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## Politics

#### CIR Will Pass Now – Obama Has the PC and Hes Pushing IT

By: Reid J. Epstein October 17, 2013 Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00B694F1-5D59-4D13-B6D1-FC437A465923

President Barack Obama made his plans for his newly won political capital official — he’s going to hammer House Republicans on immigration.¶ And it’s evident from his public and private statements that Obama’s latest immigration push is, in at least one respect, similar to his fiscal showdown strategy: yet again, the goal is to boost public pressure on House Republican leadership to call a vote on a Senate-passed measure.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do,” Obama said Thursday at the White House. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can and should get done by the end of this year.”¶ (WATCH: Assessing the government shutdown's damage)¶ And yet Obama spent the bulk of his 20-minute address taking whack after whack at the same House Republicans he’ll need to pass that agenda, culminating in a jab at the GOP over the results of the 2012 election — and a dare to do better next time.¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position,” Obama said. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building. That’s not being faithful to what this country’s about.”¶ Before the shutdown, the White House had planned a major immigration push for the first week in October. But with the shutdown and looming debt default dominating the discussion during the last month, immigration reform received little attention on the Hill.¶ (PHOTOS: Immigration reform rally on the National Mall)¶ Immigration reform allies, including Obama’s political arm, Organizing for Action, conducted a series of events for the weekend of Oct. 5, most of which received little attention in Washington due to the the shutdown drama. But activists remained engaged, with Dream Act supporters staging a march up Constitution Avenue, past the Capitol to the Supreme Court Tuesday, to little notice of the Congress inside.¶ Obama first personally signaled his intention to re-emerge in the immigration debate during an interview Tuesday with the Los Angeles Univision affiliate, conducted four hours before his meeting that day with House Democrats.¶ Speaking of the week’s fiscal landmines, Obama said: “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.”¶ (Also on POLITICO: GOP blame game: Who lost the government shutdown?)¶ When he met that afternoon in the Oval Office with the House Democratic leadership, Obama said that he planned to be personally engaged in selling the reform package he first introduced in a Las Vegas speech in January.¶ Still, during that meeting, Obama knew so little about immigration reform’s status in the House that he had to ask Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) how many members of his own party would back a comprehensive reform bill, according to a senior Democrat who attended.¶ The White House doesn’t have plans yet for Obama to participate in any new immigration reform events or rallies — that sort of advance work has been hamstrung by the 16-day government shutdown.¶ But the president emerged on Thursday to tout a “broad coalition across America” that supports immigration reform. He also invited House Republicans to add their input specifically to the Senate bill — an approach diametrically different than the House GOP’s announced strategy of breaking the reform into several smaller bills.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney echoed Obama’s remarks Thursday, again using for the same language on immigration the White House used to press Republicans on the budget during the shutdown standoff: the claim that there are enough votes in the House to pass the Senate’s bill now, if only it could come to a vote.¶ “When it comes to immigration reform … we’re confident that if that bill that passed the Senate were put on the floor of the House today, it would win a majority of the House,” Carney said. “And I think that it would win significant Republican votes.”

**Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive**

**Wilson 13** – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, **the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make**: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . **Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.**

**Increasing green cards generates an effective base of IT experts- solves cybersecurity**

**McLarty 9** (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, **when you look at the** table of the **top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors**, at least 15 of those **are** IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but **it's developed overseas** by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States. **We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly** noteworthy **attacks** here **very recently**. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. **Was there any discussion** or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security **things about what can be done to** try to **generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the U**nited **S**tates, **many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions**, academic institutions **from overseas and** often **returning back? This** potentially **puts us at a competitive disadvantage** going forward. MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, **clearly we have less talented students here studying** -- or put another way, more **talented students** studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really **have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances**, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and **I** kind of **like** Dr. Land's approach of **the green card being handed to them** or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, **that's** **going to strengthen**, I think, our system, **our security needs**.

#### Cyberterrorism will cause accidental launch that triggers the Dead Hand and nuclear war

Fritz 9 (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)
*Direct control of launch*
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted **a Pentagon review**, which **showed a potential** “electronic back door into the **US** Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders **to Trident submarines”** (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could **potentially** infiltrate **this network** and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its **details and potential** exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge **of the operating system** may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception **that** could **subsequently** be used to initiate **a** launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also **be used to** engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand**,** was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike **against Soviet leadership** and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add **pressure** to the decision making process, and **if coordinated precisely, could** appear as a **first round** EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also **attempt to** launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, **in an attempt** to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ \*\*[they cut off the paragraph]\*\* “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

## Counterplan

#### The United States Secretary of State should order that the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review be modified to include prioritization of substantially implementing a multi-year Medicare pilot program with Mexico to provide Medicare coverage to American citizens in Mexico. The United States federal government should implement the Review’s recommendations including any modifications to implementation. We’ll clarify.

This is the year for Kerry to decide whether or not to do a second QDDR; it’s not normal means and offers a chance to change policy without legislation.

Norris 13

John Norris, *Foreign* Policy, executive director of the Sustainable Security program at the Center for American Progress, 8/20/2013 “Foggy Bottom Review,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/20/foggy\_bottom\_review\_john\_kerry\_qddr

When he was a senator, he loved it so much that he thought it should be mandatory. But as secretary of state, will he be so sure?¶ I am referring, of course, to Secretary of State John Kerry and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, or QDDR.¶ A bit of history is in order. The QDDR is the grand strategic review of how America conducts its diplomacy and development through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The QDDR mimics the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, through which the Pentagon assesses its key strategies, programs, and resources every four years.¶ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, eager to put the State Department on more equal footing with the Department of Defense, announced the first-ever QDDR in July 2009. Clinton, who had grown familiar with the QDR process as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, argued that the QDDR would be the very epitome of "smart power," and would "help make our diplomacy and development work more agile, responsive, and complimentary."¶ Clinton recognized, as did many of her predecessors, that the architecture of America's diplomacy was more retro than modern, and the QDDR offered the promise of pushing through major reforms and presenting a policy vision without needing to get legislation approved.¶ But it also required a gestation period just shy of most elephants', taking 17 months to complete. During those 17 months, hardly a week went by when outsiders weren't told that the QDDR would be arriving "soon." As Josh Rogin noted in these same pages, the QDDR was first planned for release in March 2010 and then April 2010 and then September 2010, before it was finally released in December of that year. The actual QDDR report was a sprawling, but largely reasonable, document, and its findings would have generated an even warmer welcome if they had been delivered without such a lengthy wait. The Pentagon usually takes about half as much time to conducts its QDR, so the repeated delays gave the impression that the State Department had bit off more than it could chew.¶ Now, the speculation has begun as to whether or not Kerry will conduct the second-ever QDDR. Most think he probably will, but no official announcement has been made. For his part, Kerry almost has to lead a QDDR or else face an embarrassing climb down from his prior positions.¶ When Kerry was still in the Senate in 2012, he joined Sens. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ben Cardin (D-MD) in introducing legislation that would have made the QDDR mandatory. Although the bill did not pass, it would be difficult for Kerry to explain why he insisted on a QDDR from Capitol Hill but resisted it from Foggy Bottom. Such evolutions do occur when officials move from one end of Constitution Ave. to the other, and views on issues like executive privilege and congressional consultation obviously change depending on where you sit. But killing the QDDR would be a particularly stark example nonetheless. Kerry may also feel pressure to complete a QDDR during his tenure because his predecessor did, and the secretary seems to feel a measure of rivalry with Clinton.

#### Avoids politics- multiple ways-

Obama doesn’t have to push,

Plan wouldn’t be implemented until after the vote on our disad,

Presenting the plan *in the QDDR* guarantees passage and avoids our politics links- allows plan to be spun as a strategic reinvestment rather than a standalone spending package- CP’s strategy is key to *sustain support for other soft power initiatives*

Burton and Lord 2011 (Brian M. and Kristin M., Bacevich Fellow and Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, Did the State Department Get the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Right?, The Washington Quarterly • 34:2 pp. 111-123, http://www.twq.com/11spring/docs/11spring\_Burton\_Lord.pdf)

Given that the QDDR identifies a number of strategic objectives and some wise investments for the future, but falls short in prioritizing and matching proposed means to ends, what is the best route forward? To implement smart reforms, the State Department and USAID will have to adopt one of three potential paths. First, if backed by a coalition of supporters in the Defense Department, corporations, and the non-profit community, State and USAID could redouble their efforts to build support for a greater investment in civilian power. While the political climate is not evidently hospitable to such an approach, it is nonetheless feasible to imagine a bipartisan coalition which would continue to invest in civilian power. If the administration chooses this alternative, which becomes less likely as candidates prepare for the 2012 presidential election, President Obama, senior administration officials, uniformed military leaders, and a coalition of other supportive voices would need to make a much clearer and more persuasive public case for diplomacy and development, explaining how the peace, goodwill, and economic prosperity they generate serve U.S. interests. Second, the State Department and USAID could circumscribe their ambitions. Given the resources allocated by Congress, it may simply not be possible to achieve all of the objectives laid out in the QDDR. If that is the case, Secretary Clinton should identify the highest priority components of the QDDR, make clear what is no longer possible, and she should be clear about the costs of such a re-alignment of resources and objectives. The State Department should not try to achieve what it knows it cannot deliver, and Congress should not hold it to a higher standard than it can possibly achieve without sufficient resources. Unless this trade-off is clear, politicians may not recognize that it is lack of resources, not just inefficiency or lack of skill, that hampers the performance of U.S. civilian agencies, and that this lack of investment holds real costs for the American people. Third, the State Department and USAID could seek creative new ways to match means to ends. Through bold leadership, streamlining operations, internal cost-cutting, and the more effective use of technology and innovative management techniques, these agencies could commit to achieving the objectives laid out in the QDDR without the prospect of significant new resources. There are many obstacles to such an approachincluding bureaucratic inertia, congressionally-imposed reporting requirements and regulations, powerful interest groups, and an organizational culture that may not be ready for sweeping changesbut these could be overcome with strong, focused leadership from Secretary Clinton. Regardless of which option the department ultimately chooses, Secretary Clinton and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah should embark on a rigorous budget reallocation exercise, akin to Secretary Gates’ recent proposal to seek internal budget efficiencies, in order to invest more in high priority modernization programs. Such an exercise at State and USAID would not only free up resources to invest in the priorities laid out in the QDDR, but also would build confidence on Capitol Hill that new resources would be spent wisely. Such an effort should include a complete review of seemingly mundane long-held business practices, such as how frequently Foreign Service Officers and their families rotate to new posts, and centralizing administration functions such as information technology and human resources, as is done in many global corporations.17

## Topicality

#### Economic engagement is structural linkage- a long term strategy for change

Mastanduno, Professor of Gov’t @ Dartmouth, 2001 (Michael,Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice, June, Paper prepared for Interdependence and Conflict, edited by Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/114249238/Economic-Engagement-Strategies-Theory-and-Practice> Accessed 7/7/13 GAL)

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

#### It also has to use positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

#### B. Violation – Effecting the economies of both states isn’t enough – engagement requires structural linkage – which means trade expansion

Sheen, 2 – associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (Seongho, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, "US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy" http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho\_sheen.pdf-http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho\_sheen.pdf) footnote 22

22 Speaking of different strategies of economic statecraft, Michael Mastanduno distinguishes: “Whereas economic warfare and a strategic embargo aim to weaken the capabilities (economic and/or military) of a target state and rely on either comprehensive or selective trade denial, linkage strategies are characterized by a reliance on some degree of trade expansion as a means to influence the behavior or policies of a target government.” In particular, he calls the unconditional positive engagement policy as a “structural linkage” strategy. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 53–58.

#### Voting issue for limits and ground --- non-economic areas are huge, overstretch research burdens and require completely different strategies --- trade and finance allow sufficient flexibility but lock-in a core mechanism for preparation

## Neolib

#### The affirmative is confined to the dominant discourse of transnational capital. The affirmative buys into a system which produces unethical policy based on the short term logic of growth. This causes economic crisis and environmental destruction

Makwana 06 (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization¶ The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this scenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the few, writes Rajesh Makwana.¶ The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global resource allocation. Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources.¶ There has been much international attention recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin America and its moral basis is now widely questioned. Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries.¶ The neoliberal experiment has failed to combat extreme poverty, has exacerbated global inequality, and is hampering international aid and development efforts. This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries.¶ Introduction ¶ After the Second World War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on their government in the US and Europe. Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and strengthened the welfare state.¶ Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy.¶ The policies were most ardently enforced in the US and Europe in the1980s during the Regan–Thatcher–Kohl era. These leaders believed that expanding the free-market and private ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and influence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives.¶ There is a consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank and WTO), and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from within many UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.¶ There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty who are most in need of financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere 0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy. (Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.)¶ Neoliberalism has also been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the income of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including China).¶ The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic disasters suffered by countries in Latin America and South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the provision of healthcare and education. They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world.¶ The dramatic economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being demonized by the US. Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger to ‘freedom and the American way of life’, Cuba has been subject to intense US political, economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and the mainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at Venezuela’s president Chavez. This over-reaction by Washington to ‘economic nationalism’ is consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past 150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USA’s main economic objective.¶ According to Maria Páez Victor:¶ “Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the region’s most vicious dictators such as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet.”¶ As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countries are forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank and IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve global business opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model.¶ So influential are corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered a Global Compact with the United Nations, the world’s foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of economic ideology, it is no coincidence that the assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same assumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy.¶ However, there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most protected in the world. Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign markets and investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infant industries. Instead economically dominant countries are ‘kicking away the ladder’ to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs.¶ The US and EU also provide huge subsidies to many sectors of industry. These devastate small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods in international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most ‘capitalist’ countries have increased their levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has increased. The requirement is to ‘do as I say, not as I do’.¶ Given the tiny proportion of individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the economy and what serves the public good is growing fast. Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the public, and the national sovereignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs.¶ Below we examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.¶ Economic Growth¶ Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty.¶ Logically, however, a model for continual financial growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each second by profit hungry corporations.¶ Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty, representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assessments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits of economic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the statistical measures employed.¶ The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause of the growing inequalities seen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are both likely causes.¶ Free Trade¶ Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low, effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development.¶ With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade.¶ The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalism that gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services, increased inequality and caused environmental destruction.¶ In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generating just 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers to the tune of £30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be.¶ The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a government’s sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential national services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework.¶ These examples represent modern free trade which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of national and global governance to further the free trade agenda.¶ Liberalization¶ The World Bank, IMF and WTO have been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied by corporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies.¶ According to neoliberal ideology, in order for international trade to be ‘free’ all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.¶ Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute financial and economic crisis in many developing countries. At the same time, foreign speculators and large financial firms make huge gains. Market liberalization poses a clear economic risk; hence the EU and US heavily protect their own markets.¶ A liberalized global market provides corporations with new resources to capitalize and new markets to exploit. Neoliberal dominance over global governance structures has enforced access to these markets. Under WTO agreements, a sovereign country cannot interfere with a corporation’s intentions to trade even if their operations go against domestic environmental and employment guidelines. Those governments that do stand up for their sovereign rights are frequently sued by corporations for loss of profit, and even loss of potential profit. Without this pressure they would have been able to stimulate domestic industry and self sufficiency, thereby reducing poverty. They would then be in a better position to compete in international markets.¶

p. 28).

#### Root cause of global environmental degradation is neoliberal drive for profit-try or die for reorganizing social relations

**Abramsky, former Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society fellow, 2010**

(Kolya, Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution: Social Struggles in the Transition to a Post-Petrol World, pg 7-9)

The stark reality is that the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global CO2emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful periods of forced economic degrowth—namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has shown that a lot of time and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly-ineffective regulatory framework to tackle climate change. Years of COPs and MOPs—the international basis for regulatory efforts— have simply proven to be hot air. And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to climate change continue to focus on promoting regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments, multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called "civil society," especially the major national and international trade unions and their federations, and NGOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued. Furthermore, they may well contribute to shoring up legitimacy, at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern countries where the effects of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on people's lives less directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level. The problem has to do with production, not regulation. The current worldwide system of production is based on endless growth and expansion, which is simply incompatible with a long term reduction in emissions and energy consumption. Despite the fact that localized and punctual moments of reduction may well still occur, the overall energy consumption and emissions of the system as a whole can only increase. All the energy-efficient technologies in the world, though undoubtedly crucial to any long term solution, cannot, on their own, square the circle by reducing the total emissions of a system whose survival is based on continual expansion. This is not to say that developing appropriate regulation is not important—it is completely essential. However, the regulatory process is very unlikely to be the driving force behind the changes, but rather a necessary facilitation process that enables wider changes. Furthermore, regulation that is strong enough to be effective is only likely to come about once wider changes in production are already underway. Energy generation and distribution plays a key role in shaping human relations. Every form of energy implies a particular organization of work and division of labor (both in general, and within the energy sector, in particular). The most significant social, economic, cultural, political, and technological transformations in history were associated with shifts in energy generation: from hunting and gathering to agriculture, from human and animal power for transport and production to wind and the steam engine, from coal to oil and nuclear fission as drivers of industry and war. All these transformations have led to increased concentration of power and wealth. And a very real possibility exists that the coming transformation in the world's energy system will result in similar shifts in power relations. But we live in interesting times. The ecological and social carrying-capacity of our planet and existing social relations are overstretched, snapping in different places. This will trigger a major change in the next few decades, but nobody knows in which direction. Consequently, the most important single factor determining the outcome of this change will be the intensity, sophistication, and creativity of grassroots social mobilization.

#### The alternative is a process of critique that challenges the ideology of capital by prioritizing human development over production

Lebowitz 07 (Michael A. Lebowitz is author of Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of the Working Class (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Build It Now: Socialism for the Twenty-First Century (Monthly Review Press, 2006), and The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development (Monthly Review Press, forthcoming in 2008). Portions of this essay were presented as “Going Beyond Survival: Making the Social Economy a Real Alternative” at the Fourth International Meeting of the Solidarity Economy, July 21–23, 2006, at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, “Venezuela: A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin America”, <http://monthlyreview.org/2007/07/01/venezuela-a-good-example-of-the-bad-left-of-latin-america>,)

What constitutes a real alternative to capitalism? I suggest that it is a society in which the explicit goal is not the growth of capital or of the material means of production but, rather, human development itself—the growth of human capacities. We can see this perspective embodied in the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela—in Article 299’s emphasis upon “ensuring overall human development,” in the declaration of Article 20 that “everyone has the right to the free development of his or her own personality,” and in the focus of Article 102 upon “developing the creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her personality in a democratic society.”¶ In these passages (which are by no means the whole of that constitution), there is the conception of a real alternative—an economy whose logic is not the logic of capital. “The social economy,” President Hugo Chávez said in September 2003, “bases its logic on the human being, on work, that is to say, on the worker and the worker’s family, that is to say, in the human being.” That social economy, he continued, does not focus on economic gain, on exchange values; rather, “the social economy generates mainly use-value.” Its purpose is “the construction of the new man, of the new woman, of the new society.”¶ These are beautiful ideas and beautiful words, but they are, of course, only ideas and words. The first set comes from a constitution and the second comes from the regular national educational seminar known as Aló Presidente. How can such ideas and words be made real? Let me suggest four preconditions for the realization of this alternative to capitalism.¶ (1) Any discussion of structural change must begin from an understanding of the existing structure—in short, from an understanding of capitalism. We need to grasp that the logic of capital, the logic in which profit rather than satisfaction of the needs of human beings is the goal, dominates both where it fosters the comparative advantage of repression and also where it accepts an increase in slave rations. (2) It is essential to attack the logic of capital ideologically. In the absence of the development of a mass understanding of the nature of capital—that capital is the result of the social labor of the collective worker—the need to survive the ravages of neoliberal and repressive policies produces only the desire for a fairer society, the search for a better share for the exploited and excluded: in short, barbarism with a human face.¶ (3) A critical aspect in the battle to go beyond capitalism is the recognition that human capacity develops only through human activity, only through what Marx understood as “revolutionary practice,” the simultaneous changing of circumstances and self-change. Real human development does not drop from the sky in the form of money to support survival or the expenditures of popular governments upon education and health. In contrast to populism, which produces people who look to the state for all answers and to leaders who promise everything, the conception which truly challenges the logic of capital in the battle of ideas is one which explicitly recognizes the centrality of self-management in the workplace and self-government in the community as the means of unleashing human potential—i.e., the idea of socialism for the twenty-first century.¶ (4) But, the idea of this socialism cannot displace real capitalism. Nor can dwarfish islands of cooperation change the world by competing successfully against capitalist corporations. You need the power to foster the new productive relations while truncating the reproduction of capitalist productive relations. You need to take the power of the state away from capital, and you need to use that power when capital responds to encroachments—when capital goes on strike, you must be prepared to move in rather than give in. Winning the “battle of democracy” and using “political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie” remains as critical now as when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto. Consider these preconditions. Are they being met by the new Latin American governments on the left? On the contrary, for the most part, we can see the familiar characteristics of social democracy—which does not understand the nature of capital, does not attack the logic of capital ideologically, does not believe that there is a real alternative to capitalism, and, not surprisingly, gives in when capital threatens to go on strike.¶ “We can’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs,” announced the social democratic premier of British Columbia in Canada (in the 1970s when I was party policy chairman). Here, crystallized, is the ultimate wisdom of social democracy—the manner in which social democracy enforces the logic of capital and ideologically disarms and demobilizes people.¶ Venezuela, however, is going in a different direction at this point. While the Bolivarian Revolution did not start out to build a socialist alternative (and its continuation along this path is contested every step of the way), it is both actively rejecting the logic of capital and also ideologically arming and mobilizing people to build that alternative.

## Asia

#### Asian war doesn’t escalate

**Washburn 13**

Taylor, a lawyer studying Northeast Asia at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “a lawyer studying Northeast Asia at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.,” http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/03/10/averting-asias-great-war-by-taylor-washburn/

In a recent Financial Times essay, “The Shadow of 1914 Falls Over the Pacific,” Gideon Rachman compares the current situation in East Asia to that in Europe a century ago. Like Germany in the early 20th century, China is a country on the rise, concerned that status quo powers will seek to block its ascent. In prewar Europe, a German military buildup and growing nationalism around the region helped create a dynamic in which the assassination of an obscure Austrian noble could trigger a devastating multinational war. The parallels with East Asia today are clear, Rachman says, and “the most obvious potential spark is the unresolved territorial dispute between Japan and China over the islands known as the Diaoyu to the Chinese and the Senkaku to the Japanese.” There is no denying the gravity of the danger posed by this row. Violent anti-Japanese riots erupted across China last fall after Japan’s government purchased the islands from a private owner, and Tokyo has recently claimed that a Chinese frigate locked its missile-guidance radar on a Japanese destroyer in the *East* China Sea. With ships and planes from both nations mingling in the vicinity of the islands, peace depends not only on the prudence of politicians in Beijing and Tokyo, but also the temperament and skill of a handful of sailors and pilots. The U.S.-Japan security treaty has played a pivotal role in ensuring Asia’s postwar stability, and will help deter Chinese aggression going forward, but as Rachman observes, the pact also recalls the alliance network that contributed to the expansion of World War I. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that major powers have often clashed without escalation. The example of 1914, in which a seemingly insignificant event forced all of Europe’s great military machines to shudder to life, is the exception rather than the rule. Since the bloody aftermath of their 1947 partition, India and Pakistan have skirmished repeatedly–and even engaged in several limited wars–without descending into full-scale conflict. In the 1960s, China fought with first India and then the Soviet Union over land, yet on neither occasion did combat spread beyond the frontier. Indeed, large interstate wars since World War I have not generally begun with a trigger akin to an assassination or a scuffle between forces on a remote perimeter, but rather with a major attack or colonial collapse.

#### **Korean war is inevitable – better now than later – solves proliferation and Asian economies **(Iran, Soko, Japan, and general prolif and Soko and Japan economies)******Suri 13** (Jeremi, Professor of History and Public Affairs – University of Texas, “Bomb North Korea, Before It’s Too Late”, New York Times, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-before-its-too-late.html>)

Earlier this week, [North Korea](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only facility where citizens from North and South Korea work together. And now the North is openly threatening (and visibly preparing) to fire a mobile-launcher-based Musudan missile with a range that could reach many of the places Mr. Kim has menaced in his public statements. American intelligence agencies believe that North Korea is working to prepare even longer-range delivery systems to carry the nuclear warheads already in its arsenal. The Korean crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests. The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is launched. The United States should use a precise airstrike to render the missile and its mobile launcher inoperable. President Obama should state clearly and forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon. He should give the leaders of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting. And he should explain that this is a limited defensive strike on a military target — an operation that poses no threat to civilians — and that America does not intend to bring about regime change. The purpose is to neutralize a clear and present danger. That is all. If North Korea is left to continue its threatening behavior, it will jeopardize the fragile economies of the region and it will encourage South Korea and Japan to develop their own [nuclear weapons](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier) — a policy already advocated by hawks in both countries. Most of all, North Korean threats will encourage isolated states across the world to follow suit. The Iranians are certainly watching. If North Korea can use its small nuclear arsenal to blackmail the region with impunity, why shouldn’t the mullahs in Tehran try to do the same? The United States and its allies in East Asia have a legitimate right to self-defense and they have a deep interest in deterring future threats on this scale. Thanks to precise satellite reconnaissance, striking the North Korean missile on the ground would be much easier than after it was launched. Since the United States cannot possibly know the missile’s trajectory before a launch, and Mr. Kim has said he is targeting America and its allies, we have reason to believe that civilians face serious danger. Since a missile on the ground is an obvious and largely undefended target, we can be reasonably sure that a strike would destroy it and preserve regional stability and the safety of our allies. An American pre-emptive strike would also re-establish necessary red lines for North Korea and other countries in similar circumstances. As President Xi Jinping of China stated earlier this month, “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” By eliminating the most recent North Korean missile threat, the United States will reduce the threat posed by the North’s arsenal. The United States would also reassure everyone in the region, and those watching from other parts of the world, that although it is not seeking regime change, America and its allies will not be blackmailed by threatened missile launches. The North Korean government would certainly view the American strike as a provocation, but it is unlikely that Mr. Kim would retaliate by attacking South Korea, as many fear. First, the Chinese government would do everything it could to prevent such a reaction. Even if they oppose an American strike, China’s leaders understand that a full-scale war would be far worse. Second, Mr. Kim would see in the American strike a renewed commitment to the defense of South Korea. Any attack on Seoul would be an act of suicide for him, and he knows that. A war on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely after an American strike, but it is not inconceivable. The North Koreans might continue to escalate, and Mr. Kim might feel obligated to start a war to save face. Under these unfortunate circumstances, the **U**nited **S**tates and its allies **would** still **be better off fighting a war with North Korea today, when the conflict could still be confined** largely **to** **the Korean Peninsula**. As North Korea’s actions over the last two months have shown, Mr. Kim’s government is willing to escalate its threats much more rapidly than his father’s regime did. An unending crisis would merely postpone war to a later date, when the damage caused by North Korea would be even greater. China’s role in a potential war on the Korean Peninsula is hard to predict. Beijing will continue to worry about the United States extending its influence up to the Chinese border. If armed hostilities erupt, President Obama should be prepared for direct and close consultations with Chinese leaders to negotiate a postwar settlement, in a larger multinational framework, that respects Beijing’s legitimate security interests in North Korea. The United States has no interest in occupying North Korea. The Chinese are unlikely to pursue an occupation of their own. Destroying the North Korean missile before it is launched is the best of bad options on the Korean Peninsula. A prolonged crisis would undermine regional security and global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. And a future war would be much worse. The most prudent move is to eliminate the most imminent military threat in self-defense, establish clear and reasonable limits on future belligerence, and maintain allied unity for stability — not forced regime change — in the region. This is the kind of pre-emptive action that would save lives and maybe even preserve the uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula.

#### Prolif causes nuke war

**Cimbala 08** [Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia”, 27, InformaWorld]

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available forwarning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for atactical nuclear first use.Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asiacould overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

#### Japanese economy prevents China-Japan war

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(David Envall, working on the MacArthur Foundation Asian Security Initiative, “Implications for Asia in Japan’s economic decline”, East Asia Forum, 8-11-2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/11/implications-for-asia-in-japans-economic-decline/)

Economic weakness together with export dependency could also influence Japan to mismanage its current hedging strategy in dealing with China and the US. Japanese leaders describe its current approach as pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy, but the rise of China has provoked Japan to respond to the resulting geostrategic pressures in Asia. This ‘return to Asia’ policy might resolve some of Japan’s problems associated with its dark history, but there is no guarantee that any such policy would be more repentant than chauvinistic. How might these problems of economic capacity and political image be addressed? Japan has received abundant economic and diplomatic advice during the post- war era. However, owing to the difficulty of the necessary reforms, and the limited role played by outsiders, the utility of such advice seems minimal. The more immediate challenge is to manage the wider security consequences of the decline, meaning that solutions should focus on strengthening the region’s security architecture. The first option would be to strengthen Asia’s multilateral institutions. This might take the form of further developments to regional bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or sub-regional bodies such as the Six Party Talks. Or it could develop from former Prime Minister Hatoyama’s vision of an East Asia Community. Policymakers would be aiming to establish institutions that could facilitate major power security dialogue, further enmesh Japan into the region, and ensure a continued US presence. Yet region-wide institutions have many problems. Their talk-shop style, emphasis on ‘non-core’ security issues and faith in socialising states echo E. H. Carr’s descriptions of the League of Nations in The Twenty Years’ Crisis Furthermore, underlying these institutions in recent years has been a rising competitiveness between the region’s two major powers, China and the US, and so they seem an unlikely venue for resolving core security challenges. Another option, described by one analyst as ‘multilateralising the deterrence guarantees under such circumstances? Would China see it as a hardening of Western containment postures directed against it? And would America’s partners and allies be willing and able to increase their own defence burdens? Unfortunately, **continued economic stagnation in Japan will present policymakers with many such dilemmas**. If Japan were to ‘lose’ another decade, however, the US-Japan alliance, America’s Asian grand strategy and the Asian security order would all be severely tested. Whatever its specifics, any policy should address the region’s core security concerns, and the most practical path seems to be to extend or multilateralise the region’s bilateral security architecture in case there is further misfortune.

#### Nuclear war

Hayward ’12

(John, “Meanwhile China Prepares for War with Japan”, Human Events, 9-19-2012, http://www.humanevents.com/2012/09/19/meawhile-china-prepares-for-war-with-japan/)

I’m sure this didn’t come up when President Obama did the Letterman show last night, and I’m positive it wasn’t mentioned at the fundraiser Jay-Z and Beyonce hosted for Obama, but while the world’s attention has been focused on the flaming wreckage of Obama’s foreign policy in the Middle East, China and Japan have been moving to the brink of war. On Tuesday, the Washington Free Beacon reported that General Xu Caihou, chairman of the Central Military Commission and one of China’s top military leaders, issued a public statement last Friday warning his forces to be “prepared for any possible military combat.” Intelligence officials say that such a statement from a top general is unusual. Chinese warships are on the move. Huge street protests – far larger than the Muslim demonstrations against that YouTube video – have boiled through Chinese cities, with protesters urging the government to “Fight to the Death” and “Kill all Japanese,” with nuclear weapons if necessary. There has been vandalism of Japanese property, leading hundreds of Japanese stores and industrial facilities – Panasonic and Canon among them – to close down across China, with many workers evacuated back to Japan. Angry mobs have surrounded the Japanese embassy in Beijing, thus far without violence, aside from a few bottles thrown at the walls … and a bit of damage to the car containing U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke, who had to drive through the mob on his way to the nearby American embassy in Beijing. Protests were still breaking out as recently as yesterday, which happens to have been a grim anniversary in relations between China and Japan, as Sept. 18 was the date Japanese forces destroyed a Manchurian railroad and blamed it on Chinese dissidents in 1931, laying the groundwork for their invasion of China. The Obama administration shouldn’t waste time with lame “spontaneous protests took us by surprise” excuses like they did in Libya, because in China, not much of anything is “spontaneous,” including street protests. The Chinese “press,” which Obama campaign operatives and officials have suddenly become fond of citing as a credible news source (Joe Biden just did it again on Tuesday) is the voice of the regime. “Mob actions” are puppet shows in which the Communist government has mock arguments with its own id, to make itself look restrained and reasonable compared to what “the people really want.” In this case, there is a dangerous implication that Beijing’s restraint might slip.

**And it crushes the US-South Korean and Japan alliances**

**Wit 13** (Joel S., Fellow – U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins, “7 Reasons to Worry About North Korea's Weapons”, The Atlantic, 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/7-reasons-to-worry-about-north-koreas-weapons/275020/>)

3) Growing strains on the U.S. nuclear umbrella provided to our allies. America's alliances with South Korea and Japan are designed to protect them from attack. That includes not just stationing U.S. troops in those countries, but also a willingness to threaten and even use nuclear weapons in their defense against other nuclear-armed countries. While some experts question how effective our "nuclear umbrella" has been, South Korea and Japan see it as vital. It stands to reason that if the threat from North Korea's nuclear arsenal grows, the stress on the U.S. umbrella will also grow, requiring constant reassurance for our allies. The U.S. sent B-2 and B-52 bombers able to carry nuclear weapons to South Korea during the current crisis to calm our ally's growing security concerns while telegraphing a warning to the North. Whether such an approach will remain effective in the future is unclear. Washington's moment of truth may come if North Korea develops nuclear-armed missiles able to reach the United States and South Koreans ask themselves whether the U.S. will risk sacrificing Los Angeles to protect Seoul. Many South Koreans doubt American reliability even today, despite 50 years of alliance. And some cite the distressing example of Washington pulling out of Vietnam during the 1970s. With confidence in U.S. security guarantees already in question, an emboldened Pyongyang could erode that confidence even further.

**US-Japan Alliance solves extinction**

**Armitage 2K - former Deputy Secretary of State, 10-11-2K (Richard, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University)**

Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly $600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy. Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region. Japan’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new “Plus Three” grouping are further testimony to Tokyo’s increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan’s alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. Post-Cold War Drift As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence— notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well intentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties. This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan have been drawn to the notion of “Asianization” and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities. The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis. Neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula—punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape incident— captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete changes that updated defense ties in the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to bickering and poor policy coordination. The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.- Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan’s prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials. In Tokyo, many see Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others’ economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization. It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China—a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership. Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and—to a lesser extent—Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment strategy. In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang. This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.- Japan alliance. Both the United States and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries—for the United States, a new national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia— all pose shared challenges. For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s. Politics Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a govern government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through. Nevertheless, the necessity of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle—the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies—and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change. Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship—as well as test it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership. It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan’s parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for longterm gain. The political system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan’s future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound. A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change—driven by technology and the empowerment of the individual— are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions. But, just as Japan’s risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation’s economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America’s relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs. If the United States can exercise leadership— that is to say, excellence without arrogance— in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come Security Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and “real” U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning. Japan’s prohibition against collective self defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner. We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance. This arrangement requires the following elements: Reaffirming the defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation. Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to burden other peacekeeping nations. Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of technological changes and regional developments to restructure its force presence on the archipelago. We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. There will be a healthy debate in both countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American policy in every instance. It is time for burden sharing to evolve into power-sharing and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary to bring this into being. Okinawa A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan—approximately 75 percent— are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean—only about one hour’s flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression. But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost prefecture of the country. For their part, the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified. In 1996, the U.S.–Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal— diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. But from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.

## Aging Crisis

#### No aging crisis and no impact anyway

Teixeira 13 RUY TEIXEIRA, staff writer, The New Republic, February 8, 2013, " Do low fertility rates spell economic collapse?", http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112356/jonathan-lasts-what-expect-reviewed-ruy-texiera#

Forget the debt ceiling. Forget the fiscal cliff,” wrote Jonathan Last, “The root cause of most of our problems is our declining fertility rate.” This view, as recently expressed in The Wall Street Journal and at greater length in Last’s new book, What to Expect When No One’s Expecting, holds that a decline in fertility rates (the average number of children born per woman) means nothing less than the end of civilization as we know it. According to Last, fertility decline will inevitably lead to population shrinkage, which in turn will inevitably doom us to economic stagnation and social breakdown. In fact, he says, ongoing fertility decline has already saddled us with slow economic growth since the 1970s. If Last’s claims sound hysterical and overwrought, that is because they are. Let’s start with his dire predictions about population shrinkage. It is true that fertility is lower now, at 1.93 children per women, than the standard replacement rate of 2.1. But it’s also higher than it was in the mid-’70s, when it bottomed out at 1.74. Indeed, the fertility rate has mostly risen since that period, with the exception of several years in the mid-’90s and the years of the Great Recession. And population has not gone down—it is up over 50 percent since 1970. The Census Bureau does project that the fertility rate will diminish, but only by a modest .09 over the next 50 years. And while the fertility rate is likely to remain below the replacement rate for the next 50 years, the Census Bureau expects us to add another 100 million people by 2060 due to immigration and “demographic momentum.” (Despite sub-replacement fertility rates, a relatively large proportion of the population will be in prime reproductive years for decades to come.) So much for population collapse. Last is similarly off base in his projections for the rest of the world. He sees global population decline and then, of course, certain collapse—economic ruin, war, and disease, the whole Mad Max bit. The U.N. Population Division begs to differ. According to their 2010 projections, the countries with the lowest fertility rates today—typically, more developed countries—should see fertility rates rise somewhat over the century and converge with rates in less developed countries. World population should rise from about 7 billion today to 9.3 billion in the middle of the century and 10.1 billion by end of the century. This includes a slight rise, not decline, in the population of more developed countries. Last is not unaware of these projections but he dismisses them out of hand. Why? Because, well, they sound like “guesswork” and “wishful thinking” to him. Not that he has own projections of course—he’s just sure the official ones are wrong. So who are we to believe then? The Census Bureau, the U.N. Population Division and the consensus of professional demographers or Jonathan Last? Not a tough call, in my opinion. If Last’s claims about the impending population crash are fanciful, his claim that fertility decline will lead to economic collapse is completely ridiculous. Economic projections that incorporate the Census population projections show per capita income rising by 61 percent over the next thirty years. It is certainly possible the average American many not see their fair share of this rise in income, but that’s not a fertility problem, it’s an inequality problem.

#### No disease impact

Keller 13 -- Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder (Rebecca, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

Periodic media reports of bird flu, a new SARS-like virus and a case of drug-resistant tuberculosis have kept the world informed, but they have also contributed to a distorted perception of the true threat such contagions pose. Perhaps the greatest value of the media coverage is the opportunity it provides to discuss the uncertainties and the best ways to prepare for biological threats, both natural and man-made. It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### Quarantines solve disease

**Altman, et al 05** (Lawrence, reporter for The New York Times, Jeff Bailey, reporter for the New York Times in Chicago, "CDC Proposes New RUles in Effort to Prevent Disease Outbreak", 11/23, section A; column 1, National Desk, p. 22 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9802E7DF1631F930A15752C1A9639C8B63)

Federal officials yesterday proposed the first significant changes in quarantine rules in 25 years in an effort to broaden the definition of reportable illnesses, to centralize their reporting to the federal government and to require the airline and shipping industries to keep passenger manifests electronically for 60 days. The proposals would also clarify the appeals process for people subjected to quarantines to allow for administrative due process and give health officials explicit authority to offer vaccination, drugs and other appropriate means of prevention on a voluntary basis to those in quarantine. The proposals could cost the beleaguered airline industry hundreds of millions of dollars, officials of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said. The officials are inviting public comment on the proposals, which are to be published in the Federal Register on Nov. 30, they told reporters in a telephone news conference. The proposals are part of a broader Bush administration plan to improve the response to current and potential communicable disease threats that may arise anywhere in the world. If adopted, the new regulations ''will allow the C.D.C. to move more swiftly'' when it needs to control outbreaks, said Dr. Martin Cetron, who directs the agency's division of global migration and quarantine. The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 underscored how fast a disease could spread through the world and the need to modernize and strengthen quarantine measures by pointing out gaps in health workers' ability to respond quickly and effectively, Dr. Cetron said. As the C.D.C. joined with cooperative airlines to meet flights and later collect information about passengers who had contact with others who developed SARS, the epidemiologists had to compile and process by hand data collected from flight manifests, customs declarations and other sources. But manifests contained only the name and seat number; customs declarations were illegible, and when readable, the names did not match those on the manifests. ''The time required to track passengers was routinely longer than the incubation period,'' which was two to 10 days for SARS, Dr. Cetron said. ''That was really quite shocking,'' Dr. Cetron said. One proposed change would require airline and ship manifests to be kept electronically for 60 days and made available to the C.D.C. within 12 hours when ill passengers arrive on international and domestic flights. The proposed changes include provisions for maintaining confidentiality and privacy of health information.The outbreak of SARS was stopped in part because of quarantines imposed in some affected countries. Quarantine restricts the movement of a healthy person exposed to someone who has a communicable disease. The quarantine period is determined by the usual length of time that passes from exposure to an infectious agent to the onset of illness.An executive order of the president limits quarantine to nine diseases: cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers like Ebola, SARS and influenza caused by new strains that could cause a pandemic.

#### Permanent alliances aren’t useful any more- the US can act alone or form ad hoc coalitions

Bruno Tertrais 04- senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique- SPRING, The Changing Nature of Military Alliances, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring\_tertrais.pdf

If commitments toward the United States are of lesser value for allied capitals,does the United States, for its part, still need permanent alliances? Permanent alliances appear to be of increasingly limited value for the United States, as the ratio of costs to benefits has changed to such an extent that conservative commentators have called for a radical reshuffling of U.S. commitments and bases abroad.11 Alliances have become more costly for Washington, as permanent deployments have increasingly created friction with local populations, with each incident involving U.S. forces and the local populations prompting a public outcry, as in Japan and in South Korea in the 1990s. Given today’s pace of U.S. technological advances, particularly in the field of communications, allied forces are not as easily interoperable. In many cases, U.S. forces do not use the NATO Standardization Agreements as much as they did in the past. Washington complains that European forces are still ill equipped for rapid power projection (only 50 non-U.S. NATO brigades are reported to be deployable), which makes the planning and conduct of common military operations more difficult and time-consuming. Operations under the NATO banner bear a heavy political cost, relying on procedures that require constant negotiation to reach consensus. NATO was created to defend against a major threat; nations were expected to delegate command to the alliance’s military authorities at the first signal of Soviet attack. Reaching consensus thus was not expected to be a problem. Despite the wishes of some in the U.S. Congress that the alliance’s decisionmaking procedures should be reformed, with consensus giving way to majority ruling, this perspective remains a minority view both in Washington and in Brussels. At the same time, the increasing threats of terrorism and ballistic missiles make allied territories vulnerable, risking exposure of the United States to blackmail. Meanwhile, the benefits of alliances to the United States are decreasing. Washington is now capable of countering most potential military threats alone, in stark contrast with circumstances during the Cold War, when local allies were to provide the bulk of defense capabilities in case of Soviet aggression until U.S. reinforcements could arrive. In addition, the use of allied territory is no longer guaranteed in times of crisis. Rather, host countries reserve the right to say no to the United States, as Ankara and Riyadh did prior to the war in Iraq. At the same time, Washington is able to rely increasingly on long-range power projection for contingencies not involving a large deployment of ground forces and will be able to do so even more in the future as new-generation hypersonic weapons are developed.12 Moreover, alliances appear to be of limited political value if they do not help ensure that allies will refrain from actively opposing U.S. policy decisions, as some European countries did in early 2003 on issues regarding Iraq. This change in the costs-and-benefits equation helps explain why Washington finds ad hoc coalitions under U.S. command increasingly attractive. Another reason is that the United States has grown increasingly weary of potential risks for U.S. forces operating under an umbrella organization. Following the disaster in Mogadishu, in early May 1994 then-President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, strictly limiting the possibility of foreign command of U.S. forces. Changes in the U.S. domestic scene and political culture, particularly since the congressional elections of November 1994 that brought to power a new generation of Republican politicians, have demonstrated growing U.S. defiance vis-à-vis multilateral institutions, especially when U.S. troops may be placed in harm’s way. All of these factors likely help fuel the sentiment behind Bush’s statement in September 2001 that, “[a]t some point, we may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me. We are America.”13

#### No country will ever turn away from US commitment – even if they are tempted, they know they need a superpower

Alterman 11 (Jon, director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at CSIS, Former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, June 2011, “Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power,” http://csis.org/files/publication/110613\_Cohen\_CapacityResolve\_Web.pdf

Beneath the surface, however, is an appreciation of how much of the region’s security order is a consequence of U.S. action and how little ability any other country or collection of countries has to do anything close to what the United States does. While there is fear for the future of the U.S. role, there is at the same time no alternative to it. No other country has the military resources or the will to safeguard what is, in the end, a global commons. Rather than seek to eliminate the U.S. role, regional countries—both friendly and unfriendly—are determined to try to shape it in order to advance their own interests. It is worth pointing out two things at the outset. The first is that much of this is a speculative exercise. Decisions on foreign policy are closely held, with no public consultation, at the highest levels of the Gulf leadership. Those leaders are often mannered when talking with Americans, almost seeming as if they are calibrating their messages to achieve the desired response rather than to give insight into their own thinking. Although it is worth paying attention to words spoken in private, those words need to be supplemented with attention to the actions the leaders take as well as to the parameters of the public debate that they allow to exist. Second, there is a tremendous range of views within the Gulf, not only between Iran, Iraq, and their GCC neighbors, but even within the GCC itself. The United Arab Emirates feels most vulnerable to Iran, for example, while Oman and Qatar seem intent on finding a modus vivendi with Iran. Kuwait feels threatened by everyone in its neighborhood, while Saudi Arabia relies on U.S. backing in order to seek to lead the neighborhood. **For each country, the bilateral relationship with the United States is the most important relation, not least because it protects each country from the predatory actions of its neighbors.** Correspondingly, there is no single “Gulf” or “Arab” view of the United States, nor a single view of U.S. power or U.S. commitment to the region. Even within countries, there seems to be considerable diversity. **Where there is unanimity**, however, **is in the expectation that the region must have some external guarantor, as it has had since the early sixteenth century.**

#### The pursuit of hegemony and the use of its rhetoric to justify action leads to endless cycles of violence

Bonds et al 13- University of Mary Washington, Contributor to the Journal of Political Economy of the World-System Section of the American Sociological Association (Journal of World-Systems Research”, 2013 Winter Issue, http://www.jwsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Vol19\_no1\_combined.pdf#page=89\\CLans)

Certainly, the United States could not shrug off or ignore the emergence of humanitarian norms in its pursuit of hegemony during the twentieth century. Hegemony requires, after all, that a dominant nation exercise the global “moral leadership” necessary to garner the consent of a critical mass of domestic and international political factions (Arrighi 2010). Likely for this reason, the United States became the “world spokesman for liberalism” during its era of hegemony, promoting the idea of the “rights of the people,” including the notion that they should not be deprived of their most basic rights to life during times of war (Wallerstein 1995: 156). Furthermore, several scholars have argued that powerful nations work to establish global humanitarian norms as a means of controlling or diminishing the military capacities of weaker nations or insurgent non-state groups, as in the case of chemical weapons (Price 1997), landmines (Beier 2011), or the small arms trade (Stavrianakis 2011). Hegemony, however, requires more than an economically dominant nation’s ability to exert global cultural leadership; it also requires the use of violent coercion (Arrighi 2010; see also Gramsci 1971). There are several reasons why military force is particularly important to the U.S. during its era of hegemony. First and foremost, the United States was called upon to secure “international order,” including the maintenance of inequitable relationships between nations first forged through colonialism (Wallerstein 2004). Securing “international order” has often meant that the United States has used its military power to open and preserve access to foreign markets and to protect its own military and economic supremacy. It has also used its substantial military power as a threat or through actual belligerence in order to maintain access to valuable natural resources that are necessary for the continuous accumulation of capitalism (Klare 2004; Downey, Bonds, and Clark 2010). In sum, the period of U.S. hegemony has been one in which the U.S. military was continuously poised to use coercive violence to defend the established world order, and one in which it was often embroiled in one conflict or another somewhere around the globe. There is, therefore, a real contradiction that U.S. officials had to manage during the period of U.S. hegemony; in order to secure international and domestic consent, officials had to proclaim the values of liberalism and act to protect the “rights of the people,” even in times of war. This presented some pressure to comply with international humanitarian norms that prohibit and stigmatize certain acts of violence that have been identified as especially cruel or harmful. On the other hand, ensuring U.S. hegemony required the consistent use of military force that, at times, resulted in widespread killings that deprived unarmed persons of their most basic right to exist. Such contradictions have typically been managed, which is to say actively suppressed, through appeals to “military necessity” and through the dehumanization of real or potential “enemies.” Through these appeals, officials attempt to justify acts of egregious violence by claiming that they are necessary for victory or even survival. Through processes of dehumanization, aided and abetted by longstanding notions of white supremacy, state officials and other elites may portray enemy populations as subhuman, inhuman, or as being barbarous and therefore outside the bounds of civilization (Dower 1987; Steuter and Wills 2008). Such symbolic treatment of others may suppress the contradiction between the humanitarian norms that emerged during the period of liberal reformism and the brutal and altogether inhumane realities of actual state violence that characterize it. Though appeals to military necessity and the dehumanization of enemies have been important means by which the United States has historically legitimated wars and mass violence, they may not by themselves be sufficient in the contemporary era. This is particularly due to anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles that have countered dehumanization and sought to affirm the humanity of all persons, along with the development of global human rights networks that seek to publicize and shame state practices that violate international normative frameworks (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Wallerstein 2004; Blau and Moncado 2005). Historical research presented in this article indicates that the U.S. government has utilized three additional techniques to do legitimating work as a means of attempting to hide, distance itself from, or explain away perceived violations of international humanitarian norms. These techniques include defensive categorization, the use of humanitizing discourse, and surrogacy. Defensive Categorization Governments that are criticized for committing atrocities or violations of humanitarian norms often categorically deny all accusations (Cohen 2001). There are some situations, however, when certain facts about contested acts of state violence are undeniable and beyond dispute. In such instances, state officials often seek to place these acts and outcomes within an interpretative framework through which they would not be considered major violations of humanitarian norms (Cohen 2001). Defensive categorization is one such technique, by which U.S. governmental officials attempt to make the case that a certain act of state violence is quite different and altogether separate from another stigmatized category of violence. Instead, officials attempt to normalize such acts by stressing how similar they are to routine and commonplace behavior. Humanitizing Discourse U.S. officials may further attempt to legitimate contested forms of violence through the use of a humanitizing discourse, by which they may stress the extreme care that their military takes to avoid humanitarian harms when using contested weaponry. Of course, such claims are often misleading and may, in some situations, simply not be true. U.S. governmental officials may also use a humanitizing discourse in defense of contested forms of violence by stressing their alleged humanitarian benefits. For instance, wars are increasingly justified in recent times as being fought in the interest of human rights and democracy (Bricmont 2006). Surrogacy Through this legitimating technique, U.S. officials can direct client states to utilize weapons or violent practices that breach international humanitarian norms, often supplying these governments with the means to do so. Surrogacy provides the United States distance and/or the ability to argue that it is not ultimately responsible for any resulting violations of international standards committed by its adjuncts (Bonds 2012). Through the remainder of this article, I will examine three historical instances where the United States has used chemically toxic weapons from the 1960s to the present, documenting the consistency through which these three legitimating techniques were used.

# 2nc

## Neolib

### 2nc framework

#### Turns case and shuts down deliberation—implementation focus is reductionist and displaces agency—our argument is that the framework for analysis is itself a political choice

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the ¶ welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state ¶ governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In ¶ other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and ¶ social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, ¶ calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and ¶ disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason ¶ aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like ¶ incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the ¶ behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not ¶ necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a ¶ revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an ¶ internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus¶ operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently ¶ advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case ¶ the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose ¶ functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing ¶ all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. ¶ Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms ¶ through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of ¶ contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic policy decisions ¶ (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) are isolated from public ¶ debate and deliberation, and treated as matters of technocratic design and implementation, ¶ while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political ¶ life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. In the process, democratic participation in ¶ decision-making is either limited to an already highly-commodified, spectacularized, mediatized ¶ electoral politics, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be ¶ managed through public relations experts. As a result, a highly reductionist notion of economic ¶ efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in ¶ need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument¶ proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. By treating social¶ subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately trying to insulate policy-makingfrom ¶ popular politics and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a ¶ political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and ¶ over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all ¶ political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are ¶ affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice. In short, economization is ¶ itself a political project.

Yet, this drive towards technocratization and economization—which constitutes the second ¶ caveat—does not mean that the dirty and messy distortions of politics are gradually being ¶ removed from policy-making. On the contrary, to the extent that policy making is being ¶ insulated from popular and democratic control, it becomes exposed to the “distortions” of a ¶ politics of rent-seeking and speculation—ironically, as predicted by the representatives of the ¶ Virginia School. Most public-private partnerships are hammered behind closed doors of a ¶ bureaucracy where states and multinational corporations divide the economic rent among ¶ themselves. The growing concentration of capital at the global scale gives various industries ¶ (armament, chemical, health care, petroleum, etc.—see, e.g., Klein, 2008) enormous amount ¶ of leverage over the governments (especially the developing ones). It is extremely important, ¶ however, to note that this tendency toward rent-seeking is not a perversion of the neoliberal ¶ reason. For much of neoliberal theory (in particular, for the Austrian and the Chicago schools), ¶ private monopolies and other forms of concentration of capital are preferred to government ¶ control and ownership. And furthermore, for some (such as the Virginia and the Chicago ¶ schools), rent-seeking is a natural implication of the “opportunism” of human beings, even ¶ though neoliberal thinkers disagree whether rent-seeking is essentially economically efficient (as ¶ in “capture” theories of the Chicago school imply) or inefficient (as in rent-seeking theories of ¶ the Virginia school imply) (Madra and Adaman, 2010).

This reconfiguration of the way modern states in advanced capitalist social formations govern ¶ the social manifests itself in all domains of public and social policy-making. From education to ¶ health, and employment to insurance, there is an observable shift from rights-based policymaking forged through public deliberation and participation, to policy-making based solely on ¶ economic viability where policy issues are treated as matters of technocratic calculation. In this ¶ regard, as noted above, the treatment of subjectivity solely in behaviorist terms of economic ¶ incentives functions as the key conceptual choice that makes the technocratization of public ¶ policy possible. Neoliberal thinking and practices certainly have a significant impact on the ¶ ecology. The next section will focus on the different means through which various forms of ¶ neoliberal governmentality propose and actualize the economization of the ecology.

### AT – No Sustainable

2. **Economic meltdown is inevitable -- policy changes aren’t sufficient to change it. – also a link to the K**

**Dr. Farell 6-19-12**-UVirginia Law, Cornell, Carnegie Institute of Technology B.Arch., M.R.P., J.D., Ph.D.(Paul B., “20 rules that can save you from the Doomsday Cycle Commentary: Paradigm shift coming after Great Depression 2”, Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/20-rules-that-can-save-you-from-the-doomsday-cycle-2012-06-19)//sjl

Yes, they predicted doomsday three years ago. Listen: “**Over the last 30 years, we have built a financial system that threatens to topple our global economic order,” wrote Simon Johnson and Peter Boone. “We have let an unsustainable and crazy ‘doomsday cycle’ infiltrate our economic system.”** This doomsday **“cycle will not run forever … The destructive power of the down cycle will overwhelm the restorative ability of the government,** just like it did in 1929-31.” **In 2008 “we came remarkably close to another Great Depression**. Next time, we may not be so lucky.” That was 2009. Since then Johnson, former IMF chief economist, co-wrote last year’s bestseller “13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown” and the new “White House Burning.” Other new books echo the same doomsday warning: Peter Schiff’s “The Real Crash: America’s Coming Bankruptcy” … Paul Krugman’s “End This Depression Now” … James Rickards’s “Currency Wars” … Philip Coogan’s “Paper Promises” … Joseph Stiglitz, “The Price of Inequity” … Ian Bremmer, “Every Nation For Itself,” and other reminders of doomsday. Folks, **the “next time” is here. Our luck is running out. And unfortunately, our leaders in both parties are blinded by an obsession to win an election. Ergo, they will fail to act in time.** Hot news: **Global economic meltdown, a rapidly spreading virus** Today’s headlines are flashing like neon signs on the Vegas Strip … The Economist: “Playing With Fire” … Wall Street Journal: “Threat Spreads Across Europe” … L.A. Times: “Fiscal Cliff may Threaten U.S. Recovery. … Time, “The Jobless Generation: How to Get Them Jobs Before…They Erupt in Fury.” … Foreign Policy: “12 Signs of the Europocalypse” … Newsweek: “The Gathering Eurostorm Could Come to American Shores” … Gary Shilling’s Insight: “Semi-Annual U.S. Economic Report: So Far, So Bad.” And into **this accelerating meltdown mess**, USA Today added these sobering facts, “Families’ Wealth Dives 39%, Richest Gained 2%.” But we all know **neither party will fix these core economic issues driving the Doomsday Cycle.** Not this summer. Not after the elections. And we all know why. **America’s leaders on both sides are so psychologically blinded by personal ambition they’ve lost all touch with reality, no longer see what’s best for all Americans. Yes, “an unsustainable and crazy Doomsday Cycle has infiltrated our economic system**,” Johnson and Boone wrote in their 2009 article in “CentrePiece,” a publication of the London School of Economics. Worse, it’s been accelerating since 2008. And by failing to act in a timely way, politicians in both parties will let the “destructive power of the down cycle overwhelm the restorative ability of the government, just like it did in 1929-31, very much like a Second Great Depression.” Politics? Irrelevant. Who wins? Irrelevant. Money rules America Seriously, folks, the elections are relevant. Totally. Oh, both sides pretend it matters. But it no longer matters who’s president. Or who’s in Congress. **Money runs America. And when it comes to the public interest, money is not just greedy, but myopic, narcissistic and deaf. Money from Wall Street bankers, Corporate CEOs, the Super Rich and their army of 261,000 highly paid mercenary lobbyists.** They hedge, place bets on both sides. **Democracy is dead.**

### AT – Heg

#### 1. Heg causes more conflict than it solves- historical data proves

**Human Security Report ’10** ( Embargoed until 2 December 2010, 11:00am EST Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

**As with other realist claims, there are reasons for skepticism about the peace through preponderance thesis**. First, if it were true, we might expect that the most powerful states would experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World War II, the opposite has in fact **been the case**. Between 1946 and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the greatest number of international conflicts were France, the UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.19 Yet, these were four of the most powerful conventional military powers in the world— and they all had nuclear weapons. The fact that **major powers tend to be more involved in international conflicts** than minor powers is not surprising. Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project substantial military power across national frontiers and often over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity; major powers have it by definition.

#### **2.**

### AT – Ethical

#### 2. We control uniqueness— poverty is an inevitable outcome of the way we conduct globalization

**Pogge 2011** – PhD, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University (12/7, Thomas, Financial Task Force, “Endless Poverty Is A Human Rights Failure”, http://www.financialtaskforce.org/2011/12/07/endless-poverty-is-a-human-rights-failure/, WEA)

Contrary to much official rhetoric, these problems are not being overcome. The number of chronically undernourished people, for instance, has risen since the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome where the world’s governments promised to halve it by 2015. Reported at 788 million in 1996, this number has in 2009 broken above 1 billion for the first time in human history.¶ A key driver of the persistence of severe poverty is rising global inequality. While the top five percent of the world’s population increased its share of global household income from 42.9 to 46.4 percent in the 1988–2005 period, the share of the poorest quarter declined by a third from 1.16 to 0.78 percent — despite all the development assistance.[1] Clearly, and unsurprisingly, the rules of the world economy are better aligned with the interests of the world’s affluent than with those of the poor.¶ The Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development has been analyzing and fighting some important structural injustices in our global financial system, calling attention, for instance, to how corporate tax evasion in developing countries is facilitated through lax accounting standards for multinational corporations. Since they are not required to do country-by-country reporting, such corporations can easily manipulate transfer prices among their subsidiaries to concentrate their profits where they are taxed the least. As a result, they may report little to no profits in the countries in which they extract, manufacture or sell goods or services, having their worldwide profits taxed instead in some tax haven where they only have a paper presence. Task Force member Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates that, during the 2000–2008 time period, trade mispricing deprived developing countries of US$382.6 – US$405 billion per annum.¶ Even more important, as seen over the last year, existing rules have allowed banks to accept for private depositfunds from public officials in developing countries. The funds found stashed by Gaddafi in various accounts exceed the annual GDP of Libya and are clearly proceeds of corruption. This type of complicity could easily be avoided: banks are already under strict reporting requirements with regard to funds suspected of being related to terrorism or drug trafficking. Yet many banks still eagerly accept and manage embezzled funds — and legally so, with secrecy laws ensuring that their banks remain attractive for such illicit deposits. GFI estimates that developing countries have lost an average of $342- 404.7 billion annually during the 2000–2008 period due to leakages via bankingsystems—more than four times the amount they have received in official development assistance. The impact of this financial drain on the livelihood of the poor is magnified by the effects of corruption on the quality of governance.

## Asia War

## 1nc – iran prolif

#### No impact to Iran prolif.

Hibbs, 13 (Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – “Is a Nuclear Iran Inevitable ?” – The Atlantic – April 12th – http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)

You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it in terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do you think that we've reached the point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb, unless there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there?¶ No, I don't believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today, there have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear weapons capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no means a monolithic country.¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have brought them very far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right now it's up to Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's no consensus right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.

#### No breakout weapons capability- IAEA monitoring declared enrichment facilities solves

Kahl 12 – Associate Professor @ Georgetown University in Security Studies, and Senior Fellow @ Center for a New American Security. (Dr. Colin H., Testimony before the House of Representatives

Homeland Security Committee. Iran, Hezbollah and the Threat to the Homeland. March 21 2012. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Testimony%20ColinKahl%20Iran%20032112.pdf)

President Obama has made clear that: An Iranian nuclear weapon is “unacceptable.” All options – including military force – remain on the table to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The administration does not endorse a policy of containing a nuclear-armed Iran. Secretary of Defense Panetta has described Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon as a “red line,” and ¶ General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said the United States has a viable contingency plan in the event of a conflict with Iran.¶ Yet President Obama has also made clear that he prefers a peaceful solution and that there remains a ¶ window of opportunity to take advantage of unprecedented pressure on Iran to reach a lasting diplomatic ¶ settlement. This is precisely the right approach. Force should remain an option – indeed, the credible threat of military action can help enable diplomacy. But we have not yet reached the now-or-never moment for employing the military option, and a diplomatic solution is both preferable and the most sustainable path to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Military action is, and should remain, a last resort – and it should not be used until all non-military avenues have been exhausted. I base this conclusion on four arguments: The threat from Iran’s nuclear program is growing, but not yet imminent. The costs of military action are potentially very high, both in terms of the escalatory potential of any U.S. strike and the broader regional and global effects. Military action is unlikely to result in a permanent solution to Iran’s nuclear threat. Opportunities for a diplomatic solution have not yet been exhausted. The Nuclear Threat from Iran is Growing, But Not Yet Imminent According to U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials, and independent assessments by the Institute for Science and International Security, it would currently take Iran at least four months to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for a single nuclear bomb, and at least a year total to produce a crude testable nuclear device, once Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei decides to do so. It would take several more years to develop a miniaturized nuclear warhead for a missile. Although Iran is clearly positioning itself to develop a nuclear weapons capability, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, has testified that there is no hard evidence that Khamenei has yet made the final decision to translate those capabilities into a bomb. Moreover, Khamanei is unlikely to dash for a weapon anytime soon because doing so would require Iran to divert low-enriched uranium (LEU) ¶ stockpiles and enrich to weapons-grade level at the declared enrichment facilities at Natanz or Fordow. ¶ Because International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors would detect such moves, the Iranian regime is unlikely to “break out” until they can dramatically reduce the timeline to build several bombs or build a weapon at new covert facilities. This could be years away.¶ Therefore, we have not yet reached a moment of decision for the use of force.¶ Escalation and Spillover Risks¶ Moreover, when and if a decision to use force is made, it must be done in full appreciation of the likely consequences.

## North Korea

**2nc – solves war**

**Dissolving the alliance ensures war – No replacement for the alliance**

**Okamoto 02, Sepcial Adviser to the Cabinet & Chair of the Japanese Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations & President of Okamoto Associates, 2 (Yukio, “Japan and the United States: The essential alliance,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring)**

Fifty years have passed since Japan and the United States signed the original security treaty and more than 40 years have passed since the current 1960 treaty came into force. Neither Japan nor the United States has a desire to alter the treaty obligations, much less abrogate the alliance. Nevertheless, exploring potential alternatives to the alliance is worthwhile, if only to illuminate why it is likely to survive. For Japan, treaty abrogation would result in a security vacuum that could be filled in only one of three ways. The first is armed neutrality, which would mean the development of a Japan ready to repel any threat, including the region’s existing and incipient nuclear forces. The second is to establish a regional collective security arrangement. This option would require that the major powers in Asia accept a reduction of their troop strengths down to Japanese levels and accept a common political culture—democracy. Neither of these conditions is likely to be met for decades. The third option, the one outlined in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is for Japan’s security to be the responsibility of a permanent UN military force, ready to deploy at a moment’s notice to preserve peace and stability in the region. Such a force, of course, does not yet exist. None of the three possible replacements for the Japan-U.S. alliance is realistic. The alternatives also **seem certain** to increase the likelihood of war in the region, not decrease it—the only reason that Japan would want to leave the U.S.-Japan alliance. An overview of aftereffects on the United States of an abrogation of the alliance runs along similar lines. In the absence of a robust, UN-based security system, relations between the giant countries of Asia would become uncertain and competitive—too precarious a situation for the United States and the world. The United States would lose access to the facilities on which it relies for power projection in the region. Much more importantly, it would also lose a friend—a wealthy, mature, and loyal friend. Given the magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese passivity, purported U.S. arrogance, and the myriad overwrought “threats to the alliance,” the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh unbreakable— because there are no acceptable alternatives.

### 2nc - economy

**War now key to prevent global and South Korean economic collapse**

**Altman 3-15**-13(Daniel is an economist and writer, the founder of the Emerging Design Centers initiative, “[The Economics of War with North Korea](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/15/economics_war_north_korea_kim_jong_un)”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/15/economics_war_north_korea_kim_jong_un>)

Let's put aside all the political posturing and strategic guesswork surrounding North Korea's belligerence, and look at the facts. A war on the Korean Peninsula, no matter who starts it, **will be costly for the global economy**. Shipping lanes will be disrupted, exports from China will slow, and interest and insurance rates will rise, making commerce more costly everywhere. **South Korea**, which ranks in the [top 10 globally](http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=KR) in both exports and imports, **will suffer the most**, with lives lost and capital destroyed. Taken together, these effects might subtract, say, half a percentage point from world GDP, or about $350 billion. Given this enormous cost, doesn't it make sense to avoid conflict? Not necessarily. Let's say that the probability of conflict is the same every year until war happens, after which it is zero, since North Korea will surely lose. Reducing this probability essentially moves the expected arrival of war further into the future. Yet, somewhat counterintuitively, doing so is not always a good idea. If the cost of war is always a fixed share of the economy -- I said 0.5 percent above -- then we have to consider the difference between the pace of economic growth and the [discount rate](http://grist.org/article/discount-rates-a-boring-thing-you-should-know-about-with-otters/), which measures how much we value the future versus the present. If the global economy is expanding faster than our discounting of the future, then postponing war makes it *more* costly. In other words, 0.5 percent of the global economy next year will be worth more to us in today's money than 0.5 percent of the global economy this year. Here's the neat part: There's reason to believe that these rates are actually equal, thanks to the concept of [opportunity cost](http://economics.about.com/od/opportunitycosts/f/opportunitycost.htm). When making a choice as a society, we should compare its benefits to the benefits generated by other possible choices. Say we can choose whether to have the war this year or next year. This year, it will cost $350 billion. **Next year, because of economic growth, the cost will be higher**. According to the International Monetary Fund's [latest forecast](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/update/01/index.htm), 0.5 percent of the global economy will be worth $363 billion in 2014. So, should we postpone the war? If we do, we'll have $350 billion more to invest in the global economy. Most likely, it will be worth $363 billion next year -- exactly the amount we'd lose by postponing the war. After taking economic growth into account, there's no advantage at all to the delay.

**Nuclear war - research and empirics prove**

**Ockham Research 08**, independent research branch of Financial Market Management Inc,(Nov 17th, “Economic Turmoil Begets Geopolitical Risks”, <http://wallstreetpit.com/2008/11/economic-turmoil-begets-geopolitical-risks/>)

The economic turmoil roiling world markets right now brings with it plenty of pain. Jobs are being lost, people’s savings decimated, retirement plans/goals thrown out the window, etc. Hard times bring with them harsh consequences. However, it is perhaps useful to be mindful of the geopolitical risks that accompany economic dislocation. Many analysts are eager to compare the difficulties now confronting the global economic system with those of the Great Depression. While I do not believe that the world is facing a second Great Depression, it might be worthwhile to recall from history that the Great Depression spawned geopolitical turmoil that lead to the Second World War. The incoming Obama administration—and Democratic members of Congress who talk of implementing massive defense cutbacks—may want to remember the lessons of the past as they stand on the threshold of power. The hardship and turmoil which impacted the world during the Great Depression provided fertile ground for the rise of fascist, expansionistic regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan. Hard times also precluded the Western democracies from a more muscular response in the face of growing belligerence from these countries. The United States largely turned inward during the difficult years of the 1930s. The end result was a global war of a size and scale never seen by man either before or since. Economic hardship is distracting. It can cause nations to turn their focus inward with little or no regard for rising global threats that inevitably build in tumultuous times. Authoritarian regimes invariably look for scapegoats to blame for the hardship affecting their populace. This enables them to project the anger of their citizenry away from the regime itself and onto another race, country, ideology, etc. Looking at the world today, one can certainly envision numerous potential flashpoints that could become problematic in a protracted economic downturn. Pakistan, already a hotbed of Islamic extremism and armed with atomic weapons, has been particularly hard hit by the global economic crisis. An increasingly impoverished Pakistan will be harder and harder for its new and shaky democratically-elected government to control. Should Pakistan’s economic troubles cause its political situation—always chaotic—to spin out of control, this would be a major set-back in the global war on terror. Russia, whose economy, stock markets and financial system have literally imploded over the past few months, could become increasingly problematic if faced with a protracted economic downturn. The increasingly authoritarian and aggressive Russian regime is already showing signs of anger projection. Its invasion of Georgia this summer and increasing willingness to confront the West reflect a desire to stoke the pride and anger of its people against foreign powers—particularly the United States. It is no accident that the Russians announced a willingness to deploy tactical missile systems to Kaliningrad the day after Barack Obama’s election in the U.S. This was a clear “shot across the bow” of the new administration and demonstrates Russian willingness to pursue a much more confrontational foreign policy going forward. Furthermore, the collapse in the price of oil augers poorly for Russia’s economy. The Russian budget reputedly needs oil at $70 per barrel or higher in order to be in balance. Russian foreign currency reserves, once huge have been depleted massively over the past few months by ham-fisted attempts to arrest the slide in both markets and the financial system. Bristling with nuclear weapons and nursing an ego still badly bruised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of superpower status, an impoverished and unstable Russia would be a dangerous thing to behold. China too is threatened by the global economic downturn. There is no doubt that China has emerged during the past decade as a major economic power. Parts of the country have been transformed by its meteoric growth. However, in truth, only about a quarter of the nation’s billion plus inhabitants—those living in the thriving cities on the coast and in Beijing—have truly felt the impact of the economic boom. Many of these people have now seen a brutal bear market and are adjusting to economic loss and diminished future prospects. However, the vast majority of China’s population did not benefit from the economic boom and could become increasingly restive in an economic slowdown. Enough economic hardship could conceivably threaten the stability of the regime and would more than likely make China more bellicose and unpredictable in its behavior, with dangerous consequences for the U.S. and the world.

# 1nr

## 2NC Interp. Cards

#### Economic engagement requires a Quid Pro Quo—the topic demands the plan must expand economic ties to directly change target behavior

Kahler and Kastner 06

Miles, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at University of California, San Diego, and Scott, Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland, “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN”, Journal of Peace Research, Sage.

Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations – is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized. We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international politics.

#### Their interp moots the meaning of the term engagement- must include negotiations between both sides

Haas and O'Sullivan 00. [Richard N., former senior aid to President George bush, and Meghan L., Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Program fellow, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815733550/html/203.html#pagetop, 1-2]

**The term engagement** was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the word **appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations**. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. **Except in the few instances in which the** **U**nited **S**tates **has sought to isolate a regime** or country, **America** arguably **"engages" states** and actors **all the time** in one capacity or another **simply by interacting with them**. **This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation**. In our usage, **engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends** to a significant degree **on positive incentives to achieve its objectives.** Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet **the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on** the extension or provision of **incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the U**nited **S**tates **has important disagreements**.

## 2nc – at: C/I

#### “Economic” engagement is limited to trade and financial transactions --- including more explodes the topic to broad diplomatic, military, and cultural arenas --- our interpretation is the best middle ground because it still lets the Aff choose a number of positive sanctions and objectives, but locks in economic means as a site of Negative ground

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.

Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

####  2nc – term EE important

#### Many types of “engagement” exist. Meaningful debate demands precision about the term.

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival, 42(2), Summer, p. 1-2

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

Today’s rapidly globalising world, no longer beset by Cold War competitions, creates new possibilities for engagement as a foreign-policy option. In particular, the growing recognition of the drawbacks of punitive policies in this new environment has spurred a search for alternative strategies. There are increasing doubts about the wisdom of using sanctions, particularly when exerted unilaterally in a globalised world economy, to dissuade problem regimes from their agendas. Not only has the record of sanctions in forcing change been poor, but the costs of such policies to civilian populations and American commercial interests has often been substantial. Just as faith in sanctions has been shaken, the limits of military force have been exposed: despite relentless bombings, Saddam Hussein remains in power, and events in Kosovo demonstrate how even the most carefully orchestrated military campaign can result in serious collateral damages.

Moreover, the dissolution of Cold War alignments has both opened new opportunities for engagement strategies and created new rationales for them. Due to the heightened economic vulnerability and strategic insecurity of former Soviet allies, the incentives that the US can offer have new potency. At the same time, because America’s allies are freer to shape their foreign-policy agendas subject to their own desires, the US needs to seek out policies with appeal which extends beyond rigid American preferences. During the 1990s, many of America’s closest allies in Europe revealed a preference for using incentives rather than punitive actions to achieve foreign-policy goals.2

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

## Aging Crisis ADV

### 2nc – no impact

**No aging crisis impact**

Whiston 11 [Lucy, "The 'ageing crisis' thesis is exaggerated," www.scribd.com/doc/104290973/The-ageing-crisis-thesis-is-exaggerated-Critically-discuss, accessed 2-10-13, mss]

‘A gray dawn fast approaches. It is time to take an unflinching look at the shape of things to come’ (Peterson, 1999, p.43). The ‘gray dawn’ to which Peterson is referring to is the global problem of the ‘ageing crisis’. Rapid demographic transitions of rising life expectancyalongside declining fertility result in a dramatic increase in the proportion of the populationover sixty-five. This population ageing will reduce the working population as a percentage of the population as a whole which will in turn constrain economic growth, increase socialexpenditure and lead to intergenerational conflict. This is both an economic and a politicalproblem which even the wealthiest countries cannot afford, described as a ‘crisis scenario’where ‘an aging population overburdening the individual taxpayer, bankrupting the country and creating extreme social and political tensions leading to a ‘war’ between various agegroups’ (Northcott, 1994, p. 67-68). As alarming as this prospect sounds while it is logicaland may present problems this thesis appears to be somewhat **exaggerated**. There has been **much research** carried out in this area and a **considerable** body of **literature** available on this topic much of which **finds fault with statistical data on which this argument** is based and refutes the main problems which the ‘ageing crisis’ presents while evidence is put forward to show that we do not need to worry about an ageing crisis that **we may in actual fact benefit from an ageing population**.

#### Aging crisis crushes other countries not the US

Lieber 12 Robert, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, where he has previously served as Chair of the Government Department and Interim Chair of Psychology. He is an authority on American foreign policy and U.S. relations with the Middle East and Europe. He was born and raised in Chicago, received his undergraduate education at the University of Wisconsin and his Ph.D. at Harvard. He has held fellowships from the Guggenheim, Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He has also taught at Harvard, Oxford and the University of California, Davis, and has been Visiting Fellow at the Atlantic Institute in Paris, the Brookings Institution in Washington, and Fudan University in Shanghai, *Power and Willpower in the American Future*, Cambridge University Press, 2012, kindle, AM

Another key factor operating in favor of the United States, and one not always appreciated, is that of population. One advantage comes from sheer size. With 311 million people, the United States is the third most populous country in the world, after China and India, and by far the largest among the most developed countries of the world. Demography also works to the advantage of the United States in terms of the population age profile. While much attention has been focused on the looming retirement of the Baby Boom generation and the consequences for entitlement program costs, it is nonetheless the case that most other large countries are experiencing a more pronounced aging of their populations. For the United States, this shift is occurring to a lesser extent and more slowly than among its competitors. Most European countries and Japan have low birth rates, with total fertility rates (TFR) in the range of 1.3 to 1.8, as compared with a TFR average of 2.1 live births per woman as the rate required to maintain the given size of a population. The TFR of the United States has been close to the 2.1 replacement level – though a slight reduction has been evident during the recession. Live births in 2010 declined by 7 percent from 2007, but including immigration, America continues to experience sustained population growth.29 Among other major countries, Russia not only exhibits a low TFR of 1.4, but it also has an unusually high death rate for a country at its level of development, so that its overall population has been declining, with three deaths for every two live births in recent years. During the coming decades, China, because of the effects of its one-child policy, will have a larger percentage of its population among the elderly than the United States. Although China's population of 15- to 29-year-olds increased during the previous decade, beginning in 2011, the number of Chinese youth in that age group has begun dropping steeply.30 Whereas in 1990, only 9 percent of China's population was age sixty or older, compared with 17 percent in the United States, by the year 2050, 32 percent of Chinese will fall into that age group, as against 25 percent in America.31 Mark Haas argues that as a result of demographic trends of this kind, global aging “will be a potent force for the continuation of US power dominance, both economic and military.”32

### 2nc – at: heg I/L

Aging won’t hurt hegemony—

Haas 07 (Mark L., professor of political science at Duquesne University, “A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations,” International Security, Summer)

Global population aging will inºuence U.S. foreign policies in ªve major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states’ economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere ªscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difªculties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and ªscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be signiªcantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely.6 Second, global aging increases the likelihood of continued peaceful relations between the United States and the other great powers. Studies have shown that the probability of international conºict grows when either the dominant country anticipates a power transition in favor of a rising state or states, or when such a transition actually takes place.7 By adding substantial support to the continuation of U.S. hegemony, global aging works against either outcome from transpiring. An aging world therefore decreases the probability that either hot or cold wars will develop between the United States and the other great powers.

### 2nc – at: Haass

**Haas says other factors are more important.**

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Conclusion

The world is entering an unprecedented demographic era. Never before has social aging been as pervasive and extensive an issue as it will be in coming decades. Both the opportunities and challenges for U.S. security in an aging world are substantial. The United States’ aging crisis is less acute than in the other great powers, and its ability to pay the costs associated with this phenomenon is significantly better than most of these states. These facts, however, should not disguise the magnitude of these costs for the United States nor lull U.S. leaders into inaction on this critical issue. The more the United States maintains its enviable demographic position (compared with the other great powers) and rela- tively superior ability to pay for the costs of its elderly population, the more it will be able both to preserve its own position of international power dominance and to help other states address their aging (and other) problems when it is in U.S. interests to do so. A critical implication of these facts is that such domestic policies as means-testing Social Security and Medicare payments, raising the retirement age to reflect increases in life expectancies, maintaining largely open immigration policies to help keep the United States’ median age relatively low, encouraging individual behaviors that result in better personal health, and perhaps **above all** restraining the rising costs of its health-care system are critical international security concerns.116 A defining political question of the twenty-ªrst century for U.S. international interests is whether U.S. leaders have sufªcient political will and wisdom to implement these and related policies. The more proactive U.S. leaders are in minimizing the scope of its aging population and the costs associated with it, the more protected U.S. international interests will be. To ignore these costs, or even to delay implementing various reforms designed to limit their size, will jeopardize the level of global influence and security that the United States enjoys today.

#### There are no threats – regional actors can prevent war

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¶More than two decades after the Cold War dramatically ended, the U.S. maintains a Cold War military. America has a couple score allies, dozens of security commitments, hundreds of overseas bases, and hundreds of thousands of troops overseas. Yet international hegemonic communism has disappeared, the Soviet Union has collapsed, Maoist China has been transformed, and pro-communist Third World dictatorships have been discarded in history's dustbin.¶ The European Union has a larger economy and population than America does. Japan spent decades with the world's second largest economy. South Korea has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. As Colin Powell exclaimed in 1991, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung."¶ Yet America accounts for roughly half of the globe's military outlays. In real terms the U.S. government spends more on the military today than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War. It is difficult for even a paranoid to concoct a traditional threat to the American homeland.¶ Terrorism is no replacement for the threat of nuclear holocaust. Commentator Philip Klein worries about "gutting" the military and argued that military cuts at the end of the Cold War "came back to haunt us when Sept. 11 happened." Yet the reductions, which still left America by far the world's most dominant power, neither allowed the attacks nor prevented Washington from responding with two wars.¶ And responding with two wars turned out to be a catastrophic mistake. Evil terrorism is a threat, but existential threat it is not. Moreover, the best response is not invasions and occupations — as the U.S. has learned at high cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, the most effective tools are improved intelligence, Special Forces, international cooperation, and restrained intervention.¶ Attempts at nation-building are perhaps even more misguided than subsidizing wealthy industrialized states. America's record isn't pretty. The U.S. wasn't able to anoint its preferred Somali warlord as leader of that fractured nation. Washington's allies in the still unofficial and unstable nation of Kosovo committed grievous crimes against Serb, Roma, and other minorities. Haiti remains a failed state after constant U.S. intervention. The invasion of Iraq unleashed mass violence, destroyed the indigenous Christian community, and empowered Iran; despite elections, a liberal society remains unlikely. After nine years most Afghans dislike and distrust the corrupt government created by the U.S. and sustained only by allied arms.¶ The last resort of those who want America to do everything everywhere is to claim that the world will collapse into various circles of fiery hell without a ubiquitous and vast U.S. military presence. Yet there is no reason to believe that scores of wars are waiting to break out. And America's prosperous and populous allies are capable of promoting peace and stability in their own regions.

#### Hegemony doesn’t solve anything

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Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short, we shouldn’t have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the military is designed to implement, must come from other quarters.