# Round 6---Lakeland

# 2AC

## Intersectionality

### AT: Intersectionality

#### Zapatistas strategy solves – it doesn’t impose ideology and allows for everybody to define their own unique relationship to the state

Lisa Poggiali, 2005 (MA in the Social Anthropology of Development, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, “Reimagining The Possible: Zapatista Discourse And The Problematics Of Rights”, https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=8-poggiali-reimagining-the-possible&site=15 :)

In the case of Chiapas, the Zapatista movement promoted the concept of autonomy not in terms of narrow indigenous separatism or secession, nor as a petition for permission to devolve governmental functions, but rather as a demand for recognition of ongoing practices. Since the state was widely perceived to have abrogated its compact with social collectivities through the reform of Article 27--eroding the rights of ejido peasant communities, which represented 54% of the land in Chiapas (Yashar 1998b:54)--and other neoliberal policies, this demand for renegotiation of the social pact had broad resonance beyond Chiapas. Autonomy, as negotiated in the 1996 San Andrés accords on indigenous rights and culture, was supported by the new National Indigenous Congress. It was also backed up by ILO Convention 169, which recognized the collective rights of indigenous peoples to control resources in their communities (Aubry 2000). Mexico’s ratification of this convention was followed by the 1992 revision of Article 4 of the Constitution, recognizing Indians for the first time as existing with a distinct identity within a multiethnic state (Collier & Quaratiello 1999:173). This vision of autonomy incorporates part of the liberal democratic ideal of rights on the basis of citizenship, but it rejects the homogenizing implications of the market-oriented model of globalization. In its place, the Zapatista demand for a “world in which many worlds fit” would allow for a diversity of forms in which people may define their relations with the state. By demanding both political and collective rights, in the form of “ethnic citizenship” for indigenous communities (Mattiace 1998, Aubry 2000), the Zapatistas were really inviting others to cast their local struggles in terms of the political construction of democratic citizenship (Harvey 1997). This meant not only decentralization of administrative functions of the state, but the bottom-up definition of autonomy, involving the freedom to choose political and jurisdictional space and relations with other units (Esteva 2000). It was precisely because of the radically democratic implications of this model that the Zedillo administration insisted on torpedoing the COCOPA congressional commission’s efforts to legislate implementation of the San Andrés accords; and then disingenuously offered administrative decentralization as an alternative, in the form of “indigenous rights” and “remunicipalization” laws written by the Executive. As Yashar (1998a) has noted, this kind of “ethnic citizenship” demanded by indigenous communities in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America challenges liberal ideology’s assumptions of unit homogeneity (individuals as the constitutive political unit), administrative homogeneity (uniformly defined boundaries and relations with the central state), and identity homogeneity (with the corollary assumption of correspondence between nation and state). However, this kind of new federalism, rooted in collective and historic rights to protection from central power, could be confused in the neoliberal context for the central government’s abandoning of its obligations by sloughing off the costs of social services and public works to peripheral units (Aubry 2000).10 This danger led to some ambiguity in the Zapatista call for autonomy. One historic current within the autonomy movement in Chiapas was the “Pluriethnic Autonomous Regions” (RAP) project, promoted by some indigenous leaders such as Margarito Ruiz of the Independent Front of Indigenous Peoples (FIPI) and some academics (Mattiace 1997, Díaz- Polanco 1997). This approach calls for a regional, fourth level of government (besides national, state, and municipal) which would give juridical representation to indigenous regions. An alternative, communalist approach emphasizes local practices of direct democracy and self-government at the community level. Critics of the RAP model were wary of the possibility of caciquismo and cooptation, and noted that it accepted the basic design of the existing state which was less than democratic (Esteva 2000). Skeptics of the communalist model noted the vulnerability of local communities to isolation and government attack, arguing that sustaining empowerment would require a broader mechanism of engagement with the national state (Mattiace 1998). The Zapatistas avoided exclusively embracing either model of the autonomous unit, in effect supporting a kind of “autonomy of autonomies.”5 As a result, both the RAP and the CNI (which leaned toward the communalist model) supported the San Andrés accords and roundly rejected the Indigenous Reform Initiative presented by President Zedillo to the Senate on 15 March 1998. The tradeoff of inclusiveness for coherence of political strategy was perhaps a central dilemma of the Zapatista response to globalization. While arguably a necessary challenge of democratization-from-society within the framework of an authoritarian regime, this remained both a source of weakness and a source of strength of the Zapatista movement going into the 21st century.

#### Zapatismo is intersectional, perm solves best

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Yet, we still consider our project an anti-capitalist project and we wish to redefine what anti-capitalist action is. With respect to oppression, non-oppressive porn which simply does not “contain” oppression is not enough. We strive to make anti-oppression porn, which challenges the institutions of oppression along lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Similarly with capitalism, we want to make anti-capitalist porn, which challenges the existence of capitalism. How is our work anti-capitalist? Is it enough that it is free, and therefore “outside” of the economy? I would argue that no, because being outside of the economy is an almost unreachable horizon. We still buy props, lube, bandwidth and computer hardware for production. Still, I think it is important to avoid rigid binaries of thinking that something either is or is not challenging capitalism. What would we think is the “most” anti-capitalist act, shutting down the WTO, kidnapping the son of a wealthy businessman and falling in love with him, or building other worlds, parallel to and partly outside of capitalism? Our strategy is heavily informed by movements in Latin America, given our location in the US/Mexico borderlands. Many of us have been to Chiapas and done solidarity work with the Zapatistas, some of us are chicana or other south american / north american hybrids, some of us have lived in squats in Western Europe. The contemporary development of Autonomy as a political strategy can be seen in the EZLN, the Piquiteros and the squatters in Europe, Latin America and other parts of the world. The concepts of building “a world where many worlds fit”, and “caminando preguntando”, or walking while asking, are central to my understanding of our project. I see the world as already heterotopic, or as Fanon says “compartmentalized”, which means that there is space for world building. I see it as a fundamental weakness in the distributed control society that Alexander Galloway describes in protocol, that if power is distributed and the forces of order are farther away, that means that sometimes when we rise up, we find that they are not there, we find that no one is looking at those security cameras after all. We are exploring this moment and space of freedom created by the vacuum of politics in our post-democratic and post-ideological society. In doing so, we are starting from zero and walking while asking, developing our own way and not assuming we have the answers. We are struggling to learn to live without capitalism, patriarchy and heteronormativity. Still, this is not a struggle for individual liberation, but collective liberation. While the spaces we are using for this exploration are our living rooms and bedrooms, we are using the techné of social software, Free Software and access to cheap cameras to use our personal explorations as a tool to change the community, city and world around us, beyond the boundaries the world we are building. SIS is not a utopian project, but a Critical Utopia, as described by Jose Esteban Muñoz, in that it seeks to create a better world by being rooted in a critique of the current world.

#### Zapatismo solves – also, they create static identity that fails

Simon Tormey, Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, 2006, ‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation”

Thinking more generally about the socio-political ideology of Zapatismo, what becomes evident is the reluctance to commit themselves to a ‘vision’ or blueprint of how the world should be transformed, or indeed how even the Chiapas should be transformed. This again is a source of irritation for otherwise sympathetic onlookers who would like to see in the Zapatistas the vanguard of an attempt to construct a viable ‘counter- empire’ of the kind influentially discussed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their controversial work Empire. Surely it is asked, there must be some notion of what the world should look like in order to mobilise people against the world as it is now? Again, the notion that ‘resistance against’ can only make sense when seen as the antonym of a ‘resistance for’, in this case in favour of a distinct political system or space is one that is challenged both implicitly and explicitly by Zapatista practice. As Marcos insists: Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not bought and paid for by a doctrine. It is … an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question: ‘What is it that excluded me?’‘What is that has isolated me?’ In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive … 29 In attempting to elaborate what Zapatismo is, communiqués articulate the idea of ‘a political force’ that operates in negation to that which is, as opposed to the embodiment of something that has yet to be created. In this sense they directly eschew the idea of a government or system ‘in waiting’ as per the classic ‘putschist’ rhetoric of traditional revolutionary movements. As has often been noted, they have yet to articulate a response to the ‘land question’, which is the very issue that caused the Zapatistas to come into being in the first place. Zapatismo is ‘silent’ on this and all the other matters that have animated left radicals over the past two centuries, that have nurtured them in the ‘hard times’, and helped to maintain their faith that history is on their side. But the ‘silence’ is surely telling in positive ways. As we noted at the outset, this is a political force that prefers not to ‘speak’, but rather to ‘listen’ and provide what Marcos terms an ‘echo’ of what it ‘hears’. As Marcos notes, this would be: An echo that recognises the existence of the other and does not overpower or attempt to silence it. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice, yet speaks with the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound, yet opens itself to the sound of the other. An echo […] transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that turns itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, before Power’s deafness, opts to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, acknowledging itself to be equal in its desire to listen and be listened to, to recognising itself as diverse in the tones and levels of voices forming it.30 To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to ‘The People’; there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only ‘lived experience’. Zapatismo is a political force that is concerned with the means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and strategies that have prevented voices being heard. To quote Marcos, what they are struggling for is a world in which ‘all worlds are possible’. Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, Marcos declares (on behalf of the Zapatistas) that: ‘we aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle’.30 Their struggle is one to permit other conceptions of the world to come into being. Of course this is punctuated by a view of what it is that such spaces require: the obliteration of party machines, of the bloated and antique structures of representation that clog Mexico’s political system; but the point is such strictures are regarded as the basis upon which a genuine political process can take place. What is left out is any ‘final’ account of justice, equality or democracy. Contrast Zapatismo in other words, with traditional revolutionary rhetoric and more particularly with the communist struggles of the past with their tightly knit, disciplined hierarchies built on a thorough going utilitarianism that is prepared, as Trotsky once bluntly put it, ‘to break eggs to make an omelette’. In Zapatismo we find on the contrary a sentiment that insists that all the ‘eggs’ are of value. It is ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ for the singular voice that animates this struggle against representation, not a desire to fulfil the historical or foreordained destiny to which all voices are or will be subject. In this sense as in the other senses discussed here, it seems to me that this is a very Deleuzian kind of struggle, and Deleuze (and Guattari) anticipate on the plane of high theory the kinds of demands being articulated by Marcos and the Zapatistas. This is also to say that the search for a post-representational form of political practice should not be read as necessarily ‘nihilistic’ (as Laclau insists) or as one that inevitably pits the aristocratic ‘one’ against the many. Or if it is, then it is a nihilism that, as per Deleuze’s reading of ‘eternal return’, isa struggle in which being and difference are constantly affirmed. It is an affirmation of difference itself, of the singular voice, and of the possibility of and necessity for ‘spaces’ in which those voices can be heard. In the terms offered by Deleuze and Guattari this would be ‘smooth’ space as opposed to the ‘striated’ space of representational systems. It would be a ‘deterritorialised’ space of combination and recombination in accordance with differentiated, disaggregated desires; not the territorialised space of hierarchy, fixed and known roles that define ‘identity’. In terms of Zapatismo, this is a space in which ‘all worlds are possible’and in which it is the constant combination and recombination of the indigenous peoples that determines what ‘happens’.

### Perm

#### Perm solves – Zapatismo can link up with other struggles effectively

Jeffery Popke, East Carolina University Professor, 06-xx-04, “The face of the other: Zapatismo,

responsibility and the ethics of deconstruction,” <http://myweb.ecu.edu/popkee/social%20and%20cultural.pdf>

Although it is undoubtedly important to assess, and support, the reform process in the domain of ‘political realism’, I want to focus my attention here on the messianic tenor of Zapatista discourse, on what Huntington (2000) has called their ‘politics of poetic resistance’ (see also Evans 1999; Higgins 2000). I do so because the discursive intervention of Zapatismo represents, in its aims, strategies and composition, a challenge to modern ethical ideals in a manner consistent with what I have argued thus far: ﬁrst, they articulate a form of ethical subjectivity that transcends both cultural difference and borders; and second, they argue for an alternative conception of politics, in which the future is open to construction in the absence of certainty. This ethical discourse is important in part because it has produced effects that resonate far beyond the immediate context of southern Mexico. The Zapatistas are ‘awakening, moving and stimulating the creative imagination of many others, who are already involved in similar concerns and struggles but often found themselves at a dead end’ (Esteva and Prakash 1998: 36). In this sense, I believe that the writings of Marcos and the EZLN are more than simply interventions in a regional struggle over indigenous rights and autonomy. They also both reﬂect and contribute to, through their broader engagement with global civil society, the development of a new conception of social and cultural agency, within which a different form of ethics and politics is at stake (Couch 2001; Stahler-Sholk 2001).

### AT: White Heteropatriarchy

#### Zapatismo solves – inclusionary of queer identities

Subcomandante Marcos, 1999, https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/19235

'Let those who persecute be ashamed!' MEXICO — The following is an abridged version of a statement issued by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation's (EZLN) Subcomandante Marcos on the eve of Mexico City's 21st Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Pride march. To the lesbian, gay, transsexual and bisexual community: We are grateful that you have allowed us the opportunity to say our word on this, the 21st march of Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual and Bisexual Pride, which has convened some of the best of sexual diversity in Mexico. May all of you accept the greetings of the Zapatistas on this day of struggle for the dignity of, and respect for, difference. For a very long time, homosexuals, lesbians, transsexuals and bisexuals have had to live and die concealing their difference, suffering in silence persecution, contempt, humiliation, extortion, blackmail, insults, violence and assassination. The different had to bear having their humanness reduced for the simple fact of not being in accord with a nonexistent sexual norm. This norm has been converted into a banner for intolerance and segregation. Victims at every social level, objects of jokes, gossip, insults and death, those different in their sexual preference remained quiet in the face of one of the oldest injustices in history. No more. From all social sectors, from all corners of the country, from all work places, from studies, from struggles, from life: a human demand is raised — respect and recognition for the rights of the lesbian, gay, transsexual and bisexual communities. Participating in today's jornada for the recognition of sexual diversity in a visible form are those who, fed up with hiding their different nature, have courage and a fighting spirit in their hearts and in their eyes. There is nothing to hide. Neither sexual preference, nor rage over impotence in the face of the incomprehension of a government and a sector of society that thinks that everything that is not like themselves is abnormal and grotesque. What do lesbians, homosexuals, transsexuals and bisexuals have to be ashamed of? Let those who rob and kill with impunity be ashamed: the government! Let those who persecute the different be ashamed! But it is not just those who can make themselves seen and heard who are participating in this day of struggle. Many must conceal themselves — at times from themselves — but they do not for that reason renounce a right that belongs to every human being: that of respect for their dignity, without regard to the colour of their skin, their language, their income, their culture, their religious belief, their political ideology, their weight, their stature or their sexual preference. For those who are present at this mobilisation, our admiration for your courage and audacity to make yourselves seen and heard, for your proud, dignified and legitimate "Ya basta!" [enough!]. Our best wishes to your organised existence. Our support for your struggle and your demands. We Zapatistas, men, women and other, but still Zapatistas, greet lesbian, gay, transsexual and bisexual dignity. Long life to your fighting spirit and a different tomorrow, one that is more just and human for all those who are different. From the mountains of the Mexican south-east.

#### Zapatismo, at its core, is a feminist movement that struggles for gender equality

Nicole Blanc et al, Gustavo Esteva and Beatriz Ramirez, Members of Mujeres Libres, a website for female Zapatistas, 2001, “Zapatismo: a feminine movement,” <http://www.mujereslibres.org/Articles/zapatismofeminine.htm>

Women have been prominent in all the public events of the Zapatistas. Comandanta Ramona, known since the Dialogue of the Cathedral two months after the uprising, received special notoriety as the only representative of the Zapatistas at the First National Indian Congress, held in Mexico City in 1995. Comandanta Ana María pronounced the main speech of the Zapatistas in the First Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism, held in 1996 in La Realidad, Chiapas. Comandanta Ester was the main speaker of the Zapatista delegation in the Federal Congress in 2001. All of them, and many others, revealed on a number of occasions both their personal talent and the prominent role of women in the Zapatista movement. They also showed how much the movement appreciated the historical and symbolic importance of presenting its main proposals, in critical moments, through the voice of a woman. Beyond symbolism, it is significant that women have had significant participation in all Zapatista delegations, and that its largest delegation, when 5000 Zapatistas travelled all over the country, was made up of couples of men and women. In the Zapatista communities, daily exposed to the pressure of the military siege, women have directly confronted the troops with no other weapon but their dignity, in the best tradition of civil resistance. When the aggressions increased, and the army were killing the men before their eyes and forcing them to escape to the mountains, many women decided to stay in the communities and confront the troops—to protect the community, the children ... and the men. "What else could we do?", commented Comandanta Margarita, of Morelia. The Revolutionary Law of Women Due to all these entirely visible facts, it is said that Zapatismo could not exist or be understood without the participation of women. That is true but insufficient. The same can be said about almost everything happening in the world. We still need to ask ourselves: To what extent is or is not such participation an additional burden imposed on women? Does Zapatismo really include, in its orientation and practices, the struggle against the oppression of women? Hard facts offer an answer to these questions. The new burden on women was not imposed: they courageously and responsibly assumed it, as part and the expression of their own struggle. And this struggle, the women's struggle, publicly appeared with Zapatismo itself and within it, on 1 January 1994, through its Revolutionary Law of Women. Women's claims were also included in the national and international consultation on the destiny of the movement in 1996. They were also included in all the negotiations with the government, as one of the issues or themes requiring specific treatment. The march of the International Day of Women, in San Cristóbal, in 1996, was probably the first march of indigenous women in history. Women's claims are not just prominently included in the Zapatistas proposals. They also define a pattern of internal changes in the Zapatista communities. Within them there is increasing participation and influence of women in the decision processes and community affairs. There is a continual correction of the patriarchal bias of rooted customs or the sexist bias of new behaviour; the communities advance every day towards the elimination of all traditional or modern forms of masculine violence. This is not idealisation or romanticism. Women's oppression in indigenous communities, Zapatista or not, is still there. The comandantas celebrate women's advances, but denounce at the same time the problems that persist and the resistance of men to their solution. Before the Federal Congress, Comandanta Ester exposed a lucid account of such oppression. On that occasion, María de Jesús Patricio, speaking in the name of the National Indian Congress, talked about the subject at great length. She celebrated valued indigenous customs or recent changes, but at the same time identified many customs in relation to women that should be modified, observing that this applies not only to indigenous communities but to the whole of society. A feminine character Communiques, documents and facts associated with the Zapatistas clearly demonstrate their full acknowledgement of the gender question and their decision to approach it in depth. As Comandanta Ramona said, Zapatismo implied "an awakening to a struggle against a present and a past that threaten the women as a probable future". The Zapatista women have concentrated in one struggle the many facets of their oppression. Azucena Santys, a young Zapatista from Morelia, synthesised it in the following terms: "We were used to having two governments, that of our men and that of the State. We are now organising ourselves to learn more about our rights, educate our men and govern ourselves." All this has begun to be acknowledged and is awakening increasing interest. But we would like to go a little farther. We believe that women's participation in Zapatismo has not only implied an inclusion of their claims, as women, and a stimulation of profound transformations of gender relations in the communities. It has also given to the movement an original and distinctive character. Some of its peculiarities that attract a lot of attention come from the mark made on it by the women, to the point of giving to it what we describe as a feminine character.

#### The liberal subject they assume an able-bodied locus of subjectivity – excludes disabled individuals

Carol Appadurai Breckenridge1 and Candace A Volger2, Fall-xx-2001, Associate Professor of History @ the New School for Social Research, PhD @ University of Wisconsin—Madison1, David B. and Clara E. Stern Professor of Philosophy and Professor in the College at the University of Chicago2, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism,” pg.—, muse

Disability studies teaches that an assumed able body is crucial to the smooth operation of traditional theories of democracy, citizenship, subjectivity, beauty, and capital. By assuming that the normative human is an able-bodied adult, for example, liberal theory can conflate political or economic interests with desires, political representation with having a voice in policy-making, social organization with voluntary association, and so on. Liberal theory naturalizes the political by making it personal. And the “person” at the center of the traditional liberal theory is not simply an individual locus of subjectivity (however psychologically fragmented, incoherent, or troubled). He is an able-bodied locus of subjectivity, one whose unskilled labor may be substituted freely for the labor of other such individuals, one who can imagine himself largely self-sufficient because almost everything conspires to help him take his enabling body for granted (even when he is scrambling for the means of subsistence). However, the mere possibility of a severely cognitively disabled adult citizen disrupts the liberal equations of representation and voice, desire and interest. Advocacy for the severely cognitively disabled is not a matter of voicing their demands. More generally, the intricate practical dialectics of dependence and independence in the lives of many disabled people unsettle ideals of social organization as freely chosen expressions of mutual desire.

#### **D-Rule**

Bérubé 03 (Michael Bérubé, Paterno Family Professor in Literature at Pennsylvania State University, 2003“Citizenship and Disability”, Spring, <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=506>)

It is striking, nonetheless, that so few leftists have understood disability in these terms. Disability is not the only area of social life in which the politics of recognition are inseparable from the politics of redistribution; other matters central to citizenship, such as immigration, reproductive rights, and criminal justice, are every bit as complex. Nonetheless, our society's representations of disability are intricately tied to, and sometimes the very basis for, our public policies for "administering" disability. And when we contemplate, in these terms, the history of people with cognitive and developmental disabilities, we find a history in which "representation" takes on a double valence: first, in that people who were deemed incapable of representing themselves were therefore represented by a socio-medical apparatus that defined—or, in a social-constructionist sense, created—the category of "feeblemindedness"; and second, in the sense that the visual and rhetorical representations of "feebleminded" persons then set the terms for public policy. One cannot plausibly narrate a comprehensive history of ideas and practices of national citizenship in the post-Civil War United States without examining public policy regarding disability, especially mental disability, all the more especially when mental disability was then mapped onto certain immigrant populations who scored poorly on intelligence tests and were thereby pseudo-scientifically linked to criminality. And what of reproductive rights? By 1927, the spurious but powerful linkages among disability, immigration, poverty, and criminality provided the Supreme Court with sufficient justification for declaring involuntary sterilization legal under the Constitution. THERE IS AN obvious reason why disability rights are so rarely thought of in terms of civil rights: disability was not covered in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. And as Anita Silvers points out, over the next twenty-five years, groups covered by civil rights law sometimes saw disability rights as a dilution of civil rights, on the grounds that people with disabilities were constitutively incompetent, whereas women and minorities faced discrimination merely on the basis of social prejudice. Silvers writes, "[t]o make disability a category that activates a heightened legal shield against exclusion, it was objected, would alter the purpose of legal protection for civil rights by transforming the goal from protecting opportunity for socially exploited people to providing assistance for naturally unfit people." The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990 did add disability to the list of stigmatized identities covered by antidiscrimination law, but thus far the ADA has been interpreted so narrowly, and by such a business-friendly judiciary, that employers have won over 95 percent of the suits brought under the act. Perhaps if plaintiffs with disabilities had won a greater number of cases over the past thirteen years, the conservative backlash against the ADA-currently confined to a few cranks complaining about handicapped parking spaces and a wheelchair ramp at a Florida nude beach-would be sufficiently strong as to spark a movement to repeal the law altogether. But then again, perhaps if the law were read more broadly, more Americans would realize their potential stake in it. In 1999, for instance, the Supreme Court ruled on three lower-court cases in which people with "easily correctable" disabilities—high blood pressure, nearsightedness—were denied employment. In three identical 7-2 decisions, the Court found that the plaintiffs had no basis for a suit under the ADA precisely because their disabilities were easily correctable. As disability activists and legal analysts quickly pointed out, this decision left these plaintiffs in the ridiculous situation of being too disabled to be hired but somehow not disabled enough to be covered by the ADA; or, to put this another way, plaintiffs' "easily correctable" disabilities were not so easily correctable as to allow them access to employment. One case involved twin sisters who were denied the opportunity to test as pilots for United Airlines on the grounds that their eyesight did not meet United's minimum vision requirement (uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better without glasses or contacts) even though each sister had 20/20 vision with corrective lenses (Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.); another involved a driver/mechanic with high blood pressure (Murphy v. United Parcel Service); the third involved a truck driver with monocular vision (20/200 in one eye) who in 1992 had received a Department of Transportation waiver of the requirement that truck drivers have distant visual acuity of 20/40 in each eye as well as distant binocular acuity of 20/40 (Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg). Because, as Silvers argues, "litigation under the ADA commonly turns on questions of classification rather than access," all three plaintiffs were determined to have no standing under the law. The question of whether any of them was justly denied employment was simply not addressed by the Court. Indeed, in writing her opinion for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explicitly refused to consider the wider question of "access," noting that 160 million Americans would be covered by the ADA if it were construed to include people with "easily correctible" disabilities (under a "health conditions approach"), and since Congress had cited the number 43 million in enacting the law, Congress clearly could not have intended the law to be applied more widely. "Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings," wrote O'Connor. "That it did not is evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures." It is possible to object that O'Connor's decision was excessively literalist, and that the potential number of Americans covered by the ADA is, in any case, quite irrelevant to the question of whether a woman can fly a plane when she's got her glasses on. But I've since come to believe that the literalism of the decision is an indirect acknowledgment of how broad the issues at stake here really are. If the ADA were understood as a broad civil rights law, and if it were understood as a law that potentially pertains to the entire population of the country, then maybe disability law would be understood not as a fringe addition to civil rights law but as its very fulfillment. RIGHTS CAN BE created, reinterpreted, extended, and revoked. The passage of the ADA should therefore be seen as an extension of the promise of democracy, but only as a promise: any realization of the potential of the law depends on its continual reinterpretation. For the meaning of the word, just as Wittgenstein wanted us to believe (in order that we might be undeceived about how our words work), lies in its use in the language. Similarly, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1975 (originally the Education for All Handicapped Children Act) was not some kind of breakthrough discovery whereby children with disabilities were found to be rights-bearing citizens of the United States after all, and who knew that we'd had it all wrong for 199 years? On the contrary, the IDEA invented a new right for children with disabilities, the right to a "free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment." And yet the IDEA did not wish that right into being overnight; the key terms "appropriate" and "least restrictive" had to be interpreted time and again, over the course of fifteen years, before they were understood to authorize "full inclusion" of children with disabilities in "regular" classrooms. Nothing about the law is set in stone. The only philosophical "foundation" underlying the IDEA and its various realizations is our own collective political will, a will that is tested and tested again every time the Act comes up for reauthorization. Jamie Bérubé currently has a right to an inclusive public education, but that right is neither intrinsic nor innate. Rather, Jamie's rights were invented, and implemented slowly and with great difficulty. The recognition of his human dignity, enshrined in those rights, was invented. And by the same token, those rights, and that recognition, can be taken away. While I live, I promise myself that I will not let that happen, but I live with the knowledge that it may: to live any other way, to live as if Jamie's rights were somehow intrinsic, would be irresponsible. Of course, many of us would prefer to believe that our children have intrinsic human rights and human dignity no matter what; irrespective of any form of human social organization; regardless of whether they were born in twentieth-century Illinois or second-century Rome or seventh-century central Asia. But this is just a parent's—or a philosophical foundationalist's-wishful thinking. For what would it mean for Jamie to "possess" rights that no one on earth recognized? A fat lot of good it would do him. My argument may sound either monstrous or all too obvious: if, in fact, no one on earth recognized Jamie's human dignity, then there would in fact be no human perspective from which he would be understood to possess "intrinsic" human dignity. And then he wouldn't have it, and so much the worse for the human race. In one respect, the promise of the IDEA, like the promise of the ADA, is clear: greater inclusion of people with disabilities in the social worlds of school and work. But in another sense the promise is unspecifiable; its content is something we actually cannot know in advance. For the IDEA does not merely guarantee all children with disabilities a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. Even more than this, it grants the right to education in order that persons with disabilities might make the greatest possible use of their other rights-the ones having to do with voting, or employment discrimination, or with life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. IDEA is thus designed to enhance the capabilities of all American children with disabilities regardless of their actual abilities-and this is why it is so profound a democratic idea. Here again I'm drawing on Nancy Fraser, whose theory of democracy involves the idea of "participatory parity," and the imperative that a democratic state should actively foster the abilities of its citizens to participate in the life of the polity as equals. Fraser's work to date has not addressed disability, but as I noted above, it should be easy to see how disability is relevant to Fraser's account of the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution. This time, however, I want to press the point a bit harder. Fraser writes as if the promise of democracy entails the promise to enhance participatory parity among citizens, which it does, and she writes as if we knew what "participatory parity" itself means, which we don't. (This is why the promise of disability rights is unspecifiable.) LET ME EXPLAIN. First, the idea of participatory parity does double duty in Fraser's work, in the sense that it names both the state we would like to achieve and the device by which we can gauge whether we're getting there. For in order to maintain a meaningful democracy in which all citizens participate as legal and moral equals, the state needs to judge whether its policies enhance equal participation in democratic processes. Yet at the same time, the state needs to enhance equal participation among its citizens simply in order to determine what its democratic processes will be. This is not a meta-theoretical quibble. On the contrary, the point is central to the practical workings of any democratic polity. One of the tasks required of democrats is precisely this: to extend the promise of democracy to previously excluded individuals and groups some of whom might have a substantially different understanding of "participatory parity" than that held by previously dominant groups and individuals. Could anything make this clearer than the politics of disability? Imagine a building in which political philosophers are debating, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the value and the purpose of participatory parity over against forms of authoritarianism or theocracy. Now imagine that this building has no access ramps, no Braille or large-print publications, no American Sign Language interpreters, no elevators, no special-needs paraprofessionals, no in-class aides. Contradictory as such a state of affairs may sound, it's a reasonably accurate picture of what contemporary debate over the meaning of democracy actually looks like. How can we remedy this? Only when we have fostered equal participation in debates over the ends and means of democracy can we have a truly participatory debate over what "participatory parity" itself means. That debate will be interminable in principle, since our understandings of democracy and parity are infinitely revisable, but lest we think of deliberative democracy as a forensic society dedicated to empyreal reaches of abstraction, we should remember that debates over the meaning of participatory parity set the terms for more specific debates about the varieties of human embodiment. These include debates about prenatal screening, genetic discrimination, stem-cell research, euthanasia, and, with regard to physical access, ramps, curb cuts, kneeling buses, and buildings employing what is now known as universal design. Leftists and liberals, particularly those associated with university humanities departments, are commonly charged with being moral relativists, unable or unwilling to say (even after September 11) why one society might be "better" than another. So let me be especially clear on this final point. I think there's a very good reason to extend the franchise, to widen the conversation, to democratize our debates, and to make disability central to our theories of egalitarian social justice. The reason is this: a capacious and supple sense of what it is to be human is better than a narrow and partial sense of what it is to be human, and the more participants we as a society can incorporate into the deliberation of what it means to be human, the greater the chances that that deliberation will in fact be transformative in such a way as to enhance our collective capacities to recognize each other as humans entitled to human dignity. As Jamie reminds me daily, both deliberately and unwittingly, most Americans had no idea what people with Down syndrome could achieve until we'd passed and implemented and interpreted and reinterpreted a law entitling them all to a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. I can say all this without appealing to any innate justification for human dignity and human rights, and I can also say this: Without a sufficient theoretical and practical account of disability, we can have no account of democracy worthy of the name. Perhaps some of our fellow citizens with developmental disabilities would not put the argument quite this way; even though Jamie has led me to think this way, he doesn't talk the way I do. But those of us who do participate in political debates, whether about school funding in a specific district or about the theory and practice of democracy at its most abstract, have the obligation to enhance the abilities of our children and our fellow citizens with disabilities to participate in the life of the United States as political and moral equals with their nondisabled peers-both for their own good, and for the good of democracy, which is to say, for the good of all of us.

### AT: S4O

#### Zaps solve – don’t speak for others

Manuel Callahan, Professor of Race relations at Humboldt State University, 2005, “Why not share a dream? Zapatismo as Political and Cultural Practice,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263123

While we should not abandon the responsibilities and challenges of sincere solidarity work, taking our cues from the EZLN, we might suggest that Zapatismo invites people to become part of "the struggle" in their own manner, at their own pace, and without being measured by any specific model of "conscientization" or a political program specified by "the organization." However, the effort at encuentro challenges us to interrogate the limitations and contradictions of more traditional solidarity activism. Zapatismo reveals the political tensions of building a movement based only on single issue campaigns, on behalf of a specific constituency, and relying on short-lived fragile coalitions often over-determined by the most immediate crisis. In many cases those solidarity efforts that fail to escape a liberal mold can unwittingly promote possessive individualism, celebrating a single leader, often considered the best and the brightest of the group, who is expected to state the group's issues, history, strategies and goals. The result is a single model, plan, or program dominated by an elite. Consequently, a narrowly defined solidarity effort can easily reproduce paternalism and hierarchy within the organization and between the organization and the constituency being "served." Echoing Holloway's warning in this volume, traditional solidarity projects fall into the trap of defining, representing, and speaking for the struggle(s) of others, while at the same moment insisting on "the progress" of those being aided, making solidarity efforts resistant to modifications and slow to adapt to shifting contexts. Solidarity projects that represent, define and speak for the struggle (s) of others presuppose the progress of those being aided and not the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Moreover, aide workers operating in a narrow solidarity mode are less likely to acknowledge or celebrate the transformations that have already taken place in "targeted" com munities, inadvertently facilitating an insidious imperialism. Professional well-funded NGOs, for example, "can become shadow bureaucracies parallel to Southern nation state administrations."30 Ultimately, a bureaucratic model of social change will not be able to prioritize and promote the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Although there may be valid concerns we must interrogate regarding the challenges of "solidarity," the political practice examined here does not seek to impose a rigidly defined alternative practice. The Zapatistas have been consistent in keeping with what they have argued is the task of an armed movement: to "present the problem, and then step aside."31 As critical catalysts in posing problems they have deliberately not posed solutions on other groups or spaces. "But it is already known that our specialty is not in solving problems, but in creating them. 'Creating them?' No, that is too presumptuous, rather in proposing. Yes, our specialty is proposing problems."32 The Zapatista provocation insists that rights emerge from collective identities and communal needs expressing collectively articulated obligations and not the competing interests of individual need.33 Rather than emphasize networks as our only organizing objective, we might also imagine the movement in solidarity with the Zapatistas as an imagined community, a collective effort to define obligations that are rooted in a locally placed culture generating knowledge about what works across generations. The very act of provocation undertaken has been a bridge manifest in a new international, not an international based on rigid party doctrines or dogmas of competing organizations but "an international of hope." The new international is defined by dignity, "that nation without nationality, that rain bow that is also a bridge, that murmur of the heart no matter what blood lives it, that rebel irreverence that mocks borders, customs and wars."34 "Instead of a new bureaucratic apparatus, for the world coordination of a political movement expressing universal ideals and proposals," Esteva explains, "the International of Hope was created: a web constituted by innumerable differentiated autonomies, without a center or hierarchies, within which the most varied coalitions of discontents can express themselves, to dismantle forces and regimes oppressing all of them."35 The process of creating political space for dialogue between a diverse number of constituencies occupying a particular space suggests that community is neither homogenous nor static. Rather than speak of "the community," Zapatismo strives for a notion of community embodying a multiplicity of histories, experiences, resources, and obligations. The pursuit of new political relationships underscores the need to re-discover strategies to collectively define obligations of and within a community through dialogue based on respect. Political projects and proposals need to emerge organically—not imposed either by an individual (caciquismo) or a cabal (protagonismo). As the Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) have warned, people organizing themselves must begin "with the situation in which they find themselves, not in the one which we might desire to be found."36 In new political spaces all voices, all proposals must be responded to with respect. Democracy, as Marcos suggests, is a gesture "to decide upon the dominant social proposal." Liberty implies the freedom necessary to pursue one action over another, the expression of desire for the fulfillment of hope and dignity. Free from oppression, fear or persecution liberty sustains diversity and the choice, "to subscribe to one or another proposal."37 "It is," writes Marcos, "the same desire: democracy, liberty, and justice. In the heroic delirium of the Mexican southeast, hope implies a name: Tachicam, the unity of long ing for a better future."

#### Speaking for others is good

Laura Sells, Instructor of Speech Communication at Louisiana State University, 1997, “On Feminist Civility: Retrieving the Political in the Feminist Public Forum”

In her recent article, "The Problems of Speaking For Others," Linda Alcoff points out the ways in which this retreat rhetoric has actually become an evasion of political responsibility. Alcoff's arguments are rich and their implications are many, but one implication is relevant to a vital feminist public forum. The retreat from speaking for others politically dangerous because it erodes public discourse. First, the retreat response presumes that we can, indeed, "retreat to a discrete location and make singular claims that are disentangled from other's locations." Alcoff calls this a "false ontological configuration" in which we ignore how our social locations are always already implicated in the locations of others. The position of "not speaking for others" thus becomes an alibi that allows individuals to avoid responsibility and accountability for their effects on others. The retreat, then, is actually a withdrawal to an individualist realm, a move that reproduces an individualist ideology and privatizes the politics of experience. As she points out, this move creates a protected form of speech in which the individual is above critique because she is not making claims about others. This protection also gives the speaker immunity from having to be "true" to the experiences and needs of others. As a form of protected speech, then, "not speaking for others" short-circuits public debate by disallowing critique and avoiding responsibility to the other. Second, the retreat response undercuts the possibility of political efficacy. Alcoff illustrates this point with a list of people--Steven Biko, Edward Said, Rigoberta Menchu--who have indeed spoken for others with significant political impact. As she bluntly puts it, both collective action and coalition necessitate speaking for others.