# Blake---Round 7

# 2AC

## Case

### View from Nowhere

#### Must question our positions of privilege as males in debate– not doing so is the fungibility of whiteness

Darnell L. Moore 2011 (Writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and a0nti-colonial thought and advocacy, “On Location: The “I” in the Intersection”, http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection :)

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989. Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual genealogy from which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.” My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us. Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions? What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible. Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)? Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self.

#### **The Neg is a view from nowhere**

Yancy ‘5 [George, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 19(4), p. 215-216]

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes: Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.

## Historical Materialism

### 2AC Zapatismo Solves

#### The Zapatismo provides a crucial model in the struggle against capitalism that allows for further activism against the dominate neoliberal corporations – commodification just guarantee’s our message is spread

Thomas Olsen, Department of Sociology at Humbolt State University, 2005, “MIXING SCALES: NEOLIBERALISM AND THE TRANSNATIONAL ZAPATISTA SOLIDARITY

NEWTWORK,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263126

The fact that the uprising took place despite these difficult conditions has attracted considerable sympathy and astonishment from transnational activists. Considering this apparent paradox, Kerry Appel (interview 2000) comments that: It is them, the most excluded people in the world, the indigenous Mayan men and women from the marginalized, poverty stricken communities, with little or no education, litte or no food or resources, little or no rights of recognition that have risen up and said, we can change the world, and have put themselves and their lives on the line in order to do that. This view is echoed on a website calling for the formation of a so-called Zapatista Bloc at the anti-FTAA protests in Quebec in April 2001 (Zapatista Bloc 2002):15 Because of the symbolic nature of their revolt, their ability to draw connections between local oppression and international structures of institutionalized violence and repression, and their stance on indigenous rights and autonomy, the Zapatistas have been an important part of the struggle against global capitalism. The Zapatistas, the ultimate underdogs (my emphasis), have constandy and effectively batded not only with arms but also with words, ideas and visions for a sustainable and just future. The Zapatistas have inspired the mobilization of civil society in Mexico and around the world in the fight for democracy, liberty and justice. The surprising appearance of the Zapatistas in the post Cold War period is a common thread in many accounts regarding their resonance beyond the borders of Mexico. These accounts in turn often make reference to Francis Fukuyama's (1989) famous insistence on the end of history that seemed to leave litte room for alternatives to liberal democracy and neoliberal capitalism. Justin Paulson (interview 2001) thus situates the importance of the uprising in a post-Cold War setting characterized by a radical Left on the retreat and without promising alternatives to the end of history: In terms of time, the EZLN sprang into public view three years after the collapse of the USSR. [Tjhe 'End of History' had been declared; the Labor Movement was relatively weak, especially in the United States; NAFTA was being enacted; etc. For both the activist Left and the academic Left, the early 1990s was a period of retreat and of resigned capitulation to neoliberalism. What was so surprising about the Zapatistas was that they weren't supposed to be there! What's a National Liberation Army doing when there aren't supposed to be any more National Liberation Armies?... The EZLN has reminded people that there is still reason to struggle... I think for a lot of people, seeing indigenous women armed only with sticks opposing heavily-armed soldiers and tanks was something of a wake-up call: 'if they can do it, I can do it too.' Not only in sympathy, but in solidarity. When asked about the main contribution of the Zapatistas to activists outside Mexico, John Ross (interview 2001) echoes Paulson's remarks: Hope. The Zapatista rebellion dawned in a world that didn't have much Left left in it. Years of Reagan-Bush, the sell-outs in Central America, the suicide of the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf 'war,' NAFTA, were all knots in a long string of defeats. So the sudden appearance of the Zaps seemed hopeful... we were ready for them. The Zapatistas themselves also seem to be quite aware of this contribution. Commenting on the relationship between the Zapatistas and transnational solidarity activists, Subcomandante Marcos (Le Bot 1997: 260) sums up the Zapatista contribution to the faltering radical Left: Perhaps Zapatismo helped them remember that it was necessary to struggle and that struggling is worth the effort.... It is a kind of agreement: they obtain from Zapatismo what they need, this reminder, this trampoline to jump again, and the communities obtain this support, this help guaranteeing their survival. These quotes all seem to convey the impression that the radical Left had not died out in the wake of the Cold War, but rather that it found itself in an identity crisis, lacking focus and direction. As briefly touched on above, moreover, this crisis was not a result of the disappearance of the conditions usually considered to underlie the social indignation of the radical Left. This leads us to return for a moment to the previous discussions of the three components in an injustice frame (recognition, action, and solution). What seems to emerge from the quotes above is that the resonance of the Zapatista injustice frame to a significant extent lies in the action component. The action component in an injustice frame serves to provide a rationale and motivation to engage in social action to ameliorate social and political problems. The quotes above depict the time of the uprising as a time characterized not by the absence of just causes for a radical Left, but by a lack of self-confidence and conviction that action and struggle is possible and potentially effective. As suggested in the quotes from Paulson and others, the symbolic power of the Zapatista uprising was strengthened by the fact that it took place despite the adverse conditions surrounding the movement. In the preceding section, I concluded by referring to the lack of concrete solutions on the part of the Zapatistas in regard to the problems associated with neoliberalism. The absence of concrete solutions in the injustice frame reflects the anti-vanguardist position of the Zapatistas (Olesen 2004,2005). While acknowledging the effects of neoliberalism as a world wide phenomenon, the variation and diversity in the forms of resistance to neoliberalism are consequently considered by the Zapatistas (EZLN 1997) to be valuable rather than problematic: [N]ot only in the mountains of South Eastern Mexico is there resistance and struggle against neoliberalism. In other parts of Mexico, in Latin America, in the United States and Canada, in the Europe of the Maastricht Treaty, in Africa, in Asia, and in Oceania, the pockets of resistance multiply. Each one has its own history, its differences, its similarities, its demands, its struggles, its accomplishments... This is a model of pockets of resistance, but do not pay too much attention to it. There are as many models as there are resistances... So draw the model you prefer. In regard to the pockets, as well as in regard to the resistances, diversity is richness. In a seemingly paradoxical manner, it is to a large extent the insistence of the Zapatistas on the diversity of social struggles that has given them a significant role in the wave of protests we have seen since the so-called Battle in Seattle in 1999 (I will henceforth refer to this as the global justice and solidarity movement). This inspiration is a recurrent thread in the accounts and self-perceptions of activists inspired by the Zapatistas. Speaking to an audience at the protests against the IMF/World Bank meeting in Prague in September 2000, An drew Flood (2000) of the Irish Mexico Group outlined the major inspirations stemming from the Zapatistas: [T]his movement [the TPN] has no single starting point. That said... I will point to one of the places we are coming from. I believe there is a debt to be acknowledged to the people who declared 'Ya basta!’ to the new economic order on the 1st of January 1994. I'd trace my involvement in this new anti-capitalist movement to Mexico and to the '1st encounter for humanity and against neoliberalism,' held in Zapatista camps in Chiapas in 1996... If we were to pick a point where the movements against neoliberalism moved from the single campaign/issue to global anti capitalism perhaps that point is found in the jungles of the Mexican South East some four years ago. This 'historical' introduction is relevant to where we are going. Some left parties who don't understand this history are trying to take control of the movement in the hope of building their organizations, of becoming our leadership... The protests lack the guiding hand of the party not because we have not realised the need for one but because many of us have explicitly rejected the experience of this authoritarian method of organisation.

### Perm

#### Perm solves – Zapatismo can link up with other struggles effectively

Jeffery Popke, East Carolina University Professor, 06-xx-04, “The face of the other: Zapatismo,

responsibility and the ethics of deconstruction,” <http://myweb.ecu.edu/popkee/social%20and%20cultural.pdf>

Although it is undoubtedly important to assess, and support, the reform process in the domain of ‘political realism’, I want to focus my attention here on the messianic tenor of Zapatista discourse, on what Huntington (2000) has called their ‘politics of poetic resistance’ (see also Evans 1999; Higgins 2000). I do so because the discursive intervention of Zapatismo represents, in its aims, strategies and composition, a challenge to modern ethical ideals in a manner consistent with what I have argued thus far: ﬁrst, they articulate a form of ethical subjectivity that transcends both cultural difference and borders; and second, they argue for an alternative conception of politics, in which the future is open to construction in the absence of certainty. This ethical discourse is important in part because it has produced effects that resonate far beyond the immediate context of southern Mexico. The Zapatistas are ‘awakening, moving and stimulating the creative imagination of many others, who are already involved in similar concerns and struggles but often found themselves at a dead end’ (Esteva and Prakash 1998: 36). In this sense, I believe that the writings of Marcos and the EZLN are more than simply interventions in a regional struggle over indigenous rights and autonomy. They also both reﬂect and contribute to, through their broader engagement with global civil society, the development of a new conception of social and cultural agency, within which a different form of ethics and politics is at stake (Couch 2001; Stahler-Sholk 2001).

### AT: Alt

#### Singularity disad – they paper over the ways oppression constitutes itself in different ways than just [x] – dooms their movement to failure

Simon Tormey, Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, 2006, ‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation”

Thinking more generally about the socio-political ideology of Zapatismo, what becomes evident is the reluctance to commit themselves to a ‘vision’ or blueprint of how the world should be transformed, or indeed how even the Chiapas should be transformed. This again is a source of irritation for otherwise sympathetic onlookers who would like to see in the Zapatistas the vanguard of an attempt to construct a viable ‘counter- empire’ of the kind influentially discussed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their controversial work Empire. Surely it is asked, there must be some notion of what the world should look like in order to mobilise people against the world as it is now? Again, the notion that ‘resistance against’ can only make sense when seen as the antonym of a ‘resistance for’, in this case in favour of a distinct political system or space is one that is challenged both implicitly and explicitly by Zapatista practice. As Marcos insists: Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not bought and paid for by a doctrine. It is … an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question: ‘What is it that excluded me?’‘What is that has isolated me?’ In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive … 29 In attempting to elaborate what Zapatismo is, communiqués articulate the idea of ‘a political force’ that operates in negation to that which is, as opposed to the embodiment of something that has yet to be created. In this sense they directly eschew the idea of a government or system ‘in waiting’ as per the classic ‘putschist’ rhetoric of traditional revolutionary movements. As has often been noted, they have yet to articulate a response to the ‘land question’, which is the very issue that caused the Zapatistas to come into being in the first place. Zapatismo is ‘silent’ on this and all the other matters that have animated left radicals over the past two centuries, that have nurtured them in the ‘hard times’, and helped to maintain their faith that history is on their side. But the ‘silence’ is surely telling in positive ways. As we noted at the outset, this is a political force that prefers not to ‘speak’, but rather to ‘listen’ and provide what Marcos terms an ‘echo’ of what it ‘hears’. As Marcos notes, this would be: An echo that recognises the existence of the other and does not overpower or attempt to silence it. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice, yet speaks with the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound, yet opens itself to the sound of the other. An echo […] transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that turns itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, before Power’s deafness, opts to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, acknowledging itself to be equal in its desire to listen and be listened to, to recognising itself as diverse in the tones and levels of voices forming it.30 To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to ‘The People’; there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only ‘lived experience’. Zapatismo is a political force that is concerned with the means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and strategies that have prevented voices being heard. To quote Marcos, what they are struggling for is a world in which ‘all worlds are possible’. Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, Marcos declares (on behalf of the Zapatistas) that: ‘we aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle’.30 Their struggle is one to permit other conceptions of the world to come into being. Of course this is punctuated by a view of what it is that such spaces require: the obliteration of party machines, of the bloated and antique structures of representation that clog Mexico’s political system; but the point is such strictures are regarded as the basis upon which a genuine political process can take place. What is left out is any ‘final’ account of justice, equality or democracy. Contrast Zapatismo in other words, with traditional revolutionary rhetoric and more particularly with the communist struggles of the past with their tightly knit, disciplined hierarchies built on a thorough going utilitarianism that is prepared, as Trotsky once bluntly put it, ‘to break eggs to make an omelette’. In Zapatismo we find on the contrary a sentiment that insists that all the ‘eggs’ are of value. It is ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ for the singular voice that animates this struggle against representation, not a desire to fulfil the historical or foreordained destiny to which all voices are or will be subject. In this sense as in the other senses discussed here, it seems to me that this is a very Deleuzian kind of struggle, and Deleuze (and Guattari) anticipate on the plane of high theory the kinds of demands being articulated by Marcos and the Zapatistas. This is also to say that the search for a post-representational form of political practice should not be read as necessarily ‘nihilistic’ (as Laclau insists) or as one that inevitably pits the aristocratic ‘one’ against the many. Or if it is, then it is a nihilism that, as per Deleuze’s reading of ‘eternal return’, isa struggle in which being and difference are constantly affirmed. It is an affirmation of difference itself, of the singular voice, and of the possibility of and necessity for ‘spaces’ in which those voices can be heard. In the terms offered by Deleuze and Guattari this would be ‘smooth’ space as opposed to the ‘striated’ space of representational systems. It would be a ‘deterritorialised’ space of combination and recombination in accordance with differentiated, disaggregated desires; not the territorialised space of hierarchy, fixed and known roles that define ‘identity’. In terms of Zapatismo, this is a space in which ‘all worlds are possible’and in which it is the constant combination and recombination of the indigenous peoples that determines what ‘happens’.

#### Empirics prove – singular movements are doomed to failure – only Zapatismo solves

David Solnit, writer and activist organizer who helped take a part in the 1999 WTO Shutdowns, 2003, “Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World,” Text

The new radicalism is a movement of movements, a network of networks, not merely intent on changing the world, but—as the Zapatistas describe—making a new one in which many worlds will fit. It is a patchwork quilt of hope sewn together with countless hands, actions, songs, e-mails, and dreams into a whole that is much greater than the sum of its pieces. These movements, with their new ways of organizing, resistance, communication and new forms of alternative institutions, represent a dramatic departure from the last century’s prevailing strategies of working for change. A common theme within the new radicalism is the practice of letting the means determine the ends. Unless the community or world we want is built into and reflected by the struggle to achieve it, movements will always be disappointed in their efforts. Groups, political parties, or movements that are hierarchically structured themselves cannot change the antidemocratic and hierarchical structures of government, corporations, and corporate capitalism. Many of the twentieth-century’s major efforts – reforming existing institutions or governments in order to make them kinder and gentler, or overthrowing them and then occupying and replicating those same or similar structures of power – were ultimately not successful, and in the worst cases they left a legacy of disaster and betrayal for those who gave their sweat and blood in the fight for a better world. The term “Left,” has sadly lumped authoritarian groups, parties, governments, and dictators together with genuinely democratic social movements, and the “Left” and “Right” are no longer adequate to describe the complex political spectrum of the twenty-first century. Unless positive new ideas and methods are more clearly articulated and widely explored, people and movements striving for a better world will remain trapped in the failed models of the past. Without a creative break from these patterns we doom ourselves to stagnant movements, another generation of dishearted radicals, and a world unchanged. It is desperately clear that we need to articulate new ways of making change. The new radicalism has been birthed from this desire to popularize and self-organize mass movements form the ground up using these new ways. It’s time to throw out the old mythology that a single organization, ideology, or network can effectively change the world. The era of monolithic movements and international political parties is over. “Correct” political lines, one-ideology-fits-all, rigid blueprints, and cookie-cutter solutions won’t work. Instead, the new radicalism finds its hopeful possibilities in the diverse interconnected movements of movements that has risen up around the planet. These movements are distinct in each culture, community and place, and this diversity is at the heart of the new radicalism’s strength and appeal. This movement of movements represents the evolution of a new model of unity and expanded definitions of solidarity. This is the unity of acting in concert, finding points of convergence, making alliances and building networks, and networks of networks, that articulate a “NO” to the system, louder and more effectively than the sums of all our individual “NO’s.” The new radicalism has emerged organically as the impacted peoples of the world have listened to and connected with each other’s experience. Out of this instinct has come mutual respect and a common understanding of the interlocking systems that keep us all down in different ways. This is the healthy biodiviersity of an ecosystem of resistance.

### AT: Western Philosophy

#### Your Western K is privileged and colorblind

Monique Roelofs, Prof @ Hampshire College and teaches and writes at the intersection of European, analytical, and postcolonial philosophies with a special focus on aesthetics and the philosophy of art and culture, feminist philosophy, and critical race theory, 2006, “The Veiled Presence of Race in the Philosophy of Art:  Reclaiming Race for Aesthetics”

Race is a conceptual blind spot in philosophical aesthetics and the philosophies of the arts. While compelling avenues of philosophical thought reveal the intertwinements of conceptions of the state, the public, and the individual with racial constructions, that is to say, with lived realities that are organized with the help of racialized categories, aestheticians tend to bypass such entanglements or to insulate their premises and inquiries from their relations to racial formations. Philosophical investigations of common and prominent themes in aesthetics by and large proceed in ostensibly colorblind terms. I have in mind here, for example, discussions of art’s cognitive, imaginative, and affective dimensions, the relationship between aesthetics and ethics, everyday and environmental aesthetic systems, the politics of art and criticism, the nature of art’s situatedness in culture, capital, history, and modernity, and the analysis of art’s gendered and class-inflected workings-in short, numerous areas of concentration at the heart of the field. There are exceptions, especially at points where critical race theory intersects with aesthetics and, more narrowly, in the study of beauty, cross-cultural aesthetics, and artistic practices marked in terms of cultural “Others.” But characteristically the discipline-its theoretical paradigms, central preoccupations, institutionalized self-understandings, standards of quality-shuns exposing its structural principles to the workings of racial difference. In the context of asymmetrical power relations, many have argued, colorblind policies give carte blanche to the racial forces that be, whether intended or not. Colorblindness not only fails to contest racial domination, but assists also in its maintenance and reaffirmation against perceived breaches. Within a racialized social and conceptual system, what may seem to be race-neutral methodologies in fact typically reassert white privilege. The field of aesthetics is not exempted from this well-documented phenomenon. The inattention to race shores up the aesthetic pillars of whiteness and bolsters the whitening supports of aesthetics. Racialization and aestheticization (which concerns, among other things, aesthetic contributions to the shaping of identities, relations of power, and formations of knowledge and culture) stand in complex historical interconnections. These must be studied and worked through in order to create more tenable social, economic, cultural, political, environmental, and aesthetic constellations.

#### This silence sustains racism – reject them

Carrie Crenshaw, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University of Alabama, Summer 1997, “Resisting whiteness' rhetorical silence,” Western Journal of Communication 61.3, ebsco

\*\*Yellow Highlighting – sorry about that

In academic and political discourse, it is also rare for white people to explicitly reference their whiteness. The strictures of the "approved identity" in academic writing often prevent us from revealing our personal social locations and experiences (Blair, Brown and Baxter 402). Public political figures likewise avoid mentioning whiteness in their discourse (Nakayama and Krizek 297) even though the color of American politics is implicit in current debates about welfare, affirmative action, crime, and a host of other issues. Moreover, such discourse tends to ignore the ways in which race, gender, and class intersect with each other to perpetuate oppressive human hierarchies (Crenshaw, "Beyond"; Lorde). / Because discursive constructions of whiteness are typically unmarked and unnamed in personal, academic, and public discourse, they present a constellation of challenges for rhetorical scholars who are interested in the ideological role of whiteness in intersecting discourses about race, gender, and class. Previous rhetorical scholarship has focused on racist public discourse (e.g., Wander, "Salvation"; Wander, "The Savage"; Himelstein; Logue; Logue and Garner; Trank), but Nakayama and Krizek have recently taken our thinking a step further by mapping the terrain of whiteness. In a provocative study which names whiteness as a strategic rhetoric, they ethnographically "map" the "everyday" strategies of the spoken rhetoric of whiteness from a cultural studies perspective. They are "interested in ... the constructed space of whiteness, not the ways that it influences the margins" and "do[es] not address racism or racist ideology, although [they acknowledge that] these are closely aligned to many of the ways that whiteness is constructed" (306n). Their conclusion invites us to move beyond their initial topological project to investigate how the rhetoric of whiteness functions in the context of other social relations, particularly gender (303-305). In this essay, I accept their invitation and join the ongoing interdisciplinary conversation about whiteness (e.g., Allen; Dutcher; Dyer; Feagin and Vera; Frankenberg; Frye; Harris; hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek; Roediger). Because whiteness and its intersections with gender and class are steeped in silence (hooks, Black; Mcintosh; Nakayama and Krizek), this essay argues that rhetoricians must do the critical ideological work necessary to make whiteness visible and overturn its silences for the purpose of resisting racism. / To do this, scholars must locate interactions that implicate unspoken issues of race, discursive spaces where the power of whiteness is invoked but its explicit terminology is not, and investigate how these racialized constructions intersect with gender and class. One such interaction was the debate between Carolyn Moseley Braun (D-IL) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) over the U.S. Senate's decision whether to grant a fourteen-year extension of the design patent for the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) insignia. Because the UDC insignia contains a representation of the Confederate flag, the debate centered on whether a Senate approval of the patent would commend a charitable patriotic organization or commemorate an historical symbol of racism. Accounts of this debate were widely disseminated in the national news media and described Moseley Braun's argument as a dramatic history-making challenge to racism in the U.S. Senate (e.g., Clymer; Lee; McGrory). "For once Senators changed their minds. Things that are usually decided in the cloakroom, were settled on the floor in plain sight" (McGrory A2). Helms spoke first and Moseley Braun responded. After Helms' second speech, the motion to table the amendment was rejected 52 to 48. However, Moseley Braun was ultimately victorious; after her final speech, the patent extension was denied on a 75 to 25 vote. / This debate is a uniquely interesting rhetorical artifact because it was a direct and public clash of arguments about race in political discourse. It constitutes an important example of how two public political actors' discourse about race and how the personal dimensions of race, gender, and class entered into their public argument. In the next section, I argue that ideological rhetorical criticism is an appropriate avenue for analyzing interactions like this one. / Ideological Rhetorical Criticism / There is nothing essential, "natural," or biological about whiteness. Because the overwhelming unity of our genetic makeup swamps any human differences that have historically been attributed to race (Appiah 21; Shipman 269), race itself has been called a biological fiction (Gates 4). It is the historically located rhetorical meaning of whiteness that assigns it social worth (Nakayama and Krizek 292). / Whiteness functions ideologically when people employ it, consciously or unconsciously, as a framework to categorize people and understand their social locations. Within this framework, whiteness as a social position has value and has been treated legally as property (Bell; Crenshaw "Race"; Feagin and Vera; Harris). The term "white privilege" denotes a host of material advantages white people enjoy as a result of being socially and rhetorically located as a white person (Crenshaw, "Race"; Mcintosh; Wellman). Even though many white people sense that privilege accompanies whiteness (Feagin and Vera), they do not overtly acknowledge their white privilege because they think of themselves as average, morally neutral non-racists. They do not see racism as an ideology that protects the interests of all white people; rather, they envision racism in the form of white hooded Klansmen engaged in acts of racial hatred (Mcintosh 34; Ezekiel 1). Because this ideology can be produced and reproduced through spoken discourse (van Dijk; Goldberg), whiteness and its privilege have both ideological and rhetorical dimensions. / Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals the vested interests protected by a particular rhetorical framework for understanding social order. It assists the search for alternatives to oppression and enables us to engage in right action for good reasons (Wander, "The Ideological" 2, 18). While cultural and ethnographic approaches that name the complexities of our racialized social locations make the rhetoric of whiteness visible and displace its centrality (Nakayama and Krizek), an ideological approach helps to uncover the alliance between the submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness and white material privilege. Ideological rhetorical criticism reveals how the public political rhetoric of whiteness relies upon a silent denial of white privilege to rationalize judicial, legislative, and executive decisions that protect the material interests of white people at the expense of people of color.[ 3] Beyond the realm of "everyday" discourse, public political actors often engage a submerged or silent rhetoric of whiteness to protect white privilege, and their arguments are authorized by the powerful institutions from which they speak. Those authorized arguments in turn sanction the rhetorical frameworks through which white individuals make sense of and justify their privileged social status (van Dijk; Wellman). / Stuart Hall's work is useful for grasping the rhetorical nature of ideology in general and racist ideologies in specific. He defines ideology as "those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence" ("The Whites" 18). Ideological struggles are struggles over meaning. Meaning is a social production, a practice of making the world mean something, and this meaning is produced through language. Language is not a synonym for ideology because the same terms can be used in very different ideological discourses. However, language is the principle medium of ideologies, and ideologies are sets or chains of meaning located in language ("The Rediscovery" 67, 81; "The Whites" 18). / These chains of meaning are not the products of individual intention even though they are statements made by individuals. Instead, intentions are formed within pre-existing ideologies because individuals are born into them. Ideologies live within what we take-for-granted. They exist in our assumptions and descriptive statements about how the world is. "Ideologies tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted 'naturalised' world of common sense. Since (like gender) race appears to be 'given' by Nature, racism is one of the most profoundly 'naturalised' of existing ideologies" (Hall, "The Whites" 19). / To understand how racist ideologies operate, Hall draws upon the work of Antonio Gramsci. While Gramsci did not explicitly theorize about race, he did investigate the ideological and cultural implications of region and nation. Hall embraces Gramsci's argument that ideologies function hegemonically to preserve powerful interests. That is to say, ideologies are taken-for-granted frameworks that naturalize our descriptions of the way the world is, including its current power structures. This power is not achieved solely by coercive might; it also operates through the consent of those who are subjugated. Hegemony is the production of consent that determines what is taken-for-granted. So, our taken-for-granted, naturalized assumptions of what makes common sense produce and reinforce our consent to the current social order and its power structures. The advantage of Gramsci's position is that it makes room for an oppositional consciousness because it recognizes that hegemony is historically contingent. Because hegemony is never stable and is always an ongoing and fluid process of gaining consent, social transformation through the critical examination of current relations of power is possible. / Following Gramsci, Hall also believes that it is essential to analyze the historical specificity of racist ideologies in a non-reductive manner. He rejects the gross form of economism in which everything is seen to be determined by class structures, and instead he highlights the need to understand and conceptualize other oppressive forms of social differentiation including culture, region, nationality, and ethnicity. Doing so enables a productive reconceptualization of the "class subject." The class subject is not homogenous; there is never simple unity among people said to be of the same "class." Rather, hegemony is a dynamic process of the production of consent within and between different sectors and segments within classes. Thus, Gramsci's work can help us to understand how race and class intersect. We need not accept the false choice between class based explanations and race based explanations. In addition, Hall argues that Gramsci's notion of hegemony helps us to understand one of the most common, least explained features of 'racism': the 'subjection' of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideologies which imprison and define them. He reveals how different, often contradictory elements can be woven into and integrated within different ideological discourses; but also, the nature and value of ideological struggle which seeks to transform popular ideas and the 'common sense' of the masses. All of this has the most profound importance for the analysis of racist ideologies and for the centrality, within that, of ideological struggle. ("Gramsci's" 440) / A critical ideological approach to racialized discourse reveals the ongoing struggle over the meaning of race. It makes room for oppositional consciousness by helping us to "see" the meaning of racialized constructions and the vested interests they protect so that we can contest them. In addition, as the following analysis of the Braun-Helms debate illustrates, it enables our understanding of the intersections among racialized, gendered, and class discourses.

#### Your authors are armchair philosophers that sustain traditional enlightenment views and do nothing for people of color

Siskanna Naynaha, composition coordinator at Lane Community College and teaches courses on African American and Latino literature, May 2006, “RACE OF ANGELS: XICANISMA, POSTCOLONIAL PASSIONS, AND RHETORICS OF REACTION AND REVOLUTION,” <https://research.wsulibs.wsu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2376/492/s_naynaha_050306.pdf?sequence=1>

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Laclau entered into a critical discussion with cultural theorist Judith Butler and Slovenian psychoanalyst and theorist Slavoj Žižek in their collaborative Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues in the Left. Using the theoretical lenses provided by Gramsci, Derrida, and Lacan, the three debate the failure of the Left in contemporary politics and, if there has indeed been a failure, its causes. The major contribution of this work to the field of democratic theory is the ways the authors problematize current watchwords deployed in the cultural rhetoric of US democracy such as “multicultural,” “pluralistic,” and “politically correct.” Ultimately, however, the theorists of so-called radical democracy tend to become bogged down in discussions of the discursivity of democracy; what they neglect here is the material, economic realities of poor people of color in the US and around the globe. Kalyan K. Sanyal elaborates on this critique in his “Postmarxism and the Third World: A Critical Response to the Radical Democratic Agenda.” “By emphasizing the discourse of the right,” he argues, the radical democrats link their multiple struggles to the state because it is the state that endows every citizen with right, and the process of realization of the right must refer to the state rather than to any other form of collectivity . . . [but] what are the implications of the radical democratic agenda for the global order, economic and political? (128) In the end Sanyal finds that the implications are devastating. The most salient is that the “Third World” “has to bear a large part of the cost of accommodating rights in the [First World]. To the extent that these rights impinge on the logic of profit and accumulation, capital has a tendency to move to greener pastures in the Third World where such rights hardly exist” (128). In fact, the rhetoric of democracy in the US has grown out of a Eurocentric obsession with “Western” foundations which inspire and perpetuate an obsessive possessive individualism through constant appeals to Enlightenment era thinking and ideals. The deployment of such rhetoric has long obscured the problems of racism, poverty, patriarchal oppression, and heterosexism within the US, and now, given the global expansion of US domination under the logic of late capitalism, that same rhetoric of democracy obfuscates the historical and material realities of US colonialism and imperialism around the world. Debates about individual “rights” and appropriate “procedures” rage on in the US while suffering rages on in poor neighborhoods populated disproportionately by people of color in the US and enrages the devastated Two-Thirds World. It is a travesty that demands a sustained intervention, one that historicizes the political and economic dimensions of the rhetoric of democracy in the US.

### AT: Marxism

#### Marx was one racist dude

Walter Williams, WND Commentator, 2006, “MARX'S RACISM,” <http://www.wnd.com/2006/06/36692/>

Karl Marx is the hero of some labor union leaders and civil-rights organizations, including those who organized the recent protest against proposed immigration legislation. It’s easy to be a Marxist if you haven’t read his writings. Most people agree that Marx’s predictions about capitalism turned out to be dead wrong. What most people don’t know is that Marx was an out and out racist and anti-Semite. He didn’t think much of Mexicans. Concerning the annexation of California after the Mexican-American War, Marx wrote: “Without violence, nothing is ever accomplished in history.” Then he asks, “Is it a misfortune that magnificent California was seized from the lazy Mexicans who did not know what to do with it?” Friedrich Engels, Marx’s co-author of the “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” added, “In America, we have witnessed the conquest of Mexico and have rejoiced at it. It is to the interest of its own development that Mexico will be placed under the tutelage of the United States.” Much of Marx’s ideas can be found in a book written by former communist Nathaniel Weyl, titled “Karl Marx, Racist” (1979). In a July 1862 letter to Engels, in reference to his socialist political competitor, Ferdinand Lassalle, Marx wrote, “… it is now completely clear to me that he, as is proved by his cranial formation and his hair, descends from the Negroes from Egypt, assuming that his mother or grandmother had not interbred with a n[egro]. Now this union of Judaism and Germanism with a basic Negro substance must produce a peculiar product. The obtrusiveness of the fellow is also n[egro]-like.” Engels shared much of Marx’s racial philosophy. In 1887, Paul Lafargue, who was Marx’s son-in-law, was a candidate for a council seat in a Paris district that contained a zoo. Engels claimed that Paul had “one-eighth or one-twelfth n[egro] blood.” In an April 1887 letter to Paul’s wife, Engels wrote, “Being in his quality as a n[egro], a degree nearer to the rest of the animal kingdom than the rest of us, he is undoubtedly the most appropriate representative of that district.” Though few claim him as their own, such as leftists claim Karl Marx, Thomas Carlyle is another unappreciated historical figure. Carlyle is best-known for giving economics the derogatory name “dismal science,” an inversion of the phrase “gay science,” which at the time (1849) referred to life-enhancing knowledge. Most people have incorrectly learned that the term “dismal science” had its origins in reference to Thomas Malthus’ gloomy predictions that the global population would grow faster than food supplies, condemning mankind to perpetual poverty and starvation. My George Mason University colleague, professor Davy Levy, and his co-author, Sandra Peart, tell the true story in their 2001 book, “The Secret History of the Dismal Science: Economics, Religion and Race in the 19th Century.” Carlyle first used the term “dismal science” in his 1849 pamphlet entitled “An Occasional Discourse on the N[egro] Question.” He attacked the ideas of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and other free market, limited-government economists for their belief in the fundamental equality of man and their anti-slavery positions. The fact that economics assumes that people are all the same and are equally deserving of liberty was offensive to Carlyle and led him to call economics the dismal science. Carlyle argued that blacks were subhuman, “two-legged cattle,” who needed the tutelage of whites wielding the “beneficent whip” if they were to contribute to the good of society. Carlyle was by no means alone in denouncing economics for its anti-slavery and pro-equality position. No less a historical figure and a Christmastime favorite, Charles Dickens, author of “A Christmas Carol,” shared Carlyle’s positions on slavery and blacks as subhuman. Marx, Engels, Carlyle and Dickens all share one belief prevalent throughout mankind’s history down to today: the belief that some people are endowed with superior intelligence and wisdom, and they’ve been ordained to forcibly impose that wisdom on the masses.

#### Race prefigures class struggles

Charles Mills, 1997, The Racial Contract, p. 31-40

The classic social contract, as I have detailed, is primarily moral/political in nature. But it is also economic in the background sense that the point of leaving the state of nature is in part to secure a stable environment for the industrious appropriation of the world. (After all, one famous definition of politics is that it is about who gets what and why.) Thus even in Locke's moralized state of nature, where people generally do obey natural law, he is concerned about the safety of private property, indeed proclaiming that "the great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property."42 And in Hobbes's famously amoral and unsafe state of nature, we are told that "there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth."43 So part of the point of bringing society into existence, with its laws and enforcers of the law, is to protect what you have accumulated. / What, then, is the nature of the economic system of the new society? The general contract does not itself prescribe a particular model or particular schedule of property rights, requiring only that the "equality" in the prepolitical state be somehow preserved. This provision may be variously interpreted as a self-interested surrender to an absolutist Hobbesian government that itself determines property rights, or a Lockean insistence that private property accumulated in the moralized state of nature be respected by the constitutionalist government. Or more radical political theorists, such as socialists and feminists, might argue that state-of-nature equality actually mandates class or gender economic egalitarianism in society. So, different political interpretations of the initial moral egalitarianism can be advanced, but the general background idea is that the equality of human beings in the state of nature is somehow (whether as equality of opportunity or as equality of outcome) supposed to carry over into the economy of the created sociopolitical order, leading to a system of voluntary human intercourse and exchange in which exploitation is precluded. / By contrast, the economic dimension of the Racial Contract is the most salient, foreground rather than background, since the Racial Contract is calculatedly aimed at economic exploitation. The whole point of establishing a moral hierarchy and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate the privileging of those individuals designated as white/persons and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons. There are other benefits accruing from the Racial Contract—far greater political influence, cultural hegemony, the psychic payoff that comes from knowing one is a member of the Herrenvolk (what W. E. B. Du Bois once called "the wages of whiteness")44—but the bottom line is material advantage. Globally, the Racial Contract creates Europe as the continent that dominates the world; locally, within Europe and the other continents, it designates Europeans as the privileged race. / The challenge of explaining what has been called "the European miracle"—the rise of Europe to global domination—has long exercised both academic and lay opinion.45 How is it that a formerly peripheral region on the outskirts of the Asian land mass, at the far edge of the trade routes, remote from the great civilizations of Islam and the East, was able in a century or two to achieve global political and economic dominance? The explanations historically given by Europeans themselves have varied tremendously, from the straightforwardly racist and geographically determinist to the more subtly environmentalist and culturalist. But what they have all had in common, even those influenced by Marxism, is their tendency to depict this development as essentially autochthonous, their tendency to privilege some set of internal variables and correspondingly-downplay or ignore altogether the role of colonial conquest and African slavery. Europe made it on its own, it is said, because of the peculiar characteristics of Europe and Europeans. / Thus whereas no reputable historian today would espouse the frankly biologistic theories of the past, which made Europeans (in both pre- and post-Darwinian accounts) inherently the most advanced race, as contrasted with the backward/less-evolved races elsewhere, the thesis of European specialness and exceptionalism is still presupposed. It is still assumed that rationalism and science, innovativeness and inventiveness found their special home here, as against the intellectual stagnation and traditionalism of the rest of the world, so that Europe was therefore destined in advance to occupy the special position in global history it has. James Blaut calls this the theory, or "super-theory" (an umbrella covering many different versions: theological, cultural, biologistic, geographical, technological, etc.), of "Eurocentric diffusionism," according to which European progress is seen as "natural" and asymmetrically determinant of the fate of non-Europe." Similarly, Sandra Harding, in her anthology on the "racial" economy of science, cites "the assumption that Europe functions autonomously from other parts of the world; that Europe is its own origin, final end, and agent; and that Europe and people of European descent in the Americas and elsewhere owe nothing to the rest of the world."47 / Unsurprisingly, black and Third World theorists have traditionally dissented from this notion of happy divine or natural European dispensation. They have claimed, quite to the contrary, that there is a crucial causal connection between European advance and the unhappy fate of the rest of the world. One classic example of such scholarship from a half century ago was the Caribbean historian Eric Williams's Capitalism and Slavery, which argued that the profits from African slavery helped to make the industrial revolution possible, so that internalist accounts were fundamentally mistaken.48 And in recent years, with decolonization, the rise of the New Left in the United States, and the entry of more alternative voices into the academy, this challenge has deepened and broadened. There are variations in the authors' positions—for example, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Andre Guilder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein9—but the basic theme is that the exploitation of the empire (the bullion from the great gold and silver mines in Mexico and Peru, the profits from plantation slavery, the fortunes made by the colonial companies, the general social and economic stimulus provided by the opening up of the "New World") was to a greater or lesser extent crucial in enabling and then consolidating the takeoff of what had previously been an economic backwater. It was far from the case that Europe was specially destined to assume economic hegemony; there were a number of centers in Asia and Africa of a comparable level of development which could potentially have evolved in the same way. But the European ascent closed off this development path for others because it forcibly inserted them into a colonial network whose exploitative relations and extractive mechanisms prevented autonomous growth. / Overall, then, colonialism "lies at the heart" of the rise of Europe.50 The economic unit of analysis needs to be Europe as a whole, since it is not always the case that the colonizing nations directly involved always benefited in the long term. Imperial Spain, for example, still feudal in character, suffered massive inflation from its bullion imports. But through trade and financial exchange, others launched on the capitalist path, such as Holland, profited. Internal national rivalries continued, of course, but this common identity based on the transcontinental exploitation of the non-European world would in many cases be politically crucial, generating a sense of Europe as a cosmopolitan entity engaged in a common enterprise, underwritten by race. As Victor Kiernan puts it, "All countries within the European orbit benefited however, as Adam Smith pointed out, from colonial contributions to a common stock of wealth, bitterly as they might wrangle over ownership of one territory or another... [T]here was a sense in which all Europeans shared in a heightened sense of power engendered by the successes of any of them, as well as in the pool of material wealth... that the colonies produced."51 / Today, correspondingly, though formal decolonization has taken place and in Africa and Asia black, brown, and yellow natives are in office, ruling independent nations, *the global economy* is essentially dominated by the former colonial powers, their offshoots (Euro-United States, Euro-Canada), and their international financial institutions, lending agencies, and corporations. (As previously observed, the notable exception, whose history confirms rather than challenges the rule, is Japan, which escaped colonization and, after the Meiji Restoration, successfully embarked on its own industrialization.) Thus one could say that the world is essentially dominated by white capital. Global figures on income and property ownership are, of course, broken down nationally rather than racially, but if a transnational racial disaggregation were to be done, it would reveal that whites control a percentage of the world's wealth grossly disproportionate to their numbers. Since there is no reason to think that the chasm between First and Third Worlds (which largely coincides with this racial division) is going to be bridged—vide the abject failure of various United Nations plans from the "development decade" of the 1960s onward—it seems undeniable that for years to come, the planet will be white dominated. With the collapse of communism and the defeat of Third World attempts to seek alternative paths, the West reigns supreme, as celebrated in a London Financial Times headline: "The fall of the Soviet bloc has left the IMF and G7 to rule the world and create a new imperial age."52 Economic structures have been set in place, causal processes established, whose outcome is to pump wealth from one side of the globe to another, and which will continue to work largely independently of the ill will/good will, racist/antiracist feelings of particular individuals. This globally color-coded distribution of wealth and poverty has been produced by the Racial Contract and in turn reinforces adherence to it in its signatories and beneficiaries. / Moreover, it is not merely that Europe and the former white settler states are globally dominant but that within them, where there is a significant nonwhite presence (indigenous peoples, descendants of imported slaves, voluntary nonwhite immigration), whites continue to be privileged vis-a-vis non-whites. The old structures of formal, de jure exclusion have largely been dismantled, the old explicitly biologistic ideologies largely abandoned53—the Racial Contract, as will be discussed later, is continually being rewritten—but opportunities for nonwhites, though they have expanded, remain below those for whites. The claim is not, of course, that all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but that, as a statistical generalization, the objective life chances of whites are significantly better. / As an example, consider the United States. A series of books has recently documented the decline of the integrationist hopes raised by the 1960s and the growing intransigence and hostility of whites who think they have "done enough," despite the fact that the country continues to be massively segregated, median black family incomes have begun falling by comparison to white family incomes after some earlier closing of the gap, the so-called "black underclass" has basically been written off, and reparations for slavery and post-Emancipation discrimination have never been paid, or, indeed, even seriously considered.54 Recent work on racial inequality by Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro suggests that wealth is more important than income in determining the likelihood of future racial equalization, since it has a cumulative effect that is passed down through intergenerational transfer, affecting life chances and opportunities for one's children. Whereas in 1988 black households earned sixty two cents for every dollar earned by white households, the comparative differential with regard to wealth is much greater and, arguably, provides a more realistically negative picture of the prospects for closing the racial gap: "Whites possess nearly twelve times as much median net worth as blacks, or $43,800 versus $3,700. In an even starker contrast, perhaps, the average white household controls $6,999 in net financial assets while the average black household retains no NFA nest egg whatsoever." Moreover, the analytic focus on wealth rather than income exposes how illusory the much-trumpeted rise of a "black middle class" is: "Middle class blacks, for example, earn seventy cents for every dollar earned by middle-class whites but they possess only fifteen cents for every dollar of wealth held by middle-class whites." This huge disparity in white and black wealth is not remotely contingent, accidental, fortuitous; it is the direct outcome of American state policy and the collusion with it of the white citizenry. In effect, "materially, whites and blacks constitute two nations,"55 the white nation being constituted by the American Racial Contract in a relationship of structured racial exploitation with the black (and, of course, historically also the red) nation. / A collection of papers from panels organized in the 1980s by the National Economic Association, the professional organization of black economists, provides some insight into the mechanics and the magnitude of such exploitative transfers and denials of opportunity to accumulate material and human capital. It takes as its title The Wealth of Races—an ironic tribute to Adam Smith's famous book The Wealth of Nations–and analyzes the different varieties of discrimination to which blacks have been subjected: slavery, employment discrimination, wage discrimination, promotion discrimination, white monopoly power discrimination against black capital, racial price discrimination in consumer goods, housing, services, insurance, etc.56 Many of these, by their very nature, are difficult to quantify; moreover, there are costs in anguish and suffering that can never really be compensated. Nonetheless, those that do lend themselves to calculation offer some remarkable figures. (The figures are unfortunately dated; readers should multiply by a factor that takes fifteen years of inflation into account.) If one were to do a calculation of the cumulative benefits (through compound interest) from labor market discrimination over the forty-year period from 1929 to 1969 and adjust for inflation, then in 1983 dollars, the figure would be over $1.6 trillion.57 An estimate for the total of "diverted income" from slavery, 1790 to 1860, compounded and translated into 1983 dollars, would yield the sum of $2.1 trillion to $4.7 trillion.58 And if one were to try to work out the cumulative value, with compound interest, of unpaid slave labor before 1863, underpayment since 1863, and denial of opportunity to acquire land and natural resources available to white settlers, then the total amount required to compensate blacks "could take more than the entire wealth of the United States"59 / So this gives an idea of the centrality of racial exploitation to the U.S. economy and the dimensions of the payoff for its white beneficiaries from one nation's Racial Contract. But this very centrality, these very dimensions render the topic taboo, virtually undiscussed in the debates on justice of most white political theory. If there is such a backlash against affirmative action, what would the response be to the demand for the interest on the unpaid forty acres and a mule? These issues cannot be raised because they go to the heart of the real nature of the polity and its structuring by the Racial Contract. White moral theory's debates on justice in the state must therefore inevitably have a somewhat farcical air, since they ignore the central injustice on which the state rests. (No wonder a hypothetical contractarianism that evades the actual circumstances of the polity's founding is preferred!) / Both globally and within particular nations, then, white people, Europeans and their descendants, continue to benefit from the Racial Contract, which creates a world in their cultural image, political states differentially favoring their interests, an economy structured around the racial exploitation of others, and a moral psychology (not just in whites but sometimes in nonwhites also) skewed consciously or unconsciously toward privileging them, taking the status quo of differential racial entitlement as normatively legitimate, and not to be investigated further.