# Round 5---Harvard

# 2AC

## Case

### AT: Neolib Good – Heg

#### Neoliberalism is unsustainable – inevitable barriers means collapse is inevitable

Alex Knight, Master’s in political science from Lehigh University, 2012, “The Arrival of Zombie-Capitalism” <http://endofcapitalism.com/2012/11/27/the-arrival-of-zombie-capitalism/#more-1970>

The end of capitalism theory states that the global capitalist system is breaking down, due to ecological and social limits to growth, which are impeding global markets from continuing to expand, a necessary condition for the mobility of capital and therefore for the organization of global power through subservience to that mobility. In other words, the economy cannot grow anymore because A) the Earth cannot sustain it – there aren’t enough resources left to develop and the damage caused to the biosphere by ever-increasing production levels is deteriorating the ecological base for economic activity, and B) social movements across the globe are rejecting the possibility of increased exploitation, which is the only way that capital can re-fuel itself, and those movements are beginning to show more and more power from the Chinese workers movement to the Arab Spring to Occupy to Quebec to the General Strike across Europe which started on Nov. 14th. These two prongs, ecological and social, are hard limits, which together form a vice-grip on the system, constraining it and preventing it from expansion. And for capital, expansion is survival

#### This is the exact logic we critique – the logic of hegemony necessitates the United States going out and “protecting” the world by exterminating countless colored bodies – that’s WALSH.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war - empirics

Christopher Fettweis, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2010, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy” pg 59-82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### Their authors are corporate hacks who can’t see beyond capital’s epistemic regime – reject their ev

Schiwy and Ennis ‘2

(Freya Schiwy, Ph.D. Candidate, Romance Studies, Duke University, and Michael Ennis, Ph.D. Candidate, Literature, Duke University, 2002, Nepantla: Views From the South, Volume 3 // Issue 1, Muse)

The essays gathered in this dossier respond to issues raised during the workshop “Knowledges and the Known: Capitalism and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” held at Duke University in November 2000. They address concerns about the possibilities for critical knowledge production at a moment when national state structures are reconfiguring into global institutions and when technologies (like gene prospecting) and epistemic regimes (like property rights and human rights) are installing the particular as a new universal, following the legacy of Enlightenment philosophy and Western political theory. They ask how knowledge production is linked to location and subjectivity and what the importance of these critical perspectives can be when neoliberal capitalism increasingly **instrumentalizes and commodifies knowledge**, **reinforcing the growing dependence of universities around the world on corporate money.** It is precisely within this context that Oscar Guardiola-Rivera engages current critical theory from the perspective of coloniality. Although the essays by Catherine Walsh and Javier Sanjinés address contemporary indigenous uprisings in the Andes, these movements are not their object of study. Instead of being about knowledge production in the Andes, all three of these articles are efforts to think about epistemology from the Andes.1

#### That outweighs – their framing of war as an event that starts and stops formulates a crisis-politics that ignores structural violence.

Chris J. Cuomo, Fall 1996, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, “War is not just an event,” Hypatia 11.4, proquest

Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event -- an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists -- including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies -- cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. / In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) / Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. / Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. / Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.

#### Placing nuclear war within a doomsday frame allows privilege to side-step issues of racism and oppression – people of color have lost their culture for centuries and live in constant war every day

Barbara Omolade 1984 Calvin College’ first dean of multicultural affairs [“Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust”, Women’s Studies Quarterly vol. 12, No. 2]

To raise these issues effectively, the movement for nuclear disarmament must overcome its reluctance to speak in terms of power, of institutional racism and imperialist military terror. The issues of nuclear disarmament and peace have been mystified because they have been placed within a doomsday frame which separates these issues from other ones, saying. "How can we talk about struggles against racism, poverty, and exploitation when there will be no world after they drop the bombs?" The struggle for peace cannot be separated from, nor considered more sacrosanct than, other struggles concerned with human life and change In April. 1979. the US Aims Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the United States and The Soviet Union. 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World. The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war. as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation's crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people And the housing of people of color throughout the world's urban areas are already blighted and inhumane, families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets, even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago. Our world. with its Own languages, customs and ways, ended And we are only now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for It, and rebuild it in our own image The "death culture" we live in has convinced many to be more concerned with death than with life. more willing to demonstrate for "survival at any cost" than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands. As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people's wars in China, in Cuba. In Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement. The women's movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but The only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people

## Ballot PIC

### Commodification

#### Exposing the Zapatisas to the media and commodifying it is good and allows for global awareness to hegemonic structures

Jill Lane Assistant Professor of Global Studies at Ohio State University, where she

teaches performance and cultural studies of the Americas, Date last cited 2002, “Digital Zapatistas,” <http://www.csun.edu/~vcspc00g/301/digitalzap-tdr.pdf>

The Zapatista rebellion—staged in the early hours of 1 January 1994 on the day NAFTA went into effect—both engaged and challenged these critiques of “revolutionary” activism. On the one hand, the movement revitalized abandoned notions of “traditional” civil disobedience and uprising on behalf of indigenous peoples; the long Zapatista march to the seat of government in Mexico City in January 2001 demonstrates the continued support and impact these “traditional” tactics continue to have.4 Further, the particularly theatrical character of their actions, specifically those of Subcommandante Marcos, earned the Zapatista leader the name “subcomandante of performance” by artist Guillermo Go´mez-Pen˜ a. “The war was carried on as if it were a performance,” wrote Go´mez-Pen˜ a. “Most of the Zapatistas, indigenous men, women and children, wore pasamontan˜as [black ski masks]. Some utilized wooden rifles as mere props.” Wearing a “collage of 20thcentury revolutionary symbols, costumes and props borrowed from Zapata, Sandino, Che, and Arafat,” Marcos became “the latest popular hero in a noble tradition of activists [...] who have utilized performance and media strategies to enter in the political ‘wrestling arena’ of contemporary Mexico” (Go´mez-Pen˜a 1995:90–91). While the Zapatistas thus made tactical use of embodied— and theatricalized—presence, the movement also took advantage, from the beginning, of the Internet as a means to build a global grassroots support network. Dominguez describes this “digital zapatismo” as a “polyspatial movement for a radical democracy based on Mayan legacies of dialogue [that] ripped into the electronic fabric not as InfoWar—but as virtual actions for real peace in the real communities of Chiapas” (1998b). Within a week of the first uprising, a massive international network of information and support was created through the most basic digital means: e-mail distribution and web pages; witness the extraordinary Internet site, Zapatistas in Cyberspace to grasp the scope of that network.5 The radical disjunctures between the sophisticated presence of the Zapatistas on the Internet, at the same time that Chiapas has had none of the requisite infrastructure—in most cases, not even electricity— earned the movement its reputation as the “. rst postmodern revolution” (Dominguez 1998a). Thus the Zapatista’s own recombinant theatre of operations meshed virtual and embodied practices in a struggle for real material change and social well-being in Chiapas. Polyspatial Embodiment Some might understand this “recombinant” practice as a simple matter of contingency: Marcos is a superb performer who uses all forms of media with calculated savvy; his supporters around the globe use the Internet in every way possible to support his cause. Yet the on-line and off-line struggles elaborate a similar strategy of social critique and intervention based in a sophisticated use of simulation. Marcos and the Zapatistas, including the digital Zapatistas of the Electronic Disturbance Theater, rely on simulation to create a disruptive (“disturbing”) presence in the material, social, and discursive contexts in which they operate. Resistance, says Dominguez—following the major theorists of information warfare—can take one of three forms: physical, which would engage and possibly harmthe hardware itself; syntactical (a favorite of hackers), which would involve changing the codes by which the machine functions—programming, software, design; and . - nally, semantic, which involves engaging and undermining the discursive norms and realities of the system as a whole. Simulation operates at the level of semantic disturbance: a simulation of an airplane, made of paper or digital code, will have no effect on the federal government’s physical  eet of planes or their server, nor will it affect the syntactical structure of command or the software that organizes their use; rather, the simulated airplanes disturb a semantic code, making visible the underlying and hidden relations of power on which the smooth operation of government repression depends. For Marcos, as for Dominguez, semantic resistance is an effective—and viable—form of contesting power from the margins (Dominguez 2002).

#### Voting aff allows us to utilize the only power we have – changing the debate community through the discourse of the 1AC

Rebecca Bjork, Former college debater and now coach and professor at the U of Utah, 1993, “Women in Debate: Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle,” <http://web.archive.org/web/20011012220529/members.aol.com/womynindebate/article3.htm>

Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the "death culture." He argued that the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear war, environmental destruction, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and coaches signals a morbid and detached fascination with such events, one that views these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and neutral" advocates actively seek to find in their research the "impact to outweigh all other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that our "use" of such events in this way is tantamount to a celebration of them; our detached, rational discussions reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint, when emotional and moral outrage may be a more appropriate response. In the last few years, my academic research has led me to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; language is not merely some transparent tool used to transmit information, but rather is an incredibly powerful medium, the use of which inevitably has real political and material consequences. Given this assumption, I believe that it is important for us to examine the "discourse of debate practice:" that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a community of debaters and coaches, unthinkingly employ in academic debate. If it is the case that the language we use has real implications for how we view the world, how we view others, and how we act in the world, then it is imperative that we critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how our language does violence to others. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like, "we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water." I am tired of the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has mastered the art of verbal assault to the point where accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being deliberately misleading is a sign of strength. But what I am most tired of is how women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless in such a discourse community. Women who verbally assault their opponents are labeled "bitches" because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive. Women who get angry and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is rendered are labeled "hysterical" because, as we all know, women are more emotional then men. I am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really interested in debate; they just want to meet men." We can all point to examples (although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate. But I find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of negotiating the mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit. After all, what is debate except a collection of shared understandings and explicit or implicit rules for interaction? What I am calling for is a critical examination of how we, as individual members of this community, characterize our activity, ourselves, and our interactions with others through language. We must become aware of the ways in which our mostly hidden and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function to exclude not only women, but ethnic minorities from the amazing intellectual opportunities that training in debate provides. Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly difficult challenges in the years ahead. I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds resentment and frustration. We may not be able to change the world, but we can change our own community, and if we fail to do so, we give up the only real power that we have.

#### Only the ballot forces teams to confront the racial privilege that is upheld now – Louisville movement proves

Dr. Shanara Reid Brinkley, 2008, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF ‘ACTING BLACK’: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,”

Zompetti’s fears are fairly reasonable. The Louisville Project has not convinced the debate community to change its normative practice. Given the adversarial nature of tournament competition, opposing teams seem most concerned with developing viable strategies to beat Louisville inside the tournament round. Such a competitive atmosphere may not allow a resolution of conflict between the Louisville team and other community members. Yet, it seems that attempts to engage the structural barriers that maintain the lack of community diversity seems to not have substantially increased racial and ethnic inclusion. That the Louisville team shifts the discussion on racial inclusion into actual debate competition forces the broader debate community to significantly increase its discussion of the problem. In other words, the Project may not directly result in sweeping changes in the policy debate community, it did create a rhetorical controversy that forced the issue of racial exclusion and privilege onto the community’s agenda. Thus, I argue that the tournament round is a critical plateau from which to force a reflexive conversation about the normative practices of debate that might operate to maintain racial exclusion and privilege.

#### Debate is a productive space – non-traditional debaters empirically are more empowered and create change – the LBS movement proves

Dana Roe Polson, former debate coach and Co-Director, teacher, and founder of ConneXions Community Leadership Academy, 2012 “Longing for Theory:” Performance Debate in Action,” <http://gradworks.umi.com/3516242.pdf>

I think the Talented Tenth is actually the wrong metaphor for leadership in the performance debate community. Du Bois, later in his life, sharply criticized and disavowed a reliance on the Black elite to lead, believing that they were more preoccupied with individual gain than with group struggle, and willing to work within current structures rather than calling for radical change. They were becoming Americanized, Du Bois believed, and deradicalized. This deradicalization “occurs when more privileged African Americans (re) align themselves to function as a middle class interested in individual group gain rather than race leadership for mass development” (James, 1997, p. 24). Instead of his youthful belief in the Black elite, “Gradually, black working-class activists surpassed elites in Du Bois’s estimation of political integrity and progressive agency. He democratized his concept of race leaders through the inclusion of the radicalism of nonelites” (James, 1997, p. 21). The young people who have emerged as leaders in the performance debate community were definitely not those Du Bois would have identified as the Talented Tenth in 1903. Du Bois was talking to and about the Black elite, the educated middle class. Earlier in Du Bois’s life, he assumed that those people, college-educated, were the natural leaders. My participants who might be seen as potential leaders do not come from such backgrounds. Many do end up going to college and becoming potential leaders, but they are privileged through this process rather than prior to it. In addition, their focus is most definitely political as opposed to cultural. Nowhere in my research did I hear a Bill Cosby-esque injunction for Black people to shape up and work harder. Instead, the critique is focused on “uplift as group struggle” for continued liberation. Finally, these young leaders are most definitely radicalized as opposed to interested in incremental change that rocks no boats. From CRT and their open critique of white supremacy to their willingness to call for change openly in debate rounds, these young leaders are contentious and bold. Two of my participants, and many of their former debate peers, are involved with a Baltimore group called Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (LBS). The website of the LBS establishes their identity: We are a dedicated group of Baltimore citizens who want to change the city through governmental policy action. Our purpose is to provide tangible, concrete solutions to Baltimore’s problems and to analyze the ways that external forces have contributed to the overall decline of our city. (“Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle,” n.d.) As we see in this statement of identity, then, LBS as one model of leadership is focused on the political and on an analysis of external influences; this focus is very different from a racial uplift position, and their model of leadership very different from the Talented Tenth. LBS has developed platforms regarding jobs, education, incarceration, and many other issues facing Black people in the city. They hold monthly forums for discussion of these topics, inviting guests and discussing the topics themselves. Further, one of the LBS members ran for City Council this year. He lost, but plans to run again. The training my participants discuss, therefore, is not in the abstract: it is training for the real world, for their own empowerment and that of their communities. This work is extending into local high schools, as well, and Paul Robeson High School now has students involved in LBS. They attend events and meetings not only to help out but as a form of leadership training.

#### Baudrillard arguments justifies complacency in the face of violence

Lars Vaupel, Olaf Arndt, and Janneke Schönenbach, 8-19-2006, members of BBM, a Berlin-based artists group, “on first cyborgs, aliens and other sides of new technologies,” <http://www.balsas.cc/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=151> gendered language is bad

Valentinas: We all know that Jean Baudrillard did not believe that the Gulf War did take place, as it was over-mediated and over-simulated. In fact, the Gulf War II is still not over, and Iraq became much more than just a Frankenstein laboratory for the new media, technology and “democracy” games. What can we learn from wars that do not take place, even though they cannot be finished? Are they becoming a symptom of our times as a confrontation between multiple time-lines, ideologies and technologies in a single place? Lars: Actually, it has always been the same: new wars have been better test-beds for the state of art technologies and the latest computer-controlled firearms. The World War I already was a fully mechanized war where pre-robots were fighting each other and gassing the troops. And afterwards, the winners shape the new world order. Olaf: **Who on hell is Baudrillard**? The one who earns money by publishing his prognoses after the things happen? What a fuck**,** **French philosophy deals too much with luxury problems and elegantly ignores the problem itself**. It’s no wonder, **this is the colonizer’s mentality**, you can hear it roaring in their words: **they use phrases made to camouflage genocide.** I went to see that Virilio’s exhibition "Ce qui arrive" at Foundation Cartier in 2003. I was smashed by that banal presentation of the evil of all kinds: again, natural catastrophes and evil done by man were exposed on the same wall, glued together with a piece of "theory". There you find it all, filed up in one row: the pure luxury of the Cartier-funded Jean Nouvel building, an artwork without any blood in its veins, and that late Christian philosophy about the techno-cataclysm being the revenge of God. **Pure shit, turned into gold in the holy cellars of the modern alchemists’ museums.** The artist-made video "documents" of the Manhattan towers opposed to Iraqian war pictures: that’s not Armageddon, that’s man-invented war technology to be used to subdue others. And **there is always somebody who pushes the buttons,** even when the button is a computer mouse some ten thousand kilometers away from the place where **people die**, or even if it is a civil airplanes redirected by Islamists. Everybody knows that. **War technology has always been made to make killing easier**. And to produce martyrs as well. Janneke: Compare Baudrillard with **Henry Dunant,** the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Dunant was no philosopher, he was just an intelligent rich man in the late 19th century. But his ideas went far more in the direction where **you should hope to find** **philosophers** as well. He experienced war as a "randonneur": he passed by, he saw the suffering and the inhumanity of war. **And he felt obliged to act**. Apart from the maybe 10 days he spent on the battlefield, on the beautiful meadows in the Europeans Alps, helping wounded people to survive, as a complete medical layman he decided to do something more sustainable against these odds. He knew that his efforts couldn’t prevent war in general, but he felt that he could alter the cruelty of reality. **And he succeeded in doing it**. No wonder that in our days we find the most engaged people to support the TROIA projects intention in Geneva, where they are still based. And they are not only doing their necessary surgeon’s work in the field: they are as well **fighting with the same energy on the diplomatic battlefield.**

## Framework

### 2AC C/I – Discussion of Rez

#### Resolved is to reduce through mental analysis

Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved?s=ts>)

to reduce by mental analysis (often followed by into).

#### Government is the people

Jeff Oakes, Freelance writer who has published 6 books, No Date “What IS the Intent of the Constitution?” <http://criminaljusticelaw.us/issues/gun-control/chapter-4-intent-constitution/>

The very first principle forms the foundation for the new government, namely a Representative Democracy with the words, “WE the People.”  We hear this so often that we tend to forget the basic principle here is that this nation, the government, is the people not the representatives in Congress, nor the President, nor [the Supreme Court](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_court).  Our government is “WE,” so if we have a problem with our government, we have a problem with ourselves.  If we do not like the job done by those we send to represent us, we can fire them.  Strangely enough, many claim to not be pleased, yet the same folks continually get elected for the most part, thus negating that claim.  But this is a principle we really need to take to heart—WE are the Government.  Not them.

#### Claims of fairness, objectivity, predictability are ways to marginalize the out group and retrench power structures

Delgado, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled  [\*820]  to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what  [\*821]  really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.

#### Roleyplaying of the state makes it impossible to make decisions in real life and foreclose agency

Antonio ‘95 (Robert, University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43, JS)
The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held thatpersons (especially male professionals)in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are sothoroughlyabsorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." Thishighlysubjectified social self or simulator suffersdevas- tatinginauthenticity.The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra.One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Theirinwardness and aleatoryscripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot planfor the long termor participate inenduringnet- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience.The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachingand untrammeledressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

#### You should be an informed citizen, not the government – roleplaying shuts down critical thinking and deliberation

Steele 10—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

(Brent, *Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics* pg 130-132, dml)

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s primary purpose should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, ¶ we must avoid a trap into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do.” This is not a question in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts refused us, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 ¶ This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and used for *mechanisms of control*, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. ¶ When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, instead, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who plays the role of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. ¶ What the President needs, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of the brittleness of power, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its limits and pitfalls; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to listen to that voice and tremble. (1970: 28) ¶ The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” are missing the point. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “tell the story” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “tact,” “rules,” and seduction that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and no more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation” ([1964] 2006: 233).

### 2AC AT: Decisionmaking

#### We impact turn – the decisions that we make us unable to sufficiently deal with social justice issues – its just an activity of the elites

Iris Marion Young, Oct 2011 (Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct., 2001), pp. 670-690, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”, JSTOR :)

Exhorting citizens to engage in respectful argument with others they dis- agree with is a fine recommendation for the ideal world that the deliberative democrat theorizes, says the activist, where everyone is included and the political equal of one another. This is not the real world of politics, however, where powerful elites representing structurally dominant social segments have significant influence over political processes and decisions. Deliberation sometimes occurs in this real world. Officials and dignitaries meet all the time to hammer out agreements. Their meetings are usually well organized with structured procedures, and those who know the rules are often able to further their objectives through them by presenting proposals and giv- ing reasons for them, which are considered and critically evaluated by the others, who give their own reasons. Deliberation, the activist says, is an activ- ity of boardrooms and congressional committees and sometimes even parlia- ments. Elites exert their power partly through managing deliberative settings. Among themselves they engage in debate about the policies that will sustain their power and further their collective interests. Entrance into such delibera- tive settings is usually rather tightly controlled, and the interests of many affected by the decisions made in them often receive no voice or representa- tion. The proceedings of these meetings, moreover, are often not open to gen- eral observation, and often they leave no public record. Observers and mem- bers of the press come only by invitation. Deliberation is primarily an activity of political elites who treat one another with cordial respect and try to work out their differences. Insofar as deliberation is exclusive in this way, and inso- far as the decisions reached in such deliberative bodies support and perpetu- ate structural inequality or otherwise have unjust and harmful consequences, says the activist, then it is wrong to prescribe deliberation for good citizens committed to furthering social justice. Under these circumstances of struc- tural inequality and exclusive power, good citizens should be protesting out- side these meetings, calling public attention to the assumptions made in them, the control exercised, and the resulting limitations or wrongs of their outcomes. They should use the power of shame and exposure to pressure deliberators to widen their agenda and include attention to more interests. As long as the proceedings exercise exclusive power for the sake of the interests of elites and against the interests of most citizens, then politically engaged citizens who care about justice and environmental preservation are justified even in taking actions aimed at preventing or disrupting the deliberations.

#### Framework is just another form of policing - vote aff if we win this argument

Stephano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University and Fred Moten, Associate professor of African American studies and visual studies at the University of California, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study”

Stefano: Yeah, I feel that’s true. What I think is that each one is a different way to get at a similar set of questions, to think about the general antagonism, to think about blackness, to think about the undercommons. I think the impulse for me and Fred is always to try and move towards the stuff that we like, and to move towards the mode of living that we like. We know that sometimes that involves moving through certain kinds of critique of what’s holding us back. But, for me, each time, what’s going on is that I’m trying to elaborate a different mode of living together with others, of being with others, not just with other people but with other things and other kinds of senses. At one point, for me anyway, I felt very strongly that this kind of policy world was emerging everywhere – and I wanted to talk with Fred about how to find our stuff again amidst all this kind of policy work in which everybody seemed from every spot at any moment to be making policy. I had this image in my head of a kind of return to a world in which every self-determined individual had the right to make brutal policy on the spot for every person who was not selfdetermined, which essentially is a colonial or slave situation – and the kind of ubiquity of policy, which all of a sudden, didn’t emanate anymore just from government but from ~~fucking~~ policy shops in every university, and from independent policy shops, and from bloggers, etc. These policy people to me are like night riders. So, I felt at that moment it was necessary to deal with it in terms of, what would you say is going on that occasioned that kind of frenzied attack, this total mobilisation of the ‘fixed’? What provoked this? That’s why we ended up talking about planning. But there’s also a part where Fred is very directly able to address blackness in a piece. So, we were able to start with something that we were feeling was an elaboration of our mode of living, our inherited black radical tradition. Then, that piece ends up with a kind of caution around governance. At least from my point of view, I’m always approaching Fred, hanging out with Fred, to say, we know that there are things we like, so how can we elaborate them this time, not just for each other but also for other people, to say to others let’s keep fighting, keep doing our thing. So, it’s true that it isn’t an argument that builds. To me, it’s picking up different toys to see if we can get back to what we’re really interested in. Not to say that that doesn’t change. I have a richer understanding of social life than I did a few years ago. When I started working with Fred, social life, to me, had a lot to do with friendship, and it had a lot to do with refusal – refusal to do certain kinds of things. And then gradually I got more and more interested in this term, ‘preservation,’ where I started to think about, “well, refusal’s something that we do because of them, what do we do because of ourselves?” Recently, I’ve started to think more about elaborations of care and love. So, my social world is getting bigger with our work. But, each piece for me is still another way to come at what we love and what’s keeping us from what we love. So, it isn’t in that sense a scientific investigation that starts at one end and finishes at the other end. Fred: It’s funny, this ubiquity of policy making, the constant deputisation of academic laborers into the apparatuses of police power. And they are like night riders, paddy rollers, everybody’s on patrol, trying to capture the ones who are trying to get out – especially themselves, trying to capture their own fugitivity. That’s actually the first place at which policy is directed. I think that a huge part of it has to do simply with, let’s call it, a certain reduction of intellectual life – to reduce study into critique, and then at the same time, a really, really horrific, brutal reduction of critique to debunking, which operates under the general assumption that naturalised academic misery loves company in its isolation, like some kind of warped communal alienation in which people are tied together not by blood or a common language but by the bad feeling they compete over. And so, what ends up happening is you get a whole lot of people who, as Stefano was suggesting, spend a whole lot of time thinking about stuff that they don’t want to do, thinking about stuff that they don’t want to be, rather than beginning with, and acting out, what they want.

# 1AR

## Framework

### AT: SSD

#### Advocating shit you don’t believe in empirically does nothing—just breeds complacency with exceptionalism

Ronald Walter Greene, fmr debater and communication professor at U of Minnesota, and Dennis Hicks, fmr debater and communication professor, 2005 “LOST CONVICTIONS; Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens,” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ronaldwaltergreene>

In the hands of Dennis Day, the goal of debate was to reassign the convictions of students to the process of debate as a democratic form of decision-making. In this way debate training was no longer simply a mechanism for developing critical thinking or advocacy skills, but instead, debate was now a performance technique that made possible the self-fashioning of a new form of liberal citizen. The citizen’s commitments were to be redirected to the process of debate. This redirection entails a procedural notion of liberal citizenship that asks the student to invest in debate as a method of deliberation. Our argument here rests on Day’s attempt to ethically defend debating both sides by linking the pedagogical rationale of debate to a public ethic, in this case, full and free expression. We are not claiming that debate actually creates a situation in which students who participate in the activity abandon their convictions and commitments on the issues of the day nor are we claiming that debate asks students to embrace an ungrounded relativism. For us, what is important here is that when faced with an ethical criticism of debating both sides, Day sets out a deliberative-oriented vision of democracy whereby the liberal citizen materializes by divorcing his/her speech from the sincerity principle. To embody one’s commitment to the democratic norm of free and full expression required students to argumentatively perform positions they might personally oppose in order to instantiate the circulation of free and full expression and to secure a commitment toward debate as a democratic form of decision-making. Thus, the debate over debate was a struggle over the ethical attributes required for liberal citizenship. The argument that we will develop in this section begins with the premise that a key element of Cold War liberalism was the attempt to re-position the United States as the leader of the Free World (Greene 1999). One way Cold War liberalism made possible the emergence of US world leadership was by pulling together a national and international commitment to ‘American exceptionalism’. According to Nikhil Pal Singh (1998), American exceptionalism is a product of the attempt to conceptualize the United States as a concrete representative of the universal norms of democracy. In so doing, the US is granted a status and history that is deemed unique from other nations at the same time as that uniqueness qualifies the US to be the leader and judge of democratic attributes, characteristics and norms. In the aftermath of World War II, the proliferation of free speech as a characteristic of the US helped to warrant Cold War liberal claims to American exceptionalism. As Paul Passavant (1996) suggests, the ‘Millian paradigm’ of free speech has been appropriated by U.S. constitutional theorists to grant ‘America’ the status of a nation whereby ‘one legitimately claims the right to free speech’ (pp. 301/2). For Passavant, the process by which the US emerged as a nation whereby citizens claim the right to free speech creates a moral geography in which other nations are not granted the ‘maturity’ necessary for free speech and/or simultaneously must conform to the U.S. vision of free speech. It is our argument that during the cold war, the debate-free speech assemblage helped to make possible the emergence of ‘America’s’ status as an exemplar of democracy.