as "those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence" ("The Whites" 18). Ideological struggles are struggles over meaning. Meaning is a social production, a practice of making the world mean something, and this meaning is produced through language. Language is not a synonym for ideology because the same terms can be used in very different ideological discourses. However, language is the principle medium of ideologies, and ideologies are sets or chains of meaning located in language ("The Rediscovery" 67, 81; "The Whites" 18). / These chains of meaning are not the products of individual intention even though they are statements made by individuals. Instead, intentions are formed within pre-existing ideologies because individuals are born into them. Ideologies live within what we take-for-granted. They exist in our assumptions and descriptive statements about how the world is. "Ideologies tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted 'naturalised' world of common sense. Since (like gender) race appears to be 'given' by Nature, racism is one of the most profoundly 'naturalised' of existing ideologies" (Hall, "The Whites" 19). / To understand how racist ideologies operate, Hall draws upon the work of Antonio Gramsci. While Gramsci did not explicitly theorize about race, he did investigate the ideological and cultural implications of region and nation. Hall embraces Gramsci's argument that ideologies function hegemonically to preserve powerful interests. That is to say, ideologies are taken-for-granted frameworks that naturalize our descriptions of the way the world is, including its current power structures. This power is not achieved solely by coercive might; it also operates through the consent of those who are subjugated. Hegemony is the production of consent that determines what is taken-for-granted. So, our taken-for-granted, naturalized assumptions of what makes common sense produce and reinforce our consent to the current social order and its power structures. The advantage of Gramsci's position is that it makes room for an oppositional consciousness because it recognizes that hegemony is historically contingent. Because hegemony is never stable and is always an ongoing and fluid process of gaining consent, social transformation through the critical examination of current relations of power is possible. / Following Gramsci, Hall also believes that it is essential to analyze the historical specificity of racist ideologies in a non-reductive manner. He rejects the gross form of economism in which everything is seen to be determined by class structures, and instead he highlights the need to understand and conceptualize other oppressive forms of social differentiation including culture, region, nationality, and ethnicity. Doing so enables a productive reconceptualization of the "class subject." The class subject is not homogenous; there is never simple unity among people said to be of the same "class." Rather, hegemony is a dynamic process of the production of consent within and between different sectors and segments within classes. Thus, Gramsci's work can help us to understand how race and class intersect. We need not accept the false choice between class based explanations and race based explanations. In addition, Hall argues that Gramsci's notion of hegemony helps us to understand one of the most common, least explained features of 'racism': the 'subjection' of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideologies which imprison and define them. He reveals how different, often contradictory elements can be woven into and integrated within different ideological discourses; but also, the nature and value of ideological struggle which seeks to transform popular ideas and the 'common sense' of the masses. All of this has the most profound importance for the analysis of racist ideologies and for the centrality, within that, of ideological struggle. ("Gramsci's" 440) / A critical ideological approach to racialized discourse reveals the ongoing struggle over the meaning of race. It makes room for oppositional consciousness by helping us to "see" the meaning of racialized constructions and the vested interests they protect so that we can contest them. In addition, as the following analysis of the Braun-Helms debate illustrates, it enables our understanding of the intersections among racialized, gendered, and class discourses.

### AT: Academia

#### We all know that debate is militarized now up now – however, we can’t just sit here and do nothing – we must visibly retake the academy and the knowledge that it produces

Henry A. Giroux, #1 badass, 11-20-2008, “Against the Militarized Academy,” [http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138:against-the-militarized-academy](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy)

While there is an ongoing discussion about what shape the military-industrial complex will take under an Obama presidency, what is often left out of this analysis is the intrusion of the military into higher education. One example of the increasingly intensified and expansive symbiosis between the military-industrial complex and academia was on full display when Robert Gates, the secretary of defense, announced the creation of what he calls a new "Minerva Consortium," ironically named after the goddess of wisdom, whose purpose is to fund various universities to "carry out social-sciences research relevant to national security."([1](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy#1)) Gates's desire to turn universities into militarized knowledge factories producing knowledge, research and personnel in the interest of the Homeland (In)Security State should be of special concern for intellectuals, artists, academics and others who believe that the university should oppose such interests and alignments. At the very least, the emergence of the Minerva Consortium raises a larger set of concerns about the ongoing militarization of higher education in the United States. In a post-9/11 world, with its all-embracing war on terror and a culture of fear, the increasing spread of the discourse and values of militarization throughout the social order is intensifying the shift from the promise of a liberal democracy to the reality of a militarized society. Militarization suggests more than simply a militaristic ideal - with its celebration of war as the truest measure of the health of the nation and the soldier-warrior as the most noble expression of the merging of masculinity and unquestioning patriotism – [and] an intensification and expansion of the underlying values, practices, ideologies, social relations and cultural representations associated with military culture. What appears new about the amplified militarization of the post-9/11 world is that it has become normalized, serving as a powerful educational force that shapes our lives, memories and daily experiences. As an educational force, military power produces identities, goods, institutions, knowledge, modes of communication and affective investments - in short, it now bears down on all aspects of social life and the social order. As Michael Geyer points out, what is distinctive about the militarization of the social order is that civil society not only "organizes itself for the production of violence,"([2](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy#2)) but increasingly spurs a gradual erosion of civil liberties. Military power and policies are expanded to address not only matters of defense and security, but also problems associated with the entire health and social life of the nation, which are now measured by military spending, discipline and loyalty, as well as hierarchical modes of authority. As citizens increasingly assume the roles of informer, soldier and consumer willing to enlist in or be conscripted by the totalizing war on terror, we see the very idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research being usurped by a manic jingoism and a market-driven fundamentalism that enshrine the entrepreneurial spirit and military aggression as means to dominate and control society. This should not surprise us, since, as William G. Martin, a professor of sociology at Binghamton University, indicates, "universities, colleges and schools have been targeted precisely because they are charged with both socializing youth and producing knowledge of peoples and cultures beyond the borders of Anglo-America."([3](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy#3)) But rather than be lulled into complacency by the insidious spread of corporate and military power, we need to be prepared to reclaim institutions such as the university that have historically served as vital democratic spheres protecting and serving the interests of social justice and equality. What I want to suggest is that such a struggle is not only political, but also pedagogical in nature. Over 17 million students pass through the hallowed halls of academe, and it is crucial that they be educated in ways that enable them to recognize creeping militarization and its effects throughout American society, particularly in terms of how these effects threaten "democratic government at home just as they menace the independence and sovereignty of other countries."([4](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy#4)) But students must also recognize how such anti-democratic forces work in attempting to dismantle the university itself as a place to learn how to think critically and participate in public debate and civic engagement.([5](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy#5)) In part, this means giving them the tools to fight for the demilitarization of knowledge on college campuses - to resist complicity with the production of knowledge, information and technologies in classrooms and research labs that contribute to militarized goals and violence. Even so, there is more at stake than simply educating students to be alert to the dangers of militarization and the way in which it is redefining the very mission of higher education. Chalmers Johnson, in his continuing critique of the threat that the politics of empire presents to democracy at home and abroad, argues that if the United States is not to degenerate into a military dictatorship, in spite of Obama's election, a grass-roots movement will have to occupy center stage in opposing militarization, government secrecy and imperial power, while reclaiming the basic principles of democracy.([6](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy#6)) Such a task may seem daunting, but there is a crucial need for faculty, students, administrators and concerned citizens to develop alliances for long-term organizations and social movements to resist the growing ties among higher education, on the one hand, and the armed forces, intelligence agencies and war industries on the other - ties that play a crucial role in reproducing militarized knowledge. Opposing militarization as part of a broader pedagogical strategy in and out of the classroom also raises the question of what kinds of competencies, skills and knowledge might be crucial to such a task. One possibility is to develop critical educational theories and practices that define the space of learning not only through the critical consumption of knowledge but also through its production for peaceful and socially just ends. In the fight against militarization and "armed intellectuals," educators need a language of critique, but they also need a language that embraces a sense of hope and collective struggle. This means elaborating the meaning of politics through a concerted effort to expand the space of politics by reclaiming "the public character of spaces, relations, and institutions regarded as private" on the other.([7](http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138%3Aagainst-the-militarized-academy#7)) We live at a time when matters of life and death are central to political governance. While registering the shift in power toward the large-scale production of death, disposability and exclusion, a new understanding of the meaning and purpose of higher education must also point to notions of agency, power and responsibility that operate in the service of life, democratic struggles and the expansion of human rights. Finally, if higher education is to come to grips with the multilayered pathologies produced by militarization, it will have to rethink not merely the space of the university as a democratic public sphere, but also the global space in which intellectuals, educators, students, artists, labor unions and other social actors and movements can form transnational alliances to oppose the death-dealing ideology of militarization and its effects on the world - including violence, pollution, massive poverty, racism, the arms trade, growth of privatized armies, civil conflict, child slavery and the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the Bush regime comes to an end, it is time for educators and students to take a stand and develop global organizations that can be mobilized in the effort to supplant a culture of war with a culture of peace, whose elemental principles must be grounded in relations of economic, political, cultural and social democracy and the desire to sustain human life.

## Framework

### 2AC C/I – Discussion of Rez

#### Resolved is to reduce through mental analysis

Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved?s=ts>)

to reduce by mental analysis (often followed by into).

### AT: Decisionmaking

#### Reifying political decisionmakers places them beyond analysis and causes mass bandwagoning—turns us into ideological zombies

Antti Talvitie is Professor (Emeritus) in Aalto University, Finland, and Adjunct Professor in Virginia Tech and has private practice in Virginia, USA. Previously he worked in the World Bank, in the private sector, served as Director of Highway Construction and Maintenance in Finland, and as Professor and Chairman of Civil Engineering at the State University of New York in Buffalo. He has a PhD from Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, and a Certificate in Psychoanalysis from the Boston Graduate School in Psychoanalysis, July 11, 2012 (“The problem of trust in planning,” Planning Theory 11(3) 257–278)

 Theories and ideas, truth and justice as creators of (abstract) trust

“Abstract trust” is the one most linked to the “external object”, the ego ideal. While a planner’s ego ideal has early roots—dispositions, rather—those dispositions are capable of more than one expression. Therefore the planner’s education (including emotional education) is of paramount importance. The planning and engineering schools’ education is about alloplastic change: how to design and change the external world or promote economic growth and the methods and skills to do so. **Examination of the students’ personal values and motivations is neglected. This point is important: what is crucial is an examination of the values and motivations, the ego ideals, and not merely didactic lecturing about what they ought to be.** But, just to be clear, education and training in alloplastic change is important and cannot, of course, be neglected.

As a result, planning is principally a (pseudo)intellectual exercise and this approach **carries over to decision-making.** **The planning literature takes the (political) decision-maker**, **a mysterious figure, for granted and often viewed beyond the reach of analysis**. Planning proposals often support what is wished for by the decision-makers, regardless whether this wish is explicitly conveyed or not. Also the academics are prone to “jump on the bandwagon” and present positive findings and benefits of politically attractive options and not infrequently give a short shrift to costs, disbenefits and benefit transfers. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is difficult, and probably **harmful to one’s career**, whether as planner or a consultant, to make non-partisan evaluations or even to disagree professionally with the “management”. And it is here where the abstract ego ideal, a believable theory and pursuit of “truth”, can go a long way to help the professional planner and consultant. Jeffersonian and Rawlsian (ego) ideals of equality, liberty and justice enshrined in the US constitution are important concepts, which need to be examined in group settings, in the classroom and personally. This calls for extra competencies from the educators. It is important, for one’s concept of the ego ideal, that the study of “psychical dispositions” is not only intellectual or brainstorming on the matter. To get such a study process off the ground I discuss, after two detours, in the section How does trust occur or begin to develop, a common beginning of narcissistic transference. And in the following section I outline how narcissistic transference9 is a transitional phase in “re-educating” one’s ego ideal, and how to evolve it to trust and a concept useful to the planning profession.

### AT: Limits

#### Fairness isn’t a thing – portable education is the only impact

Branson 07 [Josh, NDT/TOC winner from Northwestern & St. Marks, Harvard Law school Graduate, Current lawyer; <http://osdir.com/ml/education.region.usa.edebate/2007-11/msg00295.html>]

There is no such thing as unfairness. If you respond to this and don’t make an argument about the terminal value of debate, then you have not thought about this enough. Overlooking the issue of big/small school and coaching resources (another topic for another time), I think all teams start at the same point. Everyone has access to the resolution, everyone has access to the same literature base, and everyone has the same speech time to fill. Whenever one side makes a move, it closes some doors strategically and opens others. Your job is to find it. I think whining about unfairness is almost always lame and untruthful. Think about the classic unfairness arguments: [insert K team] is unfair because they don’t have a plan we’re ready for. You know, it?s funny, but thinking back over my college debate career, I spent more time agonizing about and arguing with coaches over these far-left teams than I did the other top-5 quality teams. And, while I’ve said this before, I’ll say it again: I think that exact process is one of the main benefits of debate. Forcing yourself to adapt to circumstances in which you?re not comfortable, being made to alter your thinking on the run when you don?t have your same old stale blocks, when you have to make new cognitive connections and investigate literature bases which you are not familiar? I think THAT is the value-added of debate. I’ve written about this extensively before, but debate does not train people to be policy experts. Hell, if I’d wanted to have a sweet career in the policy world, I would have been better served quitting debate and learning Chinese. I’m not going to repeat everything I’ve said previously, but, at least for me, debate taught to be more intellectually versatile and flexible than almost anyone outside of debate that I know. That is something I think is extremely valuable both intellectually (to the debater) and socially.And, you see, it’s things that are 'unfair' that encourage this type of adaptation. Take yourselves off your theory clitche-ridden blocks for a while, and actually think about it,: how many things make it IMPOSSIBLE to win. None. How many things make it harder? A lot. But again, almost any time someone makes a good argument, it becomes harder for the other side to win. That’s what debate is. It’s about making things hard on the other side and not letting them make it hard for you. That’s what learning is. Fairness claims are bad because they contravene the idea of debate. If I?m right that fairness impacts really just conceal an assumption about what the value of debate is, then I think just directly making counter-arguments about the role of debate and cutting out the rhetoric of fairness is profoundly beneficial. I barely even need to point out that life isn?t fair. I think it's way more helpful to conceive of theory arguments in terms of routing debate towards productive ends than it is to maintain some pedantic obsession with fairness. I think the rhetorical message kids should be getting is that they should react to what they perceive of as ‘unfair’ practices by adapting, not whining. Because, when we are honest with ourselves and take ourselves off our oft-repeated theory cliches, is anything really THAT unfair I can’t really think of a single time in debate that would meet that test. I will tell you something though; right along with the shitty quality of evidence, theory arguments are at the top of the list of things that marginalize debate as a good training device. It's something that people outside debate don't really understand, and it's by far the most boring thing to judge, and, just as a matter of empirical observation, the people that do it a lot tend to be the laziest ones.

#### Claims of fairness, objectivity, predictability are ways to marginalize the out group and retrench power structures

Delgado, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled  [\*820]  to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what  [\*821]  really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.

#### Aff outweighs – leads to real world change – the LBS movement proves

Dana Roe Polson, former debate coach and Co-Director, teacher, and founder of ConneXions Community Leadership Academy, 2012 “Longing for Theory:” Performance Debate in Action,” <http://gradworks.umi.com/3516242.pdf>

I think the Talented Tenth is actually the wrong metaphor for leadership in the performance debate community. Du Bois, later in his life, sharply criticized and disavowed a reliance on the Black elite to lead, believing that they were more preoccupied with individual gain than with group struggle, and willing to work within current structures rather than calling for radical change. They were becoming Americanized, Du Bois believed, and deradicalized. This deradicalization “occurs when more privileged African Americans (re) align themselves to function as a middle class interested in individual group gain rather than race leadership for mass development” (James, 1997, p. 24). Instead of his youthful belief in the Black elite, “Gradually, black working-class activists surpassed elites in Du Bois’s estimation of political integrity and progressive agency. He democratized his concept of race leaders through the inclusion of the radicalism of nonelites” (James, 1997, p. 21). The young people who have emerged as leaders in the performance debate community were definitely not those Du Bois would have identified as the Talented Tenth in 1903. Du Bois was talking to and about the Black elite, the educated middle class. Earlier in Du Bois’s life, he assumed that those people, college-educated, were the natural leaders. My participants who might be seen as potential leaders do not come from such backgrounds. Many do end up going to college and becoming potential leaders, but they are privileged through this process rather than prior to it. In addition, their focus is most definitely political as opposed to cultural. Nowhere in my research did I hear a Bill Cosby-esque injunction for Black people to shape up and work harder. Instead, the critique is focused on “uplift as group struggle” for continued liberation. Finally, these young leaders are most definitely radicalized as opposed to interested in incremental change that rocks no boats. From CRT and their open critique of white supremacy to their willingness to call for change openly in debate rounds, these young leaders are contentious and bold. Two of my participants, and many of their former debate peers, are involved with a Baltimore group called Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (LBS). The website of the LBS establishes their identity: We are a dedicated group of Baltimore citizens who want to change the city through governmental policy action. Our purpose is to provide tangible, concrete solutions to Baltimore’s problems and to analyze the ways that external forces have contributed to the overall decline of our city. (“Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle,” n.d.) As we see in this statement of identity, then, LBS as one model of leadership is focused on the political and on an analysis of external influences; this focus is very different from a racial uplift position, and their model of leadership very different from the Talented Tenth. LBS has developed platforms regarding jobs, education, incarceration, and many other issues facing Black people in the city. They hold monthly forums for discussion of these topics, inviting guests and discussing the topics themselves. Further, one of the LBS members ran for City Council this year. He lost, but plans to run again. The training my participants discuss, therefore, is not in the abstract: it is training for the real world, for their own empowerment and that of their communities. This work is extending into local high schools, as well, and Paul Robeson High School now has students involved in LBS. They attend events and meetings not only to help out but as a form of leadership training.

### AT: Truth Testing

#### Roleplaying of the state makes it impossible to make decisions in real life and foreclose agency

Antonio ‘95 (Robert, University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43, JS)
The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate inenduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

#### You should be an informed citizen, not the government – roleplaying shuts down critical thinking and deliberation

Steele 10—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

(Brent, *Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics* pg 130-132, dml)

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s primary purpose should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, ¶ we must avoid a trap into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do.” This is not a question in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts refused us, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 ¶ This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and used for *mechanisms of control*, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. ¶ When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, instead, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who plays the role of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. ¶ What the President needs, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of the brittleness of power, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its limits and pitfalls; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to listen to that voice and tremble. (1970: 28) ¶ The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” are missing the point. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “tell the story” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “tact,” “rules,” and seduction that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and no more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation” ([1964] 2006: 233).

#### Framework is just another form of policing - vote aff if we win this argument because the policing is already done

Stephano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University and Fred Moten, Associate professor of African American studies and visual studies at the University of California, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study”

Stefano: Yeah, I feel that’s true. What I think is that each one is a different way to get at a similar set of questions, to think about the general antagonism, to think about blackness, to think about the undercommons. I think the impulse for me and Fred is always to try and move towards the stuff that we like, and to move towards the mode of living that we like. We know that sometimes that involves moving through certain kinds of critique of what’s holding us back. But, for me, each time, what’s going on is that I’m trying to elaborate a different mode of living together with others, of being with others, not just with other people but with other things and other kinds of senses. At one point, for me anyway, I felt very strongly that this kind of policy world was emerging everywhere – and I wanted to talk with Fred about how to find our stuff again amidst all this kind of policy work in which everybody seemed from every spot at any moment to be making policy. I had this image in my head of a kind of return to a world in which every self-determined individual had the right to make brutal policy on the spot for every person who was not selfdetermined, which essentially is a colonial or slave situation – and the kind of ubiquity of policy, which all of a sudden, didn’t emanate anymore just from government but from ~~fucking~~ policy shops in every university, and from independent policy shops, and from bloggers, etc. These policy people to me are like night riders. So, I felt at that moment it was necessary to deal with it in terms of, what would you say is going on that occasioned that kind of frenzied attack, this total mobilisation of the ‘fixed’? What provoked this? That’s why we ended up talking about planning. But there’s also a part where Fred is very directly able to address blackness in a piece. So, we were able to start with something that we were feeling was an elaboration of our mode of living, our inherited black radical tradition. Then, that piece ends up with a kind of caution around governance. At least from my point of view, I’m always approaching Fred, hanging out with Fred, to say, we know that there are things we like, so how can we elaborate them this time, not just for each other but also for other people, to say to others let’s keep fighting, keep doing our thing. So, it’s true that it isn’t an argument that builds. To me, it’s picking up different toys to see if we can get back to what we’re really interested in. Not to say that that doesn’t change. I have a richer understanding of social life than I did a few years ago. When I started working with Fred, social life, to me, had a lot to do with friendship, and it had a lot to do with refusal – refusal to do certain kinds of things. And then gradually I got more and more interested in this term, ‘preservation,’ where I started to think about, “well, refusal’s something that we do because of them, what do we do because of ourselves?” Recently, I’ve started to think more about elaborations of care and love. So, my social world is getting bigger with our work. But, each piece for me is still another way to come at what we love and what’s keeping us from what we love. So, it isn’t in that sense a scientific investigation that starts at one end and finishes at the other end. Fred: It’s funny, this ubiquity of policy making, the constant deputisation of academic laborers into the apparatuses of police power. And they are like night riders, paddy rollers, everybody’s on patrol, trying to capture the ones who are trying to get out – especially themselves, trying to capture their own fugitivity. That’s actually the first place at which policy is directed. I think that a huge part of it has to do simply with, let’s call it, a certain reduction of intellectual life – to reduce study into critique, and then at the same time, a really, really horrific, brutal reduction of critique to debunking, which operates under the general assumption that naturalised academic misery loves company in its isolation, like some kind of warped communal alienation in which people are tied together not by blood or a common language but by the bad feeling they compete over. And so, what ends up happening is you get a whole lot of people who, as Stefano was suggesting, spend a whole lot of time thinking about stuff that they don’t want to do, thinking about stuff that they don’t want to be, rather than beginning with, and acting out, what they want.

# 1AR

## Framework

### CI

#### Words before the colon matter

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2k

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go one…If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, beginning the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

## K

### AT: Death Drive

#### Not a thing

Lear 2kJonathan, Philosophy Professor at the University of Chicago, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life, Page 131-132

By 1920 Freud is ready to break up what he has come to see as a fantasized unity of mental functioning. The mind can no longer be understood in terms of the pleasure principle, but instead of living with the gap, he posits a “beyond.” It is in this way that Freud takes himself to be explaining aggression. Aggression is now interpreted as the death drive diverted outward. It is precisely this move which locks us into an inescapably negative teleogy. Let us just assume (for the sake of argument, though I think it true) that humans are aggressive animals, and that dealing with human aggression is a serious psychological and social problem. The question remains: how might one deal with it? But if, as Freud does, one interprets aggression as the most obvious manifestation of one of the two primordial forces in the universe, the answer would seem to be: there is no successful way. My first inclination is to say that this leads to a pessimistic view of the human condition; but this isn’t really the issue. My second inclination is to say it leads to a limited view of the human condition; but even this doesn’t get to the heart of the problem. The point here is not to endorse an ontic optimism – that if we didn’t adopt this view, we could shape life in nonaggressive ways – but to confront an ontological insight: that Freud’s interpretation is an instance of bad faith. The metaphysical basicness of the death drive implies a kind of metaphysical intractability to the phenomenon of human aggression. As a matter of empirical fact, humans may be aggressive animals – and the fact of human aggression may be difficult to deal with. It may be experienced as intractable. But to raise this purported intractability to a metaphysical principle is to obliterate the question of responsibility. And it is to cover over – by precluding – what might turn out to be a significant empirical possibilities.