## 1ac

### 1ac – china

#### China is hurting Mexican manufacturing now - the plan is key to revitalizing the industry and relations

Gallagher and Dussel 14- Kevin, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, Co-director of the Global Economic Governance Initiative, Enrique, Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Director of the Center for China-Mexico Studies (“How China crashed the Nafta party”, January 2, 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/jan/02/china-crashed-nafta-party-free-trade\\CLans

According to western tradition, the gift for the 20th anniversary of a union is china. But, two decades on from the trade nuptials enshrined in the the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), China is the uninvited guest that has walked away with many of the gifts. In 1993, pro-Nafta Washington thinktanks, such as the Peterson Institute for International Economics, went so far as to say that the agreement would lead to a trade surplus with Mexico for the US, while also providing huge benefits for the Mexican economy. The US had a trade surplus with Mexico in 1994, but since 1995 the US has had an annual trade deficit with Mexico. On the Mexican side, GNI per capita economic growth is now barely one percentage point higher than when Nafta came into force. What has happened since then? Nafta has had at least two phases. In the first (1994-2000) it increased trade, investments, productivity and overall integration, with positive effects in employment and production in several export-oriented sectors in Mexico. In the second phase since 2000, however, Nafta turned sour. Its negotiators in the early 1990s did not anticipate the rise of Asia and particularly of China. Looking back, our research shows that China has significantly penetrated many of the new markets opened by Nafta. In a paper published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, we document the extent to which Chinese products have taken away market share in the US, and how China has begun to take Mexican markets from the US as well. From 1994 to 2001, Mexico had a honeymoon with the US. No other country enjoyed the same proximity and trade preferences. Although trade increased significantly between the two countries, it failed to translate into per capita income growth and rising employment and wages in Mexico. The honeymoon ended in 2001 when China entered the World Trade Organisation and began to enjoy similar access to the US market. We find that by 2009, 84% of Mexico's manufacturing exports to the US were under threat from China. By threat we mean sectors where China is gaining market share and Mexico is losing it. We also find that 96% of US exports to Mexico are under threat from China. In 2000, the US supplied Mexico with 60.8% of its office machine and computer imports and 70% of the peripheral parts for those machines. Ten years later, the US held only 10% of the Mexican import market in each sector. By contrast, China held 13% of the office machine import market and 5% of the parts market in Mexico in 2000, and, nine years later, it had 48% and 58% of those markets respectively. Simple economics would lead one to think this would be a benefit for Mexico – as the inputs for its electronic industry decreased because imports from China are cheaper than from the US. This should lead to productivity gains and more exports to the States. China and Mexico supplied the US about 5% of the US computer market in 2000; by 2009 China had more than half that market and Mexico did not budge. We performed in-depth case studies alongside this statistical work that further confirm our findings. The yarn-textile-garment chain – similar to furniture, toys and most of Mexico's manufacturing sector – is symbolic in losing more than 50% of its employment since 2000. The US has become an additional loser, since it is the major supplier of Mexican exports. The automobile parts and assembly chain is a big exception in the competition with China, in the US market and in Mexico. Since the beginning of Nafta, Mexico's exports in the US have strengthened, with levels above 30%, while China's share has remained relatively low, mainly for domestic reasons: China's consumption in the auto sector has been dynamic and above its production, in other words the potential for exports has been low. This, however, will change as China's auto companies follow the lead set by other Chinese global multinationals. This is the hangover that will be felt long after the 20th anniversary party. The only remedy will be couples' therapy. From Mexico's vantage point the "Asia pivot" is seen as cheating on a partner. The region needs to revitalise its relationship: it is time to start a conversation about collective financing mechanisms, exchange-rate co-ordination, and strategic sectors for the Nafta region so it can negotiate and see itself as a larger block. That would give us something to celebrate.

#### Neito tax reform uniquely places sustainability at risk—

Replogle 9-20-13 Jill Replogle, Fronteras Reporter, KPBS “Mexico Fiscal Reform Could Be Bad For Maquiladoras” [<http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/sep/20/mexico-fiscal-reform-could-be-bad-maquiladoras/>] [MG]

The maquiladora export industry that’s a key component of the U.S.-Mexico border economy could face major changes under proposed reforms to Mexico’s tax system. Mexico currently collects fewer taxes from its citizens and companies than almost any other developed country. Mexico relies heavily on revenues from its state-run oil industry, which is in decline. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto wants to change this. One way he wants to do it is by tightening control over the country’s vast maquiladora export industry. Factories that make and export goods to the U.S. and other foreign markets currently don’t pay taxes on their raw materials and machinery. But that would change under the proposed reform. Maquiladoras would have to pay the normal 16 percent sales tax on their raw materials and then request a refund of that money when they export the final product. That would require exporters to invest a lot more cash up front, said Héctor Vega, a tax partner with Deloitte Mexico. It could erase some of the advantage Mexico has over its manufacturing competitors, Vega said. “Because we are very close to the U.S., it’s very natural doing business,” he said. “However, this 16 percent will impact a lot and maybe determinate where you put your investment, either in China, either in Vietnam, either in Malaysia or keep it in Mexico.” Still, Vega is hopeful that the tax change affecting maquiladoras will ultimately be stripped from the final fiscal reform bill.

#### Collapse threatens national security—altering engagement policy is critical to sustain it

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The Mexican maquiladora industry is rapidly losing market share to Asian competitors that dramatically undercut them in terms of labor cost. The decline of these assembly-for-export factories will result in instability along the U.S.-Mexico border and will prove to be a serious national security issue for the United States. This paper leverages Design theory to frame the problems surrounding Mexico’s maquiladora industry in order to develop an understanding of this complex adaptive system. It examines the wide range of actors involved in the system, focusing on their goals, motivations and conflicting tendencies. Finally, the paper recommends courses of action for U.S. and Mexican leaders that will mitigate the resulting instability in the Mexican northern border states. The economic stability of Mexico will always be a national security priority for the United States. The two nations share a border of nearly 2,000 miles, and trade between them is worth billions of dollars. To take advantage of this relationship, the Mexican government created a series of customs and trade policies specifically designed to enhance its economic ties to the U.S. For decades, such policies greatly benefited Mexico’s maquiladoras, factories that import raw materials, rapidly combine them into finished products, and export them to the American market. Unfortunately for Mexico, the strong advantages in low-cost labor and speedy delivery are gradually being eroded by similar programs in China and Southeast Asia. As U.S. companies look to Asia for more profitable business relationships, the Mexican government has done little to alter its customs and trade policies in response. A severe economic blow to the maquiladoras along the U.S. border would have dramatic effects on the stability of the area, affecting both Mexican and American national security interests. The governments of Mexico and the United States should therefore take preemptive measures to mitigate the instability that is arising as the maquiladoras lose their viability under new global economic pressures. These measures include altering customs and trade policies, providing economic incentives in order to transform the Mexican export industry, and creating labor opportunities for Mexicans within the United States. In order to support this thesis, the following paper will leverage Design Theory to examine the current situation in the Mexican maquiladora industry, identify problems in terms of potential impacts to U.S. national security, and propose possible courses of action for both American and Mexican decision-makers.

#### This threatens the entire relationship and causes industries to shift toward China—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

The Problem Frame highlights the issues that must be addressed in order to transform current conditions into the desired end state.25 In this case, the desired end state is a more stable economy in the northern Mexican states, free from the current stress brought about by the decline in the maquiladora industry. Since 60% of Mexican maquiladoras operate in the border states, this end state is a key factor in the stability of the border area for both the United States and Mexico.26 Additionally, 80% of all Mexican exports are to the United States, making this relationship extremely important.27 It is in the best interest of these nations to take action to reach this end state. In order to develop future courses of action that create conditions conducive for the desired end state, the current challenges that currently exist in this system must be examined. The three major challenges to reaching the desired end state are connected to flaws in the Mexican export industry, specifically its inability to respond to global competition, its overreliance on the American market, and its lack of complexity. A fourth challenge is connected to the free flow of labor in this region. These challenges are obstacles in the path to a stable and secure northern Mexico. First of all, Mexico’s response to increased competition for its maquiladoras has been completely inadequate. Over the past decade, China has presented an attractive alternative to Mexican maquiladoras in terms of labor costs. In 2008, Chinese hourly manufacturing wages were estimated nearly 75% cheaper than those in Mexico.28 For over a decade, Chinese factories have been able to assemble goods of equal quality as the maquiladoras, but now they can provide greater quality control and better physical infrastructure.29 As drug violence continues in Mexico, security has become a greater decision point for businesses as well, and many are concerned that investing in Mexico is a risk.30 Mexico’s two main responses to this situation have been extremely inadequate and have not improved the overall situation. The Mexican government’s first response was to escalate anti-Chinese rhetoric, even working to delay China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.31 This merely delayed the inevitable and resolved nothing. Later, driven by the need to compete with China, Mexican factories laid off personnel and cut worker salaries in order to reduce labor costs.32 Considering the weak global economy, this unfortunate move added pressure to an already-stressed workforce. The resultant increases in unemployment and underemployment, combined with reduced salaries, will increase instability in the region as people are driven to crime, either as victims or participants.33

#### US reliance on Chinese technology for military purposes undermines its capability and allows for Chinese espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Another way that China is gaining a strategic advantage over the U.S. is by getting the U.S. military to become increasingly dependent upon them. According to Forbes, now the U.S. military is even leasing a Chinese satellite for communications purposes… American dependence on China grows by the day. The latestnews is that the United States has been reduced to leasing a Chinese satellite to handle communications with U.S. military bases in Africa. Surprising, isn’t it? The nation that launched the world’s first communications satellite (I remember it well – it was called Telstar) has so lost its manufacturing mojo that it has to rely on its most formidable military adversary to provide the hardware for some of its most sensitive communications. This at a time when underlying unemployment rates among U.S. manufacturing workers remain at near-depression levels. Isn’t that crazy? And a recent Senate report discovered that many of our most advanced weapons systems are absolutely riddled with counterfeit Chinese parts… A recent Senate report, titled Inquiry Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Department Of Defense Supply Chain, “uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems.” The investigation found 1,800 cases of counterfeit electronic parts involving over one million suspect parts in 2009-10 alone, thereby exposing “a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unveiled independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive systems.” The report concluded, among other things, that China is the “dominant source” of counterfeit products that enter the DoD supply chain, that the Chinese government does little to stop it and that the DoD doesn’t know the “scope and impact” of these parts on critical defense systems. Who in the world would be stupid enough to allow one of their greatest strategic enemies to supply large numbers of parts for key weapons systems? Apparently we are that stupid. Things are particularly bad when it comes to semiconductors… Senator John McCain commented: “We can’t tolerate the risk of a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles, or any other mission failure because of a counterfeit part.” Calling the issue “a ticking time bomb,” Brian Toohey, president of the Semiconductor Industry Association, commented: “The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril.” It would be bad enough if we just had to worry about counterfeit parts failing. But what if China has a way to shut some of those parts down in the event of a conflict? What if some of those parts contain “Trojan Horse” computer chips or malware? That may sound crazy, but unfortunately Trojan Horse chips can be extremely difficult to detect. The following is from a recent Forbes article… As the Defense Science Board pointed out, Trojan Horse circuitry is almost impossible to detect even with the most rigorous analysis. This is particularly so if a saboteur can accomplish matching subversions in both software and relevant hardware.

#### Chinese espionage is the biggest internal link to Chinese military modernization

U.S.-China ESRC 7 – U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission[Report to Congress-The Commission was made up of members of the 110th Congress, 1st Session, November, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf>
The pace and success of China’s military modernization continue to exceed U.S. government estimates. Indeed, on occasion the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have been taken by surprise, 7 as in the case of the launching of the Jin class submarine by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with impressive speed and quality, and these advancements are due in part to the highly effective manner in which Chinese defense companies are integrating commercial technologies into military systems. Additionally, industrial espionage provides Chinese companies an added source of new technology without the necessity of investing time or money to perform research. Chinese espionage in the United States, which now comprises the single greatest threat to U.S. technology, is straining the U.S. counterintelligence establishment. This illicit activity significantly contributes to China’s military modernization and acquisition of new capabilities.

#### US can no longer win the war due to Chinese tech advancement through espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Most Americans assume that the U.S. military is so vastly superior to everyone else that no other nation would ever dream of fighting a full-scale war against us. Unfortunately, that assumption is dead wrong. In recent years, the once mammoth technological gap between the U.S. military and the Chinese military has been closing at a frightening pace. China has been accomplishing this by brazenly stealing our technology and hacking into our computer systems. The Pentagon and the Obama administration know all about this, but they don’t do anything about it. Perhaps the fact that China owns about a trillion dollars of our national debt has something to do with that. In any event, today China has the largest military in the world and the second largest military budget in the world. They have stolen plans for our most advanced jets, helicopters, ships and missile systems. It is estimated that stealing our technology has saved China about 25 years of research and development. In addition, China is rapidly developing a new generation of strategic weapons that could potentially enable it to actually win a future war against the United States. At one time such a notion would have been unthinkable, but as you will see below, the next war with China could go very badly for the United States.

#### Chinese military modernization causes great power war

Twomey 9, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both @ the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, 9 [Christopher, Arms Control Association, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey]

China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their modernization and sizing decisions increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core of this interlocking pattern of development. In particular, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council expanding its arsenal; it is also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the strategic balance.[2] The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign. What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy. Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

#### Recent disputes with China increase the probability of miscalculation – absent force – China will unilaterally intervene in Asia

Max Hastings 1/2/14 [educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, British journalist, editor, historian and author, “Is World War Three about to start... by accident? Max Hastings asks whether rising tensions between China and Japan could boil over”,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532932/Is-World-War-Three-start-accident-Max-Hastings-asks-rising-tensions-China-Japan-boil-over.html, ML]

If conflict does come, it will be waged with the high-tech weapons of our own time: warplanes manned and unmanned, missiles, cyber-attack weapons and the many instruments of destruction guided from space satellites. But this would not make a great power conflict any less catastrophic. And this is why a shiver will have run through the leaderships of Asia and of the Western powers this week when China's ambassador to London argued that Japan risks 'a serious threat to global peace' by 'rekindling' the bellicose attitude that hastened the expansion of World War II into a global conflict. He even compared Japan today to Lord Voldemort, the arch villain in the Harry Potter novels. This comes just a few weeks after China — with absolutely no warning — declared hundreds of thousands of square miles of airspace above the East China Sea as its own Air Defence Zone. This includes the eight tiny uninhabited pimples, called the Senkaku Islands by Japan and Diaoyu by China. Taiwan also has a claim to the islands — nationalised by Japan from private sellers in 2012, much to the anger of China. The United States responded to this bitter dispute between Tokyo and Beijing by dispatching two USAAF B-52s bombers to overfly the islands, emphasising its commitment to the right of free navigation. Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, declared gravely that China had started 'a whole new game'. His government threatened to shoot down any Chinese drones that appeared over the Senkakus. Beijing responded that this would be an act of war. Nobody, including the Chinese, wants armed conflict. Indeed, an analyst for the International Institute Of Strategic Studies has said that China 'aims to push rather than break limits'. Yet the tensions between Tokyo, Washington and Beijing have been increasing for years. For the moment, China, the U.S. and Japan still maintain courtesies between governments. Most crucially, Beijing holds trillions of dollars of U.S. debt. But many of history's wars have been triggered by miscalculations while nations have been testing each other's strengths. Indeed, there is a profound fear in Washington, in Tokyo, and maybe also in Beijing, that one day something unspeakably ghastly could happen by mistake. Remember that in 1914 before the outbreak of World War I, Britain and Germany were each other's largest trading partners. Professor Peter Dutton, of the U.S. Naval War College, has warned of the growing tensions, saying: 'China's challenge to existing maritime norms is creating hairline fractures in the global order.' This comment followed an authoritative Washington defence guru who said that, whatever short-term bother terror groups such as Al Qaeda might cause, 'in the middle-long term, there will only be one main concern of the U.S. armed forces, and that is China. China is reshaping the military order in Asia, and is doing so at our expense'. China has an ever-growing fleet of missile-armed warships — thought to number around 80, as well as nearly 300 amphibious assault ships — including fast-attack craft specifically designed as 'carrier-killers', to engage the U.S. Navy's behemoths. In response, the huge U.S. Andersen air force base on the Pacific Ocean island of Guam has become host to a £10 billion reinforcement programme. As a result, its hangars now hold B-2 and B-52 bombers, air-to-surface and cruise missiles, Global Hawk drones, F-15 and F-22 fighters, the latter just a 20-minute flight from the Taiwan Strait. Amitai Etzioni, professor of international relations at George Washington University, declares bleakly: 'There are increasing signs that the United States and China are on a collision course.' What is not disputed is that China is determined to assert its new status as a major regional power, while the U.S. is equally bent upon deterring or deflecting Chinese expansionism, and especially aggressiveness. This was the reason behind President Obama's 2010 decision to rebalance American strategic assets towards the Pacific. The American case is as readily made as was the British one, for resisting quite similar German posturing before 1914. Washington's attitude is: 'We and our allies are democracies, while China is an autocracy which denies respect for human rights or international law.' I believe that unless the Washington administration makes plain its determination to support any country (such as Japan) that is threatened with aggression by Beijing, China will go ahead and impose its ruthless will upon the entire Pacific region. As for the contrary view from Beijing itself, China's leaders cherish a profound grievance about the Tokyo government's persistent refusal to confront the reality of Japan's mid-20th century war crimes in Asia. For the Tokyo government asserts that the time has passed for any Japanese apologies or even discussion of its historical record. An example of this defiance is the military museum that is situated next door to Tokyo's Yasakuni shrine, where so many Japanese war criminals' ashes lie and to which many Japanese politicians visit to pay homage. I have been to the place myself, and find it as repugnant as do the Chinese. Which is why they found such offence a few days ago when the Japanese premier arrived there to pay his respects. (Its choice of exhibits is intended to prove that during the middle of the last century, Japan entered China — where at least 15 million people fell victim to its occupation — and other Asian countries in order to 'protect' them from European exploitation.) In the same vein, Japan describes its half-century occupation of Korea as a 'partnership'. The ghastly Thirties massacres committed by the Japanese army at Shanghai and Nanjing are not mentioned. In Japanese school textbooks, the systemic exploitation of 'comfort women' by the Japanese Army is a forbidden subject. Most shockingly, a Japanese minister claimed last year that such victims were 'volunteers'. While it is deemed unforgivable — and even criminal — across most of the world to deny the existence of the Nazi Holocaust of six million Jews, almost the entire Japanese nation denies its own barbarities across Asia. This intransigence helps to explain why South Korea, for instance, recently refused to conclude an intelligence-sharing security agreement with Japan, because public opinion remains so alienated by its former oppressors' lies about the past. For its part, the U.S. is impatient for Japan to abandon the controversial Article 9 of its post-war constitution (imposed by America after the end of World War II), which forces the country to renounce war and restricts its armed forces to a self-defence role. Times have changed and Washington now wants to see the Japanese accept a much larger share of the responsibility for containing China. But more than a few prominent Asians are wagging a warning finger at the Americans, urging: 'Be careful what you wish for.' The truth is that many of Japan's Asian neighbours — not to mention the Chinese — will never trust Tokyo until it comes clean about its dreadful history, as it seems determined not to do. China is a tough, assertive, immature nation in a hurry; the United States is seen in Beijing as a weakly led, declining military power that is vulnerable to pressure On the specific issue of the disputed Senkaku islands, China points out that Tokyo has held them only since the late 19th century, when Japan became an early entrant into the race for an Asian empire. There are economic issues at stake, too. Sovereignty claims are based on a desire to exploit the area's rich resources in fish and hydrocarbons. Above all, though, the tension is based on much bigger ambitions. China argues, just as Germany did before 1914 in respect of Britain's maritime supremacy, that now it is one of the big players in Asia, there is no reason why it should accept America's claims to Pacific hegemony. Why should Beijing tolerate U.S. warships and aircraft conducting close surveillance of the Chinese coast? Such a presence is unjustified in an age of satellites and simply reflects a wish by America to parade its military might at the expense of Chinese dignity. Such arguments have spread to cover debate about freedom of the internet. A Chinese army general recently dismissed American drum-banging about the importance of preserving 'global internet freedom.' He said that Washington was using this as an excuse to preserve its own 'cyber-hegemony'. He added: 'In the information era, seizing and maintaining superiority in cyberspace is more important than was seizing command of the sea and air in World War II'. Even if we British, as American allies, ultimately reject some of these arguments, we should acknowledge that the U.S. often seems clumsy, patronising and over-bearing in its attitude to other nations. For example, the Chinese were enraged recently by the behaviour of U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden. On a supposed goodwill visit to Beijing, he urged a group of Chinese to keep up their protests against denial of human rights. He said they should 'challenge the government'. Biden may have been right, but his action was foolish and insensitive. Such self-righteous moralising is the sort of behaviour that worries Nigel Inkster, a former deputy director of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, who, earlier this year, spoke bleakly about the relationship between the two countries. He said: 'If it is to avoid becoming the chronicle of a death foretold, both parties will need to demonstrate greater self-awareness than either has yet shown'. A key issue of contention remains human rights. Of course, it is right that the rest of the world presses China to respect international law abroad and human rights at home. Military power, firmness and clarity of purpose are essential tools for addressing China through the years ahead, as it increasingly flexes its muscles. But so, too, is a willingness to recognise that China will not become a liberal democracy any time soon. As this vast country has for centuries been so misused by the Western powers, including Britain, its rise to greatness now deserves applause as well as prudent apprehension. Yet, however careful the U.S. and China may be in managing their future relationship, I fear that it will remain fraught and indeed dangerous. China is a newly rich, increasingly mighty nation, which is bent upon elbowing aside the Americans, in the Pacific region at least, to assert its own claims as a Great Power. This makes it inevitable that there will be rows, confrontations, crises, some involving both nations' armed forces. The peril will persist throughout our lifetimes and the great worry is that a clash such as one over the disputed Senkaku islands will go horribly wrong. Popular nationalism is a growing force in China, just as it is in Japan, and the great challenge for both nations' politicians is to grapple with its excesses. China often speaks of the importance of using restraint — kezhi — in its conduct abroad. But its defence minister has said that although any full-scale war is unlikely, 'we cannot exclude the possibility that, in some local area, unexpected events may occur, or military friction may take place due a to a misfire'. History tells us that nations that create vastly expensive armed forces sooner or later feel an itch to use them. China is a tough, assertive, immature nation in a hurry; the United States is seen in Beijing as a weakly led, declining military power that is vulnerable to pressure. For the moment, Washington knows that it can deploy vaster greater military power than China. It is also morbidly anxious not to be seen to show weakness — hence its decision to dispatch the B-52s over the Senkakus. Ultimately, I want to be hopeful. The world managed to avert war during more than 40 years of armed nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Maybe it can do so through the 21st century, as China grows ever stronger and America's superiority wanes. But we cannot take peace for granted. The Pacific rim is ever more densely strewn with the toys of war. The risk of some local turf dispute exploding into a great power collision will remain alarmingly real.

### 1ac – plan

#### The United States federal government ought to offer financial assistance toward the assembly-for-export industry in Mexico.

### 1ac – manufacturing

#### Foreign investment is key to evolve factories technologically—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

A third challenge associated with this system concerns the lack of complexity of the production performed by the maquiladoras. The vast majority of maquiladoras conduct simple assembly, so the factories involved are tooled for basic production, and the employees only have basic skills. This drastically limits the ability of both the factories and their employees to adjust to new forms of production as the maquiladoras fall to foreign competitors. This industry is so tightly tied to specific customers in the U.S. that a transition to some other form of production would require massive changes in structure and labor. The Mexican government understands this as a problem and seeks to drive the evolution of so-called “first generation” maquiladoras to second and third generation models. The first generation maquiladoras are the least complex and simply assemble raw materials. Foreign investment brings with it technology, and, with this technology, the maquiladoras evolve into more complex factories that eventually focus less on labor intensity and more on more sophisticated products, R&D and even product design.39 Unfortunately, there are few examples of this trend, and many critics complain that the entire concept of the maquiladora “traps developing countries into the deadend role of providing cheap labor for low value-added assembly operations.”40

#### US financial assistance is key

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Mexican manufacturing is critical to address challenges facing the U.S. – picks up the slack for U.S. manufacturing

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

In the last decade, Mexico has proven that it has the capabilities and talent in advanced manufacturing to supply the international market of the aerospace industry. The integration of design and advanced manufacturing capabilities on a national level prove that the Mexican industry has included high technology and engineering in its processes. Through the projects identified in this Road Map, which involves the efforts of academia, industry and government, Chihuahua will become the leading A+D cluster in Latin America in precision manufacturing for the high-tech industry and dual-use goods. This exercise identified projects and factors that will promote Chihuahua’s ability to attract future high technology investments for the aerospace and defense sector by as well as creating the capabilities to optimize the sector’s industrial competitiveness in the region, such as: the creation of a talent management platform; reducing dependency on the importation of molds, dyes and tooling in the sector; and making better use of future investments that have been encouraged by Mexico’s acceptance in the WA. Chihuahua has been able to determine the right path to reach its maximum potential and become one of Mexico´s most competitive regions in the aerospace sector with a medium- and long-term vision. The road to success has been forged, and the coming years will be bursting with opportunities and new challenges for Chihuahua.

#### Mexico is key – the US can’t solve

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

The United States our major commercial partner is going through a talent crisis due to a lack of engineering graduates, added to constant cuts in defense spending, which complicates the upkeep of its current abilities to research, develop and produce defense and high-tech dual-use items. Mexico has more engineering graduates per capita than the United States and skilled and engineering labor costs are more competitive in Mexico; the technological sophistication of its manufactured goods is above that of BRIC countries such as India and Brazil. These three factors make Mexico the best answer to the issues that affect the United States. The creation of the SCE and Mexico’s acceptance into the WA have laid the foundation to guarantee national surveillance during the export of restricted and dual-use technologies and goods. According to conservative estimates, the WA will enable the national industry to access a potential high-technology export market of close to an additional 11.3 billion dollars per year, added to the potential creation of between 30 and 40 thousand highly paid jobs in the next five years.7 Chihuahua’s advanced manufacturing vocation (landing gears, fuselages, engines, harnesses and precision machining) make it the ideal destination for projects in the A+D cluster. Furthermore, the Federal Government is in negotiations with the US Department of Defense to develop a regional aerospace and defense manufacturing block focused on Buy NAFTA. This could be completed with the signing of a MoU between the US Department of State and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA)

#### Manufacturing drives innovation and pharmaceuticals

Swezey 11 (Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf>)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### Tech innovation solves extinction

Zhong 07, CEO at Jade Bird Dashing, 7-31-7 (Roger, “The Effects and Influences of Technology on Society and Humyn Kind,” http://scienceray.com/technology/applied-science/the-effects-and-influences-of-technology-on-society-and-humyn-kind/”)

The question that persists however, is, “Is technology in fact harming our society as a whole?” Albeit the fact that this is a remarkably intricate question of sorts, it can be answered with a simple answer. The actuality of this situation remains that technology is by no means detrimental to our society here in the United States, civilization throughout the world, or to the greater humynity of the humyn race; instead, it is vital to its survival. Nuclear Technology To illustrate this point, let us first examine an exceedingly significant technological advance of our time, nuclear technology. Nuclear technology is research that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. It has many vital applications in modern society, the most prominent of which are nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine, and nuclear power. The most controversial of these is, without a doubt, nuclear weapons. First created by the United States in 1945 during World War II, they were developed out of the fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them. A weapon of incredible power, a single nuclear weapon has to potential to decimate, level, and destroy an entire city. The first and only times a nuclear weapon has been used are in World War II, when the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the “Little Boy” and “Fat Myn” bombs, respectively. The usage of these bombs allowed for the near instantaneous end to the destructive World War II. Although two cities were leveled and many lives were lost, the situation involving the usage of these nuclear weapons is not nearly as negative as one may perceive. Had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would not have surrendered, and it would have without a doubt prolonged the war for months or even years. This would have forced an Allied Forces ground invasion of Japan in an effort to end the war, which would have resulted in the loss of many more people than caused by the deployment of the two nuclear weapons. When you look at the usage of nuclear technology, you must look at the situation from the viewpoint of humyn society as a whole, and not from a standpoint of an individual. While the nuclear bombs destroyed two cities and killed many, they ended a horrific World War II and prevented the loss of many other lives. Today, in more modern terms, nuclear weapons play a huge role in our lives. As citizens of the United States, it is common knowledge that we are guaranteed many degrees of freedoms and rights, but have you ever considered who enforces our right to these freedoms in the world? The military might of the United States is the key to us retaining our democratic freedoms. Being in possession of nuclear weapons is not only a positive thing, it allows for us to be free. By holding an arsenal of nuclear weapons, we have a nuclear deterrent. In this sense, we prevent wars and conflicts from escalating into another World War by instituting world order. By having nuclear technology, we are ensuring the well-being, longevity, and freedoms of the humyn race. Internet Technology Another prominent technological innovation that well represents our society today is the Internet. The Internet is the worldwide, publicly accessible network of interconnected computer networks that transmit data between themselves. It is an extremely large network that consists of countless smaller networks. The World Wide Web is accessible only through this Internet infrastructure which allows us our access to websites, email, file sharing, downloads, and media. As well as being an important provider for us common citizens who wish to access the World Wide Web, the internet serves a much greater purpose. It allows for the sharing of information almost instantaneously between scholars, researchers, and others. It allows for information to be shared from the United States to China in less than a second. Before the times of the internet, the other alternatives to transmit information were not nearly as efficient or effective. The Internet allows for us to, in some ways make the world smaller. In the days of today’s stock markets, financial infrastructure, global news organizations, powerful militarizes, strong governments and big corporations, instantaneous communication is an asset we can not afford to lose. The Internet allows for our society in modern day times to interconnect and promote globalization and information sharing. Medical Technology Perhaps one of the most vital technological advances in our society today is in the field of humyn medicine and health sciences. This field deals with the maintenance, prolongment, and restoration of humyn health through the study, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and injury. Medicine is an area where knowledge is obtained, then applied to treatment. It has been around at least as far as the beginning of recorded history, perhaps even farther. Today, modern medicine is practiced within a well-developed framework of health-care infrastructure. Research in the field of medicine has allowed for the development of many new treatments, drugs, medicines, and solutions that have allowed for the dramatic prolongment of the humyn lifespan. Today, with the influence of medicine, the lifespan of the average humyn is only increasing. Medicine in today’s world provides the most vital of all services; it ensures the survival of the humyn race as a whole. Review Now, let us review the implications of technology on our civilization here on Earth as a whole. Could the notion of technology possibly have any basis? Simply put, it does not have any credibility of any sort. Technology itself does not signify any concrete object or thing; instead it collectively portrays humyn kind’s achievements as a whole. Any advancements, abilities, creations, undertakings, views, or knowledge of us as humyns are in essence technology. This definition alone refutes the argument that technology is detrimental. Take for instance the three significant technological advances of the humyn race covered in this article: nuclear technology, the internet, and medicine. Nuclear technology, an important advancement for our society, creates a world order, protects the inhabitants of the world, and ensures the longevity, freedoms, and well-being of the entire humyn race. Also, the internet allows for our society to inter-connect and progress further into enlightenment. Perhaps most important of all, medicine, allows for us to ensure our own survival on this planet. These three technologies well represent technology as a whole, and clearly show that technology is extremely beneficial to our society. Only by advocating and advancing technology, can we as humyns, and as humynity, succeed.

**Mexican pharmaceuticals are key**

NAPS 4/11/13 (North American Production Sharing Incorporated, <http://www.napsintl.com/news/index.php/2013/04/11/the-medical-device-industry-manufacturing-in-mexico-has-a-clean-bill-of-health/>)

[Medical device](http://www.napsintl.com/medicaldevice.php) companies manufacturing in Mexico continue to exhibit steady growth with no sign of a slow down in sight. As costs in the United States and Eastern Europe continue to rise, especially with the implementation of “Obamacare” and its direct impact on medical device companies, more organizations are considering [manufacturing in Mexico](http://www.napsintl.com/manufacturinginmexico.php) as a viable solution. No other place in Mexico is this more evident than in Tijuana, where they now claim the largest concentration of medical device companies in all of North America. The ability to provide both timely deliveries and consistently high quality products are a few reasons why medical device manufacturers are choosing Mexico. Also, there is a tremendous base of talented labor with experience in medical device, [automotive](http://www.napsintl.com/auto.php), electronics, aerospace and other sophisticated industries to support the growth of manufacturing in Mexico. Furthermore, the labor laws in Mexico provide companies much more flexibility in terms of compensation, scheduling and seasonality, which plays an important roll on profitability. Another factor drawing medical device manufacturers to Mexico is the government’s enforcement, and employee’s respect, for intellectual property. Unlike many other low-cost manufacturing countries, Mexico is known for its low piracy rates, which cost companies billions of dollars a year. One of the challenges facing these companies is understanding the business landscape and culture in Mexico, which is why many of these firms are choosing to outsource their administration and compliance management to shelter companies. A good shelter company will handle 100% of the administration, including Humyn Resources in Mexico, Payroll in Mexico, Accounting in Mexico, Import/Export in Mexico and Environmental, Health & Safety in Mexico, allowing the manufacturer to focus on production and quality control. “We are receiving a record number of inquires from medical device manufacturers around the world who want to explore Mexico as a competitive solution,” said Scott Stanley, Sr. Vice President of North American Production Sharing, Inc. (NAPS), Tijuana’s largest and most sophisticated shelter service provider. “NAPS guides these companies through the process of feasibility by providing all the facts and figures about expanding into Mexico so sound business decisions can be made. Thereafter, we essentially become partners and typically work together for many years.” With an increase in demand for medical device products, not only in the United States but also within Mexico’s public health sector, Mexico will continue to be the primary choice for medical device manufacturing.

#### Pharmaceuticals is key to the development of DOD non-lethal chemical weapons

The Sunshine Project 03 (“Pentagon Perverts Pharma with New Weapons”, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr110203.html)

The conventional view is that pharmaceutical research develops new ways to treat disease and reduce humyn suffering; but the Pentagon disagrees. Military weapons developers see the pharmaceutical industry as central to a new generation of anti-personnel weapons. Although it denied such research as recently as the aftermath of the October theater tragedy in Moscow, a Pentagon program has recently released more information that confirms that it wants to make pharmaceutical weapons. And on February 5th, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went a big step further. Rumsfeld, himself a former pharmaceutical industry CEO (1), announced that the US is making plans for the use of such incapacitating biochemical weapons in an invasion of Iraq (see News Release, 7 February 2003). The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the US Army's Soldier Biological Chemical Commynd (SBCCOM) are leading the research. Of interest to the military are drugs that target the brain's regulation of many aspects of cognition, such as sense of pain, consciousness, and emotions like anxiety and fear. JNLWD is preparing a database of pharmaceutical weapons candidates, many of them off-the-shelf products, and indexing them by manufacturer. It will choose drugs from this database for further work and, according to Rumsfeld, if President Bush signs a waiver of existing US policy, they can be used in Iraq. Delivery devices already exist or are in advanced development. These include munitions for an unmynned aerial vehicle or loitering missile, and a new 81mm (bio)chemical mortar round. Many of the Pentagon’s so-called "nonlethal" (bio)chemical weapons candidates are pharmaceuticals. Different names are used for these weapons ("calmatives", "disabling chemicals", "nonlethal chemicals", etc.). Used as weapons, all minimally aim to incapacitate their victims. They belong to the same broad category of agents as the incapacitating chemical that killed more than 120 hostages in the Moscow theater. That agent was reported to be based on fentanyl, an opiate that is also among the weapons being assessed by JNLWD. In the US, pharmaceutical fentanyl is sold by Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceutica. Remifentanil, a closely related drug, is a GlaxoSmithKline product. US military contractors have identified a host of other agents manufactured by a Who's Who list of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2001 weapons researchers at the Applied Research Laboratory of Pennsylvania State University assessed the anesthetic drugs isoflurane and sevoflurane, produced by Syngenta and Abbott Laboratories, respectively. The same Penn State team recommended other drugs for "immediate consideration," some of which are in the chart below. The Pentagon is also interested in industry’s new ways to apply (bio)chemicals through the skin and mucous membranes, which could bring previously impractical drug weapons closer to reality by overcoming technical hurdles related to delivery of certain agents.

#### Those are good – prevent collateral damage

Alexander 99, Retired U.S. Army colonel, an author, and a consultant to various U.S. government agencies. He spearheaded the research on nonlethal weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1999 (John B., Oct 1st, “Nonlethal Weapons: When Deadly Force Is Not Enough”, The Futurist, L/N)

The military and law enforcement situations mentioned so far are fairly clear cut and a logical extension of current practices. However, the future of nonlethal weapons lies in far more important areas. Many of the potential enemies of the future are nontraditional. In the past few years the impact of terrorism and organized crime has been felt around the world. In most cases, response by means of conventional force is unsuitable or inadequate. When the enemy commingles with an innocent civilian population, it is not appropriate, and often counterproductive, to use bombs or missiles to attack them. As was seen earlier this year in Yugoslavia, even precision weapons can occasionally go astray and hit an unintended target. Without the development of advanced nonlethal weapons, the options available to political leaders and military commynders are too limited. It is under circumstances in which lethal weapons could lead to much broader engagements that nonlethal weapons take on strategic importance. An example of a situation that seems to have gone tragically wrong is the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical company in Sudan. This attack was undertaken based on a belief that the factory was supporting Osama bin Laden, a terrorist who had allegedly instigated and coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The factory, located near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum, was hit by cruise missiles at night in hopes that civilian casualties would be minimal. It was later learned that the factory was targeted on erroneous information and that people did die in the attack. This incident highlights the limitations of conventional weapons. In the future we need to have weapons that can degrade or destroy such facilities without the collateral damage caused by high explosives. Very few of these weapons are being thoroughly researched. However, with some effort more weapons can be developed to make long-range, nonlethal strikes against terrorist infrastructures.

#### That prevents a world war

Close 98, Arab affairs specialist for the CIA for twenty-six years & an independent consultant on the region, 1998 (Raymond, “The Only Effective Defense Against Terrorism is To Rebuild America's Reputation For Fairness,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November)

Despite U.S. government claims to the contrary, there is, in my opinion, a serious question whether our action in bombing alleged terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan was a justifiable violation of the accepted and respected norms of international law. The attacks were on the sovereign territory of another legally recognized state with which we are technically at peace. We can attempt to justify this action by quoting Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" on the American government and the American people, without distinction between them. But that is to claim, is it not, that the government of Afghanistan and the government of the Sudan abetted, and therefore share complicity in, acts of war against the United States? In fact, all that Afghanistan seems to have done was to provide Bin Laden with the sanctuary where the acts against us were planned. (Not the location where they were carried out.) We must now be ready to accept the full implications of this interpretation of our international rights. This means, it seems to me, that we are declaring one of two conditions to be true: A. That the United States makes the rules by which it acts in the world community. We are a law unto ourselves. Do we really want to say that? B. Or, that if one state believes it has enemies who are being granted refuge in another country, it is permissible to launch bombing attacks against those elements without the knowledge or permission of the legitimate host government. Is setting that precedent always going to redound to our benefit? Have we thought about that carefully? Most of us accept the premise that terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be defeated by brute force, but only by ideas, by persuasion, by the amelioration of its causes -- whether real or imagined. Terrorism has only one real asset, in the final analysis -- the passion and commitment of its adherents. Are humyn passions capable of being altered by cruise missiles? Having accepted that premise intellectually as reasonable and civilized, we now have to live with the fact that in other international situations in the future, others may emulate our resort to violence, taking the law into their own hands to launch attacks against other members of the international community if they feel their national interests are similarly threatened. **This is how world wars start.**

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### Heg prevents great power war, economic collapse, and global governance failures

**Thayer 13**—PhD U Chicago, former research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, political science professor at Baylor (Bradley, professor in the political science department at Baylor University, “Humans, Not Angels: Reasons to Doubt the Decline of War Thesis”, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 396–419, September 2013, dml)

Accordingly, while Pinker is sensitive to the importance of power in a domestic context—the Leviathan is good for safety and the decline of violence—he neglects the role of power in the international context, specifically he neglects US power as a force for stability. So, if a liberal Leviathan is good for domestic politics, a liberal Leviathan should be as well for international politics. The primacy of the United States provides the world with that liberal Leviathan and has four major positive consequences for international politics (Thayer 2006). In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, US leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy and the security blanket it provides reduce nuclear proliferation incentives and help keep a number of complicated relationships stable such as between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood—particularly the worst form—great power wars**.** Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and many of the other positive forces Pinker identifies. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Rather, it is because they are more transparent, more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with US leadership. Third, along with the growth of the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, mobility of capital, and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good. Fourth, and finally, the United States has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to also promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The US military has participated in over 50 operations since the end of the Cold War—and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the US military is the earth's “911 force”—it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic, and the planet's fire department. There is no other state, group of states, or international organizations that can provide these global benefits. Without US power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. But, the waning of US power, at least in relative terms, introduces additional problems for Pinker concerning the decline of violence in the international realm. Given the importance of the distribution of power in international politics, and specifically US power for stability, there is reason to be concerned about the future as the distribution of relative power changes and not to the benefit of the United States.

#### US benevolent leadership key to global peace—the alternative is major power wars that escalate

Kromah 9, Masters Student in IR

[February 2009, Lamii Moivi Kromah at the Department of International Relations

University of the Witwatersrand, “The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11”, http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR%2009.pdf?sequence=1]

A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States.39 This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."40 After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project.41 Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. benevolent hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.42 This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.43 America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role.46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers48, but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.49 The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on noncapitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs”. 51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony.52 If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power.53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership as been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54 Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of po1itics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.55 By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own wellbeing depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security. 57 I see a multi-polar world as one being filled with instability and higher chances of great power conflict. The Great Power jostling and British hegemonic decline that led to WWI is an example of how multi polar systems are prone to great power wars. I further posit that U.S. hegemony is significantly different from the past British hegemony because of its reliance on consent and its mutilaterist nature. The most significant would be the UN and its various branches financial, developmental, and conflict resolution. It is common for the international system to go through cataclysmic changes with the fall of a great power. I feel that American hegemony is so different especially with its reliance on liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence that U.S. hegemonic order and governance will be maintained by others, if states vary in size, then cooperation between the largest of the former free riders (and including the declining hegemonic power) may suffice to preserve the cooperative outcome. Thus we need to amend the assumption that collective action is impossible and incorporate it into a fuller specification of the circumstances under which international cooperation can be preserved even as a hegemonic power declines.58 If hegemony means the ability to foster cooperation and commonalty of social purpose among states, U.S. leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its post war position of military and economic dominance; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular administrations.59 U.S. hegemony will continue providing the public good that the world is associated with despite the rise of other powers in the system “cooperation may persist after hegemonic decline because of the inertia of existing regimes. Institutional factors and different logics of regime creation and maintenance have been invoked to explain the failure of the current economic regime to disintegrate rapidly in response to the decline of American predominance in world affairs.”60 Since the end of WWII the majority of the states that are represented in the core have come to depend on the security that U.S. hegemony has provided, so although they have their own national interest, they forgo short term gains to maintain U.S. hegemony. Why would other states forgo a leadership role to a foreign hegemon because it is in their interests; one particularly ambitious application is Gilpin's analysis of war and hegemonic stability. He argues that the presence of a hegemonic power is central to the preservation of stability and peace in the international system. Much of Gilpin's argument resembles his own and Krasner's earlier thesis that hegemonic states provide an international order that furthers their own self-interest. Gilpin now elaborates the thesis with the claim that international order is a public good, benefiting subordinate states. This is, of course, the essence of the theory of hegemonic stability. But Gilpin adds a novel twist: the dominant power not only provides the good, it is capable of extracting contributions toward the good from subordinate states. In effect, the hegemonic power constitutes a quasigovernment by providing public goods and taxing other states to pay for them. Subordinate states will be reluctant to be taxed but, because of the hegemonic state's preponderant power, will succumb. Indeed, if they receive net benefits (i.e., a surplus of public good benefits over the contribution extracted from them), they may recognize hegemonic leadership as legitimate and so reinforce its performance and position. During the 19th century several countries benefited from British hegemony particularly its rule of the seas, since WWII the U.S. has also provided a similar stability and security that has made smaller powers thrive in the international system. The model presumes that the (military) dominance of the hegemonic state, which gives it the capacity to enforce an international order, also gives it an interest in providing a generally beneficial order so as to lower the costs of maintaining that order and perhaps to facilitate its ability to extract contributions from other members of the system.

#### New trends prove that espionage emboldens China – makes them pivot with force – the aff allows for diplomacy

VOA 11/21/13 – (“Report: China 'Challenging US Military Preeminence in Asia'”, Voice of America, http://www.voanews.com/content/report-china-challenging-us-military-preeminence-in-asia/1794585.html)//javi

A U.S. congressional panel reported that China's rapidly modernizing military is "altering the security balance in the Asia Pacific and challenging decades of U.S. military preeminence in the region." That warning was given Wednesday in a wide-ranging annual report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a body which advises U.S. lawmakers on Beijing-related policy. The report also accused the Chinese government of "directing and executing a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the United States." It said sanctions may be necessary to help deter the spying. China has not responded to the allegations. Last year, Beijing's foreign ministry condemned the panel's report for having what it called a "Cold War" attitude. Though it is still far outpaced by the U.S. in defense spending, China has steadily increased its military expenditures in recent decades. Beijing, for its part, insists its rise is peaceful. However, commission chairman William Reinsch said China is more aggressively projecting its power abroad. He noted that Beijing is using "coercive" tactics in the East and South China Seas, where it has overlapping claims with many of its neighbors. "It is becoming clear that China does not intend to resolve its maritime disputes through multilateral negotiations or the application of international laws and adjudicative processes, but prefers to use its growing power in support of coercive tactics to pressure its neighbors to concede China's claims," said Reinsch. This comes as President Barack Obama pledges to put a greater economic and military emphasis on the region. The commission welcomed the so-called "pivot," but noted many U.S. allies are concerned budget constraints could limit Washington's ability to follow through. To address these concerns and to "offset China's growing military capabilities," the report recommended Congress continue to fund efforts to move 60 percent of U.S. ships to the Pacific by 2020. Currently, 50 percent are stationed there. Commissioner Larry Wortzel told lawmakers urgent action is needed. "By 2020, China's navy and air force will outnumber and almost match the technical capabilities of our own forces in the Asia Pacific. A shrunken military may be insufficient to deter China or to reassure our friends and allies in the region," said Wortzel. The panel also spoke of an "urgent need" for Washington to convince Beijing to change its approach to cyber spying, which analysts claim has cost U.S. companies billions of dollars. Wortzel said China's military views cyberspace as a "critical element of its strategic competition with the United States." "The Chinese government is directing and executing a large scale cyber espionage campaign that poses a major threat to U.S. industry, critical infrastructure, military operations, personnel, equipment, and readiness," continued Wortzel.

## 2ac

### 2ac – t – has to be a qpq

#### Counter Interpretation – Conditional and unconditional engagement are topical

Haass 2k – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June,

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>?1

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. *Conditional* engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, *unconditional* engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

### 2ac – cp

#### Ought has no temporal function

Dictionary of Americanisms, ‘99

(1999, The Dictionary of Americanisms was originally created by John Russell Bartlett in 1848, This edition was re-copyrighted 1999-2006 – http://www.merrycoz.org/voices/bartlett/AMER10.HTM#o)

OUGHT. As this verb is defective, and has no inflection to distinguish past from present time, illiterate persons often attempt to supply the deficiency by the use of auxiliaries. Hence the expressions, don't ought, had ought, hadn't ought. Mr. Pegge notices the two last among the vulgarisms of London.

#### Certainty key – prevent loss of production and hit to national security

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)djm

Accordingly, this report examined a series of defense industrial base sectors that are vital to U.S. security. Some are especially important and require immediate attention to prevent critical loss of supply or production capacity, constituting an immediate threat to national security. Some sectors are vulnerable to immediate disruption arising from excessive or misaligned foreign dependency, while others face longer-term challenges. In general, the risks posed to many sectors of the defense industrial base may prove very difficult to fix, because they are a part of powerful, prevailing trends in the international technology market and the global economy. All of these challenges demand our best strategic thinking about how to prevent or contain significant and potentially dangerous risks to national security. This report investigates those risks and is a call to action to mitigate them.

#### US-Mexico trade key to resolve Mexican instability and manufacturing sector

O’Neill 3/18/13 – (Shannon, “Mexico and the United States are linked closer than ever through trade”, Voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-united-states-linked-trade/)//javi

When it comes to Mexico, people usually think about the security issue, and that’s what much of the news coverage has been. But underneath that, behind the headlines, we have seen a transformation of Mexico’s economy over the last couple of decades: It has moved from a very closed, inward-looking economy, one whose exports were dominated by oil, to an economy that is one of the most open and increasingly competitive in the world. In measures like trade to GDP, Mexico outpaces not just the United States or places like Brazil, but it outpaces China. It is quite an open and competitive economy now. A big part of that is due to its deepening ties to the United States. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was signed almost 20 years ago, we have seen the creation of regional supply chains for a myriad of different types of industries and companies. For every product that is imported from Mexico in the US, on average 40 percent of it would actually have been made in the U.S. It has become a very symbiotic relationship, and it has become an integrated economy in many ways and in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. There, we see almost seamless integration in some companies, where production happens on both sides of the border. What it means is these economies, companies and industries are now not only intimately tied, but permanently tied at this point. Mexico’s positive future tied to the United States Mexico’s positive future is closely tied to the United States, in part because of this integration of production. If it does extend beyond the United States, it would most likely be through an expansion of what is already this North American production platform, through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand Nafta beyond Canada and Mexico, to include other Latin American countries and many Asia Pacific countries. It is quite a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and one could see it expanding in production chains in many other countries that are participants, and sales would be going up. The U.S., for all of its hiccups in recent years, is still the largest market in the world, so being tied to the U.S. is not a bad thing at all.

#### Mexican economic collapse causes instability

**Barnes 11** – (4/29/11, Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, “Oil and U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations,” <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf>)

There is already a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico.  As noted, the country is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence.  Even if the Mexican government eventually succeeds in its efforts to suppress this violence, the process is likely to be expensive, bloody, and corrosive in terms of human rights.  A period of feeble economic growth, combined with a fiscal crisis associated with a drop in revenues from Pemex, could create a “perfect storm” south of the border.   If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond.  In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.  There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s aid in an economic emergency.  In 1994, the United States extended US$20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole.  Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States.  To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive.  It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome.  Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex’s development into something like Norway’s Statol would mark an important improvement.

#### Mexico’s economy is critical to the US – collapse causes decline of US economy and competitiveness

O’Neal ’13 - Shannon K. O’Neil is a senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) a nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, (“Two Nations Indivisible”, it’s a book)

Mexico has come a long way in the last three decades, shifting from a closed to an open economy, from booms and busts to macroeconomic stability, and from a poor to a middle class nation. But it has yet to unlock its true growth potential, or to match the economic gains and growth rates seen in many of its emerging market peers—China, South Korea, Brazil, and Peru. One might sum up U.S. interest as friendly concern for a neighbor, and it is indeed that. But the U.S. economic future is also increasingly tied to Mexico. A real economic partnership between the two neighbors can be more than just an engine for Mexico’s economic middle; it can help protect and expand America’s middle class. The United States’ economic reliance on Mexico is no less real just because it is overlooked. Already twenty-two of the fifty U.S. states claim Mexico as their first or second destination for exports. Leading the pack are the border states. Each month Texan companies send over US$7 billion and their Californian counterparts almost US$2 billion in goods to their neigh bor.82 But this bonanza isn’t limited just to the border. ‘The economies of states such as South Dakota, Nebraska, and New Hampshire now depend on exports to Mexico as well. U.S. companies in industries as diverse as elec tronic equipment, household appliances, paper products, red meat, pears, and grapes rely today on Mexican industry and consumers for their livelihoods. Because of these ties, economic expansion to the south will boost growth to the north. The opposite is also true; future downturns in Puebla will mean layoffs in Peoria. This dependence through economic integration with Mexico is only deepening as companies worldwide transform the way they make things. American businesses such as Ford, General Electric, Honeywell, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard have rebounded by “near-shoring” or opening fac tories in nearby Mexico. Less recognized, this has saved many U.S. jobs in the process.83 Studies estimate that roughly 40 percent of Mexican-made products value is actually “made in the U.S.A.”—ten times that of Chinese-made goods.84 In this age of inexorable globalization, U.S. eco nomic cooperation with Mexico holds out the hope—and indeed the promise—of stopping the wholesale decampment of manufacturing firms to trans-Pacific locales. Misunderstood by U.S. politicians and pundits alike, NAFTA, and Mexican outsourcing more generally, can he a good thing for U.S. work ers and the U.S. middle class. With a different mindset and approach, U.S.-Mexico economic ties can help boost America’s chances in the global economic race. Using raw data collected confidentially from thousands of large U.S. multinational manufacturing firms, two Harvard Business School professors, along with a colleague from the University of Michigan, upend the conventional wisdom, finding that as companies ramp up investment and employment abroad they also invest and hire more people at home.8 Companies become more productive—and more competitive—and with their better products, lower prices, and higher sales, they create new jobs all around.86 The study shows that, on average, when a firm hires ten employees abroad, it will actually hire, not lay off at least two employees at home. This means that efforts to stop “oftshoring” might actually have the reverse and perverse effect of undermining U.S. jobs.

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

#### The plan bolsters social reform movements within China and prevents nationalist aggression

Blumenthal 09, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, (Dan, “Sea Change in the Pacific”, The American: The Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, <http://www.american.com/archive/2009/march-2009/sea-change-in-the-pacific>)

But the latest Sino-American naval contretemps in the South China Sea is proof positive that Beijing does not particularly like the rules of maritime behavior written when China was less powerful. Earlier this month, five Chinese naval vessels surrounded a U.S. ocean surveillance ship, the Impeccable, near China’s Hainan island and blocked its way with pieces of wood. According to the Chinese, the Impeccable was acting illegally within China’s exclusive economic zone. Washington responded, contending that the ship was operating peacefully and lawfully in international waters. The dispute is unlikely to be litigated or adjudicated anytime soon. Instead, President Obama has sent a guided missile destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, to escort the Impeccable as it conducts its missions. And its missions are none other than monitoring Chinese undersea military activity. It turns out that the Chinese are not fond of U.S. surveillance missions around China’s periphery. China has been building up its naval force at a rapid clip. Over the past decade alone it has added dozens of new submarines and surface ships to its fleet. Last year, a new nuclear submarine base at Sanya on Hainan island was exposed. That is the same Hainan island where, in April 2001, a U.S. EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft was forced to land after a Chinese fighter jet crashed into it. The dispute then was similar to this one; the United States was conducting a surveillance mission near China and Beijing did not like it. Now nearly eight years later, China has greater military capabilities and thus more for Washington to monitor. Beijing will keep adding to its naval fleet and Washington will continue to monitor Chinese military developments. The only surprise is that anyone would expect China to act differently than it has. Beijing does not like America’s military presence near its shores and the People’s Liberation Army now has more capability to do something about it. Washington’s military presence in the Asia Pacific has kept the peace and created the conditions for the region to prosper. Neither America nor her allies want a reduction in Washington’s Pacific presence. Quite the contrary, given China’s increasing power most nations in the region want more of an American presence. But America is cutting its military capability, a move that is sure to harm the Pacific balance of power. Allies already whisper worriedly about our degraded anti-submarine warfare and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Meanwhile, the Obama administration just publicly announced future defense budget cuts. With two ongoing wars engaging much of our ground forces, the victims of these cuts likely will be the Navy and the Air Force, the two services most needed to keep the peace in a quickly transforming Asia. Cutting defense spending is exactly the wrong response to China’s growing power. Instead, America must invest in reconstituting our Pacific military presence. We need the air and naval power to track China’s buildup, deter its adventurism, and defend our allies. That means more submarines, ISR, stealth fighters, and the aircraft that support them. To be sure, this is an expensive investment, but it is less costly than losing our edge in the Pacific. America’s military advantage in Asia has guaranteed the region’s decades-long peace to our great benefit. China is not monolithic. Many Chinese do not want to engage in a military competition with the United States. They would rather their government spend more on pensions and healthcare for an aging population. Our job is to strengthen their hand by demonstrating to China’s leaders that continuing down the path of military competition is too costly.

#### Extinction

Cheong 2k – East Asia Correspondent (Ching Cheong, The Straits Times, “No one gains in war over Taiwan,” 6-25-2000, Lexis-Nexis Universe)

A cross-strait conflict, even at the lowest end of the intensity scale, will suffice to truncate, if not to reverse, the steep GNP growth trends of the past few years.Other than the quantifiable losses from disrupted trade flows, there is also the longer-term damage to consider.¶For example, it took Taiwan almost three decades to establish itself as the third largest producer of information technology (IT) products in the world. It is now the island's single largest foreign exchange earner.The Sept 21 earthquake last year demonstrated the risk involved in Taiwan's dependence on the IT industry.A few days of power blackouts disrupted chip-manufacturing operations on the island, which in turn sent prices of these components soaring worldwide.Not surprisingly, a scramble followed for alternative sources of supply.¶A blockade lasting three months will devastate the industry in Taiwan.Similarly, it has taken China more than two decades to establish itself as the second largest recipient of private direct investment.In recent years, such investment has amounted to more than 20 per cent of China's total capital formation.A capital outflow will follow if there is trouble across the strait.Other than China and Taiwan, Japan's economy is likely to be hurt too if the blockade disrupts its "life-line" -the sea lane through which flows its supplies of oil and other commodities.Though no physical loss will be incurred, the blockade will force up prices across the board as Japan is so dependent on this sea lane.The Asean region stands to gain in the short run.Those with strong IT industries, like Singapore and Malaysia, will carve a big slice from what was previously Taiwan's share.Similarly, as investment flees China, the Asean countries might be able to intercept this flow and benefit thereby.¶Politically, the blockade is likely to provoke Sino-phobia in the region.Japan's rightwing forces will seize this golden opportunity to demand a revision of the post-war Constitution prohibiting its rearmament.Asean countries having territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea will beef up their defence budgets.Ethnic Chinese population in these countries may have to contend with increased suspicion or worse as Sino-phobia rises.The US stands to gain. So long as its stays on the sidelines, it does not lose the Chinese market. At the same time its defence industry gains as countries in the region start stocking up on arms in anticipation of trouble.DESTROYING THE TAIWAN MILITARYTHE medium intensity scenario postulates a situation in which Beijing wages a war against Taiwan.The objective here is to obliterate its military capability which is seen as underpinning its independence movement.The outcome: Taiwan is brought to its knees but only after widespread death and destruction have been inflicted on the island and the coastal provinces of China.In this scenario, the US while feeling obliged to supportTaiwan militarily is not party to a full-scale war with China.Washington's primary concern would be to keep it to a "limited war" to prevent hostilities from spinning out of control. Limited though it may be, the war will set back the economies of China and Taiwan by at least two to three decades.All the short-term gains enjoyed by the Asean countries in the low-intensity scenario will be nullified as the conflict intensifies.In this medium-intensity scenario, no one gains.Politically, all countries are forced to take sides.This decision is particularly hard to make in those countries having a sizeable ethnic-Chinese population.THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable.Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war.Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation.¶In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire.And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order.¶With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq.In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war?According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat.In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons.If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons.The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option.A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons.Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it.He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

### 2ac – china soi

#### US influence high now – Obama trip.

Sabatini 13. [Christopher, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director for policy of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, "Guest post: At last, US recognition of its national interest in Latin America" Financial Times -- blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/05/13/guest-post-at-last-us-recognition-of-its-national-interest-in-latin-america/#axzz2TaN36YjO]

It’s become a common refrain: US influence in the western hemisphere is on the wane. Whether measured by the US’s commercial weight in the region or its ability to dictate the terms of debate on everything from Cuba to narcotics, there is little doubt that the “Colossus to the North” is confronting a more diverse and at times contentious hemisphere.¶ President Obama’s trip to Mexico and Costa Rica in May and Vice President Joe Biden’s plans to travel to Brazil, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago reflect – at long last – the US’s recognition of its national interest in the rising economic and diplomatic powers of its hemisphere and its capacity to influence its current and potential allies.¶ Policy in the first four years of the Obama administration was marked by nice-sounding rhetoric of partnership and failed efforts to reach out to wayward countries – Bolivia and Ecuador. The Obama administration believed it could win back the region simply by not being the Bush administration and by dedicating high-level diplomatic resources to woo Ecuador – having Secretary of State Hillary Clinton give a major policy speech in Quito – and by negotiating the re-entry of the US Agency for International Development in Bolivia. The first effort was rewarded when Ecuador granted asylum at its embassy in London to Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, and when it led a regional assault to undermine the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights this year. The second effort failed on May 1, when Bolivian President Evo Morales said he was kicking USAID out of his country, again.¶ The region has changed, and with it the ability of the US to influence individual countries simply by leveraging its development dollars or its regional prestige.¶ That’s not to say, however, that the US is irrelevant or lacks resources. Despite the rhetoric of populist leaders in Ecuador and Venezuela (and the assumptions of many US commentators), popular opinion in Latin America toward the US remains positive. In central America between 70 and 80 per cent of citizens have favourable opinions of the US; even in Venezuela and Ecuador over 60 per cent of citizens are predisposed to liking the yanquis.¶ In the economic realm, across the hemisphere, the US has declined in absolute and in some cases in relative terms as an exporter to Latin American and as a market for its exports – but not by as much as many media accounts would have you believe. For example, in Brazil in 1995, the US provided 21 per cent of imports and bought 21 per cent of exports; by 2011 that had declined to 15 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. It was the same in Chile, where imports from the US dropped from 25 per cent in 1995 to 20 per cent by 2011, and the US market for Chilean exports contracted from 14 per cent to 11 per cent in the same period.¶ Yes, Latin America has joined global markets. But the US remains central, especially for countries with the fastest rates of growth and the greatest long-term potential. That’s no coincidence. Unlike China, the US is a market for Latin America’s higher-end manufactured goods. Mexico has been been particularly good in seizing the advantage of the US market provided by NAFTA to move up the value chain and is now exporting automobiles and aeronautic equipment globally.¶ The US is now seeking to play this economic card – the power of its market. The countries that President Obama and Vice President Biden have selected to visit and the message they have delivered underscore both the importance of those countries to the US and a new-found effort to buttress diplomacy with economic promise.¶ Key to this will be negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It will unite 11 countries – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam – representing a combined GDP of almost $21tn (about 30 per cent of world GDP) and $4.4tn in exports of goods and services. The effort has attracted the attention of Japan and South Korea – which, if they join, would bring the the agreement to a total of 40 per cent of global GDP – and Colombia. It’s also provoking envy in Brazil.¶ So it should. Although Brazil secured the election of Roberto Azevêdo as head of the World Trade Organization, Brazil has only a slim stake in the global free trade economy. One of five members of Mercosur, the southern cone customs union (which last year, curiously, admitted Venezuela), Brazil’s free trade agenda has been tied to that of its sometimes less liberally-inclined neighbours, particularly Argentina. Mercosur, which, as a customs union, requires that member countries negotiate free trade agreements as a bloc, has FTAs with countries or blocs that represent a mere $692bn of GDP. Compare that with the FTAs that Chile has with countries and blocs with a combined GDP of $53tn or Peru, whose FTAs link it to economies with a combined GDP of $50tn.¶ This week, it was announced that both President Sebastian Piñera of Chile and President Ollanta Humala of Peru will visit Washington to meet President Obama in June. Clearly, the US has seen free trade and its domestic market as a card to play with emerging economic powers in the region, while sending a subtle message to the others that they are free to join in if they like, or wallow in the past.

#### Congress passed THA – solves the impacts

O’Neill 12/20/13 – Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies (Shannon, “U.S. Passes the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement with Mexico”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/12/20/u-s-passes-the-transboundary-hydrocarbon-agreement-with-mexico/)//javi

Tacked onto the bipartisan budget, the U.S. Congress passed the long-awaited Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement with Mexico. Signed in 2012 by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa, it lays the groundwork for U.S. and Mexican cooperation across some 1.5 million acres of shared oil and natural gas resources in the Gulf of Mexico. The agreement creates guidelines for determining the scope of the deep-water fields and how companies acting on behalf of each country can work together to access these reserves, and creates mechanisms for dispute resolution and for safety and environmental protection.

#### Not zero sum –

#### a. Latin America will balance not pick – Brazil proves Chinese influence inevitable.

Cerna 11. [Michael, staff @ CRC, "China's growing presence in Latin America: Implications for US and Chinese presence in the region" China Research Center -- Vol 10 No 1 -- www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]

With both the U.S. and China jockeying for influence in a world where political power relations are changing, Latin America has the most to gain. The primary concern for the region is that it does not become a battle ground for a neo-Cold War between China and the U.S. Brazil already has clearly stated its concerns regarding Chinese influence. Yet, despite this tension, Brazil is now too reliant on China to turn away from the path on which Lula set the country. Agricultural exports to China are crucial to Brazil’s economy. Lula’s Brazil supported China politically and made clear moves away from the United States. Now Rouseff’s administration has welcomed Barack Obama with open arms. With all three major actors going through stages that could influence the global economic and political landscape – China implementing its 12th five-year plan, Brazil cementing itself as a prominent world player and the U.S. still recovering from a terrible financial crisis – this dynamic relationship is one that deserves close attention from all those concerned with the future of China-U.S. relations. Where Brazil and the rest of Latin America were once looking for an alternative to U.S. influence and found China, the region may now be looking to the U.S. to strike a balance with growing Chinese influence. With the global ambitions of Latin America, namely Brazil, it is essential to maintain close ties with both the United States and China. The world will be watching.

#### b. China does not want to get involved

Shixue 11/3/11 – professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Vice President of Chinese Association of Latin American Studies (Jiang, “The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations”, China US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-sino-latin-american-relations/)//javi

Finally, China does not wish to be used as a “card” against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations. It is encouraging to see that in the U.S. there are other voices commenting about Sino-Latin American relations. For instance, Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, also said, “Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster [economic] performance.” In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, in June 2008, Daniel P. Erikson, then a senior researcher at the Inter-American Dialogue, pointed out that “while China’s expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that China’s involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and well-being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood.” Erikson added, “China’s engagement in Latin America is not yet a major concern for the United States, and there are few signs of any real frictions between the two countries on that score.”

#### US-China relations are superficial – cooperation’s always fails, but issues don’t escalate

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Shortly after US President Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard sealed the bilateral defense deal in November 2011 under which 2500 US marines will be stationed in Australia came Obama's announcement on January 5 2012 of the new strategic defense guidance entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defence. The document claims that China's rise might have impact on the US economy and security, and that countries such as China and Iran continue to pursue asymmetric means of countering US power projection capabilities.1 Both the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense refuted these claims, arguing that not a shred of evidence exists to support such wild accusations.2 Many media reports nevertheless argue that competition between the United States and China amounts to a new Cold War.3 This article discusses characteristics and trends in Sino–US relations, and in this connection answers the specific question: How do the characteristics of Sino–US relations affect trends in their bilateral ties? How much longer can Sino–US relations continue to follow current trends? Where will strategic competition between China and the United States lead? Different Views of Trends in Sino–US Relations The conflict between China and the United States at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Talks gave rise to the mainstream view within US academic circles that Sino–US ties are worsening. Paul Pedrozo and Seth Cropsy argued that competition between China and the United States was a necessary outcome of China's naval modernization.4 Robert Kaplan, meanwhile, contended that China's growing military capacities and economic power made heightened tensions in Sino–US relations inevitable.5 Thomas Christensen holds that relations between the two countries will come under stress as China shifts towards a hard-line policy with respect to its sovereignty and territorial claims.6 While in 2010 US academics blamed China for the deterioration in Sino–US relations, Chinese scholars regarded the worsening of ties in 2011 as obviously a result of the Obama Administration's beefing-up of its pivot strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Scholars are nonetheless split on whether the pivot constitutes a strategy adjustment or a tactical adjustment. Those arguing the former predict long-term competition between China and the United States; those who see it as a tactical adjustment regard the deterioration in Sino–US ties as temporary, that is to say, Obama's pivot strategy in the Asia Pacific region is part of his 2012 electoral strategy that he will drop after the elections and revert to his 2009 policy towards China. We identify three distinct views regarding the future of Sino–US relations. Pessimists argue that Sino–US relations are entering a new Cold War period. Henry C. K. Liu suggests that a new Cold War is brewing between China and the United States, but that it is more geopolitically framed than ideologically based, albeit couched in residual ideological polemic.7 William Jones goes as far as to expect conflict between China and the United States to culminate in a third world war.8 Yongnian Zheng also considers that East Asia is headed towards a new Cold War dynamic that has prompted developments on the Korean Peninsula.9 Mearsheimer holds that it is not possible for China to rise peacefully. He argues that ‘if China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China's neighbours, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain China's power.’10 Lawrence S. Wittner even infers the possibility of nuclear war.11 Those more optimistic about the future of Sino–US relations are primarily Chinese scholars, who generally believe that it is possible for China and the United states to avoid a new Cold War. Wu Jianmin argues that China will not as a matter of national policy enact the role of a hegemon, but follow the historical trend of peace,

 development and cooperation and absolutely reject war, competition and conflict. Under no circumstances, therefore, will China enter into a new Cold War with the United States.12 Wang Jisi has long held that while China and the United States will not become allies, nor will a crisis in their ties arise of an extent amounting to Cold War.13 Wang argues that the structural contradictions that appeared between China and the United States in 2010 are attributable to the narrowing gap in their respective comparative capacities which, conversely, have driven them further apart in terms of mutual understanding. Major issues such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and the exchange rate have had escalating negative impact on Sino–US ties and created higher levels of strategic suspicion rather than mutual strategic trust.14 This implies that as long as the United States and China bolster strategic trust they can prevent their bilateral relationship from slipping into a Cold War scenario. As distinct from these pessimists and optimists, we, together with a number of colleagues, argue that United States’ pivot towards the Asia Pacific represents a strategy adjustment. Competition between China and the United States will consequently grow, but this does not meet the criteria for a Cold War.15 We characterize the United States and China as ‘superficial friends’, and argue that as such they have a highly volatile relationship, apparent in shifts between good and bad periods.16 As, at least for the meantime, China and the United States have no desire to abandon their strategy of superficial friendship, the conditions necessary for a Cold War are not present. For example, although Obama supports a new defense strategy whose focus is on containing China, he purposely avoided any mention of China at the time he announced this new policy at the Department of Defense.17 Moreover, four days after the announcement, Obama sent Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to China to seek Beijing's support of US sanctions against Iran.18 As China and the United States will not for the time being abandon their superficial friendship strategy, Sino–US relations will hence not teeter towards Cold War.

### 2ac – unemployment

#### No pass – repbulicans block

McLeod 1/30

[GLORIA NEGRETE McLEOD, January 30, 2014, “Congress needs to act right away to extend unemployment benefits”, <http://www.fontanaheraldnews.com/articles/2014/01/31/opinion/doc52e9e6310eff0792908783.txt>] AS

House Republicans have blocked multiple efforts to bring up legislation to extend the unemployment insurance benefit on the House Floor. Senate Republicans also voted twice to block legislation to extend the benefit, including an 11-month extension that would scale back the program substantially and offset the costs.

#### Obama doesn’t push – not priority

Zornick 1/20

[GEORGE ZORNICK, January 20, 2014, “Unemployment extension will need citizen action”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/01/20/unemployment-extension-will-need-citizen-action/>] AS

It’s also unlikely to be an all-consuming priority for the president. To be clear, the White House has been quite aggressive on this issue—President Obama spoke on it several times, including at a January event with several long-term jobless Americans. But as Dana Milbank noted last week, on the same day House Democrats were making a public push for a vote on extended benefits, Obama was in North Carolina talking about manufacturing. I hate “Green Lanternism” and empty failure-to-lead approaches by pundits as much as anyone, but it’s a simple fact that extending jobless benefits won’t be Obama’s singular focus with so many other issues going on.

#### Obama considers climate bill a top priority

Tapper, 1-30 – the Lead with Jake Tapper quoting Obama (Jake, “Obama: "In No Way Are My Expectations Or My Ambitions Diminished"” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/01/30/obama\_in\_no\_way\_are\_my\_expectations\_or\_my\_ambitions\_diminished.html)djm

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, part of it is we got a lot of that stuff done. We've got, uh, in this country, a health care, uh, reform that has already signed up millions of people and make sure that everybody who is watching, anybody who already has insurance, will not be dropped because of a pre-existing condition. And if they don't have health insurance, they can get it on HealthCare.gov. We have made enormous strides on the education front, changing our student loan programs. And millions more young people get, uh, student loans. And so part of what's happened is that checklist that I had when I came into office, we have passed a lot of that and we're implementing a lot of it. Where we haven't, we've taken some administrative actions. So on climate change, which has to be a top priority for all of us, uh, we are going to make sure that one of the biggest sources of the pollutants that are causing climate change, uh, are regulated by, uh, by regulations on exist tpower plants. And that's a big piece of business. And so in no way are my expectations diminished, or my ambitions diminished, but what is obviously true is we've got divided government right now. Uh, the House Republicans, in particular, have had difficulty rallying around any agenda, much less mine. And in that kind of environment, what I don't want is the American people to think that the only way for us to make big change is through, uh, legislation. We've all got to work together to continue to provide opportunity for the next generation.

#### The House won’t vote and EPA thumps

Bump 1/2 [Philip, “Congresx’ 2014 Could Be Even Worse Than Its 2013,” <http://www.thewire.com/politics/2014/01/congress-2014-could-be-even-lamer-its-2013/356632/>, ALB]

When the Senate returns on Monday, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid is planning on introducing a bill to extend unemployment benefits to the long-term unemployed, according to The Hill. 1.3 million people lost benefits last month when they were allowed to expire. Reid's skeptical, however, that the House will take up the measure, calling the body a "black hole of legislation." The House has its own priorities, starting the year on Tuesday with a push to block the EPA's environmental regulations — which likely wouldn't go anywhere in the Senate.

**PC is spent early—**

**Beckmann and Kumar 11**. [Matthew, Department of Poli Sci, Vimal, UC Irvine, “How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” Journal of Theoretical Politics -- SAGE Journals Database]

This paper aims to demystify the White House’s legislative strategies, both their logic and their effects. Developing a non-cooperative game in which the president allocates scarce ‘political capital’ to induce changes in legislators’ behavior, we deduce two lobbying strategies White House officials may execute and, in turn, investigate their impact on the laws that result. Interestingly, we theorize that presidents’ **foremost influence** comes from bargaining with congressional leaders over policy alternatives before bills reach the floor, not bargaining with pivotal voters for their support once they do. Precisely because so much of the presidents’ influence comes in the legislative earlygame (rather than the endgame), we theorize that typical roll-call-based tests of presidents’ legislative influence have missed most of it.

**Legislation is irrelevant—**

Philip **Locker 10**, editor of the newspaper Justice 2010 <http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article10.php?id=15>

Shortly after winning re-election last fall, President Bush declared that he had earned "political capital, and now I intend to spend it." One year later that bank account has been **significantly drained**, if not depleted and mired in debt. "This is not what the Republicans envisioned 11 months ago, when they were returned to office as a powerful one-party government with a big agenda and - it seemed - little to fear from the opposition." (NY Times, 9/28/05) In the face of Hurricane Katrina, a storm of scandals, the deepening catastrophe in Iraq, skyrocketing gas prices, and stagnating living standards for working people, support for Bush and the Republicans has plummeted.

#### Political capital theory isn’t true – gun control proves and their empirics are the exception rather than the rule

1. arm twisting fails
2. horse-trading isn’t real
3. Obama perceives it as such
4. He doesn’t try to use it

Kumar 5/24/13 (Anita, White House Correspondent for McClatchy Washington Bureau, Formerly worked for the Washington Post, "After Failing on Gun Legislation Obama Learning Limits of His Power")

The cheering crowds that helped vault him into a second term in the White House mean little, if anything, back in Washington. A close look at his most recent defeat – a series of proposals intended to curb gun violence – shows that election popularity does not automatically translate into legislative success. Nor do campaign-like efforts to win a vote in Congress. Obama put more effort into the proposals than he has most issues, but he still suffered one of his biggest legislative defeats.¶ The defeat illustrates a key truth – for all their power, presidents rarely succeed in manipulating votes on Capitol Hill. If anything, their abilities to twist arms have grown even more limited in recent years. Strained budgets leave them no extra money or pet projects to offer lawmakers in return for votes. And Obama’s detached personality and short history in Washington make him even less likely to wheel and deal with lawmakers.¶ “There’s not much presidents can do to change votes. It’s mostly a myth,” said George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “It’s never been that way and it’s less so now.”¶ His own election victory still fresh in his mind, Obama thought he had a clear path to bend Congress to his will after the horror of a mass shooting at an elementary school in Newtown, Conn., in December. His goal: the first significant new controls on guns in a generation.¶ He tapped Vice President Joe Biden to lead a task force to examine gun laws. Biden spent a month speaking to more than 200 organizations on all sides of the issue, from crime victims to religious leaders, law enforcement organizations to gun manufacturers.¶ Obama unveiled his sweeping package of executive actions and proposed legislation in January. He immediately began trying to sell it.¶ By the standards of a campaign, he did everything right.¶ Obama and Biden gave more than 30 speeches, interviews and online chats, oftentimes with families of gun victims at their side.¶ First lady Michelle Obama made a rare foray into the debate by delivering an emotional speech in her hometown of Chicago.¶ Obama’s political organization, Organizing for Action, held dozens of events, including candlelight vigils, rallies and meetings across the nation pushing the legislation.¶ Obama flew Newtown families to Washington to lobby senators and turned over his radio address for the first time to the parents of a slain child.¶ He did not win support for a proposal to renew a ban on assault weapons or to limit ammunition in clips. But support for greater background checks for gun purchases topped 90 percent in the polls. If it were an election with voters choosing whether to pass background checks, Obama would have won a landslide.¶ But it was not an either-or choice. Congress could choose to do nothing.¶ In March and April, Obama and Biden spoke to nearly 30 senators in 45 meetings or phone calls, according to the White House. The president stressed gun control proposals at a pair of dinners with Republican senators. In the final days before the vote, Obama’s chief of staff, Denis McDonough, visited an undecided Democratic senator, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, but failed to convince her to vote for the background check legislation.¶ New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, founder of Mayors Against Illegal Guns and one of the nation’s most prominent gun control advocates, said he and Biden divvied up a list of senators to call in the hopes of convincing them that backing the legislation would not hurt them in their next election.¶ “I’m thoroughly convinced that he and the president and this whole administration are committed as they could possibly be to help end the scourge of gun violence,” Bloomberg said.¶ It wasn’t enough.¶ Last month, the Democratic-controlled Senate defeated all significant gun proposals sought by Obama after some lawmakers bristled at being pushed by Obama.¶ Obama, along with gun control advocates, insist they’ll try again, at least for the proposal to expand background checks to private and Internet sales. But the initial defeat underscored the limits of presidential power and suggested Obama faces major challenges for the duration of his presidency.¶ “We actually thought he and the vice president handled this perfectly. They handled this quite deftly,” said Matt Bennett, co-founder of Third Way, a think tank, who served in the Clinton White House. “The gun issues are about as hard as it gets.”¶ “The president worked really hard on this issue,” said Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y. “He put political capital on the line. He made it one of his centerpieces of his State of the Union address and he went all around the country to try and rally support.”¶ So what happened?¶ For one, Obama and his allies often staged events in states that had been sites of mass shootings such as Illinois, Connecticut or Virginia, instead of states where senators were wavering on the issue.¶ For another, his high-profile push may have cost as many votes as it won, given how polarizing modern presidents have become.¶ Sen. John McCain of Arizona, one of four Republicans who voted for expanded background checks, said a better model of leadership would be Obama’s role on the proposed rewrite of the nation’s immigration laws. On that, Obama has expressed support but stayed out of the way to let members of Congress negotiate among themselves. “I think his role has been very appropriate, exactly appropriate,” he said of Obama’s approach on immigration.¶ Finally, Obama might have relied more on personal talks with senators and less on the bully pulpit, presidential scholars said.¶ “As soon as Obama jumps in, it makes it hard for Republicans to get behind it,” said Robert Spitzer, a political scientist at State University of New York at Cortland who has written extensively on gun control. “Obama could have done more on the inside game.”¶ But Dan Gross, president of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, said the importance of public speeches is misunderstood. They aren’t, he said, designed to convince more Americans to favor proposals backed by Obama, but rather to convince them to lobby Congress.¶ If the use of presidential rhetoric is misunderstood, the power of the presidency itself is often overstated.¶ Even Lyndon B. Johnson, whose domineering personality and negotiating skills helped fuel his reputation for helping push through major legislation, benefitted from large Democratic majorities in Congress and broad popular support in the wake of John F. Kennedy’s assassination.¶ There have been instances where presidents have helped get legislation passed, though they are the exception, not the rule.¶ Bill Clinton offered to support Republicans who voted for the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush pushed through prescription drug coverage in a rare middle-of-the-night vote in the House of Representatives by making last-minute phone calls to lawmakers.¶ But Obama’s effort to lobby or socialize with lawmakers has been sporadic, and some of his recent dinners came after the gun votes were all but locked up.¶ Also, he has little to offer the lawmakers.¶ While Washington was once a place where lawmakers openly traded votes with goodies from the White House – a president’s attendance at an event or a project in their home state – it’s not like that anymore.¶ The practice of offering so-called earmarks – pet projects for lawmakers tucked into appropriations bills – fell out of favor following years of criticism by watchdog groups, constituents and even some lawmakers themselves. And even if it hadn’t, the money for many of those projects has dried up as the economy took a downturn and the government slashed budgets.¶ “There’s not a lot he can give,” said John Burke, a political science professor at the University of Vermont who studies the presidency.¶ Still, some say, Obama should have offered senators appointments to boards or behind-the-scenes assistance with fundraising – items that even senators from conservative states who want to keep their distance from the president might want.¶ But in a recent wide-ranging news conference, Obama pushed back on the notion that he could get Congress to – as he called it – “behave.”¶ “I can urge them to,” he said. “I can put pressure on them. I can, you know, rally the American people. . . . But ultimately they themselves are going to have to say, we want to do the right thing.”

#### Security innovation is spun by the Pentagon to conceal controversial portions in Congress

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For their part, the “Army and Defense Information Systems Agency referred inquiries about their proposed cyber spending to department-level officials.” And “Navy officials said they could not provide a top-line budget figure, since funding that supports Navy cybersecurity activities is scattered across several line items, as well as multiple programs, organizations and commands.” As Sternstein points out, while “the area surrounding ‘cybersecurity’ funding is gray … the various interpretations of cybersecurity spending translate into real-world financial and national security costs, budget and technology.” Defense Department spokeswoman April Cunningham told NextGov, that the Air Force “included things that we, [at the department's office of the chief information officer] categorize as IT infrastructure, or other activities–not directly information assurance.” “According to the department,” Sternstein writes, “information assurance consists of five programs, including public key infrastructure, or digital certificates, as well as defense industrial base cybersecurity for private sector assets that support the military.” Cunningham said that “activities at the Air Force and other services that Defense considers to be ‘information assurance-cybersecurity’ are captured in the total $3.2 billion figure.” And “based on this formula” the Army is seeking $432 million and the Navy are lusting after $347 million in FY2012. However, other Defense agencies “including DISA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency–are asking for a cumulative $1.6 billion. Details on proposed cyber spending at all Pentagon components are shared with Congress in a classified budget book, she said.” Which means, given the Pentagon’s propensity to quietly hide their most controversial programs within the dark folds of the black budget, Congress, let alone the American people, really have no idea what such programs entail, who benefits from black contract outlays and ultimately, how they’ll be deployed. NextGov reported that the revised budget request “also includes funding for noninformation assurance activities” that the Pentagon claims “are integral to the military’s cyber posture, specifically cyber operations, security innovations and forensics.”

#### PC fails – ideological interests and lobby groups prevent passage and causes policy ineffectiveness

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The first is that, relative to other liberal democracies, the judiciary and the legislature (including the roles played by the two major political parties) continue to play outsized roles in American government at the expense of Executive Branch bureaucracies. Americans’ traditional distrust of government thus leads to judicial solutions for administrative problems. Over time this has become a very expensive and inefficient way to manage administrative requirements. The second is that the accretion of interest group and lobbying influences has distorted democratic processes and eroded the ability of the government to operate effectively. What biologists label kin selection and reciprocal altruism (the favoring of family and friends with whom one has exchanged favors) are the two natural modes of human sociability. It is to these types of relationships that people revert when modern, impersonal government breaks down. The third is that under conditions of ideological polarization in a federal governance structure, the American system of checks and balances, originally designed to prevent the emergence of too strong an executive authority, has become a vetocracy. The decision system has become too porous—too democratic—for its own good, giving too many actors the means to stifle adjustments in public policy. We need stronger mechanisms to force collective decisions but, because of the judicialization of government and the outsized role of interest groups, we are unlikely to acquire such mechanisms short of a systemic crisis. In that sense these three structural characteristics have become intertwined. The three core categories of political institutions—state, rule of law and accountability—are embodied in the three branches of government of a modern liberal democracy: the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. The United States, with its longstanding tradition of distrust of government power, has always emphasized the means of constraint—the judiciary and legislature—over the state in its institutional priorities. It has done so to the point that American politics during the 19th century has been characterized as a “state of courts and parties” where government functions that in Europe would be performed by an executive branch bureaucracy were performed in the United States by judges and elected representatives instead.1 The creation of a modern, centralized, merit-based bureaucracy capable of exercising jurisdiction over the whole territory of the country only began after the 1883 passage of the Pendleton Act. The United States began to look more like a modern European state by the end of World War II, but in terms of both the size and scope of government the United States remained, and still remains, an outlier. Both government expenditures as a percentage of GDP and total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are smaller in the United States than in most other OECD countries. While the American state is smaller than the state in most European countries, the absolute growth of the scope of the American state over the past half-century has nevertheless been rapid. But the apparently irreversible increase in the scope of American government in the 20th century has masked the decay in its quality. The deterioration in the quality of government has in turn made it much more difficult, for example, to get large fiscal deficits under control. The quantity, or scope, problem will not be addressable unless the quality, or strength, problem is addressed at the same time. The decay in the quality of American government has to do directly with the American penchant for a state of “courts and parties”, which has returned to center stage in the past fifty years. The courts and legislature have increasingly usurped many of the proper functions of the executive, making the operation of the government as a whole both incoherent and inefficient. The steadily increasing judicialization of functions that in other developed democracies are handled by administrative bureaucracies has led to an explosion of costly litigation, slow decision-making and highly inconsistent enforcement of laws. The courts, instead of being constraints on government, have become alternative instruments for the expansion of government. Ironically, out of a fear of empowering “big government”, the United States has ended up with a government that is very large, but that is actually less accountable because it is largely in the hands of unelected courts. Meanwhile, interest groups, having lost their pre-Pendleton Act ability to directly corrupt legislatures through bribery and the feeding of clientelistic machines, have found new, perfectly legal means of capturing and controlling legislators. These interest groups distort both taxes and spending, and raise overall deficit levels through their ability to manipulate the budget in their favor. They use the courts sometimes to achieve this and other rentier advantages, but they also undermine the quality of public administration through the multiple and often contradictory mandates they induce Congress to support—and a relatively weak Executive Branch is usually in a poor position to stop them. All of this has led to a crisis of representation. Ordinary people feel that their supposedly democratic government no longer reflects their interests but instead caters to those of a variety of shadowy elites. What is peculiar about this phenomenon is that this crisis in representativeness has occurred in large part because of reforms designed to make the system more democratic. Indeed, both phenomena—the judicialization of administration and the spread of interest-group influence—tend to undermine trust in government, which tends to perpetuate and feed on itself. Distrust of executive agencies leads demands for more legal checks on administration, which further reduces the quality and effectiveness of government by reducing bureaucratic autonomy. It may seem paradoxical, but reduced bureaucratic autonomy is what in turn leads to rigid, rule-bound, un-innovative and incoherent government. Ordinary people may blame bureaucrats for these problems (as if bureaucrats enjoy working under a host of detailed rules, court orders, earmarks and complex, underfunded mandates coming from courts and legislators over which they have no control). But they are mistaken to do so; the problem with American government is less an unaccountable bureaucracy than an overall system that allocates what should properly be administrative powers to courts and political parties. In short, the problems of American government flow from a structural imbalance between the strength and competence of the state, on the one hand, and the institutions that were originally designed to constrain the state, on the other. There is too much law and too much “democracy”, in the form of legislative intervention, relative to American state capacity. Some history can make this assertion clearer. One of the great turning points in 20th-century American history was the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, which overturned on constitutional grounds the 19th-century Plessy v. Ferguson case that had upheld legal segregation. This decision was the starting point for the civil rights movement, which, over the following decade, succeeded in dismantling the formal barriers to racial equality and guaranteed the rights of African Americans and other minorities. The courts had cut their teeth earlier over union organizing rights; new social rules based on those rights provided a model for subsequent social movements in the late 20th century, from environmental protection to women’s rights to consumer safety to gay marriage. So familiar is this heroic narrative to Americans that they seldom realize how peculiar it is. The primary mover in the Brown case was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a private voluntary association. The initiative had to come from private groups, of course, because state governments in the South were controlled by pro-segregation forces. The NAACP pressed the case on appeal all the way to the Supreme Court. What was arguably one of the most important changes in American public policy thus came about not because Congress, as the representative of the American people, voted for it but because private individuals litigated through the court system to change the rules. Later developments, like the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts, were the result of congressional action, but even in these cases enforcement was carried out by courts at the behest of private parties. No other liberal democracy proceeds in this fashion. All European countries have gone through similar changes to the legal status of racial and ethnic minorities, and women and gays in the second half of the 20th century. But in Britain, France or Germany, the same results have been achieved through a national justice ministry acting on behalf of a parliamentary majority. The legislative rule changes might well have been driven by public pressure, but they would have been carried out by the government itself, not by private parties acting in conjunction with the judiciary. The origins of the American approach lie in the historical sequence by which its three sets of institutions evolved. In France, Denmark and Germany, law came first, followed by a modern state, and only later by democracy. The pattern of development in the United States, by contrast, was one in which the tradition of English Common Law was embedded early on in the Thirteen Colonies, followed by democracy after independence, and only later by development of a modern state. Indeed, some have argued that the American state is Tudor in its basic structure, that arrangement having been frozen into its institutions at the time of the original American settlement.2 Whatever the reasons, the American state has always been weaker and less capable than its European or Asian counterparts. And note that distrust of government is not a conservative monopoly; many on the Left worry about the capture of national institutions by powerful corporate interests and prefer to achieve their desired policy outcomes by means of grassroots activism via the courts. The result in post-civil rights movement America is what the legal scholar Robert A. Kagan labels a system of “adversarial legalism.” While lawyers have always played an outsized role in American public life, their role expanded dramatically during the turbulent years of social change in the 1960s and 1970s. Congress passed more than two dozen major pieces of civil rights and environmental legislation in this period, covering issues from product safety to toxic waste cleanup to private pension funds to occupational safety and health. This constituted a huge expansion of the regulatory state founded in the Progressive Era and New Deal, which American businesses and conservatives love to complain about today. What makes this system so unwieldy is not the level of regulation as such, but the highly legalistic way in which it is pursued. Congress mandated the creation of an alphabet soup of new Federal agencies—the EEOC, EPA, OSHA and so forth—but it was not willing to cleanly delegate to these bodies the kind of rule-making authority and enforcement power that European or Japanese state institutions enjoy. What it did instead was to turn over to the courts responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the law. Congress deliberately encouraged litigation by expanding standing (that is, who has a right to sue) to ever wider circles of parties, many of whom were only distantly affected by a particular rule. For example, Federal courts rewrote Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, “turning a weak law focusing primarily on intentional discrimination into a bold mandate to compensate for past discrimination.” Instead of providing a Federal bureaucracy with adequate enforcement power, “the key move of Republicans in the Senate . . . was to substantially privatize the prosecutorial function. They made private lawsuits the dominant mode of Title VII enforcement, creating an engine that would, in the years to come, produce levels of private enforcement litigation beyond their imagining.”3 Across the board, private enforcement cases grew from fewer than a hundred per year in the late 1960s to more than 22,000 by the late 1990s. Expenditures on lawyers increased six-fold during the same period. Not only did the direct costs of litigation soar; other, more indirect costs mounted due to the increasing slowness of the process and uncertainties as to outcomes. Thus, conflicts that in Sweden or Japan would be solved through quiet consultations between interested parties through the bureaucracy are fought out through formal litigation in the American court system. This has several unfortunate consequences for public administration, among them “uncertainty, procedural complexity, redundancy, lack of finality, [and] high transaction costs.” By estranging enforcement from the bureaucracy, the system also becomes far less accountable. In a European parliamentary system, a new rule or regulation promulgated by a bureaucracy is subject to scrutiny and debate, and can be changed through political action at the next election. In the United States, by contrast, policy is made piecemeal in a highly specialized and therefore non-transparent process by judges who are unelected and usually serve with lifetime tenure. In addition, if one party loses a legislative battle, it can continue the fight into the implementation stage through the courts. This is what happened in the case of the Affordable Care Act, or “Obamacare.” The explosion of opportunities for litigation gave access and therefore power to many formerly excluded groups, beginning with African Americans. It is for this reason that litigation and the right to sue have been jealously guarded on the progressive Left. (It is also part of the reason why trial lawyers form an interest group closely wedded to the Democratic Party.) But these entail huge costs in terms of the quality of public policy. Kagan illustrates this with the case of the dredging of Oakland Harbor. During the 1970s the Port of Oakland initiated plans to dredge the harbor in anticipation of the new, larger classes of container ships then coming into service. The plan, however, had to be approved by a host of governmental agencies, including the Army Corps of Engineers, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the EPA, and their counterparts in the State of California. A succession of alternative plans for disposing of toxic materials dredged from the harbor was challenged in the courts, and each successive plan entailed prolonged delays and higher costs. The reaction of the EPA to these lawsuits was to retreat into a defensive crouch and go passive. The final plan to proceed with the dredging was not forthcoming until 1994, at an ultimate cost many times the original estimates. Other examples can be found across the entire range of activities undertaken by the U.S. government. The result is that the courts have interacted with Congress to bring about huge expansions in the scope of government, but without an increase in the effectiveness of government. For one example among many hundred, special education programs for handicapped and disabled children have mushroomed in size and cost since the mid-1970s as a result of an expansive mandate legislated by Congress in 1974. This mandate was in turn built on earlier findings by Federal district courts that special needs children had “rights”, which are much harder than mere interests to trade off against other goods, or to subject to cost-benefit criteria. Congress, moreover, threw the interpretation of the mandate and its enforcement back to the courts, which are singularly poor institutions for operating within budget constraints or making complex political tradeoffs. The solution to this problem is not necessarily the one advocated by many conservatives and libertarians, which is to simply eliminate regulation and close down bureaucracies. The ends government is serving, such as ensuring civil rights and environmental protection, are often important ones that private markets will not satisfy if left to their own devices. Conservatives often fail to see that it is the very distrust of government that leads the American system into a courts-based approach to regulation that is far less efficient than that found in democracies with stronger executive branches. But American progressives and liberals have been complicit in creating this system as well. They distrusted the bureaucracies that had produced segregated school systems in the South, or had been captured by big business interests, so they were happy to inject unelected judges into social policymaking when legislators proved insufficiently supportive. Everyone had his reasons, and those reasons have added up to massive dysfunction. This decentralized, legalistic approach to administration dovetails with the other notable feature of the American political system: its openness to the influence of interest groups. Interest groups can get their way by suing the government directly, as with the recent suit retailers brought against the Federal Reserve over debit card transaction fees. But they have another, even more powerful channel that controls significantly more power and resources: the U.S. Congress. American politics throughout most of the 19th century was thoroughly clientelistic. Politicians mobilized voters by promising individual benefits, sometimes in the form of small favors or outright cash payments but most often though offers of jobs in government bureaucracies like the Post Office or Customs House. This easy ability to distribute patronage had big spillover effects in terms of official corruption, in which political bosses and members of Congress would skim off benefits for themselves out of the resources they controlled. These historical forms of clientelism and corruption were largely ended as a result of the civil service reform movement beginning in the 1880s. Today, old-fashioned “walking around money”-type corruption is rare at the Federal level. Though high-profile ambassadorships are still distributed to large campaign donors, American political parties no longer give out government offices en masse to loyal political supporters and campaign fundraisers. But the trading of political influence for money has returned in a big way in American politics, this time in a form that is legal and much harder to eradicate. Criminalized bribery is narrowly defined in American law as a transaction in which a politician and a private party explicitly agree upon a specific quid pro quo exchange. But gift exchanges, as an anthropologist might call them, are something else again. Unlike an impersonal market transaction, if one gives someone a gift and immediately demands a gift in return, the recipient likely feels offended and refuses what is offered. But the recipient incurs a moral obligation to the other party and is then inclined to return the favor at another time or place. The law bans only the market transaction, not the exchange of favors. The latter is what the American lobbying industry is built around. I have noted that kin selection and reciprocal altruism are the two natural modes of human sociability. They are not learned behaviors, but are genetically encoded into our mental and emotional makeup. A human being in any culture who receives a gift from another member of the community will feel a moral obligation to reciprocate. Early states were what Max Weber labeled “patrimonial” because they were regarded as the personal property of the ruler, who used his family and friends to staff his administration. Such states were built around these natural modes of sociability. Modern states create strict rules and incentives to overcome the tendency to favor family and friends. These include practices like civil service examinations, merit qualifications, conflict-of-interest rules, and anti-bribery and corruption laws. But the force of natural sociability is so strong that it keeps coming back; guarding against it requires perpetual vigilance. We have dropped our guard. The American state has been thoroughly re-patrimonialized.In this respect, the United States is no different from the Chinese state in the later Han Dynasty, or the Mamluk regime in the century prior to its defeat by the Ottomans, or the French state under the ancien régime. The rules blocking overt nepotism are still strong enough to prevent patrimonial behavior from becoming ubiquitous, but reciprocal altruism runs rampant in Washington. It is the primary channel through which interest groups have succeeded in corrupting government. Interest groups can influence members of Congress in perfectly legal ways simply by making donations and waiting for unspecified return favors. In other cases, the member of Congress initiates the gift exchange, favoring an interest group in the expectation of a reward down the line, whether campaign contributions or other chips to be cashed in at a later date. In many cases the exchange does not involve money. A Congressman attending a conference on derivatives regulation at a fancy resort will hear presentations on how the banking industry does or does not need to be regulated, without hearing credible alternative arguments from outside the industry. The politician is captured in this case not by money (though there is plenty of that to go around), but intellectually, since he or she will have only positive associations with the interest group’s point of view. The explosion of interest groups and lobbying in Washington has been astonishing, with 175 registered lobbying firms in 1971 rising to 2,500 ten years later. By 2009, there were 13,700 registered lobbyists spending more than $3.5 billion annually. The distortive effects of this activity on American public policy can be seen in a host of areas, beginning with the tax code. While all taxes potentially reduce the ability of markets to allocate resources efficiently, the least inefficient types of taxation are those that are simple, uniform and predictable, so that businesses can plan and invest around them. The U.S. tax code is exactly the opposite. While nominal corporate tax rates in the United States are higher than in most other developed countries, few American corporations actually pay taxes at that rate because they have negotiated special exemptions and benefits for themselves. Often these benefits take the form of loopholes permitting the off-shoring of profits or other forms of tax arbitrage. Some political scientists have argued that all of this money and lobbying activity have not resulted in measurable changes in policy along the lines desired by the lobbyists, just as many contend that huge amounts of money spent on campaign ads make no discernable difference in electoral outcomes. Not only are such arguments implausible on their face given the sums supposedly being “wasted” in the process; they ignore the fact that interest groups and lobbyists often seek not to stimulate new policies and rules but to contort existing legislation through regulatory capture at the bureaucratic/administrative level, well out of the political line of sight. The legislative process in the United States has always been much more fragmented than that of countries with parliamentary systems and disciplined parties. The welter of congressional committees with overlapping jurisdictions often produces multiple and conflicting mandates. There are, for example, three separate proposals in the 1990 National Affordable Housing Act that embody distinctly different theories about the underlying problem the law is supposed to solve. There is a multiplicity of mandated ways of enforcing the Clean Air Act. Congress wants the Federal government to procure goods and services cheaply and efficiently, and yet mandates a cumbersome set of rules known as the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) on all government procurement agencies. In contrast to private-sector procurement, government purchasing is minutely procedural and subject to a nearly endless right of appeal. In many cases, individual Congressmen intervene directly to make sure procurement is done in ways that benefit their own constituents. This is particularly true for the big-ticket items procured by the Pentagon, which become virtual jobs programs to be distributed by lucky members of Congress. When Congress issues complex and often self-contradictory mandates, agencies are highly constrained in their ability to exercise independent judgment or make common-sense decisions. This undermining of bureaucratic autonomy starts a downward spiral. In the face of bureaucratic ineffectiveness, Congress and the public decry “waste, fraud, and abuse” in government and try to fix the problem by mandating even more detailed and constraining rules, whose final effect is to further drive up costs and reduce quality. Examples of such spiraling, self-defeating congressional interventions could be presented almost without end. Some are particularly salient, however. Thus the Affordable Care Act, pushed through Congress by the Obama Administration in 2010, turned into a monstrosity during the legislative process as a result of all of the concessions and side payments that were made to interest groups, from doctors to insurance companies to the pharmaceutical industry. In other cases, the impact of interest groups has been to block legislation harmful to their interests. The simplest and most effective response to the financial crisis of 2008–09 and the unpopular taxpayer bailouts of large banks would have been a law that put a hard cap on the size of financial institutions or else dramatically raised reserve requirements, which would have had much the same effect. If a cap on size existed, banks taking foolish risks could go bankrupt without triggering a systemic crisis and government bailout. Like the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, such a law could have been written on a few of sheets of paper. But this possibility was never considered during the congressional deliberations on financial regulation. What emerged instead was the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, or Dodd-Frank, which, while better than no regulation at all, extended to hundreds of pages of legislation and mandated reams of further detailed rules (many still unwritten years after the fact) that will impose huge costs on banks and consumers down the road. Rather than simply capping bank size, it has created a Federal Stability Oversight Council tasked with the enormous (and probably impossible) job of assessing and managing institutions that pose systemic risks, which in the end will still not solve the problem of banks being too big to fail. Though a smoking gun linking bank campaign contributions to the votes of specific Congressmen may elude us, it defies belief that the banking industry’s legions of lobbyists did not have a major impact on how Dodd-Frank turned out, and on how its terms are still being translated into regulations. Ordinary Americans express widespread disdain for the impact of interest groups and money on Congress. The perception that the democratic process has been corrupted or hijacked is not an exclusive concern of either end of the political spectrum. Both Tea Party Republicans on the Right and liberal Democrats on the Left believe that interest groups whose views they happen not to like exercise undue political influence and feather their own nests. As it turns out, both are correct. As a result, trust in Congress has fallen to historically low levels, now barely above single digits. There is plenty of good historical and social science analysis to sustain such beliefs. The late Mancur Olson emphasized the malign effects of interest group politics on economic growth and, ultimately, democracy in his 1982 book The Rise and Decline of Nations. Looking particularly at the long-term economic decline of Britain throughout the 20th century, he argued that democracies in times of peace and stability tend to accumulate ever-increasing numbers of interest groups that, instead of pursuing wealth-creating economic activities, make use of the political system to extract benefits, or rents, for themselves. These rents are collectively unproductive and costly to the public as a whole, but a collective action problem prevents those adversely affected from organizing themselves to offset groups like, say, the banking industry or corn producers, who can more readily organize to advance their interests. The result is the steady diversion of energy into rent-seeking activities over time, a process that can only be halted by a large shock like war or revolution. On the other hand, such analysis, plausible as it seems, runs smack into a far more positive understanding of the benefits of civil society, or voluntary associations, to the health of democracy. Tocqueville famously noted that Americans had a strong propensity to organize private associations, which he argued were “schools for democracy” because they taught private individuals the skills involved in coming together for public purposes. Individuals by themselves were weak; only by coming together for common purposes could they, among other things, resist tyrannical government. This tradition has been carried forward in the late 20th century by scholars like Robert Putnam, who has argued that this very propensity to organize (“social capital”) was good for democracy—and was endangered in the second half of the 20th century. James Madison, too, had a relatively benign view of interest groups. He was certainly mindful of the deleterious potential of what he called “factions”, but he was not overly worried about them because their diversity across a large country would be sufficient to prevent domination by any one group. As Theodore Lowi noted, “pluralist” political theorists in the mid-20th century concurred with Madison in opposition to critics like C. Wright Mills: The cacophony of interest groups would collectively interact to produce a public interest, just as competition in a free market would provide public benefit through individuals following their narrow self-interest. Further, there was no justification for government to regulate this process, since there was no higher ground that could define a “public interest” standing above the narrow concerns of interest groups. The Supreme Court, in its Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United decisions, was in effect affirming the benign interpretation of what Lowi labeled “interest group liberalism.” Alas, “interest groups” and “private associations” are two ways of describing the same basic phenomenon. So how do we reconcile these diametrically opposed narratives, the first claiming that interest groups corrupt democracy and harm economic growth, and the second asserting that they are necessary for healthy democracy? The most obvious way is to try to distinguish a “good” civil society organization from a “bad” interest group. The former, to use the late Albert Hirschman’s terminology, is driven by the passions, the latter by the interests. The former might be a non-profit organization seeking to build houses for the poor, or a lobbying organization promoting the public interest by protecting coastal habitats. An interest group might be a lobbyist for sugar producers or large banks, whose only objective is to maximize the profits of the companies supporting them. Additionally, Putnam tried to make a distinction between small associations that invited active participation by their members, and “membership organizations” that simply involved paying a membership fee. Unfortunately, neither distinction stands up to scrutiny. Just because a group proclaims that it is acting in the public interest doesn’t mean that it is. For example, a medical advocacy group that wants more dollars allocated to combat a particular disease—AIDS, say—might actually distort public priorities by diverting funds from equally lethal but more widespread diseases, simply because it is better at public relations. On the other hand, just because an interest group is self-interested doesn’t mean that its claims are illegitimate, that by definition it cannot promote the public welfare, or that it does not have a right to be represented within the political system. If a poorly thought-out regulation will seriously damage the interests of an industry and its workers, that industry has a right to petition Congress. Like it or not, lobbyists are often important sources of information about the consequences of government action. In the long-running battles between environmental groups and corporations, environmentalists purporting to represent the public interest are not always right with respect to the trade-offs between sustainability, profits and jobs, as the Oakland harbor dredging case illustrates. The primary argument against interest-group pluralism has to do with distorted representation. E.E. Schattschneider, in his seminal 1960 book The Semisovereign People, argued that the actual practice of democracy in America has nothing to do with its popular image as government “of the people, by the people, for the people.” Political outcomes seldom correspond with popular preferences given the very low level of participation and political awareness; real decisions are made by much smaller groups of organized interests. A similar argument is buried in Olson’s framework, since he notes that not all groups are equally capable of organizing for collective action. The interest groups that contend for the attention of Congress are therefore not collectively representative of the whole American people. They are rather representative of the best organized and (what often amounts to the same thing) most richly endowed parts of American society. This bias is not random and almost invariably works against the interests of the unorganized or unorganizable, who are often poor, poorly educated or otherwise marginalized. Relatedly, Morris Fiorina has shown that the American “political class” is far more polarized than the American people themselves. Most Americans support moderate or compromise positions on many contentious issues, from abortion to deficits to school prayer to gay marriage, while party activists are invariably more ideological and take more extreme positions, whether on the Left or Right. But the majorities supporting middle-of-the-road positions do not feel very passionate about them; they have what amounts to a collective action problem, and so remain largely unorganized. Now, it’s true that unrepresentative interest groups are not simply creatures of corporate America and the Right. Some of the most powerful organizations in democratic countries have been trade unions, environmental groups, women’s organizations, advocates of gay rights, the aged, the disabled, indigenous peoples, and virtually every other sector of society. One of the reasons that the American public sector has been so hard to reform is the resistance of public sector unions. Pluralist theory holds that the aggregation of all these groups contending with one another constitutes a democratic public interest. But due to the intrinsic over-representation of narrow interests, they are instead more likely to undermine the possibility that representative democracy will express a true public interest. There is a further problem with interest groups and the pluralist view that sees public interest as nothing more than the aggregation of individual private interests: It undermines the possibility of deliberation and ignores the ways in which individual preferences are shaped by dialogue and communication. In both classical Athenian democracy and the New England town hall meetings celebrated by Tocqueville, citizens spoke directly to one another. It is easy to idealize small-scale democracy or minimize the real differences that exist in large societies. But as any organizer of focus groups can tell you, people’s views on highly emotional subjects will change just thirty minutes into a face-to-face discussion with people of differing views, provided that they are given common information and ground rules to enforce civility. Few single-issue advocates will maintain that his or her cause will trump all other good things if forced to directly confront those alternative needs. One of the problems of pluralist theory, then, is the assumption that interests are fixed, and that the goal of legislators is simply to act as a transmission belt for them, rather than having their own views that can be shaped by deliberation with other politicians and with the public. This isn’t just a rhetorical point. It is commonly and accurately observed that no one in the U.S. Congress really deliberates anymore. Congressional “debate” amounts to a series of talking points aimed not at colleagues but at activist audiences, who are perfectly happy to punish a legislator who deviates from their agenda as a result of deliberation or the acquisition of greater knowledge. This leads then to bureaucratic mandates written by interest groups that restrict bureaucratic autonomy. In well-functioning governance systems, moreover, a great deal of deliberation occurs not just in legislatures but within bureaucracies. This is not a matter of bureaucrats simply talking to one another, but rather a complex series of consultations between government officials and businesses, outside implementers and service providers, civil society groups, the media and other sources of information about societal interests and opinions. The Congress wisely mandated consultation in the landmark 1946 Administrative Procedures Act, which requires regulatory agencies to publicly post proposed rule changes and to solicit comment about them. But these consultative procedures have become highly routinized and pro forma, with actual decisions being the outcome not of genuine deliberation, but of political confrontations between well organized interest groups. Both the judicialization of administration and the influence of interest groups over Congress represent instances of political decay in American politics. They have both deep roots in American political culture as well as more recent, contingent causes like the extreme polarization of the two parties. One source of decay has to do with intellectual rigidity. The idea that lawyers and litigation should be such an integral part of public administration is not a view widely shared in other democracies, and yet it has become such an entrenched way of doing business in the United States that no one sees any alternative. This is not strictly speaking an ideological matter but a political tradition shared by both Left and Right. Similarly, despite a widespread outcry against the disproportionate influence of interest groups in Congress, many elites (beginning with the Supreme Court) fail to see that a problem even exists. The underlying sources of political decay—intellectual rigidity and the influence of elite groups—are generic to democracies as a whole. Indeed, they are problems faced by all governments, whether democratic or not. Problems of excessive judicialization and interest groups also exist in other developed democracies. But the impact of interest groups depends heavily on the specific nature of the institutions. There is wide variation in the way that democracies structure the incentives facing political actors that makes them more or less susceptible to these forces. The United States, as the world’s first and most advanced liberal democracy, suffers today from the problem of political decay in a more acute form than other democratic political systems. The longstanding distrust of the state that has always characterized American politics had led to an unbalanced form of government that undermines the prospects of necessary collective action. It has led to vetocracy. I mean by vetocracy the process whereby the American system of checks and balances makes collective decision-making based on electoral majorities extremely difficult. To some extent, any system that duplicates authority at multiple levels, giving Federal, state and local authorities jurisdiction over whole domains of public policy, risks creating a situation in which different parts of the government are easily able to block one another. But under conditions of ideological polarization, with the major parties about evenly popular (or unpopular) with voters, the constraints become acute. That is where we now are. The government shutdown and crisis over the debt ceiling that emerged in October 2013 is an example of how a minority position (that of the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party) could threaten the ability of the government as a whole to operate. This is why the American political system early in the 21st century has failed to deal with its yawning budgetary problems, among many others. Polarization happens. It has happened in American politics before. Once it caused a civil war. A good political system mitigates underlying polarizations and encourages the emergence of outcomes that represent the interests of as large a part of the population as possible. But when polarization confronts America’s Madisonian checks-and-balances political system, the result is particularly devastating. The reason is that too many actors can veto a decision to do something to solve a problem. America’s large number of veto players becomes evident when one considers another longstanding democracy, Great Britain. The so-called Westminster system, which evolved in the years following the Glorious Revolution, is one of the most decisive in the democratic world because, in its pure form, it creates a much smaller number of veto players. Britain is a democracy because citizens have one large, formal check on government: their ability to periodically elect Parliament. (There is another important check, the tradition of free media in Britain, which is not part of the formal political system.) In all other respects, however, the system concentrates rather than diffuses power. This system produces governments with much greater formal powers than in the United States. This greater degree of decisiveness can be seen clearly with respect to the budget process. In Britain, national budgets are not drawn up in Parliament but in Whitehall, the seat of the bureaucracy, where professional civil servants in the Treasury Department act under instructions from the Cabinet and Prime Minister. The budget is then presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (equivalent of the U.S. Treasury Secretary) to the House of Commons, which decides whether to approve it in a single up-or-down vote. This usually takes place within a week or two of its promulgation by the government. The process in the United States is totally different. The Constitution grants Congress primary authority over the budget. While Presidents propose budgets, these are largely aspirational documents that have little relation to what eventually emerges. The Office of Management and Budget has no formal power over the budget but becomes in effect another lobbying organization supporting the President’s preferences. The budget works its way through a complex set of committees over a period of months, and what finally emerges for ratification by the two houses (complicated further by the distinction between appropriations and authorizations) is the product of innumerable deals struck with individual members to secure their support. Since there is little party discipline in the United States, there is no way for the congressional leadership to compel individual members to support its preferences, even when they are members of the same party. Clearly, the making of an American budget is a highly decentralized and non-strategic process in comparison to what happens in Britain. The openness and open-ended character of the American budget process in turn gives lobbyists and interest groups multiple points at which to exercise influence. In most European parliamentary systems, it makes no sense for an interest group to lobby an individual MP since the rules of party discipline allow little or no influence over the party leadership’s position. In the U.S. system, by contrast, an influential committee chairmanship confers enormous powers to modify legislation, and therefore becomes the target of enormous lobbying activity. Budgeting is not the only aspect of American government that differs systematically from its democratic counterparts in terms of proliferating veto players. In parliamentary systems, a great deal of legislation is formulated by the executive with heavy technocratic input from the permanent civil service. Ministries are accountable to Parliament and hence ultimately to voters through the minister who heads them, but this type of hierarchical system can take a longer-term strategic view and produce much more coherent legislation. Such a system is utterly foreign to American political culture, where Congress jealously guards its right to legislate and special interest groups assiduously cultivate their skill at suborning it. The lack of legislative coherence is what in turn produces a large, sprawling and often unaccountable government. Financial sector regulation, for example, is split among the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, as well as a host of state Attorneys General who have broadened their mandates to take on the banking sector. The Federal agencies are overseen by different congressional committees whose members are loath to give up their turf to a more coherent and unified regulator. It was easy to game this system to bring about deregulation of the financial sector in the late 1990s; re-regulating it after the crisis has proved much more difficult. The American political system has decayed over time because its traditional system of checks and balances has deepened and become increasingly rigid. At a time of sharp political polarization, this decentralized system is less and less able to represent majority interests, but gives excessive representation to the views of interest groups and activist organizations that collectively do not add up to a sovereign American people. The United States is trapped in a bad equilibrium. Because Americans historically distrust the government, they aren’t typically willing to delegate authority to it. Instead, as we have seen, Congress mandates complex rules that reduce government autonomy and render decisions slow and expensive. The government then performs poorly, which perversely confirms the original distrust of government. Under these circumstances, most Americans are reluctant to pay higher taxes, which they fear the government will simply waste. But while resources are not the only, or even the main, source of government inefficiency, without them the government cannot hope to function properly. Hence distrust of government becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Can we reverse these tendencies toward decay? Perhaps, but two separate obstacles stand in the way, both related to the phenomenon of decay itself. The first is a simple matter of politics. Many American political actors recognize that the political system isn’t working well, but nonetheless have very deep interests in keeping things as they are. Neither major party has an incentive to cut itself off from access to interest group money, and the interest groups fear a system where money can’t buy influence. As in the 1880s, a reform coalition has to emerge that unites groups without a stake in the current system. But achieving collective action among these out-groups is difficult; it requires skillful and patient leadership with a clear agenda, neither of which is automatically forthcoming. It may also require a major shock, or shocks, to the system. Such shocks were critical, after all, in crystallizing the Progressive movement—events like the Garfield assassination, the requirements of America’s rise as a global power, entry into the World War, and the crisis of the Great Depression. The second problem is a cognitive one, having to do with ideas. A system of checks and balances that gives undue weight to interest groups and fails to aggregate majority interests cannot be fixed with a few simple reforms. For example, the temptation in presidential systems to fix problems of legislative gridlock by piling on new executive powers is one that often creates as many problems as it solves. Getting rid of earmarks and increasing party discipline may actually make it harder under conditions of ideological polarization to achieve broad legislative compromises. Using the courts to implement administrative decisions may be highly inefficient, but in the absence of a stronger and more unified bureaucracy, there may be no alternative. Many of these problems could be solved if the United States moved to a more unified parliamentary system of government, but so radical a change in the country’s institutional structure is barely conceivable. Americans regard their Constitution as a quasi-religious document. Persuading them to rethink its most basic tenets short of an outright system collapse is highly unlikely. So we have a problem.

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