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#### TPA is top of the agenda and Obama is making a full court press - Now is the make or break time for spending political capital on trade-TPA failure collapses global trade, the economy and US leadership

McLarty, 2-2 – former chief of staff to Clinton during the NAFTA ratification fight (“A Critical Test of Leadership” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-f-mclarty/a-critical-test-of-leader\_b\_4705623.html)

In his State of the Union address last week, President Obama took a good first step in asking Congress to provide the tools he needs to close two of the most ambitious trade deals in U.S. history. But he faces an immediate challenge from within his party that could imperil negotiations, with huge stakes for the U.S. globally and for our economy at home. At issue is Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which allows the president to send a trade agreement to Congress for an up-or-down vote, without amendments. Many Republicans reflexively oppose granting any request from the administration. But the biggest opposition is coming from Democrats skeptical of the value of free trade. The day after the president's address, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said he opposed "fast track" authority. His remarks revealed the depth of a gulf among Democrats over trade, and sparked new criticism from Republicans as a sign that the president's party couldn't be lined up behind a major administration initiative. For President Obama, this is a critical test of his leadership. Can he muster enough support for his trade agenda within his own party, and then assemble a bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress? Failure would be a great setback for U.S. prestige internationally, and a dismal signal for the president's remaining three years in office. We've seen this movie before -- and it didn't end well. The last Democratic president to seek fast track authority on trade was Bill Clinton in 1997. The effort collapsed when then House Speaker Newt Gingrich was unable to marshal his Republican majority. It was an opportunity lost, ending a period of bipartisan cooperation on trade and stalling momentum created a few years earlier by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Repeating this history would be a mistake, especially as our economy struggles to create good jobs at high wages. But the president faces an uphill battle. Now is the moment for Democrats to pause and take full measure of the stakes involved in opposing fast track. It's time for Republican supporters of trade to rally. And it is essential that the president and his cabinet exert persistent, focused leadership to persuade the skeptics. President Obama deserves much credit for advancing the most far-reaching trade agenda in a generation. The administration is nearing the finish line in negotiations of the Trans Pacific Partnership, an agreement with 11 Pacific Rim nations, including Japan and perhaps South Korea and others. Simultaneous talks are underway between the United States and the European Union over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership -- creating an economic NATO and the largest liberalized trade zone in the world. Together, the agreements would lower barriers in markets accounting for more than 60 percent of the global economy. Neither negotiation would survive a failure to renew Trade Promotion Authority, which expired in 2007. TPA reassures our negotiating partners that they will not agree to difficult concessions only to see Congress later force unilateral changes. Under TPA, Congress establishes negotiating goals and must be regularly consulted by the president. In exchange, Congress promises an up-or-down vote without amendment. No major trade legislation has passed Congress in decades without it. President Clinton knew that because trade was so hard, its support had to be bipartisan. To push for NAFTA, he assembled a high-profile war room in the White House, led by a prominent Democrat, Bill Daley, and former Republican Congressman Bill Frenzel. The president worked members tirelessly. The bill eventually passed with 102 Democratic and 132 Republican votes, and a similarly bipartisan total in the Senate. By contrast, the 1997 effort to renew fast-track authority lacked that high-profile White House push -- helping seal its doom. Over the last decades, global trade has proven essential to building employment and reducing inequality at home. One of every five jobs in the United States is tied to exports. More significantly for the long run, 95 percent of the world's customers live outside our borders. While many Americans have concerns about free trade, they say the benefits of U.S. involvement in the global economy outweigh the risks (by a 2-1 margin in a poll last month by the Pew Research Center). Even so, last fall 151 House Democrats signed a letter expressing their opposition to granting President Obama Trade Promotion Authority. Almost three dozen House Republicans followed suit. When the bill to renew TPA was introduced earlier this month, a number of Democratic Senators announced their opposition. They have now been joined by Sen. Reid. The warning signs are clear, but so is the path forward. Now is the time for a full-court press from the White House. President Obama should be clear about the imperative of TPA and make the strong case for trade as a catalyst for job growth. Then he must press his cabinet to the task. Ambassador Froman is a skilled negotiator and advocate. His cabinet colleagues include many effective proponents of free trade and international engagement, including Secretary of State John Kerry, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker. Without a concerted effort, TPA may well fail, embarrassing us abroad, casting a shadow on the president's second term and hurting our economy in the long run. Why not instead show America and the world that the president and Congress, including leaders of his own party, can work together?

#### Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven

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The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

**Protectionism causes nuclear war**

**Panzner 08,** Instructor New York Institute of Finance, (Michael J.-, Financial Armageddon: Protecting Your Future from Four Impending Catastrophes, P. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by non-citizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

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#### The affirmative takes the wrong approach to nuclear weapons – believing in the power of machines to accidentally start a nuclear war negates the truth that humans are always in control and the decision is always consciously made. Fear of an accidental war forgets the possibility of an intentional one and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of hopelessness that makes nuclear war inevitable

Segal 1988 (Hanna, M.B. Ch.B, F.R.C., Psych., Executive Committee International Psychoanalysts Against Nuclear Weapons, “Psychoanalysis and the Nuclear Threat”, book, pg. 47-8)

The growth of technology is also used for a typically schizoid dehumanization and mechanization. There is a kind of pervasive depersonalization and derealization. Pushing a button to annihilate parts of the world we have never seen is a mechanized, split-off activity. Bracken (1984) contends that war is likely to happen as a result of our machines getting out of control. Everything is so automated that oversensitive machines could start an unstoppable nuclear exchange. The MIT computer expert Joseph Weizenbaum (1976) comes to a similar conclusion: modern big computers are so complicated that no expert can see through and control them. Yet the whole nuclear early warning system is based on these machines. Since one effect of nuclear explosion is a disturbance in communication systems, it might not be within the power of governments to stop a war even if they wished to. But the fact that we can even think that "machines will start the war, not us" shows the extent of denial of our responsibility. We seem to live with a peculiar combination of helplessness and terror and omnipotence—helplessness and omnipotence in a vicious circle; heightening one another. This helplessness, which lies at the root of our apathy, is inevitable. We are faced with a horrifyingly threatening danger. But partly it is induced by us and becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. Confronted with the terror of the powers of destructiveness, we divest ourselves of our responsibilities by denial, projection, and fragmentation. The responsibility is fragmented and projected further and further away—into governments, army, scientists, and, finally, into machines beyond human control. We not only project into our so-called enemies, we also divest ourselves of our responsibilities by projecting them onto governments. They, in turn, can not bear such responsibility, and they project onto us, the people, public opinion, and so on, as well as fragmenting their responsibility as previously described. When we project onto governments, we become truly helpless. We are in their hands. Then we can either become paranoid about the governments—it's all Reagan's doing . . . or Thatcher's . . . or the Kremlin's. Or we idealize our governments and leave the responsibility in their hands—they are the experts. And then we make ourselves truly helpless. And the governments again offer us the escape of megalomania. We like to feel big and powerful and think we can frighten our enemy. But we forget how dangerous a frightened enemy can be (McNamara, quoted in Prins, 1982, pp.92-93).

#### The aff centers political decision-making on how we believe other people perceive us. This non-falsifiable method mandates leaders take the most drastic actions in response to provocations and re-entrenches the elite monopoly on knowledge.

Marullo 85 (Sam, Professor of Sociology at Cleveland State University, “The Ideological Nature of Deterrence: Some Causes and Consequences” pg. 316-319 JSTOR)

An understanding of this paradox is obtained by analyzing the interests being served by this obfuscation, in conjunction with the structural correlates and technological imperatives of deterrence ideology. More specifically, we should examine officials' hesitance to speak directly and openly to the public about the possibilities of nuclear war and our own nuclear strategies because of the anticipated negative political consequences; the lack of public participation in discussion and debate over nuclear weapons policies largely due to a lack of knowledge; the realities imposed by the weapons mere existence; the military-industrial governmental bureaucratic elites' (the "iron triangle" as Adams [1981] calls it) beliefs or consciousness based on the existence of nuclear weapons technology and a world order dependent on deterrence; and the internal political functions played by deterrence. By examining these disjunctions, several cognitive beliefs of deterrence are demonstrated to lack empirical verification and are shown to be non-verifiable, demonstrating the ideological nature of deterrence. Government and military officials are reluctant to talk about nuclear exchanges because of the potential effect of "upsetting" the public. This reflects a conscious decision to withhold information from the public in an effort to avoid the negative political repercussions they have seen occur in the past (e.g., the uproars following McNamara's "No Cities" speech and Carter's PD 59). As Morton Halperin, a former Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense, has more candidly stated, All public officials have l earned to talk in public only about deterrence and city attacks. No war-fighting, no city sparing. Too many critics can make too much trouble, so public officials have run for cover. That included me when I was one of them. (Quotes in Lifton and Falk, 1982:178-179) Before 1979 there had been only sporadic and fairly restricted public discussions of nuclear weapons policy. The technical knowledge required to understand nuclear arsenal capabilities is vast and not widely circulated. Furthermore, the legal, moral, and logistical complexities surrounding the use of force in the international realm can be overwhelming. These together have enabled a virtual monopoly of knowledge and decision-making ability to be concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of defense contractors, administration security officials, defense department and military leaders, and select congressmen (Tobias, 1983). In fact, Adams sees the lack of participation in the formulation of defense policy as an intended consequence of the iron triangle's operations. He claims they feel that their internal views on national security are both received wisdom and in tune with the world around it. Government and industrial officials became adept at protecting and expanding their turf in the defense arena, creating one of the most powerful policy machines in Washington (.A dams,1 982:8) It is thus no surprise that much of the public is not very well informed regarding nuclear weapons policy, that logical inconsistencies in deterrence ideology have gone virtually unnoticed, and the mismatch between declaratory policy and actual employment policy has remained largely undetected. In addition, much of the public does not particularly want to hear or talk about the use of nuclear weapons; a "psychic numbing," as Lifton (Lifton and Falk, 1982) describes it, has occurred. Nuclear weapons are seen as deterrents and a necessary evil with which we have to live, but we prefer not to spend time agonizing over them. The horrible destructiveness of the weapons and the withholding of information on the part of military and governmental officials has precluded much informed discussion of nuclear weapons policy alternatives, thereby contributing to the rhetoric-policy disjuncture. Limited survey results attest to the general ignorance of the public on nuclear weapons capabilities, arsenals composition, and declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Ironically, the overwhelming majority of the public feels it is the government's responsibility to make more information available to the public (Zweigenhaft, 1984). The political economies of the United States and the Soviet Union are distinct enough and contain expansionary forces such that conflict over resources and interests will continue to emerge for some time. These cautiously expansionary tendencies and the concomitant efforts toward containing the other power's expansion have led to the deployment of large armed forces that serve more than to merely protect territorial boundaries, but also function to project forces around the globe for either containment or expansionist purposes.14S Since nuclear weapons have become part of the superpower's arsenals--indeed, a new stage in our technocratic consciousness--plans for their use and the prevention of the opponent's use of them have become an integral part of these policies. In sum, nuclear weapons are, by most peoples thinking, a firmly entrenched component of the global order. As a consequence, mutual assured destruction has become an accurate description of weapons technology and one facet of superpower relations. However, its transformation into a policy of deterrence requires the incorporation of the psychological component that each superpower has to convince the other of its capability and determination to carry out the threat of mutual destruction. The critical issue is that national determination, and to a lesser extent capability, cannot be measured directly, and we rely on statements of intended use (less reliable) and arsenal configuration (more reliable) as proxies. Since deterrence rests on projecting to the other side one's own determination-and knowing that it can be measured only imperfectly-each side sends messages by making declarations of intended use and configuring its arsenal in such a way that it perceives the other side will receive the intended message. Under this scheme there can be no external validation of one's assessment of the enemy's (or even one's own) determination. As a result, one can never be sure that the enemy is convinced of one's determination to carry out the threatened retaliation. This has the unfortunate consequence that there is a tendency to err on the side of making sure the appropriate message indicating determination is being conveyed. It is unfortunate in that the clearest message is usually presumed to be a highly threatening arsenal configuration. The very nature of deterrence is such that it cannot be demonstrated to work. We cannot verify that it is deterrence rather than other factors that is working, or has worked over the past 30 years to prevent nuclear war between the superpowers. In a scientific logic sense, we can only observe the failure of deterrence through the eruption of an all-out nuclear war,15 but its failure to occur may or may not reflect the effectiveness of deterrence. Furthermore, the logic of deterrence dictates that elected officials and military leaders never question the logic of deterrence, lest the Soviet Union question our resolve to carry out threatened retaliation. These two characteristics, the incorporation as a cognitive belief of a non-verifiable assertion and the self-reinforcing logic of these beliefs, demonstrate the ideological nature of deterrence in an epistemic sense (Geuss, 1981). The calls for military expansion or modernization exhibit two levels of reliance on deterrence: one for use vis-a-vis the public, and a second for use within the inner circle of nuclear weapons policymakers and strategists. The former case takes the form of officials claiming that particular military threats or Soviet superiority in specific weapons categories threatens our national security.16 New weapons are thus rationalized before the public as necessary counter-threats to the Soviets, needed to maintain deterrence. This deliberately vague use of the notion of deterrence performs an important political role in justifying increased military spending. The second, deeper level of reliance on deterrence ideology is demonstrated by administration and military officials statements within the iron triangle. There, officials freely admit that there are no foreseeable Soviet military threats to U.S. national security, but they express concern over the potential political threats which may result from sending a signal of weakness. It is feared that any defense cutbacks may lead to the Soviets' inference of a lack of U.S. resolve, which may lead them to think they could extract political or economic concessions from us.17 Thus, the need for the appearance of a united base of support for a component of our deterrent force becomes the rationale for muting public debate over particular weapons. The debate over the MX missile (rekindled in 1981) demonstrates the two levels of dependence on deterrence ideology. The "window of vulnerability" argument presented to the public focused on whether the Soviets could in fact initiate a successful first strike on our land based missiles, leaving the President in a situation where he might find it more rational to refrain from retaliating then to retaliate and prompt a second Soviet strike aimed at U.S. cities. Among military circles, this scenario is dismissed as highly unlikely (U.S. Senate, 1983b). Yet the Scowcroft Commission nevertheless strongly endorsed the deployment of the MX for "symbolic" reasons -to threaten the Soviet land based missiles and to demonstrate America's resolve. As the Commission chair Brent Scowcroft stated at a Congressional hearing to explain the report's conclusion, the MX is needed to demonstrate national will and cohesion. Four Presidents have now stated that the MX is important...To now back away from that. .. would reflect an absence of that critical element of deterrence, and that is national will and determination. (U.S. Senate, 1983b) Thus, vague deterrence language is more commonly used vis-a-vis the public, in an effort not to stir up too much controversy, while statements more truly reflective of nuclear weapons employment policy are shared within the iron triangle and infrequently transmitted to the Soviet Union. Both, however, indicate a reliance on deterrence ideology.

#### The rhetoric of accidents naturalizes the perpetual state of nuclear terror and obscures responsibility for aggressive military strategy—the impact is global war and a case turn.

Chaloupka 92 – Prof. PolSci @ U of Montana, William, Knowing Nukes, p. 12-16

A Destabilizing Standoff Although opposition has focused on the "madness of MAD," literary criticism has available the analytical tools to demonstrate instability more convincingly. The paradoxical military mission (to prepare weap­ons so that they will never be used) may have been more difficult for ci­vilian and military leaders to maintain than even their opponents realize. Deterrence itself implies a conjuring of power-a fable of power. Never used but always effective, the power of the nuclearists could be seen as the greatest single accomplishment of the poststructuralist era. Michael McCanles traces this type of power back to Machiavelli who, McCanles argues, may have been the first to discuss "an aspect of human behavior that has become the focus of theoretical attention ... [only] since World War II: the assimilation of human conflict to hypothetical models of games and srrategy.v '" The particular brand of hypothetical modeling fa­vored by the nuclear strategists forces emphasis on an ultimate "destabilizer"-nuclear war-while ignoring or benefiting from any number of other destabilizing events. Perhaps the most relevant of these excluded events is the one introduced by this schema of models and games itself; in play, the players will test limits and explore possibilities. The modeling activity itself is the great destabilizer, even if it proceeds under the sign of stability. Furthermore, the swirl of interpretations, paradoxes, and fears has a predictable structure. Within this particular game, this is not only the well-known "standoff" structure, either: as McCanles notes, a certain en­tropy is just as characteristic of this game as any standoff. Recognition of the paradox ... will inevitably generate understanding of the entropy of the threat. This understanding will in turn generate the paradoxical coexistence of equilibrium and destabilization of equilibrium, and both sides will continue to entangle each other in this paradox by [accusing] each other of bad faith and [justifying] further meta strategic plans for nuclear build-up. Even our best signs of stability are easily inverted into signs of chaos and entropy. The only dependable stasis refuses to be static; interpretation de­mands a role, despite our wishes it would recede. This absurd outcome may be most evident when we consider those major destabilizers in the nuclear world that come under the classification of “accidents”. The term accident is of obvious interest to nuclear criticism. In a discourse that allocates responsibilities pervasively, "accident" is a free spot, without cause or conspiracy. In the case of nuclear power, the notion of accident had already become visible in the late 1970s, after nuclear critics and Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials sparred over the vocabulary appropriate to Three Mile Island. To official- dom, accident was obviously an appropriate label for these events, since there was never any suggestion of malevolence or subversion. To critics it was just as obvious that when societies produce electricity by placing or- nately complex plants around the landscape, radiation releases are so in­evitable that the word "accident" reveals an evasion of responsibility.' In another case, compatriots of the Iran Air 655 victims insisted that its destruction must have been intentional, simply because the powerful American technology could not possibly have "made a mistake" (or "had an accident") of such magnitude. Meanwhile, critics in the United States-more familiar with technological failures-argued that placing a weapon such as the U.S.S. Vincennes in a place such as the Persian Gulf invited tragedy so openly as to defy the categories "mistake" and "acci­dent." Noting the radical reversibility of such analyses - the ease with which they are inverted-we might begin to suspect that "accident" is a special term in the debate over nukes. Indeed, "accident" has even served as a sign of stability, as in the oft-repeated analysis that the paradoxes of deterrence are so stable that the real danger of nuclear war comes from the chance of accident. So-called accidents may attain this special status because of the role the rhetoric of "accident" necessarily preserves for a rhetoric of agency. To call something an "accident" is to claim (or hope) that there is no har­bor for responsibility, even though we continually use rhetorical devices that allocate causality when we talk about politics. This double character give the formulation "nuclear accident" an extraordinary power. Hypo­thetically, such an accident could destroy all life; if that weren't enough, the formulation draws attention to the provisional, constituted character of American discourse about agency and authority. Richard Klein and William B. Warner presented the Korean Air Lines downing as a case that illustrates the ambivalence of accidents. " As they suggest, we have long known that designating something an "accident" is an implement of international diplomacy. Such a designation can be (and often is) constructed after the event in question, for purposes not neces­sarily connected to the "facts" of the event. Statesmen make events into accidents (or, conversely, attribute a conscious purpose to an inadvertent event) depending on the geopolitical move they want to make. In the case of nuclear war, which has no "after the fact," these determinations would have to be made very quickly, and "this determination of the char­acter of the incident, before it happens, may itself initiate a war.,,3? In such a situation, it might well be impossible for the participants to map all of the contingencies required to produce reliable clarity. Indeed, clarity on causation, responsibility, and accident has often been an artifact of "the luxurious time of diplomatic distance," not some obvious feature of the event in question. And clarity, as it pertains to nukes, is no abstract exercise; it is a precondition for continuing at all. One failure and the rubble bounces, as the saying goes. The case of KAL 007 is illustrative. This time, there was an "after," so we have the usual and predictable diplomatic interpretations to examine. The Soviets cried foul, charging conspiracy. The Reagan administration renewed its claim that the U.S.S.R. was an evil empire and used the event to justify weapons requests. No surprises. Klein and Warner's point, how­ever, is that in the heat of this particular night, it would not be even slightly implausible to suggest that hugely different interpretations of this event could have prevailed in Washington and Moscow, whatever the "actual" facts and motivations were. This is an interpretive moment, and these interpretations tend to diverge, not to converge in some safe and reassuring way. From the Soviet vantage point it hardly seems an accident that the course of KAL 007 happened to coincide with the course of a U.S. RC-135 spy plane. But from the vantage point of the U.S., the flight "deviation" of this particular plane does not seem so surprising at all; it may in fact be inevitable given the thousands of flights along this Pacific route .... Thus, what seems a telling coincidence to the collective subjectivity defined by Soviet leadership seems merely accidental to observers ... who do not share the same national subjectivity." Klein and Warner use literary interpretations to show how utterly incom­prehensible this "fact" may have been in its unfolding. One can even imagine that KAL OO7s James Bond-like name imparted confusion. That name could have been seen as proof that this was no spy mission (obvi­ously, they wouldn't have named it *that),* or proof that it was such a mission (they'd never suspect this), or evidence or a classic spy's slip, betrayed by "what he has taken every conceivable rational precaution to conceal.,,39 The indeterminacy of language and the characteristically linguistic, interpretive nature of such politics take away any reassurance we could be offered that, despite all our critical complaints, we have only "accidents" to fear now. Or, in slightly different form, we can imagine an interpretive moment-fraught with levels and complexities-far more difficult, even, than an episode in which one had to "get the facts." "The injured party will not enjoy the luxurious time of diplomatic distance from the event that allows one to choose" a course of action. Instead, the injured party finds himself in an almost inevitably catastrophic position, trying "to determine in these swiftly passing moments, before the end, whether he is not actually already at war," knowing, perhaps, that his attempts to determine "the character of the incident ... may itself initiate a war.,,40 To demarcate something as "an accident" is to imply that it is outside the rationalist realm of planning and decision that supposedly lies at the core of the national defense. Actual events, however, fail to honor such demarcations; a successful political actor manipulates them and gains benefit. The "accident," then, exposes the presumptions of nuclearist positions that propose that such events are all that remain to fear. Indeed, we should have long ago seen through the rhetoric of "accident." As Garry Wills has explained, the entire nuclearist project suffers from a reversal of Clausewitz, who "understood that the very conditions of war tend to break down the effective conduct of war.,,41 Presuming that "everything works" ignores Clausewitz's advice that a sizable margin of error must be assumed. On the battlefield, even the most dependable moves will break down. "Danger, of itself, takes a toll, in apprehension or despair, in heightened alertness or the racing of one's pulse. And danger, says Clausewitz, is . the very air one breathes in war. It charges the atmosphere, giddying a person, unsettling judgment."42 Nuclear strategy has veered sharply away from the master strategist's insight, even while our intimacy with danger has intensified. Not only do we presume that our devices will work (and SDI raises that presumption to new levels), we even base our strategy-in the case of "window of vulnerability" scenarios-on the assumption that the Soviets also will act on the assumption that their own weaponry is infallible.44 Seeking managerial control in the form of deterrence, nuclearism strays off course, elevating the "accident" to a new, reified status. In this new context, accidents will happen-continually taunting the managers' forgetfulness of Clausewitz's most obvious points. It is not technological bugs, then, that deliver us to perilous times, so much as it is confusions of agency and misunderstandings about the role of plans and strategies. Citizens and nuclear strategists alike have blithely ignored some long-understood tenets of politics and war, and the traces of that forgetfulness can be identified within nuclearist discourse itself, as the case of "accident" shows. This gives the era a hallucinatory quality, when the master-in-control reveals his own foibles. And, as Klein and Warner conclude, "Hallucinatory effects and effects of coincidence acquire, in this space, uncanny power to become the bases for fateful decisions.,,

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#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 5**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### “Its economic engagement” is an increase in trade or aid – only definition in the context of the resolution

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

#### The Aff does not increase trade or aid contacts with the Cuban government

#### Voting Issue –

#### A) Kills predictable limits – the term “economic engagement” is meaningless if each Aff can claim non-economic mechanisms – determines link turn and advantage ground

#### B) Neg ground – trade and aid mechanisms are vital to exports disads, kritiks of economics, and non-economic counterplans

#### C) Bidirectionality – they can decrease trade and aid in the short-term to promote economic relations, which is distinct and anti-topical – independent voter for jurisdiction

## 1NC

#### TEXT: As a method for opening space for agonistic debate within and between political communities, Matt and I advocate that the United States federal government should ease restrictions on travel between the United States and Cuba for all persons except for child sex traffickers.

#### Child Sex Trafficking Exists in Cuba

Graham Sowa March 30, 2013 Prostitution in Cuba: Denied at Home, Enabled from Abroad Posted By Graham On @ 4:51 pm In Graham Sowa's Diary,Highly Popular Posts | 35 Comments http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=90370&print=1

Few people in Cuba want to talk about prostitution. I’ve been here for three years and I have yet to see any type of campaign against prostitution or sex tourism. Denial that prostitution is rampant in the tourist sector is an outright lie. Anyone who disagrees is invited to walk down Obispo Street with me (this is a serious offer). You will think the only services offered to tourists in Havana Vieja are taxis and blowjobs.¶ Police are often witness to the solicitation. I’ve never seen them intervene. I’m left to wonder if they are paid in-kind or in cash for their see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil approach to their job.¶ I know right now those readers who defend Cuba out of reactionary habit are preparing their anecdotal story about how sex crimes with minors are prosecuted in Cuba. And those stories are probably true. But they don’t originate from the official news here.¶ Not the crime, not the societal problem, not the obvious police corruption and not even the successful prosecution (of what I am left to imagine are a very small percentage of cases) are addressed at any level higher than street gossip among neighbors.¶ Child sex tourism (or child rape tourism as it should be known as) not only exists, but is literally killing Cuban children. I refer here to a good piece of journalism [1] from the Miami Herald about a 12 year old girl who was statutorily raped to death by European and Cuban tourists.¶ The Cuban authorities acted appropriately and tried and jailed the rapists. Of course we read nothing in the local newspapers about the crime or punishment.¶ In a problem this grave both Cuba and the United States share blame. And while I would like to see both countries take a much more hard-line approach to child rape tourism that involves civil society; as a United States citizen I’m going to appeal to my homeland.¶ In the United States the story ran one day in the Miami-Herald and I could not find any syndication in other newspapers, not even the European ones. So I can’t say my society is very interested in making this problem known either.¶ The same day the Toronto Star ran an article [2] about child rape tourism in Cuba originating from Canada after a lengthy Canadian Government investigation of the sick enterprise.¶ But the Cuban problem in Cuba is only one half of the picture.

#### We Should Restrict the Travel – Lifting Restrictions Would Increase Trafficking Due to Lack of Enforcement

Graham Sowa March 30, 2013 Prostitution in Cuba: Denied at Home, Enabled from Abroad Posted By Graham On @ 4:51 pm In Graham Sowa's Diary,Highly Popular Posts | 35 Comments http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=90370&print=1

Few people in Cuba want to talk about prostitution. I’ve been here for three years and I have yet to see any type of campaign against prostitution or sex tourism. Denial that prostitution is rampant in the tourist sector is an outright lie. Anyone who disagrees is invited to walk down Obispo Street with me (this is a serious offer).¶ Instead of making predictable observations about American travel attitudes I think Senator Rubio would have been better off having a discussion on how the United States could do something to prevent child rape tourism to Cuba. Because as it stands we are probably facilitating more than we are prosecuting.¶ Illegal travel to Cuba under the current United States travel ban usually involves passing through Mexico first, followed by the final leg to Cuba. Upon arrival in Cuba the Cuban Passport Control does not stamp United States passports. Instead they stamp a piece of paper inside of the passport.¶ Without a passport stamp the traveler is left with plausible deniability that they never traveled to Cuba. And with Cuban-American relations kept dismal by petty disputes perpetuated by feuding octogenarian neighbors there is no reason to expect Cuban cooperation in a United States investigation into crimes committed by a U.S. Citizen in Cuba.¶ So the situation, made possible by both Cuban and United States policies, is that a pedophile can travel to Cuba from the United States knowing that their home country will not be able to prosecute the crime.¶

## Case

#### 1 Travel restrictions have already been eased for both sides – no reason the plans perception is key

Roger R. Betancourt 8/31/13 [Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland, “SHOULD THE US LIFT THE CUBAN EMBARGO? YES; IT ALREADY HAS; AND IT DEPENDS!” P.14, ML]

While there are a number of issues associated with these calculations in the Cuban case, e.g., Betancourt (2007), the amounts are still significant even after adjusting for them. Furthermore, given the substantial numbers of migrants that have come into the U.S. from Cuba as a result of the Accord and the usual strength of familial links of recent migrants with those left behind everywhere, it would be a striking anomaly if these sizable remittances were not strongly and increasingly associated with the immigrants who have been able to come in under the Accord, e.g., Orozco (2013, Ch.2). Furthermore, this process will continue in the foreseeable future in the absence of a change in policy by either or both countries. More recently, the lifting of travel restrictions on Cuban-Americans is a further softening of the embargo. Thus, with respect to Cuban-Americans the embargo is already lifted in terms of travel restrictions and the same is true with respect to Cubans through the Migration Accord. Indeed Cuba is already receiving the main economic benefits from such lifting: through the increased travel to and associated expenditures in the island and through the remittances to the island. What is left in this realm is the formal lifting of travel restrictions on American citizens that are not Cuban-Americans. Even on this dimension some informal lifting has already taken place trough expansion of people-to-people programs. For instance, the Havana Consulting Group (Morales, 2013 ) reports that 41,000 other American residents visited Cuba in 2007 and estimates that 103,000 did in 2012; it also reports visits by Cuban-American visitors residing in the United States that rose from 204,000 in 2007 to an estimated 475,000 in 2012. This is happening despite incidents such as the detention and treatment of U.S. citizen Alan Gross since 2009.

**2 Engaging international institutions and evaluating consequences through our framework is key – especially in the context of targeted killings**

**Burke 13** (Anthony Burke, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of New South Wales, "Security Cosmopolitanism," CRITICAL STUDIES IN SECURITY v. 1. n. 1, 2013, pp. 13-28.)

It might be argued that having to peer long into an uncertain future through the prism of one's choices is an impossible burden. I disagree. Uncertainty is also potentiality; it opens up the potential for more just and secure paths, and the possible effects of particular technological, policy, and strategic choices can often be reasonably predicted through a combination of critical history, social science, public dialogue, and scenario-based planning. A consistent aim must be to create legal and structural frameworks that work to build security and ward off disastrous outcomes in a systemic fashion. This process will be assisted by a third ethical principle: a principle that can responsibly guide security actions in the face of their future impacts, some of them potentially unknowable. This, in a modification of Kant, one could call a global categorical imperative. Recall that Kant's categorical imperative of morality stated that one ‘must act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law…act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’ (Kant 2004, 31). The global categorical imperative refines Kant's categorical imperative in two ways. First, its address expands from the individual to collectivities and organizations – governments, NGOs, international organizations, militaries, defence ministries, diplomats, insurgents, and more – to any actor or agency whose activities will affect the security of others (a principle that modifies the criteria for institutional moral responsibility developed in Erskine 2003, 6–8). Second, its scope moves beyond the moral individual wrestling with their duties to take in the world as a whole: actors must consider the systemic context and impact of their actions, work to understand their potential collective consequences, and act collectively to manage those impacts and resolve global insecurities. The global categorical imperative would thus state: act as if both the principles and consequences of your action will become global, across space and through time, and act only in ways that will bring a more secure life for all human beings closer. We must act as if the principles and consequences of our actions will become global because they are likely to: because norms, ideas, and effects spread, or they lie dormant until they appear at other times and in other places, and because the complex security processes that actions feed into reverberate widely through space and time; they take on momentum that is difficult to arrest. The global categorical imperative tests norms and actions against their global consequences and the complex causal chains they feed into. What is the impact on global security if bad norms become commonplace-torture, the violation of human rights, military aggression, proxy warfare, **targeted killings**, terrorism, corruption, gender or racial discrimination, colonialism, and other great injustices? Can the world really bear them, and judge itself secure? The global categorical imperative demands that security actors look into a distant and open future, and take responsibility for it, in the face of the particularly challenging quality that Arendt attributed to action: ‘action has no end. The process of a single deed can quite literally endure through time until mankind itself has come to an end’ (Arendt 1998, 233). The global categorical imperative asks us to consider what violence, conflict, and insecurity put into the world – grief, radicalization, impoverishment, resentment, pain, trauma, and fear – and then of the myriad ways that the insecurity that manifests them can multiply and mutate. The long-standing security concern with ‘proliferation’ here widens to take in its systemic potentials: proliferation of weapons, doctrines, tactics, norms, ideas, feelings, dilemmas, and consequences. The ethical principles of security cosmopolitanism, then, are not merely normative preferences: they are strategic necessities.

#### 3 – suffering turn – The aff commodifies the suffering of the Cuban people in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---r eject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse to engage in the trauma economy

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

**4 – gradualism turn – Castro is implementing gradual economic reforms now - but – he must walk a fine line and avoid rocking the political boat**

**Sweig and Rockefeller, 2013** (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, and Michael Bustamante “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>)

Small-time diaspora capital may prove easier to regulate and rely on than funds from multinational corporations driven strictly by profits. **Under the** repatriation provisions of the **island's new migration law**, some **Cubans** may even **retire to the island with** their **pensions and savings** after decades of working abroad. Yet opening the doors for more young citizens to leave could prove risky for a quickly aging, low-birthrate society that has been suffering from a brain drain for some time. Besides, along with remittance dollars, **Cuba** urgently **needs both** medium and large **investors**. Ultimately, **only larger outlays can help fix Cuba's most fundamental economic problem: its depleted productive base**. **Castroappears to recognize that attracting foreign investment, decentralizing the government, and further expanding the private sector are the only ways to tackle this long-term predicament**. **The government is unlikely to proceed with anything but caution,** however. **Officials are wary ofrocking the domestic political boat**, **and citizens and party leaders alike recoil from** the prospect of more **radical shock therapy**. Risi**ng public protests in China and Vietnam against inequality and rampant corruption** have only **reinforced the Cuban government's preference for gradualism. Striking an adequate balance will be no easy task**. In late 2012, Havana legalized the creation of transportation cooperatives -- private, profit-sharing entities owned and manage by their members -- to fix bottlenecks in agricultural distribution. Meanwhile, 100 state enterprises are now running their finances completely autonomously as part of a yearlong pilot program. **The government is** also reportedly **considering ways to offer a** wider **array of potential foreign partners more advantageous terms** for joint ventures. But **the Communist Party is working through numerous contradictions** -- **recognizing a place for market economics, challenging old biases against entrepreneurs, and hinting at decentralizing** the budget while incongruously insisting, in the words of its official 2011 guidelines, that "central planning, and not the market, will take precedence."¶ EASING OFF THE DADDY STATE¶**Curtailing the state's economic role while preserving political continuityrequires threading a delicate ideological needle**. Although the government expects to continue providing Cubans with key social services, such as health care and education, party leaders have reprimanded the island's citizens for otherwise depending too heavily on what one prominent official a few years ago called the "daddy state." In the eyes of many Cubans, this is deeply ironic. Cuba's revolutionary founders, who built up a paternalistic state in the service of equality, are now calling for that state's partial dismantlement. What's more, most Cubans already need to resort to the black market or assistance from family abroad to acquire many daily necessities.

**The Plan causes a political whirlwind in Cuba that decimates Castro’s ability to reform**

**Hernandez, 2012**(Cuba’s Leading Social Sciences professor and researcher at the University of Havana and the High Institute of International Relations; Director of U.S. studies at the Centro de Estudiossobre America; and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institutocubano de Investigacion Cultural “Juan Marinello” in Havana. “Debating U.S-Cuban Relations”)

As far as costs are concerned, **although many Cubans favor** detente and appreciate its **economic benefits**, **they** also **remain worried about its political and ideological effects. These could affect the national consensus in a period during which social and political cohesion is of strategic value**. **A wave of U.S. capital floodinga Cuban economythat has not completed its reform processcould have** some **counter­productive effects. The U.S.** government **could** try to**steerthe** flow of **capital to favor its political goals.** Various groups— **Cuban-American organizations, NGOs, other institutions, and the U.S. ideological apparatuses**—**would have more avenues to influence the Cuban domestic context**.¶**Given the fundamentalasymmetry of power between** the two sides, **once the words "let's play cards" are spoken, the "hands" will be quite unequal. If the U**nited **S**tates **were to reverse its policy and begin to "make concessions**" in return for "equivalent Cuban responses," **the government of the Island would find itself in an unprecedented tactical arid strategic situation**. This won't be one more round but, rather, a whole new rule book. In other words, **with any increased chance of an alternative form of relations**, the risk profile of quid pro quo increases. **For Cuba**, **to take on this challenge could mean to adopt a conservative line** and play defensively only; or it could mean **to invent a new proactive strategy for the game**. **Within such** a new approach, **the ability to realign the available resources of political power would be decisive**. Classically, **the sources of political power in a situation of asymmetric confrontation lie in alliances and in consensus**. This issue is complex both for Cuba and for the United States. Besides allied powers, affinities within the international system, and sympathetic ideological currents, **the dynamic of rapprochement not only highlights and energizes the role of "rivals" or "opponents**" **but also that of" allies" within the "enemy's" own camp. The** identities of such **allies** of the United States in the region, in Europe, and also on the Island are obvious. The allies of Cuba are also well known, paradoxically including novel ones such as many business executives and military officials who **had** classically **been the** "**tips of the imperialist spear**."¶**In a scenario of re-encounter** between the United States and Cuba, **both governments face the challenge of** overcoming old dogmas, **dealing with changes in therespectivepolitical consensus** of each, **trying toreshape those and restructure their alliances**. The main weakness Cuba must overcome is not its lesser military or physical power but its siege mentality. That of the United States is not its ineptitude in dealing effectively with "communist regimes" but its sense of superpower omnipotence.

**This makes armed conflict inevitable, and triggers a laundry list of impacts**

**Treto, 2012**(Carlos, Professor and Senior researcher at the University of Havana’s Centro de EstudiosHemisfericos y de EstadosUnidos and a member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences. He was a former Cuban ambassador the EU and to Belgium and Luxembourg and a former Cuban Minister to Ethiopia; visiting scholar at universities in the US, Mexico and Europe; visiting professor at Beloit College, the University of Basque Country, and the University of Winnipeg. *Debating U.S. - Cuban Relations* Chapter: “Cuba’s National Security vis-à-vis the United States”)

In the historical period preceding the one analyzed here, two opposite visions took shape. **To the governmental leaders and the majority of the Cuban people**, **theU**nited **S**tates **has been a permanent andpowerfulthreat to national security**. **To the** government leaders and elites and a good part of the population of the **U**nited **S**tates, **Cuba has been a**small **country capable ofendangering legitimateU.S. interests**, **through its alliance** with extra-continental powers (case in point, the Soviet Union), its example **and attraction** (soft power) **in the eyes of other** Latin American **countries, and the internationalist policies** that led it to actively support liberation movements in Africa from Algeria to South Africa.¶**The Cold War's legacyis a security relationshipthat is** complex and, in general, **conflictualand** potentially **explosive**. **This agenda has continued into the succeeding period**, which has been **marked by** the continuation of **multi-tracked Washington policies designed to produce** "**regime change**" in Cuba **and to limit Cuba's role** as an example for the region. It has been marked as well by a logical Cuban response of emphasizing stubborn but realistic resistance and a disposition to seek any possibility of normalization that respects Cuba's sovereignty and self-determination. This has opened up opportunities for limited cooperation in certain security spheres, which is one of the most interesting and enduring traits of the relationship after the end of the Cold War.¶**The potential for armed conflict springsfrom the existence of two borders between countriesthat have been mutually hostilefor the past fifty years**. The sea frontier runs throughout the Florida Straits with a separation of as little as 145 kilometers, a distance that jet aircraft can cover in a few minutes. The land border separates a Cuban defensive perimeter from U.S. troops stationed at the Guantanamo naval base, which is situated on land occupied by the United States for more than a century under the provisions of a treaty that Cuba, with merit, views as lacking legitimacy.¶ The most important fact is that **the two nations are close enough to each other to share security issuessuchasborders, terrorism,migration**, **environment**, **natural disasters, anddrug trafficking**,**but the hostile U.S. attitude** toward an independent Cuba, **when joined with the asymmetry in the countries' hard power resources**, **imposessignificant obstaclesfor advance and requires Havana to act cautiously** with respect to all of these issues. Nonetheless, in normal conditions there would be broad opportunities for cooperation.¶ In terms of traditional security threats, there are obvious signs that both parties prefer the present stable environment and see possibilities for more cooperation and confidence-building measures. These have been adopted on both the maritime and land borders, facilitating some forms of cooperation between the two countries' armed forces, including the Cuban border guards and the U.S. Coast Guard.¶ The border agreement signed during the Carter administration was strengthened by the migration accord of 1995, which has been respected and implemented by both governments. The United States has prevented Miami groups hostile to Cuba from mounting provocations in the border area, especially since the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue airplanes in 1996.¶Nonetheless,**a structural contradiction exists insofar as security** is concerned. **This contradiction is** between, on the one hand, the confidence-building measures in the areas of potential armed conflict and the pragmatism shown by both sides in such sensitive areas as migration, and, on the other hand, **the manifest US. hostility toward the social, economic, and political regime** which has prevailed in Cuba over the last fifty years. **Although it is possible to widen cooperation** in areas such as the struggle against drug trafficking, **the structural contradiction constitutes an obstacle to any greater forward motion,especially on issues such as** the struggle against **terrorism**. **The influence of** some **non-governmental actors such as Cuban-American conservative political figures is a clear demonstration that there are constraints to what can be done.** The **mutual accusations of terrorism**, which carry a lot of weight in the Cuban case, **are the "elephant in the room,"especially because Washington applies the hard sanction of putting Cuba on the list of "states that sponsor terrorism,**" when there has not been any concrete and proven accusation of Cuban participation or stimulus to terrorist actors that have damaged the United States or any other country.¶

#### 5 They can’t solve cosmopolitanism because the roots are in manifest destiny and they don’t solve colonialism

#### 6 Democracies cause war

**Ostrawski, 02** (James, a trial and appellate lawyer and libertarian author from Buffalo, New York. He graduated from St. Joseph’s Collegiate Institute in 1975 and obtained a degree in philosophy from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1980. His articles have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Buffalo News, Cleveland Plain Dealer and Legislative Gazette. His policy studies have been published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Ludwig von Mises Institute at Auburn University, and the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. His articles have been used as course materials at numerous colleges including Brown, Rutgers and Stanford, “The Myth of Democratic Peace: Why Democracy Cannot Deliver Peace in the 21st Century,” Lewell Rock, http://www.lewrockwell.com/ostrowski/ostrowski72.html)

A myriad of domestic political concerns have led democracies into war. Modern democracies tend to extensively intervene in the free market by means of high taxes, welfare, and subsidies in order to buy the votes that keep the politicians in power. As Ludwig von Mises demonstrated, each intervention into the economy causes problems that lead to the demand for ever further interventions. Government thereby creates its own demand. Eventually, the economic problems become intractable, leading to the inevitable temptation to create a foreign policy distraction.34 Combine that with the fact that **war, while undeniably harming the economy, gives the appearance of stimulating the economy, and we have a formula for why democratic governments would have a motive for war.** For example, the Great Depression was caused by the Federal Reserve’s expansion of the money supply in the late 1920’s.35 Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal had failed to bring America out of the Great Depression as late as 1941. Many believe that FDR welcomed American entrance into World War II to distract attention from his domestic policy failures or in the hope that the war would get the economy moving again. Such theories cannot definitively be proven. What cannot be denied is that, on two fronts, FDR did everything he possibly could do to goad either Germany or Japan into attacking the United States. Why did the United States fight a pointless war in Viet Nam? One theory is that President Kennedy escalated U.S. involvement because he had accused President Eisenhower in 1960 of being "soft" on communism. When Lyndon Johnson came to power, he had ambitious domestic plans for creating a "Great Society," and could not afford to lose political capital over the "loss" of another country to communism.36 Socialists have often supported war as a means to introduce their command and control economies. Historian Ralph Raico quotes John Dewey’s enthusiasm about World War I: "In every warring country there has been the same demand that in the time of great national stress production for profit be subordinated to production for use.

## Framing

#### 1 Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### 2 No impact to disposability

**Dickinson 04**, associate professor of history – UC Davis,

(Edward, Central European History, 37.1)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because it obfuscates the **profoundly different** strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively **quite different from totalitarianism.** Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is **functionally incompatible** with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufé cient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic coné guration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point** for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. **This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian** (and Peukertian) **theory.** Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stiè ing night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite **radically differing potentials.**91

#### 3 Nuclear war outweighs – possibility of extinction outweighs all ethical principles

Kateb, 84 - professor @ Princeton University (George, “The Inner Ocean”)

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous an acknowledgment that the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility—a genuine possibility— as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctive-ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizeable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to earth’s uninhabitability, to “nuclear winter,” or as Schell’s “republic of insects and grass.” But the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or “theater” use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizeable exchange of because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect of nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counter on to seek expression later.

#### 4 “Responsibility to the other” depoliticizes action – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained

A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it

B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity

C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim

Zizek, 99 - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)

Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that the bombing of Yugoslavia, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this did not come into being in some irresponsible way, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the \_Sueddeutscher Zeitung\_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.

#### 5 Moral absolutism is complicity with violence – it allows people to die for the sake of clean hands

A – moral absolutism means you don’t take action because you are afraid of the purity of your intention

B – moral purity is a form of complicity with violence and injustice because you didn’t lead to that so your hands are clean

C – it kills political effectivness

Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### 6 War could still happen- litany of conflicts could go global

**Ferguson 08, professor of history @ Harvard, (Niall, sr. fellow @ the Hoover Institute and professor of History @ Harvard, Hoover Digest no1 47-53 Wint 2008)**

The risk of a major geopolitical crisis in 2007 is certainly lower than it was in 1914. Yet it is not so low as to lie altogether beyond the realm of probability. The escalation of violence in the Middle East as Iraq disintegrates and Iran presses on with its nuclear program is close to being a certainty, as are the growing insecurity of Israel and the impossibility of any meaningful U.S. exit from the region. All may be harmonious between the United States and China today, yet the potential for tension over trade and exchange rates has unquestionably increased since the Democrats gained control of Congress. Nor should we forget about security flashpoints such as the independence of Taiwan, the threat of North Korea, and the nonnuclear status of Japan. To consign political risk to the realm of uncertainty seems almost as rash today as it was in the years leading up the First World War. Anglo-German economic commercial ties reached a peak in 1914, but geopolitics trumped economics. It often does. The closure of the New York Stock Exchange and federal bailouts for the likes of Goldman Sachs may seem unimaginable to us now. But financial history reminds us that ten-sigma events do happen. And, when they do, liquidity can ebb much more quickly than it previously flowed.

**Even if it doesn’t cause extinction, it still guarantees escalation – Cold war arms build ups prove. Second strike capabilities exist –countries can fire back when attacked**

**Major war is still possible**

**George Modelski 11 – Professor Emeritus, Political Science, University of Washington - September 2011, Preventing Global War, For publication in: The Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention, Hall Gardner and O. Kobtzeff eds., (London: Ashgate), 2012, https://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/PreventGW.pdf**

Students of world politics, such as John Mueller (1989) have urged a strong case for the “obsolescence of major war”. They argue that major war (or is it all wars? that is not always clear) might disappear from human practice and become abnormal, just as slavery, or dueling, that are now seen as abhorrent, are now unthinkable, and have faded away, not so long ago. War that before 1914 was thought to be virtuous and ennobling is no longer so regarded, and prestige and status accrue to economic performance. If major war is unthinkable, then maybe scholars should avoid discussing it, and decision-makers might let it slip from conscious thought and never consider embarking on such? A more recent examination of these arguments appears in The Waning of Major War, edited by Raimo Vayrynen (2006). These are powerful ideas, but they do not cover all of the ground. Mueller dismisses the thought that war needs to be replaced, in the manner of William James, “by some sort of moral or practical equivalent”. But he refuses to recognize that past global wars have had formative consequences for global politics, and that such a function must continue to be performed, albeit in new forms. In any event, so long as some states retain their nuclear arsenals, and others try to emulate them, the possibility of major war is not entirely unthinkable. The accession to nuclear power status of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and such a prospect for Iran, has been greeted by wide popular acclaim by their respective publics.