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#### Temporary Window of Bipartisanship Means CIR Will Pass And Top of the Agenda – Obama Focus is Key

A. New Year = Obama new focus on immigration B. support now because congress just passed military bill and spending cuts

Fox News 12/27 December 27, 2013 President Obama Eyes Immigration Reform As A Top Priority For 2014 http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/12/27/president-obama-eyes-immigration-reform-as-top-priority-for-2014/

The last vestiges of 2013's political wrangling officially behind him, President Barack Obama is setting his sights on the coming year, when a number of unfinished tasks will increasingly compete for attention with the 2014 midterm elections.¶ High on the agenda for the start of the year is a renewed push on immigration. Bipartisan consensus about the need for action on immigration in the wake of the 2012 presidential election gave way in 2013 to opposition from conservative House Republicans.¶ U.S. House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, has started offering subtle signs he'll put more weight behind the issue despite continued resistance from the tea party. Vacationing in Hawaii, Obama on Thursday signed into law a bipartisan budget deal softening the blow from scheduled spending cuts and a military bill cracking down on sexual assault. The two bills, passed by Congress with broad bipartisan support, constituted a modest step away from gridlock, and both parties cautiously hoped that spirit of cooperation might linger after New Year's Day.¶ "This law is proof that both parties can work together. We can put aside our differences and find common ground," House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, who negotiated the budget deal for Republicans, said in a statement.

#### Political capital sustains Boehner support for Immigration reform

A. Obama using PC to get advisers to make the best of his PC B. Sustaining what he has left is key

Juliet Eilperin; Karen Tumulty, The Washington Post , 12/11/13 (“Podesta, Schiliro to return to White House:” P. Nexis)

The decision to enlist influential Democratic strategist John D. Podesta, just days after bringing back his former legislative affairs chief Phil Schiliro, signals a larger shift in how the White House will operate in coming months. Eager to salvage his landmark health-care law and advance climate-change policy before he leaves office, Obama and his aides are open to empowering a handful of advisers with broader policy portfolios to ensure the administration achieves its goals.¶ The president and his aides have been discussing a possible reorganization with some trusted outside advisers for at least a month, according to a senior White House official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the topic's sensitive nature. The staff changes will continue in the coming weeks, the official said.¶ The moves mark a recognition by the White House that it needed to change its operations in light of the botched Oct. 1 rollout of the health-care law, particularly given that Pete Rouse, the president's longest-serving aide, will be leaving by the end of the year.¶ Obama has been hesitant to replace many within his small inner circle operating in the West Wing, in part because his limited time in Washington before the presidency left him with relatively few trusted advisers. While he replaced several key members of his Cabinet after his 2012 reelection - including his secretaries of state, Treasury and defense - it is a measure of how static White House staff has been that the recruitment of two former advisers, on a temporary basis, amounts to a staff shake-up.¶ "Obama still has an opportunity to get one or two major initiatives through Congress, possibly immigration reform, but he doesn't have much gas left in the tank," New York University public affairs professor Paul C. Light wrote in an e-mail. "Podesta and Schiliro may be able to ration Obama's declining political capital, and hold the line on House Republican attacks. The door is closing on Obama's presidency - these two advisers know how to do it as well as it can be done."

#### Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

**Immigration reform expands skilled labor—spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.**

**LA Times 11/9/12** [Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html]

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see **expansion of skilled labor visas**," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a **fivefold increase** in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a **significant shot in the arm for India and China**." There is **widespread consensus among economists and academics** that skilled migration **fosters new trade and business relationships** between countries and **enhances links to the global economy**, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a **bigger plus than not**," he said.

**US-Indian relations avert South Asian nuclear war.**

**Schaffer 2** [Spring 2002, Teresita—Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, Lexis]

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can **benefit by closer cooperation**. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a **stronger position** from which to help **calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region**. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a **prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India**. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

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### 1nc – not restrictions

#### Interpretation – Economic engagement is direct investment – not removal of RESTRICTIONS

Haass, 2K – Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director

[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a **wide variety** of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

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### 1nc – definitions

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, 04 - (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 - Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U. (Jon M., “The Debater’s Guide”, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

### 1nc – debate = game theory

#### Debate is a game which means fairness comes first – the resolution is the starting point, the debate is the process, and the ballot determines and winner and a loser

A – the game has to have a stasis point which all players have access to (resolution)

B – the point of the game should be to have specific solutions to a problem (debate)

C – decide whether or not that solution was preferable (winner and a loser)

Landa and Meirowitz, 09 – Assistant Professors of Department of Politics NYU (Dimitri and Adam, “Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy” www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf)

The game-theoretic approach involves a three-step process. The first step defines a game, which captures (a) the relevant choices that are understood to be available to the players (in models of deliberation, typically, what messages, if any, could be sent, and what decisions could be made after the exchange of messages), (b) what the players know about those choices, about each other, and about the deliberative interaction to which they are a party, and finally, (c) how attractive they would perceive the consequences of those choices to be if they knew everything that there was to know about them. The second step specifies a solution concept, which embodies a set of assumptions about the general behavioral agency ascribed to the players in the model. Given the first two steps, the third step is logically entailed: through well-defined techniques of analysis, one can generate predictions about what types of behavior, with respect to the particular choices analyzed in the model, are and are not mutually consistent - that is, are or are not supportable by equilibria of the specified game. The key question that motivates the game-theoretic analysis is how policy selection is related to private information and preferences when participants engage in equilibrium behavior.

#### Game theory is the best way to understand debate

A – a game can be defined as zero-sum in that one wins and one person loses

B – competitive drive is good

Kelly, 03 – lecturer at the University of Southampton Research & Graduate School of Education (Anthony, “Two-person zero-sum games of strategy” Decision Making using Game Theory Cambridge University Press)

A two-person zero-sum game is one in which the pay-offs add up to¶ zero. They are strictly competitive in that what one player gains, the¶ other loses. The game obeys a law of conservation of utility value, where¶ utility value is never created or destroyed, only transferred from one¶ player to another. The interests of the two players are always strictly¶ opposed and competitive, with no possibility of, or benefit in, cooperation. One player must win and at the expense of the other; a feature¶ known as pareto-efficiency. More precisely, a pareto-efficiency is a¶ situation in which the lot of one player cannot be improved without¶ worsening the lot of at least one other player.¶ Game theory is particularly well-suited to the analysis of zero-sum¶ games and applications to everyday life (especially sporting contests)¶ abound.

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### 1nc heg da

#### Plan collapses US credibility

Brooks, 9 - Senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation. (Peter, 4-16, “Keep the Embargo, O“http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)

In another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba. Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### That kills heg

APSA, 09 - American Political Science Association (Sept., “U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, Task Force Report)

As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As credibility and esteem decline, the United States may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it.

#### Ensures hotspots and turns the case

Kagan, 12 - Senior Fellow at Brookings (Robert, 3-14, “America has made the world freer, safer and wealthier” <http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp_c1>)

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

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### 1nc – Normative Difference

#### Enmity is a fundamental condition that defines the political - the strategy of surrender ignores that the goal of politics must be to limit, not eradicate war - the affirmative’s project of embracing vulnerability can only end in a violent war on difference

A – their arguments about “too much government” is a link

B – to be truly human we need to be corrected of our mistakes – the institution exists to do that

C – fear of the other does not end just because you destroy the state or the controlling power

D – enemies may be destroyed but friend v FOE dichotomy still exists in the aff

E – terrorist attacks occur because they feel we aren’t respecting what the represent – they do it to get noticed

F – the question is how we will deal with enmity, embracing vulnerability means those that do not follow it are seen as dispoable

Prozorov 6 – Sergei Prozorov, collegium fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Politics and Social Sciences, Petrozavodsk State University, Russia, 2006, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 75-99

The Savage and the Barbarian: Natural Liberty and Supplementary Violence

Schmitt’s prophecy about the infinite plasticity of the category of the foe as ‘proscribed by nature itself’ may be elaborated with reference to the naturalistic political ontology of liberal government, discussed in Foucault’s analytics of governmentality and multiple post-Foucauldian studies in this field. In this section we shall argue that it is precisely the **combination of the universalist ethos**, at work in the deployment of the category of humanity, with a naturalist political ontology that accounts for the emergence of friend–foe ultra-politics in contemporary Western liberal democracies.¶ The radical innovation of liberal governmentality, which emerged as a critique of the theory of ‘police science’ and the practice of ‘police states’ of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, is the reinscription of the social order in terms of socio-economic processes, which, in the episteme of classical liberalism, are deemed to be natural, self-regulating, antecedent to authority and as having an intrinsic logic of their own that is not fully transparent to state knowledge: ‘Inscribed within the very logic of liberalism is a certain naturalism.’55 From this epistemic principle follows the central tenet of liberal government: **the suspicion that ‘one always governs too much’**.56 The liberal solution to this problem consists in adapting the techniques of government to the principles found in the naturalised reality of the social and making government itself accountable to these principles of the ‘system of natural liberty’.57¶ At the same time, liberal policies of laissez-faire are not a passive abandonment of an aboriginal reality to its own devices, but an elaborate activist and interventionist course that secures natural liberty by taking necessary measures to correct its perversions. This ‘corrective’ aspect points to what Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess have respectively termed **the ‘illiberality of liberalism’** and the ‘liberal government of unfreedom’.58 Within the ‘natural’ realm of the social, liberal government has historically identified manifold categories of the population, whose properties or acts were ‘**contrary to nature’** and had to be **rectified through governmental intervention**, which historically has taken manifold forms, from the confinement of madmen to the correction of juvenile delinquents.59¶ It is in this possibility of governmental ‘re-naturalisation’, which we have elsewhere described in terms of the ‘pedagogical technology’ of liberalism60 that we may locate the condition of emergence of the figure of the foe as the ‘enemy of liberalism’.¶ The centrality of pedagogical interventions to liberal governmentality demonstrates that despite its avowed naturalism, liberalism remains conditioned by the constitutive, asymmetric and individualising ‘pastoral power’ that Foucault has famously identified as the condition of emergence of modern governmentality as such.61 What unites all the objects of liberal corrections, irrespectively of whether they are deemed to be evil, mentally disabled, morally deficient or simply ‘irrational’, is their functioning in the liberal discourse as beings, whose existence is deemed to be contrary to nature. On the one hand, these individuals and groups belong to the social realm, cast as ontologically and axiologically prior to government in the liberal episteme. On the other hand, however, their practices are not in accordance with the liberal vision of ‘natural liberty’ and thus require corrective interventions of liberal government, whose modus operandi is itself adapted to the natural processes of the social. ‘Natural liberty’ is therefore not an aboriginal property of the subject, but an effect of governmental intervention. The Other, who was so generously let into the global liberal ‘homeland’, is endowed with liberty only on condition of his or her subjection to the corrective interventions that eradicate his or her alterity.¶ This Foucauldian thesis parallels Schmitt’s critique of the ‘educational theory’ involved in the valorisation of liberal democracy: The people can be brought to recognise and express their own will correctly through the right education. This means nothing else than that the educator identifies his will at least provisionally with that of the people, not to mention that the content of education that the pupil will receive is also decided by the educator. The consequence of this educational theory is a dictatorship that suspends democracy in the name of a true democracy that is still to be created.62¶ Thus, liberal government finds its condition of (im)possibility in the generalised illiberality of pedagogical interventionism, which manifestly violates liberalism’s own naturalist presuppositions but is nonetheless essential to its existence, functioning in the manner of the Derridean supplement, ‘a strange difference which constitutes [liberalism] by breaching it’.63¶ In Dean’s argument, **this paradox makes liberalism a potentially** ‘**total’ modality of government**, ‘because its program of self-limitation is linked to the facilitation and augmentation of the powers of civil society and its use of these powers, in conjunction with the sovereign, disciplinary and **biopolitical powers of the state itself**, to establish a comprehensive **normalisation of** social, economic and cultural existence’.64 The naturalisation of a certain artefactual conception of the social permits perpetual interventions in the name of its natural values, disavowing the constitutive and frequently violent character of governmental practices. At the heart of liberal government we may therefore observe the aporia whereby the naturalist ontology is always contaminated by the logic of supplementarity and every ‘natural liberty’ bears traces of governmental ‘corrective’ interventions.65¶ This relationship is at work not only in liberal domestic politics, but also, and with an even greater intensity, in the international domain, where liberal governmentality is deployed in such diverse contexts as military interventions ‘in the name of democracy’, neoliberal programmes of **development assistance and economic restructuring**, and even the global campaign for the **promotion of ‘human rights’**. As William Rasch argues in his reading of the discourse of human rights as a form of geopolitics, ‘the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. **To be truly human, one needs to be corrected**.’66 It is this object of liberal corrective interventions, whether domestic or international, that epitomises the figure of the foe – a ‘not truly human’ being ‘proscribed by nature itself’. The ‘incomplete’ humanity of this creature renders it **infinitely inferior** to the ‘fully’ liberal rights-holders, which **justifies the deployment of asymmetric subject–object relations** in **pedagogical practices of correction**, while the ‘unnaturality’ of this creature provokes a degree of apprehension:¶ even if the foe is infinitely weaker than ‘us’, any engagement with him is dangerous, as one never knows what these ‘monsters’ are capable of. To recall our discussion in the previous section, the **fear of the Other** that animates Schmitt’s discourse on enmity does not disappear **in the liberal political ontology** of monistic naturalism. Instead, it is **supplemented with a** violent project of eradicating this dangerous alterity that liberalism has itself incorporated into its ‘universal homeland’ through manifold corrective, disciplinary and **punitive practices**, which have no rationality whatsoever in the Schmittian pluriverse of irreducible alterity. The foe is therefore, as it were, a double enemy: both a transcendental Other that is intrinsically dangerous in Schmitt’s sense of radical alterity and an empirical Other, whose dangerousness is established by his or her actual resistance to the efforts of liberal government to purge this alterity. We may specify the liberal construct of the foe with the help of Foucault’s idiosyncratic contrast between the savage and the barbarian.¶ The savage (usually presented as ‘noble’) is manifestly a natural being, albeit probably a prehistoric one, a being that exists before society and who is central in founding society in the mythology of the ‘social contract’ – a central presupposition of liberal political ontology. Moreover, for the liberal economic rationality the savage is an essential presupposition that provides a referent to the abstract figure of the ‘homo economicus’, ‘a man without past or a history, who is motivated only by self-interest and who exchanges his product for another product’.67 The savage is therefore both a precursor of civilisation and a condition of its possibility. Thus, when modern liberal subjects perceive the Other as a ‘savage’, they may be said to be encountering their own selves in pure essence; hence the interest in and even a mild fondness for the ‘exotic otherness’ of the savage throughout the history of liberalism, from the colonial period to the contemporary ‘multiculturalism’.¶ The barbarian, on the other hand, is ‘someone who can be understood, characterised, and defined only in relation to a civilisation, and by the fact that he exists outside it. There can be no barbarian unless an island of civilisation exists somewhere, unless he lives outside it, and unless he fights it.’68 Crucially, unlike the savage, who becomes a subject only insofar as he enters or founds a civilised social relationship, the barbarian is an active subject from the outset, yet solely a negative subject of refusal, resistance and destruction. ‘Unlike the savage, the barbarian does not emerge from some natural backdrop to which he belongs. He appears only when civilisation already exists, and only when he is in conflict with it. He does not make his entrance into history by founding a society, but by penetrating a civilisation, setting it ablaze and destroying it.’69¶ What is the criterion that distinguishes the barbarian as the foe to be battled and annihilated from the ‘noble savage’, whose authenticity we might revel in and whose safe eccentricities we might even valorise in the spirit of liberal ‘tolerance’? The savage is manifestly the object of the liberal pastoral, whose transformation into a liberal subject does not, in the aporetic ontology of liberalism, detract from his naturality, but rather completes it, transforming a ‘not truly human’ being into a full-fledged ‘free subject’. The pedagogical endowment of the savage with a ‘natural liberty’ transforms this Other, that from the perspective of the ‘most extreme possibility’ is always a ‘potential enemy’, into a liberal ‘friend’, thereby creating the conditions for the universalisation of the ‘liberal peace’.¶ In contrast, the barbarian is simply the savage who resists this civilising correction and thus forfeits his own nature, becoming a monstrous foe. The barbarian is thus anyone who does not feel at home in the universal liberal homeland and continues to assert his Otherness despite his inclusion in global civilisation. It is thus resistance and daringness to resist that turns the savage, a mute and passive Other, into **the most extreme form of the enemy, the enemy of** both nature and **civilisation**, insofar as in the liberal ontology the two function in a mutually supplementary manner. The enemy of liberalism is thus, by necessity, a foe, which entails that a Schmittian relation of ‘just enmity’ is **entirely foreclosed in the liberal political ontology**. While in the latter relation a minimal identity of all interacting subjects as sovereign states provided a common framework of legitimate equality between particularistic communities, liberalism is constituted by a strict dividing line between societies that are in accordance with ‘natural liberty’ and those that are not. The latter may either function in the modality of the savage, the passively acquiescent objects of pedagogical correctional practices, or, in the case of their resistance to such interventions, **are automatically cast as inhuman** and unnatural foes, with whom **no relationship of legitimate equality may be conceivable**. If the transformation of the savage into a liberal subject functions as a condition for ‘liberal peace’, the ultrapolitical engagement with the foe may well be viewed as the continuation of the liberal peace by other means.¶ Thus, the distinguishing feature of the liberal ‘politics of enmity’ is that its utopian desire to eliminate enmity as such from the human condition inevitably leads to the return of the foreclosed in the most obscene form – for liberalism, there indeed are no enemies, just friends and foes. President **Bush’s infamous diatribe** ‘you are either with us or against us’ should not be read as an extreme deviation from the liberal standard of tolerance, but rather as an **expression**, at an ‘inappropriate’ site of the transatlantic ‘community of friends’, **of the binary liberal logic**. When both nature and humanity are a priori on the side of liberalism, there is no need for a Schmittian reflection on how to manage co-existence with radical alterity for the purposes of limiting a permanently possible confrontation. One is either with ‘us’ or against ‘us’, and, in the latter case, one forfeits not merely a place within ‘our’ community of friends, but also one’s belonging to nature and humanity.¶ Conclusion: Beyond the Ultra-Political Terrain¶ The present hegemony of liberal ultra-politics is well illustrated by the contemporary phenomenon of the global ‘war on terror’. The ‘war on terror’ offers a fruitful site for inquiring into the politics of enmity for two reasons. First, the widely perceived undecidability of the category of ‘terrorism’ to the extent that it is frequently attributed to the very same states that have launched the ‘war on terror’ illuminates starkly the contingency of the friend–enemy distinction. This contingency, i.e. the absence of both essence and necessity to any particular empirical form of enmity, points to the permanent gap between the transcendental function of the friend–enemy distinction and its particular historical modality. The deployment of the ultra-political **objectification of the enemy as a terrorist ‘rogue’** is a purely contingent option, **made possible by a** fundamental asymmetry that endows the subjects of the ‘war on terror’ with what Derrida terms the ‘reason of the strongest’, an epistemico-moral self-certitude that itself has something roguish about it:¶ [T]hose states that are able or are in a state to denounce or accuse some ‘rogue state’ of violating the law, of failing to live up to the law, of being guilty of some perversion or deviation, those states that claim to uphold international law and that take the initiative of war, of police or peacekeeping operations because they have the force to do so, are themselves, as sovereign, the first rogue states. This is true even before any evidence is gathered to make a case against them, however useful and enlightening such a case may be. There are always (no) more rogue states than one thinks.70¶ Secondly and consequently, the ‘war on terror’ is of particular interest, insofar as the perception of this fundamental inequality is arguably constitutive of the very subject-position of the ‘terrorist’ foe. Indeed, contemporary terrorist violence may be grasped as a retort of the foe, a paradoxical **refusal of the subject-position**, imposed on the enemy of liberalism, through its assumption in a hyperbolic and excessive manner, whereby the foe ‘acts out’, with a vengeance, an identity attributed to him or her. Let us suggest that the specificity of terrorist violence is not derivative of extra-political factors that may function as its background motives (poverty, economic inequality, underdevelopment, lack of education, etc.), but is rather a **direct expression of a properly political grievance**, a retort against the humiliation, incurred in not being recognised as a legitimate enemy. Our demonstration of the monistic nature of liberal pluralism and the artefactual character of liberal naturalism points to the fact that the subject-position of the foe is **preconstituted in the political ontology of liberalism**, insofar as the appropriation of the capacity to adjudicate what is human and what, within humanity, is natural **makes exclusion and stigmatisation a** permanently available option for dealing with expressions of dissent.¶ The image of the terrorist foe is thus both entirely contingent from the standpoint of a Schmittian transcendental function of enmity and always-already articulated within the ontological edifice of liberalism. While the motives for particular acts of terrorism might be distinct in each particular case, we may suggest that all these acts, first, take place in the preconstituted subject position of the ‘enemy of liberalism’ and, secondly, target precisely this subject position as a priori inferior. Terrorism is little more and nothing less than the resentful acceptance by the Other of the ultra-political terms of engagement, if only because there is no other way that the present global order can be legitimately opposed: the refusal to be liberalism’s ‘noble savage’ inevitably turns one into a barbarian. If our enemy can only be a monster, should we be surprised that the acts of our enemies are so monstrous? The uncanny effect of the liberal negation of pluralistic antagonism is that in the eyes of its adversaries liberalism may no longer be opposed other than by murderous and meaningless destruction. To the oft-cited empirical claims that contemporary terrorism has been produced as an effect of Cold War policies of Western powers, we must add a conceptual thesis: terrorism is the practical expression of **that mode of enmity** which the liberal West has **constituted as the sole political possibility due to its appropriation of both nature and humanity**. The ‘war on terror’ is not an accidental deviation from the maxims of Western liberalism but rather an exemplary model of **the only kind of ‘war’ that the liberal foreclosure of political enmity permits**, i.e. **a war against an a priori ‘unjust enemy’**. It should therefore not be surprising to see this model generalised beyond its original articulation, whereby it becomes a standard response to the **worldwide expressions of anti-liberal dissent**.¶ For this reason, **one gains nothing by attempting to battle terrorism** either on its constitutive ultra-political terms or, as much of critical thought suggests, on the extra-political fronts of development, poverty relief, civic education, democratisation, etc. Instead, any authentic confrontation with terrorism must logically pass through the stage of questioning what confrontation, struggle and antagonism actually mean today, who we fight, how we fight and, possibly, whether we still have any meaningful willingness to fight. During the 1970s, Foucault frequently lamented that the proverbial ‘class struggle’ tended to be theorised in critical thought in terms of ‘class’ rather than ‘struggle’, the latter term functioning as a mere metaphor.71 The same problem is still with us today – the proliferation of metaphors (‘culture wars’, ‘wars on drugs’, ‘fight against poverty’) is increasingly obscuring the reflection on the concrete meaning of antagonism in contemporary political life.¶ In the interbellum of the 1990s, one frequently encountered discussions of who the new enemy might be after the demise of the Soviet Union. As subsequent events have demonstrated, it is entirely redundant to attempt a theoretical deduction of the concrete enemy, which is after all always constituted in a political decision. However, while the ‘who’ question may be entrusted to history and politics, what requires reflection is a question of **how enmity is to be managed**. Should we maintain the present ultra-politics of the foe despite its evident boomerang effects on our societies, or should we attempt to return to the structure of ‘legitimate enmity’ of the Westphalian era, expanding it beyond the European system to the entire international society? Should we put our trust in and surrender our freedom to the governmental apparatuses of ‘homeland security’ or should we heed Schmitt’s warning that no security may ever be attained as long as our sense of the world is that in which there is ‘only a homeland’?¶ This article has demonstrated that it is impossible to evade these questions by the plethoric yet repetitive discourse on overcoming enmity in the chimerical project of ‘world unity’ and that answers to these questions require an interrogation of many ontological assumptions that frame the conduct of modern liberal politics. **We have seen that the desire to dispense with enmity as such**, arising out of liberal epistemicomoral certitude, **has not brought about a ‘universal friendship’** but rather produced a limited but universalistic community, **which permanently feels threatened** due to its incomplete embrace of the globe and, for the same reason, threatens everyone outside itself. The escape from the murderous ultra-politics of the foe is impossible unless it passes through the stage of an ontological critique of liberalism, hence the present importance of Schmitt.

#### That generates total war through paranoia and genocidal conflicts of all against all

A – enmity construction is inevitable, eliminating the friend enemy dichotomy causes us to wage wars without reason

B – you lose connection with reality because we define ourselves as what we are not

C – without an enemy it creates paranoia that results in violence

Reinhard 4 – Kenneth Reinhard, Professor of Jewish Studies at UCLA, 2004, “Towards a Political Theology- Of the Neighbor,” online: http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. **A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms** that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one **subject to radical instability**, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: ¶ The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question **would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities**; it would multiply ‘little **wars’ between nation-states**; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or **genocidal struggles**; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, **through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam?** Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) ¶ If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in **full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia.** ¶Hence, for Schmitt, **a world without enemies is** much more dangerous **than one where one is surrounded by enemies**; as Derrida writes, **the disappearance of the enemy** opens the door for “an **unheard-of violence**, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its **unprecedented** – therefore **monstrous** –forms; a **violence** in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

#### The alternative is to affirm the necessity of the sovereign to define the state of exception

de Benoist 7 – Alexis de Benoist, editor of the two French academic journals Krisis and Nouvelle Ecole, has translated articles by Carl Schmitt into French and has published the first full bibliography of Schmitt’s works, 2007, “Global terrorism and the state of permanent exception: The significance of Carl Schmitt’s thought today,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 85-87

The notion of the ‘state of emergency’ (Ernstfall) or the state of exception (Ausnahmezustand) plays a central role in Schmitt’s political and constitutional theory, where it is clearly linked to his critique of liberalism (see Schmitt 1985: chapter 1). For Schmitt, the exception being unpredictable, it is vain to believe that one can determine in advance the methods with which to respond to it. Liberalism, inspired either by neo-Kantian formalism or by Kelsenian positivism, cannot understand the nature of the exception, neither can it face the exception without betraying itself, because it adheres to a legal conception which is strictly formal or procedural, and which claims that a pre-established rule or norm can be applied to any situation. Schmitt adds that, in suspending legal norms, the exception helps us to understand and appreciate the nature of the political, in the sense that it reveals to us the domain of the sovereign, meaning in this case the concrete capacity to make a decision in the face of an urgent or exceptional situation. The state of exception reveals both who is sovereign and also where sovereignty lies, in the very moment that it makes the decision appear (Entscheidung) in its ‘absolute purity’. In such conditions, one can see that the politically sovereign instance does not coincide automatically with the state. ‘Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet (Sovereign is he who decides on the exception)’, writes Schmitt (2004a: 13). This famous formula can be understood in two ways: first, he who is sovereign is he who decides in the case of exception, and second, also sovereign is he who decides about the exception itself, that is he who decides that it is no longer a normal situation and that the rules no longer apply. There is therefore a close connection between the exception and the decision, which Schmitt identifies as the ‘premier cause’ of all political society. To Schmitt, the purest expression of the political act is the decision in (and about) the case of exception (or emergency): the suspension of legal norms in the case of exception constitutes the ultimate manifestation of political sovereignty. Sovereignty, he underscores, is not so much the power to make laws as the power to suspend them. But one would be wrong to interpret this affirmation as an apology for arbitrariness. On the one hand, Schmitt emphasizes that in making decisions in a case of exception, the sovereign is not rendered free by circumstances to act according to his own pleasure, but he is, on the contrary, obliged to act in a way that makes him responsible for them. On the other hand, he stresses that the exception defines the rule in the sense that we cannot understand a rule without taking into consideration its limits, which is to say the circumstances that can make it inapplicable. In other words: whoever decides to derogate from the norm is equally fixing the norm. The state of exception is also important because it reveals the original nonnormative character of the law. Moreover, it is not the law/right (Recht) which is suspended in the state of exception, but only the normative element of the law (Gesetz). Through this, the state of exception unmasks the ‘existential’ character of laws. The exception is essential, not because it is rare, but because it is unpredictable. Like the enemy himself, who cannot be determined beforehand by a pre-existing general norm – because enmity can only be defined in a specific temporal context – the exception cannot be codified in advance. In linking the law (Recht) to its non-legal source, that is the sovereign decision, Schmitt attacks all forms of constitutional rationalism, notably the theory of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) or the positivist theory, according to which the sovereign must, under all circumstances, submit himself to the rule of law. The occurrence of an exceptional case (Ausnahmezustand), with all that is implied, shows that it is simply not possible to submit the sovereign unconditionally to the rule of law, since norms cannot predict the exception. A constitution is, in this sense, always incomplete. The most it can do is predict a situation where it is no longer applicable. However, Schmitt also underscores that the exception is, by definition, exceptional; that is, it can never be transformed into a permanent state. Exception is to rules or norms what war is to peace. As in the case of the ancient Roman dictatorships, the suspension of the norms by the sovereign can only be provisional. It can also open a new cycle of law. In his book on dictatorship (Schmitt 1921), Schmitt states clearly that dictatorship, which can be justified in certain cases of exception, suspends norms but does not change the legal order or the nature of the state, which means that it does not have any legitimacy except inasmuch as it aims to restore the pre-existing legal order. A dictatorship therefore remains a constitutional dictatorship: the suspension of legal order does not signify its abolition.9 In an exceptional situation, if the state suspends the rule of law, it is because it wishes to preserve it. Hence, to decide on the exception means also to decide on the concrete conditions in which the norm can still be applied.

## OFF

### 1NC

#### TEXT: As a method for opening space for agonistic debate within and between political communities, David and I advocate that the United States federal government should ease restrictions on travel between the United States and Cuba for all persons except for child sex traffickers.

#### Child Sex Trafficking Exists in Cuba

Graham Sowa March 30, 2013 Prostitution in Cuba: Denied at Home, Enabled from Abroad Posted By Graham On @ 4:51 pm In Graham Sowa's Diary,Highly Popular Posts | 35 Comments http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=90370&print=1

Few people in Cuba want to talk about prostitution. I’ve been here for three years and I have yet to see any type of campaign against prostitution or sex tourism. Denial that prostitution is rampant in the tourist sector is an outright lie. Anyone who disagrees is invited to walk down Obispo Street with me (this is a serious offer). You will think the only services offered to tourists in Havana Vieja are taxis and blowjobs.¶ Police are often witness to the solicitation. I’ve never seen them intervene. I’m left to wonder if they are paid in-kind or in cash for their see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil approach to their job.¶ I know right now those readers who defend Cuba out of reactionary habit are preparing their anecdotal story about how sex crimes with minors are prosecuted in Cuba. And those stories are probably true. But they don’t originate from the official news here.¶ Not the crime, not the societal problem, not the obvious police corruption and not even the successful prosecution (of what I am left to imagine are a very small percentage of cases) are addressed at any level higher than street gossip among neighbors.¶ Child sex tourism (or child rape tourism as it should be known as) not only exists, but is literally killing Cuban children. I refer here to a good piece of journalism [1] from the Miami Herald about a 12 year old girl who was statutorily raped to death by European and Cuban tourists.¶ The Cuban authorities acted appropriately and tried and jailed the rapists. Of course we read nothing in the local newspapers about the crime or punishment.¶ In a problem this grave both Cuba and the United States share blame. And while I would like to see both countries take a much more hard-line approach to child rape tourism that involves civil society; as a United States citizen I’m going to appeal to my homeland.¶ In the United States the story ran one day in the Miami-Herald and I could not find any syndication in other newspapers, not even the European ones. So I can’t say my society is very interested in making this problem known either.¶ The same day the Toronto Star ran an article [2] about child rape tourism in Cuba originating from Canada after a lengthy Canadian Government investigation of the sick enterprise.¶ But the Cuban problem in Cuba is only one half of the picture.

#### We Should Restrict the Travel – Lifting Restrictions Would Icnrease Trafficking Due to Lack of Enforcement

Graham Sowa March 30, 2013 Prostitution in Cuba: Denied at Home, Enabled from Abroad Posted By Graham On @ 4:51 pm In Graham Sowa's Diary,Highly Popular Posts | 35 Comments http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=90370&print=1

Few people in Cuba want to talk about prostitution. I’ve been here for three years and I have yet to see any type of campaign against prostitution or sex tourism. Denial that prostitution is rampant in the tourist sector is an outright lie. Anyone who disagrees is invited to walk down Obispo Street with me (this is a serious offer).¶ Instead of making predictable observations about American travel attitudes I think Senator Rubio would have been better off having a discussion on how the United States could do something to prevent child rape tourism to Cuba. Because as it stands we are probably facilitating more than we are prosecuting.¶ Illegal travel to Cuba under the current United States travel ban usually involves passing through Mexico first, followed by the final leg to Cuba. Upon arrival in Cuba the Cuban Passport Control does not stamp United States passports. Instead they stamp a piece of paper inside of the passport.¶ Without a passport stamp the traveler is left with plausible deniability that they never traveled to Cuba. And with Cuban-American relations kept dismal by petty disputes perpetuated by feuding octogenarian neighbors there is no reason to expect Cuban cooperation in a United States investigation into crimes committed by a U.S. Citizen in Cuba.¶ So the situation, made possible by both Cuban and United States policies, is that a pedophile can travel to Cuba from the United States knowing that their home country will not be able to prosecute the crime.¶

#### This Comes First – You Have a Moral Obligation to Reject the Affs Narrative of Inclusiveness as a method of moral amnesia that ignores trafficking

Williams, founder of Sex Workers Anonymous in Las Vegas, Schwartz, Ph.D in private psychotherapy practice, Farley, clinical psychologist, research, and anti-prostitution activist, 7 [Jody, Harvey, and Melissa, *Prostitution and Trafficking in Nevada: Making the Connections*, 83-84]

Oppressive criminal systems brainwash not only the victims who are trapped inside. They also create cover narratives, seductions, and distractions that promote dissociation in the general public. These cover dialogues obscure the violence that is intrinsic to prostitution. We ask ourselves, how could something that cruel, that vicious be advertised publicly as “Live Sexy Girls” right there in plain sight? As we’ll see in the chapter on advertising, almost half of the people visiting Las Vegas assume that prostitution is legal although it is not. Sex industry entrepreneurs, organized crime, sexually predatory johns, and the politicians who are complicit with them together construct elaborate camouflage that obscures the nature of the harm in prostitution. They promote social amnesia. Similarly, the Nazis constructed an elaborate camouflage in the Terezin concentration camp so that it would appear to be a summer camp for Jews rather than a death camp for them. Even though they investigated, the Red Cross was fooled. So was the rest of the world. The “Duping delight” of perpetrators as they pull off their hoaxes is the frosting on the cake of economic and psychological benefits obtained from their simultaneous management of victims and collaborators. As Belgian King Leopold savaged the Congo in a bloodbath of destruction, a hundred years of colonial violence was carefully painted as a mutually beneficial trade pact between Africa and Europe. Leopold and his trading partners fabricated organizational names that were designed to camouflage the nature of the Belgian rape of the Congo and its people. One organization controlled by Leopold was the humanistic-sounding International Association of the Congo. Leopold certainly did not talk about starving porters, raped hostages, emaciated slaves, and severed hands. Slavery in the United States also had cover narratives that led to collective dissociation of what was actually going on inside the system, what made it work, and the lethality of it to the slaves involved. All intelligently designed oppressive systems use variations on these tactics. Most important is garnering the complicity of the masses through exploitation of peoples’ ignorance and incredulity. This is accomplished by the deceptive and distracting use of language, by exploiting people’s natural self-interest, fears, avoidances, anxieties, and by exploiting the dynamics of sacrifice that happen in human relationships and societies. The interlocking systems of drugs, prostitution, mind control, and economic exploitation of those trapped in prostitution are mind-boggling. One snapshot alone can be deceiving. Only by taking a panoramic view of its entirety can the public become educated about this system of modern day sexual slavery. We live in a world where we somehow accept that thousands of humans a day can die or be sacrificed from hunger and starvation, thousands can be left uneducated and unattended in poverty, and hundreds of thousands of people a day can be emotionally and physically brutalized and psychosexually enslaved in terms of prostitution and trafficking. We act as if there are no consequences to our refusal to acknowledge these sacrificed, marginalized, dehumanized people. We forget that our own humanity is compromised when anyone’s humanity is compromised.

## Contention 2

### 1nc – moral absolutism

#### Moral absolutism is complicity with violence – it allows people to die for the sake of clean hands

A – moral absolutism means you don’t take action because you are afraid of the purity of your intention

B – moral purity is a form of complicity with violence and injustice because you didn’t lead to that so your hands are clean

C – it kills political effectivness

Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### 1nc – nuke war o/w

#### Nuclear war outweighs – possibility of extinction outweighs all ethical principles

Kateb, 84 - professor @ Princeton University (George, “The Inner Ocean”)

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous an acknowledgment that the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility—a genuine possibility— as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctive-ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizeable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to earth’s uninhabitability, to “nuclear winter,” or as Schell’s “republic of insects and grass.” But the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or “theater” use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizeable exchange of because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect of nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counter on to seek expression later.

### 1nc – progressivism

#### Consequentialism key to progressivism – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible

A – identifications don’t change people they just show that there is a counter-movement

B – moralism is satisfied with saying that is wrong but doesn’t do anything about it

C – focus on moralism means the focus goes on what the government did wrong and anyone who did that is alienated

Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)

But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global *politics*. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.

### 1nc – depoliticization turn

#### “Responsibility to the other” depoliticizes action – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained

A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it

B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity

C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim

Zizek, 99 - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)

Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that the bombing of Yugoslavia, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this did not come into being in some irresponsible way, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the \_Sueddeutscher Zeitung\_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.

### 1nc – reversibility

#### The reversibility of “the other” as a subject position means unconditional ethics always devolve into a relationship of domination in a face to face encounter

A – it isn’t logical and not sustainable, it says to be nice to those that hurt you

B – the theory supposes that everyone is going to act on good nature

C – the other is reversible so instead of “you should subject yourself to the other” it could be “you should subject yourself to me”

Hägglund, 6 - PhD candidate in Comparative Literature at Cornell University (Martin, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” Project Muse)

As a result, Levinas's injunction of unconditional submission before the other cannot be sustained. Although Levinas claims to proceed from the face-to-face relation, he evidently postulates that the subject in the ethical encounter either gazes upward (toward the Other as the High) or downward (toward the Other as someone who is helplessly in need, bearing "the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan" as a refrain declares in *Totality and Infinity*). But regarding all the situations where you are confronted with an other who assaults you, turns down the offered hospitality, and in turn denies you help when you need it, Levinas has nothing to say. If the other whom I encounter wants to kill me, should I then submit myself to his or her command? And if someone disagrees with me, should I then automatically accept this criticism as a law that is not to be questioned or counterattacked? Questions like these make it clear that Levinas does not at all found his ethics on an intersubjective encounter. Rather, he presupposes that the ethical encounter exhibits a fundamental asymmetry, where the other is an absolute Other who reveals the transcendence **[End Page 52]**of the Good. Accordingly, Levinas condemns every form of self-love as a corruption of the ethical relation, and prescribes that the subject should devote itself entirely to the other. To be ethical is for Levinas to be purely disinterested, to take responsibility for the other without seeking any recognition on one's own behalf.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v034/34.1hagglund.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT19) It suffices, however, to place yourself face-to-face with someone else to realize that the asymmetry assumed by Levinas is self-refuting. If you and I are standing in front of each other, who is the other? The answer can only be doubly affirmative since "the other" is an interchangeable term that shifts referent depending on who pronounces the words. I am an other for the other and vice versa, as Derrida reinforces in "Violence and Metaphysics." Derrida's argument not only contradicts Levinas's idea of the absolutely Other, but also undercuts his rhetoric. That "the other" is a reversible term means that all of Levinas's ethical declarations can be read against themselves. To say that the I should subject itself to the other is at the same time to say that the other should subject itself to the I, since I am a you and you are an I when we are others for each other. To condemn the self-love of the I is by the same token to condemn the self-love of the other. Indeed, whoever advocates a Levinasian ethics will be confronted with a merciless irony as soon as he or she comes up to someone else and face-to-face declares, "You should subject yourself to the Other," which then literally means, "You should subject yourself to Me, you should obey My law."

# 2nc

## T

### 2nc – at: haas

####  “Incentives” are appeasement

Stern 6 (Martin, University of Maryland Graduate, Debunking detente, 11/27/06, http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article\_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe-5d08bfff6e08.html)

Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy. If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.

#### Appeasement is resolving grievances, diffusing secondary threats, or buying time – includes removing restrictions

Barros et. al 9 (Andrew, Associate Professor of History at the University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada, Debating British Decisionmaking toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s, 2009, <http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/2009%20IS%201930s%20correspondence.pdf>)

Conventional definitions of appeasement generally emphasize the use of concessions to satisfy the adversary’s grievances, reduce tensions, and avoid war for the foreseeable future. We argued that these definitions narrowly equate appeasement with the dominant interpretation of British and French appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s and neglect other forms of appeasement. They also fail to distinguish appeasement from other influence strategies involving concessions. These concerns led us to propose an alternative definition of appeasement as “a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical concessions in response to a threat, with the aim of avoiding war, at least in the short term” (p. 154). We then distinguished three different types of appeasement strategies, based on the goals and expectations of the appeaser: (1) “resolving grievances” to create a lasting peace; (2) “diffusing secondary threats” to focus on a primary threat—by conserving resources, denying the primary adversary an important ally, or perhaps redirecting the hostility of the secondary threat toward the primary threat; and (3) “buying time” to prepare for (and perhaps deter) a possible military confrontation by rearming or securing allies. We used this typology to distinguish our buying-time interpretation of British appeasement policy toward Nazi Germany from a standard resolving grievances interpretation.

#### Engagement and appeasement are distinct

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)

Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

### 2nc –Resnick

#### The plan is cultural engagement which is distinct

Resnick 1 (Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco | Danco)

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.¶ Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.¶ A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.28¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Hass says - promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

#### The plan is exchange of people – their evidence is creatively highlighted – they don’t meet

Sullivan 12 (Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances,” CRS Report for Congress RL31139, 11-9-2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31139.pdf)

Overview of the U.S. Restrictions¶ Since the United States imposed a comprehensive trade embargo against Cuba in the early 1960s,¶ there have been numerous policy changes to restrictions on travel to Cuba. The embargo¶ regulations do not ban travel itself, but place restrictions on any financial transactions related to¶ travel to Cuba, which effectively result in a travel ban. Accordingly, from 1963 until 1977, travel¶ to Cuba was effectively banned under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) issued by¶ the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to implement the embargo.¶ In 1977, the Carter Administration made changes to the regulations that essentially lifted the¶ travel ban. In 1982, the Reagan Administration made other changes to the CACR that once again¶ restricted travel to Cuba, but allowed for travel-related transactions by certain categories of¶ travelers. Under the Clinton Administration, there were several changes to the Treasury¶ Department regulations, with some at first tightening the restrictions, and others later loosening¶ the restrictions.¶ Under the George W. Bush Administration, the travel regulations were tightened significantly,¶ with additional restrictions on family visits, educational travel, and travel for those involved in¶ amateur and semi-professional international sports federation competitions. In addition, the¶ categories of fully-hosted travel and people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to¶ academic coursework were eliminated as permissible travel to Cuba. The Bush Administration¶ also cracked down on those traveling to Cuba illegally, further restricted religious travel by¶ changing licensing guidelines for such travel, and suspended the licenses of several travel service¶ providers in Florida for license violations.¶ Under the Obama Administration, Congress took action in March 2009 (P.L. 111-8) to ease[d]¶ restrictions on travel by Cuban Americans to visit their family in Cuba and on travel related to the¶ marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. In April 2009, President Obama¶ went even further by announcing that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family¶ members in Cuba would be lifted, and on September 3, 2009, the Treasury Department issued¶ regulations implementing these policy changes. In January 2011, President Obama took further¶ action to ease[d] restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba by providing new general licenses for¶ travel involving educational and religious activities and restoring a specific license authorizing¶ travel for people-to-people exchanges. The Administration also restored a general license for any¶ U.S. person to send remittances to Cuba (up to $500 per quarter) and created a general license for¶ remittances to religious organizations. Finally, the Administration also expanded the U.S. airports¶ eligible to provide services to flights to and from Cuba. In most respects, with the exception of¶ the expansion of eligible airports, these new measures appear to be similar to policies that were¶ undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1999 but were subsequently curtailed by the Bush¶ Administration in 2003 and 2004.¶ The President has the authority to ease restrictions on travel to Cuba. For example, the President¶ could choose to authorize travel to Cuba under a general license for all eligible categories of¶ travel. Lifting all the restrictions on travel, however, would require legislative action. This is¶ because of the codification of the embargo in Section 102(h) of the Cuban Liberty and¶ Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114); that act conditions the lifting of the embargo,¶ including the travel restrictions, on the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions in Cuba.¶ Although the Administration retains flexibility through licensing authority to ease travel¶ restrictions, the President may not lift all restrictions on travel as set forth in the CACR.¶ Moreover, a provision in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000¶ (§910(b) of P.L. 106-387, Title IX) prevents the Administration from licensing travel for tourist¶ activities, and defines such activities as any activity not expressly authorized in the 12 broad¶ categories of travel set forth in the CACR regulations. This legislative provision essentially¶ circumscribes the authority of the executive branch to issue travel licenses for activities beyond¶ the broad categories of travel allowed, and would have to be amended, superseded by new¶ legislation, or repealed in order to expand categories of travel to Cuba or lift travel restrictions¶ altogether.

### 2nc - reasonability

**Reasonability is arbitrary – it’s impossible to determine what is “reasonable” because it differs from judge to judge forcing judge intervention – we have evidentiary support**

**Stone 1923** — Justice in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit [Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 F. 597; 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2531; 34 A.L.R. 249, No. 6192; No. 6193, Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, December 5, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis]

Where the use of land affects others, the use must be "reasonable" to escape liability for resultant damage to others. What is "reasonable" depends upon a variety of considerations and circumstances. It is an elastic term which is of uncertain value in a definition. It has been well said that "reasonable," means with regard to all the interest affected, his own and his neighbor's and also having in view public policy. But, elastic as this rule is, both reason and authority have declared certain limitations beyond which it cannot extend. One of these limitations is that it is "unreasonable" and unlawful for one owner to physically invade the land of another owner. There can be no damnum absque injuria where there is such a trespass.

**Reasonability is arbitrary and undermines research and preparation**

**Resnick 01**, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University,

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## CP

#### The Counterplans Explicit Restriction is Key to Call Attention to it

Miami Herald 2013 3/17 How Cuba became the newest hotbed for tourists craving sex with minors

http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/16/3289971/how-cuba-became-the-newest-hotbed.html#storylink=cpy

But the government’s news monopoly has published almost nothing on underage prostitution. Cuban diplomats in Washington did not respond to requests for comment on this story.¶ “They treat this issue as a matter of revolutionary purity,” Garcia said.¶ Former ruler Fidel Castro cracked down on prostitution after he seized power in 1959, and boasted his country was no longer a U.S. brothel. But the sex market blossomed again after Moscow cut off its subsidies and plunged the island into crisis in the early 1990s.¶ Cuba’s response was to throw its doors open to mass tourism. Travel agencies made no bones about the island’s attractions: white sand beaches, cheap prices, hot weather and dark-skinned women.¶ A Spanish airline advertisement for travel to Cuba showed two black women in bikinis with a white baby who sang, “mulatas … take me to my crib.” Complaints from a Spanish consumer group forced the airline to pull the ad.¶ But Cuban officials never complained publicly about the ad, and Castro himself seemed to accept sex tourism in a 1992 speech.¶ Cuban women are not “forced to sell themselves to a man, to a foreigner, to a tourist. Those who do so do …without any need for it,” he declared. “We can say that they are highly educated hookers and quite healthy, because we are the country with the lowest numbers of AIDS cases…Therefore, there is truly no prostitution healthier than Cuba’s.”¶ A SHOCKING DEATH¶ One State Department dispatch on underage prostitution in Cuba from 2009, also made public by Wikileaks, lists the following “Recommendations for Cuba.”¶ “Acknowledge that child sex trafficking … is a problem; provide greater legal protections and assistance for victims; develop procedures to identify possible trafficking victims among vulnerable populations; increase anti-trafficking training for law enforcement; and, take greater steps to prevent the trafficking of children in prostitution.”¶ That advice has clearly fallen on deaf ears, and Raúl Castro, who succeeded ailing brother Fidel in 2008, continues to officially say nothing about the sex predators among the more than two million tourists who visit the island each year.

#### sex industry currently operates causes heterosexism and racism

Brents, Sociology Prof @ UNLV, and Hausbeck, senior associate dean in the UNLV graduate college, 01 (Barbara and Kathryn, , “STATE-SANCTIONED SEX: NEGOTIATING FORMAL AND INFORMAL REGULATORY PRACTICES IN NEVADA BROTHELS”, Sociological Perspectives)

Formal restrictions on workers focus on limiting the age and even sex of workers and customers. These reflect traditional sexual norms about the sexual needs and abilities of men, the availability of women, and the enforcement of het­erosexual relations.For many years men were forbidden from working in the brothels at all**.** The justification given to us was that community leaders wanted to protect women from men who would undoubtedly seek free sex from the working girls**. Unfortu­nately,** one of the major complaints from the working women is that too many male owners do seek to take advantage of the women's services**.** The two or three offenders are well known among the prostitutes, and most seasoned women avoid these houses. Nonetheless,most counties have changed the rules prohibiting male owners, managers, and bartenders**.** A few counties still have rules forbidding men from residing on the premises, including maintenance or security guards. Other rules dictate that no men, other than customers, are allowed on the premises except for repairmen, and they must leave before 5:00 p.m. Wells specifies that all security guards must be female.Many brothels prohibit nonworking women from entering. Brothel owners con­sistently justified this by saying they feared irrate wives or irrational girlfriends constituted a serious hazard for potential customers.While some said it was local law, the only codified version of this was Elko's rule that it is unlawful for anyone who is not an owner, employee, potential customer, or medical or city employee to enter a brothel**.** This is interpreted and enforced at will, at the discretion of management and owners. In every county except Storey and Mineral, brothel prostitutes must be twenty-one. Customers must be at least eighteen in Churchill, Carlin, and Mineral Coun­ties, and they must be twenty-one in the rest**.** All counties require prostitutes to get work cards. These are the same cards issued to hotel and casino employees. Work cards are issued by either the county sheriff's offices or the city police departments. They often require minimal back­ground checks and a small fee and must be renewed periodically. Importantly, the registration procedure is therefore not distinguishable from that for other workers and serves to protect the privacy of prostitutes. We know of no recent incidents in which work cards were denied to women who passed their health tests and wanted to work in a brothel. Beyondthis, most other regulations regarding the sex of workers or customers are imposed by brothel owners themselves and reflect community norms that clearly reproduce heterosexual privilege. This is manifested in two ways: first, owners hire women prostitutes only; and second, customers can only be men, although some brothels allow a male and female couple to purchase services together.When asked why there were no male prostitutes, the most common answer was that it would not be profitable. "Women can get it free at any bar, why would they pay?" One local official joked with us, "As Beverly down at the Cot­tontail used to say, she just never met a man that could put in an eight hour shift." Finally**,** most owners acknowledged that the only profitable customer base is men, and local governments would absolutely not tolerate male homosexual services being offered in the brothels. The restrictions against homosexuality also extend to patriarchal interpretations of lesbian sex.One owner justified the lack of female customers of women prostitutes this way, "There are certain technical reasons why the ladies don't often party with other women, and that's because it is very difficult to check another woman for diseases." At the same time**,** some brothels typically do not allow women to purchase services without a man being part of the "party." However, most all the brothels offer male customers the option to "party" with two or more of their own house prostitutes. There are also informal racial norms. There are far more women of color work­ing as prostitutes than there are customers of color. This pattern reflects the stereo­types of the availability of women of color and the taboo against men taking white women. Some of the women reported discriminatory practices among the prostitutes. For example: "I know some girls that won't do black guys . . . they're like, 'because you've got a whole bar full of cowboys that are white, they might not want you because you were just with a black guy. " There appears to be much more racism against black men than Hispanic or Asian men. This reflects the racial composition of northern Nevada and the accompanying racist attitudes. The politics of sexuality imposes restrictions on workers and customers alike, and brothel owners are motivated by the need to maintain a conservative, tradi­tional, noncontroversial profile in their communities. The patchwork of formal and informal, state and local regulations governing the structure of the brothel industry results in the always tenuous nature of brothel businesses, which reflects the most traditional and restrictive sexual stereotypes and norms and racial ste­reotypes. This is further evidenced by the role of local police and sheriff's depart­ments in the regulation and operation of brothels.

# 1nr

### Overview

#### Understanding the fynction of the government is critical to reshape the partisanship surrounding the way that the public sphere understands immigration policy

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 97-8

In contrast to "deliberation," which means "the thoughtful consider­ation of alternative courses of action,"1 we might think of "partisan­ship" as "struggle to enact a fixed course of action." So defined, the differences between deliberation and partisanship are as obvious as they are profound: deliberation requires openness and the cooperative exercise of the intellect; partisanship presumes closure and involves the factional exercise of rhetorical manipulation or raw power. As a general rule, it also follows that deliberative democracy will flourish in inverse proportion to partisanship. For this reason deliberative democrats need a strategy for eliminating (or at least containing) par­tisanship. This paper advances such a strategy, a strategy which I recommend based on a critique of the two alternatives that have for some time dominated thinking in this area. The first of these alterna­tives is advanced by a wide-range of participatory democrats. On their view, partisanship can not only be contained, but also perhaps elimi­nated altogether, by having would-be partisans confront one another in public decision-making bodies. The participatory strategy ultimately rests on the belief that all partisan conflict is susceptible to transforma­tion as long as partisanship is confronted directly. Indeed, the partici­patory strategy for dealing with partisanship enjoins two sorts of confrontation: confrontation among citizens and confrontation with an actual decision. The second alternative strategy for dealing with parti­sanship that I examine here, no less well known, is Madisonian. Its strategy for limiting partisanship is in many ways the mirror image ofthat proposed by participatory democrats. Where the participatory strategy puts its faith in confrontation, the Madisonian strategy puts its faith in separation—again of two sorts. For the Madisonian, the worst effects of partisanship can be contained by first separating citi­zens from the actual task of decision-making and then by institution­alizing separate sources of decision-making power.Although I believe there is something to be learned from both the participatory and the Madisonian strategies for dealing with par­tisanship, I end up rejecting both of them in favor of an alternative which weds Madisonian institutional insights to participatory demo­crats' concern with the individual citizen. I argue that the best way to limit the unavoidable influence of partisanship is to confine par­tisan maneuvering to the latter stages of decision making and policy formation. I conclude that both distance and proximity can be made to serve the ends of deliberative democracy, that, indeed, distance and proximity must be combined in any effective strategy for limit­ing partisanship. That deliberation and partisanship are mutually exclusive does not seem particularly controversial. Deliberation is a process of weighing alternative courses of action. Partisanship is the exercise of power on behalf of a chosen course of action. Especially when viewed in the context of democratic politics, deliberation and partisanship thus seem irreconcilable. First, and most obviously, deliberation involves weigh­ing alternatives; partisanship involves coercion, negotiation, or, in its most discursive form, rhetorical manipulation. Second, deliberation requires balancing or adjudicating between a plurality of views; par­tisanship presupposes that one view has been judged superior (or advantageous). Third, deliberation requires only an opposing view­point; partisanship requires an opponent

### 2nc – value to life module

**The denial of a pathway to citizenship institutionalizes a second-class non-citizenship where immigrants are treated as labor not humans – this creates unending human misery and pathologies associated with “living in the shadows”**

**The Atlantic 1-17**-2013 [“Reform Immigration, but Don't Create Second-Class Non-Citizens” <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/reform-immigration-but-dont-create-second-class-non-citizens/267277/>]

Immigration still divides the Republican Party. Its restrictionist wing occasionally gets riled up and flexes its muscles, inspiring politicians like Joe Arpaio and Tom Tancredo to seize upon the issue. But the fervor always dies down, advisers like Karl Rove reassert the importance of the Hispanic vote, and presidential aspirants -- George W. Bush and John McCain during the aughts, Marco Rubio and Paul Ryan today -- start talking about "comprehensive immigration reform," a term also embraced by liberals looking for a bipartisan deal. The business community would get a guest-worker program. Illegal immigrants would get a "path to citizenship." Restrictionists would theoretically get better border enforcement than there is today.¶ It isn't a deal that I like. ¶ I'm all for more legal immigration, especially for highly skilled workers, and I want people who sneaked into the United States, worked or studied, and committed no crimes to get citizenship. ¶ But a guest-worker program? ¶ I'd rather permit more new citizens to come here permanently, as prospective citizens, than to institutionalize a sort of second-class non-citizenship that treats people as labor. I am here today, along with most of the restrictionists in America, because the legislators of bygone decades permitted waves of immigrants to come here legally (and not as guest workers, either -- as full citizens). When I read deep into New York City history about the crowded tenements, street gangs, ethnic machine politics, and disease outbreaks associated with the waves of European immigration, and then hear people who are far less affected complaining bitterly today about (and this is a thing) having to press one for English, I wonder, as the tiniest violins play, if they ever stop to reflect that they wouldn't be here if bygone generations were as restrictionist as they are. ¶ That isn't to say that immigration today, legal and illegal, doesn't have costs in addition to its benefits. For example, it makes economic competition tougher for Americans without high-school diplomas. There are still immigrant gangs. And kids who grow up in non-English-speaking homes impose higher costs on public schools. I feel for Americans who are made worse off as a result, but they were lucky enough to be born in one of the world's richest countries, and the fact that immigration makes them a bit worse off isn't a reason to stop it given that (1) it makes many Americans better off and (2) it makes the immigrants themselves a lot better off. ¶ Crime is down. And while it's tough to face increased wage competition in America, it's not nearly so tough as knowing that your family is unable to escape a country that'll consign you and your children to suffering and poverty. ¶ So anyway, Rubio and Ryan are speaking up in favor of "comprehensive immigration reform," and Mark Krikorian, National Review's resident restrictionist, doesn't like it. This is partly because he doesn't believe the "tougher border enforcement" piece of the compromise is actually going to happen. Well, let's be honest, he's probably right -- I don't think immigration enforcement is likely to get much better than it is now. And yet he is wrong, too. Here's how he puts it:¶ There's one central question that Rubio and Ryan need to be asked: Do they trust President Obama to enforce the immigration laws in the future, after today's illegals have been legalized? If they answer "yes," then they need to explain why they think he'd suddenly become committed to enforcement after four years of downgrading immigration law enforcement, and more generally acting as though the U.S. Code were a body of suggestions rather than laws. ¶ This is written as if Obama has been an especially unreliable president on border enforcement. As best I can tell, that isn't true. Here's how Politifact sums up his tenure thus far: ¶ According to current figures from Immigration and Customs Enforcement -- the federal agency responsible for deportations -- Obama has removed 1.4 million people during his 42 months in office so far. Technically, that's fewer than under George W. Bush, whose cumulative total was 2 million. But Bush's number covers eight full years, which doesn't allow an apples-to-apples comparison. If you instead compare the two presidents' monthly averages, it works out to 32,886 for Obama and 20,964 for Bush, putting Obama clearly in the lead. Bill Clinton is far behind with 869,676 total and 9,059 per month. All previous occupants of the White House going back to 1892 fell well short of the level of the three most recent presidents.¶ In what sense has Obama presided over "four years of downgrading immigration law enforcement"? It's Obama's record-breaking deportations that make me think restrictionists have nothing to gain from "comprehensive immigration reform." The "amnesty for tougher enforcement" compromise doesn't make sense if you're someone for whom tougher enforcement is the draw. Personally, I think you'd substantially decrease both human misery and the pathologies associated with "living in the shadows" if a "path to citizenship" were passed. Krikorian won't go along with that because he's worried it'll lead to "another 11 million illegal aliens a few years down the road." Given economic conditions in the U.S. and Mexico, which I take to be the main factors influencing immigration, I doubt he's right. We ought to be able to pass an immigration-reform bill that improves on the status quo.¶ Restrictionists can take solace in the fact that if amnesty happens, there might not be more immigrants, just fewer people breaking the law. Or maybe they'll manage to get riled up as in years past and stop "comprehensive reform." But I doubt Rubio and Ryan are betting on the side that winds up losing this fight.

### Top Level Links – 2nc

#### Obama can’t even shake Raul’s hand without drawing controversy

Terbush 12/10- Staff Writer for The Week (“Yes, Obama and Raul Castro shook hands. No, you shouldn't freak out about it., December 10, 2013 http://theweek.com/article/index/253909/yes-obama-and-raul-castro-shook-hands-no-you-shouldnt-freak-out-about-it\\CLans)

Over at National Review, Mona Charen wrote that the handshake "makes the stomach turn" and that "the nature of the Cuban regime should be enough to cause our president to find some way to avoid a handshake." "Shameful day to be an American," she added. Meanwhile, Fox News spent a chunk of time discussing the handshake, with anchor Bill Hemmer saying an unnamed fellow journalist told him it "would not have been in the spirit of Mandela, it would have been disrespectful to the spirit of Mandela." (It should be noted that Mandela was not only a great conciliator, but a huge fan of the Castros.) On the congressional front, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) piled on, saying, "If [Obama] was going to shake his hand, he should have asked him about those basic freedoms Mandela was associated with that are denied in Cuba." And Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) made sure at least someone trotted out a Nazi reference. "Neville Chamberlain shook hands with Hitler," he warned. The outrage, of course, was predictable in the hyperpartisan atmosphere that dominates Washington. That said, the idea that the president should avoid this most basic form of decorum is absurd. Presidents routinely shake hands with world leaders with whom they disagree. To wit, here's a sampling of pictures of Republican presidents doing just that. That's because handshakes are a purely ceremonial act that don't in themselves represent official government policy. "Unlike in the case of, say, sanctions, handshakes are purely symbolic," wrote The New Republic's Isaac Chotiner, adding that "no American president, including Obama, will consistently shun unsavory world leaders." The same goes for members of Congress. Consider McCain, who infamously tweeted about his pleasant experience meeting former Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi. In fairness to McCain, he didn't say anything about shaking Gadhafi's hand, so who knows, maybe he drew the line there. Handshakes are a mere civility. But from all the outrage, you'd think Obama had sealed a deal to give Florida to Cuba.

#### Plan saps PC- seen as appeasement

Bloomberg News 12/15 (“Obama Needs More Than a Handshake With Cuba”, December 15, 2013 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-15/obama-needs-more-than-a-handshake-with-cuba.html\\CLans)

President Barack Obama’s handshake with Cuban president Raul Castro at Nelson Mandela’s memorial service last week has fed both hopes and fears that the half-century freeze between the U.S. and Cuba is about to thaw. Don’t light up the Cohibas just yet. Obama’s largely meaningless courtesy was accompanied by a more relevant bit of meaningless theater: Republican Senator Ted Cruz’s walkout on Castro’s speech. Obama has done little to fix the U.S.’s failed Cuba policy. Yet Congress’s bitter-enders remain determined -- and able -- to defend an embargo that hurts U.S. interests and undermines its values. Last month, Obama went to Miami and wisely told a gathering of Cuban-Americans that U.S. policy toward their homeland “doesn’t make sense.” Yet his administration’s easing of restrictions on travel and commerce has basically just restored the status quo under Bill Clinton’s administration, before George W. Bush clamped down from 2001 to 2009. Obama could do much more before bumping up against the limits to his executive authority set by Congress, which has made the dismantlement of the U.S. embargo on Cuba contingent on significant progress toward democratic governance. The argument against Obama doing so is that Cuba remains a repressive regime. As Obama shook Castro’s hand, for instance, Cuban security forces were beating and arresting dozens of activists for celebrating International Human Rights Day. Although Castro’s regime has instituted some noteworthy economic reforms, its detention and harassment of dissidents increased last year.

### Iran Thumper

Finkel 14 (David Finkel, editor of Against the Current, sponsor of New Politics, “Will the Iran Deal Hold?” ATC, #168, Jan/Feb 2014, http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/node/4058)

BASIS OF POLITICAL AGREEMENT As amended in 2013. We oppose the capitalist system and its destructive impact on humanity and the planet. Another world is possible, socialism: a system that is democratic, international, and ecologically sustainable. Our strategic goal is revolution‒led by the working class and oppressed‒that shatters the foundations of patriarchy, white supremacy, settler-colonialism, and capitalist rule. In the labor and social movements, we call for political independence and a break from the two-party system. We see organized labor as a central part of the working class movement; within it we organize for greater solidarity, internationalism, democracy, and militancy. We fight against all forms of racism and support the right of self-determination against national/racial oppression. We are a feminist organization that fights for the liberation of all women. We fight against homophobia, heterosexism, and the compulsory gender binary and support sexual and gender self-determination for all people. We are internationalists: we oppose the imperialist domination of the world by the United States and other rich countries. United by these principles, we are committed to building an organization of socialist activists and a broader anti-capitalist movement within the borders of the United States.

### AT: No PC

#### State of the Union address will generate PC

A. State of the Union Speech sufficient for the President to gain PC necessary

James Hohmann, national political reporter for POLITICO, 1/1/14 (“As D.C. turns: 14 dates to watch in 2014”, Politico)

The president said in his most recent news conference that “2014 needs to be a year of action.” He will flesh out what that means during his State of the Union speech.¶ Obama becomes more of a lame duck with each annual update to Congress, and, faced with strong Republican opposition, it’s likely many of the priorities he outlines will go nowhere. Still, the State of the Union is an important platform for any president, and this is a chance for Obama to convey how much of his diminishing political capital he will invest in pursuing immigration reform, making the health care law work and other priorities.¶ Whatever he says will be the Democratic rallying cry for the months ahead.

### AT: Lame Duck

#### Unique Window Now

A. Now is key because in June legislators won’t do anything because they are so focused on getting reelected

Fox News 12/27 December 27, 2013 President Obama Eyes Immigration Reform As A Top Priority For 2014 http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/12/27/president-obama-eyes-immigration-reform-as-top-priority-for-2014

"There's a fresh year, but it's not as good as being re-elected. Obama is starting from a rough position, and the clock is already short," said Julian Zelizer, a presidential historian at Princeton University. "By June or July, most legislators are focused on getting re-elected, and it's very hard to get them to do anything at that point."

## Impacts

### 2nc – unions module (v2l)

#### And, comprehensive immigration reform is critical to unions

**Sarlin 13**(Benjy Sarlin, 2013, Talking Points Memo, January 14, 2013, <http://bit.ly/YtDOzS>)

Eliseo Medina, secretary treasurer of the Service Employees International Union and labor’s point man on immigration, has been waiting decades for a moment like this one. “I think we get it this year,” a smiling Medina told TPM in his office in Washington. “And if we don’t, the discussion won’t be about whether it’s coming afterwards, just what it will look like and when.” Over his long career, Medina’s witnessed dozens of promising immigration reform efforts, only to see them countered just as often by a restrictionist backlashes — backlashes that sometimes included support from unions. But everything seems to be coming together at the right time in 2013, with a broad coalition of labor, business, religious leaders, Latino groups, and even some prominent Republicans demanding immediate action. With victory in sight, SEIU is committing the full force of its 2.1 million members to pushing comprehensive reform in 2013, with plans for rallies around the country, education campaigns for members, and an inside game aimed at lobbying lawmakers in Washington towards a final vote. The AFL-CIO, the nation’s largest federation of unions, is on board as well; and the two sometimes rival groups are united around a common set of policy principles after splitting on President George W. Bush’s failed immigration effort. Both organizations identify passing a bill that includes a path to citizenship for the undocumented population as one of their absolute top priorities for the 113th Congress. “The inequality created by our current immigration system is having a deeper effect on our society then anything we’ve seen in recent history,” Ana Avendaño, director of the AFL-CIO’s director of immigration and community action, told TPM. “We have 11.5 million people who really are not benefitting from the hard fought gains that the labor movement and other social movements have accomplished in this country.” **For labor, the debate may be more than just a policy question, but an existential one**. Union membership has cratered in recent decades for reasons ranging from the collapse of the manufacturing sector to improved tactics by business to discourage workers from organizing. To reverse this trend, labor bet big in 2008 on card check legislation that would make it easier to form a union, but that bill languished in Congress — even with 60 Democratic senators. Outside of Washington, things only grew more dire as Republican governors enacted right to work legislation and looked to limit collective bargaining rights in states like Michigan and Wisconsin. Under pressure from all sides, immigration reform may be labor’s last, best chance at major legislative gains under Obama. Leaders are counting on a comprehensive reform bill to **boost living standards** for low-wage workers currently vulnerable to exploitation, **spur recruitment** in growing industries, **and bank goodwill** with both union members and the public at large.

#### And, strong unions are key to check devaluation of life and annihilates society

**Munck 10,**theme leader for institutionalisation, interculturalism and development at Dublin City University in Ireland and visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Liverpool [Ronaldo, “Globalisation, labour and development: a view from the South,” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa Number 72/73, 2010, project muse]

Polanyi goes further than Marx to argue that 'labour power' is but an 'alleged commodity' precisely because it 'cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity' (Polanyi 2001:76). This is more than a moral critique of capitalism, however, because Polanyi goes on to argue that **trade unions**, for example, should be quite clear that their **purpose is precisely 'that of** interfering with the laws of supply and demand **in respect of human labour**, and **removing it from the orbit of the market'** (Polanyi 2001:186). **Any** move from within society to remove any element from the market (**'decommodification') thus challenges the market economy in its fundamentals.**The self-regulation orself-adjusting market was, for Polanyi, a 'stark-utopia' in the sense that it could not be achieved: 'Such an institution **could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society**; **it would have physically destroyed** **[hu]man** **[ity]** **and transformed** **his** **[or her] surroundings into a wilderness'** (Polanyi 2001:3). In modern terminology, the self-regulating market was **neither socially nor environmentally sustainable**. Neo-liberals today have developed a similarly fundamentalist discourse based on the 'magic of the market'. Central to this identity is the notion that government interference in economic affairs must be reversed and that the individual market agent or 'entrepreneur' should be given a free hand. In this grand schema society does not exist and nature is seen simply [End Page 211] as a factor of production. This market system and the associated laissez-faire ideology 'created the delusion of economic determinism' (Polanyi 1947:143).