## 1nc

### 1nc – debt ceiling

#### Debt ceiling deal will pass – tough move politically for the GOP but they’ll blink

The Hill, 9-14-2013 <http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/322247-confident-democrats-want-separate-showdowns-on-shutdown-and-debt-limit>

Democrats, however, want to force the GOP to debate these issues successively.¶ “We’re not negotiating on the debt ceiling. We think we have the high ground in both of those fights,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide.¶ The Senate Democratic strategy over the next several weeks will be to stand pat and refuse to make any significant concessions in exchange for funding the government or raising the debt ceiling.¶ “If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. “They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets.”¶ Schumer said Republicans are on stronger political ground if there’s a government shutdown, but warned “even on that one, they’re on weak ground because the public sort of is finally smelling that these guys are for obstructing.”

#### Cuba policy changes require tons of political capital and trade off with the rest of Obama’s agenda

Global Post 10 – “Midterms and a changing face of Congress,” November 10, 2010, online: <http://www.globalpost.com/webblog/cuba/midterms-and-changing-face-congress>

The November 2 midterm elections resulted in a new balance of power in Congress, most notably in the House of Representatives—now a Republican majority house. Domestic implications aside, the shift in power will have a significant effect on foreign policy initiatives, not least of which (for our purposes) is Cuba policy.¶ First of all, the next head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—changing because the majority party has the privilege of holding this seat—will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), the unrelenting anti-Castro, pro-embargo ranking Republican. She will replace Representative Howard Berman (D-CA), an advocate for modest rapprochement with Havana and co-sponsor of stalled bipartisan legislation to end the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba.¶ To be fair, we were not counting on much happening regarding the embargo in the short term, even with a Democratic House. But with Ileana at the helm of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, any loosening of restrictions will be out of the question. Significant changes in Cuba policy, without some sort of unforeseen breakthrough, will almost certainly be tabled until 2012.¶ Of course, although President Obama cannot lift the heavy embargo legislation on his own, he can use his executive authority to dismantle parts of it.¶ But it is highly unlikely that the President will spend any of his diminished political capital on the issue of Cuba when there is so little potential gain for him in doing so. The likely cost—say, a storm of ill will from Republicans in Congress and from an easily angered public that is vigilant these days for signs of executive overreach—simply outweighs any benefit that might emerge… a positive reaction from the global community, perhaps? The promise of applause from partners abroad has not been the impetus for any change on U.S. policy toward Cuba in prior years and will not be now, not even when the entire body of the United Nations General Assembly (save Israel) condemns the embargo. Every year the vote is taken and every year the tiny U.S. team has become more outnumbered: in 2008 the vote was 185 to 3; in 2009, 187 to 3; and now in 2010 (last week), 187 to 2—the two being the United States and Israel, a country whose citizens freely travel to, spend and invest in Cuba.¶

#### PC Key to avoid prolonged standoff over debt ceiling that tanks economy

McGregor, 13 (Richard, Richard McGregor (born 1958) is a journalist, writer and author. He was the chief political correspondent, Japan correspondent and China correspondent for The Australian. He also worked for the International Herald Tribune, the BBC and the Far Eastern Economic Review. He has worked as a journalist in Taiwan, Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne.[1] He is the former bureau chief for the Financial Times. He has written The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers.[2] The book was published by Allen Lane from Penguin Press in the UK and HarperCollins in the US in June 2010.[3] McGregor has won the 2010 Society of Publishers in Asia (SOPA) Editorial Excellence Award [1] for reporting on the Xinjiang Riots[10] and the SOPA Award in 2008 for Editorial Intelligences.[1][11] Financial Times, 6/24,

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a66c240-dc0f-11e2-8853-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Z7YPAEJQ>

The debt ceiling debate will take place in a very different context this time, with the economy recovering and the US budget deficit falling rapidly after earlier deals on tax rises and spending cuts. “There is also a certain crisis fatigue,” said Stan Collender, a former congressional staffer, at Qorvis Communication, a Washington consultancy. The debt ceiling will probably be increased eventually, even if a prolonged stand-off has the potential to damage confidence in the economy. “This isn’t 2011: if Republicans provoke a debt ceiling confrontation over demands for massive, offsetting spending cuts, the business community is going to come unglued,” said John Lawrence, former chief of staff to Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic minority leader in the House. But the political capital needed to get the statutory debt ceiling raised has the potential to drain the energy and spirit of compromise that both sides will need to forge a majority coalition for immigration.

#### This outweighs any other internal

Swagel 9-4 [Phillip, professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from 2006 to 2009, “Fiscal Collisions Ahead,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/fiscal-collisions-ahead/>, ALB]\*we don’t support the ableist rhetoric of the evidence

A failure to act would harm the economy. Not lifting the debt ceiling in particular would be expected to have catastrophic economic effects. Interest rates could skyrocket if investors question the full faith and credit of the United States government, leading to a credit crunch that pummels business and consumer spending. The calamity might be avoided if the Treasury Department makes payments to bondholders to avoid a default, but even with this contingency plan (which the Treasury shows no sign of putting into place), the spectacle of a government that cannot finance its routine operations would doubtless translate into a severe negative impact on private confidence and spending.¶ A shutdown of nonessential government operations on Oct. 1 would mean an unintended reduction in spending that could retard [halt[ the recovery, but the larger consequence again would be indirect through a hit to confidence. With the government unable to attend to routine matters, it does not take much to imagine that American families and companies would halt plans to spend, invest and hire. This would repeat the natural instinct that contributed to the plunge in economic activity in the fall of 2008.¶ Fiscal uncertainty matters for monetary policy as well, because the Federal Reserve will hesitate to start unwinding its expansionary policy if a serious fiscal drag seems imminent.

#### Best studies prove economic collapse causes war

Royal 10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### 1nc – pink tide – russia

#### Chavez’s death means Pink tide at a cross road

\*Chavez was critical to petro diplomacy which funded the pink tide, but maduro doesn’t have the same leverage that he did

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The death of Chávez and the succession of Lula by Dilma Rousseff in Brazil leaves a big vacuum in the Latin American left. Even if, as likely as it is, Nicolás Maduro wins the presidency in Venezuela in April, he is no Chávez and will not have the resources that Chávez had to promote his petro-diplomacy. Three years into her first term in office, Rousseff remains highly popular in Brazil and will be a strong candidate for re-election in 2014. But she does not have the same presence as Lula in Latin America and her foreign policy priorities are rather different than those of her political mentor. Moreover, Venezuela is in a dire economic situation and Brazil’s economic growth has been lacklustre over the past two years.¶ The death of Chávez and the absence of Lula from frontline regional politics do not mean that the Pink Tide is necessarily coming to an end. But together with the retake of economic growth and the election of Peña Nieto in Mexico, the strong economic performance of Colombia, Peru and Chile and the emergence of the Alianza Pacifico as an alternative to Mercosur, suggest the unfolding of a much more complex and diverse process of regional change than encapsulated by the narrative of the rise of the left.

#### The plan kills US resolve and funds the pink tide

\*embargo is key to resolve

Removing it will not solve relations and it will give money to legitimize the Cuban regime and allow them to partner with other socialist or anti-american countries

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Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.¶ Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Castro-led pink tide causes US-Russia military confrontations.

\*with petro power they will pay Russia to guarantee their security which brings the US and Russia into confrontation

Walser ‘8 (Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation – Chávez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis? – WebMemo #2064 -- September 15th http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm2064.cfm)

Like his iconic mentor, Fidel Castro, Chávez thrives on mounting tensions and confrontation with the U.S. It is through confrontation that he attains political identity and larger-than-merited international standing. Like Fidel Castro, Chávez aspires to build and lead an anti-U.S., anti-Western coalition. Unlike Castro, however, Chávez is in possession of significant petroleum power and has varied sources of international support. There is danger that Chávez, like Castro, will invite Russia to serve as a guarantor of Venezuela's security and subsequently draw Russia, either willingly or unwillingly, into additional confrontations with the U.S. At present, Venezuela represents the single most difficult diplomatic and security challenge facing the U.S. in the immediate future. How the U.S. chooses to deal with this challenge will say much about the direction the next Administration will take as it shapes its policy toward America's neighbors in the hemisphere.

#### Small US-Russia conflicts can escalate or cause nuclear miscalc

\*US and Russia tensions are unpredictable which increases the risk of miscalc and the US or Russia would launch on warning causing nuclear war

Gottemoeller ‘8 (Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – “U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE – THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE DEBATE DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The website below redirects to her October article: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-After-Georgia)

No holds barred, no rules—the United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more unpredictable and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile crisis. A confrontation today would be different—the two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the situation in 1962—but if those exchanges provoke mutual anger and recrimination, they have the potential to spark a dangerous crisis. This effect is especially dangerous because both countries are in presidential transitions. Russia, whose government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is attempting an unprecedented tandem leadership arrangement. The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both political parties competing to show that their man is more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. The unpredictability of these two transitions stokes the potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We must avoid such a crisis, because we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear existential threat that we each pose to the other. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.–Russian relationship into one that is closer to that which the United States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no nuclear weapons were on the bombers it flew to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off to launch on warning of an attack, and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close to nuclear catastrophe before we knew it.

### 1nc – oil pic

#### The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with Cuba except as it pertains to crude oil reservoirs.

### 1nc – shunning

#### The affirmative engages with known human rights abusers-— *moral duty* to shun

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a **duty** (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but **also to support that moral order**. Consider that the moral order itself **contributes significantly** to people's rights being respected. It does so by **encouraging and reinforcing** moral behavior and by **discouraging and sanctioning** immoral behavior. In this moral community people **mutually reinforce** each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be **much more violation of people's rights**. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute **a direct attack on the moral order**. When the violation of human rights is **flagrant**, **willful**, and **persistent**, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually **undermine altogether** the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone **flagrantly**, **willfully**, and **repeatedly** violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, **must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order**. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces **support for the moral order** and **backs up the announcement with action**. This action **reinforces the commitment to the moral order** both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have **a moral effect** on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by **moral suasion** what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of **moral sanction**, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of **maintaining the moral order**, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have **an obligation to shun** in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as **tacit complicity** in the **willful**, **persistent**, and **flagrant immorality**.

### 1nc – ofac cp

The United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should normalize **its trade relations with Cuba** under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

#### First, the counterplan solves via specific exemptions — OFAC has broad discretion over sanctions enforcement.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation* (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

2. Ability to Mitigate Collateral Damage

Because OFAC prefers to formulate its sanctions program broadly, its economic sanctions can affect the lives of unintended targets, such as ordinary citizens of foreign countries that have no influence in their sanctioned government. n347 The broad reach of U.S. sanctions can also unnecessarily put U.S. citizens and companies at a competitive disadvantage, undermine international support for the sanctions programs, and even undermine the policy objectives of the programs. n348 One way in which OFAC mitigates [\*792] the collateral damage of its holistic sanctions is by issuing licenses that permit U.S. citizens to export food and medical supplies n349 and provide humanitarian aid n350 to people in sanctioned countries. In an effort to avoid placing private enterprises at an unnecessary competitive disadvantage, which can damage U.S. influence internationally and U.S. interests as a whole, OFAC may also allow certain activities from an otherwise sanctioned country. n351 Additionally, OFAC issues licenses to avoid interfering with the legitimate activities of international and charitable organizations and to permit U.S. persons to participate in such organizations. n352 By licensing these types of activities and transactions, OFAC focuses its sanctions and the punitive consequences thereof, to the extent possible, on those in a position to produce the desired change, rather than on innocent civilians and businesses. n353

#### Second, the counterplan solves quickly and without political fallout — it doesn’t require legislative or regulatory action.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation* (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

3. Adaptability

The third core competency of OFAC's licensing practices is the ability to adapt a particular sanctions program quickly in response to political or circumstantial changes. n388 In situations where sanctions goals can change with the tides of revolution, the slow march of legislative and rulemaking processes may be incapable of producing a timely response. Sanctions targeting government-owned or government-operated entities may need to be lifted in response to a positive regime change or re-imposed in the event that the new government fails. n389 OFAC often utilizes general licenses to manage these fast-paced scenarios, either by easing sanctions through license adoption or strengthening sanctions through license revocation. n390 By issuing or revoking general licenses, OFAC can react to the changing political circumstances of a targeted country without requiring a regulatory overhaul or the signing or withdrawal of an executive order. n391

### 1nc – solvency

#### 1. Cuba will say no – they don’t trust we’ll follow through and the embrgo serves their interests

French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, (Anya Landau, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He Take On Cuba” http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary\_kerry\_will\_he\_or\_wont\_he\_take\_cuba)

And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps) want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw. Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.¶ Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.

### 1nc – multilateralism

#### 1 China trade wars never escalate despite the threats and rhetoric in their ev – we’ll negotiate

Ding Dou 11, is associate professor in School of International Studies at Peking University, September 23, 2011, “Tire Trade Truncheon Looks More Threatening for the Future,” online: http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/tire-trade-truncheon-looks-more-threatening-for-the-future/

Trade battles are no surprise to China. As a rising and already mighty economic power in a short span of time, it has become accustomed to various trade disputes with other countries around the globe. As the Chinese Commerce Ministry claimed, China suffered the most anti-dumping lawsuits in 16 consecutive years up to 2010, and the most anti-subsidy lawsuits in five consecutive years. In its long-term struggle to deal with these trade disputes, Chinese government adopted a bilateral negotiation approach rather than letting complaints or appeals be dealt with by the multi-national WTO or other watchdogs. In tandem with its bilateral negotiations, China sometimes threatened retaliatory action against imports from the complainant. One outstanding example was the trade war between Japan and China in early 2001 when Japan took safeguard measures against three Chinese agricultural imports. As a tit-for-tat retaliation, China declared punitive tariffs on three Japanese industrial imports. Through a raft of subsequent discussion, both sides reached a rapprochement at the end of that year and cancelled punitive tariffs against each other. Eventually, this belligerant trade friction lasting for three hundred days was quelled, as if it never occurred at all.

#### 2 Heg Turn –

#### US inevitably clings to power

**Dorfman 12** (Zach Dorfman, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, May 18, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>)

¶ The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million.¶ U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage.¶ The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, **it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition**. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement.¶ In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still.¶ Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview.¶ Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system.¶ In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination.¶ As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire.¶ Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants.¶ Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances.¶ This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes:¶ He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians.¶ Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake.¶ Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support.¶ The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN.¶ Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran.¶ And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but **the national security state appears here to stay**.

**Multilateralism kills heg – it causes delays and undermines international security**

**Gaffney 02, President of the Center For Security Policy, 8-27- (Frank J., The Wasington Times)**

This amounts to what Margaret Thatcher once famously derided [about the time she was warning George Bush pere and his advisers against "going wobbly" over Iraq in 1990] as the impossibility of "leadership by consensus." She recognized that, on matters of surpassing importance, the United States has to lead by providing direction and initiative, around which a broader or narrower consensus will ultimately form - not try to get everyone else to agree in advance to do what it believes must be done. We know in advance that the Baker diplomatic gambit would be a fool's errand, adding obstacles not clearing them away. Ever since the end of the Gulf war, the U.N. Security Council has been ever-less-willing to support intrusive inspections in Iraq. This was hardly surprising since at least three of the permanent, veto-wielding Council members [France, Russia and China] were anxious to curry favor with Saddam Hussein - especially if they could frustrate American policy in the process. Under present circumstances, an effort to secure from the U.N. what would amount to a casus belli with Iraq is more likely to produce further evidence of international opposition to U.S. action there, and intensify the multilateralists' contention that we lack the authority to undertake such action. In truth, this is but the latest manifestation of a struggle that has been going on since the end of the Cold War. Foreign governments, particularly the unfriendly ones [which has in recent years included a number of our allies], have striven to establish via treaties, "international norms" and other devices means of constraining the American "hyperpower." This sentiment enjoys considerable currency as well among the Vietnam generation of the U.S. security policy elite. During the Bush 41 administration, when Mr. Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger were last in office, Washington frequently acceded to such pressure. Usually, it claimed that doing so was necessary to: fashion multinational coalitions [so as to prosecute Operation Desert Storm], maintain "stability" [for example, to preserve the "territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia] and advance fatuous arms-control objectives [notably, "ridding the world of chemical weapons."] The American foreign policy establishment embraced the idea that diminishing U.S. sovereignty in these and other ways was an unavoidable, if not actually a desirable, component of forging a "New World Order." During its eight years in office, the Clinton team greatly exacerbated this trend. It became practically axiomatic in the 1990s that the United States could not, and certainly should not, consider doing anything internationally without a U.N. mandate. A series of "global" agreements - governing everything from climate change to nuclear tests to war crimes - were consummated with active U.S. involvement and with manifest disregard for American sovereignty and constitutional processes. Over time, the nation inexorably became hamstrung like Gulliver, both by myriad institutionalized constraints and obligations and by the logic that the United States was just another country, one whose vote and influence in multinational councils should count no more than any others'. Since taking office, President Bush has confronted this syndrome time and again. To his great credit - and to the outraged howls of self-described "internationalists," he has repeatedly acted to reassert our national sovereignty and to restore our ability to act unilaterally. He has renounced the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and "unsigned" the International Criminal Court treaty. He has also withdrawn the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, clearing the way at last for the accelerated deployment of missile defense systems - including at sea, a highly promising option about which Mr. Bush was briefed last week in Crawford. The party line from the foreign policy establishment types at home and abroad is that such behavior constitutes damnable "unilateralism." The putative fear is that America will revert to isolationism. The real concern, however, is very different - namely, that the United States will appreciate that it is able to act alone where it must, and that it may just have the will to do so. The truth of the matter is that the world is a safer place, not only for American interests but for those of freedom-loving people elsewhere, when the United States has the military, economic and political power to engage unilaterally where necessary and is led by an individual who is willing competently to exercise such power.

#### Heg solves great power war and dampens all global violence

Brooks et al 13

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Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement Even if deep engagement’s costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy’s major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States’ security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars. A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war.72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays.74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces.78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem.79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows.80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.”82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing.83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States.84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.85 In the end, therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term.

#### 3 Russia is not aggressive- looking for cooperation

Itar-Tass 12 [Itar-Tass 28/02/2012 “Experts see no aggressiveness in Putin’s foreign policy article” http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/354109.pdf]

Outright criticism of the United States and NATO in the international scene has prompted some analysts to speculate that¶ with Putin’s return to the Kremlin Russia’s foreign policy will get tougher. However, the key idea of most commentaries is¶ this: the national leader defends Russia’s interests in the world arena, and the article is not aggressive, it merely expresses¶ the expectation Russia will be respected. In his article titled Russia and the Changing World Putin says the country will not¶ be isolating itself and wishes to stay open and cooperate with al l other countries in various fields , including the¶ strengthening of universal security, but at the same time it believes it will be impermissible for individual countries and¶ blocks to encroach on state sovereignty.¶ Putin unequivocally accused the United States and NATO of “undermining confidence” and pointed out that “some aspects¶ of their behavior do not fit in with the logic of modern development and rely on the stereotypes of bloc mentality.” Russia, as¶ follows from the article, is most resentful over NATO’s expansion and plans for building a missile defense system in Europe.¶ The United States and NATO, Putin believes, on the pretext of human rights protection has abused the sovereignty of other¶ states in a series of armed conflicts. Moreover, it was protecting human rights “selectively,” while violating the right of¶ masses of other people to life. The events of the ”Arab spring,” and the outcome of the operation in Iraq have brought about¶ a situation where religious extremism is on the rise in the countries involved, and the situation is getting even worse than it¶ had been before external intervention, he said.¶ In his analysis of the West’s participation in the events of the “Arab spring” and its actions in the Middle East in general Putin¶ calls in question whether the aims of the United States and NATO are really ‘noble’. He speculates that the real aims are not¶ the establishment of democracy or the protection of human rights, but “interest in the re-division of markets.” Such foreign¶ interference, whatever noble goals may be used as a cover-up, is confined to actual support for one of the parties to a¶ conflict and to ousting the latter’s rival with the net effect “domination of one force is replaced by a still more aggressive¶ domination of the other,” Putin said.¶ Alongside his critical description of the United States’ foreign policy Putin believes that “in periods of international¶ turbulence close and trusting cooperation by Moscow and Washington is particularly in great demand.” In relations with the¶ United States Russia is prepared for a qualitative breakthrough on the condition “the Americans will be guided in reality by¶ the principles of equitable partnership and mutual respect.”¶ “Putin is contesting the Russian presidency and for that reason he was obliged to formulate Russia’s attitude to a number of¶ fundamental issues very harshly. This article was written not only for the people of Russia. With it the prime minster sends a¶ message to our neighbors, partners and competitors. If the article were written for the sole purpose of maneuvering, it would¶ remain unnoticed, the deputy chairman of the State Duma’s international affairs committee, is quoted by Life News as¶ saying.¶ At the same time Putin not only identified the problems of international community, but proposed ways of handling them,¶ the legislator said. For instance, he not only mentioned our differences over the missile defense issue, but also called for¶ enhancing cooperation, thereby easing the risk of a major international conflict.¶ “This article is a demand for respecting Russia,” the weekly Argumenty I Fakty quotes the general director of the Center forPolitical Information, Alexei Mukhin, as saying. “Putin has not proposed some new foreign policy strategy, he merely stated¶ that at a certain point Russia selected the correct path to follow, and if it continues along it, it will achieve respect. The most¶ important thing is the prime minister declared he is a serious person and does not change his views under the influence of¶ time-serving political considerations.”¶ “There are some nuances, but in general the point of view is clear and stable,” political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov said on¶ the Russian News Service radio station. “I believe that in this article there is nothing offensive or aggressive. It is rather¶ defensive. It describes the world in which Russia will have to exist during his hypothetical presidency as a very dangerous¶ place.”¶ “It is very important the article declares that despite the existing controversies and problems Russia sees the United States¶ as a partner,” the RBC Daily quotes political scientist Alexei Zudin as saying. “Certainly there will be attempts to interpret¶ the foreign policy approaches, declared in that article, as aggressive. I believe that this does not agree with the reality.

#### 4 Cold war calculations no longer apply – neither side would consider war

Cartwright et al 12 [Gen (Ret) James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Amb. Richard Burt, former ambassador to Germany and chief negotiator of START; Sen. Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas Pickering, former ambassador to the UN; Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO and Commander-in-Chief for the U.S. Atlantic Command; GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUcLEAR POLicy cOMMiSSiON REPORT, http://orepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cartwright-report.pdf]

These illustrative next steps are possible and desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual nuclear deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation to attack is no longer a cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian security relationship. Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship. To be sure, there remains a physical-technical side of MAD in our relations, but it is increasingly peripheral. Nuclear planning for Cold War-style nuclear conflict between our countries, driven largely by inertia and vested interests left over from the Cold War, functions on the margins using outdated scenarios that are implausible today. There is no conceivable situation in the contemporary world in which it would be in either country’s national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side. Their current stockpiles (roughly 5,000 nuclear weapons each in their active deployed and reserve arsenals) vastly exceed what is needed to satisfy reasonable requirements of deterrence between the two countries as well as vis-à-vis third countries whose nuclear arsenals pale in comparison quantitatively.

**5 Multilateralism doesn’t solve conflict – It causes delays and people won’t cooperate**

**Wedgwood 02**, Law Professor at Yale & Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Ruth, Multilateralism & U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivelent Engagement, edited by: Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman)

The possible debility of multilateral structures should not mask these advantages. To be sure, multilateral institutions face a host of problems. They can be slow in reaching decisions, sometimes being unable to act at all. Decisions are often made at a level of generality that masks persistent national differences, and unacknowledged national rivalries can corrosively undermine common action. There are monitoring problems, since the pretense of agreement may mask backsliding in implementation or wholesale defection. Coalitions may not endure over time as circumstances change and individual opportunity becomes more alluring. A complicated mixture of independent and common interests may make countries reluctant to share sensitive information or national tactics, impeding sound decisions and effective action. The bureaucracies available to execute multilateral decisions vary in quality and may lack incentives for optimal performance. Cultural misunderstanding, inability to understand allies' political constraints, and technological obstacles to interoperability add to the problems. 168-9

### 1nc – ethanol

#### 1 Non-unique --- Brazil is investing in Cuban sugar ethanol in the status quo and will only increase.

Israel 12 (Esteban, Reuters Correspondent to Brazil, “Brazil to breathe life into faded Cuban sugar sector,” Reuters, 1-30-12, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/30/brazil-cuba-sugar-idAFL2E8CUA7620120130)

SAO PAULO, Jan 30 (Reuters) - Brazilian builder Odebrecht plans to produce sugar in Cuba, the company said on Monday, as looser restrictions on foreign investment in the communist island raise hopes of a recovery in the once-booming sector after decades of decline. News of the project came on the day Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff begins a mostly ceremonial official visit to the country, which has been under communist rule since the Fidel Castro-led revolution and an ensuing U.S. trade embargo. Odebrecht will sign a "contract of productive administration" with Cuba's state sugar company Grupo de Administracion Empresarial del Azucar to operate the 5 de Septiembre mill in Cienfuegos province on the south coast. "The agreement for a period of 10 years aims for an incremental increase in the production of sugar and crushing capacity and help with an overhaul" of the sector, Odebrecht said in an email to Reuters through its press office. The project will finally open the capital-starved Cuban sugar industry to foreign inflows after years of failed attempts by overseas investors to gain a foothold in the sector nationalized several years after the 1959 revolution. Cuba's sugar production has fallen from a peak of 8 million tonnes in 1970 to just 1.2 million tonnes in the last harvest. The country was once the world's top sugar supplier. Odebrecht gave no further details but a Brazilian sugar sector executive told Reuters the contract could be signed this week during Rousseff's two-day visit, deepening Brazil's role in modernizing the island's dilapidated infrastructure. Brazil is not only the world's top sugar producer but a pioneer in cane-derived ethanol, with flex-fuel technology fitted to almost all new cars sold in the country enabling them to run on ethanol or gasoline or any mix of both. Odebrecht is also carrying out work estimated at $800 million to modernize the container port at Mariel, west of Havana. The project, largely financed by Brazil's development bank BNDES, is seen as vital for commerce should the United States lift its trade embargo with the island. Cuba has allowed foreign investment for more than a decade to develop other strategic industries including tourism and more recently, oil, with a consortium led by Spain's Repsol to explore Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico. ETHANOL ON AGENDA Cuba, where sugar once accounted for 90 percent of export earnings compared with under 5 percent last year, has drawn up plans to reorganize the industry and allow foreign investment for the first time since mills were nationalized. Its once-powerful Sugar Ministry was abolished last year, leaving it up to a new state-owned company to revamp the rusting industry, with many mills pre-dating the revolution and some built with capital provided by the Soviet Union. Odebrecht would also produce ethanol from sugarcane as well as electricity from the biomass that is left over when the cane is crushed, according to the Brazilian sugar industry executive who is familiar with the details of the project. "Cuba is opening up the possibility of producing ethanol through energy generation and Odebrecht will build a distillery there," the executive said, adding the project is similar to one Odebrecht is developing in Angola. That is a $258 million undertaking in partnership with Angola's Sonagol oil company to produce 260,000 tonnes of sugar, 30 million liters of ethanol and 45 megawatts of electricity. Large-scale ethanol production in Cuba has come up against opposition from former president Castro, a fierce critic of the use of edible crops as fuel. Some experts believe that with sufficient investment, Cuba has the potential to become the world's No. 3 biofuel producer after the United States and Brazil. Ron Soligo, economist at Rice University in Houston, Texas, and an expert on the Cuban sugar industry, calculates that the island could achieve ethanol output of 7.5 billion liters per year. Brazil, by comparison, produces roughly 20 billion liters. "But developing the ethanol sector in Cuba will take time, since most of the (cane-growing) land was abandoned for years," he said. Brazil, the world's No. 2 ethanol producer, has offered technical assistance to Cuba to produce the biofuel from cane. "The subject is on the table. There are investments planned in sugar and there exists a possibility that at some time this will be taken on board by the ethanol industry," a source at Brazil's foreign ministry told Reuters.

#### 2 Can’t re-build sugar sector – unworkable land and long-time frame

Soligo ‘10

et al; Ronald Soligo is a professor emeritus of economics at Rice University and a Rice scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. The author writes a chapter within the book “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication, edited by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska –obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 102

Three and a half billion gallons seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. There is some question as to whether Cuba could ever again attain the 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane harvested in 1970, let alone 2 million. According to Brian Pollitt, the 1970 harvest was achieved only by cutting cane that would normally be left to mature for another season in order to produce a higher sugar yield in the following year. 48 Obviously this is not a sustainable practice if optimal yields are to be achieved. Two billion gallons can be produced with a harvested area of 1.33 million hectares and a yield of seventy-five tons per hectare. That area of cultivation is not too far from the average harvest of 1.28 million hectares that Cuba was able to maintain during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet reaching 1.33 million hectares will require time and substantial investment in farm machinery and restoration of the land, which has been neglected and compacted by the use of heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. The land will also have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane. Achieving higher sugarcane yields will also require time and investments to acquire or develop higher-yielding sugarcane varieties. Cuban yields averaged only fifty-eight tons per hectare during the 1970s and 1980s, substantially below the seventy-five tons per hectare needed to produce 2 billion gallons of ethanol. Yet other countries, as noted, have achieved or exceeded that yield, and some private Cuban farmers are reported to have achieved even higher yields of 100 tons per acre. 49 Yields, of course, are a function of other factors besides cane variety. The condition of the land, access to water and fertilizer, and other inputs would all need to be considered.

#### 3 Aff cant solve – Castro won’t allow sugar-ethanol

Specht ‘12

(Jonathan – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D.,¶ Washington University in St. Louis 2012. “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States” – ExpressO – http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)

To speak of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry is, at this point, largely¶ a matter of speculation.¶ 46¶ Because of the anti-ethanol views of Fidel Castro (who¶ has said that ethanol should be discoura¶ ged because it diverts crops from food to¶ fuel),¶ 47¶ Cuba currently has almost no ethanol industry. In the words of Ronald¶ Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings Institution, “Despite the fact that¶ Cuba is dependent on oil imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of¶ Brazil in using ethanol to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it has not embarked¶ on a policy to develop a larger ethanol industry from sugarcane.”¶ 48¶ There is,¶ however, no reason why such an industry cannot be developed. As Soligo and¶ Jaffe wrote, “In addition, Cuba has large land areas that once produced sugar but¶ now lie idle. These could be revived to provide a basis for a world-class ethanol¶ industry. We estimate that if Cuba achieves the yield levels attained in¶ Nicaragua and Brazil and the area planted with sugarcane approaches levels¶ seen in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba coul¶ d produce up to 2 billion gallons of¶ sugar-based ethanol per year.”¶ 4

#### 4 Cuba won’t accept FDI for its ethanol sector.

Frank ‘8

Havana-based Reuters correspondent Marc Frank is a former writer for the People's Daily World – Reuters – Feb 22, 2008 – http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/22/cuba-castro-ethanol-idUSN2261316320080222

Some experts believe Cuba could become the world's third ethanol producer after the United States and Brazil, but that would require huge investments, not just to improve its cane harvests, but also to finance the research and construction of distilleries.¶ The government, however, has been reluctant to allow foreign companies to administer farms, a precondition for any business wanting to invest in agriculture in Cuba.

#### 5 No Cuban ethanol – not enough sugar and Castro says no

Sanchez ‘11

Adriana E. Sanchez, NotiEn, News Agency, 2011, “Biofuels Fighting for Space in Central America and Cuba,” http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/12797/Biofuels%20Fighting%20for%20Space%20in%20Central%20America%20and%20Cuba.pdf?sequence=1

Similar to Central America, Cuba’s potential to become a leader in biofuel production is subject to speculation, and it will be strongly tied to the energy policy that the island adopts within the next few years. The Association for the Study of Cuban Economy (ASCE) says sugarcane could seemingly provide the raw material for biofuel production. But tight supplies might be a problem. The island nation is expected to produce only 1.2 million tons of raw sugar. This is a very small amount when compared to sugar production in the 1990s, which was estimated to reach 7 million to 8 million tons per year. With its current sugarcane output, Cuba could produce an estimated 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year, energy industry sources say. ¶ In an interview with NotiEn, Jorge Piñón, a well-known expert on Cuban energy policy, suggested that Cuba would have to stop its dependence on fossil fuels from foreign countries if it is to develop energy independence. "Cuba passed from papa Russia to papa Venezuela to solve its population’s energy demand," said Piñón. "Cuba must strive to start working on an energy policy that can help the country independent of who is in power." ¶ Piñón said ethanol production has not been more actively promoted because of the complicated relation that Cuba has had with sugarcane. "Fidel Castro puts his foot down every time there are talks about an increase in ethanol production; for him it is a political issue," said Piñón, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center and an analyst for the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami.

#### 6 Turn –Midwest econ

#### Plan kills it and the domestic ethanol sector.

Specht ‘12

(Jonathan – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D.,¶ Washington University in St. Louis 2012. “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States” – ExpressO – http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)

Absent a scenario in which the RFS was raised at the same time as U.S.¶ consumption of ethanol from Cuban sugarcane increased, it is likely that¶ importing Cuban sugarcane ethanol would have a negative economic effect on¶ the Midwestern United States. The worst case economic scenario for the United¶ States that could possibly arise out importing ethanol from Cuba would be that¶ such ethanol largely supplants rather than supplements the domestic ethanol¶ industry. This could lead to ethanol plant closures, job losses, and a regionalized economic slowdown across the Midwestern United States. This regionalized¶ economic slowdown would be made worse if a drop in demand for corn-based¶ ethanol led to a significant decline in corn prices and a resulting loss of¶ purchasing power by corn farmers (whose spending in times of high commodity¶ prices boosts small-town economies).¶ 139¶ The likelihood of this worst-case economic scenario depends on a number of¶ factors. The U.S. ethanol industry, like other ethanol industries around the¶ world, is largely affected by two major variables: governmental policy and¶ commodity prices. While it has not received anything close to the level of¶ support granted to the Brazilian ethanol industry,¶ 140¶ the U.S. ethanol industry¶ has received major boosts from the federal government.¶ 141¶ The future strength of¶ the domestic ethanol industry will depend on whether it continues to receive the¶ backing of the federal government. “Growth in the U.S. ethanol industry is¶ directly related to Federal and State policies and regulations.”¶ 142¶ According to a¶ 2006 economic analysis, “[T]he most likely scenario is that renewable fuels¶ continue to compete with petrofuels only on the basis of government incentives¶ and/or mandates.”¶ 143¶ How important such governmental support will be to the survival of the¶ domestic ethanol industry, however, will depend on the other major external¶ factor affecting the ethanol industry¶ : commodity prices. According to one¶ economic analysis, if oil prices stay at or above $105 per barrel, even with low¶ levels of governmental support, the U.S. ethanol industry will “move into high¶ gear.”144 Besides petroleum prices, the other major commodity price variable¶ with an effect on American ethanol production is the price of corn.145 Market¶ conditions are most favorable for U.S. ethanol producers when corn prices are¶ low and petroleum prices are high, as was the case in the United States between¶ 2001 and 2006.146 For both policy and market reasons, the 2000s were a good¶ decade for U.S. ethanol producers. In th¶ e first five years of that decade, both production and consumption of ethanol doubled in the United States.147 In¶ 2012, however, corn prices rose sharply as a result of that summer’s drought,¶ reducing profitability for ethanol producers. This commodity price shift leaves¶ the future of domestic corn-based ethanol production in question. The shift was¶ particularly damaging because it followed the expiration of policies favoring¶ domestic ethanol production at the end of 2011 and also because Congress has¶ yet to pass a new Farm Bill.¶ Over the past thirty years, ethanol has become a greater and greater factor in¶ the economics of corn production, and thus the economy of the Midwestern¶ United States. In this time period, the amount of U.S. corn production used for¶ ethanol has dramatically increased. In 1980, less than 1% of the U.S. corn crop¶ went to ethanol production.¶ 148¶ By 2011, that amount rose to approximately one-¶ third of the annual U.S. corn crop.¶ 149¶ The success of the ethanol industry has¶ been one reason¶ 150¶ that much of the Corn Belt¶ 151¶ has weathered the most recent¶ economic recession relatively well.¶ 152¶ According to the Bureau of Labor¶ Statistics, as of March 2013, North Dakota¶ 153¶ (with 3.2%), Nebraska (with¶ 3.8%), South Dakota (with 4.43%), and Iowa (with 5.0%) had four of the six¶ lowest state unemployment rates in the United States.¶ 154¶ Two other states with¶ significant ethanol production, Minnesota and Kansas,¶ 155¶ were also in the¶ bottom fifteen states for unemployment. ¶ While it may be true that the Corn Belt region is currently doing well¶ economically (that is, aside from the effects of the drought of 2012), especially¶ relative to other parts of the country, this has not always been the case. During¶ the 1980s, when commodity prices were very low, the Corn Belt region suffered¶ economic stress from sharply reduced farm profits.¶ 157¶ By providing a certain¶ source of demand for corn, domestic ethanol production sets a floor on the price¶ of corn, preventing this type of regional disaster from repeating. § Marked 11:11 § Additionally,¶ the population of the rural Midwest has been declining for years.¶ 158¶ As President¶ Obama acknowledged in a 2010 speech, in an era of outsourcing and¶ downsizing that began long before the most recent economic recession, the¶ domestic corn-based ethanol industry stands out as one of the few sectors that is¶ bringing jobs to rural America and allowing towns that might otherwise die to¶ survive.¶ 159¶ For roughly two decades, the domestic ethanol industry has relied on the¶ promise of continued government support in some form in order to expand¶ facilities and ratchet up production.¶ 160¶ For years policy-makers have promoted¶ the goals of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, cutting back on fossil fuel¶ usage, and reducing U.S. dependence on foreign countries for its energy¶ needs.¶ 161¶ Although the degree to which the domestic ethanol industry actually¶ meets these goals is disputed,¶ 162¶ it does contribute to achieving each goal to¶ some degree. While importing ethanol from Cuban sugarcane would meet the first¶ two national policy goals, it would detract from the third. It would seem¶ perverse for policy-makers to enact policies that would severely damage an¶ industry that helped meet the national po¶ licy goals they had espoused, especially¶ after the policy-makers had supported the industry.

#### That key to the US economy.

Dinneen ‘13

Bob Dinneen, President and CEO, Renewable Fuels Association¶ House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power Hearing;¶ "Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard: Stakeholder Perspectives." (Part One); Congressional Documents and Publications – July 23, 2013 – lexis

It is important to remember that a central objective in developing a vibrant and robust ethanol industry was to increase demand for agricultural products and enhance farm income. Girded by the RFS, ethanol has become the single most important value-added market for American grain farmers, stimulating investment in agricultural technology and enhancing economic opportunities for rural communities across the country. The emergence of the ethanol industry over the past decade has served as an incredibly important economic catalyst, transforming the grain sector from a stagnating, surplus-driven marketplace to one that is vibrant, high-tech, and demand-driven.¶ The expansion of the ethanol industry has catalyzed substantial growth in the agriculture sector's output, efficiency, and value. The role of the RFS has been to create a certain and stable market environment for renewable fuels producers and feedstock providers. In turn, this certainty has enabled investment in new agricultural technologies, such as more efficient farm machinery and higher-yielding corn seed. Agricultural gross domestic product (GDP), net farm income, livestock receipts, and crop receipts have all hit new record highs in recent years, indicating that the net impact of ethanol expansion on the agriculture sector has been resoundingly positive.¶ While the emergence of the ethanol industry has increased demand for corn, U.S. farmers have responded by growing significantly larger corn crops. U.S. corn production has increased tremendously in the "ethanol era." The average annual U.S. corn crop averaged 7.2 billion bushels (bbu.) in the 1980s, 8.6 bbu. in the 1990s, 10.3 bbu. in 2000-2006, and 12.3 bbu. since 2007 (the year EISA was enacted). As a result of larger annual corn harvests and the growing production of animal feed co-products, increased ethanol production has not affected availability of corn for traditional users. Corn supplies available for non-ethanol uses (i.e., the amount of corn and co-products "left over" after net consumption of corn by the ethanol industry) have been larger, on average, since passage of the RFS2 in 2007 than at any other time in history. Corn and corn co-products available for non-ethanol uses averaged 314 million tons (equivalent to 11.2 bbu.) from 2007/08 through 2011/12. This compares to an average of 308 million tons (11.0 bbu.) available for non-ethanol use from 2002/03 through 2006/07 and an average of 300 million tons (10.7 bbu.) from 1997/98 through 2001/02. In other words, the emergence of ethanol as a major source of corn demand has not reduced the supply of corn available for other uses, including livestock feed. It is important to note that expanded corn production has come primarily through increased productivity per unit of land (i.e., yield per acre). In 1980, farmers averaged a yield of 91 bushels of corn per acre and produced a crop of 6.6 bbu. In 2009, just a generation later, farmers produced an average yield of 164.7 bushels per acre and harvested 13.1 bbu. This doubling in size of the American corn crop was achieved by planting just 3% more corn acres in 2009 than were planted in 1980.¶ Recent research shows that when farmers receive higher prices for corn, they re-invest more of their income in technologies that further enhance productivity. n4 Every 10% increase in corn prices translates to a 2.5% increase in average corn yields. For example, if corn prices increase from $5.50 to $6.60 per bushel (20%), yields would increase from 150 bushels per acre to 157.5 bushels per acre. This increase in output is driven entirely by the higher market price paid to the farmer.¶ Meanwhile, contrary to claims that the RFS has "diverted" grain away from livestock and poultry production, U.S. meat output has grown steadily since the original RFS was enacted in 2005. In fact, 2013 production of red meat and poultry is projected to be the second-highest on record (only behind 2008) and 7% higher than output in 2005. n5 Steady growth in production of red meat and poultry show the fallacy of the notion that ethanol expansion and the RFS have somehow eroded U.S. meat output.¶ Expansion of the ethanol industry over the past decade has created and/or supported tens of thousands of jobs across all sectors of the economy. § Marked 11:11 § According to an analysis conducted by Cardno-ENTRIX, the production of 13.3 billion gallons of ethanol in 2012 directly employed 87,292 Americans. An additional 295,969 Americans found work in positions indirectly affiliated with or induced by ethanol production. These 383,260 total jobs helped create $30.2 billion in household income and contributed $43.4 billion to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In addition, more than 200 ethanol plants in 26 states paid $7.9 billion in federal, state and local taxes.

**7 No resource wars or conflict over scarcity**

**Tetrais 12**, Senior Fellow at Foundation for Strategic Research, (Bruno- Editorial Board at TWQ, July, “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol 35 Issue 3, p 7-22, T&F Online)

**The invasion of Kuwait may go down in history as being the last great resource war**. **Future resource wars are unlikely**. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent.61 The invasion of Kuwait—a nationwide bank robbery—may go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources.¶ China's and India's energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts.62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan's decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.)63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.¶ Only in civil wars does the question of resources such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and the like play a significant role; this was especially true as Cold War superpowers stopped their financial patronage of local actors.64 Indeed, as Mueller puts it in his appropriately titled The Remnants of War, “Many [existing wars] have been labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly ‘clashes of civilization.’ But in fact, most…are more nearly opportunistic predation by packs, often remarkably small ones, of criminals, bandits, and thugs.”65 It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels such conflicts. The risk is particularly high when the export of natural resources represents at least a third of the country's GDP.66¶ What about fighting for arable land, in light of population growth in Africa and Asia? Even in situations of high population densities, the correlation between the lack of arable lands and propensity to collective violence remains weak.67 Neo-Malthusians such as Jared Diamond believe that the Rwanda tragedy was driven by such scarcity.68 But there was no famine in Rwanda at the time. And the events of 1994 were not a revolt of the poor: Hutu landowners were amongst the most active perpetrators of genocide. There was, however, a significant youth bulge: the 15–24 age group represented 38 percent of the adult population.69 Land scarcity played a role, but at best as a factor explaining the intensity of the violence in some areas.70

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#### Normalization of economic relations with other countries include oil – in cross ex he said it would be the same policy that the Us has with other countries

DeRosa and Hufbauer, 2008, analysts @ Nation Foreign Trade Council(Dean DeRosa, Gary Clyde Hufbauer; “Normalization of Economic Relations Consequences for Iran’s Economy and the United States”, http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/NFTC%20Iran%20Normalizaton%20Book.pdf)//Holmes

With the support of its allies and the UN community, the United States maintains economic sanctions against Iran in response to Iran's support for international terrorism, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and more recently its practice of supplying arms to insurgents operating in Iraq. As with all economic embargoes, the efficacy of the sanctions in forcing political change is controversial. In economic terms, however, both sides lose from the geopolitical standoff. This study quantifies the consequences for Iran’s economy and trade of normalizing its economic relations with the United States and the Western Allies -- without attempting to map out policy guidelines for how normalization might be pursued. Instead, starting from the assumption that US sanctions currently enforced against Iran are lifted and, equally importantly, that Iran adopts more open policies toward foreign investment and other dimensions of its national economy, we examine the impact on Iran in two broad economic areas: the oil sector and trade in all other goods and services, emphasizing as possible the corresponding benefits to the US economy. Our focus on the oil sector of Iran is motivated by the sector's prominence in Iran's economy. It is also motivated by the importance of marginal supplies for world prices of oil and petroleum products. Against the backdrop of the dramatic run-up of the world price for crude oil by more than 100 percent during 2008, increased production of oil by a petroleum-rich country such as Iran could appreciably reduce world prices -- measured from either the approximate average world price of crude oil during 2008 ($100/bbl) or the average world price of crude oil during 2005 ($50/bbl) upon which the present analysis is predominantly based and which the world price of crude oil appears to be approaching amid the ongoing, end-2008 downturn in the global economy. Our analysis suggests that normalizing Iran's economic relations, both through the removal of US economic sanctions against Iran and through the liberalization of Iran's own economic policies could enable US and EU oil companies, over a period of about five years, to secure an incremental presence in Iran. We estimate the additional petroleum production from proven Iranian oil reserves -- arising in particular from the application by US and EU firms of efficient oil-lifting technologies and the unrestricted sale to Iran of modern oilfield equipment -- would expand production of crude oil in Iran by as much as 51 percent. In turn, this would raise world output by nearly 3 percent over the medium-term. By our estimates, this expansion of world output could reduce world oil prices by as much as 10 percent, trimming nearly $76 billion off the annual oil consumption bill of the US economy at the proximate 2008 world price of $100/bbl and nearly $38 billion at the 2005 world price of $50/bbl.1 The impact of normalization on the non-oil merchandise trade of Iran is assessed using econometric estimates both from the Peterson Institute gravity model for merchandise trade and from applying a simpler comparative framework.2 Finally, the analysis of nonoil trade is extended to the service sector by applying indicators of the prospective increased presence of the US and EU firms in the services trade (and possibly inward foreign direct investment) of Iran, based on the recent extent of US and EU trade in services with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iran is a prime target of current US economic sanctions, but it is also a country with an aversion to interaction with the global economy and a high degree of internal economic controls. Our analysis focuses on the impact of external and internal normalization on Iran’s economy and trade. Where the analysis permits, however, the economic gains to the United States and its allies are highlighted, especially in the concluding section of our report. The expected benefits to Iran’s economy and trade from normalization of economic relations with the United States and its allies will also generate substantial economic gains to US and EU firms and consumers -- directly to the extent that trade in goods and services between Iran and the Western Allies expands, and indirectly to the extent that world market conditions for crude oil and related petroleum products improve.

#### They don’t happen – countries know its too expensive

Montaner, 13 – A former university professor, he is an acclaimed writer and journalist. His syndicated column appears in dozens of newspapers in the United States, Latin America and Spain. Originally published in the Miami Herald. (Carlos Alberto, 9-3 “Why Do Nations Go to War?” <http://www.realclearworld.com/printpage/?url=http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/09/03/why_do_nations_go_to_war_105420-full.html>) djm

Two serious falsehoods about war, very hard to uproot, are embedded in the minds of people. The first is about motivation. Why do the powerful go to war? The most frequent explanation is that they want to seize another country's resources. In reality, that's almost never true. For it to be true, it would be necessary for those nations to be governed by elites or leaders intent on improving the collective quality of life by means of bloody and costly actions unleashed against other peoples. That may have been true when humans lived in caves and hunted in small groups, but not when the species evolved, developed agriculture and created the bases of modern societies. It is absurd to think that the United States went to war in Iraq to seize the oil. The war in Iraq has already cost the American taxpayers $784 billion. If we add the Afghan conflict, the price tag exceeds $1 trillion. That figure is higher than the cost of the Korean War at current prices. To buy energy from Iraq and resell it is what oil companies do. It is good business for everyone. To seize it through firepower is unaffordable. To intervene in Syria to plunder that country would be, in addition to a crime, supreme folly. Syria exports fewer than 150,000 barrels of oil a day, and its annual per-capita income is barely $3,400. It is a very poor society, badly managed. The notion that the motivation of Washington or Paris is to steal the few belongings of that dusty corner of the Middle East is absurd. It would be like killing a blind beggar to steal the pencils he sells. If the United States wanted to seize a very rich oil-producing country, it could turn north to Canada, but no one in his right mind would consider such madness. The second falsehood is that wars are useful to energize the economy, which even some famous people subscribe to. Fortunately, others like Nobel Economics Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz don't, and he's right. In addition to annihilating thousands of people, wars destroy material property, pulverize infrastructures, provoke inflation, inhibit the formation of capital and perversely assign the available resources. It is possible for arms manufacturers and merchants to enrich themselves, but that happens at the cost of pauperizing 99 percent of the country's productive fabric. The money spent to build an aircraft carrier is enough to start up 5,000 enterprises that can generate wealth and create jobs. It is absurd to think that the recruitment of soldiers is a reasonable way to contribute to full employment. The ideal is not to have a society with millions of uniformed people who produce no goods or appreciable services but to have a dense and diversified entrepreneurial apparatus with millions of productive workers. Switzerland has become the world's richest country by avoiding wars, not by participating in them. John Maynard Keynes thought that World War II had contributed to end the Depression caused by the Crash of 1929, but his confusion was likely due to the fact that he didn't have adequate information. When the United States entered that conflict, 12 years had passed since the start of the crisis and the world was in full recovery. To think that the war helped to strengthen the U.S. economy is like thinking that the earthquake that devastated San Francisco in 1906 or that Hurricane Katrina, which in 2005 flooded New Orleans and killed 1,831 people, helped revitalize the country's general economic picture.

### Spills

#### No drilling - all companies left

O’Grady ,13 Mary O'Grady is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journal – WSJ – April 24, 2013 – http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html

Then came promises of an oil boom and last week the predictable bust. The Brazilian state-owned Petrobras PETR4.BR +1.01% had given up on deep-sea drilling in Cuban waters in 2011. Repsol REP.MC -2.46% gave up in May 2012. The deep water platform it was using was then passed to Malaysia's state-owned Petronas, which also came up empty. Venezuela's PdVSA had no luck either. In November Cuba announced that the rig that had been in use would be heading to Asia. Last week came the end of shallow-water drilling.

#### The ecosystem is resilient

Kareiva et al 12 – Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter, Michelle Marvier **--**professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz **--** director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene/)

2. As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.¶ But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.¶ These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31¶ Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse.¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again.¶ The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.

#### Especially resilient to oil spills

Schwennesen, ’10 (Paul, holds an MA in government from Harvard University and a BS in History and Science (biology concentration) from the U.S. Air Force Academy, completed a fellowship at the Property & Environment Research Center (PERC) in Bozeman, Montana, “The Catastrophe That Wasn’t: The Gulf Oil Spill in Perspective,” 8/25, http://www.masterresource.org/2010/08/false-catastrophe-bp-spill/, bgm)

“Ah,” says the ecologist in you, “but oil is like poison to an ecosystem, and so any amount is disproportionately harmful.” Well, the science doesn’t agree, but let’s assume for the moment that you’re right. Ignoring that the vast majority of this poison-oil has already been happily consumed by portions of this delicate ecosystem, let’s pretend that oil is to the Gulf what botulinum toxin is to man (really bad news, as it’s the deadliest substance known). Distributed uniformly, oil would contaminate the water of the Gulf at a ratio of eight thousand millionths per gallon. If the same concentration of botulinum existed in your swimming pool, you could safely spend the day in it without a second thought.[2] Sure, oil is not distributed uniformly, but shrill cries about the “collapse” of the Gulf’s ecosystem imply that it effects are. It is indeed true that every action has reverberating ecological consequences, but if we delude ourselves into thinking this means disintegration then we risk making poor policy choices. Good Intentions, Good Analysis, Good Policy Please don’t misunderstand. I am firmly in the camp of those who think the Gulf ecosystem is a wonderful and valuable thing that we should never take for granted. Furthermore, it’s not my intention here to dismiss or minimize BP’s bungle. Neither am I suggesting cleanup shouldn’t continue with the utmost diligence. After all, “scale” matters not one whit if that sliver of oil washes into your crab pots. Legally, BP should be held to account for their negligence and must make whole anyone whose property or livelihood they have harmed. But two lessons rise to the surface here. The first is to never underestimate the power of ecosystems to absorb shocks and adapt to change. While we should not treat Nature with reckless disregard, we should also not dishonor her by intimating that she stands in precarious balance, perennially on the brink of human-caused collapse. As ecology continues to develop as a science, I expect that it will be the extraordinary resilience of natural systems that will become the prevailing acknowledgment.

### Solvency

#### Cuba says no -

#### Anti-american sentiment outweighs

Suchlicki, 13 (JAIME, “Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro,” JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History **¶** and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban **¶** and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the **¶** founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past **¶** decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of **¶** Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/>)

Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere.¶ Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.

Cuba fears regime change

Hanson and Lee, 13 - is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR AND is the Senior Production Editor of CFR (Stephanie and Brianna, “U.S.-Cuba Relations” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)djm

A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

#### Leaders from both countries reject the offer

Padgett, 13 - (Tim Padgett, WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America and the Caribbean, “Why This Summer Offers Hope For Better U.S.-Cuba Relations” http://wlrn.org/post/why-summer-offers-hope-better-us-cuba-relations)

Like a lot of idealistic U.S. presidents, Barack Obama took office in 2009 hoping to establish better dialogue with communist Cuba. Remember his plan to “pursue direct diplomacy” with Havana? Then he quickly discovered what most U.S. presidents find out:¶ First, communist Cuba really doesn’t want improved dialogue with Washington, since conflict with the U.S. offers more political payoff on the island. Hence Cuban leader Raúl Castro’s 2009 Christmas gift to Obama: the arrest of U.S. aid subcontractor Alan Gross on dubious espionage charges.¶ Second, the hardline U.S. Cuban exile lobby doesn’t want improved dialogue with Havana, since conflict with Cuba offers (or has traditionally offered) more political payoff here. Hence the Cuban-American congressional caucus’ efforts in 2011 to keep Obama from letting convicted Cuban spy René González return home to finish his probation, a fairly benign gesture that might have enhanced the chances of Gross’ release.

### Multilateralism

**Hegemony is vital Japanese foreign protection**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Third, our allies like Australia, Great Britain, Japan, Kuwait, Israel, and Thailand are protected by American military might and so we are able to deter attacks against them. They are aligned with the United States, and thus under its "security umbrella"—any attack on those states would be met by the military power of the United States. Other states know this and, usually, that is sufficient to deter aggression against the allies of the United States. <16>

**Extinction**

**Ratner 03**

[Ellen, 1/17. World Net Daily Executive Report]

Experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years. This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race—for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

#### Heg won’t collapse – it’s sustainable

Susman 12, US Ambassador to the UK (Louis, “America: Still the Indispensable Power?” Chatham House, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/260612susman.pdf)

Because an argument is being made by some academics, commentators and journalists that America is now in permanent decline. The argument goes that a gradual but irreversible erosion of economic strength, the so-called ‘rise of the rest’, and the effects of two gruelling wars is stripping the United States of its power, influence and authority. Now, there’s no doubt – as President Obama acknowledged in his speech to Parliament last year – that the international order is being reshaped and that as we adapt to it, we face undeniable and significant challenges. But we have overcome similar circumstances before. In the 1950s and 60s the fear was we were falling behind the Soviet Union in technology and ambition. The 1970s brought recession and unemployment to America; combined with a loss of faith in our system after Vietnam and Watergate. At the same time, Japan’s economy was taking off. Then in the 1980s and 90s the tiger economies of East Asia produced an economic miracle of rapid growth unparalleled in modern history. Each time America’s standing was questioned. Each time America rose to the particular challenges it faced. Time and again the doom mongers and the defeatists were proven wrong. And I am confident that they will be again. There are many reasons for my conclusion but three factors stand out. First, the strength of our economy. Second, our military prowess. Third, the power and scope of our international partnerships. Let me start with the strength and resilience of the United States economy. Despite being damaged by the most severe recession in more than 70 years, America is still – by far – the world’s largest economy. Today the United States is responsible for one quarter of all global economic output, just as we have been for more than four decades. Our economy is growing – with the IMF, Federal Reserve and others projecting growth of somewhere between two and three per cent this year. And the trend lines of the important economic factors continue to be strong. Unemployment nationally is at 8.2% – down from a peak of 10% in October 2010. More than four million private sector jobs have been created in the past two years. There is a renewed consumer confidence - essential to a selfsustaining recovery – where people are no longer paying off their credit cards but out spending again. The Troubled Asset Relief Program – known as TARP – has ensured that our banks are stable and well capitalized. TARP authorized the Treasury to use up to $700 billion to stabilize banks and other financial institutions. Ultimately, only $410 billion was disbursed – including $245 billion to recapitalize the banks. The Treasury is now confident that overall TARP will cost less than $50 billion – in fact, the financial assistance we provided banks will actually result in taxpayer gains of approximately $20 billion. The stronger position of banks is helping to support broader economic recovery, including a 30% increase in private investment in equipment and software. Lending to companies is also rising by over 10% a year. And America is still the No. 1 choice for foreign investment. US exports increased almost 16% last year to $2.1 trillion. That is well on track to achieving America’s ambitious goal of doubling exports by 2015 under the National Export Initiative. Our manufacturing sector is making a strong comeback for the first time since the 1990s. The United States has added nearly half a million manufacturing jobs since the beginning of 2010. The revival is evidenced by General Electric bringing back manufacturing operations from China and opening new plants in America. The French company Michelin is investing $750 million in a new plant and factory expansion in South Carolina. And there is no better example of the recovery in American manufacturing than the United States automobile industry. In 2008, 400,000 jobs across the car-making industry were lost. Two of the big three manufacturers were on the brink of administration. Today, GM is the No. 1 car-maker in the world, Chrysler is growing faster in America than any other car company, and Ford is posting record profits. So while always guarding against complacency, the American economy is on the right path to a return to full health. But one of our greatest and most enduring strengths comes from the fundamentals of our economic approach. Our philosophy is built on the whole-hearted belief in free trade. While other nations – including some of the fast-growing emerging economies – still trade behind barriers, the United States continues to embrace market-based principles. Free trade means every country, every business, and even every individual, has a chance to compete. That in turn creates the very jobs and wealth that lift people and communities out of poverty – both at home and abroad. America has firmly rejected protectionist policies; reaffirming our commitment to open markets with a number of new international free trade agreements. We are also open to immigration. Our ethnically diverse society and a culture of opportunity continues to draw talent from around the world. The latest OECD records show that more than 1.1 million foreigners came to live permanently in America in 2009. A survey by Gallup published in April once again put the United States as the most desirable destination for immigrants. Another distinct advantage America enjoys is the entrepreneurial spirit embedded in our DNA. Equally, our faith in free enterprise and freedom of thought and speech helps stimulate creativity and innovation. Today our companies – many of them small start-ups – are at the forefront of the highgrowth, R&D-based industries of the future. It is also worth noting that America is blessed with an abundance of natural resources. From the most arable land of any country on Earth to a diverse range of energy sources that will leave us increasingly energy independent. Current crude oil production is the highest since 2003, we have been the world’s largest producer of natural gas since 2009, we have vast shale oil deposits, and use of renewables such as wind and solar has doubled since 2008. All these underlying strengths make me confident that the United States will continue to be a vibrant and vital global economic power. And a strong economy, of course, underwrites our second enduring strength: the capability and reach of our military. Clearly, we are in a period of transition; turning the page on a decade of war and at the same time dealing with our budget deficit. But despite what some might say, America is not dismantling its defences. The truth is that in the wake of 9/11 and our response to it, our defence budget grew at an extraordinary pace. In 2001 – the year of the attacks – annual defense spending was $319 billion. By 2011 it had more than doubled to $691 billion a year. So we are taking the difficult step of reducing our planned defence spending by around $45 billion a year over a period of 10 years. But this adjustment is in no way going to undermine America as the foremost military power on earth. Our defense budget was – and still is – larger than roughly the next 10 countries combined. The new approach combines the need for deficit reduction with a recognition of the changing nature of the security threats we face. Today our policy encompasses a more agile, flexible, rapidly deployable and technologically advanced military – complemented with strong international alliances and multilateral cooperation. Which brings me to America’s third core strength, which is the power of our partnerships. Partnerships are essential in the 21st century. Today’s challenges are too many, too immense and too complex for one country to go it alone. This administration is intent on expanding and intensifying US engagement with other nations and with international institutions. As a result, the United States now has a range of formidable alliances on every continent. We don’t see ourselves as a super-power believing unilateral action can solve everything. A more direct, confrontational approach advocated by some in previous decades is clearly no longer appropriate – nor, I should add, would it be effective. The complexity of today's challenges demand a different style of American leadership. That's why today we see ourselves as a super-partner applying Secretary Clinton’s focus on ‘smart power’. In Libya, for example, we used an effective range of tools – including diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian – in the multilateral alliance against Colonel Gaddafi. And we will continue to play a central role within the United Nations and NATO – and also inside the G8, G20, the World Bank, and the IMF. At the same time, we are forging new relationships across Asia-Pacific, which is fast-becoming a strategic and economic center of gravity. This is what the Pacific pivot is all about. As a truly global power, we have widespread, enduring interests in the region – and they demand our widespread, enduring presence. But turning our face towards Asia-Pacific does not mean turning our back on Europe. We are constantly reinforcing ties with our oldest and strongest allies, including our special relationship with the United Kingdom. Building and maintaining strong, mutually beneficial partnerships, however, does not come from government alone. Successful and enduring alliances are not simply born from the President signing a treaty, a trade agreement or military pact. They are entrenched and sustained by a range of additional assets that are hard to quantify but nonetheless highly significant: our values, our customs and culture, our institutions and organizations. In effect, what the United States represents to the world. Take the timeless appeal of the values we embrace. Values of freedom, democracy, human rights, tolerance, opportunity and the rule of law. These are the values we promote on the international stage. And one way others learn what we stand for, and who we are, and what aspirations we share comes from the power of our example. America’s standing and influence is not only built on economic and military authority. Consider how the US was one of the first countries to send a message to the corporate world on transparency and bribery. We passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act because it was the right thing to do – even though it possibly put American companies at a disadvantage. America was also among the first to take humanitarian action following the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan last year. We sent relief supplies, elite search and rescue teams, and disaster response experts - while the American Red Cross provided shelter for some of those made homeless. The exceptional work of American NGOs and foundations around the world also provides US leadership on a number of global causes. In 2011 alone, American individuals, corporations and foundations donated almost $300 billion to charities. But it is not just the immense resources our NGOs bring to their efforts, it is also the boldness of their vision. The Carter Center – the organization founded by former President Jimmy Carter – is close to eradicating Guinea worm disease. It is also promoting democracy through monitoring elections across Africa, Latin America, and Asia. And look at Bill and Melinda Gates. How easy it would have been for them to slip into comfortable early retirement, using their wealth to hide from the world’s troubles. Instead, they were determined to use their personal fortune to help confront and overcome some of the world’s toughest health problems. This enlightened approach to public service and social responsibility is an explicit demonstration of America’s ‘hidden’ role as a global leader. Another source of international influence comes from our educational institutions. The excellence of our universities helps us to cultivate some of the world’s best and brightest minds. Indeed, America remains the No. 1 destination for foreign students – attracted by a system that gives them the opportunity to pursue and achieve their ambitions. According to the QS World University Rankings, 11 of the top 15 universities in the world are located in the United States. Perhaps that is why the US can also claim more Nobel Prizes than any other country. This widespread appeal of America is part of what makes us strong because it means our alliances are built on conviction not convenience. We do not stand alone in the world. We face our challenges in partnership with others. And yes, of course, America has enormous challenges. So nothing I have said this evening is intended to sound either boastful or complacent. We recognize that we constantly have to work, and that there is still a lot to do to maintain our leadership in a turbulent world undergoing significant transformation. But I do believe strongly that our continued leadership is more important than ever. And America is not perfect, we know that. Unemployment is still too high; the need for deficit reduction is essential and must be addressed; there remain issues around equality in our society; and aggressive partisanship is causing dysfunction in our government and cannot be ignored. In these and many other areas, we know our country needs to do more: to heal wounds, take courageous decisions, and adapt to new circumstances. But the lesson from history is that America has always shown the capacity to overcome its difficulties. In the past decade, we’ve endured the deadliest terrorist attacks in modern history; two conflicts that have lasted longer than both world wars; and a global financial crisis on scale unprecedented in a generation. Through it all, America has retained its global leadership. And, as I have outlined this evening, the sources of our influence are many and they are durable. Our economic strengths are unequaled. Our military power unrivaled. And our international partnerships unsurpassed. I believe that our weaknesses pale in comparison to our resilience and our strengths. This is why I can say with confidence that ultimately America will remain the indispensable global power.

#### Multilateralism doesn’t solve resource failures – it fails just as much

Naim 13, Senior Fellow International Economics at Carnegie, 2-15-’13 (Moises, “The G20 is a Sad Sign of Our Uncooperative World” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/15/g20-is-sad-sign-of-our-uncooperative-world/fgvs)

The reality is that, despite many commitments by national leaders, the capacity of nation-states to co-ordinate their responses has dwindled. Problems may have gone global but the politics of solving them are as local as ever. It is hard for governments to devote resources to problems beyond their national borders and to work with other nations to address these challenges – while painful problems at home remain unsolved. The changing landscape of global politics also plays a role. As the number and the interests of those sitting at the tables where agreements are negotiated have increased, the opportunities for consensus and concerted action have shrunk. Emerging powers such as the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), new international coalitions, and influential nongovernmental players are now demanding a say in the way the world handles its collective problems. Inevitably, when all these disparate and often conflicting interests need to be incorporated into any agreement, the resulting solutions fall short of what is needed to solve the problem. This is why global multilateral agreements in which a large number of countries deliver on co-ordinated commitments have become increasingly rare. When was the last time you heard that an agreement with concrete consequences was reached by a large majority of the world’s nations? I think it was 13 years ago – the Millennium Development Goals. Since then, almost all international summits have yielded meagre results, most visibly those seeking to advance the global agendas on trade liberalisation and curbing global warming. This gap between the growing need for joint international action and the declining ability of nations to act together may be the world’s most dangerous deficit. In economics, when demand outstrips supply prices go up. In geopolitics the inability of nations to satisfy the demand for solutions to problems that transcend national boundaries results in dangerous instability. Pirates hijacking ships off the coast of Somalia, financial crashes that spread internationally at great speed, overfishing, the exploitation of the rainforest and nuclear proliferation are just a few well-known examples on the long list of problems that need international co-operation.

**We can stay engaged despite resources – multilat isn’t any cheaper**

**Brookies, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13** (Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth, Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, (Brooks is a professor at Darmouth, Ikenberry is a professor at Princeton and Wohlforth is a professor at Dartmouth), "Lean forward: in defense of american engagement," 92.1, Proquest)

Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement-numbers that are hard to pin down.¶ If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.¶ The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of gdp by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.¶ Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of gdp, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.

**Hegemony solves china**

**Mcgiffert 03 – Fellow CSIS International Security Program China In The American Political Imagination, P 69-70**

THROUGHOUT THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA, the most critical U.S. security objective in the Asia Pacific region has been the maintenance of predominant political and military influence across the vast reaches of maritime Asia.' In support of this objective, the United States has sought to maintain the ability to project superior naval, air, and in some cases land power within this region and to sustain close political and diplomatic relations or to establish explicit bilateral se­curity alliances with key states, including Japan, South Korea, Austra­lia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Such American predominance is designed to protect four key in­terests viewed as vital to the safety, prosperity, and beliefs of the American people. First, it is critical to preventing the emergence of a hostile power in the Asia Pacific region that could limit or exclude U.S. political, economic, or military access to the region. During the Cold War, this meant that the United States would act to prevent the expansion of Soviet or Chinese communist power or influence throughout littoral Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has remained committed to the objective of preventing any ri­power from emerging in the region, while also seeking to prevent reemerging regional disputes or rivalries from disrupting ti. and economic development. Second, American predominance is important to ensuring free­ commerce, market access, and strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) throughout the region, thus preventing the emergence of any exclusionary economic associations or the obstruction of free passage by both commercial and military transports. This reflected the view that free market systems with relatively open access to for­eign trade and investment facilitate the global activities of U.S. busi­ness, thereby ensuring U.S. economic prosperity and encouraging democratic development. It also reflected the need to protect critical transportation routes within and across maritime Asia, also viewed as essential to U.S. prosperity and the security of American allies and friends in Asia and beyond. Third, U.S. leadership in Asia is key to defending and encouraging democratic states and processes and preventing the expansion of nondemocratic movements or regimes. Although not always a top priority, the United States encourages the emergence of democratic states whenever possible. This derives from the widely held assump­tion that fellow democracies will resist totalitarian expansion, facili­tate the exercise of U.S. power, and reduce the overall tendency of states to engage in military conflict (which in turn derives from the view that democracies will be less inclined to wage war against one another than nondemocratic states). The protection or expansion of democratic states is also viewed by some elites as an important moral objective of the United States. Finally, U.S. power and access to Asia is viewed as necessary to pre­venting the proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies, and know-how across or into littoral Asia. The importance of this objec­tive has grown over time, as increasingly potent and mobile items as­sociated with weapons of mass destruction or other highly destructive weapons have emerged and become obtainable by both states and nonstate actors.

**US contains Russian aggression- Other countries want US protection**

**Kagan 12 –** senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (Robert “The world America Made”)

What role the United States played in hastening the collapse of the Soviet system will always be a subject of contention. Undoubtedly, it played some role, both in containing the Soviet empire militarily and in out performing it economically and technologically. Nor was the turn to democracy throughout eastern Europe primarily America’s doing. The peoples of the former Warsaw Pact nations had long yearned for liberation from the Soviet Union, which also meant liberation from communism. They wanted to join the rest of Europe, which offered an economic and social model that was even more attractive than that of the United States. That they uniformly chose democratic forms of government, however, was not simply the aspiration for freedom or comfort. It also reﬂected the desires of eastern and central European peoples to place themselves under the American security umbrella. The strategic, the economic, the political, and the ideological were thus inseparable. Those nations that wanted to be part of NATO, and later the European Union, knew they stood no chance if they did not present democratic credentials. These democratic transitions, which turned the third wave into a democratic tsunami, need not have occurred had the world been conﬁgured differently. The fact that a democratic, united, and prosperous western Europe was even there as a powerful magnet to its eastern neighbors was due to American actions after World War I.

**They create a perception that the U.S. is weak**

**Bolton 02, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, (John R., Chicago Journal of International Law, Fall, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205)**

The Globalists' second approach is specifically targeted against the United States, in an effort to bend our system into something more compatible with human rights and other standards more generally accepted elsewhere. This conscious effort at limiting "American exceptionalism" is consistent with the larger effort to constrain national autonomy because the United States as a whole is the most important skeptic of these efforts. Every time America is forced to bend its knee to international pressure, it sets a significant, and detrimental, precedent for all of the others.

#### Multilateralism doesn’t solve resource failures – it fails just as much

Naim 13, Senior Fellow International Economics at Carnegie, 2-15-’13 (Moises, “The G20 is a Sad Sign of Our Uncooperative World” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/15/g20-is-sad-sign-of-our-uncooperative-world/fgvs)

The reality is that, despite many commitments by national leaders, the capacity of nation-states to co-ordinate their responses has dwindled. Problems may have gone global but the politics of solving them are as local as ever. It is hard for governments to devote resources to problems beyond their national borders and to work with other nations to address these challenges – while painful problems at home remain unsolved. The changing landscape of global politics also plays a role. As the number and the interests of those sitting at the tables where agreements are negotiated have increased, the opportunities for consensus and concerted action have shrunk. Emerging powers such as the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), new international coalitions, and influential nongovernmental players are now demanding a say in the way the world handles its collective problems. Inevitably, when all these disparate and often conflicting interests need to be incorporated into any agreement, the resulting solutions fall short of what is needed to solve the problem. This is why global multilateral agreements in which a large number of countries deliver on co-ordinated commitments have become increasingly rare. When was the last time you heard that an agreement with concrete consequences was reached by a large majority of the world’s nations? I think it was 13 years ago – the Millennium Development Goals. Since then, almost all international summits have yielded meagre results, most visibly those seeking to advance the global agendas on trade liberalisation and curbing global warming. This gap between the growing need for joint international action and the declining ability of nations to act together may be the world’s most dangerous deficit. In economics, when demand outstrips supply prices go up. In geopolitics the inability of nations to satisfy the demand for solutions to problems that transcend national boundaries results in dangerous instability. Pirates hijacking ships off the coast of Somalia, financial crashes that spread internationally at great speed, overfishing, the exploitation of the rainforest and nuclear proliferation are just a few well-known examples on the long list of problems that need international co-operation.

#### Multilat fails – international coop impossible on key issues

Spoerri 13, Host of Ethics Matter at Carnegie Council, 2-25-’13 (Marlene, “Global Ethics Corner: Is Multilateralism Dead?” http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20130225/index.html#section-26501)

Global problems need global solutions. Just ask members of the G-20 or the United Nations. Both groups were founded on the assumption that multilateral cooperation is key to solving major international challenges. There's just one problem. Multilateralism isn't working. The last global agreement that included specific commitments and concrete benchmarks was the Millennium Development Goals. That was passed in the year 2000. Since then, multilateral summits like Doha and Davos have amounted to lots of promises, but little action. Which is why a growing number of analysts are questioning the merits of multilateralism and advocating something called "mini-lateralism." Proponents of "mini-laterialism" say multilateral negotiations have grown too inclusive. They warn that new actors like the BRICS and NGOs like Oxfam have made the search for common ground on contentious global issues impossible. More players mean more conflicts and ultimately, less consensus. So "mini-lateralists" recommend restricting the number of negotiators to those countries actually capable of enacting policy change. In other words, major world powers. It’s that last point that has outraged critics. They say "mini-laterialism" is unethical and anti-democratic. Take the issue of climate change. Multilateral negotiations currently include small countries like the Maldives. As an island state, the Maldives will be one of the chief beneficiaries—or losers—of any climate agreement. But since it doesn't have much geostrategic power, minilateralists would exclude the Maldives from negotiations. Critics say that's unjust. Proponents of "mini-laterialism" make a different ethical argument, however. When it comes to tackling global challenges, they say we have to sacrifice fairness for the greater good. After all, an undemocratic deal on a subject as important as climate change is better than no deal at all. As analysts debate the failings of current international negotiations, what do you think? Is multilateralism in peril? Does mini-lateralism offer an ethical alternative?

### China

#### No US-China trade war

Ian Fletcher 10, Adjunct Fellow @ San Francisco office of the U.S. Business and Industry Council,

Don't Fear a Trade War With China, Huffington Post, 9-28, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/dont-fear-a-trade-war-wit\_b\_742811.html

For a start, there is the fundamental fact that China is unlikely to engage in catastrophic escalation because they, not we, are running the surplus, so they are the ones with something to lose. (China's exports to the U.S. are more than four times America's exports to China.) The only way a deficit nation can "lose" a trade war is by having its trade balance get even worse. Given that the U.S. trade balance is already outlandish, it is hard to see how this could happen. Of course, China has other cards up its sleeve, like threatening to dump its massive dollar reserves. But doing so would carry enormous costs for Beijing. For a start, beginning to sell these reserves would reduce the value of the large reserves they would still be holding. Furthermore, this would depress the value of the dollar -- exactly the opposite of their currency manipulation strategy. Then there is the awkward problem of what China would do with all the money it would get by selling off its dollars. There just aren't that many good alternatives for parking that much money. The Japanese don't want their currency used as an international reserve currency (and will stymie anyone who tries), and the Euro has huge problems of its own right now. Assets like gold and minor currencies are volatile or in limited supply. Other assets, like American or European real estate or corporate stocks, are, by definition, denominated in dollars or euros, so this wouldn't get around the currency problem. Similarly, China could threaten to stop buying U.S. Treasury debt (which would spike American interest rates), but is constrained by the fact that this would reduce the value of the $840 billion or so that it already holds. This action would also lower the price of the dollar by abandoning China's key lever for pushing it up. Furthermore, the U.S. could retaliate by revoking the tax exemption of interest on foreign-held Treasury debt, established in 1984 by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan. (As a true hypothetical doomsday scenario, we could even suspend interest payments on the debt, though this would be irresponsibly disruptive and is thus extremely unlikely in peacetime.)

#### No US-China conflict

Allison & Blackwill 13 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)

Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.

#### China rise will be peaceful

Logan 13 (Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “China, America, and the Pivot to Asia,” Policy Analysis No. 717, Jan-8)

Two logics underpin the theory of the optimists, both borrowed from the liberal school of international relations.11 First is “liberal institutionalist” logic, which holds that China’s political and military behavior can be constrained in a web of international institutions. These would allow it to rise into the existing international order—which was shaped by the institutions created un- der American leadership after World War II—and prevent China from transforming the rules that govern the order.12¶ For liberal institutionalists, it is hard to understand why China would have any problems with the status quo. They wonder why, given that China has made huge strides forward in terms of prosperity and even influence under the existing order, it would bother to try changing it.13 Liberal institutionalists see international politics as tightly constrained by international institutions and laws, and argue, as Princeton’s G. John Ikenberry does, that while “the United States cannot thwart China’s rise, it can help ensure that China’s power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted over the last century, rules and institutions that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future.”14¶ Optimists argue that China can be con- strained because the expansive and cross- cutting network of international institutions promotes positive-sum outcomes and renders the American-dominated order “hard to overturn and easy to join.”15 If Washington plays its cards correctly, Iken- berry writes, it can “make the liberal order so expansive and institutionalized that China will have no choice but to join and operate within it.

”16¶ The second liberal logic holds that states’ international behavior is induced by the domestic political structures within them.17 In this view, to the extent that China has foreign policy objectives that conflict with American interests, these exist because of China’s undemocratic domestic politics. Accordingly, the argument goes, if China democratized, China could continue to rise while resigning itself to U.S. preponderance.¶ Advocates of this view place less emphasis on international institutions. For them, the question is whether China’s domestic politi cal system can be transformed from one-party rule toward democracy. If it can, there is less reason to fear that China’s international am- bitions will grow dangerously expansive. This theory is popular in Washington, where policy is based in part on the belief that continued economic growth will help transform China’s political system in a democratic direction.¶ If all goes according to plan, economic growth in China will produce a growing middle class, which should then demand greater political rights. These demands are expected to generate more democratic politics.18 Then, these increasingly democratic politics are supposed to plug into a crude version of democratic peace theory, in which the domestic institutions of democratic countries prevent them from going to war (or presumably, in this case, even engaging in serious security competition) with other democracies.¶ What both schools of liberalism agree on is that there is no iron law that growing Chinese power will create a zero-sum security tradeoff between China and the United States and its allies. This represents the central disagreement between the optimists and pessimists.

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### Pink Tide

#### Cuba-Iran ties risks EMP and bioweapons attacks against the US without containing Cuba

**Suchlicki, 13-** Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the University of Miami (Jaime, “Cuba’s Continuous Support for Terrorism”, Cuba Democracia Y Vida, 4/22/13, <http://www.cubademocraciayvida.org/web/article.asp?artID=21053)//TL>

Iran, Cuba and Venezuela have developed a close and cooperative relationship against the U.S. and in support of terrorism. The three regimes increasingly coordinate their policies and resources in a three way partnership aimed at counteracting and circumventing U.S. policies in the Middle East and Latin America. Within this relationship, Cuba plays a strategic role in terms of geography (proximity to the U.S.), intelligence gathering (both electronic eavesdropping and human espionage) and logistics. Worrisome to the U.S. are reports that “have uncovered covert operations between Cuba and Iran in the development and testing of electromagnetic weapons that have the capacity to disrupt telecommunication networks, cut power supplies and damage sophisticated computers.” (1) Furthermore, Cuba can easily provide Iran with valuable information from its sophisticated espionage apparatus. Iran is also able to obtain information on biotechnology from Cuba. In the late 1990s, Cuba began “transferring (licensing) both its medical biotechnologies and, along with the technical know-how, implicit capabilities to develop and manufacture industrial quantities of biological weapons,” creating a significant security threat for the United States and Israel. (2) In addition to its proven technical prowess to interfere and intercept U.S. telecommunications, Cuba has deployed around the world a highly effective human intelligence network. The type of espionage carried out by Ana Belén Montes, the senior U.S. defense intelligence analyst who spied for Cuba during some 16 years until her arrest in 2001, has enabled the Castro regime to amass a wealth of intelligence on U.S. vulnerabilities as well as a keen understanding of the inner-workings of the U.S. security system. Such information and analysis was provided to Saddam Hussein prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and would undoubtedly be provided to a strategic ally like Iran. While one may argue that factors such as Iran’s limited military capabilities and sheer distance diminish any conventional concerns, one should expect that Tehran, in case of a U.S.-Iran conflict would launch an asymmetrical offensive against the U.S. and its European allies through surrogate terrorist states and paramilitary organizations. In such a scenario, Cuban intelligence would be invaluable to Iran and its proxies and Cuban territory could be used by terrorist groups to launch operations against the U.S.

**Those cause extinction**

Matheny 07 (Jason G. Matheny, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg

School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Humyn Extinction”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007)

Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

#### Independently, causes retaliation that goes nuclear

Hymers 01, Ret. Lt. Colonel in the US Army, published over a hundred articles, summa cum laude Masters Degree in Theology, (Robert, “The Roots of Terrorism”, http://www.rlhymersjr.com/Online\_Sermons/11-04-01PM\_TheRootsOfTerrorism.html)

It could be smallpox, botulism or other deadly biological agents. Anthrax is the current focus of the nation's post-September 11 trauma, but it's just one of many potential weapons in bioterrorism's terrible arsenal. This news article deals with bioterrorism through salmonella, drug resistant tuberculosis, and "flesh eating" bacteria. The article says: Even without high-tech delivery systems, a single suicidal terrorist spraying a few drops of smallpox virus - or a liquid solution of Ebola or even plague - in a crowded mall or into the ventilation system of a large building could cause untold harm…Or a terrorist might use…botulism [or] a few drops of cholera bacteria, for example, [to] poison the water tank of an apartment house…Health and Humyn Services Secretary Tommy Thompson said last week what worries him most is the safety of the nation's food supply, especially of imports...[and] an attack on Americans, if traced back to a state sponsor, could trigger nuclear retaliation. (Time, November 5, 2001, pp. 44-45). In other words, terrorism could easily spark World War III - with nuclear bombs going off - here in Los Angeles, the water supply and the food supply poisoned, and thousands infected with smallpox, incurable tuberculosis, or the Black Plague. This is a frightening time to be alive! That's why you need to get back here to church next Sunday - and become a real Christian!

#### The Pink Tide spread kills US hegemony

**Fidler ’13**- Long-time socialist activist and writer (Richard, “'Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions': compelling contribution to our understanding of the 'pink tide'”, LINKS, March 11 2013, <http://links.org.au/node/3254>) //CW

Although, as the title indicates, a subtext of this volume is the professed effort in some countries to build a “socialism of the 21st century”, the term itself (as the authors acknowledge) calls for clarification. Although Venezuela has established that as its goal, no Latin American government (with the partial exception of revolutionary Cuba) has gone beyond capitalism. However, some governments in South America are attempting with notable successes to reverse the ravages of neoliberalism. Each is pursuing distinct strategies tailored to meet the needs of its particular social conditions, subject to the limitations imposed on all of them by their insertion within the global capitalist system. An opening chapter outlines the international context. “The old order is breaking down with the decline of the United States as the planet’s hegemonic power.” And while Washington is preoccupied with its wars in the Middle East and South Asia, its grip on Latin America has weakened as an emerging China enters this market in search of raw materials to supply its booming economy. China is now the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Its trade with Latin America as a whole increased 18-fold in the first decade of this century, while US exports dropped from 55 per cent of the region’s total to 32 per cent.

#### Plan saves Cuban oil – which is key to Cuban growth, That growth will be vital to successful funding of the “pink tide”.

Miller ’11 Edward – Author and Frequent Contributor to Global Research Reports. He frequently reports on issues of global trade, energy, and agriculture. He holds degrees in philosophy and law from the University of Auckland. “Cuba's Offshore Oil & the US Blockade” – Nov 06, 11 – Geopolitical Monitor – http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/cubas-offshore-oil-the-us-blockade-4524/

With the announcement of 2.9% economic growth from the Cuban Minister for Foreign Trade and Investment and sugar production bouncing back after recent hurricane destruction, it would appear that the Cuban star is again rising. While commentators cannot agree whether Raul Castro’s economic reforms push the country toward the free market or a form of libertarian socialism, it is clear that the flow of petrodollars will have a significant impact on the country’s future, for better or worse. The nation’s resilience in the face of hardship, and at times direct threat, remains unquestioned, and Cuba could indeed be heading towards a period of hitherto unknown economic prosperity.¶ Regardless of the embargo, the contribution of this prosperity to the Latin American and Caribbean communities at large, in particular the other ALBA-TCP countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and St Vincent and the Grenadines) could also prove significant. This bloc has presented a united front against Northern imperialism, and trade between these nations has increased massively over the past few years, undermining traditional mercantilist relations while providing a credible alternative to the neoliberal model of development. While far from perfect, Cuba has blazed a trail of resistance that has stood the test of time and endured the heady wilderness of political alienation, both during the Cold War and after the Wall came down. Despite its resurgence after uniting with other Latin American ‘pink-tide’ governments through ALBA-TCP, many Cubans feel trapped on the island, prisoners of a communist fiefdom run for the enrichment of central government officials. With luck, the development of these oil reserves in accordance with adequate environmental standards and contingency procedures will alleviate this sense, providing them with renewed vigour to continue the Cuban social revolution.

#### The plan is an international sign of weakness and builds castro’s influence

Carlos Ferrer and Carlos González Sháněl 2011 (carlos ferrer is a Graduate in journalism professionally and academically ¶ connected to the Czech Republic. For several years he worked ¶ in the Ibero-American service of Radio Prague and he is¶ currently studying a PhD in Media Studies at the Charles ¶ University in Prague. The topic of his thesis is the difference ¶ in treating the information about the Cuban reality in Spain ¶ and the Czech Republic, carlos shanel is the Head of the Center for Research and Analysis on Latin America (CASLA)¶ Respekt Institut, Latin America Insight Project, “The fundamentals of the U.S. embargo against ¶ Cuba. National interest or political game?” pdf)

The right wing, traditionally having a more aggressive foreign policy, still sees in ¶ Cuba a symbol of struggle, stressing the totalitarian aspects of the Castro regime. ¶ Their positions insist that there is no reason to remove the sanctions, because there ¶ has not been any political progress on the island. A unilaterally lift would be a ¶ demonstration of weakness that would lead Castro to new heights of audacity. On ¶ the other hand, they counter that the economic benefits that would occur in Cuba ¶ would not represent an improvement in the quality of life of the population, since ¶ we are speaking about a centralized economy state.