#  1nc

## 1nc

### 1nc – general

#### A - Your decision should answer the resolutional question – is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

#### 1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, 04 - (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### 2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 - (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### B. They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action

#### C. You should vote negative:

#### <insert modules>

#### Preparation and clash – changing the question now leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow, uneducational debate. Requiring debate on a communal topic forces argument development and develops persuasive skills.

#### Decision-making skills and engagement with the state prevents Latin American xenophobia and actualizes radical politics

Cook, 85 - Education Practitioner (Kay K., September 1985, “Latin American Studies”, <http://www.ericdigests.org/pre-923/latin.htm>)

Gallup polls indicate that Latin America--Mexico, Central America, South America, and the independent countries of the Caribbean--is a region about which United States citizens are poorly informed (Glab 1981). Yet for practical reasons of politics and economics, as well as cultural and historical reasons, United States citizens should be well informed about Latin America. This Digest considers the present status of Latin American studies in elementary and secondary schools. It discusses the need and rationale for Latin American studies, effective teaching techniques, and resources to supplement textbooks which treat Latin America inadequately. THE PRESENT STATE OF TEACHING ABOUT LATIN AMERICA Social studies textbooks and media often present an incomplete or biased portrait of the countries comprising Latin America. Newspapers and television news programs tend to focus on such spectacular events as earthquakes, terrorism, coups, and American foreign policy related to the region. "It is rare to find stories on the arts, humanities, or culture of Latin America" (Glab 1981). The same is true of textbook representation. A recent survey of ten high school texts revealed that "with the exception of one textbook, little recognition was given to cultural characteristics" (Fleming 1982). Latin American history was presented primarily in the context of United States foreign policy. The point of view of Latin American countries was rarely considered. Textbooks often created or reinforced negative stereotypes of Latin America and its citizens. THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR TEACHING ABOUT LATIN AMERICA Glab (1981) offers the following considerations for including more about Latin America in the curriculum: --Foreign Policy. International controversies over the influence of other governments in the politics of Latin America need analysis and examination. --Physical Proximity. Latin American countries are virtually next-door neighbors, "with close political, commercial, and cultural interactions with the United States extending over many years." --The American Heritage. Latin American culture and the Spanish language are part of the American heritage, exerting early and continuing influence on what are now the states of Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona. --Negative Stereotyping. It is well documented that Hispanic-Americans in general "suffer from explicit negative stereotyping." In addition to those suggested by Glab, other considerations, based on commonality, exist. Shared problems include traffic congestion, pollution, and crime related to urbanization; unemployment and slow economic growth; concentration of ownership of agricultural land; and government debt. EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO TEACHING LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES In his analysis of high school textbook treatment of Latin America, Fleming (1982) points out that "a major source of information on Latin America should be the social studies classroom." The world history course offers an especially fertile ground for introducing a Latin American perspective into a study of world events. As an article in the WORLD HISTORY BULLETIN stresses, "The New World was not simply the passive recipient of European civilization; rather, it modified and changed Europe's civilization and contributed to the development of the Old World" (Burns 1984). Case studies, decision-making exercises, and role playing have been effective methods of introducing Latin American culture and erasing preconceived notions about that region. A separate Latin American studies course would itself be interdisciplinary in nature, making use of subject areas such as science, art, literature, mathematics, the Spanish language, computer science, and the social sciences. The course would require students to apply a variety of social studies skills and concepts and would be applicable to students of diverse grade levels, skills, and socio-economic backgrounds. When possible, bilingual terminology would be employed.

### 1nc – dialogue

#### 1 – dialogue – debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

#### Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj, 08 - Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. (Thorkild, Copenhagen http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is the biggest impact - the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

Morson, 04 - Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy. <http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson, 04 - Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy. <http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

### 1nc – decision-making

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg and Freeley, 13 – \* David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And \*\* Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, (“Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” 121-4)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decisionmaking is the most portable skill – key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, 08 - lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law (David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

## OFF

#### The aff commodifies the suffering of the Cuban people in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse to engage in the trauma economy

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

## Case

### 1nc – turn

#### They don’t have an endpoint- they don’t have a way their rethinking translates to material change

#### People may join their movement – consumer culture proves they do it just to be different

A – critiques of “mainstream” culture are based on the idea of being an individual to affirm your superiority over “society”

B – empirics prove 60s hippies and 80s goths

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

And the thought that wearing Burberry might telegraph the message "I like reality TV and boob jobs," instead of "I prefer classic elegance," is enough to scare most members of the social elite off of the brand. Another way of formulating the problem is to say that Burben became too mainstream and thus ceased to serve as a source of distinction. And it is here that we can see the obvious point of contrast. between the critique of mass society and the problem of consumerism. The traditional critique of mass society suggests that most people are members of the herd, cogs in the machine, victims of mindless conformity They lead vacuous, hollowed-out lives ruled by shallow, materialistic values. They are manipulated to serve the functional requirements of the system, and so will never experience true creativity, freedom or even complete sexuih fulfillment. That having been said, who could possibly want to be member of mass society? If anything, people should be desperate to prove that they are not victims of conformity, that they are not merely cogs in the machine. And of course, as the critique of mass society became increasingly widespread, this is precisely what people tried to do. Thus countercultural rebellion—rejecting the norms of "mainstream" society—came to serve as a source of considerable distinction. In a society that prizes individualism and despises conformity, being "a rebel" becomes the new aspirational cate­gory "Dare to be different," we are constantly told. In the '60s, becorning a beat or a hippie was a way of showing that you were not one of the squares or the suits. In the '80s, dressing like a punk or a goth was a way showing mat you were not one of the prep**pies** or the yuppies. It was a way of visibly demonstrating one's rejection of mainstream society, but it was also a tacit affirmation of one's own superiority. It was a way of telegraphing the message ' that "I, unlike you, have not been fooled by the system. I am not a ; 'mindless cog."

#### Creates a race to the bottom – counterculture is a status symbol that causes more radicalism – the effort to remain exclusive will continue feeding the system

A – if everyone join their movement then it becomes the “norm” hence they have to change again

B – because the movement becomes more common it is forced to always evolve to continue being an “individual”

C – this drives the culture of consumption to reinvent the movement

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

The problem, of course, is that not everyone can be a rebel, for the same reason that not everyone can have class and not everyone can have good taste. If everyone joins the counterculture, then the counterculture simply becomes the culture. Then the rebel has to invent a new counterculture, in order to reestablish distinction. -Countercultural style begins as a very exclusive thing. It starts out ."underground." Particular symbols—a love bead, a safety pin, a brand of shoes or cut of jeans, a Maori tattoo, a body piercing, an aftermarket muffler—will serve as points of communication among those who are "in the know." Yet as time passes, the circle of those who are "in the know" expands, and the symbol becomes increasingly common. This naturally erodes the distinction that these markers confer—in the same way that Nascimento cheap­ened the Burberry brand. "The club" becomes less and less elite. As a result, the rebel has to move on to something new. Thus the coun­terculture must constantly reinvent itself. This is why rebels adopt and discard styles as quickly as fashionistas move through brands. In this way, countercultural rebellion has become one of the Major forces driving competitive consumption. As Thomas Frank Writes, With the "alternative" facelift, "rebellion" continues to perform its traditional function of justifying the economy's ever accelerating -: cycles of obsolescence with admirable efficiency. Since our willingness to load up our closets with purchases depends upon an eternal shifting of the products paraded before us, upon our being endlessly convinced that the new stuff is better than the old, we must be persuaded over and over again that the "alternatives" are more valuable than the existing or the previous. Ever since the a; 1960s, hip has been the native tongue of advertising, "antiestablishment" the vocabulary by which we are taught to cast off our ?) old possessions and buy whatever they have decided to offer this year. And over the years the rebel has naturally become the cen­tral image of this culture of consumption, symbolizing endless, directionless change, and eternal restlessness with "the establish­ment"—or, more correctly, with the stuff "the establishment" convinced him to buy last year.

### Inevitable

#### Biopower is inevitable

Wright, 08 - Fellow at the Centre for Global Political Economy (Nathan,“Camp as Paradigm: Bio-Politics and State Racism in Foucault and Agamben”, http://ccjournal.cgu.edu/past\_issues/nathan\_wright.html)//dm

Perhaps the one failure of Foucault’s that, unresolved, rings as most ominous is his failure to further examine the problem of bio-political state racism that he first raises in his lecture series, Society Must Be Defended. At the end of the last lecture, Foucault suggests that bio-power is here to stay as a fixture of modernity. Perhaps given its focus on the preservation of the population of the nation it which it is practiced, bio-power itself is something that Foucault accepts as here to stay. Yet his analysis of bio-politics and bio-power leads inevitably to state-sanctioned racism, be the government democratic, socialist, or fascist. As a result, he ends the lecture series with the question, “How can one both make a bio-power function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death, without becoming racist? That was the problem, and that, I think, is still the problem.” It was a problem to which he never returned. However, in the space opened by Foucault’s failure to solve the problem of state racism and to “elaborate a unitary theory of power” (Agamben 1998, 5) steps Agamben in an attempt to complete an analysis of Foucauldian bio-politics and to, while not solve the problem of state racism, at least give direction for further inquiry and hope of a politics that escapes the problem of this racism.

### Perspective

Metaphorical readings of the “borderlands” displace the cultural reality of the site in favor a particular vision that silences the Mexican perspective

Vaquera-Vásquez ’98 (Santiago, Texas A&M - Latin American Issues 14(6). http://webpub.allegheny.edu/group/LAS/LatinAmIssues/Articles/Vol14/LAI\_vol\_14\_section\_VI.html)

In contemporary cultural theory, the metaphor of the Borderlands has become a repository in which all manners of cultural Otherness is contained. The assumption is that "border thinking" posits a contestatory space for emerging cultures; it shapes the concepts of national and cultural authenticity and promotes global and transnational processes. The border has become referred to so often, as Trinh T. Minh-ha notes, that "it already runs the risk of being reduced to yet another harmless catchword expropriated and popularized among progressive thinkers" (2). And yet, the Borderlands metaphor resonates even more at the end of the century, when borders are continually crossed and recrossed. In focusing on geographic borderlands, more specifically, the borderlands between Mexico and the United States, metaphorical readings often displace the cultural reality of the site in favor of a particular border vision. In cultural discourse on the US/Mexico Borderlands, the dominant inscriptions are most often that of the Chicano and that of a global communal space. The region has been variously encoded as Aztlán--the pre-Columbian mythic past which is the cornerstone of the Chicano movement--and more recently as "Borderlands," the universal cultural construct representing the encounter of diverse cultures, genders, social classes, and world-views. As observed by Claire Fox, the Borderlands has come to replace Aztlán as "the metaphor of choice to designate a communal space" (61). This favoring of a universal reading of the Borderlands in contemporary criticism tends towards the collapsing of the distinct geographic differences between border regions and the abrogation of the cultural production of writers and critics in that region for an authentication of the border "reality" through a small number of primarily Chicano critics and writers. In this appropriation of the border, the Mexican perspective is largely silenced; there has been little interest in promoting the vision of the border as viewed from the northern Mexican border provinces.1 As a result, the image of the borderlands that is generally preferred is far removed from the multi-faceted reality of the site, a fact which puts into question the validity of the Borderlands metaphor: To what degree does current discourse on the Borderlands illuminate the border region, and to what degree does it obscure the very region to which much of this discourse is addressed? The present work aims to redress this oversight by focusing on the diverse "imaginative geographies" which arise from the Borderlands. In so doing, the work contributes to the formulation of a more extensive and complete account of border culture in general, and of the US/Mexico border in particular.

### Identity

The adoption of the mestiza identity erases all cultural traditions and history where it becomes one disembodied metaphor anyone can claim.

Donadey ‘7 (Anne, Department of European Studies and Women’s Studies at San Diego State University, “Overlapping and Interlocking Frames for Humanities Literature Studies: Assia Djebar, Tsitsi Dangarembga, Gloria Anzaldua,” College Literature, Fall, Volume: 34(4), p. 23)

In an important essay on the centrality of Anzaldúa’s work, Yvonne Yarbro-Bejarano cautions against “universalizing the theory of mestiza or border consciousness, which the text painstakingly grounds in specific historical and cultural experiences” (1998, 13) in order to preclude “[a]ppropriative readings” in which everyone becomes a mestiza and difference and specificity are erased (14; see also Phelan 1997; Castillo 2006). While I agree with Yarbro-Bejarano that what Emma Pérez (1999) would call Anzaldúa’s “decolonial imaginary” should not be flattened out by a post-modern translation of the concept of borderlands that would erase its historical and cultural grounding by turning it into a disembodied metaphor that all can come to claim, it is also important to remember that Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera has at least two levels of address: one deals with the specificity of the Chicana/o history in the U.S./Mexican borderlands; the other seeks to make a space for Chicanas/os and others whose identities cannot be reduced to binaries in a variety of locations, including the academy. Anzaldúa’s first words in Borderlands/La Frontera emphasize this very multiplicity of addresses: “The actual physical borderland that I’m dealing with in this book is the Texas-U.S. Southwest/Mexican border. The psychological borderlands, the sexual borderlands and the spiritual borderlands are not particular to the Southwest.” (1999, 19). Thinking of academic fields of study through the model of borders and borderlands is**, I believe, a way to follow up on an important insight of Anzaldúa’s, rather than an appropriation of her work.**

### Privilege Turn

The relegation of change to a subconscious process places a limitation on the individuals’ ability to change the conditions of their existence.

Hames-Garcia ’00(Michael, Department Head and Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies Education, “How to Tell a Mestizo from an Enchirito: Colonialism and National Culture in the Borderlands,” *Diacritics,* Volume: 30(4), p. 111-112)

Moreover, one might worry that Anzaldúa sometimes seems to relegate the possibilities for change to vague, unspecified subconscious processes. She writes, for example, that the new mestiza can move beyond choques by an “event which inverts or resolves the ambivalence,” but she is “not sure exactly how. The work takes place underground—subconsciously. It is work that the soul performs” [79]. She adds that this entails a “massive uprooting of dualistic thinking in the individual and collective consciousness” [80].

I do not deny that change needs to take place in the way we think and how we conceptualize ourselves and the world around us. However, exploitation and dualistic thinking are not necessarily linked. Consider, for example, the orgy of indigenismo, mestizofilia, and hybridity which constitutes much of consumer culture in Mexico (and, increasingly, in the United States under the rubrics of *diversity* and *multiculturalism*), even as actual indigenous peasants and mestizo workers are kept in wretched poverty. She writes, for example, that “[t]he struggle is inner. . . . The struggle has always been inner. . . . Nothing happens in the ‘real’ world unless it first happens in the images in our head” [87, emphasis mine]. Passages like these make her description of the new mestiza seem at times overly voluntarist and idealist, insofar as such moments contradict other places in her work that describe the limitations placed on people’s ability to do and think what they want and the need for material change in their conditions of existence.14 Elsewhere, she has stressed the point that “we can’t just escape and say, ‘Oh this is just a play on some kind of stage and it doesn’t really matter.’ . . . it’s a matter of life and death. So these things can only be worked out in physical reality” [Keating 118]. Additionally, she has cited activism as her primary motivation in her cultural work, writing that “it wasn’t enough just to sit and write and work on my computer. I had to connect the real-life, bodily experiences of people who were suffering because of some kind of oppression” [Lunsford 25]. She has also written, “I can’t discount the fact of the thousands that go to bed hungry every night. The thousands that do numbing shitwork eight hours a day each day of their lives. . . . I can’t reconcile the sight of a battered child with the belief that we choose what happens to us, that we create our own world” [“La Prieta” 208].

# 2nc

### AT: Predictable

#### Their side-stepping of deliberative testing means you should treat all their arguments as presumptively false.

Lasch 95 – Christopher, Social Critic and Author, “The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy”, p170

THE ROLE OF the press, as Lippmann saw it, was to circulate information, not to encourage argument. The rela-tionship between information and argument was antagonis-tic, not complementary. He did not take the position that reliable information was a necessary precondition of argu-ment; on the contrary, his point was that information pre-cluded argument, made argument unnecessary. Arguments were what took place in the absence of reliable information. Lippmann had forgotten what he learned (or should have learned) from William James and John Dewey, that our search for reliable information is itself guided by the questions that arise during arguments about a given course of action. It is only by subjecting our preferences and projects to the test of debate that we come to understand what we know and what we still need to learn. Until we have to defend our opinions in public, they remain opinions in Lippmann's pejorative sense—half-formed convictions based on random impressions and unexamined assumptions. It is the act of articulating and defending our views that lifts them) out of the category of "opinions," gives them shape and definition, and makes it possible for others to recognize them as a description of their own experience as well. In short, we come to know our own minds only by explaining ourselves to others.

#### Unpredictability means we can never disprove whether or not their solvency method is effective – you should presume it to be false since we can’t test it - which means they don’t get to weigh the case

Graff, 03 - University of English& Education, University of Illinois at Chicago (Gerald, Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures The Life of The Mind, p. 11-12)

But an even more important point that some readers of my work have missed is that the ultimate motivation of my argument for teaching the conflicts is the need to clarify academic culture, not just to resolve spats among academics or cultural factions. My assumption is that an institution as rife with conflicts as the American school and college can clarify itself only by making its ideological differences coherent. But even if our cultural and educational scene were a less contentious place than it is, the centrality of controversy to learning would still need to be stressed. For there exists a deep cognitive connection between controversy and intelligibility. John Stuart Mill pointed up the connection when he observed that we do not understand our own ideas until we know what can be said against them. In Mill's words, those who "have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them ... do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess."9 In other words, our very ability to think depends on contrast-on asking "as opposed to what?" This "dialogical" or contrastive character of human cognition has long been a given of modern thought, but the academic curriculum with its self isolated courses has yet to reflect it. When schooling is bad or dull, it is often because the curriculum effaces this element of contrast or as-opposed-to-whatness from students' view. the academic habit of evading conflict helps obscure the life of the mind.

### 2nc – at: roleplaying bad

#### Arguing that a current government policy is bad is not roleplaying

Harris, 13 - Director of Debate, Kansas University (Scott, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0)

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decision-making – the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman, 12 - is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal (Dr. Henk Simon “The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice” <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>)

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

X

### 2nc –borders

#### Their border analogy is ridiculous – not only are all borders different, but their silly comparison to T devalues the experiences of migrants

Vila, 05 - Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio (Pablo, “Conclusion: The Limits of American Border Theory,” Ethnography at the Border, Ed. Pablo Vila, p.307-315)

After dominating the field for some time, this corpus of work has come under criticism in recent years. This criticism does not deny the pathbreaking character of those books but seeks to address several short- comings that have now become apparent. As Heyman points out, "A single-image representing grand theoretical assertions is too general for the political and economic environment of the border. I propose that we specify our analytical tools for the border: that is, that we respect the concretely located nature of the Mexico-U.S. border" (1994, 43). Thus several authors have lately advanced different criticisms of mainstream border theory. First, some Mexican scholars (Tabuenca, Barrera) have complained that the U.S.-Mexico border most of this work portrays with such theo- retical sophistication has little resemblance to the border they experience from the other side of the (literal) fence. Second, other writers have noted the exclusionary character of border studies and theory exemplified in these major works and claim that current mainstream border theory essentializes the cultures that must be crossed. Third, as I claim hereafter, in the vast majority of recent border scholarship, there is a general failure to pursue the theoretical possibility that fragmentation of experience can lead to the reinforcement of borders instead of an invitation to cross them. Thus crossing borders, and not reinforcing borders, is the preferred metaphor in current border studies and theory. Fourth, a corollary of the previous trend is the tendency to construct the border crosser or the hybrid (in some cases the Latin American inter- national immigrant in general, but in others the Chicano in particular— at least in the books I am criticizing here) into a new "privileged subject of history." Fifth, border studies have recently moved from the study of is- sues related to the U.S.-Mexico border in particular to broader themes, in which the metaphor of borders is used to represent any situation where limits are involved. Border studies thus takes as its own object of inquiry any physical or psychic space about which it is possible to address problems of boundaries: borders among different countries, borders among ethnicities within the United States, borders between genders, borders among disciplines, and the like. Borderlands and border crossings seem to have become ubiquitous terms to represent the experience of (some) people in a postmodern world described as fragmented and continually producing new borders that must again and again be crossed. And if current border studies and theory propose that borders are everywhere, the border-crossing experience is in some instances assumed to be similar: that is, it seems that for the "border crosser" or the "hybrid," the experience of moving among different disciplines, different ethnicities, and different countries and cultures is not dissimilar in character (Grossberg 1996). This approach not only homogenizes distinctive experiences but also homogenizes borders.' Sixth, there is a tendency in current border studies and theory to confiise the sharing of a culture with the sharing of an identity, so that use of the "third country" metaphor promotes the idea that Fronterizo Mexicans and Mexican Americans construct their social and cultural identities in similar ways. My criticism here is that it is quite possible to share aspects of the same culture while developing quite different narrative identities, to the point, in some instances, where the "other kind of Mexican" is constructed as the abject "other." Finally, in some extreme circumstances and in particular locales, these theoretical processes have developed a version of identity politics on the U.S.-Mcxico border that rely on the metaphor of "brotherhood"-— meaning the purportedly intrinsic connections between Mexican na- tionals, Mexican immigrants, and Chicanos. Yet because that brotherhood does not exist in particular border situations (as exemplified, for instance, in Mexican American support for Operation Blockade in the region dealt with in this collection), this form of identity politics is doomed to failure.

#### Border analogies lead to poor analysis about oppressive structures – turns the case

Ang, 98 - Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Western Sydney, Nepean (Ien, “Doing cultural studies at the crossroads,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 1(1), p. 27-28)

As I have already suggested, an explicitly comparative perspective is called for here, as the strategy of comparison implies an awareness of difference as its episte- mological stimulus while at the same time, in its very requirement of juxtaposing at least two realities, being a guard against exaggerated notions of uniqueness and incommensurability. Thus, we should expect as much as we can, say, from a dialogue between Gloria Anzaldua and Iain Chambers; and put as much effort as we can in the substantiation and specification of the metaphors and concepts we use to establish our common grounds. This is not altogether different from the ideal of cosmopolitalism, embraced by Bruce Robbins not, in his words, 4as a false universal1 but \*as an impulse to knowledge that is shared with others, a striving to transcend partiality that is itself partial, but no more so than the similar cognitive strivings of many diverse peoples' (ibid.: 194). This, of course, returns us straight to the borderlands, the arena where the sharing of partial perspectives and knowledges are supposed to take place, in what Robbins (ibid.: 196) calls 'a long-term process of translocal connecting". What I have tried to emphasize in this chapter, however, is the practical fact that there are limits to the sharing we can do, that there is only so much (or so little) that we can share. Indeed, I think we could only stand to gain from the recognition that any process of 'translocal connecting' not only needs hard work, but, more importantly, can only be partial also. I would even suggest that our crossroads encounters would be more productive if we recognize the moments of actual disconnection rather than hold on to the abstract Utopian ideal of connection so bound up with celebrations of the borderlands. For it is in the realization and problematization of such moments of actual disconnection - that is, moments when the act of meaningful comparison and communication reaches its limits - that the material consequences of difference, of the irreducible and unrepresentable specificity and particularity of 'the local' are most bluntly exposed, but always-already within the translocal context within which that 'local' is distinctively constituted. In short, it is at moments when comprehending my local-specific narrative becomes problematic to you, my reader, when such comprehension seems muted because I do not seem to speak in familiar discourse, that the malleability of general theoretical concepts such as 'race', 'nation' and 'identity', not to mention metaphors such as the 'borderlands' and the 'crossroads', becomes evident. It is the ways in which we both do and do not share these (and many other) concepts and metaphors across local/particular/spccific boundaries that we should begin to interrogate and highlight.

# 1nr

### FW

#### Economic engagement is trade or aid

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.

Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

### AT: Contradictory

#### Changing what we say is key to CHANGE OUR MINDS – Pure ideological consistency prevents gear switching — key to compromise and democratic deliberation

van Zuylen-Wood 12 — Simon van Zuylen-Wood, Writer for Philadelphia Magazine*,* former writer for the New Republic and the Washington Monthly,2012 (“In Defense of Flip-Flopping,” *Political Animal*—a *Washington Monthly* blog, October 28th, Available Online at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2012\_10/in\_defense\_of\_flipflopping040786.php, Accessed 07-22-2013)

There’s another reason the strategy is a foolish one. Hypocrisy in politics is not only inevitable, but a very necessary evil. To condemn it as a high political crime is to ignore the virtues of ideological malleability. Cass Sunstein, whose post at OMB consisted of high-level cost-benefit analysis, rather than doctrinaire policy-making, praised hypocrisy in a recent column.

In politics, turncoats make sensible compromises possible. If Democrats and Republicans are sharply divided on a question of economic policy, and no one is willing to break ranks, an agreement might be unachievable… Turncoats also break down echo chambers. If conservatives or liberals are listening only to those on their side, they tend to become more confident, more unified and more extreme.

Nixon went to China, Clinton enacted welfare reform, Roberts upheld Obamacare, as Sunstein writes. If the past is any indication, his party will eventually come around to Roberts’s way of thinking, as with Nixon and Clinton, after their supposed heresies. Few castigate Obama now for flipping on the individuate mandate, a policy he vehemently opposed (for conservative reasons) in his primary fight with Hillary Clinton. Moreover, Obama, whose entire 2008 candidacy was based on finding middle ground, demonstrates the necessity not only of embracing flexibility in our politicians, but in practicing it ourselves. Those progressives who still condemn Democrats for giving up on a public option to his health care law, for instance, are interested less in political process—the art of the possible—than in political revolution. Indeed, historian Martin Jay wrote in 2010, after candidates ‘etch-a-sketch’ out of their primary campaigns, “we give them a pass because we know that a genuine consensus based on rational deliberation is highly unlikely, and yet democratic politics requires building a winning coalition…truth-telling is not always the best policy in even the most democratic of political contexts.”

There’s something not only political unfeasible, but morally worrisome about demanding complete ideological coherence from our candidates. The capacity to switch gears reflects the ability to make clear-headed, rather than doctrinaire, judgments. “The ‘big truth’ - ‘the absolute, univocal truth, which silences those who disagree with it and abruptly terminates discussion’,” wrote NYU political theorist Jeremy Waldron in a 2011 review of Jay’s book The Virtues of Mendacity in the London Review of Books “may be as oppressive and inimical to human freedom, plurality, and the vigour of debate as the ‘big lie.’” Political math aside, we’d rather have Romney tack to the center than hang back with the ideologically pure Tea Party puritans, right?

### 2nc – turn

#### Their radical shift never stops – as people adopt it they are forced to go further and further

A – their movement becomes subversive when society begins to accept it, or what they call “co-option”

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

How many times can the system be subverted without any noticeable effect before we begin to question the means of subversion? If insanity truly is doing the same thing again and again while expecting a different result, then it must be madness to think that any of this radicalism is going to undermine the system. How many more decades will it take before we realize that nuns who say "fuck" are not radical, they are simply entertainment? Here's a quick list of things that, in the past fifty years, have been considered extremely subversive: smoking, longhair for men, short hair for women, beards, miniskirts, bikinis, heroin, jazz music, rock music, punk music, reggae music, rap music, tattoos, underarm hair, graffiti, surfing, scooters, piercings, skinny ties, not wearing a bra, homosexuality, marijuana, torn clothing, hair gel, mohawks, afros, birth control, postmodernism, plaid pants, organic vegetables, army boots, interracial sex. Nowadays, you can find every item on this list in a typical Britney Spears video (with the possible exception of underarm hair and organic vegetables). Countercultural rebels have become like doomsday prophets, forced to constantly push back the date on which the world is posed to end, as one deadline after another passes by uneventfully. Each time a new symbol of rebellion gets "co-opted" by the systern, countercultural rebels are forced to go further and further^ prove their alternative credentials, to set themselves apart from despised masses. Punks started out with multiple ear piercirr When that became too common, they moved on to nose piercia then eyebrow, tongue and navel piercing. When high school gir started getting those, the rebels moved into "primitive" styles, to" Balinese ear blocks or ampallangs. One can see a self-radicalizing tendency at work here that is highly characteristic of countercultural movements. The fundamental problem is that rebellion against aesthetic and sartorial norms is not actually subversive. Whether people have piercings and tattoos, what kind of clothes they wear, what music they listen to, simply does not matter from the standpoint of the capitalist system. Corporations are fundamentally neutral when it comes to gray flannel suits and biker jackets. No matter what the style, there will always be merchants lined up to sell it. And any successful rebel style, becau. i it confers distinction, will automatically attract imitators. Because there is no genuine subversion involved, there is nothing to stop everyone from adopting the same style. Anyone can get a piercing < grow their hair long. So anything that is "alternative" or "cool" and has the least bit to recommend it will inevitably be "mainstreamed This creates a dilemma for the rebel. Sartorial markers that on< served as a source of distinction find their significance eroded. This leaves the rebel with two choices: accept the inevitable and be o1 L I taken by the masses, or resist further, by fmding some new, moi t-extreme style, one that has not yet attracted as many imitators anu thus can still serve as a source of distinction. What the rebel is looking for, in the end, is the unco-optable subculture. Like the gambler in the Leonard Cohen song, looking for the card so high and wild he'll never need to play another, the countercultural rebel is looking for a path that no one else will follow, a look so extreme that it will never be mainstream. "" I be problem is that by the time the imitators start to fall away, ^usually for a pretty good reason.

### Biopower Defense

#### Even if they win that policy turns to the dark side of biopolitics, their impact will still be prevented by localized resistance.

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism,

Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the current literature, it seems that biopolitics is almost always acting on (or attempting to act on) people; it is almost never something they do. This kind of model is not very realistic. This is not how societies work. The example of the attempt to create a eugenic counseling system in Prussia should be instructive in this respect. Here public health and eugenics experts— technocrats— tried to impart their sense of eugenic crisis and their optimism about the possibility of creating a better “race” to the public; and they successfully mobilized the resources of the state in support of their vision. And yet, what emerged quite quickly from this effort was in fact a system of public contraceptive advice — or family planning. It is not so easy to impose technocratic ambitions on the public, particularly in a democratic state; and “on the ground,” at the level of interactions with actual persons and social groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the fantasies of technocrats. This is of course a point that Foucault makes with particular clarity. The power of discourse is not the power of manipulative elites, which control it and impose it from above. Manipulative elites always face resistance, often effective, resistance. More important, the power of discourse lies precisely in its ability to set the terms for such struggles, to define what they are about, as much as what their outcomes are. As Foucault put it, power— including the power to manage life —“comes from everywhere.”105 Biomedical knowledge was not the property only of technocrats, and it could be used to achieve ends that had little to do with their social-engineering schemes.106 Modern biopolitics is a multifaceted world of discourse and practice elaborated and put into practice at multiple levels throughout modern societies.

#### Tons of alt causes – airports and the construction of border logic in other countries and naval patrols – their impact evidence is too generic – if they can’t solve all of these then their impact is inevitable – BUT if they do then they’re extra-topical

Agnew 2008 (John, Department of Geography, UCLA, Los Angeles, “Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking,” Ethics & Global Politics 1, no. 4, http://ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/egp/article/view/1892/1985 - oliver g)

In my view, borders have always been more equivocal practically and ethically in their origins and in their effects than the two dominant types of story allow. I would suggest that the overarching normative question in re-framing understanding of borders is how much borders enhance or restrict the pursuit of a decent life. They have always been open to question, if not to all who would cross them. The paths they follow are often quite arbitrary and without any sort of ‘natural&#8217; justification. Their socio-political significance is very recent (much more recent, for example, than Sahlins's sixteenth century) and this relates perhaps as much to the increased infrastructural power of some states and lack of it in others, increased gradients of economic development across borders around the world, and improved ease of travel as to the identity functions they perform and that are emphasized so much in both of the stories. In moving beyond the either/or perspective, we need recourse to some concepts that aid in understanding the ambiguity of borders.¶ In a recent article, Mark Salter makes imaginative use of Michel Foucault's ideas of ‘heterotopia’ and ‘confessionary complex&#8217; to understand the bordering activities that take place at airports.56 Borders are encountered at locations within (airports and immigrant policing at workplaces) and well beyond (immigration posts at foreign ports and airports) any particular map borders. Heterotopias are locations that because of their very specificity, problematize the various functions typically associated with ‘like’ locations; in this case bordering locations other than airports.57 These are unusual places. They are sometimes referred to as a type of ‘non-place’ in which the rules of everyday life that prevail elsewhere across places within a national territory are replaced by some very particular and peculiar ones. A confessionary complex refers to the docility and anxiety typically engendered, at least in Western cultures, by the gauntlet that must be run past agents of the state in places such as airports. This dual focus takes us away from the simple obsession with borders as easily guarded land borders characteristic of much border thinking (and anti-border thinking) and towards the complexity of what borders do and how they are managed for both territorial and networked spaces. Two particularly important features of the article lie in its countering both excessively laudatory accounts of airports as transversal places in which inside and outside are invariably confused and the similarly frequent failure to note the relative inefficiencies with which airports fulfill their security functions because of their inherent contradictions (screening for objects versus identifying dangerous persons, etc.) and all of the other activities they carry out, such as transportation and, increasingly, shopping, by those not subject to containment and deportation. In other words, border crossings such as **airports** are not always as easily grounded or readily transgressed as the two dominant stories, respectively, would have us believe.¶ Of course, borders have always had such focal points, from Ellis Island NY as a port of entry for European immigrants to the US, to Checkpoint Charlie between the two Berlins during the Cold War. All checkpoints, not just airports, have simply become more complex in the range of functions they perform. Beyond them, along the border, not much happens most of the time. Indeed, most borders remain unfenced and largely undefended outside of the checkpoints to which people crowd because of routes and modes of transport that focus them there. In a number of respects, therefore, it is not entirely clear to me that airports differ fundamentally from other border checkpoints (except, perhaps, in the shopping) and should be placed in this wider context. What airports do suggest is how much bordering is beyond the land borders of states per se. Rather than taking place only at borders on a map, bordering practices are much more widely diffused geographically.¶ What I have in mind about the practical and ethical equivocality of borders can be related to four points that should be placed in this broader context about airports and other border checkpoints. First off, the security functions of airports are part of what can be called ‘territorial regimes&#8217;, constituting a wide range of state-based inclusionary and exclusionary practices that are more and less discriminatory and effective in given areas, compare financial transactions and container traffic across borders, for example, with eligibility for certain social and political rights by people that follow from establishing legal territorial residence.58 With respect to human border crossing, which country's passport (and associated paperwork) you happen to hold and where it stands in the global pecking order becomes the crucial variable determining the experience of passing from one territory to another, be it at an airport gate, a ship's gangplank, or a land-border crossing. Although an important, and frequently neglected, site of territorial control, the airport should be kept within this larger theoretical frame of reference. In other words, the possibilities of transversal practice or transgression and ‘global citizenship’ should not be exaggerated. They are available, if at all, to relatively few, above all to the privileged employees of multinational companies and skilled immigrants of one sort or another. In addition, these days border controls extend well beyond borders per se into workplaces and neighborhoods in the interior of the state.59 This not only makes the whole national territory into a border zone, but also potentially criminalizes the entire population in the face of enforcement of identity checks and so on. Immigration checks at foreign airports extend the reach of some authorities well beyond their own putative borders.60¶ In addition, as is clear from the American media rhetoric about ‘broken borders’, the fanatical CNN news anchor Lou Dobbs uses this phrase regularly to refer specifically to the US-Mexico border, and my second point, the map image of the borders of the state still exercises a major influence on the territorial imagination of whose security is at stake and who most threatens it.61 Many of us still live in a world where political borders are the most important signs on a world map. Even though airports, for example, may well be major sites for the arrival of contested migrants and possible terrorists, the most popular idea is that of the former running, swimming, or otherwise penetrating land **and sea borders**. This powerful image of the border as a guardian of personal security akin to a security perimeter or fence around one's home underwrites much of the hardening of border controls around the US and the European Union in recent years.62 Yet, of course, this is totally misleading; not only in the fact that most undocumented aliens/those without papers/clandestini are not security threats (at least not in the sense frequently considered as involved in terrorist plots) and once they arrive fulfill a variety of economic functions that would otherwise go unfulfilled, but that the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks around the world have involved legal visitors from ‘friendly&#8217; countries or local citizens. The notion of trespass or unregulated violation appears to provide the primary ethical basis to the imaginative emphasis on the physical border per se as ‘the face of the nation to the world&#8217;, so to speak. Rarely is it immigrants tout court who are openly in question, it is those without legal recognition. Of course, it is their very illegality that is attractive to employers and consumers because of the lack of qualification for public services and the ever-present threat of deportation as a disciplinary measure. No one talks much about how difficult it usually is to be a legal immigrant. Yet, the discourse frequently is more ambiguous in simultaneously always seeming to worry about the cultural threat that foreign immigrants of whatever legal status pose to the national identity because blood and family ties often count so much (either officially or unofficially) in most definitions of who ‘really belongs&#8217; within the national territory.63 Even in countries which officially claim more ‘open&#8217; definitions of citizenship than is typically the norm, such as France and the US, nativist movements have little doubt about who is more and who is less deserving of recognition as French or American. Debates about who does and who does not belong draw attention to both the fluid and the contested character of national identities.64¶ Perhaps even more importantly, however, borders, including their sites at airports, serve vital economic functions. A third point, therefore, is that though borders are about classifying identities, they are also about sorting and sifting goods and people to enhance or maintain unequal cross-border exchanges.65 They are not simply about a security-identity nexus as both dominant stories about borders tend to allege. Cheap labor on one side facilitates cheaper products for more affluent consumers on the other. Though the idea of a global economy has become widely accepted, in fact much economic activity is still overwhelmingly within national borders and most firms are still effectively reliant on national models of business structure and spatial organization.66 There are very few truly global companies and they are mostly Swiss (or from other small countries). More particularly, borders still stand guard over massive differences in standards of living that, though shrinking somewhat as within-nation differences have grown in recent years, are still largely defined precisely at national borders. The US-Mexico border&#8212; &#8216;the tortilla curtain&#8217;—is emblematic in this regard. The extreme income gradient that it marks invites people to cross it whatever the barriers they encounter on the way. Alain Badiou makes the overall point eloquently as follows:¶ The fall of the Berlin wall was supposed to signal the advent of the single world of freedom and democracy. Twenty years later, it is clear that the world's wall has simply shifted: instead of separating East and West it now divides the rich capitalist North from the poor and devastated South. New walls are being constructed all over the world: between Palestinians and Israelis, between Mexico and the United States, between Africa and the Spanish enclaves, between the pleasures of wealth and the desires of the poor, whether they be peasants in villages or urban dwellers in favelas, banlieues, estates, hostels, squats and shantytowns. The price of the supposedly unified world of capital is the brutal division of human existence into regions separated by police dogs, bureaucratic controls, naval patrols, barbed wire and expulsions.67¶ Fourthly, and finally, policing borders still has a powerful normative justification in the defense of that territorial sovereignty which serves to underpin both liberal and democratic claims to (Lockean) popular rule. Now such claims may frequently be empirically fictive, particularly in the case of imperial and large nation-states, but the logic of the argument is that, absent effective worldwide government, the highest authority available is that of existing states.68 How such states police their borders, of course, should be subject to transparent and open regulation. But why it is popularly legitimate to engage in policing functions in the way they are carried out cannot simply be put down to mass docility in the face of an omnipotent (because it is omniscient) state apparatus. National populations do worry about their borders because their democracy (or other, familiar, politics) depends on it. The border is a continuing marker of a national (or supranational) political order even as people, in Europe at least, can now cross it for lunch.69 The problem here is that democratic theory and practice is not yet up to dealing with the complexities of a world in which territories and flows must necessarily co-exist. If one can argue, as does Arash Abizadeh, that ‘the demos of democratic theory is in principle unbounded&#8217;, this still begs the question of who is ‘foreigner&#8217; and who is ‘citizen&#8217; in a world that is still practically divided by borders.70 As Sofia N&#228;sstrom puts the problem succinctly: &#8216;it is one thing to argue that globalization has opened the door to a problem within modern political thought, quite another to argue that globalization is the origin of this problem&#8217;.71 **Until political community is redefined in some way as not being co-extensive with nation-state, we will be stuck with much of business as usual**.¶ Currently then, given the strong arguments about what borders do and the problems that they also entail, a more productive ethic than thinking either just with or just against them would be to re-frame the discussion in terms of the impacts that borders have; what they do both for and to people. From this perspective, we can both recognize the necessary roles of borders and the barriers to improved welfare that they create. In the first place, however, this requires re-framing thinking about borders away from the emphasis on national citizenship towards a model of what Dora Kostakopoulou calls ‘civic registration’ Under this model, the only condition for residence would be demonstrated willingness to live according to democratic rule plus some set requirements for residency and the absence of a serious criminal record. Such a citizenship model requires a reconceptualization of territorial space as a ‘dwelling space’ for residents and, thus, a move away from the nationalist narratives which cultivate ‘the belief that territory is a form of property to be owned by a particular national group, either because the latter has established a “first occupancy&#8221; claim or because it regards this territory as a formative part of its identity&#8217;.73 In a world in which wars and systematic violations of human rights push millions to seek asylum across borders every year, this rethinking is imperative.74¶ In the second place, and by way of example, from this viewpoint it is reasonable ‘to prefer global redistributive justice to open borders. To put it bluntly, it is better to shift resources to people rather than permitting people to shift themselves towards resources&#8217;.75 Currently much migration from country-to-country is the result of the desire to improve economic well-being and enhance the life-chances of offspring. Yet, people often prefer to stay put, for familial, social, and political reasons, if they can. There seems no good basis, therefore, to eulogize and institutionalize movement as inherently preferable to staying put. If adequate mechanisms were developed to stimulate development in situ, many people who currently move would not. Not only people in destination countries associate their identities with territory.¶ Using the standard of a decent life, therefore, can lead beyond the present impasse between the two dominant views of borders towards a perspective that re-frames borders as having both negative and positive effects and that focuses on how people can both benefit from borders and avoid their most harmful effects. In political vision as in everyday practice, therefore, borders remain as ambiguously relevant as ever, even as we work to enhance their positive and limit their negative effects.

### Mexican Perspective 2NC

The borderland narrative has contributed to the further invisibility of the Mexican perspective – northern Mexican analysis soundly rejects the work of Anzaldua.

Vaquera-Vásquez ’98 (Santiago, Texas A&M - Latin American Issues 14(6). http://webpub.allegheny.edu/group/LAS/LatinAmIssues/Articles/Vol14/LAI\_vol\_14\_section\_VI.html)

While the vision of the border as a metaphor for a hybrid, communal zone may be appealing, it has further advanced the displacement and "invisibilation" of the borderlands reality, and particularly, of northern Mexico. As noted at the outset, and corroborated throughout the present discussion, much of the Chicano cultural discourse has ignored the Mexican perspective.6 If there is a conception of Mexico at all, it is as an echo, a cultural tie in the past-such a trace is evident in the works of Anzaldúa and Mora-or as a zone of poverty and lawlessness, as in much of the media portrayals, the political discourse out of Washington D.C. and Mexico City, and such works as Luis Alberto Urrea's Across the Wire, in which the author documents the hardships of Tijuana's lower classes. While the latter work is a powerful testimonial, exposing the terrible conditions of the poor on the border, it also maintains the stereotypical image of Tijuana--and on a larger scale, the perception of the border region--as a zone of corruption.7 A necessary component of the present Borderlands project. then, is the in-depth study of northern Mexican border perspective. There are a number of problems which arise in taking a binational perspective of the region, for instance, the dissemination of northern Mexican writing and criticism outside and within the border regions. Notwithstanding such difficulties, several binational projects dedicated to the border and studies have taken in the region as a geographic unity. The BAW/TAF, for example, was composed of artists from Mexico and the United States. However, it should be noted that the BAW/TAF was not always a contented binational collective. Several of the Mexican writers rebelled against the border "reality" that the American artists, in particular Gómez-Peña, were presenting. Rosina Conde, for instance, left the workshop because "they wanted to present a border art much different than ours, but this was not the problem since art can be represented in a number of forms. The problem was that they wanted to impose their will. They wanted to turn us into pseudo-Chicano/as, or into a fronterizo/a that did not represent us" (Tabuenca, "Viewing the Border" 164). One early successful binational encounter was the Primer Festival de Literatura Fronteriza México-Estados Unidos, which took place in 1981 in Tijuana. At this meeting, Luis Leal states of borderlands culture, "en verdad, ambas literatures pueden ser consideradas como dos perfiles de la misma cara..." and that they both examine "las relaciones entre las dos culturas, principalmente con el objeto de llegar a comprenderse mejor exponiendo las diferencias, las causas de los malos entendimientos y lo que cada cultura puede aportar a la otra" (38). His work proposes to view the region not as a homogenous zone, but rather one in which both Mexican and American writers negotiate the borderlands but through different means. It merits noting that this work by Leal is a call for a truly binational study which has yet to be undertaken.

### Privilege 2NC

The relegation of change to a subconscious process places a limitation on the individuals’ ability to change the conditions of their existence.

Hames-Garcia ’00(Michael, Department Head and Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies Education, “How to Tell a Mestizo from an Enchirito: Colonialism and National Culture in the Borderlands,” *Diacritics,* Volume: 30(4), p. 111-112)

Moreover, one might worry that Anzaldúa sometimes seems to relegate the possibilities for change to vague, unspecified subconscious processes. She writes, for example, that the new mestiza can move beyond choques by an “event which inverts or resolves the ambivalence,” but she is “not sure exactly how. The work takes place underground—subconsciously. It is work that the soul performs” [79]. She adds that this entails a “massive uprooting of dualistic thinking in the individual and collective consciousness” [80].

I do not deny that change needs to take place in the way we think and how we conceptualize ourselves and the world around us. However, exploitation and dualistic thinking are not necessarily linked. Consider, for example, the orgy of indigenismo, mestizofilia, and hybridity which constitutes much of consumer culture in Mexico (and, increasingly, in the United States under the rubrics of *diversity* and *multiculturalism*), even as actual indigenous peasants and mestizo workers are kept in wretched poverty. She writes, for example, that “[t]he struggle is inner. . . . The struggle has always been inner. . . . Nothing happens in the ‘real’ world unless it first happens in the images in our head” [87, emphasis mine]. Passages like these make her description of the new mestiza seem at times overly voluntarist and idealist, insofar as such moments contradict other places in her work that describe the limitations placed on people’s ability to do and think what they want and the need for material change in their conditions of existence.14 Elsewhere, she has stressed the point that “we can’t just escape and say, ‘Oh this is just a play on some kind of stage and it doesn’t really matter.’ . . . it’s a matter of life and death. So these things can only be worked out in physical reality” [Keating 118]. Additionally, she has cited activism as her primary motivation in her cultural work, writing that “it wasn’t enough just to sit and write and work on my computer. I had to connect the real-life, bodily experiences of people who were suffering because of some kind of oppression” [Lunsford 25]. She has also written, “I can’t discount the fact of the thousands that go to bed hungry every night. The thousands that do numbing shitwork eight hours a day each day of their lives. . . . I can’t reconcile the sight of a battered child with the belief that we choose what happens to us, that we create our own world” [“La Prieta” 208].