## 1

**Interpretation – Economic engagement is direct investment – not removal of RESTRICTIONS**

Haass, 2K – Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director

[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a **wide variety** of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

**Violation – the aff only gets rid of something that PREVENTS engagement, but doesn’t directly INCREASE engagement**

**That’s a voting issue**

**They explode the topic – every possible restrictions suddenly becomes a viable aff**

**And they wreck neg ground – they can get claim advantages off getting rid of restrictions, but not defend INVESTMENT**

## 2

#### The aff commodifies the suffering of the Cuban people in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse to engage in the trauma economy

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

## 3

#### The affirmative engages with known human rights abusers-— *moral duty* to shun

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a **duty** (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but **also to support that moral order**. Consider that the moral order itself **contributes significantly** to people's rights being respected. It does so by **encouraging and reinforcing** moral behavior and by **discouraging and sanctioning** immoral behavior. In this moral community people **mutually reinforce** each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be **much more violation of people's rights**. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute **a direct attack on the moral order**. When the violation of human rights is **flagrant**, **willful**, and **persistent**, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually **undermine altogether** the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone **flagrantly**, **willfully**, and **repeatedly** violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, **must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order**. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces **support for the moral order** and **backs up the announcement with action**. This action **reinforces the commitment to the moral order** both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have **a moral effect** on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by **moral suasion** what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of **moral sanction**, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of **maintaining the moral order**, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have **an obligation to shun** in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as **tacit complicity** in the **willful**, **persistent**, and **flagrant immorality**.

## 4

#### Text: The United States federal government ought to **remove potable water, and dual-use restrictions on Cuba.**

#### Cuba is transitioning to sustainable agriculture because the embargo- the plan reverses that

Gonzalez, 03 - Professor of International Law at Seattle University. (Carmen, 2003. "Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba". Tulane Environmental Law Journal. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=987944)

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S.¶ pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415 It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418 Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The¶ distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### Cuban agriculture is key to solve the environment

Peters 10 (Kathryn A. Peters, J.D. from the University of Oregon . "Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution". University of Oregon Law School. law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

While urban agriculture was a response to a dramatic crisis in ¶ Cuba’s history, through the development of a community-based ¶ system of cultivation on previously vacant lots employing organic ¶ farming techniques, Cuba has created a sustainable food production ¶ system.189 As of 2005, Havana was producing over ninety percent of ¶ the perishable produce consumed in its city as well as a significant ¶ portion of its milk and meat.190 With government support, the urban ¶ gardens have become a profitable economic enterprise for many ¶ Cubans.191 Local access to fresh foods has added diversity to the ¶ Cuban diet and reduced the carbon footprint associated with its food ¶ supply by reducing the transportation and chemical input required to ¶ grow and transport the food.192 The development of urban farming ¶ has also ensured food security for Cuba.193 The success of Cuba’s ¶ system has established the country as a model for the urban ¶ production of sustainable agriculture around the world.194¶ In transitioning to a sustainable urban agricultural system, Cuba ¶ has drastically reduced its harmful impacts on the environment. ¶ Cubans have been able to significantly reduce their carbon footprints ¶ as their food supply is no longer shipped across oceans and Cuban ¶ residents can walk to local markets for fresh produce rather than drive¶ to grocery stores.195 Reduced mechanization in food production ¶ further reduces carbon emissions. Increased urban vegetation also ¶ mitigates the impact of climate change because vegetation has a ¶ cooling effect when air temperatures are high.196 Because much of ¶ Cuba’s urban land is now vegetative, surface temperatures in Cuba ¶ may remain cooler due to the thermoregulation created by the ¶ vegetation cover.197¶ According to Dr. Nelso Camponioni Concepción, the Cuban ¶ government, through its urban agricultural program, aims “to gain the ¶ most food from every square meter of available space.”198 By ¶ utilizing available urban space for sustainable food production, Cuba ¶ is reducing its impact on the planet’s carrying capacity. The organic ¶ urban gardening techniques do not consume greenspace or harm the ¶ environment; therefore, measuring the true cost of externalities is not ¶ an issue. The growth of the urban gardens has created an increasing ¶ food supply and a new economy for many Cubans without negatively ¶ impacting the environment or society.

#### Billions die and risks extinction

Cummins and Allen, 10 (Ronnie, Int’l. Dir. – Organic Consumers Association, and Will, Policy Advisor – Organic Consumers Association, “Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6)

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."

## Hospitality

#### 1 Unconditional hospitality is bad – puts the host in a constant state of guilt, leads to paralysis since no actions can truly be “ethical,” it causes immense suffering and prevents obligation towards particular individuals.

Gerasimos Kakoliris, 1-20-2009, School of Humanities, The Hellenic Open University, Patras, Greece, “Jaques Derrida on Unconditional and Conditional Hospitality,” http://books.google.com/books?id=\_42Oiy7nn80C&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&dq=unconditional+hospitality+unethical&source=bl&ots=JLCIczBd3u&sig=Iui9VNVHL\_1xV-PnjzYBXERPSRA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DKDtUbGLHeHhygGt4YHYAQ&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=unconditional%20hospitality%20unethical&f=false

The accession to this “hyperbolic” ethics of hospitality places us in a permanent situation of “had conscience.” or “guilt”. The “absolute” or “hyperbolic” law of hospitality precludes someone from ever being hospitable enough. Therefore, one is always guilty and he or she must always ask for forgiveness for never welcoming the other enough. Moreover, one should feel also guilty and, therefore, ask forgiveness for the fact that the hospitality he or she offers can be transformed into a weapon, a confirmation of his or her sovereignty, or even omnipotence, or an appeal for recognition since “one always takes by giving.” One must, therefore, a priori, ask forgiveness for the gift of hospitality itself, for the sovereignty or the desire of sovereignty of the gift of hospitality.d As Derrida declares: “So you cannot prevent me from having a had conscience, and that is the main motivation of my ethics and my poIitics.c It seems that, since such an ethics is “hyperbolic”, it prohibits any decision from being absolutely ethical. This prohibition is, in a certain sense, the dissolution of the possibility of ethical decision. For, how one can reconcile the fact that while, for Derrida. hospitality is given to the irreducible, singular entity, simultaneously, unconditional hospitality, as universal law, obliges hospitality to he given to anyone indiscriminately. Because, as Derrida himself recognizes, “as soon as I relate to an irreducible singular one, I am betraying another one, or I introduce a third one who disturbs or corrupts the singular relation to the other.” Hence, the more “absolute” or “hyperbolic” the ethics of hospitality becomes the more unethical it becomes. By demanding the unconditional welcome of the stranger, beyond the possibility of any discrimination, pure or absolute hospitality can lead not only to the destruction of one’s home, but also to the suffering or even the death of the host, since the person who enters can be a murderer. Consequently, if hospitality ought to be given, according to the law of unconditional hospitality, to anyone indiscriminately, then it seems legitimate for someone to think, when he or she engages in the experience of decision-making. that “no one has more weight than anybody else.” As Derrida poses it in The Gift of Death.8 why should I look after this particular cat and not the other cats? Yet. do we not usually experience the sense that — even if we can agree that there are lots of situations where we can never be absolutely sure of this — somebody has some sort of prior claim? Hence, to place at the centre of the experience of decision-making the idea that hospitality is an absolutely general obligation to everybody is to render any notion of special obligation towards persons who are in urgent need of it rather problematic. For, the unconditional law excludes the possibility of any kind of discrimination between individuals.

#### 2 Universal hospitality kills ethics and morals – renders decision-making impossible.

Richard Kearney, 1-01-2001, Charles Seelig professor of philosophy at Boston College, author of over 20 books on European philosophy and literature, “Others and Aliens; Between Good and Evil,” from “Evil After Postmodernism; Histories, Narratives, and Ethics,” https://www2.bc.edu/~kearneyr/pdf\_articles/pl86217.pdf

The difficulty with this analysis of hospitality is that it seems to preclude our need to differentiate between good and evil aliens, between benign and malign strangers, between saints and psychopaths (though admittedly 99 per cent of us fall somewhere between the two). If hospitality is to remain absolutely just and true, all incoming others must remain unidentifiable and undecidable. Derrida appears to claim as much when he declares that for pure hospitality or pure gift to occur there must be absolute surprise . . . an opening without horizon of expectation . . . to the newcomer whoever that may be. The newcomer may be good or evil, but if you exclude the possibility that the newcomer is coming to destroy your house, if you want to control this and exclude this terrible possibility in advance, there is no hospitality. . . . The other, Like the Messiah, must arrive whenever he or she wants.10 For Derrida, aliens only come in the dark (like thieves in the night), and we are always in the dark when they come. We are never sure who or what they are; we cannot even be sure if we are hallucinating or not. For the absolute other is without name and without face, an “impossible, unimaginable. unforseeable, unbelievable, absolute surprise.” The best we can do is try to read between the lines and make a leap of faith, an impossible leap of faith, like Abraham, like Kierkegaard. But why not add — and here’s my difficulty with thc undecidable — “like Jim Jones or David Koresh” or other figures of mystical madness who believe they are recipients of messianic messages from some Other they call God? If all reading is reading in the dark, how can we discern between holy and unholy spirits, how distinguish between the deities of peace and justice and those of horror and destruction? Joseph Campbell. for one, has much to say about messianic monsters in The Power of Myth. a cautionary reminder (it seems to me) of the need for some kind of ethical decision: “By monster I mean some horrendous presence or apparition that explodes all your standards for harmony, order and ethical conduct.. . . That’s God in the role of destroyer, Such experiences go past ethical judgements. Ethics is wiped out.. . God is horrific.”2 To be absolutely hospitable is to suspend all criteria of ethical or juridical discrimination. And in such non-discriminate openness to alterity we find ourselves unable to differentiate between good and evil, which is a fine lesson in tolerance but not necessarily in moral judgement. 1f there is a difference between Jesus and Jim Joncs, between Saint Francis and Stalin, between Melena and Mengele. between Siddhartha and the Marquis de Sade and I think most of us would want to say there is — then some further philo sophical reflections are needed to supplement the deconstructive gesture of hospitality. Deconstructive non-judgementalism needs to be supplemented, I suggest. with a hermeneutics of practical wisdom.

#### 3 Unconditional hospitality is politically impossible – it inevitably totalizes the Other and denies the choice to Others who don’t want to be interacted with.

Gilbert Leung1 and Matthew Stone2, 4-1-2009, Birkbeck, University of London1, London Metropolitan University2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law and Politics,” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise\_than\_Hospitality.pdf

Although ethically it is unconditional, one cannot say that at the political level hospitality is always the right choice, because one cannot be hospitable to all. Indeed, Levinas was acutely aware of the harsh reality of politics. In a notorious radio interview, when asked whether the Palestinian is, for the Israeli, the deserving other par excellence, he said the following: [I]f your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (Levinas 1989, 294). Whilst at the heart of humanity is an originary ethics, a subjective welcoming of the other person, this does not negate the necessity of politics in all its coldness and brutality. The issue, then, at the core of this critique, is Derrida’s pursuance of hospitality at this political level. Does this not over-simplify the political problematic, revealing a questionable assumption that all people desire (political) hospitality, and that the latter is the most appropriate political strategy? Is there a situation in which the ethical demand requires a non-hospitable response at the level of politics? The decline of the nation state and the contemporary prevalence of ‘refugees of every kind, immigrants with or without citizenship, exiled or forced from their homes, whether with or without papers’ heighten Derrida’s interest in hospitality, and helps to justify his preoccupation (Derrida 1999, 71). But this is to characterise the other in a particular way: migratory; stateless and, crucially, seeking a home. Within the context of refugee politics, this is clearly appropriate. But against a generalisation of the category of the other, we pose an alternative exemplar: the other that does not desire hospitality. This alterity is embodied by the person who wants to resist political inclusion. Whilst such an other would necessarily still provoke the unconditional hospitality of originary ethics, it is clear that it is no longer appropriate in their case to promote hospitality at the political level. As David Gauthier has emphasised, a politics of hospitality would presume a universal fraternity, a kinship and co-belonging. And, as he notes, surely the absolute other would be beyond fraternity itself. In this case, then, there can be only two alternatives when hospitality becomes the dominant political imperative: Either one can remain outside the community, or one can seek to become assimilated into it. In the former instance, the Other remains outside the community’s warm embrace. In the latter, the Other is absorbed into the community, and its otherness is eliminated. In both cases, the Other is totalized. (Gauthier 2007, 178). In other words, the other is either given hospitality that it does not desire, and is therefore assimilated into a fraternity to which it does not belong, or it is left out, which presumably undermines hospitality as a locus for politics. In either case, hospitality reveals its own violence (and we must stress again that by violence we mean ontological violence: the failure of ethics as the reduction of absolute otherness to the language of the same, to whatever extent). The critique being made of Derrida here is perhaps one of emphasis. He was undoubtedly aware, as the last section has observed, of the inherent hostility of hospitality. But with this in mind, we ask why he championed it as a political strategy, as well as a mere descriptive account of an originary ethics. When one shifts attention away from the refugee and toward the other who does not desire inclusion, the violence of hospitality is rendered inescapably visible. And to welcome, in this scene, demonstrates a different type of violence, for the failure of hospitality is not that one is not hospitable enough but, paradoxically, that one has been hospitable at all. To welcome, and indeed to say anything, to engage the other in dialogue, is to say too much, to reduce alterity to the sameness of language. This is a violence that cannot be answered fully with the idea of forgiveness, because here forgiveness itself reveals a similar violence: the aspiration to dialogue, and a demand for interaction with an other that prefers to be left alone. Whilst we are told that it is necessary to impose limits, would Derrida go so far to say that conditional hospitality is not merely a requirement to maintain limits and order, but also offers the possibility of judging whether the other wants hospitality in the first place? Whilst he was clearly aware that the scene of forgiveness and hospitality contains its own violence and impossibility, it could be suggested that, in some cases, these are the wrong goals, even as aporias. Forgiveness seeks a bond, a touch, a linguistic recognition and, ultimately, the redemption of the wrong-doer. Might we suggest that in certain situations, such as the quiet provocation of the other that resists inclusion, one cannot honestly seek redemption, but must simply aspire to an impossible and guilty silence?

#### 4 An ethic of love for the other is bad – endorse universal indifference instead.

Jodi Dean, 3-15-2006, teaches political theory, research and writing focus on the contemporary space and possibility of politics, edited Feminism and the New Democracy (1997), Cultural Studies and Political Theory (2000), with Paul A. Passavant, Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri (2004), with Jon Anderson and Geert Lovink, Reformatting Politics: Information Technology and Global Civil Society (2006), “Zizek’s critique of Levinas,” http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/2006/03/zizeks\_critique.html

As I read him, Zizek's critique of Levinas has 3+1 elements, that is, three criticisms and a counter. The criticisms focus on: the big Other of the Symbolic order, the implicit privileging that results from the asymmetry of the call of the Other; and the Musselman. The counter involves Zizek's view that others are an ethically indifferent multitude. Put in most general terms, the disagreements might be thought in terms of the ethics of the other. Zizek rejects this view, as he must with his basic assumptions of the subject as lack and of the symbolic other has lacking, incomplete. Any fundamental emphasis on the call of the other would involve filling in/covering over/denying the lack in the subject and hence eliminate the very space necessary for freedom. Additionally, we might say that unlike Deleuze (and Agamben?) Zizek does not equate ethics and ontology and unlike Levinas Zizek does not think of the ethical as pre-ontological/transcendental. Rather, for Zizek, ethics emerges in and as the gap within immanence, as the split or that cuts through our relations or interactions with all sorts of differentiated others. This split might be thought of as a no to these relations, as a calling into question their givenness, as a withdrawal from their everydayness. 1.The Symbolic. Zizek argues that Levinas ultimately anchors the symbolic order of norms in the face. Why? Because the face is that which guarantees itself. It is always already there as an ethical a priori that establishes the conditions of possibility for ethics. In Zizek's view, this grounding is fetishistic insofar as it covers over the lack in the symbolic, the fact that there is nothing that guarantees it and that it remains essentially non-all. Zizek does endorse one aspect of Levinas's ethics, however, the way that it is fundamentally anti-biopolitical, the way that it endorses something that is beyond mere life. 2. Asymmetry Zizek argues that the asymmetry in which I am always already responsible (hostage) to the Other ends up "privileging one particular group that assumes responsibility for all others, that embodies in a privileged way this responsibility." In support of this claim he cites a passage from Difficult Freedom regarding the ultimate duties of the chosen people and a moral consciousness that knows itself to be the center of the world. Yet, his argument also runs along a different course, namely, that what I'll call the hostage notion of subjectivity results in questioning one's own basic right to exist, as self-questioning that Zizek finds to be speculatively identical with self-privileging: I am the center whose existence threatens all others. Ultimately, the matter is one of privileging, whether of a group or of a singular moral consciousness. Not surprisingly, Zizek's response emphasizes the subject as lack, the subject as the hole in the order of being. 3. The Muselmann Zizek emphasizes that the Muselmann is one who cannot answer the call of the other and who cannot be seen as addressing us--he is faceless, a blank wall. He rejects the possibility that Levinasian ethics can include the Muselmann because of the way that the Muselmann is an overlap of innocence and evil, and hence subverts the sense of absolute authenticity to which the idea of the face is supposed to attest. +1 Justice is not with regard to the neighbor Zizek argues for a cold justice that chooses against the face for the third. For him, this is an uprooting of justice, one that severs the 'contingent umbilical link that renders it embedded in a situation' (and, my question here is whether this marks a disagreement with Badiou's ethics of the situation or an agreement insofar as it is indifference to difference.) More specifically, Zizek argues in this regard that grounding ethics in the relationship to the Other's face is a priori impossible, since the limitation of our capacity to relate to Others' faces is the mark of our very finitude. In other words, the limitation of our ethical relation of responsibility toward the Other's face which necessitates the rise of the Third (the domain of regulations) us a positive condition of ethics, not simply its secondary supplement. If we deny this--in other word, if we stick to the postulate of a final translatability of the Third into a relation to the Other's face--we remain caught in the vicious cycle of 'understanding.' So, what is choosing the third? It is not choosing some kind of others with positive features; it is not recognition caught in some kind of imaginary or symbolic relationship to others. Rather, it is a kind of radical indifference to others, the abstraction of the law. This indifference is also the space of love, love for one who stands out from the multitude toward whom I am indifferent. And, this indifference is preferable to something like love for all insofar love for all relies on the logic of universality and its exception: there can only be an all whom I love insofar as there is one whom I hate. (Preferable, then, is the reformulation in terms of the feminine formula of sexuation: there is nobody whom I do not love--which is connected with I do not love you all (the all remains incomplete, non-all).

#### 5 Applying universal hospitality to politics is silly if the Other rejects your hospitality – causes net more suffering.

Gilbert Leung1 and Matthew Stone2, 4-1-2009, Birkbeck, University of London1, London Metropolitan University2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law and Politics,” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise\_than\_Hospitality.pdf

In this essay, we would like to consider a potential critique of Derrida’s application of an ethics of hospitality to a politics. Given that this project started as a debate between the authors at the 2007 Critical Legal Conference, it seemed appropriate that the style of the essay should follow the excitement of a dialectic that is quasi-Socratic in form. In section one, we give an overview of Derrida’s notion of hospitality and then proceed in section two to critique the ontological violence in hospitality through the positing of an other who rejects hospitality. For this other, we ask why we should pursue hospitality on a political level when it would be far less violent to not offer hospitality in the first place. The third section serves as a counter-critique or self-critique which focuses on the nature of the relation between ethics and politics and the distinction between conceiving the other as either transcendent or transimmanent. The concluding section tangentially expands on this by looking at the violence endured and the kind of hospitality proffered \* G. Leung, Birkbeck, University of London; M. Stone, London Metropolitan University.2 Law and Critique (2009) vol. 20 no. 2, 193–206. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com in order for this essay to come before you as a joint collaboration between two authors using the first person plural and which ends with one ‘dissensual’ signature.

#### 6 The demand for engagement with the "faceless Other" prevents recognition of how encounters with the Other are implicated in broader power relations and structures – understanding of social location is necessary.

Sara Ahmed, 2-01-2013, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies @ Goldsmiths, “Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality,” http://books.google.com/books?id=Af0mtGfAv\_gC&pg=PT177&lpg=PT177&dq=sara+ahmed+hospitality+forgetting+of+name&source=bl&ots=FGIcDZTbE8&sig=UcyVCC3PRI35meWFjzYkQhcoktQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NMztUcuWAsXCyAG7gIHICg&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=sara%20ahmed%20hospitality%20forgetting%20of%20name&f=false

However, while Derrida is providing us with a model of hospitality which is an opening to that which is yet to be assimilated (as either a friend or stranger), there is still a failure to acknowledge the relationship between this opening the forms of assimilation that already function to differentiate others. Such a hospitality is based on the forgetting of the names that are used, however inadequately, to locate subjects in a topography of time and place. In contrast, what is required is a hospitality that remembers the encounters that are already Implicated in such names (including the name of ‘the stranger’), and how they affect the movement and ‘arrival’ of others, in a way which opens out the possibility of these names being moved/from. This hospitality, premised on the surprise ut an opening or gift, would begin by admitting to how the assimilation of others, and the differentiation between others, might already affect who or what may arrive, then or now, here or there. In his analysis of the politics of friendship, Derrida explicitly defines the importance of the particularity of an other whom I might encounter. He writes that the desire for friendship, ‘engages me with a particular him or her rather than with anybody… This desire of the call to bridge the distance (necessarily unbridgeable) is (perhaps) no longer of the order of the common or community, the share taken up or given, participation or sharing’ (Derrida 1995: 298). Friendship is both a friendship with a particular him or her, as it is a form of sharing that is not premised on community or commonality. One is hence surprised by, and open to, that which is particular, in some sense, one is surprised by who is already assimilated into ‘my life.’ Perhaps it is here that we can begin to think of hospitality differently. Being hospitable, or generous, is being open to the particularity of the ‘who’ I might encounter, but in such a way, that this particularity does not hold this ‘you’ in place. However, as I argued in the previous section, we must be careful not to locate the particular in the present of a given ‘who’ we might encounter: rather, what is at stake, is the different modes of encounter that allow us to face (up to) others. A generous encounter may be one which would recognise how the encounter itself is implicated in broader relations and circuits of production and exchange (how did we get here? how did you arrive?), but in such a way that the one who is already assimilated can still surprise, can still move beyond the encounter which names her, and holds her in place. Is it here that an ethics of welcoming that which is other than the Stranger might begin?

#### 7 Repeal would represent a commitment to multilateralism for the international community, and also bolster human rights credibility that motivates other countries to rally

\*plan spreads multilateralism – only the removal of the embargo carries the symbolic weight of revoking previous unilateral efforts to backlash against other countries in votes during conferences in the UN

\*overwhelms alternative causes – removing the embargo signifies an endorsement of international law that overwhelms human rights violations in Guantanamo and Iraq – prefer comparative evidence

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In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation which was severely damaged by US engagements in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The perception that the US does not do its utmost to fully respect international law is an issue that renders difficult joint efforts to make the UN a meaningful instrument for acting decisively against human rights violations.2 If the US wants to act more effectively in multilateral forums in general on human rights matters, Washington, as a matter of priority, needs to restore US credibility, thus making human rights a more defendable key priority in international relations. Together, the EU and US stand a far better chance of furthering democratic change and sustainable improvement of the living conditions in Cuba. It is also then that other foreign partners, notably from Latin America, could be more easily approached to engage on Cuba along commonly agreed upon agendas. A realistic scenario, however, has to consider that political change in Cuba will probably take longer and most likely be preceded by economic reform measures coming from the regime itself. Foreign actors wishing to assist in this process in a meaningful manner, are well advised to pursue a long term, incentives-based approach to both the Cuban authorities and Cuba’s emerging civil society, including the human rights defenders. Outlook: Will President Obama radically change US policy towards Cuba? An answer to that question requires reviewing three important factors: first, constraints and opportunities in the political environment in the US, i.e. power constellations in the Congress and in Florida; second, interests in Cuba, i.e. Cuba’s elite and the domestic opposition; and third, likely reactions in the international community, i.e. within the Latin American and Caribbean region; in Europe; with respect to Cuba’s allies; and last but not least, at multilateral level. 6.1 What are the key considerations in today’s political environment in the US? During the electoral campaign Obama promised to undo the restrictions on travel and remittances imposed by the first Bush administration. He called the embargo a “complete fiasco” but shied away from suggesting the lifting of the economic sanctions or revoking Helms-Burton, saying that he would maintain the embargo as long as no substantial political reform and release of political prisoners would take place on the island. In essence, Obama’s proposed measures would correspond to a policy similar to the one enacted during the second term of President Clinton. This was during the campaign. Is it reasonable to assume that Obama’s resounding victory nation-wide and in Florida provide a more conducive domestic platform for overhauling for good the failed and discredited embargo policy? Most observers would give a negative answer, at least during President Obama’s first two years in office, and this for the following reasons: First, Cuba and Latin America are not among the top foreign policy concerns at this juncture. Second, while US business is clearly interested in strengthening trade and developing investment ties with Cuba strong pressure, so far, has only come from the agribusiness sector which succeeded in exporting US goods despite the embargo since 2002. Moreover, Cuban demand is still crippled by rather modest purchasing power and the overall business and regulatory environment is certainly not conducive to foreign investment. Third, despite a change in the electoral map overall and a slow generational change within the Cuban-American community, a clear majority of registered Cuban-American voters actually participating in elections leans towards the Republican party and can still be mobilized around the single issue of taking a principled stance against the Castro regime (e.g. all three Republican incumbents in Miami Dade county have re-won their seats; moreover, in 2010 Senator Mel Martinez’ seat comes up for election – if the Democrats were to take his seat they could come close to gaining a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate). Few commentators, on the other hand, think that the new president should and could lift the embargo during his first year in office, arguing that he enjoys at present and for a limited period only, a unique window of opportunity because of the high rate of approval at home and abroad (including in Cuba among the Afro-Cuban community). Lifting the embargo unconditionally would be widely heralded as the dawning of a new era in the Western Hemisphere and beyond, with immediate positive repercussions on bilateral relations with all major Latin American and Caribbean countries. Pressure to lift the embargo, or parts of it, may also come from the powerful US oil lobby if commercially viable finds are discovered in Cuba’s exclusive economic zone, with Cuba actively courting US investments in the remaining off-shore blocks. It would make little sense for the US to prohibit off-shore oil exploration in Florida’s continental shelf when a few miles further down South numerous international companies exploit Cuba’s oil and gas reserves. Moreover, the argument goes, President Obama does not need to ‘pander’ to the conservative Cuban-American vote in South Florida (i.e. those 65% having voted for McCain) because this part of the electorate will remain an anti-Obama constituency no matter what he does. As a matter of fact, the democrats could actually loose Latino votes in Florida in the next elections among the nonCuban Latino community and among those 35% of Cuban-Americans having supported Obama in 2008 (according to exit polls 75% of whom are reported to be against the embargo) if his Cuba policy changes remain largely symbolic, i.e. simply undoing what has been established under President Bush, while maintaining the embargo. As far as the 2010 Florida senate seat is concerned seasoned political analysts recall that, traditionally, any incumbent president’s party tends to loose seats in mid-term elections, thus making the prospect of getting closer to the 60 seat majority a rather difficult task (especially if former governor Jeb Bush were to run for the vacant post). 6.2 How about the political environment in Cuba? Since coming to power in August 2006 Raul Castro has reiterated on several occasions that Cuba is willing to discuss with the US ways and means to improve bilateral relations and bring an end to the policy of confrontation. The only requisite would be to conduct these talks on the basis of equality and without any political pre-conditions. These statements did not contain much of a political risk for Havana since they were unlikely to be heeded by the Bush administration. If, however, the Obama administration were to take them at face value, it is fair to say that Cuba’s government appears to be ill-prepared for commencing meaningful discussions with the US. For the past 50 years the official dogma was based on the premise that US policy is hostile, interventionist and imperialist. A fundamental overhaul of the US approach towards Havana would make it difficult for the Cuban government to continue propagating the David-versus-Goliath myth, considering that the new US president, as an Afro-American, shares with two-thirds of Cubans a similar ethnic background. Obama may indeed be perceived by many in Cuba as the personification of a different, less fearful and certainly better America. In this context it is interesting to note that Armando Hart, former Minister of Culture and one of the chief ideologues of the Communist party, published an article in Granma in October 2008 where he underlined the need for defending the Cuban Revolution against the erosive power of a non-embargo centered, i.e. open door US policy towards Cuba. Havana might, indeed, not be ready yet to engage with Washington under a non-embargo scenario. The present situation, with the embargo being nominally in place (yet discredited internationally and in Cuba, in addition to being undermined in its impact because of direct commercial links with US business and the massive flow of remittances without the ‘danger’ of millions of visiting Americans pouring into the island), seems to be the best of both worlds for Cuba: while Havana can blame US hostility for domestic development problems, which serves the regime well politically both abroad and at home, the embargo does not do any major economic and financial damage that would jeopardize the survival of the regime. Furthermore, Cuba’s illegal political opposition strongly disagrees with the embargo because the continuation of a coercive policy framework is used by the authorities as a pretext to discredit those opposing the regime as ‘puppets’ and ‘counterrevolutionary agents’ at the service of the US. The Cuban opposition would clearly prefer Washington to conduct an open door policy addressing all sectors of the Cuban society, including, of course, concrete measures supporting directly the emerging dissident movement and providing high-profile visibility to human rights defenders. 6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

#### 8 Advancing Derridian philosophy risks causing extremism and genocide --- the aff must be held accountable, even if the results are unintended

Arthur J. Dyck 5, Professor of Population Ethics in the School of Public Health and Member of the Faculty of Divinity at Harvard University, “Taking Responsibility for Our Common Morality,” The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 391-417

Scholars in all fields should hold themselves morally responsible for what they publish and teach. One would think that everyone would take this for granted, but Hilary Putnam, for one, has earnestly warned that we dare not. As he writes, “To-day, as we face the twenty-first century, our task is not to repeat the mistakes of the twentieth century.” He sounded this warning at the conclusion of his analysis of Jacques Derrida’s philosophical works. Putnam regrets that philosophers reside among the all too numerous scholars whose publications and instruction aided and abetted the development of the “political tragedy” exemplified by the regimes of Hitler and Stalin. Derrida the philosopher counts among current scholars whose thinking raises the specter of repeating those mistakes of the twentieth century and their horrendous aftermath. Taking the renewal of philosophy as the theme for his Gifford Lectures of 1990, Putnam characterized the writings of Derrida as not only philosophically unsound, but also as dangerous and irresponsible.2¶ Why does Putnam sound the alarm at the thinking of Derrida? For one thing, as Putnam observes, “[T]he thrust of Derrida’s work is so negative, so lacking in any sense of what and how we should construct, politically or otherwise, that it is difficult to exonerate him completely from the effect of his teaching.”3 When Derrida. for example, treats the notions of “justification,” “good reason,” and warrant as “primarily repressive gestures,” Putnam regards that as dangerous because, “it provides aid and comfort for extremists (especially extremists of a romantic bent) of all kinds, both left and right.”4 Derrida’s left-wing followers include those who call for freeing ourselves from the very concepts of rightness and truth.¶ Putnam knows that others hold Derrida responsible for the diverse and unfortunate ways in which people receive his scholarship. Derrida has spoken of his desire to write as “the desire to perfect a program on a matrix having the greatest potential variability, plunvocality, et cetera, so that each time something returns it will be as different as possible.” and that, as Richard Bernstein writes, makes him responsible for the “divergent and incompatible ways in which [hisi texts are read and heard.” Thus some view Derrida as a nihilist; others see him as one who respects the irreducibly other. According to Putnam. such a ‘double reading” results, not because Derrida wants to appear “irresponsible.” but because he “problematizes” the notions of reason and truth by claiming that they remain indispensable while, at the same time, speaking of them as “collapsed” in a manner that leads to the interpretation that he has dispensed with them.¶ Putnam does not regard Derrida as a political extremist but rather as one whose philosophical writings lend support to political extremists**.** While viewing Derrida’s own political pronouncements as “generally admirable,” Putnam’s fear of Derrida’s philosophical influence on political thought remains unabated. As he says:¶ The philosophical irresponsibility of one decade can become the real-world political tragedy of a few decades later**.** And deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility.6 ¶ Putnam does not in the least exaggerate his concerns. That some scholars cast doubt on our commitments to truth and rightness, that others lay aside the quest to augment our knowledge of them, while still others deny that scholars can even attain such knowledge, must surely cause alarm. As I shall illustrate in this essay, this philosophical trend threatens the purpose of higher education.

## Framing

#### 1 Nuclear war outweighs – possibility of extinction outweighs all ethical principles

Kateb, 84 - professor @ Princeton University (George, “The Inner Ocean”)

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous an acknowledgment that the possi

bility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility—a genuine possibility— as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctive-ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizeable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to earth’s uninhabitability, to “nuclear winter,” or as Schell’s “republic of insects and grass.” But the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or “theater” use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizeable exchange of because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect of nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counter on to seek expression later.

#### 2 Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

**3 War could still happen- litany of conflicts could go global**

**Ferguson 08, professor of history @ Harvard, (Niall, sr. fellow @ the Hoover Institute and professor of History @ Harvard, Hoover Digest no1 47-53 Wint 2008)**

The risk of a major geopolitical crisis in 2007 is certainly lower than it was in 1914. Yet it is not so low as to lie altogether beyond the realm of probability. The escalation of violence in the Middle East as Iraq disintegrates and Iran presses on with its nuclear program is close to being a certainty, as are the growing insecurity of Israel and the impossibility of any meaningful U.S. exit from the region. All may be harmonious between the United States and China today, yet the potential for tension over trade and exchange rates has unquestionably increased since the Democrats gained control of Congress. Nor should we forget about security flashpoints such as the independence of Taiwan, the threat of North Korea, and the nonnuclear status of Japan. To consign political risk to the realm of uncertainty seems almost as rash today as it was in the years leading up the First World War. Anglo-German economic commercial ties reached a peak in 1914, but geopolitics trumped economics. It often does. The closure of the New York Stock Exchange and federal bailouts for the likes of Goldman Sachs may seem unimaginable to us now. But financial history reminds us that ten-sigma events do happen. And, when they do, liquidity can ebb much more quickly than it previously flowed.

**4 Even if it doesn’t cause extinction, it still guarantees escalation – Cold war arms build ups prove. Second strike capabilities exist –countries can fire back when attacked**

**5 War can still happen**

**Joyner 10** – managing editor of the Atlantic Council, Ph.D. in national security affairs from the University of Alabama (3/5, James, Atlantic, “Are nuclear weapons obsolete?”, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/are-nuclear-weapons-obsolete, WEA)

Nuclear Weapons Obsolete? There appears to be a growing sentiment in Europe that nuclear weapons are obsolete, kept around only for symbolic value. Their use is considered so morally reprehensible, the argument goes, that no political leader would dare authorize their use and be forever a pariah. And, if there are no circumstances under which they might be used by Western leaders, then the deterrence argument goes out the window. The problem with that theory is that desperation changes the utility equation. No sane Japanese government would have provoked war with the United States in 1941. But, facing even worse alternatives, they threw a Hail Mary with the Pearl Harbor bombing and hoped for the best. Could China or Russia be backed into a corner and become so desperate that they'd launch a nuclear first strike? It's pretty hard to imagine. Then again, the mere fact that they have that theoretical option makes it less likely that they'll be backed into a corner. It's a little easier to come up with a scenario under which North Korea's Kim Jong Il or a nuclear-empowered Iranian ayatollah might see nuclear weapons as a plausible option. Or, goodness knows, India and Pakistan. More likely, though, the sense of security that comes with being a nuclear possessor will prevent conflicts that might otherwise have been tenable. Clausewitz taught us that war and politics are inextricably linked. So, the distinction between the "political" and "military" viability of nuclear weapons is one without meaning. The bottom line is that deterrence theory still works, at least amongst state actors. After all, no nuclear power has ever been attacked by another state. The same can't be said about attacks by nuclear powers against non-nuclear states. Indeed, this argument was laid out quite nicely three years ago by Des Browne, the UK's then-Secretary of State for Defense, in a speech to King's College: Why do we need a nuclear deterrent? The answer is because it works. Our deterrent has been a central plank of our national security strategy for fifty years. And the fact is that over this fifty years, neither our nor any other country’s nuclear weapons have ever been used, nor has there been a single significant conflict between the world’s major powers. We believe our nuclear deterrent, as part of NATO, helped make this happen. In the same speech, he asked, "Are we prepared to tolerate a world in which countries who care about morality lay down their nuclear weapons, leaving others to threaten the rest of the world or hold it to ransom?" Quite obviously, the answer is No. A World Without Nuclear Weapons The obvious retort, then, is that we maintain nuclear weapons only because others might use them against us. So why not rid ourselves of these weapons entirely? The Europeans seem very enthusiastic about President Obama's Prague nuclear disarmament speech of last April, in which he promised, "The United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons." While most Americans likely took that as rhetorical throat clearing, what with the difficulty of uninventing 60-year-old technology. (Indeed, Obama acknowledged that "This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime.") Europeans apparently see that as a legitimate goal. Indeed, one parliamentarian announced that "no sane person" would disagree with it.

**6 Major war is still possible**

**George Modelski 11 – Professor Emeritus, Political Science, University of Washington - September 2011, Preventing Global War, For publication in: The Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention, Hall Gardner and O. Kobtzeff eds., (London: Ashgate), 2012, https://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/PreventGW.pdf**

Students of world politics, such as John Mueller (1989) have urged a strong case for the “obsolescence of major war”. They argue that major war (or is it all wars? that is not always clear) might disappear from human practice and become abnormal, just as slavery, or dueling, that are now seen as abhorrent, are now unthinkable, and have faded away, not so long ago. War that before 1914 was thought to be virtuous and ennobling is no longer so regarded, and prestige and status accrue to economic performance. If major war is unthinkable, then maybe scholars should avoid discussing it, and decision-makers might let it slip from conscious thought and never consider embarking on such? A more recent examination of these arguments appears in The Waning of Major War, edited by Raimo Vayrynen (2006). These are powerful ideas, but they do not cover all of the ground. Mueller dismisses the thought that war needs to be replaced, in the manner of William James, “by some sort of moral or practical equivalent”. But he refuses to recognize that past global wars have had formative consequences for global politics, and that such a function must continue to be performed, albeit in new forms. In any event, so long as some states retain their nuclear arsenals, and others try to emulate them, the possibility of major war is not entirely unthinkable. The accession to nuclear power status of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and such a prospect for Iran, has been greeted by wide popular acclaim by their respective publics.

**7 Deterrence doesn’t check**

**Mearsheimer 99 (John J., pg. http://www.ciaonet.org.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/conf/cfr10/cfr10.html)**

Second reason: There is no question that in the twentieth century, certainly with nuclear weapons but even before nuclear weapons, the costs of going to war are very high. But that doesn’t mean that war is ruled out. The presence of nuclear weapons alone does not make war obsolescent. I will remind you that from 1945 to 1990, we lived in a world where there were thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides, and there was nobody running around saying, “ War is obsolescent.” So you can’t make the argument that the mere presence of nuclear weapons creates peace. India and Pakistan are both going down the nuclear road. You don’t hear many people running around saying, “ That’s going to produce peace.” And, furthermore, if you believe nuclear weapons were a great cause of peace, you ought to be in favor of nuclear proliferation. What we need is everybody to have a nuclear weapon in their back pocket. You don’t hear many people saying that’s going to produce peace, do you?

#### 8 The reversibility of “the other” as a subject position means unconditional ethics always devolve into a relationship of domination in a face to face encounter

A – it isn’t logical and not sustainable, it says to be nice to those that hurt you

B – the theory supposes that everyone is going to act on good nature

C – the other is reversible so instead of “you should subject yourself to the other” it could be “you should subject yourself to me”

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As a result, Levinas's injunction of unconditional submission before the other cannot be sustained. Although Levinas claims to proceed from the face-to-face relation, he evidently postulates that the subject in the ethical encounter either gazes upward (toward the Other as the High) or downward (toward the Other as someone who is helplessly in need, bearing "the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan" as a refrain declares in *Totality and Infinity*). But regarding all the situations where you are confronted with an other who assaults you, turns down the offered hospitality, and in turn denies you help when you need it, Levinas has nothing to say. If the other whom I encounter wants to kill me, should I then submit myself to his or her command? And if someone disagrees with me, should I then automatically accept this criticism as a law that is not to be questioned or counterattacked? Questions like these make it clear that Levinas does not at all found his ethics on an intersubjective encounter. Rather, he presupposes that the ethical encounter exhibits a fundamental asymmetry, where the other is an absolute Other who reveals the transcendence **[End Page 52]**of the Good. Accordingly, Levinas condemns every form of self-love as a corruption of the ethical relation, and prescribes that the subject should devote itself entirely to the other. To be ethical is for Levinas to be purely disinterested, to take responsibility for the other without seeking any recognition on one's own behalf.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v034/34.1hagglund.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT19) It suffices, however, to place yourself face-to-face with someone else to realize that the asymmetry assumed by Levinas is self-refuting. If you and I are standing in front of each other, who is the other? The answer can only be doubly affirmative since "the other" is an interchangeable term that shifts referent depending on who pronounces the words. I am an other for the other and vice versa, as Derrida reinforces in "Violence and Metaphysics." Derrida's argument not only contradicts Levinas's idea of the absolutely Other, but also undercuts his rhetoric. That "the other" is a reversible term means that all of Levinas's ethical declarations can be read against themselves. To say that the I should subject itself to the other is at the same time to say that the other should subject itself to the I, since I am a you and you are an I when we are others for each other. To condemn the self-love of the I is by the same token to condemn the self-love of the other. Indeed, whoever advocates a Levinasian ethics will be confronted with a merciless irony as soon as he or she comes up to someone else and face-to-face declares, "You should subject yourself to the Other," which then literally means, "You should subject yourself to Me, you should obey My law."

#### 9 “Responsibility to the other” depoliticizes action – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained

A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it

B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity

C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim

Zizek, 99 - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)

Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that the bombing of Yugoslavia, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this did not come into being in some irresponsible way, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the \_Sueddeutscher Zeitung\_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.

#### 10 Moral absolutism is complicity with violence – it allows people to die for the sake of clean hands

A – moral absolutism means you don’t take action because you are afraid of the purity of your intention

B – moral purity is a form of complicity with violence and injustice because you didn’t lead to that so your hands are clean

C – it kills political effectivness

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As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.