## 1ac

### 1ac – china

#### China is hurting Mexican manufacturing now - the plan is key to revitalizing the industry and relations

Gallagher and Dussel 14- Kevin, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, Co-director of the Global Economic Governance Initiative, Enrique, Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Director of the Center for China-Mexico Studies (“How China crashed the Nafta party”, January 2, 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/jan/02/china-crashed-nafta-party-free-trade\\CLans

According to western tradition, the gift for the 20th anniversary of a union is china. But, two decades on from the trade nuptials enshrined in the the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), China is the uninvited guest that has walked away with many of the gifts. In 1993, pro-Nafta Washington thinktanks, such as the Peterson Institute for International Economics, went so far as to say that the agreement would lead to a trade surplus with Mexico for the US, while also providing huge benefits for the Mexican economy. The US had a trade surplus with Mexico in 1994, but since 1995 the US has had an annual trade deficit with Mexico. On the Mexican side, GNI per capita economic growth is now barely one percentage point higher than when Nafta came into force. What has happened since then? Nafta has had at least two phases. In the first (1994-2000) it increased trade, investments, productivity and overall integration, with positive effects in employment and production in several export-oriented sectors in Mexico. In the second phase since 2000, however, Nafta turned sour. Its negotiators in the early 1990s did not anticipate the rise of Asia and particularly of China. Looking back, our research shows that China has significantly penetrated many of the new markets opened by Nafta. In a paper published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, we document the extent to which Chinese products have taken away market share in the US, and how China has begun to take Mexican markets from the US as well. From 1994 to 2001, Mexico had a honeymoon with the US. No other country enjoyed the same proximity and trade preferences. Although trade increased significantly between the two countries, it failed to translate into per capita income growth and rising employment and wages in Mexico. The honeymoon ended in 2001 when China entered the World Trade Organisation and began to enjoy similar access to the US market. We find that by 2009, 84% of Mexico's manufacturing exports to the US were under threat from China. By threat we mean sectors where China is gaining market share and Mexico is losing it. We also find that 96% of US exports to Mexico are under threat from China. In 2000, the US supplied Mexico with 60.8% of its office machine and computer imports and 70% of the peripheral parts for those machines. Ten years later, the US held only 10% of the Mexican import market in each sector. By contrast, China held 13% of the office machine import market and 5% of the parts market in Mexico in 2000, and, nine years later, it had 48% and 58% of those markets respectively. Simple economics would lead one to think this would be a benefit for Mexico – as the inputs for its electronic industry decreased because imports from China are cheaper than from the US. This should lead to productivity gains and more exports to the States. China and Mexico supplied the US about 5% of the US computer market in 2000; by 2009 China had more than half that market and Mexico did not budge. We performed in-depth case studies alongside this statistical work that further confirm our findings. The yarn-textile-garment chain – similar to furniture, toys and most of Mexico's manufacturing sector – is symbolic in losing more than 50% of its employment since 2000. The US has become an additional loser, since it is the major supplier of Mexican exports. The automobile parts and assembly chain is a big exception in the competition with China, in the US market and in Mexico. Since the beginning of Nafta, Mexico's exports in the US have strengthened, with levels above 30%, while China's share has remained relatively low, mainly for domestic reasons: China's consumption in the auto sector has been dynamic and above its production, in other words the potential for exports has been low. This, however, will change as China's auto companies follow the lead set by other Chinese global multinationals. This is the hangover that will be felt long after the 20th anniversary party. The only remedy will be couples' therapy. From Mexico's vantage point the "Asia pivot" is seen as cheating on a partner. The region needs to revitalise its relationship: it is time to start a conversation about collective financing mechanisms, exchange-rate co-ordination, and strategic sectors for the Nafta region so it can negotiate and see itself as a larger block. That would give us something to celebrate.

#### Neito tax reform uniquely places sustainability at risk—

Replogle 9-20-13 Jill Replogle, Fronteras Reporter, KPBS “Mexico Fiscal Reform Could Be Bad For Maquiladoras” [<http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/sep/20/mexico-fiscal-reform-could-be-bad-maquiladoras/>] [MG]

The maquiladora export industry that’s a key component of the U.S.-Mexico border economy could face major changes under proposed reforms to Mexico’s tax system. Mexico currently collects fewer taxes from its citizens and companies than almost any other developed country. Mexico relies heavily on revenues from its state-run oil industry, which is in decline. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto wants to change this. One way he wants to do it is by tightening control over the country’s vast maquiladora export industry. Factories that make and export goods to the U.S. and other foreign markets currently don’t pay taxes on their raw materials and machinery. But that would change under the proposed reform. Maquiladoras would have to pay the normal 16 percent sales tax on their raw materials and then request a refund of that money when they export the final product. That would require exporters to invest a lot more cash up front, said Héctor Vega, a tax partner with Deloitte Mexico. It could erase some of the advantage Mexico has over its manufacturing competitors, Vega said. “Because we are very close to the U.S., it’s very natural doing business,” he said. “However, this 16 percent will impact a lot and maybe determinate where you put your investment, either in China, either in Vietnam, either in Malaysia or keep it in Mexico.” Still, Vega is hopeful that the tax change affecting maquiladoras will ultimately be stripped from the final fiscal reform bill.

#### Collapse threatens national security—altering engagement policy is critical to sustain it

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The Mexican maquiladora industry is rapidly losing market share to Asian competitors that dramatically undercut them in terms of labor cost. The decline of these assembly-for-export factories will result in instability along the U.S.-Mexico border and will prove to be a serious national security issue for the United States. This paper leverages Design theory to frame the problems surrounding Mexico’s maquiladora industry in order to develop an understanding of this complex adaptive system. It examines the wide range of actors involved in the system, focusing on their goals, motivations and conflicting tendencies. Finally, the paper recommends courses of action for U.S. and Mexican leaders that will mitigate the resulting instability in the Mexican northern border states. The economic stability of Mexico will always be a national security priority for the United States. The two nations share a border of nearly 2,000 miles, and trade between them is worth billions of dollars. To take advantage of this relationship, the Mexican government created a series of customs and trade policies specifically designed to enhance its economic ties to the U.S. For decades, such policies greatly benefited Mexico’s maquiladoras, factories that import raw materials, rapidly combine them into finished products, and export them to the American market. Unfortunately for Mexico, the strong advantages in low-cost labor and speedy delivery are gradually being eroded by similar programs in China and Southeast Asia. As U.S. companies look to Asia for more profitable business relationships, the Mexican government has done little to alter its customs and trade policies in response. A severe economic blow to the maquiladoras along the U.S. border would have dramatic effects on the stability of the area, affecting both Mexican and American national security interests. The governments of Mexico and the United States should therefore take preemptive measures to mitigate the instability that is arising as the maquiladoras lose their viability under new global economic pressures. These measures include altering customs and trade policies, providing economic incentives in order to transform the Mexican export industry, and creating labor opportunities for Mexicans within the United States. In order to support this thesis, the following paper will leverage Design Theory to examine the current situation in the Mexican maquiladora industry, identify problems in terms of potential impacts to U.S. national security, and propose possible courses of action for both American and Mexican decision-makers.

#### This threatens the entire relationship and causes industries to shift toward China—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

The Problem Frame highlights the issues that must be addressed in order to transform current conditions into the desired end state.25 In this case, the desired end state is a more stable economy in the northern Mexican states, free from the current stress brought about by the decline in the maquiladora industry. Since 60% of Mexican maquiladoras operate in the border states, this end state is a key factor in the stability of the border area for both the United States and Mexico.26 Additionally, 80% of all Mexican exports are to the United States, making this relationship extremely important.27 It is in the best interest of these nations to take action to reach this end state. In order to develop future courses of action that create conditions conducive for the desired end state, the current challenges that currently exist in this system must be examined. The three major challenges to reaching the desired end state are connected to flaws in the Mexican export industry, specifically its inability to respond to global competition, its overreliance on the American market, and its lack of complexity. A fourth challenge is connected to the free flow of labor in this region. These challenges are obstacles in the path to a stable and secure northern Mexico. First of all, Mexico’s response to increased competition for its maquiladoras has been completely inadequate. Over the past decade, China has presented an attractive alternative to Mexican maquiladoras in terms of labor costs. In 2008, Chinese hourly manufacturing wages were estimated nearly 75% cheaper than those in Mexico.28 For over a decade, Chinese factories have been able to assemble goods of equal quality as the maquiladoras, but now they can provide greater quality control and better physical infrastructure.29 As drug violence continues in Mexico, security has become a greater decision point for businesses as well, and many are concerned that investing in Mexico is a risk.30 Mexico’s two main responses to this situation have been extremely inadequate and have not improved the overall situation. The Mexican government’s first response was to escalate anti-Chinese rhetoric, even working to delay China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.31 This merely delayed the inevitable and resolved nothing. Later, driven by the need to compete with China, Mexican factories laid off personnel and cut worker salaries in order to reduce labor costs.32 Considering the weak global economy, this unfortunate move added pressure to an already-stressed workforce. The resultant increases in unemployment and underemployment, combined with reduced salaries, will increase instability in the region as people are driven to crime, either as victims or participants.33

#### US reliance on Chinese technology for military purposes undermines its capability and allows for Chinese espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Another way that China is gaining a strategic advantage over the U.S. is by getting the U.S. military to become increasingly dependent upon them. According to Forbes, now the U.S. military is even leasing a Chinese satellite for communications purposes… American dependence on China grows by the day. The latestnews is that the United States has been reduced to leasing a Chinese satellite to handle communications with U.S. military bases in Africa. Surprising, isn’t it? The nation that launched the world’s first communications satellite (I remember it well – it was called Telstar) has so lost its manufacturing mojo that it has to rely on its most formidable military adversary to provide the hardware for some of its most sensitive communications. This at a time when underlying unemployment rates among U.S. manufacturing workers remain at near-depression levels. Isn’t that crazy? And a recent Senate report discovered that many of our most advanced weapons systems are absolutely riddled with counterfeit Chinese parts… A recent Senate report, titled Inquiry Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Department Of Defense Supply Chain, “uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems.” The investigation found 1,800 cases of counterfeit electronic parts involving over one million suspect parts in 2009-10 alone, thereby exposing “a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unveiled independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive systems.” The report concluded, among other things, that China is the “dominant source” of counterfeit products that enter the DoD supply chain, that the Chinese government does little to stop it and that the DoD doesn’t know the “scope and impact” of these parts on critical defense systems. Who in the world would be stupid enough to allow one of their greatest strategic enemies to supply large numbers of parts for key weapons systems? Apparently we are that stupid. Things are particularly bad when it comes to semiconductors… Senator John McCain commented: “We can’t tolerate the risk of a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles, or any other mission failure because of a counterfeit part.” Calling the issue “a ticking time bomb,” Brian Toohey, president of the Semiconductor Industry Association, commented: “The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril.” It would be bad enough if we just had to worry about counterfeit parts failing. But what if China has a way to shut some of those parts down in the event of a conflict? What if some of those parts contain “Trojan Horse” computer chips or malware? That may sound crazy, but unfortunately Trojan Horse chips can be extremely difficult to detect. The following is from a recent Forbes article… As the Defense Science Board pointed out, Trojan Horse circuitry is almost impossible to detect even with the most rigorous analysis. This is particularly so if a saboteur can accomplish matching subversions in both software and relevant hardware.

#### Chinese espionage is the biggest internal link to Chinese military modernization

U.S.-China ESRC 7 – U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission[Report to Congress-The Commission was made up of members of the 110th Congress, 1st Session, November, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf>
The pace and success of China’s military modernization continue to exceed U.S. government estimates. Indeed, on occasion the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have been taken by surprise, 7 as in the case of the launching of the Jin class submarine by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with impressive speed and quality, and these advancements are due in part to the highly effective manner in which Chinese defense companies are integrating commercial technologies into military systems. Additionally, industrial espionage provides Chinese companies an added source of new technology without the necessity of investing time or money to perform research. Chinese espionage in the United States, which now comprises the single greatest threat to U.S. technology, is straining the U.S. counterintelligence establishment. This illicit activity significantly contributes to China’s military modernization and acquisition of new capabilities.

#### US can no longer win the war due to Chinese tech advancement through espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Most Americans assume that the U.S. military is so vastly superior to everyone else that no other nation would ever dream of fighting a full-scale war against us. Unfortunately, that assumption is dead wrong. In recent years, the once mammoth technological gap between the U.S. military and the Chinese military has been closing at a frightening pace. China has been accomplishing this by brazenly stealing our technology and hacking into our computer systems. The Pentagon and the Obama administration know all about this, but they don’t do anything about it. Perhaps the fact that China owns about a trillion dollars of our national debt has something to do with that. In any event, today China has the largest military in the world and the second largest military budget in the world. They have stolen plans for our most advanced jets, helicopters, ships and missile systems. It is estimated that stealing our technology has saved China about 25 years of research and development. In addition, China is rapidly developing a new generation of strategic weapons that could potentially enable it to actually win a future war against the United States. At one time such a notion would have been unthinkable, but as you will see below, the next war with China could go very badly for the United States.

#### Chinese military modernization causes great power war

Twomey 9, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both @ the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, 9 [Christopher, Arms Control Association, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey]

China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their modernization and sizing decisions increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core of this interlocking pattern of development. In particular, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council expanding its arsenal; it is also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the strategic balance.[2] The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign. What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy. Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

#### Recent disputes with China increase the probability of miscalculation – absent force – China will unilaterally intervene in Asia

Max Hastings 1/2/14 [educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, British journalist, editor, historian and author, “Is World War Three about to start... by accident? Max Hastings asks whether rising tensions between China and Japan could boil over”,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532932/Is-World-War-Three-start-accident-Max-Hastings-asks-rising-tensions-China-Japan-boil-over.html, ML]

If conflict does come, it will be waged with the high-tech weapons of our own time: warplanes manned and unmanned, missiles, cyber-attack weapons and the many instruments of destruction guided from space satellites. But this would not make a great power conflict any less catastrophic. And this is why a shiver will have run through the leaderships of Asia and of the Western powers this week when China's ambassador to London argued that Japan risks 'a serious threat to global peace' by 'rekindling' the bellicose attitude that hastened the expansion of World War II into a global conflict. He even compared Japan today to Lord Voldemort, the arch villain in the Harry Potter novels. This comes just a few weeks after China — with absolutely no warning — declared hundreds of thousands of square miles of airspace above the East China Sea as its own Air Defence Zone. This includes the eight tiny uninhabited pimples, called the Senkaku Islands by Japan and Diaoyu by China. Taiwan also has a claim to the islands — nationalised by Japan from private sellers in 2012, much to the anger of China. The United States responded to this bitter dispute between Tokyo and Beijing by dispatching two USAAF B-52s bombers to overfly the islands, emphasising its commitment to the right of free navigation. Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, declared gravely that China had started 'a whole new game'. His government threatened to shoot down any Chinese drones that appeared over the Senkakus. Beijing responded that this would be an act of war. Nobody, including the Chinese, wants armed conflict. Indeed, an analyst for the International Institute Of Strategic Studies has said that China 'aims to push rather than break limits'. Yet the tensions between Tokyo, Washington and Beijing have been increasing for years. For the moment, China, the U.S. and Japan still maintain courtesies between governments. Most crucially, Beijing holds trillions of dollars of U.S. debt. But many of history's wars have been triggered by miscalculations while nations have been testing each other's strengths. Indeed, there is a profound fear in Washington, in Tokyo, and maybe also in Beijing, that one day something unspeakably ghastly could happen by mistake. Remember that in 1914 before the outbreak of World War I, Britain and Germany were each other's largest trading partners. Professor Peter Dutton, of the U.S. Naval War College, has warned of the growing tensions, saying: 'China's challenge to existing maritime norms is creating hairline fractures in the global order.' This comment followed an authoritative Washington defence guru who said that, whatever short-term bother terror groups such as Al Qaeda might cause, 'in the middle-long term, there will only be one main concern of the U.S. armed forces, and that is China. China is reshaping the military order in Asia, and is doing so at our expense'. China has an ever-growing fleet of missile-armed warships — thought to number around 80, as well as nearly 300 amphibious assault ships — including fast-attack craft specifically designed as 'carrier-killers', to engage the U.S. Navy's behemoths. In response, the huge U.S. Andersen air force base on the Pacific Ocean island of Guam has become host to a £10 billion reinforcement programme. As a result, its hangars now hold B-2 and B-52 bombers, air-to-surface and cruise missiles, Global Hawk drones, F-15 and F-22 fighters, the latter just a 20-minute flight from the Taiwan Strait. Amitai Etzioni, professor of international relations at George Washington University, declares bleakly: 'There are increasing signs that the United States and China are on a collision course.' What is not disputed is that China is determined to assert its new status as a major regional power, while the U.S. is equally bent upon deterring or deflecting Chinese expansionism, and especially aggressiveness. This was the reason behind President Obama's 2010 decision to rebalance American strategic assets towards the Pacific. The American case is as readily made as was the British one, for resisting quite similar German posturing before 1914. Washington's attitude is: 'We and our allies are democracies, while China is an autocracy which denies respect for human rights or international law.' I believe that unless the Washington administration makes plain its determination to support any country (such as Japan) that is threatened with aggression by Beijing, China will go ahead and impose its ruthless will upon the entire Pacific region. As for the contrary view from Beijing itself, China's leaders cherish a profound grievance about the Tokyo government's persistent refusal to confront the reality of Japan's mid-20th century war crimes in Asia. For the Tokyo government asserts that the time has passed for any Japanese apologies or even discussion of its historical record. An example of this defiance is the military museum that is situated next door to Tokyo's Yasakuni shrine, where so many Japanese war criminals' ashes lie and to which many Japanese politicians visit to pay homage. I have been to the place myself, and find it as repugnant as do the Chinese. Which is why they found such offence a few days ago when the Japanese premier arrived there to pay his respects. (Its choice of exhibits is intended to prove that during the middle of the last century, Japan entered China — where at least 15 million people fell victim to its occupation — and other Asian countries in order to 'protect' them from European exploitation.) In the same vein, Japan describes its half-century occupation of Korea as a 'partnership'. The ghastly Thirties massacres committed by the Japanese army at Shanghai and Nanjing are not mentioned. In Japanese school textbooks, the systemic exploitation of 'comfort women' by the Japanese Army is a forbidden subject. Most shockingly, a Japanese minister claimed last year that such victims were 'volunteers'. While it is deemed unforgivable — and even criminal — across most of the world to deny the existence of the Nazi Holocaust of six million Jews, almost the entire Japanese nation denies its own barbarities across Asia. This intransigence helps to explain why South Korea, for instance, recently refused to conclude an intelligence-sharing security agreement with Japan, because public opinion remains so alienated by its former oppressors' lies about the past. For its part, the U.S. is impatient for Japan to abandon the controversial Article 9 of its post-war constitution (imposed by America after the end of World War II), which forces the country to renounce war and restricts its armed forces to a self-defence role. Times have changed and Washington now wants to see the Japanese accept a much larger share of the responsibility for containing China. But more than a few prominent Asians are wagging a warning finger at the Americans, urging: 'Be careful what you wish for.' The truth is that many of Japan's Asian neighbours — not to mention the Chinese — will never trust Tokyo until it comes clean about its dreadful history, as it seems determined not to do. China is a tough, assertive, immature nation in a hurry; the United States is seen in Beijing as a weakly led, declining military power that is vulnerable to pressure On the specific issue of the disputed Senkaku islands, China points out that Tokyo has held them only since the late 19th century, when Japan became an early entrant into the race for an Asian empire. There are economic issues at stake, too. Sovereignty claims are based on a desire to exploit the area's rich resources in fish and hydrocarbons. Above all, though, the tension is based on much bigger ambitions. China argues, just as Germany did before 1914 in respect of Britain's maritime supremacy, that now it is one of the big players in Asia, there is no reason why it should accept America's claims to Pacific hegemony. Why should Beijing tolerate U.S. warships and aircraft conducting close surveillance of the Chinese coast? Such a presence is unjustified in an age of satellites and simply reflects a wish by America to parade its military might at the expense of Chinese dignity. Such arguments have spread to cover debate about freedom of the internet. A Chinese army general recently dismissed American drum-banging about the importance of preserving 'global internet freedom.' He said that Washington was using this as an excuse to preserve its own 'cyber-hegemony'. He added: 'In the information era, seizing and maintaining superiority in cyberspace is more important than was seizing command of the sea and air in World War II'. Even if we British, as American allies, ultimately reject some of these arguments, we should acknowledge that the U.S. often seems clumsy, patronising and over-bearing in its attitude to other nations. For example, the Chinese were enraged recently by the behaviour of U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden. On a supposed goodwill visit to Beijing, he urged a group of Chinese to keep up their protests against denial of human rights. He said they should 'challenge the government'. Biden may have been right, but his action was foolish and insensitive. Such self-righteous moralising is the sort of behaviour that worries Nigel Inkster, a former deputy director of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, who, earlier this year, spoke bleakly about the relationship between the two countries. He said: 'If it is to avoid becoming the chronicle of a death foretold, both parties will need to demonstrate greater self-awareness than either has yet shown'. A key issue of contention remains human rights. Of course, it is right that the rest of the world presses China to respect international law abroad and human rights at home. Military power, firmness and clarity of purpose are essential tools for addressing China through the years ahead, as it increasingly flexes its muscles. But so, too, is a willingness to recognise that China will not become a liberal democracy any time soon. As this vast country has for centuries been so misused by the Western powers, including Britain, its rise to greatness now deserves applause as well as prudent apprehension. Yet, however careful the U.S. and China may be in managing their future relationship, I fear that it will remain fraught and indeed dangerous. China is a newly rich, increasingly mighty nation, which is bent upon elbowing aside the Americans, in the Pacific region at least, to assert its own claims as a Great Power. This makes it inevitable that there will be rows, confrontations, crises, some involving both nations' armed forces. The peril will persist throughout our lifetimes and the great worry is that a clash such as one over the disputed Senkaku islands will go horribly wrong. Popular nationalism is a growing force in China, just as it is in Japan, and the great challenge for both nations' politicians is to grapple with its excesses. China often speaks of the importance of using restraint — kezhi — in its conduct abroad. But its defence minister has said that although any full-scale war is unlikely, 'we cannot exclude the possibility that, in some local area, unexpected events may occur, or military friction may take place due a to a misfire'. History tells us that nations that create vastly expensive armed forces sooner or later feel an itch to use them. China is a tough, assertive, immature nation in a hurry; the United States is seen in Beijing as a weakly led, declining military power that is vulnerable to pressure. For the moment, Washington knows that it can deploy vaster greater military power than China. It is also morbidly anxious not to be seen to show weakness — hence its decision to dispatch the B-52s over the Senkakus. Ultimately, I want to be hopeful. The world managed to avert war during more than 40 years of armed nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Maybe it can do so through the 21st century, as China grows ever stronger and America's superiority wanes. But we cannot take peace for granted. The Pacific rim is ever more densely strewn with the toys of war. The risk of some local turf dispute exploding into a great power collision will remain alarmingly real.

#### New trends prove that espionage emboldens China – makes them pivot with force – the aff allows for diplomacy

VOA 11/21/13 – (“Report: China 'Challenging US Military Preeminence in Asia'”, Voice of America, http://www.voanews.com/content/report-china-challenging-us-military-preeminence-in-asia/1794585.html)//javi

A U.S. congressional panel reported that China's rapidly modernizing military is "altering the security balance in the Asia Pacific and challenging decades of U.S. military preeminence in the region." That warning was given Wednesday in a wide-ranging annual report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a body which advises U.S. lawmakers on Beijing-related policy. The report also accused the Chinese government of "directing and executing a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the United States." It said sanctions may be necessary to help deter the spying. China has not responded to the allegations. Last year, Beijing's foreign ministry condemned the panel's report for having what it called a "Cold War" attitude. Though it is still far outpaced by the U.S. in defense spending, China has steadily increased its military expenditures in recent decades. Beijing, for its part, insists its rise is peaceful. However, commission chairman William Reinsch said China is more aggressively projecting its power abroad. He noted that Beijing is using "coercive" tactics in the East and South China Seas, where it has overlapping claims with many of its neighbors. "It is becoming clear that China does not intend to resolve its maritime disputes through multilateral negotiations or the application of international laws and adjudicative processes, but prefers to use its growing power in support of coercive tactics to pressure its neighbors to concede China's claims," said Reinsch. This comes as President Barack Obama pledges to put a greater economic and military emphasis on the region. The commission welcomed the so-called "pivot," but noted many U.S. allies are concerned budget constraints could limit Washington's ability to follow through. To address these concerns and to "offset China's growing military capabilities," the report recommended Congress continue to fund efforts to move 60 percent of U.S. ships to the Pacific by 2020. Currently, 50 percent are stationed there. Commissioner Larry Wortzel told lawmakers urgent action is needed. "By 2020, China's navy and air force will outnumber and almost match the technical capabilities of our own forces in the Asia Pacific. A shrunken military may be insufficient to deter China or to reassure our friends and allies in the region," said Wortzel. The panel also spoke of an "urgent need" for Washington to convince Beijing to change its approach to cyber spying, which analysts claim has cost U.S. companies billions of dollars. Wortzel said China's military views cyberspace as a "critical element of its strategic competition with the United States." "The Chinese government is directing and executing a large scale cyber espionage campaign that poses a major threat to U.S. industry, critical infrastructure, military operations, personnel, equipment, and readiness," continued Wortzel.

### 1ac – plan

#### The United States federal government ought to offer financial assistance toward the assembly-for-export industry in Mexico.

### 1ac – manufacturing

#### Foreign investment is key to evolve factories technologically—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

A third challenge associated with this system concerns the lack of complexity of the production performed by the maquiladoras. The vast majority of maquiladoras conduct simple assembly, so the factories involved are tooled for basic production, and the employees only have basic skills. This drastically limits the ability of both the factories and their employees to adjust to new forms of production as the maquiladoras fall to foreign competitors. This industry is so tightly tied to specific customers in the U.S. that a transition to some other form of production would require massive changes in structure and labor. The Mexican government understands this as a problem and seeks to drive the evolution of so-called “first generation” maquiladoras to second and third generation models. The first generation maquiladoras are the least complex and simply assemble raw materials. Foreign investment brings with it technology, and, with this technology, the maquiladoras evolve into more complex factories that eventually focus less on labor intensity and more on more sophisticated products, R&D and even product design.39 Unfortunately, there are few examples of this trend, and many critics complain that the entire concept of the maquiladora “traps developing countries into the deadend role of providing cheap labor for low value-added assembly operations.”40

#### US financial assistance is key

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Mexican manufacturing is critical to address challenges facing the U.S. – picks up the slack for U.S. manufacturing

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

In the last decade, Mexico has proven that it has the capabilities and talent in advanced manufacturing to supply the international market of the aerospace industry. The integration of design and advanced manufacturing capabilities on a national level prove that the Mexican industry has included high technology and engineering in its processes. Through the projects identified in this Road Map, which involves the efforts of academia, industry and government, Chihuahua will become the leading A+D cluster in Latin America in precision manufacturing for the high-tech industry and dual-use goods. This exercise identified projects and factors that will promote Chihuahua’s ability to attract future high technology investments for the aerospace and defense sector by as well as creating the capabilities to optimize the sector’s industrial competitiveness in the region, such as: the creation of a talent management platform; reducing dependency on the importation of molds, dyes and tooling in the sector; and making better use of future investments that have been encouraged by Mexico’s acceptance in the WA. Chihuahua has been able to determine the right path to reach its maximum potential and become one of Mexico´s most competitive regions in the aerospace sector with a medium- and long-term vision. The road to success has been forged, and the coming years will be bursting with opportunities and new challenges for Chihuahua.

#### Mexico is key – the US can’t solve

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

The United States our major commercial partner is going through a talent crisis due to a lack of engineering graduates, added to constant cuts in defense spending, which complicates the upkeep of its current abilities to research, develop and produce defense and high-tech dual-use items. Mexico has more engineering graduates per capita than the United States and skilled and engineering labor costs are more competitive in Mexico; the technological sophistication of its manufactured goods is above that of BRIC countries such as India and Brazil. These three factors make Mexico the best answer to the issues that affect the United States. The creation of the SCE and Mexico’s acceptance into the WA have laid the foundation to guarantee national surveillance during the export of restricted and dual-use technologies and goods. According to conservative estimates, the WA will enable the national industry to access a potential high-technology export market of close to an additional 11.3 billion dollars per year, added to the potential creation of between 30 and 40 thousand highly paid jobs in the next five years.7 Chihuahua’s advanced manufacturing vocation (landing gears, fuselages, engines, harnesses and precision machining) make it the ideal destination for projects in the A+D cluster. Furthermore, the Federal Government is in negotiations with the US Department of Defense to develop a regional aerospace and defense manufacturing block focused on Buy NAFTA. This could be completed with the signing of a MoU between the US Department of State and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA)

#### Manufacturing drives innovation and pharmaceuticals

Swezey 11 (Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf>)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### Tech innovation solves extinction

Zhong 07, CEO at Jade Bird Dashing, 7-31-7 (Roger, “The Effects and Influences of Technology on Society and Human Kind,” http://scienceray.com/technology/applied-science/the-effects-and-influences-of-technology-on-society-and-human-kind/”)

The question that persists however, is, “Is technology in fact harming our society as a whole?” Albeit the fact that this is a remarkably intricate question of sorts, it can be answered with a simple answer. The actuality of this situation remains that technology is by no means detrimental to our society here in the United States, civilization throughout the world, or to the greater humanity of the human race; instead, it is vital to its survival. Nuclear Technology To illustrate this point, let us first examine an exceedingly significant technological advance of our time, nuclear technology. Nuclear technology is research that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. It has many vital applications in modern society, the most prominent of which are nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine, and nuclear power. The most controversial of these is, without a doubt, nuclear weapons. First created by the United States in 1945 during World War II, they were developed out of the fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them. A weapon of incredible power, a single nuclear weapon has to potential to decimate, level, and destroy an entire city. The first and only times a nuclear weapon has been used are in World War II, when the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the “Little Boy” and “Fat Myn” bombs, respectively. The usage of these bombs allowed for the near instantaneous end to the destructive World War II. Although two cities were leveled and many lives were lost, the situation involving the usage of these nuclear weapons is not nearly as negative as one may perceive. Had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would not have surrendered, and it would have without a doubt prolonged the war for months or even years. This would have forced an Allied Forces ground invasion of Japan in an effort to end the war, which would have resulted in the loss of many more people than caused by the deployment of the two nuclear weapons. When you look at the usage of nuclear technology, you must look at the situation from the viewpoint of human society as a whole, and not from a standpoint of an individual. While the nuclear bombs destroyed two cities and killed many, they ended a horrific World War II and prevented the loss of many other lives. Today, in more modern terms, nuclear weapons play a huge role in our lives. As citizens of the United States, it is common knowledge that we are guaranteed many degrees of freedoms and rights, but have you ever considered who enforces our right to these freedoms in the world? The military might of the United States is the key to us retaining our democratic freedoms. Being in possession of nuclear weapons is not only a positive thing, it allows for us to be free. By holding an arsenal of nuclear weapons, we have a nuclear deterrent. In this sense, we prevent wars and conflicts from escalating into another World War by instituting world order. By having nuclear technology, we are ensuring the well-being, longevity, and freedoms of the human race. Internet Technology Another prominent technological innovation that well represents our society today is the Internet. The Internet is the worldwide, publicly accessible network of interconnected computer networks that transmit data between themselves. It is an extremely large network that consists of countless smaller networks. The World Wide Web is accessible only through this Internet infrastructure which allows us our access to websites, email, file sharing, downloads, and media. As well as being an important provider for us common citizens who wish to access the World Wide Web, the internet serves a much greater purpose. It allows for the sharing of information almost instantaneously between scholars, researchers, and others. It allows for information to be shared from the United States to China in less than a second. Before the times of the internet, the other alternatives to transmit information were not nearly as efficient or effective. The Internet allows for us to, in some ways make the world smaller. In the days of today’s stock markets, financial infrastructure, global news organizations, powerful militarizes, strong governments and big corporations, instantaneous communication is an asset we can not afford to lose. The Internet allows for our society in modern day times to interconnect and promote globalization and information sharing. Medical Technology Perhaps one of the most vital technological advances in our society today is in the field of human medicine and health sciences. This field deals with the maintenance, prolongment, and restoration of human health through the study, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and injury. Medicine is an area where knowledge is obtained, then applied to treatment. It has been around at least as far as the beginning of recorded history, perhaps even farther. Today, modern medicine is practiced within a well-developed framework of health-care infrastructure. Research in the field of medicine has allowed for the development of many new treatments, drugs, medicines, and solutions that have allowed for the dramatic prolongment of the human lifespan. Today, with the influence of medicine, the lifespan of the average human is only increasing. Medicine in today’s world provides the most vital of all services; it ensures the survival of the human race as a whole. Review Now, let us review the implications of technology on our civilization here on Earth as a whole. Could the notion of technology possibly have any basis? Simply put, it does not have any credibility of any sort. Technology itself does not signify any concrete object or thing; instead it collectively portrays human kind’s achievements as a whole. Any advancements, abilities, creations, undertakings, views, or knowledge of us as humans are in essence technology. This definition alone refutes the argument that technology is detrimental. Take for instance the three significant technological advances of the human race covered in this article: nuclear technology, the internet, and medicine. Nuclear technology, an important advancement for our society, creates a world order, protects the inhabitants of the world, and ensures the longevity, freedoms, and well-being of the entire human race. Also, the internet allows for our society to inter-connect and progress further into enlightenment. Perhaps most important of all, medicine, allows for us to ensure our own survival on this planet. These three technologies well represent technology as a whole, and clearly show that technology is extremely beneficial to our society. Only by advocating and advancing technology, can we as humans, and as humanity, succeed.

**Mexican pharmaceuticals are key**

NAPS 4/11/13 (North American Production Sharing Incorporated, <http://www.napsintl.com/news/index.php/2013/04/11/the-medical-device-industry-manufacturing-in-mexico-has-a-clean-bill-of-health/>)

[Medical device](http://www.napsintl.com/medicaldevice.php) companies manufacturing in Mexico continue to exhibit steady growth with no sign of a slow down in sight. As costs in the United States and Eastern Europe continue to rise, especially with the implementation of “Obamacare” and its direct impact on medical device companies, more organizations are considering [manufacturing in Mexico](http://www.napsintl.com/manufacturinginmexico.php) as a viable solution. No other place in Mexico is this more evident than in Tijuana, where they now claim the largest concentration of medical device companies in all of North America. The ability to provide both timely deliveries and consistently high quality products are a few reasons why medical device manufacturers are choosing Mexico. Also, there is a tremendous base of talented labor with experience in medical device, [automotive](http://www.napsintl.com/auto.php), electronics, aerospace and other sophisticated industries to support the growth of manufacturing in Mexico. Furthermore, the labor laws in Mexico provide companies much more flexibility in terms of compensation, scheduling and seasonality, which plays an important roll on profitability. Another factor drawing medical device manufacturers to Mexico is the government’s enforcement, and employee’s respect, for intellectual property. Unlike many other low-cost manufacturing countries, Mexico is known for its low piracy rates, which cost companies billions of dollars a year. One of the challenges facing these companies is understanding the business landscape and culture in Mexico, which is why many of these firms are choosing to outsource their administration and compliance management to shelter companies. A good shelter company will handle 100% of the administration, including Human Resources in Mexico, Payroll in Mexico, Accounting in Mexico, Import/Export in Mexico and Environmental, Health & Safety in Mexico, allowing the manufacturer to focus on production and quality control. “We are receiving a record number of inquires from medical device manufacturers around the world who want to explore Mexico as a competitive solution,” said Scott Stanley, Sr. Vice President of North American Production Sharing, Inc. (NAPS), Tijuana’s largest and most sophisticated shelter service provider. “NAPS guides these companies through the process of feasibility by providing all the facts and figures about expanding into Mexico so sound business decisions can be made. Thereafter, we essentially become partners and typically work together for many years.” With an increase in demand for medical device products, not only in the United States but also within Mexico’s public health sector, Mexico will continue to be the primary choice for medical device manufacturing.

#### Pharmaceuticals is key to the development of DOD non-lethal chemical weapons

The Sunshine Project 03 (“Pentagon Perverts Pharma with New Weapons”, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr110203.html)

The conventional view is that pharmaceutical research develops new ways to treat disease and reduce human suffering; but the Pentagon disagrees. Military weapons developers see the pharmaceutical industry as central to a new generation of anti-personnel weapons. Although it denied such research as recently as the aftermath of the October theater tragedy in Moscow, a Pentagon program has recently released more information that confirms that it wants to make pharmaceutical weapons. And on February 5th, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went a big step further. Rumsfeld, himself a former pharmaceutical industry CEO (1), announced that the US is making plans for the use of such incapacitating biochemical weapons in an invasion of Iraq (see News Release, 7 February 2003). The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the US Army's Soldier Biological Chemical Commynd (SBCCOM) are leading the research. Of interest to the military are drugs that target the brain's regulation of many aspects of cognition, such as sense of pain, consciousness, and emotions like anxiety and fear. JNLWD is preparing a database of pharmaceutical weapons candidates, many of them off-the-shelf products, and indexing them by manufacturer. It will choose drugs from this database for further work and, according to Rumsfeld, if President Bush signs a waiver of existing US policy, they can be used in Iraq. Delivery devices already exist or are in advanced development. These include munitions for an unmynned aerial vehicle or loitering missile, and a new 81mm (bio)chemical mortar round. Many of the Pentagon’s so-called "nonlethal" (bio)chemical weapons candidates are pharmaceuticals. Different names are used for these weapons ("calmatives", "disabling chemicals", "nonlethal chemicals", etc.). Used as weapons, all minimally aim to incapacitate their victims. They belong to the same broad category of agents as the incapacitating chemical that killed more than 120 hostages in the Moscow theater. That agent was reported to be based on fentanyl, an opiate that is also among the weapons being assessed by JNLWD. In the US, pharmaceutical fentanyl is sold by Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceutica. Remifentanil, a closely related drug, is a GlaxoSmithKline product. US military contractors have identified a host of other agents manufactured by a Who's Who list of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2001 weapons researchers at the Applied Research Laboratory of Pennsylvania State University assessed the anesthetic drugs isoflurane and sevoflurane, produced by Syngenta and Abbott Laboratories, respectively. The same Penn State team recommended other drugs for "immediate consideration," some of which are in the chart below. The Pentagon is also interested in industry’s new ways to apply (bio)chemicals through the skin and mucous membranes, which could bring previously impractical drug weapons closer to reality by overcoming technical hurdles related to delivery of certain agents.

#### Those are good – prevent collateral damage

Alexander 99, Retired U.S. Army colonel, an author, and a consultant to various U.S. government agencies. He spearheaded the research on nonlethal weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1999 (John B., Oct 1st, “Nonlethal Weapons: When Deadly Force Is Not Enough”, The Futurist, L/N)

The military and law enforcement situations mentioned so far are fairly clear cut and a logical extension of current practices. However, the future of nonlethal weapons lies in far more important areas. Many of the potential enemies of the future are nontraditional. In the past few years the impact of terrorism and organized crime has been felt around the world. In most cases, response by means of conventional force is unsuitable or inadequate. When the enemy commingles with an innocent civilian population, it is not appropriate, and often counterproductive, to use bombs or missiles to attack them. As was seen earlier this year in Yugoslavia, even precision weapons can occasionally go astray and hit an unintended target. Without the development of advanced nonlethal weapons, the options available to political leaders and military commynders are too limited. It is under circumstances in which lethal weapons could lead to much broader engagements that nonlethal weapons take on strategic importance. An example of a situation that seems to have gone tragically wrong is the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical company in Sudan. This attack was undertaken based on a belief that the factory was supporting Osama bin Laden, a terrorist who had allegedly instigated and coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The factory, located near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum, was hit by cruise missiles at night in hopes that civilian casualties would be minimal. It was later learned that the factory was targeted on erroneous information and that people did die in the attack. This incident highlights the limitations of conventional weapons. In the future we need to have weapons that can degrade or destroy such facilities without the collateral damage caused by high explosives. Very few of these weapons are being thoroughly researched. However, with some effort more weapons can be developed to make long-range, nonlethal strikes against terrorist infrastructures.

#### That prevents a world war

Close 98, Arab affairs specialist for the CIA for twenty-six years & an independent consultant on the region, 1998 (Raymond, “The Only Effective Defense Against Terrorism is To Rebuild America's Reputation For Fairness,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November)

Despite U.S. government claims to the contrary, there is, in my opinion, a serious question whether our action in bombing alleged terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan was a justifiable violation of the accepted and respected norms of international law. The attacks were on the sovereign territory of another legally recognized state with which we are technically at peace. We can attempt to justify this action by quoting Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" on the American government and the American people, without distinction between them. But that is to claim, is it not, that the government of Afghanistan and the government of the Sudan abetted, and therefore share complicity in, acts of war against the United States? In fact, all that Afghanistan seems to have done was to provide Bin Laden with the sanctuary where the acts against us were planned. (Not the location where they were carried out.) We must now be ready to accept the full implications of this interpretation of our international rights. This means, it seems to me, that we are declaring one of two conditions to be true: A. That the United States makes the rules by which it acts in the world community. We are a law unto ourselves. Do we really want to say that? B. Or, that if one state believes it has enemies who are being granted refuge in another country, it is permissible to launch bombing attacks against those elements without the knowledge or permission of the legitimate host government. Is setting that precedent always going to redound to our benefit? Have we thought about that carefully? Most of us accept the premise that terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be defeated by brute force, but only by ideas, by persuasion, by the amelioration of its causes -- whether real or imagined. Terrorism has only one real asset, in the final analysis -- the passion and commitment of its adherents. Are human passions capable of being altered by cruise missiles? Having accepted that premise intellectually as reasonable and civilized, we now have to live with the fact that in other international situations in the future, others may emulate our resort to violence, taking the law into their own hands to launch attacks against other members of the international community if they feel their national interests are similarly threatened. **This is how world wars start.**

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Statistics prove heg is effective

**Owen 11** [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

## 2ac

### 2ac – human rights cp

#### Certainty key – prevent loss of production and hit to national security

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)djm

Accordingly, this report examined a series of defense industrial base sectors that are vital to U.S. security. Some are especially important and require immediate attention to prevent critical loss of supply or production capacity, constituting an immediate threat to national security. Some sectors are vulnerable to immediate disruption arising from excessive or misaligned foreign dependency, while others face longer-term challenges. In general, the risks posed to many sectors of the defense industrial base may prove very difficult to fix, because they are a part of powerful, prevailing trends in the international technology market and the global economy. All of these challenges demand our best strategic thinking about how to prevent or contain significant and potentially dangerous risks to national security. This report investigates those risks and is a call to action to mitigate them.

#### Ought has no temporal function

Dictionary of Americanisms, ‘99

(1999, The Dictionary of Americanisms was originally created by John Russell Bartlett in 1848, This edition was re-copyrighted 1999-2006 – http://www.merrycoz.org/voices/bartlett/AMER10.HTM#o)

OUGHT. As this verb is defective, and has no inflection to distinguish past from present time, illiterate persons often attempt to supply the deficiency by the use of auxiliaries. Hence the expressions, don't ought, had ought, hadn't ought. Mr. Pegge notices the two last among the vulgarisms of London.

#### Mexico says no – They ignore the problem for economic and security reasons

Shear and Archibold, 5/04 – a White House correspondent for The New York Times. Previously, Shear wrote for the Washington Post as a metro reporter covering Virginia politics, the 2008 presidential election and, most recently, as White House correspondent. Mr. Shear received a B.A. degree from Claremont McKenna College and a M.A. degree in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University and Randal Archibold has been a reporter for The New York Times’s national desk since September 2005, based in the Los Angeles bureau.

 ([MICHAEL D. SHEAR](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/michael_d_shear/index.html) and [RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/randal_c_archibold/index.html), May 4, 2013, “In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts From Drug War to Economy”, The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>)//GP

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains clear eyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry.

#### CP No Solve – Human rights adoption not enforced and hypocrisy undermines perception

**Sikkink 04** political science professor at the University of Minnesota, PhD from Columbia (Kathryn A Sikkink, 2004, “Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America”, book)

A better understanding of the emergence and diffusion of human rights norms on a global scale represents a crucial contribution to international relations scholarship. However, such norms matter in the world only if rhetorical commitments actually lead states to improve their human rights practices. The second part of the book therefore asks under what conditions a human rights policy can be effective. When do human rights policies and norms lead to improvements in human rights behaviors? There is not a clear linkage between the ratification of human rights treaties and actual human rights practices. Be cause ratification is easiest in an authoritarian state, countries that ratify human rights treaties don’t necessarily treat their citizens well. “ So, why should we care about ratifying human rights treaties if they don’t lead directly to better human rights practices? Because ratification of human rights treaties is seen as an important symbol of a country ‘s commitment to the human rights idea. We need to be aware that for many people around the world, U.S. failure to ratify these treaties undermines our capacity for leadership in the area of human rights. Recently, the United States has not only filed to ratify human rights treaties hut the administration of George V. Bush ‘unsigned” the statute of the International Criminal Court and actively lobbied other governments not to abide by its provisions. Officials in the administration claim that they were responding to flaws in the statute. Because of the symbolic importance of these treaties, however, such action is often interpreted abroad as reckless disregard for international rule of law. The emergence of human rights policy is not a simple victory of ideas over interests. It demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape understandings of national interest. The adoption of human rights policies does not represent a neglect of national interests but rather signifies a fundamental shift in the perception of long-term national interests. Indeed, human rights policies emerged because policy makers began to question the causal assumption that U.S. national interests are furthered by supporting repressive regimes that violate the human rights of their citizens and the related assumption that other countries’ internal human rights practices arc not a legitimate topic of foreign policy.

#### Plan solves the net benefit—Economic engagement itself causes human right protection

**Burton 03** professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and director of the Laboratory on International Law and Regulation, PhD in political science (Emilie Hafner-Burton, 2003, “Globalizing human rights? How international trade agreements shape government repression”, book)

In this dissertation I aim to convince that this growing web of international economic organizations does indeed influence governments’ social policies and practices, although these institutions neither compel the death of the state nor wield their influence equally. To be sure, there are many different social policies and practices that such a dissertation might engage. Such outcomes are brought to light by the many anti-globalization protests, which scholars across different disciplines investigate in various ways. I choose to focus this study on one of the most essential social practices that a government must choose: government observance of human rights. I do so not because environmental, social welfare, or labor policies are somehow less important or interesting, but because they themselves depend in some fundamental way on the establishment of basic human rights, without which laws protecting the rainforest or the worker are empty promises. I also make this choice to focus on government observance of human rights because there is an emergent and innovative literature spanning the fields of international relations and sociology that is centrally concerned with explaining how economic globalization of various kinds shapes government repression, cross-nationally. This literature provides a concrete stepping stone to study the linkage between international economic institutions and government repression, a linkagethat might otherwise prove difficult to maneuver without such a theoretical roadmap in place from which to start

#### Evaluate these impacts – consequences matter

Isaac 02 (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” *Dissent*, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli,Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and HannahArendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.The concern may be morally laudable, reflectinga kind of personal integrity, but it suffersfrom three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make commoncause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is alwaysa potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiatingviolence, it refuses in principle tooppose certain violent injustices with any effect;and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good”may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is thelesson of communism in the twentieth century:it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere oridealistic; it is equally important, always, to askabout the effects of pursuing these goals andto judge these effects in pragmatic and historicallycontextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Mexico can produce drones – open licensing is necessary to overall production

Godoy 5/11/13 – Mexico-based correspondent who covers the environment, human rights and sustainable development, journalist since 1996 and has written for various media outlets in Mexico, Central America and Spain (Emilio, “Mexicans Develop Drones for Peace”, Tierramerica, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/mexicans-develop-drones-for-peace/)

MEXICO CITY, Apr 11 2013 (IPS) - Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have earned a bad reputation due to their controversial use by the United States in its “war on terrorism”, yet they have almost unlimited potential as tools for scientific research. The word “drone” is most commonly associated with the remotely piloted and heavily armed aircraft that are used by the United States to strike down suspected terrorists, but have also caused a great many civilian deaths in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, more than 40 countries around the world either deploy or manufacture drones, according to reports consulted for an article published by IPS. These unmanned airplanes and helicopters are used for such diverse purposes as drawing maps, exploring the ocean floor, measuring temperature or pollution levels, monitoring weather phenomena, and the surveillance of high-risk areas or archaeological sites. Last month, the U.S. space agency NASA sent drones into the plume of the Turrialba volcano in Costa Rica to study its chemical composition. “The technology is emerging, the first applications have just barely begun. Society itself has learned to accept drones beyond their military uses, because they have seen the different ways they can be used. It’s just a matter of time” until they become more widely developed and used, said young Mexican entrepreneur Jordi Muñoz, co-founder of 3D Robotics, a pioneer in the manufacture of drones in Mexico. His story mirrors the evolution of drones, which he began to build in 2007 with the help of 500 dollars provided by U.S. physicist Chris Anderson. “He gave me the money purely on trust. It was the best 500 dollars I ever invested. I decided to build a drone. I was developing the automatic pilot and I went on Google to look for information when I came across a forum. I went in, registered, and saw that they were posting things about homemade drones,” recalled Muñoz, who is currently finishing a degree in computer engineering at the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. The forum was DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Drones, an online community created by Anderson in 2007 as a space for hobbyists who build their own UAVs to share experiences, electronic codes and component maps. “I started to post videos, write code, and document and publish what I was doing,” Muñoz told Tierramérica\*. His work caught the attention of Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine until this past January and now the young Mexican’s partner in 3D Robotics. The company does not sell UAVs for military use. The vehicles are designed in the southwest U.S. city of San Diego and assembled across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. They receive between 100 and 150 orders daily from clients in the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Israel and Japan. 3D Robotics currently employs 60 people and hopes to expand its staff to 100 by the end of the year. Since its founding in 2009, the company has earned around 10 million dollars through sales and received another five million from three U.S. funds that provide financing for tech firms. “In 2013 we want to professionalise all of our products. There have been huge advances, everything has now been greatly simplified, and we want to make drones easy to use. But we need engineers to write code, for manufacturing,” said Muñoz. Working on the basis of open licensing, a network of engineers around the world work together to improve codes and develop more advanced products.

#### Drones Are Key to Decapitating AQAP – Criticisms That Highlight Blowback Wrongly Link Drone Strikes to Recruitment and Overstate the Negative Consequences – Only Increasing the Effectiveness of Drone Strikes Can Drain AQAPs Legitimacy and Create Space for Alternative Engagement Strategies

By Stacey Emker second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations January 14, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes.¶ The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen. Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency.¶ Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people.¶ Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance.¶ With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.¶ While Yemen is facing a number of issues, debilitating AQAP represents the first step in improving the overall security situation. By targeting AQAP’s local leadership, the U.S. can eliminate the individuals who are most responsible for maintaining the group’s coherency and strategic guidance. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the AQAP members next in line will be less skilled and will be more prone to violence in order to consolidate power. The leadership will make more mistakes, such as targeting Yemeni civilians, and undermine the group’s legitimacy within Yemen.

#### Nuke Terror Outweighs All Other Impacts – Most Likely Scenario For Extinction

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

Jaspal– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12 (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does noteliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states**.**

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

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#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Only our framework can change economics – they re-entrench the current system

**Scott, 04** – Allen J., Department of Geography, University of California–Los Angeles (“A perspective of economic geography,” Journal of Economic Geography, vol. 4, 2004, http://ecamp.usach.cl/Portales/digeo/asignaturas/geografia\_economica/GE\_8.pdf)

A prospective economic geography capable of dealing with the contemporary world must hew closely, it seems to me, to the following programmatic goals if it is to achieve a powerful purchase on both scientific insight and progressive political strategy. 1. To begin at the beginning: economic geography needs to work out a theoretical re-description of capitalism as a structure of production and consumption and as an engine of accumulation, taking into account the dramatic **changes** that have occurred in recent decades in such phenomena as technology, forms of industrial and corporate organization, financial systems, labor markets, and so on. This theoretical re-description must be sensitive to the generic or quasi-generic forms of capitalist development that occur in different times in different places, which, in turn, entails attention to the kinds of issues that regulation theorists have￼identified under the general rubric of regimes of accumulation (Aglietta, 1976; Lipietz, 1986). 2. In addition to these economic concerns, we must recognize that contemporary capitalism is intertwined with enormously heterogeneous forms of social and cultural life, and that **no one element** of this conjoint field **is** necessarily **reducible to the other.** Directions of causality and influence across this field are a matter of empirical investigation, not of theoretical pre-judgment. Note that in this formulation, class becomes only one possible dimension of social existence out of a multiplicity of other actual and possible dimensions. 3. This nexus of economic, social, and cultural relationships constitutes a creative field or environment within which complex processes of entrepreneurship, learning, and innovation occur. Geographers have a special interest in deciphering the spatial logic of this field and in demonstrating how it helps to shape locational dynamics. 4. In combination with these modalities of economic and social reality, we need to reserve a specific analytical and descriptive space for collective action and institutional order at many different levels of spatial and **organizational scale** (the firm, the local labor market, the region, **the nation**, etc.), together with a due sense of the political tensions and rivalries that run throughout this sphere of human development. By the same token, a vibrant economic geography will always not only be openly policy-relevant (Markusen, 1999), but also politically engaged. A key question in this context is how to build local institutional frameworks that promote both economic success and social justice. 5. We must recognize that social and economic relations are often extremely durable, and that they have a propensity to become independent in varying degree of the individuals caught up within them. This means that any normative account of social transformation and political strategy, must deal seriously with the idea that there are likely to be stubborn resistances to change rooted in these same relations. The solutions to this problem proposed by sociologists like Bourdieu (1972) and Giddens (1979) strike me as providing reasonable bases for pushing forward in this respect, for they explicitly recognize the inertia of social structures while simultaneously insisting on the integrity of individual human volition. Unfortunately, these solutions (most especially the structure-agency formulation of Giddens) have been much diluted in recent years by reinterpretations that lean increasingly heavily on the agency side of the equation, partly as a reflection of the cultural turn, partly out of a misplaced fear of falling into the pit of determinism.5 Invocations of unmediated agency (or, for that matter, neoclassical utility) as an explanatory variable in social science are often little more than confessions of ignorance, in the sense that when we are unable to account for certain kinds of relationships or events, we are often tempted to fall back on the reassuring notion that things are thus and so for no other reason than because that’s the way we want them to be, irrespective of any underlying structural conditions. 6. A corollary of the structured organization and sunk costs of social life is that economic relationships (especially when they are locationally interrelated, as in the case of a regional production system) are likely to be path-dependent. This observation suggests at once that an evolutionary perspective is well 0suited to capture important elements of the dynamics of the economic landscape (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999). It follows that any attempt to describe the economic landscape in terms of instantaneous adjustment and readjustment to a neoclassical optimum optimorum is intrinsically irrelevant. 7. All of these moments of economic and social reality occur in a world in which geography has not yet been—and cannot yet be—abolished (Leamer and Storper, 2001). The dynamics of accumulation shape geographic space, and equally importantly, geographic space shapes the dynamics of accumulation. This means, too, that capitalism is differentiated at varying levels of spatial resolution, from the local to the global, and that sharp differences occur in forms of life from place to place. Indeed, as globalization now begins to run its course, geographic space becomes more important, not less important, because it presents ever-widening possibilities for finely-grained locational specialization and differentiation. Critical analysis of these possibilities must be one of modern economic geography’s principal concerns. 8. Finally, I want to enter a plea for methodological variety and openness. One corollary of this plea is that economic geographers need to recover the lost skills of quantitative analysis, not out of some atavistic impulse to reinstate the economic geography of the 1960s, but because of the proven value of these skills in the investigation of economic data. The steady erosion of geographers’ capabilities in this regard over the last couple of decades is surely a net loss to the discipline.

#### Methodology is sound – weighs the effects of losing integral parts to the military – justifies securitization in this instance

Adams 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “Remaking American Security: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities & National Security Risks Across the U.S. Defense Industrial Base”, Alliance for American Manufacturing, [http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)//javi](http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf%29//javi)

\*altered to discourage use of ableist language

Based on the specific defense purpose or purposes of each commodity, resource, or technology, each node’s risk of supply chain disruption is paired with an assessment of its threat to U.S. defense capabilities. The first question of the uniqueness of each node’s function is whether there is a suitable and available substitute, capable of being seamlessly introduced to overcome the shortage. If there is a readily available substitute, a shortage will have little or no real impact on defense readiness, suggesting only a marginal impact on U.S. capabilities. If a node lacks a suitable and cost-effective substitute, the impact of supply shortages must be evaluated according to the military capabilities no longer available. The impact of a non-substitutable product or commodity is determined by the scope or breadth of its usage in conjunction with the specific function it performs. An isolated impact is one in which the non-availability of a commodity, resource, or technology will have a minor impact on military operations. Examples include the substitution of an item with an adequate but not ideal alternative, or when non-availability affects a very narrow range of operations. This category is reserved primarily for capabilities that are force multipliers rather than enablers: without these products, operations could be conducted but with reduced efficiency due to the lack of a tactical advantage or at higher risk to the warfighter. When the non-availability of a product or commodity begins to take options off the table, it can be said to have a significant impact on national defense capabilities. For example, product non-availability restricts the use of mission-critical capabilities. In contrast to an isolated impact, which reduces the effectiveness of military platforms or operations, a significant impact would render a given capability unavailable. In these situations, substitutes may exist, but would be restrictive in cost or result in significant performance loss. An incapacitating impact is one in which a broad segment of U.S. military capabilities effectively would be ~~crippled~~ ineffective. This classification is reserved for commodities, components, or end-items needed to produce and sustain military capabilities for which the U.S. military has widespread use. Examples include products critical to the construction of important aircraft and naval vessels. In the event of a shortage or loss of supply, substitutes would be altogether unavailable and national security severely compromised.

#### Aerospace maquilas are good – provide stable jobs

Guidi 12 – competitive set in the larger media and information landscape consists of organizations focused on creating, partnering and providing global news and cultural perspectives content (Ruxandra, “US Aerospace and Defense Companies Set Up Shop in Mexico”, PRI, 1/6/12, http://pri.org/stories/2012-01-06/us-aerospace-and-defense-companies-set-shop-mexico)//javi

"People's perception about what cross-border manufacturing, what maquiladoras are like, is still based upon what was happening in the 70s and maybe the 1980s," said Kenn Morris, president of Crossborder Group, a San Diego-based market research firm. Morris said the aerospace industry along Mexico's north-western border is nothing like the stereotype of overcrowded, low-skilled factories. "The fact is that a lot of the factories," he said, listing medical devices, aerospace, and electronics, "they're building in such a way these days, and they're managed in such a way, that they can be put anywhere on the planet. But they're coming to Mexico." In the past five to 10 years, more than 50 aerospace and defense companies have started operations in Baja California, according to Mexico's trade ministry. Most of them are American, and they produce everything from electronic components to steel bolts for commercial and military aircraft. These companies employ more than 10,000 high-tech workers, many of them engineers, technicians and software developers. The companies choose this region for its proximity to the US and to western ports catering to Asian markets. But the main reason they come here is simple: the cost of even highly skilled labor is roughly half of what it is in the United States. In San Diego, a senior aerospace engineer makes on average $90,000. In Tijuana, an engineer with similar skills earns $35,000 to $45,000. Cobham, which produces defense systems, made the move to Tijuana in 1997. Inside its factory, workers dressed in royal blue coveralls sit in groups, looking into microscopes, holding tiny tweezers. "Over here we do the tuning and testing of the product," said Javier Urquizo, a plant manager at Cobham. But Urquizo can't tell me exactly what the product is. That's classified information. "So after we finalize the assembly, we need to tweak around some components to get the electrical responses required on the different frequencies," he said. The company has to apply for special licenses from the State Department to build those components here in Mexico – that's to make sure the raw materials and parts and the technology don't get into the wrong hands. Teresa Jesus Rio Ramos, a production supervisor here, said that aerospace and defense companies offer the most stable, best paid jobs of all the Tijuana maquilas. She makes around $1,800 a month. "I think our company is pretty financially stable," she said, "I don't have to worry from month to month whether I'll have a job or not. But that's not true for all maquilas in Tijuana; people get fired and rehired elsewhere all the time."

#### They don’t have a concrete alternative – kills activism

Bryant ‘12

(Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do *even if* all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, *and when we do*, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

#### It’s sustainable—no political crises and self correcting

Stelzer 9 Irwin Stelzer is a business adviser and director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute, “Death of capitalism exaggerated,” http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26174260-5013479,00.html

A FUNNY thing happened on the way to the collapse of market capitalism in the face of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. It didn't. Indeed, in Germany voters relieved Chancellor Angela Merkel of the necessity of cohabiting with a left-wing party, allowing her to form a coalition with a party favouring lower taxes and free markets. And in Pittsburgh leaders representing more than 90 per cent of the world's GDP convened to figure out how to make markets work better, rather than to hoist the red flag. The workers are to be relieved, not of their chains but of credit-card terms that are excessively onerous, and helped to retain their private property - their homes. All of this is contrary to expectations. The communist spectre that Karl Marx confidently predicted would be haunting Europe is instead haunting Europe's left-wing parties, with even Vladimir Putin seeking to attract investment by re-privatising the firms he snatched. Which raises an interesting question: why haven't the economic turmoil and rising unemployment led workers to the barricades, instead of to their bankers to renegotiate their mortgages? It might be because Spain's leftish government has proved less able to cope with economic collapse than countries with more centrist governments. Or because Britain, with a leftish government, is now the sick man of Europe, its financial sector in intensive care, its recovery likely to be the slowest in Europe, its prime credit rating threatened. Or it might be because left-wing trade unions, greedily demanding their public-sector members be exempted from the pain they want others to share, have lost their credibility and ability to lead a leftward lurch. All of those factors contribute to the unexpected strength of the Right in a world in which a record number of families are being tossed out of their homes, and jobs have been disappearing by the million. But even more important in promoting reform over revolution are three factors: the existence of democratic institutions; the condition of the unemployed; and the set of policies developed to cope with the recession. Democratic institutions give the aggrieved an outlet for their discontent, and hope they can change conditions they deem unsatisfactory. Don't like the way George W. Bush has skewed income distribution? Toss the Republicans out and elect a man who promises to tax the rich more heavily. Don't like Gordon Brown's tax increases? Toss him out and hope the Tories mean it when they promise at least to try to lower taxes. Result: angry voters but no rioters, unless one counts the nutters who break windows at McDonald's or storm banks in the City. Contrast that with China, where the disaffected have no choice but to take to the streets. Result: an estimated 10,000 riots this year protesting against job losses, arbitrary taxes and corruption. A second factor explaining the Left's inability to profit from economic suffering is capitalism's ability to adapt, demonstrated in the Great Depression of the 1930s. While a gaggle of bankers and fiscal conservatives held out for the status quo, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his experimenters began to weave a social safety net. In Britain, William Beveridge produced a report setting the stage for a similar, indeed stronger, net. Continental countries recovering from World War II did the same. So unemployment no longer dooms a worker to close-to-starvation. Yes, civic institutions were able to soften the blow for the unemployed before the safety net was put in place, but they could not cope with pervasive protracted lay-offs. Also, during this and other recessions, when prices for many items are coming down, the real living standard of those in work actually improves. In the US, somewhere between 85 per cent and 90 per cent of workers have kept their jobs, and now see their living costs declining as rents and other prices come down. So the impetus to take to the streets is limited. Then there are the steps taken by capitalist governments to limit the depth and duration of the downturn. As the economies of most of the big industrial countries imploded, policy went through two phases. The first was triage - do what is necessary to prevent the financial system from collapse. Spend. Guarantee deposits to prevent runs on banks and money funds, bail out big banks, force relatively healthier institutions to take over sicker ones, mix all of this with rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers - the populist spoonful of sugar that made the bailouts go down with the voters - and stop the rot. Meanwhile, have the central banks dust off their dog-eared copies of Bagehot and inject lots of liquidity by whatever means comes to mind. John Maynard Keynes, meet Milton Friedman for a cordial handshake. Then came more permanent reform, another round of adapting capitalism to new realities, in this case the malfunctioning of the financial markets. Even Barack Obama's left-wing administration decided not to scupper the markets but instead to develop rules to relate bankers' pay more closely to long-term performance; to reduce the chance of implosions by increasing the capital banks must hold, cutting their profits and dividends, but leaving them in private hands; and to channel most stimulus spending through private-sector companies. This leaves the anti-market crowd little room for manoeuvre as voters seem satisfied with the changes to make capitalism and markets work better and more equitably. At least so far. There are exceptions. Australia moved a bit to the left in the last election, but more out of unhappiness with a tired incumbent's environmental and foreign policy. Americans chose Obama, but he had promised to govern from the centre before swinging left. And for all his rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers and other malefactors of great wealth, he sticks to reform of markets rather than their replacement, with healthcare a possible exception. Even in these countries, so far, so good for reformed capitalism. No substitutes accepted.

#### Globalization resolves the root cause of conflict – interconnectedness and trade benefits provide cohesion between partner countries

Lindsay et. al. 3 (“The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century”, Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2003, http://www.cfr.org/world/globalization-politics-american-foreign-policy-new-century/p6330)

September 11 signaled the end of the age of geopolitics and the advent of a new age— the era of global politics. The challenge U.S. policymakers face today is to recognize that fundamental change in world politics and to use America's unrivaled military, economic, and political power to fashion an international environment conducive to its interests and values. For much of the 20th century, geopolitics drove American foreign policy. Successive presidents sought to prevent any single country from dominating the centers of strategic power in Europe and Asia. To that end the United States fought two world wars and carried on its four-decade-long Cold War with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet empire ended the last serious challenge for territorial dominion over Eurasia. The primary goal of American foreign policy was achieved. During the 1990s, American foreign policy focused on consolidating its success. Together with its European allies, the United States set out to create, for the first time in history, a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. That effort is now all but complete. The European Union— which will encompass most of Europe with the expected accession of 10 new members in 2004— has become the focal point for European policy on a wide range of issues. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has evolved from a collective defense alliance into Europe's main security institution. A new relationship with Russia is being forged. Progress has been slower, though still significant, in Asia. U.S. relations with its two key regional partners, Japan and South Korea, remain the foundation of regional stability. Democracy is taking root in South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan. U.S. engagement with China is slowly tying an economically surging Beijing into the global economy. The success of American policy over the past decade means that no power— not Russia, not Germany, not a united Europe, and not China or Japan— today poses a hegemonic threat to Eurasia. In this new era, American foreign policy will no longer pivot on geography. Instead, it will be defined by the combination of America's unrivaled power in world affairs and the extensive and growing globalization of world politics. The Sole Global Power The United States is today the only truly global power. Its military reach— whether on land, at sea, or in the air— extends to every point on the globe. Its economic prowess fuels world trade and industry. Its political and cultural appeal— what Joseph Nye has called soft power— is so extensive that most international institutions reflect American interests. America's position in the world is unique— no other country in history has ever come close. But is America's exalted position sustainable? Militarily, the vast gap between the United States and everyone else is growing. Whereas defense spending in most other countries is falling, U.S. defense spending is rising rapidly. This year's requested increase in defense spending is greater than the entire Chinese defense budget. Most remarkably, America can afford to spend more. Defense spending takes a smaller share of the U.S. gross domestic product than it did a decade ago— and even the Bush administration's projected increases will produce an overall budget equal to only about 3.5 percent of GDP, about half of Cold War highs. There is little prospect of any country or group of countries devoting the resources necessary to begin competing with the United States militarily, let alone surpassing it. Economically, the United States may not widen its edge over its competitors, but neither is it likely to fall behind. The U.S. economy has proven itself at least as adept as its major competitors in realizing the productivity gains made possible by information technology. Europe and Japan face severe demographic challenges as their populations rapidly age, creating likely labor shortages and severe budgetary pressures. China is modernizing rapidly, and Russia may have turned the corner, but their economies today are comparable in output to those of Italy and Belgium— and they have yet to develop a political infrastructure that can support sustained economic growth. Which brings us to the issue of how to transform this unquestioned power into influence. Unless employed deftly, America's military and economic superiority can breed resentment, even among its friends. A growing perception that Washington cares only about its own interests and is willing to use its muscle to get its way has fueled a worrisome gap between U.S. and European attitudes. European elites increasingly criticize the United States as being morally, socially, and culturally retrograde— especially in its perceived embrace of the death penalty, predatory capitalism, and fast food and mass entertainment. Europe has also begun to exercise diplomatic muscle in international institutions and other arenas, seeking to create new international regimes designed to limit America's recourse to its hard power. The sustainability of American power ultimately depends on the extent to which others believe it is employed not just in U.S. interests but in their interests as well. Following its victory in World War II, the United States led the effort to create not only new security institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO, but also new regimes to promote economic recovery, development, and prosperity, such as the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods monetary system, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs to promote free trade. These institutions and agreements preserved and extended American power— but in a way that benefited all who participated. The challenge for the United States is to do the same today. Globalization Globalization is not just an economic phenomenon, but a political, cultural, military, and environmental one as well. Nor is globalization new; networks of interdependence spanning continents were increasing rapidly in the decades before the First World War as the steam engine and the telegraph reduced the cost of transportation and information. What distinguishes globalization today is the speed and volume of cross-border contacts. The prophets of globalization have trumpeted its benefits, particularly how the increased flow of goods, services, and capital across borders can boost economic activity and enhance prosperity. During the 1990s the more globalized economies grew an average of 5 percent a year, while the less globalized economies contracted by an average of 1 percent a year. The spread of ideas and information across the Internet and other global media has broadened cultural horizons and empowered people around the world to challenge autocratic rulers and advance the cause of human rights and democracy. Globalization can even lessen the chance of war. Fearing that war with Pakistan would disrupt their ties to U.S.-based multinationals, India's powerful electronic sector successfully pressed New Delhi in mid-2002 to deescalate its conflict with Pakistan.

#### Capitalism is key to the formation of successful space programs

Martin 10 (Robert, Amerika, June 21, <http://www.amerika.org/politics/centrifuge-capitalism/>, accessed: 3 July 2011)

Centralization and capitalism are necessary for any intelligent civilization, yet in excess drains the base population of any sustenance whatsoever, leaving them unemployed, homeless and starving at worst. The answer to this event is not a swing on the pendulum all the way onto total equality fisted socialism out on a plate for everyone who isn’t rich, that would be devastating for organization, but is a more natural ecosystem type of financing of a near-barter economics with different values and currencies for localized entities and more buoyant monetary for inter-localities – only monetizing where absolutely necessary. Without the higher economics that goes beyond small barter communities, there could be no space programs, or planetary defences providing the technology or the organization necessary to survive extinction events or fund a military etc, it’s critical for the structure of the superorganism – yet too much and some individuals inside of it become so padded from outside reality that they completely ignore the world around them.

#### Extinction – we have to go to space

Garan 10 – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” <http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-to-the-moon>)

Resources and Other Benefits: Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet. Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration. The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

**Rejection fails-leads to passivity means that only the perm solves best because it pragmatically incorporates neoliberal elements for social good AND mean our framework is superior because it promotes experimentation over theoretical rejection**

**Ferguson, Stanford anthropology chair and professor, 2010**

(James, “Toward a left art of government: from ‘Foucauldian critique’ to Foucauldian politics”,History of the Human Sciences 2011 24: 61, SAGE)

One of the founding premises of this special issue and the conference with which it began is that Foucault has been read, and used, in different ways in different academic disciplines. In this article I will discuss one common way of using Foucault’s thought in my own discipline of anthropology**. I will suggest** that **the** strategy of using Foucauldian modes of **analysis** **to ‘critique power’** (as it is often put) **has frequently led to a rather sterile form of political engagement**. Attention to some of Foucault’s own remarks about politics hints at a different political sensibility, in which empirical experimentation rather than moralistic denunciation takes center place. I will reference some examples of such experimentation that come out of my current research on the politics of social assistance in southern Africa (though I do not have space here to give a full exposition of these). The sort of use of Foucault that I have in mind is well represented in the anthropology of development (and the related field of what is sometimes called critical development studies). Here, **the characteristic strategy is** to use Foucauldian analysis to **reveal the way that** **interventions**, projects, etc., **which claim** to be merely **technical or benevolent**, **really involve relations of** power. This is a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but **too often**, in this field, **such a simple demonstration is apparently seen as the end of the exercise**. **Power has been ‘critiqued’, an oppressive system has been exposed as such, and that seems to be taken as a satisfactory end to the matte**r. This impasse in development studies and anthropology is related, I think, to a wider predicament that progressive or left politics seems to find itself in today. **The predicament is that the left seems increasingly to be defined by a series of gestures of refusal – what I call ‘the antis’ (anti-globalization, anti-neo-liberalism**, anti-privatization, anti-Bush, sometimes even anti-capitalism – but **always ‘anti’, never ‘pro’).** The **current world** system, the **politics** of the ‘anti-’ points out, **rests on inequality and exploitation**. The global poor are being screwed, while the rich are benefiting. The powerless are getting the short end of the stick. **This is** all perfectly **true**, of course, **if not terribly illuminating.** But **such lines of argument typically** **have very little to propose by way of an alternative ‘art of government’.** Governing is exercising power over others, which is what the powerful do to the downtrodden. **It appears as something to be resisted or denounced, not improved or experimented with.** My first observation about this sort of analysis is that it rests on what seems tome a very un-Foucauldian idea of the political. **Foucault did, certainly, valorize certain forms of resistance, and worked tirelessly to undermine and denaturalize taken-for-granted arrangements of power**. **But he never suggested that power ought not be exercised**, or that it was illegitimate for someto seek to govern the conduct of others.On the contrary, he repeatedly insisted that it made no sense (in his scheme of things) to wish for a world without power.1 Naive readings of Foucault turned his skeptical analytics of power into a simple denunciation. Thus the question (once posed to him by an interviewer) of whether it would be an intolerable use of power for a parent to prevent a child from scribbling on the walls of a house. Foucault’s instructive answer was: If I accepted the picture of power that is frequently adopted – namely, that it’s something horrible and repressive for the individual – it’s clear that preventing a child from scribbling would be an unbearable tyranny. But that’s not it. I say that power is a relation. A relation in which one guides the behavior of others. And there’s no reason why this manner of guiding the behavior of others should not ultimately have results which are positive, valuable, interesting, and so on. If I had a kid, I assure you he would not write on the walls – or if he did, it would be against my will. The very idea! (Foucault, 1988a: 11–13) In the same interview, he complained of those who . . . think I’m a sort of radical anarchist who has an absolute hatred of power. No! What I’m trying to do is to approach this extremely important and tangled phenomenon in our society, the exercise of power, with the most reflective, and I would say prudent, attitude. . . . To question the relations of power in the most scrupulous and attentive manner possible, looking into all the domains of its exercise, that’s not the same thing as constructing a mythology of power as the beast of the apocalypse. (ibid.: 11–13) **In fact, Foucault was as fascinated and attracted by power as he was by resistance, and his fundamental concern was with how (not whether) power is exercised. This led him, naturally enough, to the problem of government, which he inevitably took up as a pragmatic puzzle**. Some **contemporary practitioners** of what I have termed ‘Foucauldian critique’ seem to **think** **it is some sort of scandal that people should be governed at all** – supposing it to be somehow illegitimate that some should seek to guide the conduct of others. But Foucault took a deep and largely sympathetic interest in the development of what he called ‘arts of government’. Indeed, **he once suggested** (in a provocative set of remarks on neo-liberalism) **that while the right** had, in the mid- to late 20th century, **invented powerful new arts of government**, the **left had suffered from the ‘absence of a socialist art of government’**, and a historic failure to develop an ‘autonomous governmentality’ comparable to liberalism (Foucault, 2008: 93–4). This observation leads to a question that must be a central one for what I am here terming ‘Foucauldian politics’. That is**: What might a genuinely ‘left’ art of government look like? And where might we find the specific governmental techniques and rationalities that might enable such an art**? Looking at the world as a whole – and especially at the poorest and most disadvantaged parts of it, in which both I and my discipline have long taken a special interest – it seems evident that we can only answer such questions if we are willing to question some of the foundational assumptions that have dominated left thought throughout the last century or more. Let me cite just two reasons for this. **First, in much of the world** (and especially in the poorest parts of it), **formal wage labor does not play the central role that so much left thought ascribes to it**. The semimythical figure of the proletarian was, of course, at the heart of ideologies of state socialism, even as the extraction of labor was foundational to its political economy. But the ‘able bodied worker’ was hardly less central to the workings of social democracies and welfare states, where Keynesian policies implied a kind of pact between capital and labor, mediated by the state. ‘Society’, in such a scheme, was grounded on the (normatively male) wage earning worker and ‘his family’, while ‘social welfare’ intervention was available for those left outside the security of labor (whether through injury, old age, or periodic dips in the business cycle). Insurance rationality provided the technical means for universalizing certain sorts of social citizenship (at the level of the nation-state) on the basis of the non-universal (but sufficiently widespread) social condition of wage labor. This template never really applied very well to Africa, where wage laborers have always been a small minority of the population. **And it applies even less well today, when economic restructuring and de-industrialization have meant that formal wage employment is ever more the exception than the rule.** In the rapidly expanding cities of today’s Africa, the great mass of the population is not ‘employed’ in the usual sense of the word, and increasingly lacks connections (or rights) to land as well. Neither workers nor peasants, they dwell in the socalled ‘informal economy’, eking out a meagre survival through an impressive range of improvised bits of this and that (cf. Davis, 2007). The poverty of our analytical vocabulary in describing such people and their way of life (Are they ‘the lumpen’? ‘The youth’? ‘The informal’ – whatever that means?) ismatched by our inability to conceive of forms of politics that would given them a central place. Certainly, the old left strategy of dismissing such people as a residual and degenerate fringe (Marx’s ‘lumpenproletariat’) can hardly suffice when we are talking (as we often are today) about the majority of the population. **The second challenge I wish to note to conventional left thinking is the rise of forms of social assistance that bypass nation**-**states**. The usual left stance identifies ‘neo-liberalism’ as the enemy of the state, and thus of such social goods as welfare and pensions. But in much of Africa, most forms of ‘social assistance’ are funded and implemented by non-state agencies. This has long been the case, in many areas, thanks to the key role of Christian missions in providing education, health care and other social services from the colonial era onward. The NGO revolution of the recent decades has only accentuated the pattern, to the point where many of the key governmental relations that servicer eceiving Africans have are not with state bureaucracies, but with NGOs funded by transnational philanthropic foundations. **The most common left response to this transnationalization of ‘the social’ has been to oppose such developments (again, the ‘anti’), and to defend the sovereignty o**f African **states**, which are imagined as being (at least potentially) the agents of development and resistors of imperialism. **Such stances have sometimes been justified, but they have not led to very effective forms of politics**. **Might another sort of left politics not be possible – one that would look forward and try to identify new possibilities and openings in the current transnational regime**, **instead of looking back to an (often misremembered or idealized) era of sovereign ‘developmental states’? And (crucially for my purposes here), might it not be possible to identify or discover new ‘arts of government’ that might take advantage of (rather than simply fighting against) recent transformations in the spatial organization of government and social assistance?** This is the sort of rethinking that will be necessary if we are to get beyond the politics of the ‘anti’ and arrive at a convincing response to Foucault’s challenge to develop a true left art of government. **Such rethinking will have to be willing to decenter the two sacred touchstones of 20th-century progressive politics – the worker and the nation-state – while finding or reinventing techniques of government that can gain traction in settings where most of ‘the masses’ are not workers, and most social services are not delivered by state**s. **In such circumstances, simply attacking ‘neo-liberalism’** and defending ‘the welfare state’ **is not terribly helpful**. What is needed instead is a revitalized notion of the political good – and of what ‘social assistance’ might mean in a world where so many of the assumptions of the Keynesian welfare state no longer obtain. In matters of ‘social policy’, Foucault’s 1983 observation remains true nearly a quarter-century later: We are still bound up with an outlook that was formed between 1920 and 1940, mainly under the influence of Beveridge, a man who was born over a hundred years ago. For the moment . . . we completely lack the intellectual tools necessary to envisage in new terms the form in which we might attain what we are looking for. (Foucault, 1988b: 166) My recent work is concerned with empirical domains in which some of the conceptual innovation that Foucault called for may be under way. **Perhaps the most provocative finding to date is that some of the most interesting and promising new forms of government being devised seem to be taking market mechanisms that we are used to associating with neo-liberalism**, **and putting them to new political use**s. Consider, for instance, new anti-poverty programs in southern Africa that seek to provide cash support for incomes, and thus (in theory) harness markets to the task of meeting the needs of the poor. This is happening in several African countries, but also in a great many other postcolonial states – from Brazil and Venezuela to Mexico and Bangladesh – where leftist and rightist regimes alike have seen fit to introduce policies that transfer cash directly into the hands of the poor (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; cf. Ferguson, 2010). The South African Basic Income Grant campaign is the example I know best. This involves a proposal to deal with a crisis of persistent poverty by providing a small unconditional minimum monthly payment to all. The argument goes like this: markets are not working for poor people because they are too poor to participate in them. Government programs are not working for them because the state is inefficient. So: provide income support directly, in the form of cash, then say to the poor: ‘You are now empowered to solve your own problems in the way you see best.’ In contrast to older forms of ‘welfare’ assistance, the claim is that such grants rely on poor people’s own ability to solve their own problems, without imposing the policing, paternalism and surveillance of the traditional welfare state. The ‘social’ of the social welfare state is largely discarded, in this scheme. Assistance is largely decoupled from familistic assumptions and insurance rationality alike, while the state is imagined as both universally engaged (as a kind of direct provider for each and every citizen) and maximally disengaged (taking no real interest in shaping the conduct of those under its care, who are seen as knowing their own needs better than the state does). (See Standing and Samson, 2003; Barchiesi, 20007; Ferguson, 2007.) Similar new lines of thought are visible in recent campaigns for an increased role for direct cash transfers in many forms of social and humanitarian policy. For instance, an increasingly influential argument in the area of humanitarian assistance maintains that hunger is best dealt with by boosting the purchasing power of those at risk, rather than by distributing food aid. The current international food aid system involves taking excess grain (produced under subsidized conditions in rich countries) and transporting it to places (largely in Africa) where people are at risk of hunger. Following Amartya Sen, critics have long noted the perverse effects of this: depressing producer prices for local farmers, and damaging the local institutions for producing and distributing food crops. Once food aid has arrived, local food production often never recovers, and the ‘temporary’ crisis becomes permanent. As an alternative, Sen’s followers have pushed for cash payments to be made directly to those at risk of food deficit. People with money in their pockets, Sen points out, do not starve. And the economic chain of events that is set in motion by boosting purchasing power leads (through market forces) to increased capacity for local production and distribution (Sen, 1983; Dreze and Sen, 1991). The argument recalls Jane Guyer’s groundbreaking work on feeding African cities (1989). Consider, Guyer suggests, how food ends up in bellies in the vast mega-cities of West Africa such as Lagos. The logistical task of moving thousands of tons of food each day fromthousands of local producers to millions of urban consumerswould be beyond the organizational capacity of any state (to say nothing of the less-than-exemplary Nigerian one). Here, market mechanisms, drawing on the power of vast self-organizing networks, are very powerful, and very efficient. Such forms of organization must appear especially attractive where states lack capacity (and let us remember how many progressive dreams in Africa have crashed on the rocks of low state capacity). **Why should relying on this sort of mechanism be inherently right-wing?** Well, the answer is obvious: **markets serve only those with purchasing power.** But **the food aid example shows a way of redirecting markets toward the poor**, by intervening not to restrict the market, but to boost purchasing power. I **have become convinced that (at least in the case of food aid) this is good public policy. Is it also neo-liberal? Perhaps that is not the right question**. Let us rather ask: **Are there specific sorts of social policy that might draw on characteristic neo-liberal ‘moves’** (like using markets to deliver services) **that would also be genuinely pro-poor**? That seems to me a question worth asking. **It seems clear that the governmental programs I have discussed here do draw on recognizably neo-liberal elements** (including the valorization of market efficiency, individual choice and autonomy; themes of entrepreneurship; and skepticism about the state as a service provider).2 **But those who advocate and fight for these policies would insist that they are, in fact ‘pro-poor’**, and that they are ways of fighting against (rather than capitulating to) the growing inequality that recent ‘neo-liberal’ economic restructuring has produced. These claims, I think, are not easily dismissed. **And this, in turn, raises the fascinating possibility that the ‘neo-liberal’ and the ‘pro-poor’ may not be so automatically opposed as we are used to supposing**. What is **of special interest here is the way that certain sorts of new progressive initiatives may involve not simply ‘opposing the neo-liberal project’, but appropriating key mechanisms of neo-liberal government for different ends**. This does not mean that these political projects are therefore suspect – ‘contaminated’ by their association with neo-liberal rationality. **Rather, it means that they are appropriating certain characteristic neo-liberal ‘moves’** (and I think of these discursive and programmatic moves as analogous to the moves one might make in a game) **that while recognizably ‘neo-liberal’, can be used for quite different purposes than that term usually implies.** As I have argued in a related paper (Ferguson, 2010), this situation may be analogous to the way that statistical techniques that were developed in the 19th century for calculating the probabilities of workplace injuries eventually became building blocks of the insurance techniques that enabled the rise of the welfare state. Such techniques were originally developed in the 19th century by large employers to control costs, but they eventually became the technical basis for social insurance, and ultimately helped enable unprecedented gains for the working class across much of the world (Ewald, 1986). Techniques have no necessary loyalty to the political program within which they were developed, and mechanisms of government that were invented to serve one purpose can easily enough be appropriated for surprising other uses. ‘Market’ techniques of government such as those I have discussed were, like workplace statistics, undoubtedly conservative in their original uses. But it seems at least possible that they may be in the process of being creatively appropriated, and repurposed for different and more progressive sorts of ends. **To be sure: we need to be skeptical about the facile idea that problems of poor people can be solved simply by inviting them to participate in markets and enterprise**. Such claims (which often ascribe almost magical transformative powers to such unlikely vehicles as ‘social entrepreneurship’ or ‘microcredit’) are almost always misleading, and often fraudulent. But **it would be a mistake to dismiss the coupling of pro-poor social policy with market mechanisms out of hand, out of a reflexive sense that the latter are ‘neo-liberal’ and thus ‘bad’**. Again, my interest here is in the potential mobility of a set of governmental devices. These devices originated within a neo-liberal project that deserves all the criticism it gets. But they may be in the process of being redeployed in creative ways. **If so, some emergent political initiatives that might appear at first blush to be worryingly ‘neo-liberal’ may, on closer inspection, amount to something a good deal more hopeful. This leaves us with a politics that requires more of us than simply denouncing neo-liberalism**. The political demands and policy measures I have mentioned here (whether conditional cash transfers, basic income, or cash-based food aid) do not merit, I think, either wholesale denunciation or uncritical acceptance. Instead, they call on us to remain skeptical and vigilant, but also curious and hopeful. They leave us less with strong opinions than with the sense that we need to think about them a bit more, and learn a bit more about the specific empirical effects that they may produce. Are cash transfers, for instance, a device for demobilizing the poor (as some traditional Marxists claim) – effectively buying the political quiescence of those who have the most to gain from radical social change for a paltry sum? Or do they have the contrary effect, as many proponents of basic income argue – opening up a new space of mobilization and political demand by radically decoupling labor and consumption and opening a new domain of decommodification? This is not a question to be answered theoretically or ideologically; the only answer that really convinces is the empirical and experimental one: Let us find out! Such a stance, I suggest, brings us much closer toward a truly Foucauldian politics. **For politics, for Foucault, was always more about experimentation than denunciation**. In an interview on social security, Foucault insisted that what was required for a progressive rethinking of social policy was not a theoretically derived ‘line’, but, as he put it, ‘a certain empiricism’. We have to transform the field of social institutions into a vast experimental field, in such a way as to decide which taps need turning, which bolts need to be loosened here or there, to get the desired change. . . . What we have to do . . . is to increase the experiments wherever possible in this particularly interesting and important area of social life. (Foucault, 1988b: 165) **What this implies is a form of politics that has less to do with critique and denunciation than with experimentation and assessment**. It is a matter not of refusing power, but rather exercising it in a way that would be provisional, reversible, and open to surprise**. If we are indeed to arrive at viable left ‘arts of government’, we will need to be open to the unexpected, ready to ‘increase the experiments wherever possible’, and attentive to the ways that governmental techniques originally deployed for nefarious purposes can be appropriated toward other ends**. To **do this, we will need to forgo the pleasures of the easy, dismissive critique, and instead turn a keen and sympathetic eye toward the rich world of actual social and political practice**, the world of tap-turning and experimentation. That is a world still full of invention and surprise, where the landscape of political possibility and constraint that we have come to take for granted is being redrawn, even as we speak.

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Henk **Overbeek**, associate professor in international relations at the Free University, Amsterdam, “Neoliberalism and the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility,” May **2002**, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, JSTOR

These **neoliberal forms of mobility controls will not disappear with political changes in countries at the receiving end**. **Because of their inclusion into regional frameworks of integration, these mechanisms become locked in, and it would be extremely costly, both economically and politically, not to respect them** (Gill 1998). Accordingly, states become more accountable **to external than to internal forces**. States are made responsible for maintaining the direction or the orientation taken by the regional system and to upholding the principles or social purpose of the agreements signed. Both the Budapest Process and the Puebla Process have developed mechanisms to strengthen these tendencies and to monitor the compliance of the participating states. Particular emphasis is placed in both contexts on the selective criminalization of migration.