# Round 2

# 1AC

## 1AC

### Changes

#### Bronx RR Round 1 – except “Affirm Zapatismo” was included as an adovocacy statement

# 2AC

## Coloniality K

### AT: Kritik

#### This ability allows us to move past traditional leftist movements that have failed and create new political spaces for change – their alternative necessarily creates a static identity that fails

Manuel Callahan, Professor of Race relations at Humboldt State University, 2005, “Why not share a dream? Zapatismo as Political and Cultural Practice,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263123

While we should not abandon the responsibilities and challenges of sincere solidarity work, taking our cues from the EZLN, we might suggest that Zapatismo invites people to become part of "the struggle" in their own manner, at their own pace, and without being measured by any specific model of "conscientization" or a political program specified by "the organization." However, the effort at encuentro challenges us to interrogate the limitations and contradictions of more traditional solidarity activism. Zapatismo reveals the political tensions of building a movement based only on single issue campaigns, on behalf of a specific constituency, and relying on short-lived fragile coalitions often over-determined by the most immediate crisis. In many cases those solidarity efforts that fail to escape a liberal mold can unwittingly promote possessive individualism, celebrating a single leader, often considered the best and the brightest of the group, who is expected to state the group's issues, history, strategies and goals. The result is a single model, plan, or program dominated by an elite. Consequently, a narrowly defined solidarity effort can easily reproduce paternalism and hierarchy within the organization and between the organization and the constituency being "served." Echoing Holloway's warning in this volume, traditional solidarity projects fall into the trap of defining, representing, and speaking for the struggle(s) of others, while at the same moment insisting on "the progress" of those being aided, making solidarity efforts resistant to modifications and slow to adapt to shifting contexts. Solidarity projects that represent, define and speak for the struggle (s) of others presuppose the progress of those being aided and not the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Moreover, aide workers operating in a narrow solidarity mode are less likely to acknowledge or celebrate the transformations that have already taken place in "targeted" com munities, inadvertently facilitating an insidious imperialism. Professional well-funded NGOs, for example, "can become shadow bureaucracies parallel to Southern nation state administrations."30 Ultimately, a bureaucratic model of social change will not be able to prioritize and promote the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Although there may be valid concerns we must interrogate regarding the challenges of "solidarity," the political practice examined here does not seek to impose a rigidly defined alternative practice. The Zapatistas have been consistent in keeping with what they have argued is the task of an armed movement: to "present the problem, and then step aside."31 As critical catalysts in posing problems they have deliberately not posed solutions on other groups or spaces. "But it is already known that our specialty is not in solving problems, but in creating them. 'Creating them?' No, that is too presumptuous, rather in proposing. Yes, our specialty is proposing problems."32 The Zapatista provocation insists that rights emerge from collective identities and communal needs expressing collectively articulated obligations and not the competing interests of individual need.33 Rather than emphasize networks as our only organizing objective, we might also imagine the movement in solidarity with the Zapatistas as an imagined community, a collective effort to define obligations that are rooted in a locally placed culture generating knowledge about what works across generations. The very act of provocation undertaken has been a bridge manifest in a new international, not an international based on rigid party doctrines or dogmas of competing organizations but "an international of hope." The new international is defined by dignity, "that nation without nationality, that rain bow that is also a bridge, that murmur of the heart no matter what blood lives it, that rebel irreverence that mocks borders, customs and wars."34 "Instead of a new bureaucratic apparatus, for the world coordination of a political movement expressing universal ideals and proposals," Esteva explains, "the International of Hope was created: a web constituted by innumerable differentiated autonomies, without a center or hierarchies, within which the most varied coalitions of discontents can express themselves, to dismantle forces and regimes oppressing all of them."35 The process of creating political space for dialogue between a diverse number of constituencies occupying a particular space suggests that community is neither homogenous nor static. Rather than speak of "the community," Zapatismo strives for a notion of community embodying a multiplicity of histories, experiences, resources, and obligations. The pursuit of new political relationships underscores the need to re-discover strategies to collectively define obligations of and within a community through dialogue based on respect. Political projects and proposals need to emerge organically—not imposed either by an individual (caciquismo) or a cabal (protagonismo). As the Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) have warned, people organizing themselves must begin "with the situation in which they find themselves, not in the one which we might desire to be found."36 In new political spaces all voices, all proposals must be responded to with respect. Democracy, as Marcos suggests, is a gesture "to decide upon the dominant social proposal." Liberty implies the freedom necessary to pursue one action over another, the expression of desire for the fulfillment of hope and dignity. Free from oppression, fear or persecution liberty sustains diversity and the choice, "to subscribe to one or another proposal."37 "It is," writes Marcos, "the same desire: democracy, liberty, and justice. In the heroic delirium of the Mexican southeast, hope implies a name: Tachicam, the unity of long ing for a better future."

### Perm

#### Perm solves – Zapatismo can link up with other struggles effectively

Jeffery Popke, East Carolina University Professor, 06-xx-04, “The face of the other: Zapatismo,

responsibility and the ethics of deconstruction,” <http://myweb.ecu.edu/popkee/social%20and%20cultural.pdf>

Although it is undoubtedly important to assess, and support, the reform process in the domain of ‘political realism’, I want to focus my attention here on the messianic tenor of Zapatista discourse, on what Huntington (2000) has called their ‘politics of poetic resistance’ (see also Evans 1999; Higgins 2000). I do so because the discursive intervention of Zapatismo represents, in its aims, strategies and composition, a challenge to modern ethical ideals in a manner consistent with what I have argued thus far: ﬁrst, they articulate a form of ethical subjectivity that transcends both cultural difference and borders; and second, they argue for an alternative conception of politics, in which the future is open to construction in the absence of certainty. This ethical discourse is important in part because it has produced effects that resonate far beyond the immediate context of southern Mexico. The Zapatistas are ‘awakening, moving and stimulating the creative imagination of many others, who are already involved in similar concerns and struggles but often found themselves at a dead end’ (Esteva and Prakash 1998: 36). In this sense, I believe that the writings of Marcos and the EZLN are more than simply interventions in a regional struggle over indigenous rights and autonomy. They also both reﬂect and contribute to, through their broader engagement with global civil society, the development of a new conception of social and cultural agency, within which a different form of ethics and politics is at stake (Couch 2001; Stahler-Sholk 2001).

### AT: Alt

#### Singularity disad – they paper over the ways oppression constitutes itself in different ways than just modernity – dooms their movement to failure

Simon Tormey, Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, 2006, ‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation”

Thinking more generally about the socio-political ideology of Zapatismo, what becomes evident is the reluctance to commit themselves to a ‘vision’ or blueprint of how the world should be transformed, or indeed how even the Chiapas should be transformed. This again is a source of irritation for otherwise sympathetic onlookers who would like to see in the Zapatistas the vanguard of an attempt to construct a viable ‘counter- empire’ of the kind influentially discussed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their controversial work Empire. Surely it is asked, there must be some notion of what the world should look like in order to mobilise people against the world as it is now? Again, the notion that ‘resistance against’ can only make sense when seen as the antonym of a ‘resistance for’, in this case in favour of a distinct political system or space is one that is challenged both implicitly and explicitly by Zapatista practice. As Marcos insists: Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not bought and paid for by a doctrine. It is … an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question: ‘What is it that excluded me?’‘What is that has isolated me?’ In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive … 29 In attempting to elaborate what Zapatismo is, communiqués articulate the idea of ‘a political force’ that operates in negation to that which is, as opposed to the embodiment of something that has yet to be created. In this sense they directly eschew the idea of a government or system ‘in waiting’ as per the classic ‘putschist’ rhetoric of traditional revolutionary movements. As has often been noted, they have yet to articulate a response to the ‘land question’, which is the very issue that caused the Zapatistas to come into being in the first place. Zapatismo is ‘silent’ on this and all the other matters that have animated left radicals over the past two centuries, that have nurtured them in the ‘hard times’, and helped to maintain their faith that history is on their side. But the ‘silence’ is surely telling in positive ways. As we noted at the outset, this is a political force that prefers not to ‘speak’, but rather to ‘listen’ and provide what Marcos terms an ‘echo’ of what it ‘hears’. As Marcos notes, this would be: An echo that recognises the existence of the other and does not overpower or attempt to silence it. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice, yet speaks with the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound, yet opens itself to the sound of the other. An echo […] transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that turns itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, before Power’s deafness, opts to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, acknowledging itself to be equal in its desire to listen and be listened to, to recognising itself as diverse in the tones and levels of voices forming it.30 To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to ‘The People’; there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only ‘lived experience’. Zapatismo is a political force that is concerned with the means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and strategies that have prevented voices being heard. To quote Marcos, what they are struggling for is a world in which ‘all worlds are possible’. Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, Marcos declares (on behalf of the Zapatistas) that: ‘we aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle’.30 Their struggle is one to permit other conceptions of the world to come into being. Of course this is punctuated by a view of what it is that such spaces require: the obliteration of party machines, of the bloated and antique structures of representation that clog Mexico’s political system; but the point is such strictures are regarded as the basis upon which a genuine political process can take place. What is left out is any ‘final’ account of justice, equality or democracy. Contrast Zapatismo in other words, with traditional revolutionary rhetoric and more particularly with the communist struggles of the past with their tightly knit, disciplined hierarchies built on a thorough going utilitarianism that is prepared, as Trotsky once bluntly put it, ‘to break eggs to make an omelette’. In Zapatismo we find on the contrary a sentiment that insists that all the ‘eggs’ are of value. It is ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ for the singular voice that animates this struggle against representation, not a desire to fulfil the historical or foreordained destiny to which all voices are or will be subject. In this sense as in the other senses discussed here, it seems to me that this is a very Deleuzian kind of struggle, and Deleuze (and Guattari) anticipate on the plane of high theory the kinds of demands being articulated by Marcos and the Zapatistas. This is also to say that the search for a post-representational form of political practice should not be read as necessarily ‘nihilistic’ (as Laclau insists) or as one that inevitably pits the aristocratic ‘one’ against the many. Or if it is, then it is a nihilism that, as per Deleuze’s reading of ‘eternal return’, isa struggle in which being and difference are constantly affirmed. It is an affirmation of difference itself, of the singular voice, and of the possibility of and necessity for ‘spaces’ in which those voices can be heard. In the terms offered by Deleuze and Guattari this would be ‘smooth’ space as opposed to the ‘striated’ space of representational systems. It would be a ‘deterritorialised’ space of combination and recombination in accordance with differentiated, disaggregated desires; not the territorialised space of hierarchy, fixed and known roles that define ‘identity’. In terms of Zapatismo, this is a space in which ‘all worlds are possible’and in which it is the constant combination and recombination of the indigenous peoples that determines what ‘happens’.

#### Empirics prove – singular movements are doomed to failure – only Zapatismo solves

David Solnit, writer and activist organizer who helped take a part in the 1999 WTO Shutdowns, 2003, “Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World,” Text

The new radicalism is a movement of movements, a network of networks, not merely intent on changing the world, but—as the Zapatistas describe—making a new one in which many worlds will fit. It is a patchwork quilt of hope sewn together with countless hands, actions, songs, e-mails, and dreams into a whole that is much greater than the sum of its pieces. These movements, with their new ways of organizing, resistance, communication and new forms of alternative institutions, represent a dramatic departure from the last century’s prevailing strategies of working for change. A common theme within the new radicalism is the practice of letting the means determine the ends. Unless the community or world we want is built into and reflected by the struggle to achieve it, movements will always be disappointed in their efforts. Groups, political parties, or movements that are hierarchically structured themselves cannot change the antidemocratic and hierarchical structures of government, corporations, and corporate capitalism. Many of the twentieth-century’s major efforts – reforming existing institutions or governments in order to make them kinder and gentler, or overthrowing them and then occupying and replicating those same or similar structures of power – were ultimately not successful, and in the worst cases they left a legacy of disaster and betrayal for those who gave their sweat and blood in the fight for a better world. The term “Left,” has sadly lumped authoritarian groups, parties, governments, and dictators together with genuinely democratic social movements, and the “Left” and “Right” are no longer adequate to describe the complex political spectrum of the twenty-first century. Unless positive new ideas and methods are more clearly articulated and widely explored, people and movements striving for a better world will remain trapped in the failed models of the past. Without a creative break from these patterns we doom ourselves to stagnant movements, another generation of dishearted radicals, and a world unchanged. It is desperately clear that we need to articulate new ways of making change. The new radicalism has been birthed from this desire to popularize and self-organize mass movements form the ground up using these new ways. It’s time to throw out the old mythology that a single organization, ideology, or network can effectively change the world. The era of monolithic movements and international political parties is over. “Correct” political lines, one-ideology-fits-all, rigid blueprints, and cookie-cutter solutions won’t work. Instead, the new radicalism finds its hopeful possibilities in the diverse interconnected movements of movements that has risen up around the planet. These movements are distinct in each culture, community and place, and this diversity is at the heart of the new radicalism’s strength and appeal. This movement of movements represents the evolution of a new model of unity and expanded definitions of solidarity. This is the unity of acting in concert, finding points of convergence, making alliances and building networks, and networks of networks, that articulate a “NO” to the system, louder and more effectively than the sums of all our individual “NO’s.” The new radicalism has emerged organically as the impacted peoples of the world have listened to and connected with each other’s experience. Out of this instinct has come mutual respect and a common understanding of the interlocking systems that keep us all down in different ways. This is the healthy biodiviersity of an ecosystem of resistance.

## Framework

### 2AC C/I – Rez Basis

#### Resolved is to reduce through mental analysis

Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved?s=ts>)

to reduce by mental analysis (often followed by into).

### 2AC AT: Passivity

#### Their focus on politics generates personal violence

Susanne Kappeler ‘95

[Associate Prof @ Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, 1995, pg. 10-11]

‘We are the war’ does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society—which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of collective irresponsibility1, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyze the specific and differential responsibilities of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility—leading to the –well-known illusion of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens- even more so those of other nations – have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia – since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### 2AC AT: Limits

#### Fairness isn’t a thing – portable education is the only impact

Branson 07 [Josh, NDT/TOC winner from Northwestern & St. Marks, Harvard Law school Graduate, Current lawyer; <http://osdir.com/ml/education.region.usa.edebate/2007-11/msg00295.html>]

There is no such thing as unfairness. If you respond to this and don’t make an argument about the terminal value of debate, then you have not thought about this enough. Overlooking the issue of big/small school and coaching resources (another topic for another time), I think all teams start at the same point. Everyone has access to the resolution, everyone has access to the same literature base, and everyone has the same speech time to fill. Whenever one side makes a move, it closes some doors strategically and opens others. Your job is to find it. I think whining about unfairness is almost always lame and untruthful. Think about the classic unfairness arguments: [insert K team] is unfair because they don’t have a plan we’re ready for. You know, it?s funny, but thinking back over my college debate career, I spent more time agonizing about and arguing with coaches over these far-left teams than I did the other top-5 quality teams. And, while I’ve said this before, I’ll say it again: I think that exact process is one of the main benefits of debate. Forcing yourself to adapt to circumstances in which you?re not comfortable, being made to alter your thinking on the run when you don?t have your same old stale blocks, when you have to make new cognitive connections and investigate literature bases which you are not familiar? I think THAT is the value-added of debate. I’ve written about this extensively before, but debate does not train people to be policy experts. Hell, if I’d wanted to have a sweet career in the policy world, I would have been better served quitting debate and learning Chinese. I’m not going to repeat everything I’ve said previously, but, at least for me, debate taught to be more intellectually versatile and flexible than almost anyone outside of debate that I know. That is something I think is extremely valuable both intellectually (to the debater) and socially.And, you see, it’s things that are 'unfair' that encourage this type of adaptation. Take yourselves off your theory clitche-ridden blocks for a while, and actually think about it,: how many things make it IMPOSSIBLE to win. None. How many things make it harder? A lot. But again, almost any time someone makes a good argument, it becomes harder for the other side to win. That’s what debate is. It’s about making things hard on the other side and not letting them make it hard for you. That’s what learning is. Fairness claims are bad because they contravene the idea of debate. If I?m right that fairness impacts really just conceal an assumption about what the value of debate is, then I think just directly making counter-arguments about the role of debate and cutting out the rhetoric of fairness is profoundly beneficial. I barely even need to point out that life isn?t fair. I think it's way more helpful to conceive of theory arguments in terms of routing debate towards productive ends than it is to maintain some pedantic obsession with fairness. I think the rhetorical message kids should be getting is that they should react to what they perceive of as ‘unfair’ practices by adapting, not whining. Because, when we are honest with ourselves and take ourselves off our oft-repeated theory cliches, is anything really THAT unfair I can’t really think of a single time in debate that would meet that test. I will tell you something though; right along with the shitty quality of evidence, theory arguments are at the top of the list of things that marginalize debate as a good training device. It's something that people outside debate don't really understand, and it's by far the most boring thing to judge, and, just as a matter of empirical observation, the people that do it a lot tend to be the laziest ones.

### 2AC AT: Limits – Offense

#### Claims of fairness, objectivity, predictability are ways to marginalize the out group and retrench power structures

Delgado, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled  [\*820]  to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what  [\*821]  really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.

### 2AC AT: Switch Side Good

#### Switch side debate just creates neocons who automatically reject the idea of somebody who has a different knowledge production – allowing for outside voices allows critical thinking skills in areas besides simply policy and decolonize the debate space

William Spanos professor of English and Comparative Literature at the SUNY Binghamton and Christopher Spurlock, High school and college debater, conductor of the interview with William Spanos, 2011, <http://kdebate.com/spanos.html>

CS: Many of the most charged criticisms of your comments on debate stem from the charge that you have had very little experience with debate and are not qualified to comment on it. We've taken the position often that our insular activity could use some outside criticism, but others remain skeptical of the view that disinterested, 'switch-side,' debate, where debaters can take any position on an issue, will actually produce more neoconservatives like Cheney and Rumsfeld. They cite policy debaters who practiced this and went on to champion rights for Guantanamo Bay detainees after debate and law school. Surely you don't believe that all debaters will become neocons simply from following this model. But what should we be most on guard against in order to avoid the worst of the imminent global disaster that the neocons are undoubtedly leading us to? WVS: The danger of being a total insider is that the eye of such a person becomes ~~blind~~ [ignorant] to alternative possibilities. The extreme manifestation of this being at one with the system, of remaining inside the frame, as it were, is, as Hannah Arendt, decisively demonstrated long ago, Adolph Eichmann. That's why she and Said, among many poststructuralists, believed that to be an authentic intellectual --to see what disinterested inquiry can't see-- one has to be an exile (or a pariah) from a homeland-- one who is both apart of and apart from the dominant culture. Unlike Socrates, for example, Hippias, Socrates' interlocutor in the dialogue "Hippias Major" (he is, for Arendt, the model for Eichmann), is at one with himself. When he goes home at night "he remains one." He is, in other words, incapable of thinking. When Socrates, the exilic consciousness, goes home, on the other hand, he is not alone; he is "by himself." He is two-in-one. He has to face this other self. He has to think. Insofar as its logic is faithfully pursued, the framework of the debate system, to use your quite appropriate initial language, does, indeed, produce horrifically thoughtless Eichmanns, which is to say, a political class whose thinking, whether it's called Republican or Democratic, is thoughtless in that it is totally separated from and indifferent to the existential realities of the world it is representing. It's no accident, in my mind, that those who govern us in America --our alleged representatives, whether Republican, Neo-Con, or Democrat-- constitute such a "political class." This governing class has, in large part, their origins, in a preparatory relay consisting of the high school and college debate circuit, political science departments, and the law profession. The moral of this story is that the debate world needs more outsiders -- or, rather, inside outsiders -- if its ultimate purpose is to prepare young people to change the world rather than to reproduce it.

### 2AC Antonio

#### Roleyplaying of the state makes it impossible to make decisions in real life and foreclose agency

Antonio ‘95 (Robert, University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43, JS)  
The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held thatpersons (especially male professionals)in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are sothoroughlyabsorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." Thishighlysubjectified social self or simulator suffersdevas- tatinginauthenticity.The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra.One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Theirinwardness and aleatoryscripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot planfor the long termor participate inenduringnet- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience.The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachingand untrammeledressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### 2AC Moten and Harney

#### Framework is just another form of policing - vote aff if we win this argument because the policing is already done

Stephano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University and Fred Moten, Associate professor of African American studies and visual studies at the University of California, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study”

Stefano: Yeah, I feel that’s true. What I think is that each one is a different way to get at a similar set of questions, to think about the general antagonism, to think about blackness, to think about the undercommons. I think the impulse for me and Fred is always to try and move towards the stuff that we like, and to move towards the mode of living that we like. We know that sometimes that involves moving through certain kinds of critique of what’s holding us back. But, for me, each time, what’s going on is that I’m trying to elaborate a different mode of living together with others, of being with others, not just with other people but with other things and other kinds of senses. At one point, for me anyway, I felt very strongly that this kind of policy world was emerging everywhere – and I wanted to talk with Fred about how to find our stuff again amidst all this kind of policy work in which everybody seemed from every spot at any moment to be making policy. I had this image in my head of a kind of return to a world in which every self-determined individual had the right to make brutal policy on the spot for every person who was not selfdetermined, which essentially is a colonial or slave situation – and the kind of ubiquity of policy, which all of a sudden, didn’t emanate anymore just from government but from ~~fucking~~ policy shops in every university, and from independent policy shops, and from bloggers, etc. These policy people to me are like night riders. So, I felt at that moment it was necessary to deal with it in terms of, what would you say is going on that occasioned that kind of frenzied attack, this total mobilisation of the ‘fixed’? What provoked this? That’s why we ended up talking about planning. But there’s also a part where Fred is very directly able to address blackness in a piece. So, we were able to start with something that we were feeling was an elaboration of our mode of living, our inherited black radical tradition. Then, that piece ends up with a kind of caution around governance. At least from my point of view, I’m always approaching Fred, hanging out with Fred, to say, we know that there are things we like, so how can we elaborate them this time, not just for each other but also for other people, to say to others let’s keep fighting, keep doing our thing. So, it’s true that it isn’t an argument that builds. To me, it’s picking up different toys to see if we can get back to what we’re really interested in. Not to say that that doesn’t change. I have a richer understanding of social life than I did a few years ago. When I started working with Fred, social life, to me, had a lot to do with friendship, and it had a lot to do with refusal – refusal to do certain kinds of things. And then gradually I got more and more interested in this term, ‘preservation,’ where I started to think about, “well, refusal’s something that we do because of them, what do we do because of ourselves?” Recently, I’ve started to think more about elaborations of care and love. So, my social world is getting bigger with our work. But, each piece for me is still another way to come at what we love and what’s keeping us from what we love. So, it isn’t in that sense a scientific investigation that starts at one end and finishes at the other end. Fred: It’s funny, this ubiquity of policy making, the constant deputisation of academic laborers into the apparatuses of police power. And they are like night riders, paddy rollers, everybody’s on patrol, trying to capture the ones who are trying to get out – especially themselves, trying to capture their own fugitivity. That’s actually the first place at which policy is directed. I think that a huge part of it has to do simply with, let’s call it, a certain reduction of intellectual life – to reduce study into critique, and then at the same time, a really, really horrific, brutal reduction of critique to debunking, which operates under the general assumption that naturalised academic misery loves company in its isolation, like some kind of warped communal alienation in which people are tied together not by blood or a common language but by the bad feeling they compete over. And so, what ends up happening is you get a whole lot of people who, as Stefano was suggesting, spend a whole lot of time thinking about stuff that they don’t want to do, thinking about stuff that they don’t want to be, rather than beginning with, and acting out, what they want.

# 1AR

## Framework

### 1AR – Delgado

#### Rules are created to re-enforce status quo power and privilege – masking these rules in the language of fairness makes them more acceptable

Delgado, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world- making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world.n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations.n37 It is no surprise, then, that judgment under an "objective" (or reasonable person) standard generally will favor the stronger party. This, however, is not always the case: Rules that too predictably and reliably favored the strong would be declared unprincipled. n38 The stronger actor must be able to see his favorite principles as fair and[\*819] just -- ones that a reasonable society would rely upon in contested situations.n39 He must be able to depict the current standards as integral to justice, freedom, fairness, and administrability -- to everything short of the American Way itself (and maybe even that, since societies that regulate these relationships more closely are paternalistic, and verge on (shhh!) socialism.