## 1ac

### 1ac – embargo

#### The thesis of status quo governmental policy is to support “human rights”- this is hypocritical in nature- sanctions cause life to be worse for those experiencing its negative effects and lead to a perpetuating cycle of oppression

A. Sanctions and military interventions are both rooted in the logic of supporting human rights

B. Perceiving life this way is bad because whenever a minor infraction of human rights is seen the United States will bully its way into getting what it wants which ends up causing more oppression

Arvan 13- Marcus, University of Tampa, 1998 Tufts University, B.A.

2008 University of Arizona, Ph.D. (“A Better, Dual Theory of Human Rights”, http://philpapers.org/archive/ARVABD.pdf\\CLans)

Coercive international actions, from political and economic sanctions to outright military force, have been repeatedly used over the past several decades – most often, by the United States – in the name of “human rights.” For example, the US has coercively imposed a commercial, economic, and financial embargo on the nation of Cuba ever since 1960 in response to Cuba’s refusal to move toward “democratization and greater respect for human rights.”65 The US has also imposed coercive sanctions on China in response to the military crackdown on public protests and free speech in Tiananmen Square in 1989. And, of course, the US has not only imposed economic sanctions on Iraq from 1990 to the present, but also invaded Iraq militarily in 2003 and occupied Iraq until 2011. Although the US government initially justified the invasion and occupation on the grounds that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a threat to international peace and security due to allegations it had weapons of mass destruction, as time went on, and weapons of mass destruction are not found, many US politicians increasingly attempted to justify the war and occupation on human rights grounds, citing the history of violence the Hussein regime was known to have taken against its own citizens.67 Although coercive sanctions and military intervention have been repeatedly justified on “human rights” grounds, many people – not only social and political theorists, but the public at large – have been morally uncomfortable with many of these cases. Long-term US economic sanctions on Iraq, for example, have been estimated to have cost anywhere between 100- and 500-thousand lives.68 The 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, on other hand, is estimated to have cost anywhere between 600 and one million lives.69 The United States’ embargo of Cuba has been continually criticized as unjust and disproportionate to actual state of life in Cuba, causing the Cuban people to suffer from lack of food, clean water, medicine, and even soap, resulting in medical crises and higher rates of serious infectious diseases.70 Indeed, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly passed resolutions from 1992 to the present protesting the US embargo of Cuba. Finally, US sanctions on China and Burma have been criticized as ineffective and failing to properly appreciate cultural differences.71 Indeed, some have argued that the deployment of economic sanctions has demonstrated a clear and consistent kind of moral and cultural imperialism that is insensitive to the actual needs and quality of life of people living in “human rights violating” regimes.72 The reason, in short, why people are often morally uncomfortable with the use of sanctions and military force on human rights grounds is simple. As unjust as places like Cuba or China may be, and as oppressive as Saddam Hussein’s regime was in Iraq prior to 2003, the human costs of coercive international actions – from sanctions to military force – seem disproportionate to the actual human situation in those regimes. For the simple facts are these. Although the average Cuban, Chinese, or Iraqi citizen may not enjoy the “human rights” codified in the UDHR or existing human rights covenants, on a day to day basis people in those nations have still been able to live recognizably human lives, and are treated on a day-to-day basis like human beings, not mere animals. The average Iraqi citizen did, in the Hussein regime, have to worry about being kidnapped or executed for certain kinds of speech – but still, as long as they did not behave in those ways, they could go about everyday human life in relative peace: they could have families, hold jobs, etc. The same is true in present-day China and Cuba. Although both nations’ governments violate numerous UDHR articles and human rights covenants, Chinese and Cuban citizens still live recognizably human lives, and are treated as human beings, on a day-to-day basis. For although their citizens do not enjoy anything remotely like freedom of speech, expression, or religion, in conformity with existing human rights standards, their citizens do get to do all of the things that make a human life a human life: they can hold jobs, have families, have friends and acquaintances, and so on. In all of these places, however unjust their governments may be by Western standards, people still enjoy the basic human capacity that Griffin’s account draws our attention: the distinctly human capacity to develop and pursue a conception of a worthwhile life. Yes, these governments set limits – sometimes quite extensive limit – on the kind of life their citizens are permitted to live; but setting limits on a person’s choices is still consistent with treating them like a human being rather than an animal. This is intuitively what is wrong with the imposition of coercive sanctions or military force on citizens in places like Cuba, China, or Iraq. Mere injustices – even severe injustices violating existing “human rights” standards – are not severe enough to morally justify international force or coercion. People are morally entitled to coercive international action when, and only when, they are treated so badly that they do not even live recognizably human lives, such as when people are being enslaved, exterminated, or terrorized by their government to such an extent that they cannot go about their daily lives developing and pursuing a conception of a worthwhile life. The theory of international human rights I have developed and defended here is the only theory that provides a detailed, and compelling, account of why this is. When people are treated like animals, or mere objects – when they cannot even go about their daily lives in peace, developing and pursuing a conception of a worthwhile life, due government terrorism, genocide, etc. – the rest of us are all morally required, as fellow human beings, to ensure that our governments take coercive actions, up to and including military force, to prevent and protect people from such abuses.

#### Specifically, sanctions require the US to oppose any loans to Cuba, financial restrictions prevent normal banking transactions, and dual-use restrictions prevent importation of critical medical supplies.

A. We can’t give cuba normal practices of banking which is necessary for advancement they desire

B. Medical supplies shut off which hurt Cuban people

Bolender, 13

[Keith, 4-22-13, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against Cuba,” http://www.coha.org/22355/,]

Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the Castro government more than its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. The designation is seen by Havana as an impediment towards improving relations and as a cruel hypocrisy that provides political cover for Washington to justify the imposition of economic penalties along with the perpetuation of anti-revolutionary propaganda.¶ There is an opportunity to eliminate that stumbling block in the next few weeks, if newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry decides to recommend Cuba’s deletion from the list to President Obama. Kerry has until the release of the State Department’s annual terror report on April 30 to make the determination of whether Cuba will remain on the terrorist list. High ranking Cuban officials are closely watching this development, indicating the removal could offer an opportunity to re-engage with the United States. [1]¶ The history of Cuba’s controversial inclusion goes back to 1982, the same year Iraq was taken off the list by the Reagan administration. Besides Cuba, only Sudan, Iran, and Syria continue to be labeled as state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea was dropped in 2008, while Pakistan, long the home of Osama Bin Laden and recognized as a haven for Islamic terrorists, has never been considered. Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11 terrorists came from, is looked upon as a staunch ally of the United States.¶ There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used. Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.

#### The sanctions imposed on Cuba are a modern version of siege warfare – they purposefully deprive civilians of basic necessities putting the most vulnerable at risk

A. To get what we want we operate under “siege warfare” we basically restrict any goods that people need to survive

B. This puts citizens who have nothing to do with the Castro regime at the center of this oppression

Gordon 6-prof philosophy Fairfield- (Joy, Professor of Philosophy at Fairfield University, published in the Harvard University Press, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics Of Economic Sanctions,” Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, 4-11-06, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00330.x/pdf>)

In many regards, sanctions are the modern version of siege warfare: each involves the systematic deprivation of a whole city or nation of economic resources. Although in siege warfare this is accomplished by surrounding the city with an army, the same effect can be achieved by using international institutions and international pressure to prevent the sale or purchase of goods, as well as to stop migration. It is sometimes argued that an embargoed nation can still engage in marginal trade, despite sanctions; but in a siege as well there may be marginal ways of getting goods through gaps in the blockade. In both cases, however, the unit under embargo or siege is a mixed population rather than a military installation, or is entirely civilian. In both cases, the net effect is the same: the disrup- tion or strangulation of the economy as a whole. As Michael Walzer notes, siege is the oldest form of total war; in siege, noncombatants are not only exposed, but in fact are more likely to be killed than combatants, given that the goal of siege “is surrender, not by defeat of the enemy army, but by the fearful spectacle of the civilian dead. ” 3 The principle of discrim- ination in just war doctrine requires the attacker to distinguish between combat- ants and noncombatants; between combatants who are injured and those who are uninjured; between combatants who are armed and those who have surrendered and are defenseless; and so forth.4 There has never been a strict prohibition against killing civilians, or killing injured or unarmed combatants, when it is required by “military necessity” or as an unavoidable consequence of an attack on a legitimate military target. A common example is that an ammunition facto- ry is a legitimate military target in wartime; if during the bombing of the factory civilians who live nearby are also killed, no war crime has been committed. What is prohibited is to target civilians, or injured or defenseless combatants, directly, or to bomb indiscriminately where the deaths of civilians are foreseeable. Siege warfare reverses these priorities: civilian suffering is not “collateral” damage, but rather is the primary objective of the siege strategy, or at least the foreseeable and direct result of siege. Siege operates by restricting the economy of the entire community, creating shortages of food, water, and fuel. Those who are least able to survive the ensuing hunger, illness, and cold are the very young, the elderly, and those who are sick or injured. Thus the direct consequence of siege is that harm is done to those who are least able to defend themselves, who present the least military threat, who have the least input into policy or military decisions, and who are the most vulnerable. The harm done by the enemy’s deprivation is exacerbated by domestic policy, which typically shifts whatever resources there are to the military and to the political leadership. This is sometimes done for security reasons, in the belief that defending against military attack is the highest priority, more immedi- ately urgent than the slower damage of hunger and illness to which the civilian population is subjected. It may also happen because the leadership is corrupt, or because the desperation creates conditions for black marketeering. Both of these consequences —the suffering of the innocent and helpless, and the shifting of resources to the military and the privileged—are as old as siege itself. Thus, the argument can be made that siege is a form of warfare that itself constitutes a war crime. In just war doctrine we could demand a justification for a military strategy in terms of the obligation to minimize harm to civilians: the ammunition factory was a legitimate target, and there was no way to bomb it without collateral damage to nearby residential areas. But siege is peculiar in that it resists such an analysis: the immediate goal is precisely to cause suffering to civilians. In the case of the ammunitions factory, we can answer the question, how is this act consistent with the moral requirement to discriminate? In the case of siege, we cannot. Sanctions are subject to many of the same moral objections as siege. They intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most vulnerable and the least political, and this is something the party imposing sanctions either knows or should know. To the extent that economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society and thereby prevent the production or importation of necessities, they are functioning as the modern equivalent of siege. To the extent that sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society of the food, potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for survival and basic human needs, sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege warfare.

#### This direct violence against the Cuban people is a form of economic terrorism, but is concealed by an ethically bankrupt form of consequentialism that excuses this violence in the name of national security

A. We operate under victim blaming in where we look at how Cubans are suffering and just are like “yeah they deserve it”

B. We never look at how we messed or how we can improve from our mess ups

C. The state is the main actor responsible because decisionmakers have to operate within the state to determine who becomes a victim

Kauzlarich et al 1 (DAVID KAUZLARICH, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville;¶ RICK A. MATTHEWS, Ohio University; WILLIAM J. MILLER, Carthage College; Critical Criminology 10: 173–194, 2001. “TOWARD A VICTIMOLOGY OF STATE CRIME,” <http://jthomasniu.org/class/781/Assigs/kauzvictimology.pdf>)

Propositions about the victimology of state crime can be developed from this¶ review to help shed light on the larger phenomenon of state crime victimization, although a caveat is in order because state crime takes a variety of¶ forms. For instance, it is difﬁcult to compare the victimology of international¶ economic terrorism against the people of Cuba and Iraq to institutionalized¶ racism, sexism, and classism, or the suffering of human radiation subjects to¶ unjust criminal justice system practices. Nevertheless, several general propositions about the victims of state crime may be formulated based on current and¶ prior research in the area.¶ (1) Victims of State Crime Tend to be among the Least Socially Powerful¶ Actors¶ Even a cursory examination of state crime reveals large power differences¶ between the victim and victimizer. The authority of the state extends well¶ beyond crude asymmetries in the ability to control others, and constitutional¶ and due process protections also vary relative to the power of subjects.¶ State ofﬁcers, agencies, and organizations often exploit scarce resources to¶ advance larger agendas through the use of specialized terminology, scientiﬁc¶ knowledge, and information technology. Clearly the victims of the human¶ radiation experiments, those harmed by environmental degradation, atomic¶ and nuclear weapons tests, and the COINTELPRO, did not have the resources¶ to marshal commensurate levels of technological, terminological, or scientiﬁc¶ expertise. The state also has the ability to conceal illegalities and immoralities¶ by privileging concerns about “national security” over humane, fair, and due¶ processes. In the case of those victimized by criminal justice and the prison experiments, one senses a great deal of dehumanization and ideology, which¶ allows unjust practices and policies to ﬂourish.¶ Victims of other state crimes – such as civilians in war, people targeted for¶ genocide, workers, and the homeless – also have less social power than state¶ agencies and ofﬁcials. Scapegoating, stereotyping, proﬁling, and typifying¶ people belonging to these groups is far easier for the state because of broad¶ asymmetries in power. It is therefore not surprising that galvanizing support¶ for unethical and illegal practices and policies against these groups is not¶ difﬁcult for the state. As a result, the likelihood of the legitimation of a crisis¶ or substantial social protest movements is diminished. It also militates against¶ conceptualizing unjust state actions as crime. One can see evidence of this¶ process at work in the cases of economic and domestic terrorism and the¶ support of terrorism abroad.¶ More broadly, there seems to be a positive relationship between the¶ unequal distribution of power and the level and frequency of state crime, both¶ domestically and internationally. Clearly, social power is unevenly distributed among states as well, providing further opportunities for state crime.¶ The United States has more control over the deﬁnition, enforcement, and¶ prosecution of state crime than most countries. The World Court, the United¶ Nations’ Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary¶ Fund are likely to support U.S. interests. With few exceptions, peripheral and¶ semi-peripheral states are less likely to have any victimization by the U.S.¶ acknowledged and redressed. There is a direct link between U.S. supported¶ and enforced sanctions against Iraq and the death of innocent Iraqi children¶ because of starvation. Sanctions against the Cuban people have also resulted¶ in social and physical harms.¶ Authority-subject relationships (Turk 1969) in an international context¶ help explain how these harms are marginalized in popular U.S. discourses:¶ The claims-making and legitimation exercises of the authority (the U.S. state)¶ are seldom met with organized opposition by subjects. If there is a sizeable movement against U.S. policy and practice, citizens might either be¶ unaware of its existence or may perceive opposition as the work of radicals¶ disconnected with reality (Iraqi politicians, Castro, prisoners’ rights, welfare¶ rights, and anti-nuclear weapons groups). Social harms and higher immoralities might therefore be overlooked, or even worse, supported because of¶ the apparent lack of overt conﬂict over the policy or practice. This makes it¶ appear as though the harms are actually necessary, fair, and consensus-based.¶ U.S. public support of the Gulf War is most illustrative of this point. (2) Victimizers Generally Fail to Recognize and Understand the Nature,¶ Extent, and Harmfulness of Institutional Policies. If Suffering and Harm¶ are Acknowledged, It Is often Neutralized within the Context of a Sense¶ of “Entitlement”¶ The most important difference between victimizers and their victims is the¶ power to exert their will. Victimizers often do not acknowledge the degree¶ to which their policies have caused harm while assessing the effectiveness of¶ their policies to bring about desired change, maintain hegemony, or promote¶ other forms of dominance. Unjust and deleterious domestic and international policies can also be downplayed by neutralizing reasonable categorical¶ imperatives (e.g. do no harm) by employing bankrupt consequentialism,¶ perhaps guided by ethnocentric paternalism. Following Sykes and Matza¶ (1957), others have found evidence of this at work in the wider problem¶ of elite deviance. Denying responsibility, dehumanizing the powerless for¶ purposes of exploitation, and appealing to higher loyalties (i.e. the capitalist¶ political economy and national security) are often employed in the victimology of state crime. Specialized vocabularies may also be used to aide in the¶ dehumanization.¶ Tifft and Markham (1991) have noted that the way policy makers¶ neutralize the destructive and harmful effects of their policies is similar to the¶ manner batterers view their victims. Noting the long history of U.S. abuses in¶ Latin and Central America, they argue that:¶ U.S. policy makers have consciously decided (1) that the U.S. is entitled¶ to control Central America and that the peoples of Central America are¶ obligated to acquiesce in this power exercise; (2) that violence is permissible, and policy makers can live with themselves and conclude that they¶ are ethical/moral persons and that these policies are ethical/moral even if¶ they involve violence; (3) that the use of violence, intimidation, and threat¶ of violence will produce the desired effect or minimize a more negative¶ one; and (4) that the policy of violence and control will not unduly¶ endanger the United States, and the country will neither sustain physical harm nor suffer legal, economic, or political consequences that will¶ outweigh the beneﬁts achieved through this violence (Tifft and Markham¶ 1991: 125–126).¶ Similarly, Cohen (1996) has documented how governments construct ofﬁ-¶ cial responses to allegations of human rights violations. Cohen (1996: 522)¶ contends that the forms of denial on the part of governmental ofﬁcials to such¶ allegations typically include one of the following: “a literal denial (nothing¶ happened); interpretive denial (what happened is really something else); and¶ implicatory denial (what happened is justiﬁed).” At the domestic level, few policy makers have recognized that the cumulative effects of the policies supportive of institutionalized racism and structural inequality have caused considerable harm to various minority groups¶ and women. Often times, the victims are viewed as undeserving or unworthy¶ of the social, political, or economic rights bestowed to others.¶ (3) Victims of State Crime are often Blamed for Their Suffering¶ Victim blaming is unfortunately a common reaction to those most wounded¶ by state crime. The poor, minorities, the homeless, and women become targets¶ of criticism because of the false belief in the ease of achieving vertical intergenerational mobility in the U.S., even in the face of overwhelming structural¶ odds. Prisoners and those accused of crimes are less likely to be treated¶ sympathetically because their assigned master status solipsistically leads to¶ a marginalization of their human worth, morality, and potential. Subjects in¶ the prisoner experiments were viewed as less deserving of informed consent¶ at best and expendable at worst.¶ Harms caused by economic terrorism and the support of anti-democratic¶ governments can be neutralized by popular audiences (and victimizers) as¶ a part of the United States’ interests in national security or the previously¶ mentioned technique of neutralization, “appealing to higher loyalties.” The¶ harms caused by sanctions in Cuba and Iraq are good examples because,¶ while they are easy to see, there is a tendency to assume victim responsibility on the part of citizens because they have not waged successful civil¶ insurrections against their oppressors.¶ (4) Victims of State Crime Must Generally Rely on the Victimizer, an¶ Associated Institution, or Civil Social Movements for Redress¶ Theoretically, the U.S. criminal justice system carries out the criminalization¶ process in the name of the state, not the particular victim. The “people”¶ are identiﬁed as the abstracted victim. What happens, however, when “the¶ people” or a group of peoples are victimized by the body who holds dominion¶ over them and the law? What institutionalized justice process is available to¶ the victim?¶ Often times, as in the case of the prisoner and plutonium experiments,¶ and some instances of racial and gender discrimination, reparations may¶ come about in civil court, and often involve the efforts of special interest¶ groups, people in social movements, and of course private attorneys. In other¶ cases, appeal may be made to the United Nations Human Rights Committee,¶ through the United Nations General Assembly, or the International Court¶ of Justice. The opportunities for international redress of domestic victimi- zation, to some extent, depend on the primary state’s membership status.¶ For example, the United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention for¶ decades because it sought to limit “foreign intrusion” into what were deﬁned¶ as domestic affairs. Citizens victimized in countries with tenuous or marginal¶ standing in the international community as it pertains to human rights may¶ therefore ﬁnd little in the way of assistance.¶ The most potentially dangerous act that could ever by undertaken by a¶ state, the use of nuclear weapons, has recently been criminalized through this¶ latter avenue. Six billion people still live under the nuclear threat, but at least¶ one organization of legitimate authority, the World Court, has conceptualized¶ the entire world population as potential victims of state crime by declaring¶ the use and threat to use nuclear weapons illegal under international law¶ (see Kramer and Kauzlarich 1999). More often than not, however, international organizations like the U.N. have been slow to enforce existing laws or¶ to punish nation-states that are powerful. For example, each year, the U.N.¶ General Assembly has voted to condemn the U.S. embargo on Cuba, but no¶ ofﬁcial action has been taken by the U.N. to end it. In short, there is little¶ hope of formal intervention on the part of the international community when¶ the offending state is powerful like the U.S. On another level, U.S. opposition¶ to international agreements because of the state’s fear of the loss of sovereignty (no matter how slight) also thwart the materializing of democratic and¶ restorative justice.¶ In any case, the process of helping victims or even ending the victimization of state crime is very different than in cases of traditional or white-collar¶ crime. This stems from problems related to the identiﬁcation of the actors,¶ organizations, and institutional forces responsible for state crime, if the¶ policy, actions, or omissions are even recognized as unethical, harmful,¶ criminal, or worthy of resistance.¶ (5) Victims of State Crime Are Easy Targets for Repeated Victimization¶ The manner in which victims of state crime are harmed may change over¶ time; however, the harm incurred by most victims of state crime does not¶ decrease – rather it merely takes another form. Additionally, some victims are¶ continually victimized by the same organization. Examples include women,¶ minorities, the poor, workers, and those living in less developed countries,¶ in much the same manner as some victims of traditional street crime (e.g.,¶ domestic violence and child abuse) who are targeted for repeat victimization.¶ In the cases of the poor, there have been few genuine attempts to alleviate¶ the structural conditions that create abject poverty (Bohm 1993). Women have¶ faced institutional sexism and the “glass ceiling” in spite of superﬁcial efforts¶ designed to give them equal status in society. Minorities have long been the targets of overt and institutionalized racism. While some have argued that¶ afﬁrmative action policies have eliminated the effects of racism, institutionalized racism persists in spite of the progress which has been made. Native¶ Americans have been repeatedly victimized throughout U.S. history, and¶ remain one of the most repressed minority groups in our society (Churchill¶ 1995).¶ Another example is the repeated victimization of the plutonium subjects¶ and their families, who continued to be treated unethically by state agencies¶ for decades. Several years after the deaths of many of the plutonium subjects,¶ the families were sent a letter from the Atomic Energy Commission, which¶ exhumed the bodies for additional research:¶ The purpose of the exhumation was to examine the remains in order to¶ determine ...residual radioactivity from past medical treatment, and that¶ the subjects had an unknown mixture of radioactive isotopes (Advisory¶ Committee on Human. Radiation Experiments 1995: 260).¶ Two willful lies are told in this memo: (1) that the subjects were treated, and¶ (2) that they had received an unknown quantity of radiation. The truth is this:¶ (a) the subjects were guinea pigs not expected to react favorably to the injections, and (b) internal records clearly showed how much plutonium had been¶ injected into their veins (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Rowland provides¶ further evidence of higher immorality when he wrote to his colleagues about¶ the exhumation project:¶ Please note that outside the Center ... we will never use the word¶ plutonium in regard to these cases. “These individuals are of interest to us¶ because they may have received a radioactive material at some time is the¶ kind of statement to be made, if we need to say anything at all” (Markey¶ Report 1986: 27).¶ (6) Illegal State Policies and Practices, while Committed by Individuals and¶ Groups of Individuals, Are Manifestations of the Attempt to Achieve¶ Organizational, Bureaucratic, or Institutional Goals¶ A recurrent theme has been that the harms caused by the state are due to the¶ actions of individuals or groups of individuals who are pursuing the larger¶ goals of their respective organizations. These larger institutional goals may¶ or may not be consistent with the goals of particular individuals. Rather¶ than viewing the harm to the victims of state crime as the result of a few¶ people engaging in immoral, unethical, and/or illegal behavior, it is more¶ instructive to conceptualize state crime as the product of organizational pressures to achieve organizational goals. Many forms of state crime persist for long periods of time (e.g., Iran-Contra, the economic embargo against¶ Cuba, institutionalized discrimination in the criminal justice system), and¶ are carried out by many different actors. If the unethical, immoral, and/or¶ illegal behavior in question were the result of a handful of people, then one¶ would presume that either the activities would desist once those people left¶ the organization or that there would be other people waiting to ﬁll those roles.¶ Since many state crimes persist over time with different people ﬁlling various¶ roles, one can only presume that either there are a lot of immoral people¶ who come into positions of power to carry out the immoral or unethical¶ behavior, or that there is something about the organizational culture itself¶ which fosters such immorality. In the best case, the organization itself has¶ a problem screening out immoral/unethical decision-makers. In the worst¶ case, the organizational climate itself fosters, facilitates, or encourages such¶ behavior (e.g., see Braithwaite 1989: Ermann and Lundman 1996).¶ Also, to reduce state crimes to the individual level is to ignore the¶ social, political, and historical contexts which shape the nature, form, and¶ goals of state agencies. Even a cursory examination of the various forms¶ of state crime reveals that these larger contexts are macrologically linked¶ to state crime victimization and offending. Sometimes these contexts are¶ exigent, such as when cold war hysteria provided motivation for illegal and¶ unethical human radiation experiments, weapons testing, and environmental¶ degradation. Other times, the crimes may be politically and geographically¶ contextualized (i.e., Cuba’s proximity to the U.S.). The state, therefore, may¶ be instrumental in creating and sustaining the conditions that account for the¶ persistence of institutional harms caused by its agencies.

#### Sanctions preclude the possibility of resolving hunger and suffering in Cuba by any alternative- this thought process is not created from ourselves, rather groups in Cuba themselves have been desiring such a process to resolve their ailments

Peter 2K- Philip, Policy Analyst for the Cato Institute (“A Policy toward Cuba That Serves

U.S. Interests”, November 2, 2000 [http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa384.pdf\\CLans](http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa384.pdf%5C%5CCLans))

A. Numerous agencies in Cuba have wanted a lifting of the embargo

B. Violate human rights violations the only way to resolve this is through removing the embargo because that is what constructed it to begin with

The economic and political isolation of Cuba was America’s goal in the early 1960s and, in spite of periodic tinkering, it remains the goal of policy today. With limited exceptions, the embargo bans trade, travel, and investment. Contacts between officials are kept to relatively low levels. The economic objective is to block hard currency flows that would benefit the Cuban government. The political aim has been to deny Cuba’s government any prestige or “political victory that might accompany improved relations. To reexamine this policy framework today it is useful to bear in mind five factors. First, any credible US. policy toward Cuba must place human rights at the forefront not simply to be true to American values but to keep faith with Cuban citizens who have stood up for human rights and who see dissent and free speech not as threats but as vital attributes of a strong, self-critical society. Second, current American policy finds little to no support in Cuba. In 1992 a pastoral letter from Cuba’s Catholic bishops said that the US embargo “directly affects the people who suffer the consequences in hunger and illness. If what is intended by this approach is to destabilize the government by using hunger and illness to pressure civic society to revolt then the strategy is also cruel.” In November 1999 a statement issued at ‘Encounter of Cuban Non-Government Organizations” said ‘We do not support nor do we seek actions from abroad that isolate Cuba. Whoever wishes to act with moral integrity, to respect our sovereignty, and to act in solidarity with Cuba should always demand both the end of the embargo and a democratic opening In Cuba.’ Oswaldo Paya leader of the Christian Liberation Movement, directed a message to Congress In 1996: The US economic embargo against Cuba. In all its expressions, goes against the will arid the needs of Cubans and for that reason it should end. We request that you take a first step, above all for justice and also to good faith toward the people of Cuba l lifting unconditionally, the embargo against Cuba In food and medicine. Another dissident group the Democratic Socialist Current, says that the embargo has allowed the Cuban government to present itself as the only defender of the Interests of a threatened nation.” “It only stands to reason that Cubans would hold this opinion; Cubans like America and people who have lived under communism have generally wanted to be connected to, not isolated from the United States. It may be that there are Cubans who support the embargo but are afraid to voice that opinion, but in hundreds of my own private conversations across that island I have never heard a Cuban express support for the embargo. Typically. Cubans associate relations with the United States with economic improvement, and they ask when relations might resume. Third, the policy denying hard currency earnings to the Cuban government carries a tradeoff: reduced American Influence. It is impossible to isolate Cuba without also erecting barriers between Americans and Cubans, cutting off a free flow of people activities, and ideas that could constitute a powerful source of American Influence in Cuba. Fourth the United States has little to lose by experimenting with different approaches to Cuba. It is now dear that the pressure of US economic sanctions will not bring down the Cuban government—and. 1f that policy had indeed worked,” It could have produced a social collapse and a migration crisis that would have been costly for both nations. Unless one views US sanctions merely as a means of expressing disapproval of the Cuban government, the policy has yielded very few measurable results, and the opportunity cost of change is negligible. Finally, the sanctions violate the rights of the American people to trade and travel that Americans enjoy in parts of the world that are not considered national security threats and that hardly have enviable human rights records.

### 1ac – plan

**The United States federal government ought to remove economic sanctions against Cuba.**

### 1ac – framing

#### Concrete political action is key – absent removal propaganda will dominate embargo debates

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However, it is difficult to speak of far-reaching generational change in attitudes, as some commentators do (and have for a long time) (e.g., Nordheimer 1988), when the drop in support of Cuban-Americans in favor of the embargo has decreased from 62.4 percent in 2000 to 56 percent in 2011. Nevertheless, the polls do confirm the trend displayed in the empirical analysis of this book that older Cuban-Americans with long residence in the United States tend to favor the embargo more strongly than younger and/or more recent community members do. Furthermore, the segment of the community in favor of the embargo continues to be better mobilized politically than the anti-embargo segment. Among registered Cuban-American voters, the percentage of embargo proponents rises to 64 percent in the 2011 FIU Cuba poll (FIU 2000c, 2011). As long as the embargo skeptics lag behind the embargo proponents in political mobilization, the former camp will likely continue to dominate the debate. Although the political landscape In the making of US Cuba policy has changed significantly since the year 2000 with regard to interest group advocacy and also, though much less, with regard to the interests represented in Congress, the political process has not swung in favor of a veritable overhaul of US dealings with Cuba. In addition to the discussed actors, this outcome can also be explained by looking at structural factors. ¶ This brings us to the third (and major) reason for continuity instead of change in US dealings with Cuba – the codification of the embargo in the mid-1990s through the so-called Helms-Burton bill. Based on this law, any attempt to substantially change US Cuba policy has to be approved by Congress. At the same time, Cuba remains an issue at the sidelines of the foreign policy debate. As long as no large coalition assembles and convinces a majority of members of Congress in both chambers its embrace a policy change, the embargo will stay in place. Given the political gridlock in Washington, which has prevented progress on much more urgent and “popular” issues, such as funding for government operations or the creation of jobs, the prospects for change are very slim as of summer 2013.

#### Sanctions are part of a bad approach to the world—the advocacy is the first step to changing policy

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The United States’ power-over mindset is not just evident in its direct relationship with Iraq, but also evident in the principles behind the institution of sanctions policy for security reasons. The security that is being prioritized is the security of those within the borders of the United States of America, and the quality of life that is being sacrificed is that of people outside those borders. The idea of national sovereignty as the location of the privilege of security is contrary to a feminist interpretation of international relations. While a feminist interpretation would not necessarily abolish the concept of the state, it would reject the prioritization of one state over another. The feminist interpretation would value equality above absolute security for the few, and would value understanding and cooperation over competitive power. Sanctions do not fit this model of understanding of the lack of hierarchy of people around the world. The feminist redefinition of power, as mentioned in Chapter 1, necessarily attacks the hierarchy involved in elitism, and dominant-subordinate relationships. Sanctions reinforce elitism in two ways. First, nations cannot have a sanctioner-sanctioned relationship without having a dominant-subordinate relationship. The sanctioner must be dominant, as coercion cannot be described in other terms but an attempt to assert dominance to force change. The sanctioned, even if it does not give into the demands of sanctions, is subordinated, as their quality of life and membership in the international community are damaged by the simple existence of sanctions. While the sanctioned may not give in, they are still subordinated by the destruction of sanctions, which they are powerless to do anything about. The dominant sanctioner makes the rules that the subordinate sanctioned is required to follow, or else. And the ‘or else’ is as subordinating as following the rules. Second, the dominant is fighting for control of the subordinate with the subordinate. Elites compete with non-elites for control of even the most meager things, as power- over is the sustaining breath of elitism. An ambiguity about the feminist recalculation of international relations’ relationship with sanctions is on the issue of national sovereignty. Jill Steans’ ideas about the problems of sovereignty as it relates to the prioritization of national interests, an area where we clearly can critique the sanctions policy. But this criterion is a double-edged sword, because national sovereignty is the reason that Saddam Hussein claims he has a right to stop United States’ weapons inspectors from coming into Iraq and looking for weapons. Still, there are differences between these concepts of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty that the United States utilizes in making sanctions policy is one that prioritizes the possible violation of the sanctity of its borders over the lives of millions of people who live outside of them. The concept of sovereignty that Iraq uses is requiring that another power cannot violate its borders for reasons ultimately damaging to Iraq’s security. In other words, Saddam Hussein’s claim to sovereignty is on balance defensive, and the United States’ claim to sovereignty is on balance aggressive. Also, I think that there is space for a feminist viewpoint concerning international relations to recognize Iraq’s claim to sovereignty and not to recognize the United States’ claim to sovereignty, even if they were equivalent. Because there is a constant power inequality in international relations between the United States and Iraq, where the United States is always more powerful. This power inequality is a barrier to the sort of interactions between nations that feminist international relations envisions. Recognizing the claim of Iraq while ignoring the claim of the United States would be a transgression against the normal power structures of international relations, a transgression that would contribute to the deconstruction of those structures. Recognizing that sanctions operate with a power-over mindset of international relations causes a feminist viewpoint of international relations to critique them. Stopping sanctions from being United States policy towards the sanctioned nations will be a step towards changing the unequal power dynamic between the United States and those nations.

#### Rejecting the embargo on the basis of ethical considerations of the cuban people is critical to reorienting government decisionmkaing away from its current util framework

A. Sanctions are immoral because they directly are formed to cause harm in order to create change

B. People that had nothing to do with being punished are in the center of punishment which utilitarianism can’t account for

Kochler 94 [Dr. Hans, International Press Organization and Professor of Philosophy, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, <http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm#I>, accessed 7/8/13]

Comprehensive economic sanctions which heavily impact the life and health of the civilian population need to be analyzed from an ethical standpoint before a normative evaluation of the current practice in international law can be undertaken. Indeed, comprehensive economic sanctions seem to be the "classical" instruments for inducing submission in the power politics of the so-called "New World Order"14 – and instruments whose permissibility must be critically examined from the standpoint of ethics as well as of international law. It does not of necessity follow that a measure praised as the panacea of power politics fulfills the requirements placed on a legitimate international order. In the first place, coercive measures like economic sanctions represent a form of collective punishment15 and thus do not comply with the ethical principle of individual responsibility, i. e. with the ability to attribute behaviour to an individual. The punishment of people not responsible for political decisions is most akin to a terrorist measure; the aim of such a measure is to influence the government's course of action by deliberately assaulting the civilian population.16 Purpose fully injuring the innocent is, however, an immoral act per se, one which cannot be justified by any construction of utilitarian ethics. In accordance with the conception of Thomas Aquinas, inquiring into the intention behind a particular decision is of decisive value for an ethical evaluation.17 In the present context, several conditions govern the moral permissibility of acts in which a morally questionable bad upshot is foreseen: (a) the intended final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it must be morally acceptable; (c) the foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some sense, intended); and (d) the good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot18, (that is, must be important enough to justify the bad upshot).19 The problematic nature of this utilitarian context of evaluation is plain to view. Are those who suffer under a certain measure to be viewed sympathetically as the victims of the pursuit of a good intention, or is their suffering to be regarded as the deliberate component of a strategy? This debate seems merely to invite hypocritical casuistry. The outcome for the affected population is one and the same. A "superficial" difference may only be discerned by an ethics of attitude from the viewpoint of the perpetrator. The latter appeases his conscience with reference to the unintentional but "inevitable" side effects. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect" was developed, following a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas.20 It was designed to help clarify ethical questions that arise when a morally good end can only be reached through inflicting harm upon other people.21 In the concrete instance of comprehensive economic sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the moral good that is aspired is the maintenance or restoration of international peace; the wrong that is thereby effected is the suffering of the civilian population (including sickness and death as results of the mass suffering that accompanies the breakdown in the distribution of essential commodities). According to Quinn's ethical analysis, it is necessary to take into account the relation which the aspired goal has to the foreseen wrong that results from it.22 In this context, Quinn refers to the difference between "terror bombing" and "strategic" bombing in war: in the first instance, the suffering of the civilian population is deliberately intended; in the second, the possibility that the population will suffer is merely tolerated. In the first instance, harm is directly inflicted, in the second case indirectly. (In accordance with the currently valid rules of international humanitarian law, which we will later examine more closely, terror bombings are strictly prohibited, for the civilian population is never allowed to be the direct target in a military conflict.) Economic sanctions, however, are in line with the first case mentioned above: harm is directly and deliberately inflicted so as to force the government to alter its course of action.

#### Utilitarianism destroys decision-making— it justifies atrocities in a framework of “necro-economics”

A. We always look at things as what is the lesser evil while in reality all evil should be rejected

B. It makes it ok to torture and cause people to suffer for things they didn’t know because it is “necessary” to maintain the current world order

**Weizman 11** [Eyal, Prof of visual and spatial cultures @ Goldsmiths, U of London, The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza, p. 8-10, accessed 9/12/13]

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measures are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.

#### Sanctions use the citizens of the target state as a means to an end—to effectuate political change—this never works and it justifies the sacrificing of whole populations to maintain or achieve order—this is the genocidal impulse

A. The theory of sanctions is flawed because when sanctions harm people it just causes the regime to hate the creator of those sanctions more and they become more authoritarian

B. We have become so desensitized through the use of sanctions we think it’s alright to kill hundreds of thousands of people to create the lesser evil

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In fact, as argued earlier, in a general sense, a major reason for the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions is a result of this conceptual confusion. In relation to the behavior modification objective, it was argued earlier that economic sanctions falsely assume that the people of the target state could pressure the regime to alter the offending policies and behavior. Many studies indicate that multilateral (or, for that matter, even unilateral) economic sanctions do not often force regimes to alter their conduct or policy. To add another voice to that general conclusion, below are comments from the Sub-Commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights: The "theory" behind economic sanctions is that economic pressure on civilians will translate into pressure on the Government for change. This "theory" is bankrupt both legally and practically, as more and more evidence testifies to the inefficacy of comprehensive economic sanctions as a coercive tool. The traditional calculation of balancing civilian suffering against the desired political effects is giving way to the realization that the efficacy of a sanctions regime is in inverse proportion to its impact on civilians. 94 This is not to say, of course, that sanctions are not economically effective—they are. They have devastating impacts on the target nation and its citizens, as the UN sanctions against Iraq and US trade embargoes against Cuba 95 [End Page 606] testify. The point here, rather, is that "the relation[ship] between economic effectiveness and political effectiveness is not at all clear; indeed, it may be an inverse relation." 96 An unaccountable regime will always externalize the cost from itself and its supporters to the ordinary citizens. And the power of the ordinary citizen to punish the regime for the consequences of the sanction is rather negligible, if not non-existent. A newspaper report on the effects of the decade old UN imposed sanctions against Iraq concluded that in Baghdad those sanctions have created two classes of people, a small group of citizens who are "close to the ruling circles" and who are still doing very well, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens "whose income has been so devalued that few . . . can afford a helping of chicken at al-Sa'ah [the equivalent of Kentucky Fried Chicken]." 97 Treating civilians in such circumstances effectively as "outlaws" is the cruelest form of indifference. Economic effectiveness does not correlate with political effectiveness. 98 Even in relation to the identity-constituting objective, many of the sanction regimes seem to be spectacularly unsuccessful. The image they project is not an international community that believes in the centrality of human rights as its very identity, but the opposite. Once again, consider Iraq. When the lives of many civilians, including many children, are put at risk or even lost as a result of sanctions, part of whose purpose is said, at least publicly, to be the protection of human rights, 99 the image (the identity) [End Page 607] of the international community becomes one that is quite willing to sacrifice the rights and lives of a considerable number of individuals from certain parts of the world to achieve certain political goals. For many individuals from developing countries and from non-western traditions, this suspicion gets strengthened when they hear statements such as the one from former US Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright. Albright was asked by Lesley Stahl of "60 Minutes" whether the death of a half-million people—which reports had suggested might have taken place—was an acceptable price for sanctions and Albrght responded: "we think the price is worth it." 100 The image of the international community is, therefore, one that devalues not only non-western traditions and horizons of significance, 101 but the very lives of non-western peoples as well. 102 A public attempt to dissociate oneself from evil ends up creating an even greater evil.

#### The way we approach Cuba has an profound impact through the international sphere

A. Spills over to how we deal with other countries

B. subsumes any alt causes because we overlook past US politices to formulate better ones and not just endlessly critique how the past has failed

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At a time when relations between Iran and the West have the potential to improve, after many years of antagonism, it is worth reflecting on the fact that relations between nations can contribute either to a climate of antagonism and war, or one of cooperation and peace that extends even beyond the countries in conflict. Nowhere is this truer than in the relationship between the United States and Cuba. Irrationality reigns. The trade embargo against Cuba, the most enduring in modern history, has been strongly criticized not only by those sympathetic to the Cuban regime but also by many leading US officials and legislators. In 2005, George P. Schultz, Secretary of State under President Ronald Reagan, called the continuing embargo “insane.” Now, by a vote 188 to 2, and for the 22nd time, the United Nations condemned the US blockade of Cuba. Former President Jimmy Carter says anti-Castro leaders in Florida have a major and exaggerated influence on the US presidential election in that battleground state. Carter, a severe critic of US policy on Cuba, estimates that most Cuban-Americans now want open borders and an end to the trade embargo. Before taking office, President Barack Obama declared that he wanted to recast long-hostile U.S.-Cuba relations. After Pope Benedict XVI’s 2012 visit to Cuba, the US Bishops called for an end to the embargo. The embargo has gained the US universal condemnation without making a dent in the Castro brothers’ policies. Paradoxically, in absolute terms, the embargo now costs the United States far more than it costs Cuba. The Cuban Policy Foundation (CPF), a US nonprofit organization dedicated to the study of the benefits of expanding trade and people-to-people contact with Cuba, estimated that up to $4.84 billion are lost annually by the US because of the restrictions on exports to Cuba. The Cuban government estimates that the embargo costs Cuba $685 million annually. Many Cubans consider the embargo a political measure that doesn’t respond to the wishes of the majority of Americans. The time is overdue to implement a diplomatic approach that would lead to the lifting of the embargo and the reestablishment of normal relations between both countries. If we can have normal relations with Vietnam, the reasoning goes, why not have them with Cuba?

#### Knowledge is controlled by neoconservatives and hacks—it allows unspeakable violence

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This book presents a little-known reality, equivocal, even consciously obscured, and in any case, underreported by the media that are charged with selecting and analyzing information. The mainstream media, multiple but unambiguous, hide a reality that Salim Lamrani is working to restore. Cuban “institutional specialists” and the “special envoys” in Havana certainly mention the existence of an “embargo” in their commentaries concerning the difficulties endured by the Cuban people. But they always mention it in the same way: as briefly and as vaguely as possible, through the turn of a phrase or even with a single word. They cannot deny, of course, the existence of the embargo, but in their analyses they treat it as though it hardly exists. Thus they see no need to recall its deplorable effects. They often fail even to name the country responsible for it. For them, the embargo is an incidental factor without importance, a mere circumstance devoid of meaning and consequence. When they deign to mention it, they turn it into an alibi or even a boon for Cuba. And, as Voltaire said, that “is exactly how history is written.” But what a strange coincidence this convergence is! Of course, one cannot contend—now less than ever—that the only cause of the present serious economic stagnation in Cuba is due to the blockade imposed by all U.S. administrations since 1960. The drastic reforms being carried out in Cuba prove the contrary. Still, some argue that the Cuban government has for decades used these unjust sanctions afflicting its people as propaganda designed to minimize its own errors and the shortcomings of its system. But if this were the case one would need to explain why the United States has not ended the sanctions. Indeed, ending the sanctions is something that a near-unanimous United Nations General Assembly asks it to do each year. In October 2010, for example, 187 states, with only two opposed (the United States and Israel) and three abstentions (Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau) once again demanded dropping the sanctions when they voted yes on the resolution titled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba.” Now, either the embargo is outdated, expensive and unnecessary, in which case those responsible should renounce it immediately, or, worse, the embargo is a convenient excuse for the Cuban government to hide its faults, in which case it would also seem judicious for its instigators to drop it. Yet they persist in maintaining it—Democrats as well as Republicans, Obama as well as Bush—in the face of world opinion, against the majority opinion of their own citizens, against the vital interests of a Cuban population victimized by this state of siege. How? Why? For what reason? Salim Lamrani is not content simply to underscore the human suffering caused by an embargo that was imposed in another century (think of the boycott of Haiti) and has ravaged the island for more than fifty years. He examines, point by point, the stages of its development and its effectiveness, places it in a historical context, and considers it from the perspective of international law. He has little difficulty in pointing out its iniquities. At the same time, he does this without pomposity and without acrimony. As is his habit, he rests his arguments on primary source materials, most of which are official documents published in the United States. In so doing, the author builds upon specific facts and dates, while presenting a wide range of official opinions. His tone is measured, even sober, but he is prolific in his exposition. Is all this too serious? The business at hand hardly lends itself to humor, but we can smile here and there while reading about the follies that the strict application of the embargo entails. In the words of American judges we learn, for example, that importing dolphins from, or selling pianos to, Cuba are actions detrimental to the interests and the internal security of the United States. Ridicule never kills. But the blockade does, certainly, by banning irreplaceable medicines from being exported to Cuba. Call it what you will—blockade—or embargo—the economic sanctions leveled against Cuba are groundless. The pretexts Washington uses to justify them go up in smoke one by one. Furthermore, who can seriously pretend that Cuba has menaced or might represent a menace to the United States? We all know which country has been the aggressor throughout history and which has been aggressed, notably since 1959. We are also quite aware that the Bay of Pigs, where mercenaries tried to land in 1961, is in Cuba and not in California. We also know, or should know, that when New York’s Twin Towers were brought down, the Cuban government immediately offered help, and when Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, Cuban authorities spontaneously offered their disinterested aid. All this occurred despite the tightening of the embargo. The undisputed success Cuba has achieved in the fields of education and health, culture and sports, has been achieved in spite of the embargo, the cost of which, aside from the expenses generated by the various aggressions and menaces of armed intervention, was evaluated in October 2010 by the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bruno Rodriguez, at more than $750 billion (current value) for the past fifty years. This is money that could have paid off many public debts, beginning with those of Cuba. Despite the incongruity of this permanent state of siege and the enormity of the suffering it causes, the author does not use overly emotional language nor is he ironic nor does he resort to invective. He even shows some consideration for President Barack Obama and acknowledges the positive steps he has taken to loosen travel restrictions on Cuba. But how much more his reputation would be burnished were he to order the lifting of the embargo! The Nobel Peace Prize he received somewhat prematurely would then appear to have been justified. France, through its representative to the United Nations, regularly votes in favor of the resolution that advocates lifting the embargo. But the commitment of France ends there. Elsewhere, in Africa or Asia, France advocates for the environment and follows an aggressive policy for “the protection of civilian populations” that it applies, unfortunately, in a quite arbitrary manner. Salim Lamrani does not tell us what we should do. But his rigorous exposé would be in vain if friends of justice and the rule of law did not seize upon it. We must circulate this book, which is at once strong and relentless. We must indignantly pursue this state of siege, struggle against it, and contribute to its unconditional end

#### Even if this stance of unconditional hospitality is impossible to legislate, we should constantly attempt to make society more open to the other – ending the drive to spread American democracy is necessary to end cultures of xenophobia which demonize Latin America.

Brock Bahler, Spring-xx-2010, Duquesne University, Philosophy, Graduate Student, “Derridean Hospitality in an Age of Political Xenophobia,” http://www.academia.edu/2235169/Derridean\_Hospitality\_in\_an\_Age\_of\_Political\_Xenophobia

The Cult(ure)ivation of Fear Consequently, however, we are not a nation of people who know how to practice philoxenia, despite how much we claim to give to non-profit organizations or to foreign aid. Instead, we have opted for a culture of xenophobia instead. Fear drives the installation of security systems, fenced-in homes, and our ever-increasingly private lives. Fear is what sells our newspapers, drives our political policies, and often ultimately influences our vote. Rather than a culture of welcoming the stranger, we have witnessed a cultivation of fear. Insidious in our thinking is a belief that anything foreign is dangerous and ought to be feared. As a result, much of the inflammatory rhetoric in the public square is aimed at spreading distrust and a complete dismissal of the other rather than willingness for open dialogue. Such rhetoric can be clearly seen in the speech revolving around terrorism and American foreign policy with the Middle East, the issue of immigration and undocumented immigrants in the United States, and most recently in the 2008 presidential campaign. A common view pervades our culture, for instance, that all Muslims support terrorism, and that the Middle East is in desperate need of American democracy. Such views have led to the mistreatment of Muslim and Arab-native people in our country, and in the blacklisting and deportation of some of them. It can be observed in the way “being Arab” has become a kind of racial slur in our society. And this xenophobia is evidenced in the up-to-date tally of U.S. military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan while there is virtually no report of the possibly 1.3 million Iraqis who have died since the American occupation in 2003 and millions of others who have fled from their homes.9 Xenophobia can be seen in the way many people have responded to the problem of undocumented workers, particularly in those who are convinced “those Mexicans”—as if every one of them is from Mexico—are going to steal our jobs and force us to all learn Spanish, and that the only proper response is to round them up and ship them home. Convinced that to be “all-American” is to be White and English-speaking, there exists a large portion of our population who are wary of the foreign tongues and faces of immigrants. This white supremacist thinking is exhibited in the comments of Pat Buchanan, for instance, who said that the diverse immigration population that is eradicating a white majority in the U.S. will bring about a “Third World America.” Such convictions have not only led to the subhuman treatment of undocumented workers but have also made it more difficult for refugees, individuals seeking asylum, and immigrants to obtain U.S. citizenship. This culture of xenophobia seems no more vivid in our imagination currently than in how it has been portrayed in the finally over 2008 presidential campaign. Numerous Republicans utilized countless fear tactics to try to deter people from voting for our new President, Barack Obama. They chanted his middle name “Hussein” in order to incite distrust and fear into Americans. They fabricated lies that Obama is a Muslim— which, again, would having a Muslim as President really be such a bad thing? In fact, Rush Limbaugh went so far as to say that Obama was not American but was an Arab (codeword for “Muslim,” which is then a codeword for “terrorist”) and came from an Arab part of Africa. His comment not only encourages the breeding of a culture of fear, but it is simply not true—Kenya (even though Obama is not “from” Kenya) is in sub-Saharan Africa, where, ironically enough, the national language is English and 90% of its population identify themselves as Christian. Obama has been said to “pal around with terrorists,” has been called a socialist, a Marxist, and a communist—as if all of these terms were synonymous and were somehow evil in themselves. He has been called unpatriotic and un-American (i.e., not White), and even the anti-Christ. This billowing racist neo-McCarthyism is expounded with the view in mind that Obama, because of his blackness, is somehow not one of us, is mysterious and strange—is the enemy—and we ought to do everything to shore up our defenses against those who may take away what we hold to be “American.” Indeed, one article which noted the many hate crimes which occurred after Obama won the election—from campaign signs vandalized to schoolchildren chanting “Assassinate Obama”—cited how there is “a large subset of white people…who feel that they are losing everything they know, that the country their forefathers built has somehow been stolen from them” because of the results of this election. One man went so far as to say, “If you had real change it would involve all the members of (Obama's) church being deported” (Washington).10 The (Im)Possibility of a Politics of Hospitality What then can be said about the state of our nation and its need for hospitality? Derrida himself made it extremely clear he did not think it possible to legislate unconditional hospitality. Nations, governments, & communities have multiple ethical obligations constantly interfering with and overriding each other. Nations are just as equally obligated to create asylums for the stranger, the orphan, and the widow as they are to protect against the threat of terrorism, for example. In other words, Derrida The American Future: www.American-Future.com writes, “Hospitality is doomed to be conditional and limited—and therefore violent” (Smith 70). But even if unconditional hospitality cannot be legislated—which is undesirable in many ways—it nonetheless is the very thought which allows us to think of the idea of alterity and is, therefore, “the condition of the political” (Borradori 129). In other words, all of our limited kinds of hospitality, no matter how fractured or discriminating they are, can only be conceptualized in light of unconditional hospitality. As Derrida states, “If we want to understand what hospitality means, we have to think of unconditional hospitality, that is, openness to whomever, to any newcomer” (Derrida, Caputo, & Kearney 304).11 Furthermore, unconditional hospitality is like a specter haunting us from the future, reminding us that we have yet to arrive at “real” democracy, that democracy is always “to come.” Unconditional hospitality, then, haunts us as a healthy reminder that, for Derrida, the “(essential) opposition between the unconditional ideal and the conditions of reality, does not issue in either complacency or despair; rather, [it] finds in this disparity a call and a challenge: to make laws more hospitable” (Smith 70). It is an ideal that should permeate our life and political practice in such a way that it breaks forth as justice through the cracks of the law. What then are some ways in which unconditional hospitality can challenge our laws and stretch our current thresholds of hospitality? A formidable response to the complex matter of the proliferate racism in America would require far more than this paper can offer, but it is safe to say that such acts and attitudes should be roundly condemned. And the notion that there exists an essential, unified “American identity” that ought to be preserved—whether that consists of being White, Christian, English speaking, pro-war, or pro-capitalist—ought to be seriously questioned.

## 2ac

### 2ac – embargo

#### Intervening actors check all impacts—can’t be responsible for events beyond our direct control

Gewirth 83 (Alan, philosopher, *Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications*, p 230-231)

A third distinction is between respecting other persons and avoiding bad consequences. Respect for persons is an obligation so fundamental that it cannot be overridden even to prevent evil consequences from befalling some persons. If such prevention requires an action whereby respect is withheld from persons, then that action must not be performed, whatever the consequences. One of the difficulties with this important distinction is that it is unclear. May not respect be withheld from a person by failing to avert from him some evil consequence? How can Abrams be held to respect the thousands of innocent persons or their rights if he lets them die when he could have prevented this? The distinction also fails to provide for degrees of moral urgency. One fails to respect a person if one lies to him or steals from him; but sometimes the only way to prevent the death of one innocent person may be by stealing from or telling a lie to some other innocent person. In such a case, respect for one person may lead to disrespect of a more serious kind from some other innocent person. 7. None of the above distinctions, then, serves its intended purpose of defending the absolutist against the consequentialist. They do not show that the son’s refusal to tortures his mother to death does not violate the other persons’ rights to life and that hes is not morally responsible for their deaths. Nevertheless, the distinctions can be supplemented in a way that does serve to establish these conclusions. The required supplement is provided by the principle of the intervening action. According to this principle, when there is a causal connection between some person A’s performing some action (or inaction) X and some other person C’s incurring a certain harm Z, A’s moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between X and Z, there intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or show produces Z through recklessness. The reasons for this removal is that B’s intervening action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike A’s action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs. An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations. By the principle of the intervening action, however, it was King’s opponents who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks.

### 2ac – appeasement

#### Zero theoretical basis for appeasement

Paul Huth, Autumn 1997. Director of Research at CIDCM as well as a professor in the Government and Politics Department at the University of Maryland. “Reputations and Deterrence: a Theoretical and Empirical Assessment,” Security Studies 7.1.

THE NUMBER of studies which have either focused on reputations as an explanatory variable, or treated reputations as one of several causal variables in tests of deterrence theory, is limited. These studies have employed both comparative case-study methods as well as statistical analyses of larger datasets, and the predominant focus has been on reputations for resolve as opposed to reputations for military strength. 20 A number of conclusions can be drawn from these studies: 1) Lack of Support for Schelling. There is weak support for the strong interdependence-of-commitments argument that potential attackers infer reputations for defender states based on the latter's prior behavior in disputes with other states across a broad range of geographic locations. Huth and Russett in their statistical analysis of fifty-four cases of extended deterrence from 1900 to 1980, found that the past behavior of the defender in disputes with other states had no significant impact on deterrence outcomes. 21 Mercer, in his analysis of the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 as well as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908—9 did not find a clear or consistent pattern of European leaders inferring reputations from previous crisis outcomes. 22 Ted Hopf, in his study of U.S. foreign policy victories and defeats in the Third World from 1965 to 1990, concluded that Soviet assessments of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrent commitments in Europe and Asia were essentially unaffected by U.S. behavior in the Third World.

#### Syria thumps the link- Obama gave concessions to a rogue regime that he had previously took a stance against

**Obama’s appeasing cuba**

**Diaz-Balart ‘12** (Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart represents the 21st congressional district in South Florida; August 21, 2012; “Mario Diaz-Balart: Obama has Pursued Policy Appeasement”; Fox News Latino; http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/08/21/mario-diaz-balart-obama-has-pursued-policy-appeasement-toward-castro-regime/)

These compliments – and the fact that they were not disavowed by the White House – come as no surprise, given President Obama’s appeasing stance regarding anti-American totalitarian regimes. Since he took office in January 2009, President Obama has pursued a policy of appeasement toward the totalitarian Cuban dictatorship. Despite the Castro brothers’ harboring of international terrorists and their increasingly relentless oppression of the Cuban people, President Obama weakened U.S. sanctions and has increased the flow of dollars to the dictatorship. In response, the Castro brothers amped up their repression of the Cuban people and imprisoned American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross for the “crime” of taking humanitarian aide to Cuba’s small Jewish community. Clearly, President Obama is not concerned about the threat posed by the Cuban dictatorship, nor has he manifested genuine solidarity with the pro-democracy aspirations of the Cuban people. - U.S. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. The Cuban people are protesting in the streets and demanding freedom. But rather than supporting the growing, courageous pro-democracy movement, President Obama instead has chosen to appease their oppressors. While President Obama claims that his policies aim to assist the oppressed Cuban people, his actions betray that he is not on their side. You cannot credibly claim to care about the oppressed while working out side deals with their oppressors and welcoming the oppressors’ elite into the United States with open arms. And you cannot claim to support political prisoners while increasing the flow of dollars to their jailers. The failures of the Obama administration in Cuba are not an isolated foreign policy failure. Around the world, President Obama has taken an approach of appeasement when it comes to some of our most virulent enemies. In addition to Cuba, from Iran to Syria to Venezuela, President Obama has shown an unwillingness to stand firm when anti-American forces threaten our interests, and his weakness has emboldened America’s enemies. If we are going to reassert our position in the world, we need a change at the top.

#### No link- the plan bolsters United States anti-communist cred

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(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, <http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran>, google scholar)//KW

The continuance of the embargo has incited widespread international condemnation of the Untied States. The United Nations General Assembly has consistently denounced the imposition of the embargo almost unanimously on the basis of its illegitimacy and violation of internationally accepted humanitarian standards. (Herrera, 2003, 50) The United States has also recently had to relinquish its seats on the human rights commissions both in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States, which many analysts believe to be a form of retribution aimed at the United States in response to its continuation of the Cuban embargo in the midst of its unfathomable and deplorable effects on the Cuban populace. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Many leaders in the international community have expressed their distain for the U.S. embargo through international organizations based on the fact that the United States attempts to impose the sanctions it places on Cuba via “extraterritoriality,” or against the international community, thus clearly violating internationally-accepted standards of national sovereignty and international law (Herrera, 2003, 51). Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.

### 2ac – shunning

#### Shunning is immoral—it uses people as *means to an end*.

Gordon 99 — Joy Gordon, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Fairfield University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Yale University and a J.D. from Boston University, 1999 (“A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions,” *Ethics & International Affairs*, Volume 13, Issue 1, March, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Wiley Online Library, p. 138-139)

To the extent that commentators have pondered the question of why sanctions are still used—and why they are justified—they have generated two main responses: expression and punishment. Galtung and Lundborg, in documenting the failure of sanctions to achieve compliance with the stated political objectives, argue that sanctions should not be seen as "instrumental."41 Sanctions are not really designed to achieve compliance, they assert, but rather are "expressive." A government may consider sanctions useful if they serve to "declare its position to internal and external publics or help win support at home or abroad."42 It is common enough to hear sanctions discussed in these terms—"It's important that we send a message that this type of conduct is unacceptable to the international community."43 If we view sanctions in this light, then they are no longer a failure. For example, after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, President Carter imposed a grain embargo on the USSR, which President Reagan lifted in 1981. The Soviets did not withdraw from Afghanistan until 1988.44 If we look at sanctions from an instrumental point of view, they were clearly a failure. But sanctions could also "be interpreted as having been motivated in part by a desire to signal resolve and leadership to the domestic public during an election year," Nossal observes, suggesting that as an act of expression, the sanctions were in fact successful.45

However, "sending a message," while ordinarily a legitimate undertaking for a state, becomes ethically problematic if the means of communication consist of depriving vulnerable sectors of a foreign population of basic necessities. While sanctions against aggression might be justified on utilitarian grounds, sanctions as a means of sending a message cannot claim the same moral legitimacy. And while deontological ethics might not be able to raise a particular objection to sanctions that prevent aggression—since in either case, some innocent population will suffer—the same cannot be said of sanctions as expression. Where "sending [end page 138] a message" or "signaling resolve" or "expressing outrage" is the purpose of sanctions, the sanctions patently entail the use of human beings as simply a means to an end; human suffering becomes merely a device of communication. Thus the purpose is unacceptable on deontological as well as utilitarian grounds.

### 2ac – capitalism

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

**Political rhetoric frames our understanding of political reality.**

**Whisnant 12** Associate Professor of EuropeanHistory (Clayton, November 10, 2012, “Foucault & Discourse,” http://webs.wofford.edu/whisnantcj/his389/foucault\_discourse.pdf)//DR. H

**Discourse creates a world.** By shaping our perceptions of the world, pulling together chains of associations that produce a meaningful understanding, and then organizing the way we behave towards objects in the world and towards other people, one might say that discourse generates the world of our everyday life. After all, even though science teaches us that the “real world” is the material world made up of atoms and energy, in a real way the world for most of us is a world of colors, emotions, ideas, and life. It is a kind of virtual world generated by our minds, but not by us alone—we construct this world socially through a complex interaction between experience, upbringing, and education. Discourses, as chains of language that bind us social beings together, play a key role in the social construction of reality.

 **Discourse generates knowledge and “truth.”** Discourse constitutes not only the world that we live in, but also all forms of knowledge and “truth.” Knowledge for Foucault (as for most other structuralists and poststructuralists) was not something that existed independently of language. In other words, knowledge is not simply communicated through language; all knowledge is organized through the structures, interconnections, and associations that are built into language. Foucault would even go so far as to say that discourse generates truth—or what some have called truth-effects. Certain discourses in certain contexts have the power to convince people to accept statements as true. This power can have no relation to any objective correctness of the statement. The medical practice of leeching was accepted in the eighteenth century as helpful despite the harmful affects that we recognize today because it was embedded in a network of ancient medical discourses that many accepted as “true.” Likewise, many medical practices commonly accepted today might have seemed like madness or even barbaric because they had no discursive support.

 **Discourse says something about the people who speak it.** Discourse communicates knowledge not only about the intended meaning of the language, but also about the person speaking the discourse. By analyzing the discourse a speaker uses, one can often tell things about the speaker’s gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class position, and even more specifically the speaker’s implied relationship to the other people around him. Medical discourse, for example, gives doctors the authority to speak, thereby placing them in a position of power over their patients. Foucault was particularly interested in looking at modes of discourse that not everyone had a right to use, or that require specific locations to gain authority. 11

A sermon that would be right at home behind a church lectern might produce only an awkward silence if given at a party. And a certified lawyer acquires a certain right to speak legal discourse in a courtroom setting through a complex system of education, a series of exams, and network of state controls.

 **Discourse and Power.** This brings us to the fourth way that discourse operates, namely by being intimately involved with socially embedded networks of power. Because certain types of discourse enable specific types of individuals to “speak the truth,” or at the very least to be believed when speaking on specific subjects, discourses also give these individuals degrees of social, cultural, and even possibly political power. Doctors are generally believed when they talk about physical or mental illnesses, and this gives them an authority to recommend courses of action or patterns 11 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 50. of behavior. In many societies, and for long stretches of Western history, religious authorities wielded tremendous social and political power because they had the power to speak about the divine. This power was caught up with their specific position, but was also based on the fact that religious discourse suffused all of life, shaping social organization and influencing how people interpreted the world.

#### Colonization drove capitalism – necessarily means resolving a colonialist policy like the embargo comes first- also means sequencing da to the alternative not the permutation

Mignolo, Duke University Professor of Literature and Romance Studies 5 (Walter, “The Idea of Latin America”, BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, pg. 49 igm)

What happened has much to do with the increasing complicity of Christianity (and Christian knowledge) with the force of developing capitalism and its consequences in the cultural industry: map making, book publishing and circulation, the authority of the printed book, etc. Without that partnership, the outcome of capitalism and the world in which we are living in today, with the Americas, would have certainly been different. History is an institution that legitimizes the telling of stories of happenings simultaneously silencing other stories, as well as stories of the silence of histories. 18 How did Christianity and capitalism come together in America? Indeed, Christianity and capital came together before, more clearly toward the middle of the fifteenth century. But America propelled capital into capitalism. How come? Again, the massive appropriation of land, massive exploitation of labor, and massive slave trade came together with a common goal (to produce the commodities of a global market, from gold to tobacco and sugar) and a dramatic consequence (the expendability – dispensability – of human lives in the pursuit of commodity production and capital accumulation). Capital turned into capitalism when the radical changes in land appropriation, labor exploitation, and massive commodity production were conceived in the rhetoric of modernity as an advancement of humanity (in the eighteenth century, Adam Smith would be the first in theorizing political economy starting from the Atlantic commercial circuits). The consequences of the conversion of capital into capitalism were the devaluation of human lives and and the naturalization of human expendability. That is the beginning of a type of racism that is still well and alive today(as evidenced in the treatment of immigrants in Europe and the US, as well as the expendability of people’s lives in Iraq).

#### Sanctions are economic bullying—only the superpowers have the ability to hurt growing nations to make the rich richer and the poor poorer

Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99

[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 136-137 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13,]

Large and diversified economies are virtually immune to sanctions, since they have the economic flexibility to pay higher costs in the short run, and to make structural changes in the long run.sq Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott note that nations with weak or unstable economies therefore make the best targets for economic sanctions. In a section entitled “The Weakest Go to the Wall,” they argue that “there seems to be a direct correlation between the political and economic health of the target country and its susceptibility to economic pressure,” and suggest that their data “demonstrate that countries in distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to succumb to coercion by the sender country. “3s They conclude with a list of “dos and don’ts” for those imposing sanctions, including “Do pick on the weak and helpless. “3s Their analysis of the cases indicates that sanctions are most effective when the target is much smaller than the country imposing sanctions, and economically weak and politically unstable. In successful cases, the average sender’s economy was 187 times larger than that of the average target.37 Thus, sanctions offer themselves solely as mechanisms that strong nations with large economies, or international alliances including strong nations with large economies, can effectively use against countries with weak or import-dependent economies, or countries with unstable governments. The reverse is not true— sanctions are not a device realistically available to small or poor nations that can be used with any significant impact against large or economically dominant nations, even if the latter were to, say, engage in aggression or human rights violations, or otherwise offend the international community. This has been obvious since the reformulation of sanctions as a tool of international law.38 Therefore, there is a danger that sanctions will be used “opportunistically” by powerful nations39 —for example, as a response by a superpower to its declining economic hegemony. Here we can understand the particular enthusiasm the United States holds for sanctions; the sheer size of the U.S. economy means that sanctions can be imposed at little cost to itself, and with no likelihood that any other nation could retaliate in kind. It would seem that we have lost altogether the rationale for sanctions that was articulated in the formation of the League of Nations, It may be that sanctions, and the attendant harm to innocents, can be justified as an alternative to actual warfare; but in order to justify this choice on utilitarian grounds, we would have to have reason to believe that sanctions in fact obtain compliance by the target state. If not, then they simply constitute the gratuitous imposition of suffering on a helpless population, for no ethically defensible reason.

#### There’s no alternative- chinese fill-in ensures mercantilism

**Posen, 9** - Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,”<http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf>)

In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success.  These facts enabled the US to promote economic opennessand buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration.  With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, andunderpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries offollowing the American model and playing by American rules.   Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.  With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades.  The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order.  While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed.  In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come.    Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements.   First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia.  Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western Europe.  The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership.  The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions.  One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s.  This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven.  The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well.  This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice.  That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets.  Thus,American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-termby the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism.  This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge.  Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally).  Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West.  That would be premature.  The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation.  Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category.  A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption.   Though the relative rise ofthe major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being.  None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power.  These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation.  This last point is key.  In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative.The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism.  There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system.  While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another.  Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example.  Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths.  If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system.  That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years.  It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country's detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.

#### Alt can’t solve and neolib inevitable – Cuba government can’t be convinced to bail on neoliberalism

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“The Ideological Success of Neoliberalism in Cuba” – Havana Times – April 29, 2012

http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=68708#sthash.tWIio2fK.dpuf

Despite this, we know that the Cuban government has affected a neoliberal shift in its reform policies. Nonetheless, even today it’s difficult to find a direct connection between the socioeconomic “reforms” implemented by the government and fundamentals of international neoliberalism. The similarities, which clearly exist, fail to form a definite pattern of neoliberal-style economic and social policy. This is why it’s so difficult to follow the economic moves of the political elite in their desperate retreat toward the deregulation of the economy. However at the ideological level, this complicity is apparent. It’s at this level that **neoliberalism has become hegemonic in Cuba.** The ideological foundations of neoliberalism have achieved a tremendous success in the sphere of the government on the island. The authorities have proclaimed the deregulation of Cuba’s economy as inevitable, as they quietly accept the consolidation of inequality as well as decreased social spending and the renunciation of full employment as a goal. These are basic principles of neoliberalism, ones reflected by measures which they say should guide economic policy over the times to come .**The government is *convinced* that neoliberalism has won the ideological battle** on the field of international relations, despite its economic and social failures. Because of this they are paving the way for a future of the radicalized application of its principles of economic deregulation and social inequality.

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