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### FW

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm an increase in economic engagement toward Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela through instrumental defense of action by the United States federal government.

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### The government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### “Toward” means in the direction of

Merriam Webster Dictionary ‘13

<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/toward>. Retrieved July 1, 2013.

1: in the direction of <driving toward town>

2 a : along a course leading to <a long stride toward disarmament>

b : in relation to <an attitude toward life>

3 a : at a point in the direction of : near <a cottage somewhere up toward the lake>

b : in such a position as to be in the direction of <your back was toward me>

4 : not long before <toward the end of the afternoon>

5 a : in the way of help or assistance in <did all he could toward raising campaign funds>

b : for the partial payment of <proceeds go toward the establishment of a scholarship>”

#### The term “with” changes the nature of the resolution – independent voting issue – kills predictability

#### You Should Prioritize Our Competition Impacts First – Games Theory Accounts for the Role of the Resolution as a Starting Point, The Debate as a Process, and The Ballot as a Tool That Determines a Winner and a Loser

Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz Assistant Professors of Department of Politics, New York University 2009 Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf

The game-theoretic approach involves a three-step process. The first step defines a game, which captures (a) the relevant choices that are understood to be available to the players (in models of deliberation, typically, what messages, if any, could be sent, and what decisions could be made after the exchange of messages), (b) what the players know about those choices, about each other, and about the deliberative interaction to which they are a party, and finally, (c) how attractive they would perceive the consequences of those choices to be if they knew everything that there was to know about them. The second step specifies a solution concept, which embodies a set of assumptions about the general behavioral agency ascribed to the players in the model. Given the first two steps, the third step is logically entailed: through well-defined techniques of analysis, one can generate predictions about what types of behavior, with respect to the particular choices analyzed in the model, are and are not mutually consistent - that is, are or are not supportable by equilibria of the specified game. The key question that motivates the game-theoretic analysis is how policy selection is related to private information and preferences when participants engage in equilibrium behavior.

#### Games Theory is the Best Model To Understand Debate

Anthony Kelly lecturer at the University of Southampton Research & Graduate School of Education 2003 “Two-person zero-sum games of strategy” Decision Making using Game Theory Cambridge University Press

A two-person zero-sum game is one in which the pay-offs add up to¶ zero. They are strictly competitive in that what one player gains, the¶ other loses. The game obeys a law of conservation of utility value, where¶ utility value is never created or destroyed, only transferred from one¶ player to another. The interests of the two players are always strictly¶ opposed and competitive, with no possibility of, or benefit in, cooperation. One player must win and at the expense of the other; a feature¶ known as pareto-efficiency. More precisely, a pareto-efficiency is a¶ situation in which the lot of one player cannot be improved without¶ worsening the lot of at least one other player.¶ Game theory is particularly well-suited to the analysis of zero-sum¶ games and applications to everyday life (especially sporting contests)¶ abound.

#### Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space

#### A stasis point in the game is critical to research and dialogue

Hanghoj 08 - Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Process of dialogue outweighs the outcome of debates

Morson 04 - Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres especially satire, utopia, and the novel; <http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>)

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

#### Debate is a game which means fairness comes first – the resolution is the stasis point for deliberation and meaningful debates

Steinberg & Freeley 8 (Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation is key to better decision making skills

Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz Assistant Professors of Department of Politics, New York University 2009 Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf

Democracy is minimally defined as a form of governance in which policy decisions are made by a majority vote of the citizens. While useful as a rough way of classifying polities, this definition turns out, on closer examination, to be both ambiguous and radically incomplete. The main thrust of the critique of minimal democracy developed in contemporary democratic theory is that voting is not the best, or at least not the only, political mechanism for ensuring that policy decisions conform to the interests of the citizens. A key political mechanism that also serves that role and that is missing from the minimalist view of democracy is deliberation, and the appreciation of the effects of this mechanism is changing the way scholars of democracy think about democratic institutions.¶ In revealing correct, fuller, or simply better organized information, deliberation provides an opportunity for participants to arrive at more considered judgments of their own and to affect collective decision-making by influencing the judgments of others. Its consequences may affect what happens in a voting booth or in a legislative or a judicial chamber, or in the way we approach a personal moral conundrum. A political decision-making process that fails to create the opportunity for or to take advantage of these benefits of deliberation is bound to raise questions about the legitimacy of the resulting outcomes (Manin 1987; Habermas 1996; Cohen 1996).¶ Apart from the immediate effects of better information, deliberation contributes to the legitimacy of policy choices and of the underlying political institutions in a number of other ways. It can raise the sense of political autonomy and of the effective fairness of policy choices, enable a better assessment of fellow citizens’ motives with respect to a given political choice, and even encourage other-regarding motives on their part (Elster 1995). It may also increase the stability of collective choice by reducing the number of issue dimensions and introducing more structure into individual preferences (Johnson and Knight 1994; Dryzek and List 2003). But to have these effects, deliberation must bring about some kind of learning that can produce a change in participants preferences over choices.1 At bottom the transmission processing and aggregation of information that forms the basis of individual and collective decision-making is the engine that sets in motion the deliberative wheels.

#### Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, 8 lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8 (David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

¶ After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### Advocacy

#### We advocate the 1ACs parsing of the resolution excluding the idea that debate is dead—

#### First, they should lose for undermining debate’s transformative potential—Believing in the power of deliberation is critical to challenging elite domination, especially in Latin America. It’s the only way to re-integrate ethics into decision-making

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Second, you should take a leap of faith – we should attempt to build truth even if everything revolves around simulation─

Fawver, 8 [Kurt, Master of Arts Engilsh – Cleveland State University, “ DESTRUCTION IN SEARCH OF HOPE: BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATION, AND CHUCK PALAHNIUK’S CHOKE,” August 2008, <http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Fawver%20Kurt%20D.pdf?csu1219269969>]

If Palahniuk’s Choke was merely an excellent resource for understanding Baudrillardian theory, it would still be a valuable text. As it stands, however, Choke expands on the ideas of simulation and mediation and struggles to free itself from the snares of Baudrillard’s ultimate unreality. Through a regime of breakdown and disorder, the text fights to emerge from “the end or disappearance of… the real, the social, history, and other key features of modernity” (Best 133). It attempts to create a meaningful correspondence between signifiers and signifieds, between images and meanings. While Baudrillard posits that “everything can and has been done, and all we can do is to assemble the… pieces of our culture and proceed to its extremities,” Choke resists such reasoning and, in fact, runs through stages of assembly and extremism to demonstrate how utterly futile and pointless they are (Best 137). Choke seeks to blow apart those very reproductions that Baudrillard claims cause the implosion of meaning. Essentially, the text advocates a clean sweep of communication, a discarding of all mediated reality. In Choke, as in many other Palahniuk novels, the flow of true meaning can only return to society and individuals once all mediated, simulated, reproduced “meanings” are razed. Thus, the text does glorify destruction, but it is destruction in search of hope, destruction that will, presumably, lead to creation. Victor’s eventual identity collapse, and his subsequent rebuilding, is paradigmatic of Choke’s anti-Baudrillardian philosophy. Victor begins by compiling the persona of a dysfunctional, perpetually orphaned child-cum-adult from mediated symbols of “dysfunction.” His sex addiction and his compulsion to simulate choking in restaurants are symptoms of this poor attempt at constructing a workable identity. When the “traumatized child-now-in-adulthood” simulation fails, Victor turns to new mediated identities: Christ and Antichrist. These personas also lack any depth or connection to Victor’s core being and are, subsequently, discarded. As the text progresses, Victor drops all attempts at creating his identity from the palette of society’s mass-produced conceptions. He pleads for someone to “just show me one thing in this world that is what you’d think” (Choke 205). But, as no inherent realness exists in contemporary society, no one can show Victor a thing or an individual with inherent meaning. Therefore, his only option is to extricate himself from the culture of simulation by cutting himself off from his own history and other individuals’ mediated perceptions of his past. In a moment of clarity, Victor realizes that he must reduce his identity to its simplest, most immediate terms because “There’s no way you can get the past right. You can pretend. You can delude yourself, but you can’t re-create what’s over” (Choke 273). Thus, by the end of the novel, Victor is more a blank page than a fully fleshed character. Rather than continuing to allow his identity to be an ever-evolving reactive simulation that forms in reference to external mediation, he becomes a clean slate on which he can write his own self-generated identity. He slakes off most of the factors that traditionally 26 inform self; familial expectation, personal history, and even conventional emotion are all missing from his identity at the text’s close. As Victor explains, “For the first time in longer than I can remember, I feel peaceful. Not happy. Not sad. Not anxious. Not horny. Just all the higher parts of my brain closing up shop…. I’m simplifying myself” (Choke 282). The implication is that, in order to escape simulation, Victor must revert to a more primitive state. His thoughts are of an essentially basic order; he no longer seeks out “deeper” meanings or alternate referentials. Instead, events, feelings, people, and things simply are what they appear to be, without connection to external mediation. For Victor, the universe of multiple signified meanings for any given signifier is no longer relevant. He has destroyed his perception of alternate reference and, therefore, has limited his field of meaning to exclusively intrinsic values. Such perception comes at a price, however. Victor has to sacrifice a world of possibility, of variable signification, for concrete meaning. He can no longer ponder whether an image means one thing or another; rather, an image will, to Victor, always be fixed to one referent. In a sense, then, he has given up the parts of his “higher brain,” namely a rigorous intellect and boundless creativity, in order to gain a foothold into solid reality and flee Baudrillard’s infinite simulatory spiral. Whereas Baudrillard “critiques… representational thought which is confident that it is describing reality as it is,” Victor embraces such thoughts with open arms (Best 140). Victor is intelligent enough to understand that choosing a path of selfimposed communicative primitivism is the only measure of prevention against accruing a new body of simulacra. The polar opposite of Victor is Tracy, the woman to whom he loses his virginity. She is the prime example of an individual forever lost in Baudrillardian post27 structuralism, representing everything that Victor, or any person, may become when nihilistic acceptance of simulation has infiltrated every aspect of self. Victor meets her on an airplane, in an unlocked bathroom. She takes flights, enters the restroom, leaves the door unlocked, then waits until someone walks in on her and attempts to engage them in a sexual encounter. When Victor questions her aberrant behavior, she replies that “the answer is there is no answer… when you think about it, there’s no good reason to do anything. There is no point… people… don’t want an orgasm as much as they just want to forget. Everything.” (Choke 256-7). Clearly, life in the Baudrillardian void has taken its toll on this woman. Tracy ponders “Why do I do anything? …I’m educated enough to talk myself out of any plan. To deconstruct any fantasy. Explain away any goal. I’m so smart I can negate any dream.” (Choke 257). She is the essence of Baudrillard’s postconstructionist theory; in her, the text introduces an embodiment of hyper-intellectualism that has cut away all the joy, fulfillment, and meaning from life and reality and, subsequently, sees only a vacuum underlying all existence. Her nihilism leads into a quest for extrication from the ultimate emptiness and, thus, works as the catalyst for her sexual addiction. She wants to find meaning and absolute reality but will always be forced, due to her intelligence and her deconstructive ability, to undermine the very goal she is trying to achieve. For Tracy, meaning is impossible not because it has objectively disappeared, but because she cannot accept simple truths or non-multiplicitous signifiers. She thrives on the complexity of reality and, therefore, will never be satisfied by a simplistic interpretation, even if the simplistic interpretation is that for which she yearns. Through Tracy’s unsatisfied, perpetually-wandering nature, the text puts forth the implication that 28 maintaining such an unflinching post-constructionist mindset has no future other than disappointment, dysfunction, and existential despair. Indeed, Choke implicitly attacks Baudrillard’s blasé acceptance of simulation and attempts to show the ramifications of such acceptance. Hence, while the critical perspective from which Baudrillard’s theory stems is akin to a scalpel, cutting deeper and deeper into the body of reality to reveal unending layers of nothingness, Choke advocates a return to a bandaged surface; it strives toward the revitalization of easily accessible signifieds, and, thus, shuns Tracy’s (see also Baudrillard’s) system of thought that only seeks to forever prove the disappearance of meaning. Therefore, the text is ultimately moving beyond Baudrillard by “emphasizing creation over destruction” and promoting the deemphasization of post-constructionist critical inquiry as a means of understanding reality (Kavadlo 12). To further illustrate the resurrection of meaningful signifiers and images, the text introduces Denny, Victor’s best friend. Denny is a recovering sex addict who, throughout the text, earnestly seeks rehabilitation. As sex addictions in Choke seem to be symptomatic of a fatalistic surrender to the simulatory world, Denny is the one character who consistently seeks out a means of resistance. Strangely enough, this resistance takes the form of thousands of rocks. As the novel progresses, Denny builds an enormous rock collection and, with those rocks, embarks on the construction of a mystery structure in an empty field. He enlists Victor’s help and, when a local reporter comes to interview Victor and Denny about the construction project, Victor’s responses are veiled in a haze of ignorance. Victor recalls the dialogue between himself and the reporter, saying that she asked: “‘This structure you’re building, is it a house?’ And I say we don’t know. 29 ‘Is it a church of some kind?’ We don’t know. …‘What are you building, then?’ We won’t know until the very last rock is set. ‘But when will that be?’ We don’t know.” (Choke 263-4). Victor’s reticence with the reporter is not due to any particular stigma or grudge against the media. Rather, his unforthcoming answers are a result of a new (or perhaps ancient) mode of perception and, thus, communication. Instead of focusing on the possibilities of the stone structure or its eventual outcome, Denny instructs Victor to focus on the process of building, alone. He says that “the longer we can keep building, the longer we can keep creating, the more will be possible. The longer we can tolerate being incomplete,” the better (Choke 264). Initially, this statement appears to echo Baudrillard’s sentiments, with a perpetual process of building that leads nowhere and creation that actually creates nothing. Yet, precisely the opposite is true. By compelling the rock structure to remain a work-in-progress without a definitive end, Denny has squashed any simulatory nature the building may possess. He and Victor are not putting stones atop one another to create any of the long-mediated structures of society. The stone building is not a house or a church or any other structure of convention and, therefore, is not founded upon any previous referent. Denny’s rock building is not trying to simulate any other structure; it is simply allowed to rise and become whatever it eventually becomes. With the stone structure, Denny is attempting to introduce a product that holds inherent, unmediated meaning. As soon as Denny or Victor would conclude that the building is a house or a church, then it would, necessarily, begin to take on aspects of those structures. It would begin to simulate a house or a church. But, by allowing the structure to grow almost organically, Denny has set the 30 groundwork for a signifier that may finally be connected with an inherent meaning, with a concrete undeniable reality. The price for cultivating an unmediated, unsimulatory reality is high, however. Both Denny and Victor must discard the realm of speculation and conjecture. In order to maintain a sense of the real, all possibility outside a thing’s readily apparent meaning must vanish. Denny and Victor do not know what the stone building will be because they don’t want to know until it is finished. They choose a path of ignorance so that realness may reassert itself within the structure without being crushed by external mediated “reality.” Basically, Denny and Victor must become simple, single-minded individuals who have no need for multiplicitous signs and no desire for a constant outgrowth of discourse. Theirs is a reality that requires no mediation, no simulation, and, hence, no emptiness. Such a lifestyle choice flies in the face of our contemporary world, where formulating variable meanings for signifiers and expanding the possible field of referentials for images is second-nature. The very fiber of critical theory, or of practically any academic discipline, hinges on increased speculation, on infinitely sprawling discourses, and on the complication of texts, signifiers, and reality itself. Choke’s solution for escaping Baudrillard’s simulation is to escape that same incisively critical manner of thinking. In doing so, Denny and Victor become primitive postpostmodern men. The duo simultaneously evolve and devolve communication; they usher reality back into a signifier but cause the collapse of complexity. Indeed, “many of the seemingly random transgressive acts perpetrated by the characters in Palahniuk’s fiction,” such as Denny and Victor’s intentional ignorance, “fall within an understanding of entropy as a force for renewal and meaning” (Sartain 32). Thus, while Denny may 31 have set society on a course for a neo-stone age, his rock structure may actually be something that simply “is what it is.” Victor’s mother, Ida, is an individual who also manages to cut ties with simulation, but in a much different, and arguably more destructive, manner. Her perspective on reality, like the neo-primitivism of Victor and Denny, strives to attain communion with a long-lost realness. However, Ida takes a much more direct and assertive approach. She uses drugs to “simplify” her state of mind. As Ida explains, “Trichloroethane… All my extensive testing has shown this to be the best treatment for a dangerous excess of human knowledge” (Choke 148). She is attempting to clear away the debris of contemporary society’s all-consuming media (and with it mediation and simulation) by chemically altering her consciousness, thus allowing her to ignore its multiplicity of disembodied voices and images that would, otherwise, crush her unmediated, individual perception of reality. Ida claims that she can see things as they truly are when she is on drugs. She says that the trichloroethane makes the world appear “without the framework of language. Without the cage of associations… without looking through the lens of everything she knew was true…” (Choke 149). Through her druginduced highs, Ida is stripping away mediation and, therefore, making simulation impossible. Without a vast body of mediated meanings to draw upon, Ida is forced to view the world as it actually is, in its simplest terms. She has rid herself of simulation and allowed realness to seep back into images. However, the reality is fleeting and dissipates back into the cacophony of Baudrillard’s simulatory universe as soon as Ida is clean once more. Even worse, the constant drug use takes its toll on Ida; over the course of the text, she ends up with a perpetual bloody nose and, ultimately, is reduced to a 32 feeble, emaciated skeleton. Idea proves that, while escaping Baudrillard’s simulation may be possible in a number of ways, the return to reality can come at an indescribably steep price. Ida is also critical to understanding Choke’s postulation on the manner in which society may be galvanized into forsaking simulation. It is “Ida’s ideology of adventure, her belief in the restorative power of chaos [that] serves to unbalance comfortable homogeneity. She… seeks to create meaning and potential for change through random chaotic acts” (Sartain 33). Ida vandalizes merchandise in stores, kidnaps children, and causes public disturbances all in the service of disrupting complacent adherence to mediated reality. She knows that “a fire alarm is never about a fire, anymore” and tries to disseminate this knowledge across society, albeit obliquely and illegally (Choke 161). Ida challenges simulation by creating real panic and real excitement. Her acts of destruction are aimed squarely at bringing a sense of reality back into a populace that, normally, experiences events and emotions in a heavily mediated environment. Ida causes people to feel true fear, to experience events that are precisely what they appear to be: actual, unsimulated danger. However, there is no proof that Ida’s regime of philosophy-based crime alters the perception or behavior of anyone but Victor over the long term. For a brief moment, the victims of Ida’s crimes may experience a true, unmediated, unsimulated event, but as soon as the danger has been resolved, the contemporary culture of mass media creeps back in and continues to suffocate with its hollow signifiers. Therefore, Ida’s attempts to empower society may be entirely pointless. While her personal freedom from Baudrillard’s simulatory world is assured, she cannot force others to choose the same path of informed, intelligible ignorance. 33 Indeed, Ida’s failure to enact social change exhibits the textual implication that release from simulation must begin in the most intensely personal and introspective realms and radiate outward. Perhaps meaning can be reconnected with images, but, as Choke demonstrates, such reconnection must be instituted at the individual level long before it can solidify into an absolute reality upon which everyone agrees. If Choke’s resolution to the Baudrillardian dilemma seems somewhat perfunctory or abrupt, it would be in keeping with the theoretical concerns of the text. In a simulatory reality, where all information is produced and mediated to individuals at a hyperkinetic speed, it would be logical for a solution or paradigmatic rebellion to arise just as quickly, given that this solution would still, necessarily, have a point of emergence within a system that is unable to slow the production of information, images, and signifiers. Thus, the text’s resolution – an idea that works as a competing perception of reality – appears as quickly and as suddenly as any other random image or information structure; the system of mindless, endless generation has unwittingly generated its own demise. That Choke ends without much exploration of its resolution to simulatory reality is also reasonable, given that such an open-ended future is antithetical to the very principle of Baudrillardian nihilism. The text fights despair and a defeated acceptance of missing reality with unabashed romanticism. With the novel ending shortly after the characters have lain in place their newfound adherence to knowing ignorance, the future is uncertain. Anything could happen to reality following the close of the text; a reunion of images and meaning is as possible as the continuation of hollow simulation. Victor and Denny’s plan for identity-formation and reality-perception may lead to the eventual destruction of all simulacra or it may be entirely useless. The reader is left in a state of 34 unknowing, of hope for meaning-filled future. Such a conclusion is impossible in a Baudrillardian scheme of reality. Under Baudrillard’s critical eye, the world has reached a point where struggle against the forces of simulation is impossible. In Baudrillardian theory, there is no hope for the retrieval of meaning; rather, the process of simulacra will continue, unabated. In answer to this bleak nihilistic view, Choke presents an open space, an ending that is more the beginning of a competing discourse than a summation of all that has come before it. There is no definite success at the end of the text, nor is there assured defeat. The text’s concluding indeterminacy, its allowance for hope, separates it from Baudrillard’s nihilism and reinforces the supposition that escape from simulation is, in fact, possible.

Saying NO to this idea has value regardless of truth—Especially in the context of death

Barash and Lipton, 1985

David P., Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington (Seattle) and Judith Eve, psychiatrist at the Swedish Medical Center in Washington, “The Caveman and the Bomb” p.261-267

Fortunately, whatever genetic imperatives operate in Homo sapiens, they are unlikely to extend directly to nuclear weapons, any more than a tendency for body adornment necessarily leads to a Christian Dior necktie or a New Guinea penis sheath. The general patterns that char­acterize today's nuclear Neanderthal are, in fact, general, nonspecific. They may incline us to a degree of saber rattling that seems likely to trouble the world in one way or another as long as we and the world persist, but these patterns don't require that the saber be nuclear. On this level the nuclear Neanderthal doesn't even have to play "as if": We are called on to behave not as if we had free will regarding the renun­ciation of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, but to act in accord with that free will, which we assuredly have. That is honest empowerment indeed. Teilhard de Chardin wrote about the "Omega point" at which human beings become conscious of their own evolution and, hence, of them­selves. He called for a recognition of unity and connectedness, with our speciesborn on this planet and spread over its entire surface, coming gradually to form around its earthly matrix a single, major organic unity, enclosed upon itself; a single, hypercomplex, hyperconcentrated, hyperconscious arch-molecule, coextensive with the heavenly body on which it is born.9 In overcoming the Neanderthal mentality we could finally become hu­man, or perhaps even more than this, at last able to answer affirmatively the question: Is there intelligent life on earth? As poet and novelist Nikos Kazantzakis pleaded, "Let us unite, let us hold each other tightly, let us merge our hearts, let us create for Earth a brain and a heart, let us give a human meaning to the superhuman struggle."'° Something has spoken to me in the night, burning the tapers of the waning year; something has spoken in the night, and told me I shall die, I know not where. Saying: "To lose the earth you know, for greater knowing; to lose the life you have, for greater life; to leave the friends you loved, for greater loving; to find a land more kind than home, more large than earth—Whereupon the pillars of this earth are founded, toward which the conscience of the world is tending—a wind is rising and the rivers flow." THOMAS WOLFE 11 For the existentialists the essence of humanity is in saying no—no to injustice, to murder, to the absurd and dehumanizing universe itself But the ultimate existential tragedy is that in the long run, saying no cannot succeed. Each of us will eventually die, and this looming inevitability makes our lives absurd. By our very aliveness we are therefore embarked on a hopeless campaign, which may yield some victories, but only tem­porary ones. Like a cosmic poker game, we are playing against the house, but in this game the house never loses; even if we are briefly ahead, we cannot cash in our chips and go home winners. There is no other place to go. At the close of The Plague, Albert Camus lets us inside the thoughts of Dr. Rieux, who had courageously battled a typhoid epidemic in a North African city. Just as the plague has finally been overcome, and the survivors were celebrating in the streets, Dr. Rieux understood that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never-ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers. And, indeed, as he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux remembered that such joy is always imperiled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.12 But effectiveness per se is not the issue. The rats may come again, and with them the plague, just as every person now alive must some day die. The real question—for would-be post-Neanderthals no less than for existential thinkers—concerns the obligation of human beings in the face of such a world. "In everlasting terms—those of eternity," wrote Thomas Wolfe, "there is no greater wisdom than the wisdom of Ecclesiastes, no acceptance finally so true as the stern fatalism of the rock. Man was born to live, to suffer, and to die, and what befalls him is a tragic lot. There is no denying this in the final end." Nonetheless, he concludes, we must "deny it all along the way." Although admitting the "stern lesson of acceptance," which calls for acknowledging the "tragic under-weft of life into which man is born, through which he must live, out of which he must die," Wolfe described his intention, "having accepted it, to try to do what was before me, what I could do, with all my might."13 Camus went farther. According to Greek mythology, Sisyphus had been condemned to spend eternity rolling an enormous rock up a steep hill; when the rock neared the top, it would roll back down, and Sisyphus would have to start again. In "The Myth of Sisyphus," Sisyphus serves not only as a metaphor for humanity but, as Camus sees it, as a model as well. His struggle is not only self-defining, but also ennobling. More­over, Camus concludes that Sisyphus is happy. There are some important differences between Sisyphus and Dr. Rieux, and the post-Neanderthal. For one thing, Dr. Rieux could afford to lose many battles and even many patients, just as Sisyphus can tolerate the constant victory of gravity. Sisyphus, after all, is crushed neither mentally nor literally by his stone; no matter how many people die from a plague, some survive. Dr. Rieux will never eradicate the plague; his glory comes from his fighting on in the face of that knowledge. Sisyphus will never succeed in his labor; his happiness comes from his self-defi­nition, knowing his futility. Unlike them, however, we are not doomed to failure. Before beginning their combat the Roman gladiators used to face the spectators in the Coliseum and announce, "We who are about to die salute you." Two thousand years later the poet W. H. Auden updated their credo: "We who are about to die demand a miracle." Like the gladiators, Auden was concerned about the end of his life, what Kurt Vonnegut calls "plain old death." And to overcome plain old personal death, nothing less than a bona fide miracle in the theological sense will do. We can say no to personal death and an absurd universe all we like, but in the end, like Rieux and Sisyphus, we are bound to lose. The good news, however, is that the other kind of death—the mass, meaningless annihilation that would come with nuclear war—is not inevitable. Unlike the overturning of personal death, no divine intervention is required. Unlike the eruption of a volcano or the brewing of a hurricane, nuclear war is a man-made problem, with man- and woman-made solutions. Unlike Auden and the gladiators, we have a precious and unique op­portunity: We can say no to our Neanderthal mentality, to our genes. We are the only creatures on earth who can do this. We have this op­portunity because our genes whisper to us, they do not shout. They can be stubborn, but they can be persuaded, cajoled, bribed, or, if necessary, simply overruled and strong-armed into submission. Dr. Rieux learned in a time of pestilence that "there are more things to admire in men than to despise." Similarly, the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts, if we choose to be. We can be greater than the sum of our genes. If that is our decision, evolution can't do a thing about it. Making that decision is the supreme test of our humanity, our greatest challenge and our most sublime opportunity. Nonetheless, war touches a deep chord in most human beings, and the decision to say no will not be an easy one. Sigmund Freud com­mented that prohibitions and taboos by their very existence strongly suggest a preexisting desire to perform the prohibited act, otherwise there would be no need for the prohibition: "What no human soul desires, there is no need to prohibit; it is automatically excluded. The very em­phasis of the commandment Thou Shalt Not Kill makes it certain that we spring from an endless ancestry of murderers, with whom the lust for killing was in the blood, as possibly it is to this day with ourselves." He also emphasized that wars occur because nations, like individuals, "still obey their immediate passions far more readily than their inter­ests,"14 a succinct summary of the plight of today's Neanderthal. Prior to World War I especially, the making of war was generally considered a laudable activity. Admiration and often adulation flowed to such men as Alexander, Achilles, Caesar, Charlemagne, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Robert E. Lee. The first masterpiece of Western literature (Homer's Iliad) and the first histories (Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars, and Thucydides' study of the Peloponnesian War) focused on war. Western culture is by no means unique in its glorification of war, as witness the cultures of ancient Africa, Mexico, and Fiji. Ac­cordingly, "the war against war," as William James pointed out, "is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party."15 The fact is that war and sanctified violence have had a powerful and persistent appeal cross‑culturally, although not in all cultures, and throughout human history. Thus, as James said, war has come to be seen as "preserving our ideals of hardihood," a supreme test of human effectiveness, the most de­manding and, hence, for many people, the most rewarding activity of which they are capable. It is revealing that whereas "war" exists in the plural, "peace" is conceived only in the singular. (A similar pattern obtains in other lan­guages as well.) We have the War of the Roses, the Napoleonic wars, the Maori wars, World Wars I and II, and so on, but only one peace, despite the fact that there must have been as many different kinds of peace as different kinds of wars. As with the Eskimos, who are said to have eleven words for what in English we simply call "snow," or the Bedouin, who have more than one hundred words for "camel," human beings distin­guish carefully among whatever is important to them. For countless generations the human Neanderthal has been obsessed with war, and indifferent to peace, even slightly bored with it. When and if peace becomes as appealing as war, perhaps then we shall focus on it, identi­fying its varieties and nuances. Words signifying normalcy, like "peace," "health," and "sanity," have lagged behind their pathological counter­parts; thus, we know more about diseases than about wellness. Yet, as the holistic health movements are demonstrating, in order to practice preventive medicine, it is necessary to define, describe, and validate the state of wellness before one can act effectively to preserve it. Much of war's appeal, according to William James, comes from its aura of extremis, embodying the most dangerous and strenuous of human struggles, and hence becoming strangely ennobling despite (or in part, because of) its extraordinary horror. The contemplation of war, the prep­aration for war, and in many cases even the fighting of war is something that most Neanderthals find compelling, exciting, and even fun. Accord­ing to James, this gut-level attraction "cannot be met effectively by mere counter-insistency on war's expensiveness and horror. The horror makes the thrill; and when the question is of getting the extremist and supremist out of human nature, talk of expense sounds ignominious." He therefore proposed a "substitute for war's disciplinary function"—his now-famous Moral Equivalent of War, suggesting a peacetime conscription which would not so much overcome the Neanderthal mentality as bypass it with a bit of social ju jitsu, sublimating dangerous human urges into constructive activity.16 In a sense, the Peace Corps was a practical example of James's con­ception; but a real peace corps can be fashioned only when peacemaking becomes recognized as an acceptable and active verb, and when peace takes its rightful place at our own core. Ironically, in a world society that is increasingly intolerant of personal violence, that forbids murder, assault, even the threat of physical abuse, and in which fistfights and even bullying are grossly out of place, in diplomatic parlors, war and the threat of war remain acceptable. Rather than finding a moral equivalent of war, we have collectively made war itself into a morally acceptable form of violence such that societies can contemplate and plan actions that would be unacceptable if undertaken by its individual members. Those old Neanderthal cravings are still alive and well, running just beneath the surface, needing only the slightest provocation to erupt, even in the most sophisticated and presumably civilized societies. Just let some Americans be taken hostage in Iran, or a Korean airliner violate Soviet airspace, and suddenly the cavemen are at it again and the old predictable tribal bellowing resumes. Homo, called sapiens, is all but drowned in an atavistic avalanche of anger, distrust, and intolerance. The structures of peace, built up with such care and needing such nurturance, seem woefully delicate and fragile before the crude, easily evoked Neanderthal onslaught. But here we note Theodore Roethke's observation, "In a dark time, the eye begins to see." Perhaps by thinking, feeling, and believing, we can see through our Neanderthal mentality, and forge a new awareness where we confront our limitations and our strengths, able to bend, but nonetheless to resist and not to break. A major impediment to this awareness has been our ignorance that the Neanderthal mentality even exists. There is also the double irony of pessimism—the assumption that the Neanderthal mentality, under the alias of "human nature," is un­changeable. Insofar as it succeeds, this assumption is a triumph for the Neanderthal mentality and, moreover, a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is also seductive; it leaves each of us free to go ahead with his or her own little life, all the while treading on unstable slopes, heedless of the danger. "The challenge to humans in our time is whether they can become aroused not just over small but over larger dangers," observed Norman Cousins. "Whether they can perceive universal problems as well as per­sonal ones, whether they can become as concerned over their survival as a species as they are over their jobs."" This arousal is growing, in part because the overriding universal problem is increasingly perceived as an intensely personal one, because it threatens the deepest personal values of every human being, and also because it demands a committed personal response. Perhaps we shall have the final laugh after all, and perhaps the laugh will be on evolution. In giving so much autonomy to the bodies they create, the genes of Homo sapiens have unwittingly sewn the seeds of their own overthrow (not the seeds of their destruction, for that would mean our own demise as well). It is precisely—and only—by overthrowing our genes, by taking the unprecedented step and saying no to their dangerous and insistent whisperings, that we can preserve them, along with everything else. By saying no to that aspect of our genes, we say yes to life, to love, and to hope, and even to the continuation of those troublesome genes themselves. There is no better time. "At this moment," wrote Albert Camus, when each of us must fit an arrow to his bow and enter the lists anew, to reconquer, within history and in spite of it, that which he owns already, the thin yield of his fields, the brief love of this earth, at this moment when at last a man is born, it is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies. The bow bends; the wood complains. At the moment of supreme tension, there will leap into flight an unswerving arrow, a shaft that is inflexible and free.18 Maybe in the long run we shall all laugh together, as through our negation of the Neanderthal mentality we arrive at a new affirmation, a higher level of life, its most exalted accomplishment. This will be the point at which, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to universal murder, we resolve to overcome the Neanderthal mentality and thereby transcend, if not overcome, our biology itself.

### Case

**Rational economic methodology is awesome – avoids falling into relativism and key to some semblance of pragmatic action**

**Rowland 95** – professor of communication at the University of Kansas (10/1, Robert, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 28.4, “In defense of rational argument: A pragmatic justification of argumentation theory and response to the postmodern critique”, BESCO, credit to LDK)

¶ The first step in developing a justifiable theory of rational argument that can account for the epistemological and axiological attacks is to recognize the **performative contradiction at the heart of the postmodern critique**. Postmodernists rely on rational argument in order to attack rational argument and they consistently claim that their positions are in some way superior to those of their modernist opponents. Writing of post-structuralism, Amanda Anderson notes "the incommensurability between its epistemological stance and its political aims, between its descriptions and its prescriptions, between the pessimism of its intellect and, if not the optimism, at least the intrusiveness of its moral and political will" (1992, 64).¶ The performative contradiction at the heart of postmodernism is nowhere more evident than in the epistemological critique of modernism. The two most important points made by postmodernists in relation to epistemology are that humans can understand the world only through their symbols and that there is no means of using "reality" to test a symbolic description. Advocates of traditional approaches to rationality have not been able to satisfactorily answer these positions, precisely because they seem to be "true" in some sense. This "truth," however, suggests that a theory of rational argument may be salvageable. If postmodernists can defend their views as in some sense "truer" than those of their modernist opponents, then there must be some standard for judging "truth" that can withstand the postmodern indictment. That standard is **pragmatic efficacy** in fulfilling a purpose in relation to a given problem.¶ Both modernists and postmodernists generally assume that truth and fact are equivalent terms. Thus, a "true" statement is one that is factually correct in all circumstances. By this standard, of course, there are no totally "true" statements. However, if no statement can be proved factually true, then a focus on facts is an inappropriate standard for judging truth.¶ I suggest that knowledge and **truth should be understood not as factual statements** that are **certain**, but as symbolic statements that function as **useful problem-solving tools**. When we say that a view is true, we really mean that a given symbolic description consistently solves a particular problem. Thus, the statement "the sun will come up tomorrow" can be considered "true," despite ambiguities that a postmodernist might point to in regard to the meaning of sun or tomorrow, because it usefully and consistently solves a particular epistemic problem.¶ **The standard for "truth" is pragmatic utility** in fulfilling a purpose in relation to a particular problem. A true statement is one that "**works" to solve the problem**. Both the nature of the problem and the arguer's purpose in relation to that problem infiuence whether a given statement is viewed as true knowledge. This explains why biological researchers and physicians often seem to have different definitions of truth in regard to medical practice. The researcher is concerned with fully understanding the way that the body works. His or her purpose dictates application of rigorous standards for evaluating evidence and causation. By contrast, the physician is concerned with treating patients and therefore may apply a much lower standard for evaluating new treatments. The pragmatic theory of argument I am defending draws heavily on the work of William James, who believed that "the only test of probable truth is what works" (1982, 225). Alan Brinton explains that for jEunes "the ultimate question of truth is a question about the concepts and their fruitfulness in serving the purposes for which they were created and imposed. Ideas are true insofar as they serve these purposes, and false insofar as they fail to do so" (1982, 163). Some contemporary pragmatists take a similar view. For example, Nicholas Rescher writes in relation to methodology that "the proper test for the correctness or appropriateness of anything methodological in nature is plainly and obviously posed by the paradigmatically pragmatic questions: Does it work? Does it attain its intended purposes?" (1977, 3). Similarly, Celeste Condit Railsback argues that "truth is . . . relative to the language and purposes of the persons who are using it" (1983, 358-59). At this point, someone like Derrida might argue that while the pragmatic approach accounts for the symbolic nature of truth, it does not deal with the inability of humans to get at reality directly. Although the postmodern critique denies that humans can directly experience "the facts," **it does not deny that a real-world exists**.¶ Thus, a pragmatist endorses a given scientific theory because the symbolic description present in that theory does a better job than its competitors of fulfilling a set of purposes in a given context. Because it fulfills those purposes, we call the theory "true." We cannot attain knowledge about "the facts," but we can test the relative adequacy of competing problem-solving statements against those facts. Michael Redhead, a professor of history and philosophy of science at Cambridge University, notes that "we can always conjecture, but there is some control. The world kicks back" (in Peterson 1992,175; emphasis added). Knowledge is not about "facts." It is about finding symbolic descriptions of the world that work, that is, avoiding nature's kicks in fulfilling a given purpose.¶ The foregoing suggests that a principled pragmatic theory of argument **sidesteps the postmodern critique**. Argumentation theory ¶ should be understood as a set of pragmatic rules of thumb about the kinds of symbolic statements that effectively solve ¶ problems. These statements exist at varying levels of generality. A consistency principle , for example, is really a rule of thumb stating something like "All other things being equal, consistent symbolic descriptions are more likely to prove useful for solving a particular problem in relation to a given purpose than are inconsistent descriptions." Other principles are linked to narrower purposes in more specific contexts. Thus, the standards for evaluating arguments in a subfield of physics will be tied to the particular purposes and problems found in that subfield. The key point is that all aspects of a theory of argument can be justified **pragmatically**, based on their value for producing **useful solutions to problems**.¶ A pragmatic theory of argument can be understood as operating at three levels, all of which are tied to functionality. At the first or definitional level, argument is best understood as a kind of discourse or interaction in which reasons and evidence are presented in support of a claim. Argument as a symbolic form is valued based on its **ability to deal with problems**; the business of argument is **problem solving**. At a second or theoretical level, what Toulmin would call fieldinvariant, general principles of rational argument are justified pragmatically based on their **capacity to solve problems**. Thus, tests of evidence, general rules for describing argument, standards relating to burden of proof or presumption, and fallacies, all can be justified pragmatically based on the general problem-solving purpose served by all argument. For example, the requirement that claims must be supported with evidence can be justified as a general rule of thumb for distinguishing between strong and weak (that is, useful and useless) arguments. Certainly, there are cases in which unsupported assertions are "true" in some sense. However, the principle that any claim on belief should be supported with evidence of some type is a functional one for distinguishing between claims that are likely to be useful and those that are less likely to be useful.¶ At a third level, that of specific fields or subfields, principles of argumentation are linked to pragmatic success in solving problems in the particular area (see Rowland 1982). Thus, for instance, the rules of evidence found in the law are linked directly to the purposes served by legal argument. This explains why the burden of proof in a criminal trial is very different from that found in the civil law. The purpose of protecting the innocent from potential conviction requires that a higher standard of proof be applied in this area than elsewhere.¶ The pragmatic perspective I have described is quite different from that of interpretive pragmatists such as Richard Rorty (1979, 1982, 1985, 1987) and Stanley Fish (1980, 1989a, 1989b). Rorty, while denying the existence of legitimate formal or content-based standards for "proof" (1982,277), endorses a processual epistemology based on "the idea of [substituting] 'unforced agreement' for that of 'objectivity' " (41-42). Janet Home summarizes Rorty's views, noting that "the difference between 'certified knowledge' and 'mere belief is based upon intersubjective agreement rather than correspondence" (1989, 249). By contrast. Fish grounds reason in the practices of particular "interpretive communities" (1989b, 98). In this view, "Particular facts are firm or in question insofar as the perspective . . . within which they emerge is firmly in place, settled" (Fish 1989a, 308).¶ Unfortunately, a theory of argumentation cannot be salvaged merely by grounding reason in conversational practice or community assent. If there are no agreed upon standards, then how does one "rationally" test a claim intersubjectively or in process? Fish and Rorty beg the question when they ground reason in community and conversational process. Unlike Rorty and Fish, who reject the ideas of "truth" and "knowledge," I argue that those concepts must be redefined in relation to problem solving.¶ The pragmatic theory of argument that I have advanced provides a principled means of choosing among competing alternatives, regardless of the context. One always should ask whether or not a particular symbolic description of the world fulfills its purposes. In so doing, methodological principles for testing knowledge claims, such as tests of evidence, fallacies, and more precise field standards, can be justified, and then they can be applied within the conversation or by the community. The approach, therefore, provides standards to be applied in Rorty's process or by Fish's community and avoids the tautology that otherwise confronts those approaches. The perspective neatly **avoids the problems associated with modernism**, but also provides a principled approach to argument that does not lead to **relativism**.¶ In defense of rational argument¶ When argument is viewed as a pragmatic problem-solving tool, the power of the postmodern critique largely dissipates. At the most basic level, a pragmatic theory of argument is based on premises such as the following:¶ 'Statements **supported by evidence and reasoning** are more likely to be useful for satisfactorily solving a problem than ones that lack that support.¶ 'Consistent arguments are more likely to be generalizable than inconsistent ones.¶ **'Experts** are **more likely to have useful viewpoints** about technical questions tied to a particular field than nonexperts. These statements are **not "true" in the factual sense**, but they are universally recognized as useful, a point that is emphasized in the work of even the most committed postmodernist. Even someone like Derrida demands that his opponents support their claims with evidence and consistent reasoning. In so doing, Derrida clearly recognizes the functional utility of general standards for testing argument form and process.¶ Arguing should be understood as a **pragmatic process** for **locating solutions to problems**. The ultimate justification of argument as a discipline is that it produces useful solutions. Of course, not all arguments lead to successful solutions because the world is a complex place and the people who utilize the form/process are flawed. However, the general functional utility of argument as a method of ¶ invention or discovery and the method of justification is undisputed. The pragmatic approach to argument also provides a means of answering the axiological objections to traditional reason. Initially, the view that argument is often a means of enslaving or disempowering people is based on a misunderstanding of how argument as a form of discourse functions. In fact, the danger of symbolic oppression is less applicable to argument as a type of symbol use than to other forms. Argument tells us **how to solve problems**. It can be a force for enslavement only to the degree that a successful problem-solution is enslaving. This is a **rare event** in **any society** grounded in **democratic ethics**.¶ Additionally, argument as a form and process is inherently person-respecting because § Marked 14:26 § in argument it is not status or force that matters, but only the reasoning (see Brockriede 1972). In a pure argumentative encounter, it does not matter whether you are President of the United States or a college junior; all that is relevant is what you have to say. Of course, this ideal is rarely realized, but the principle that humans should test their claims against standards of argumentation theory that are tied to pragmatic problem solving (and not base conclusions on power) is one that recognizes the **fundamental humanity in all people**.¶ Furthermore, argument is one of the most important means of protecting society from symbolic oppression. Argument as an internal process within an individual and external process within society provides a method of testing the claims of potential oppressors. Therefore, training in argument should be understood as a means of providing pragmatic tools for breaking out of terministic or disciplinary prisons.¶ Against this view, it could be argued that pragmatism, because of its "practical" bent, inevitably degenerates into "hegemonic instrumental reason" in which technocratic experts control society. In Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer takes the position that "in its instrumental aspect, stressed by pragmatism," reason "has become completely harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the domination of men and nations has been made the sole criterion" (1947, 21). Later, he notes that "pragmatism is the counterpart of modern industrialism for which the factory is the prototype of human existence" (50).¶ The claims that pragmatism reduces reason to a mere instrument of production or leads to undemocratic technocratic control of society are, however, **misguided**. Initially, it is worth noting that Horkeimer's aim is not to indict rationality per se, but to focus on the inadequacy of a purely instrumental form of rationality, which he labels "subjective reason." Near the conclusion of Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer defends "objective reason": "This concept of truth—the adequation of name and thing—inherent in every genuine philosophy, enables thought to withstand if not to overcome the demoralizing and mutilating effects of formalized reason" (1947, 180). The goal of this essay, to develop a theory of rational argument that can withstand the postmodern indictment, is quite consistent with Horkheimer's view that humans need "objective reason" in order to "unshackle . . . independent thought" and oppose "cynical nihilism" (127, 174). While there can be no **purely "objective reason**," field-invariant and field-dependent principles of argumentation can be justified pragmatically to serve the aims that Horkheimer assigns to that form.¶ Moreover, a pragmatic theory of argument should not be confused with a decision-making approach based on mere practicality or self-interest. Principles of argument are justified pragmatically, that is, because they work consistently to solve problems. But after justification, the invariant and relevant field-dependent principles may be used to test the worth of any argument and are **not tied to a simple utilitarian benefit/loss calculus**. The misconception that a pragmatic theory of truth is tied to a simplistic instrumentalism is a common one. John Dewey notes, for instance, that William James's reference to the "cash value" of reasoning was misinterpreted by some "to mean that the consequences themselves of our rational conceptions must be narrowly limited by their pecuniary value" (1982, 33). In fact, pragmatism "concerns not the nature of consequences but **the nature of knowing**" (Dewey 1960,331). Or as James himself put it, "The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of **invaluable instruments of action**" (1948, 161). Pragmatism "is a method only," which "does not stand for any special result" (James 1982, 213), but that method can be used to justify principles of argument that in turn can be used to **check the excesses of instrumental reason**. Moreover, a pragmatic approach to argument is **self-correcting**. According to James, pragmatism "means the open air and possibilities of nature, as **against dogma,** artificiality and the pretense of finality in truth" (213). Dewey makes the same point when he claims that pragmatic theory involves "the use of intelligence to **liberate and liberalize action**" (1917,63). **Nor does pragmatism necessarily lead to expert domination**. A pragmatic argumentation theory endorses deference to the opinion of experts **only on questions for which the expert possesses special knowledge** relevant to a particular problem. And even on such issues, the views of the expert would be subject to rigorous testing. It would be quite unpragmatic to defer to expert opinion, absent good reasons and strong evidence.¶ The previous analysis in no way denies the risks associated with technical reason. It is, however precisely because of such risks that a principled pragmatic theory of argument is needed. Given that we live in an advanced technological society, **it is inevitable that technical reason will play a role**. Postmodernism points to the dangers of technical reason, but provides **no means of avoiding those risks**. A pragmatic theory of argument, by contrast, **justifies principles of rationality** that can be used to **protect society** from the **nihilistic excesses** of a **purely instrumental reason**.¶

## 2nc

### FW

#### The Competitive Nature of Debate Makes Fairness a Prior Question to the Affirmatives Politics

Brian Martin 1978 The Selective Usefulness of Game Theory in Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8, 1978, pp. 85-110.

In the most well-known attempt to apply game theory to ethics, Braithwaite considers the problem of equitable distribution.[24] For the two-person cooperative game Braithwaite proposes a method of solution which seems to weigh each player's ethical claims in a reasonable manner. What is more dubious is whether such an intricate adjudication of competing claims is ever necessary. A game theory formulation of an ethical problem, with a Braithwaite-type solution, may actually obscure the possibility of more basically corrective approaches to ethical problems. In game theory terms, it might be better to inquire first whether it is possible to change the players, the choices, the circumstances which determine the payoffs, and so forth, before putting the problem in a game theory format.

#### Reducing social reality to discourse and text undermines coherency in education – turns their offense

Alan D. Sokal 96, Professor of Physics at New York University, “A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies,” Lingua Franca, May, 1996, http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/lingua\_franca\_v4/lingua\_franca\_v4.html

Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: **one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance**. At its best, a journal like Social Textraises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters. In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). **There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions**; **facts and evidence do matter**. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being **concealed through obscure** and **pretentious** language. Social Text's acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist literarytheory -- carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``text,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then **internal logical consistency is superfluous** too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. **Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue**; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre. Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about ``the social construction of reality'' **won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for** preventing global warming**. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics** if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

#### Competition turn - trying to accomplish political goals within a debate ground just creates backlash against whatever you’re trying to accomplish, debaters care about winning – telling opponents they should lose at the altar of your political movement just causes alienation and resentment, which means instead of trying to make the ballot mean something, if you want to change the activity do so outside of an actual debate round

Atchison and Panetta 9– \*Director of Debate at Trinity University and \*\*Director of Debate at the University of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community.

However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.

From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

## 1nr

### Case

#### The use of the word “fuck” perpetuates a notion of violence that should be considered before anything else – it turns all their offense to have an effective and good form of debate

Cambell, family court philosopher, ‘7 (Glenn, “A Linguistic Analysis of "Fuck"”, <http://www.familycourtchronicles.com/philosophy/fuck/>)

As a general rule, people who use "fuck" a lot—like prisoners, gang members and adolescent youth—tend to have very little real control over their lives. "Fuck" is a linguistic trick to give their talk more apparent swagger and substance and make them feel more powerful. It is often accompanied by verbal threats of violence and sometimes real violence, which are both desperate devices to try to gain control. "Fuck" can be dangerous and should not be ignored, because it means that someone has reached the end of their linguistic arsenal, and physical aggression could be next.

#### This language must be evaluated—it shapes reality and translates to actual forms of violence, reject the Aff to maintain a safe forum for competition free of violence and aggression

Roland Bleiker Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland 2K Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, pg 41

Language penetrates all aspects of transversal struggles. Whatever we think and do is framed by the language within which these acts are carried out. Hence, an engagement with the philosophy of language must be part of an adequate approach to questions of agency in global political especially if this approach rests upon a view of human life as constituted by self-understanding. From such a vantage point language must be seen not as an image of the world or a way of representing realities, but, as Wittgenstein’s famous dictum holds, as ‘part of an activity, a way of life.’ This position has far-reaching consequences. If language expresses a particular way of life it is also responsible, at least in part for the constitution of this way of life. Human agency cannot take place outside language, in some pre-or extra-linguistic realm. It can only take place through language. Expressed differently: languages age not just frameworks to assess actions. They are themselves forms of action. There are, of course, countless domains in which language interferes with transversal struggles. We live at a time when ever increasing communicative capabilities account for an ever-shrinking globe. Moreover, transversal politics revolves not only around interactions between various national languages, but also between different types of speech. When a liberal, a realist, a defense technician or a peace movement member describes the same event, they use very different languages to interpret the realities they see. Each of these languages has its own set of rules. Each embodies a world-view that implicitly promotes certain social values and certain political, ethical and spatial perceptions of global politics. The clash between these forms of speech is the domain where domination and resistance is carried out. It is the process that engenders human agency.

Language is the basis for understanding all things in the world. It is literally the lynchpin of the way we view our surroundings—we cannot let violent language shape our outlook on the world, it only perpetuates a system of violence

Robber Lord PhD in Philosophy 1996 Words: A Hermeneutical Approach to the Study of Language, p 126

All language, insofar as it is a symbolic entity, constantly “makes” and “remakes” the world. The alleged differences between metaphorical and literal statements can easily be shown to be factitious. Propositions have no exclusive claim to cognitive validity, feelings and emotions also function cognitively in aesthetic experience. Had this not been the case human beings would never have been able to convey specific subjectivity experiences sensations: even the most basic sensations, such as sensations of pain, shades of colour, tastes, or likes and dislikes. We all know what “pain” is for example. Language gives the concept to us and no purpose is served by attempting to communicate it, unless I am experiences an acute or unfamiliar pain at a particular moment and in a particular location, and feel the need to describe it to someone, especially a doctor. From this moment on, and until the pain recedes, I become heavily dependent on figurative language; and so too does the doctor’s attempt to arrive at a proper diagnosis, unless that same doctor is hiding behind (metaphorically derived) medical jargon and mystique.

#### Especially in the forum of debate, a linguistic activity, it is imperative that you evaluate the linguistic consequences—voting issue for ethics

Cambell, family court philosopher, ‘7 (Glenn, “A Linguistic Analysis of "Fuck"”, <http://www.familycourtchronicles.com/philosophy/fuck/>)

In the real world, "fuck" must be respected, even if it is just a word. If you are involved in a debate with someone, and their side degenerates into a high density of fucks, it is usually best to withdraw. From a practical standpoint, the person who uses the most "fucks" in any argument automatically wins. It means that all illusion of rational debate has vanished and that any further intelligent argument is futile.

### Framework

#### Their criticism of spectatorship is reactionary - it produces a false dichotomy between duped spectators and political actors, ignoring that we are all spectators and that spectatorship is a form of action

Ramos et al, 2009 (Manuel, University of London, Costica Bradatan, Texas Tech, and Fabienne Collignon, University of Glasgow, “We Are All Spectators,” review of Jacques Ranciere’s “Emancipated spectator,” Parallax, vol. 15, no. 3)

Spectatorship constitutes the new focus in Jacques Ranciere’s continuous interrogation of the ground that supports our understanding of the efficacy of the arts ‘to change something in the world we live in’ (p.29). In Le spectateur e´mancipe´1 he calls into question the recurrent production of pitiable spectators in the Western critical tradition and its contemporary mutations. The book is particularly engaging in its fierce stance against practices of intellectual paternalism in art and philosophy. Ranciere repeatedly portrays numerous authors as pathologists who presuppose that the spectacle ‘weakens the heads of the children of the people’ (p.52), or that too many images ‘soften the brains of the multitude’ (p.105). The emphasis on the pseudo-medical veneer of cultural expertise stresses that what is at stake in this book is not a mere affair of intellectual condescension but the complete incapacitation of the spectators. The five conference papers composing this volume effectively dismantle the all too often characterization of the spectator as a malade of passivity and ignorance in order to vehemently affirm that spectatorship is a capacity of all and anyone. An heir of Foucault, Ranciere builds an expeditious genealogy that associates the work of disparate authors whose common premise is the spectator’s idiocy. The resonance of this genealogy of stultification is amplified by the re-activation of Ranciere’s investigation of pedagogical relations in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1987). This pivotal book in Ranciere’s re-conceptualization of emancipation examined the practice of Joseph Jacotot, who at the beginning of the nineteenth century developed a pedagogy not aimed at the instruction of the people but their emancipation. Jacotot refused to accept the instruction model because it repeatedly produces a hierarchical distance between the teacher and the student; instead he developed a methodology based on the equality of all intelligences. The parallelism Ranciere draws between Jacotot’s conclusions and the case of the spectator persistently galvanizes the anti-mastery brio of this book. But rather than a parallelism, Ranciere recognizes the very same process of stultification at work in the ways various philosophers and cultural revolutionaries indoctrinated and continue to indoctrinate the spectator. Ranciere, with undisciplined ardour, identifies the hierarchical distance between actors and spectators with a historical consensus produced by the work of stultifying pedagogues from Plato to Nicolas Bourriaud. If the instruction of the spectator dates back to Plato, it seems reasonable for Ranciere to declare it is high time to situate spectatorship on different grounds (p.54). However, Ranciere is chiefly concerned here with the current version of the instructional consensus and with what he recognizes as its particularly powerful stultifying effects. Post-critical thought (chapter 2) and different practices calling for a re-politicization of the arts (chapters 3 and 4) continue to entertain today a paternalistic relation with spectatorship. Ranciere regards this malaise as evidence of the persistence of the modernist model of critique and its determination to restore to health the ‘fragile brains of the people’ (p.54). But he also introduces a discontinuity between modernity and our present, and this difference is the key to understand the urgent pathos of these pages. Authors from the modern critical tradition such as Bertolt Brecht or Guy Debord got it wrong, and yet their horizon was the emancipation of the spectator. Since the winter, as Fe´ lix Guattari called the 1980s, the consensus to overturn the modernist paradigm disconnected the critique of capitalist spectatorship from any process of emancipation. Ranciere is vociferous against the disenchanted and apocalyptic subtraction of capability operated by what he calls ‘leftist melancholia’ (p.43). Theories of notorious authors such as Jean Baudrillard or Peter Sloterdijk are disgraced without ceremony as ‘tools against any process or even any dream of emancipation’ (p.38). In this sense, post-critical consensus has redoubled the incapacity of the spectators: we are not only seduced into passivity and ignorance by the capitalist spectacle but our experiments and desires are doomed to end up ‘swallowed in the belly of the monster’ (p.40). Le spectateur e´mancipe´ argues that to verify the capacity of art to resist the voracity of consensus it is crucial to re-conceptualize the political efficacy of spectatorship. Political art most often regulates the agency of the spectator according to the hierarchical opposition of doing and looking. The current will to re-politicize the arts is not an exception; its modus operandi is footed on the hierarchy between ‘active intelligence’ and ‘material passivity’ (p.69). Ranciere perceives a ‘strange schizophrenia’ in contemporary art: artists denounce the impasses of critique and post-critique and yet they continue to massively validate their consensual rationale of political action (p.57). The two usual suspects are targeted in this book: the critique of representation and the ethical immediacy between art and life. Both models are genealogically reconstructed as pedagogies of efficacy presupposing that spectators are ignorant of what they are really looking at and/or they are passive because they are only looking at. For Ranciere the current mobilization of concepts such as participation or community most often confirms the distribution of capacities and incapacities between actors and spectators. Different art practices, relational and other, seek to directly produce social relations in order to erase the distance between the spectator and the real world. Ranciere rightly insists that there is no evil distance that needs to be abolished between the spectator and the reality of political action. Ranciere, always ready to remove the act of looking an image from ‘the trial atmosphere it is so often immersed in’ (p.104), affirms spectatorship as an action that intervenes to confirm or modify the consensual order. Pedagogies of action are not only fallacious; for Ranciere to produce one model of efficacy is always a critical error. In Le spectateur e´mancipe´ political efficacy is constructed as an incalculable relation between the spectators and a political subjectivation. There is no model to be founded on the activation of spectatorship because, quite simply, we are all spectators. With unfussy statements such as ‘spectatorship is our normal situation’ (p.23), rather than through meticulous argumentation, Ranciere displaces the omnipotent logic of instruction inherent to countless edifying pedagogies to postulate spectatorship as a condition of all. Following his usual production of vacant names, Ranciere evacuates any specificity from the term spectatorship to problematize its capacity to designate one identifiable audience. The name-without-a-specific-content spectator becomes an operator performing in different configurations the gap between an identification and anonymity. Thus spectators become in these pages alternatively readers, viewers or consumers, but also poets, authors, translators. From the film La socie´te´ du spectacle to the photographs of Sophie Ristelhueber, from the documentary films of Rithy Panh to Madame Bovary, from the installation The Sound of Silence by Alfredo Jaar to media images, the book gathers contrasting voices across disciplinary boundaries to attest to the emancipation of the spectators. This indisciplinarity is not a virtuoso amplification of the scope of the book; it works to stage different theatrical manoeuvres to address different stakes of our spectatorship. Each chapter is best understood as a singular intervention pursuing the implications of the axiom we are all spectators for a re-conceptualization of critical art and in particular for the relation actor/spectator. The emancipated spectator of the title is not celebrated in this book as an active creator. In contrast to an author like Michel de Certeau who rejoiced in productive everyday tactics (‘the ways of operating of the weak’2), Ranciere understands the transformation of the consumer into a producer as a validation of the dominant hierarchy between action and passivity. In the chapter entitled ‘The Misadventures of Critical Thinking’ Ranciere points out that strategies of reversal like de Certeau’s continue to thrive among the critical intelligentsia and continue to be useless. Thus he understands the photographs of Josephine Meckseper or the work of Bernard Stiegler as the futile propositions from an up-to-date ‘inverted activism’ (p.42).3 The emancipation at stake in this book is not about turning the passive spectator into an active participant. It is about constructing another ground of efficacy through the disarticulation of the order equating the actor with activity, living reality, self-possession and the spectator with passivity, illusion and alienation. For Ranciere this hierarchical order is untenable because actors are always and already immersed in spectatorship. Actors and spectators actively engage with images and words through a ‘poetic work of translation’ (p.16). The distance between the actor, the spectator and the spectacle is not the evidence of a process of alienation but ‘the pathway that endlessly abolishes any fixation and hierarchy of positions’ (p.17). With welcomed polemical impetus Ranciere transforms the evil litany of interpretation, representation and mediation into a series of crucial components in the process of our emancipation as spectators. Spectatorship is thus constructed as a common, active, anonymous distancing that allows different re-distributions of capacities and incapacities between proper and improper bodies. Le spectateur e´mancipe´ re-formulates the critical capacity of numerous films, photographs and texts to verify that they produce effects inasmuch as they do not tell us what to do. Ranciere performs himself this anti-authoritarian stance with a conflictive equilibrium between a doctrinal style of writing and the declaration that the equalitarian ground of his oeuvre is a ‘foolish assumption’ (p.54). But the engagement against postures of mastery in these pages does not simply resonate in an anarchist vacuum that negates the hierarchy between authors and moronic spectators, readers or consumers. Very differently the cinema of Pedro Costa or a photograph by Walker Evans are interpreted as the ‘work of a spectator addressed to other spectators’ (p.91). Ranciere advocates a critical art that disqualifies its instructional authority and confirms an anonymous capacity of all to re-organize the set of distances and proximities of a consensual order. Spectatorship is re-worked as the cultural counterpart of the empty name people, i.e. an anonymous we that ruins any definitive formula to regulate cause and effects between art and political efficacy. The insistence on the un-decidability of the relation between spectators and a specific political subjectivation is not a sophisticated allegory of the state of the world or a cunning strategy of suspension. It works as an affirmative call to the readers of these pages to re-distribute again the grounds from where we read, write or look.

### Advocacy

#### The search for an authentic relationship to death devalues life

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In her book Spirit of Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death, Edith Wyschogrod presents a history of how Western philosophers have thought of the meaning of death and its relation to life. She explains that for the most part, death has been viewed according to what she calls the “authenticity paradigm.” This paradigm is governed by “the assumption that a good death, even if not free of pain, is the measure of a good life.” The ultimate test of one’s life, according to this model, is whether one meets the inevitability of death with unflinching acceptance or with terror before the unknown. Wyschogrod offers two examples of the authenticity paradigm, one ancient and one more modern. The first comes from Plato’s Phaedo, which records the death of Socrates. According to the Phaedo, Socrates met his death not only with calm but with positive good cheer, taking time to instruct his disciples and to offer them words of encouragement even as the hemlock neared his lips. Because he had so thoroughly examined the nature of death while still alive, for him death held neither surprise nor sting. Socrates was able to accept the possibility that death would mean sinking into non-existence, even as he hoped that it might lead him to the freedom of the unimpaired soul, and the truth that is the goal of all philosophers. He underwent a “good death” because of the thoughtfulness and courageous quality of his life. Wyschogrod’s second example comes from the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke. For Rilke, she says, death is not so much a future event as it is a dimension of the present. She explains that for the poet, “Only by integrating death into the texture of life is an authentic living and dying possible.” In this view, life can only be experienced in its depths if death is not only accepted but is allowed to illuminate each moment. And yet death does not thereby become the victor over life. Instead, death is the very condition of life; it is what makes the intensity of each moment possible and what makes each moment worth living. This point is crucial to Wyschogrod’s argument, as she believes that it is what differentiates Rilke’s situation from our own. For Rilke, she explains, there is a continuity that binds the present and the future together. She cites the first of Rilke’s Duino Elegies: “True it is strange to inhabit the earth no longer, / to use no longer customs scarcely required, / not to interpret roses, and other things / that promise so much, in terms of a human future…and to lay aside / even one’s proper name like a broken toy.” Even as the poem contemplates the disruption between the cares of the living and the concerns of the dead, it asserts a continuity between them. Explains Wyschogrod, “For this reason the fundamental assumption, the hidden premise, which undergirds this verse is the indestructability of an accustomed field of reference – “the things that promise so much,’ ‘customs scarcely acquired,’ ‘roses,’ ‘the name laid aside’ – since these are the stuff through which any meaningful grasp of the future comes about.” However, says Wyschogrod, the possibility of anticipation, of “looking forward to,” is precisely what has been called into question by the twentieth century and the advent of mass death. The threat of annihilation made possible by nuclear holocaust overwhelms any poetic holding-in-balance of life and death. We face, she observes, the prospect of wiping not only ourselves but all earthly being out of existence. This possibility of pure annihilation opens up a breach between our present and our future. In contemplation of mass destruction, we can no longer imagine, as Rilke did, the dead gently laying aside their customs, their roses, and their names like so many broken toys. We do not have the luxury of imagining individual souls parting reluctantly from those whom they leave behind, and thus no one to weight the meaning of death with a counterbalancing intensity of life. Concludes Wyschogrod, “By destroying the system of meanings which rendered death-accepting behavior possible, the effect of man-made mass death has undercut the power of the authenticity paradigm which permitted mastery over death.” What can we say, then, about the Catholic admonition to remember that we are dust and that we will return to dust? Let us begin with what we cannot say. We cannot simply comfort ourselves with the idea that death is a part of life, that is always has been and always will be, and that our deaths will clear the way for the generation of new life. Not only has the projection towards “always” been called into question, but the notion that death contributes to life has been overshadowed by the possibility of the complete annihilation of all life. Moreover, death as the origin of life has been given sinister meaning by the calculations of Nazism: the use of human remains as fertilizer and stuffing for mattresses, among other things. Such economics turn imagery of the “cycle of life” into mockery.

#### Our argument may contain an element of fear, but that’s not really the point – it’s about embracing freedom – their search for an authentic relationship to mortality recreates the worst kind of solipsism

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(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

But freedom cannot embrace death. Despite taking so much from modern philosophers of death like Heidegger and Kojeve, Sartre finally has to eliminate death from the finitude of being. He takes Heideggerian nothingness into self, making it the basis of freedom, but he also privileges selfhood in a way which Heidegger emphatically did not, and resists Heidegger's embrace of death. Sartre knows that to take death so profoundly into being, as did Heidegger and Kojeve, threatens the entire project of human freedom as praxis, which is the most important aspect of Sartre's existentialism. Certainly, for Heidegger, authenticity did not entail praxis, and in his Letter on Humanism' he actually repudiated Sartre's attempt to derive from his work a philosophical rationale for existential engagement; so far as Heidegger was concerned, such engagement was only another version of inauthentic 'social' existence, a social evasion of the truth of Being. But was Heidegger's own truth of Being ever more than a state of authenticity whose main objective is obsessively to know or insist on itself as authentic? For all his talk of freedom, there remains in Heidegger a sense in which authenticity remains a petrified sense of self, paralysed by the very effort of concentrating on the profundity of Being, which always seems to be also a condition of mystical impossibility: 'Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein\* (Being and Time, p. 294). Not so for Sartre. He recognizes the modern project whereby death is Snteriorizcd . . . humanized (and] individualized\*, and that Heidegger gave philosophical form to this process. On the face of it, this is an attractive development, since death as apparent limit on our freedom is reconceptualized as a support of freedom {Being and Nothingness, pp. 532-3). But, against Heidegger, Sartre argues that death, far from being the profound source of being and existential authenticity, is just a contingent fact like birth, and this, far from being a limit, is what guarantees one's freedom. Heidegger's entire account of death rests on an erroneous conflation of death and finitude; finitude is essentially internal to life and the grounds of our freedom - 'the very act of freedom is therefore the assumption and creation of finitude. If I make myself, I make myself finite and hence my life is unique' - whereas death is simply an external and factual limit of my subjectivity (pp. 546-7). Quite simply, 'It is absurd that we are born; it is absurd that we die' (p. 547). This perhaps entails a fear of death, since 'to be dead is to be a prey for the living': one is no longer in charge of one's own life; it is now in the hands of others, of the living (p. 543). It is true that death haunts me at the very heart of each of my human projects, as their inevitable reverse side. But this reverse side of death is just the end of my possibilities and, as such, 'it does not penetrate me. The freedom which is my freedom remains total and infinite . . . Since death is always beyond my subjectivity, there is no place for it in my subjectivity' (pp. 547-8).