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#### Interpretation - “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

### Politics

#### Debt ceiling deal will be reached- tough move politically for the GOP but they’ll blink

The Hill, 9-14-2013 <http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/322247-confident-democrats-want-separate-showdowns-on-shutdown-and-debt-limit>

Democrats, however, want to force the GOP to debate these issues successively.¶ “We’re not negotiating on the debt ceiling. We think we have the high ground in both of those fights,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide.¶ The Senate Democratic strategy over the next several weeks will be to stand pat and refuse to make any significant concessions in exchange for funding the government or raising the debt ceiling.¶ “If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. “They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets.”¶ Schumer said Republicans are on stronger political ground if there’s a government shutdown, but warned “even on that one, they’re on weak ground because the public sort of is finally smelling that these guys are for obstructing.”

#### Plan guarantees congressional backlash

Hanson and Lee 13 (Stephanie, associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, Brianna, Senior Production Editor, 01/31, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)

Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

#### PC Key to avoid prolonged standoff over debt ceiling that tanks economy

McGregor, 13 (Richard, Richard McGregor (born 1958) is a journalist, writer and author. He was the chief political correspondent, Japan correspondent and China correspondent for The Australian. He also worked for the International Herald Tribune, the BBC and the Far Eastern Economic Review. He has worked as a journalist in Taiwan, Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne.[1] He is the former bureau chief for the Financial Times. He has written The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers.[2] The book was published by Allen Lane from Penguin Press in the UK and HarperCollins in the US in June 2010.[3] McGregor has won the 2010 Society of Publishers in Asia (SOPA) Editorial Excellence Award [1] for reporting on the Xinjiang Riots[10] and the SOPA Award in 2008 for Editorial Intelligences.[1][11] Financial Times, 6/24,

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a66c240-dc0f-11e2-8853-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Z7YPAEJQ>

The debt ceiling debate will take place in a very different context this time, with the economy recovering and the US budget deficit falling rapidly after earlier deals on tax rises and spending cuts. “There is also a certain crisis fatigue,” said Stan Collender, a former congressional staffer, at Qorvis Communication, a Washington consultancy. The debt ceiling will probably be increased eventually, even if a prolonged stand-off has the potential to damage confidence in the economy. “This isn’t 2011: if Republicans provoke a debt ceiling confrontation over demands for massive, offsetting spending cuts, the business community is going to come unglued,” said John Lawrence, former chief of staff to Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic minority leader in the House. But the political capital needed to get the statutory debt ceiling raised has the potential to drain the energy and spirit of compromise that both sides will need to forge a majority coalition for immigration.

This outweighs any other internal

Swagel 9-4 [Phillip, professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from 2006 to 2009, “Fiscal Collisions Ahead,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/fiscal-collisions-ahead/>, ALB]\*we don’t support the ableist rhetoric of the evidence

A failure to act would harm the economy. Not lifting the debt ceiling in particular would be expected to have catastrophic economic effects. Interest rates could skyrocket if investors question the full faith and credit of the United States government, leading to a credit crunch that pummels business and consumer spending. The calamity might be avoided if the Treasury Department makes payments to bondholders to avoid a default, but even with this contingency plan (which the Treasury shows no sign of putting into place), the spectacle of a government that cannot finance its routine operations would doubtless translate into a severe negative impact on private confidence and spending.¶ A shutdown of nonessential government operations on Oct. 1 would mean an unintended reduction in spending that could retard [halt[ the recovery, but the larger consequence again would be indirect through a hit to confidence. With the government unable to attend to routine matters, it does not take much to imagine that American families and companies would halt plans to spend, invest and hire. This would repeat the natural instinct that contributed to the plunge in economic activity in the fall of 2008.¶ Fiscal uncertainty matters for monetary policy as well, because the Federal Reserve will hesitate to start unwinding its expansionary policy if a serious fiscal drag seems imminent.

#### Best studies prove economic collapse causes war

Royal 10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### K

#### The rhetoric of democratic accountability is a trojan horse for neo-liberal dominance by the U.S.- the alternative is to reject the aff and its form of decisionmaking

**Evans, Southampton politics professor, 2001**

(Tony, the Politics of Human Rights pg. 86-88)

Democracy and Global Order Why then have the generally held assumptions about human rights and democracy been so vigorously promoted in some quarters? The answer to this question is found by looking at the failure of development in the less developed world. According to this argument, the threat of social unrest, which would disrupt the supply of raw materials, restrict investment opportunities and severely damage prospects for exploiting low-cost labour, cannot be avoided by using coercive policing and military suppression, as it was during the Cold War period. During the Cold War such coercion was legitimated by the argument that the threat of communism justified support for any tyrannical government provided it was avowedly anti-communist (Mahbubani 1992). Violence was justified 'because the Third World people were being killed to protect them from the evil incarnate -communism' (Shivji 1999: 257). The collapse of the Soviet bloc removed this rationale for maintaining order at the expense of human rights and justice. Instead, policy makers turned to democracy as the moral justification for maintaining economic and political relations with governments known to violate human rights. This left those who trade with repressive regimes, or those who want to maintain cordial relations for political reasons, with the dilemma of promoting a new rationale that justified continuing economic and political relations. The distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, which assumes that the former represents a transitory stage in the move to full democracy, while the latter does not, offers a well-known foundation for resolving this dilemma (Kirkpatrick 1982). The success of this move can be judged by the way that the democracy discourse increasingly replaces the human rights discourse in US foreign policy circles (Carothers 1994). Through this device, it remains legitimate to continue with economic relationships, to call for extended aid programmes and to develop new trade and business relations, **unhindered by moral concerns**, provided a country has created the institutions of democracy. However, the promotion of democracy was not necessarily concerned with **social justice, human rights, human security or ideas of human worth**, but the need to create an appropriate global order for the continued **expansion of global capital**. In support of this aim, powerful capitalist states sought to promote democracy in its procedural guise: as a set of democratic institutions rather than as a means of achieving social and economic transformation that would have empowered the poor and the socially excluded. This form of **'low-intensity democracy'** may be understood as a component of 'low-intensity conflict', a policy that the US sought to promote as a means of securing anti-communist and antireformist support that avoided either unstable representative democratic systems or military dictatorship: Democracy was thus used as a form of intervention. **Its intent was to pre-empt either progressive reform or revolutionary change.** Beyond seeking to demobilise popular forces, it also sought to legitimise the status quo. Authoritarianism was thus discredited and delegitimised. The new 'democratic' regime, which temporarily enjoys increased legitimacy, can in fact undertake economic and social policies of 'adjustment' that impose new hardships on the general population and compromise economic sovereignty. The paradox of Low Intensity Democracy is that **a civilianised conservative regime can pursue painful and even repressive social and economic policies with more impunity and with less popular resistance than can an openly authoritarian regime**. From the point ofview of the US and conservative domestic elites in these countries, this quality must make it an interesting and useful alternative to traditional overt authoritarianism. (Gills, Rocamora & Wilson 1993: 8) This paradox does not escape the consciousness of citizens where low-intensity democracy operates. As incidents of resistance to globalization often remind us, the economic conditions suffered by many people, together with an absence of basic liberties, stimulates challenges to established systems of government, which are seen 'domestically as predatory and corrupt and internationally, servile executors of the economic agenda of ruling classes of the major OECD nations' (Cheru 1997: 164). By adopting a definition of democracy that places emphasis on the creation of formal institutions, which promises limited changes to civil and political rights but has little to say about economic and social reform, 'repressive abuses of human rights continue usually against the familiar targets of labour, students, the left and human rights activists' (Gills, Rocamora & Wilson 1993: 21). For those countries who adopt the institutions of low-intensity democracy, the economic support offered by international financial institutions and aid programmes, together with the promise of corporate investment, is conditional upon maintaining a particular type of democracy that plays a crucial role in maintaining the conditions of globalization. If reformist groups attempt to transcend the limitations imposed by low-intensity democracy, and instead promote a version of popular democracy that includes social reform and justice, then su**pport is withdrawn and the spectre of military intervention surfaces** (Chomsky 1998). In short, democracy often means little more than a 'thin veneer of Western parliamentary institutions and the 'rule of law', all of which are intended to subdue ethnic, cultural and religious tensions in the effort to secure an order fit for economic growth and development (Mahbubani 1992). For critics of democracy, however, the claim to have established a democratic form of government must rest upon something more than the introduction of formal institutions, which often do nothing to provide for social, economic and political reforms or the rights of the people. In countries where low-intensity democracy operates, governments give little attention to developing an open, rights-based culture. On the contrary, the governments of low-intensity democracies commonly work to ensure that trade unions are weak, wages are kept at a level beneath that necessary for a dignified life, non-governmental organizations are marginalized or declared illegal and the press and media are censored. The practice of offering fledgling democracies technical and training assistance to strengthen some state institutions -the police and the military, for example -can provide the means for maintaining a domestic order that pays little attention to human rights and social justice (Carothers 1994; HRW 1999). Furthermore, the social structures and traditions that support low intensity democracy often mean that in practice access to public office is restricted to particular groups. While the existence of the institutions of democracy may help to legitimate external relations, particularly where the established democracies of advanced technological states remain squeamish about trading with authoritarian governments, the protection of universal human rights is not necessarily guaranteed. Although some commentators defend the introduction of low-intensity democracy, arguing that it is the **first stage in a journey** that ends in full democratic participation and social reform, Gills, Rocamora and Wilson argue that it is **more accurate to understanding it as an end in itself** -as a way **of maintaining an order** that supports the interests of global and national capital

### XO Counterplan

#### Plan text: The President of the United States of America should issue an executive order to end the United States Federal Governments claims against Cuba for the expropriation of United Fruit Company property.

#### Unilateral action avoids the politics DA – doesn’t spend political capital.

Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, 5 (William G., Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, “Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 3, September, p. 421)

The actions that Bush and his modern predecessors have taken by fiat do not fit¶ easily within a theoretical framework of executive power that emphasizes weakness and¶ dependence, and offers as recourse only persuasion. For at least two reasons, the ability¶ to act unilaterally is conceptually distinct from the array of powers presidents rely upon¶ within a bargaining framework. First, when presidents act unilaterally, they move policy first and thereby place upon Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape. If they choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against¶ the president, then the president’s order stands. Only by taking (or credibly threatening¶ to take) positive action can either adjoining institution limit the president’s unilateral powers. Second, when the president acts unilaterally, he acts alone. Now of course, he¶ relies upon numerous advisers to formulate the policy, to devise ways of protecting it¶ against congressional or judicial encroachment, and to oversee its implementation (more¶ on this below). But in order to issue the actual policy, the president need not rally majorities,¶ compromise with adversaries, or wait for some interest group to bring a case to¶ court. The president, instead, can strike out on his own. Doing so, the modern president is in a unique position to lead, to break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and to impose his will in new areas of governance.¶ The ability to move first and act alone, then, distinguishes unilateral actions from other sources of influence. Indeed, the central precepts of Neustadt’s argument are turned¶ upside down, for unilateral action is the virtual antithesis of persuasion. Here, presidents just act; their power does not hinge upon their capacity to “convince [political actors]¶ that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for their sake and¶ for their authority” (Neustadt 1990, 30). To make policy, presidents need not secure the formal consent of Congress. Instead, presidents simply set public policy and dare others to counter. And as long as Congress lacks the votes (usually two thirds of both chambers)¶ to overturn

him, the president can be confident that his policy will stand.

### China

#### China expanding influence expanding in Cuba now

Hearn 09 – Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim (Adrian, "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January, usf.usfca.edu/pac\_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)//VP

In terms of economic openness and political ideology Mexico and Cuba are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, for China both hold high strategic value. Examining China’s relations with Mexico and Cuba opens an analytic window into the way that bilateral commercial, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation programs have adapted to distinct local conditions. Based on interviews and observations gathered during three years in Cuba, ten months in China, and eight months in Mexico, this Pacific Rim Report outlines some of the positive and negative local responses that intensifying engagement with China has produced. It also suggests that China has effectively tailored bilateral programs to local environments to advance common economic, political, and cultural objectives.China’s economic impact across Latin America has been uneven. Its demand for energy resources has driven up commodity prices, benefiting exporters such as Argentina and Brazil (soy), Chile (copper), Peru (iron, fishmeal), and Venezuela (crude oil) (Jiang 2005, Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Nevertheless, as the case studies of José Luis León Manríquez (2006) show, the exports of Mexico and the countries of Central America consist primarily of manufactured products and textiles, resulting in seemingly insurmountable competition from a tidal wave of legal and illicit Chinese imports. Romer Cornejo (2005) suggests that this regional variation results in part from the structural adjustments of the public and private sectors pursued by Latin American countries to facilitate cooperation with China. To examine this issue in depth, in 2006 the Red de Estudios de América Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia del Pacífico (Latin American and Caribbean Study Network on Asia and the Pacific, or REDEALAP) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) brought together scholars from IADB member countries to debate the effectiveness and future trajectory of structural adjustments in order to deepen cooperation with China in areas ranging from fiscal integration into regional trade blocks to natural disaster relief (REDEALAP 2006). A recent book from the OECD (Santiso 2007) argues that although China’s emergence represents a valuable opportunity for Latin America to develop alternative economic partnerships that reduce dependence on the United States and Europe, resource exports to China could gradually push the region into a ‘raw materials corner’. Similarly, a book from the Inter-American Development Bank entitled, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean, argues that to avoid future dependence on primary resource exports, Latin American governments should adopt long-term strategies that position their countries as service providers for the expanding Chinese middle class, particularly in the tourism and education sectors (Devlin et al. 2006). The authors signal that to climb the industrial value chain in this way will require a greater coordinating role for Latin American governments, since development strategies guided by the market alone, adopted in part as a backlash to previous import substitution strategies, will naturally favor short-term growth through commodity export.One summary of China’s relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domínguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the ‘triangular’ relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). China’s multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote China’s image as a ‘non-aligned’ protagonist of ‘South-South’ cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin America’s ‘New Left’. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

#### Increased US engagement challenges China in Latin America.

Dumbaugh et al 5. [Kerry, specialist in Asian Affairs, Mark Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American affairs, "China's growing interest in Latin America" CRS Report for Congress -- April 20 -- www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/AWCGATE/crs/rs22119.pdf]

Some observers believe increased Chinese interest and economic linkages with Latin¶ America constitute a significant future threat to U.S. influence and interests in Latin¶ America. They maintain that China “is using Latin America to challenge United States¶ supremacy in the western hemisphere and to build a third world coalition of nations with¶ interests that may well be at variance or even inimical to American interests and values.”13¶ According to this view, the assertive Chinese commercial interest demonstrated at the¶ November 2004 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Chile¶ should serve as a wake-up call to U.S. policymakers to focus more attention on China’s¶ growing role in the region.14 China’s regional presence, they say, ultimately could have¶ significant strategic implications for the United States when China begins to take action¶ to protect its interests in the region.15 Some observers who are wary of PRC initiatives¶ in the Western Hemisphere contend that the Chinese government is attempting to exploit¶ weaknesses left by U.S. inattentiveness to the region. According to this view, the United¶ States should adopt a new strategy in Latin America — including “expanding its own free¶ trade network, helping friendly nations develop strong market economies, fostering closer,¶ more cooperative security relationships” — in order to deflect the China challenge.16

#### Influence key to the Chinese economy

Jenkins, 13 - Professor of development economics with an particular interest in Latin America, 13 (Rhys, “Latin America and China- A New Dependency?,” 6/11, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2012.691834#.UbphhvlQFsk)//VP

Nevertheless, the trend over the past decade has been for the USA’s share in both Latin American imports and exports to decline while that of the EU has remained roughly constant and China’s has increased signiﬁcantly**.** The Economic Commission for Latin America has projected, based on data for 16 Latin American countries, that, by 2020, China will have overtaken the EU as both an export destination and as a source of imports for the region, and will have narrowed the gap with the USA. In 2020 it is projected that China will account for almost a ﬁfth of Latin American exports and a sixth of imports. In terms of FDI China’s role in the region continues to be marginal. Despite the signiﬁcant recent growth of Chinese investment, in 2010 China accounted for less than 0.3% of the total stock of foreign capital in the region and its share of FDI inﬂows in that year was only 0.8%.47 Even though the oﬃcial ﬁgures may underestimate the true extent of Chinese FDI and a number of major new investments were made in 2010, the role of Chinese ﬁrms in the region remains very limited. As they continue to expand globally, their presence in Latin America is likely to become more signiﬁcant in the future. Nevertheless Chinese FDI is starting from such a low base that it will be some time before it achieves levels comparable to that of US or EU FDI in the region. The global ﬁnancial crisis provides a good test of the extent to which China has emerged as a key driver of economic growth in Latin America, making the region less vulnerable to ﬂuctuations in the US economy. The crisis had a major impact on Latin American exports in 2009, with a decline in value of 23% compared to 2008.48 Exports to the USA fell by 26% and to the European Union by 28%. In stark contrast Latin American exports to China continued to increase in 2009, by 7.5%, reﬂecting the continued growth of the Chinese economy through the crisis (see Table 10). This has led ECLAC to claim that **‘**China’s economic dynamism has come to the rescue of Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports**’.**

#### Global war

**Plate, 03 -** Mr. Plate is a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, the Century Association of New York and the Phi Beta Kappa Society(Tom Plate, “Why Not Invade China” Asia Pacific Media Networks, 6/30, http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/TomPlate2003/06302003.htm)//JS

But imagine a China disintegrating -- on its own, without neo-con or CIA prompting, much less outright military invasion -- because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. Refugees by the gazillions would head for Indonesia and other poorly border-patrolled places, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their chops for World War II Redux and look to annex a slice of China. That would send small but successful Singapore and Malaysia -- once Japanese colonies -- into absolute nervous breakdowns. India might make a grab for Tibet, and while it does, Pakistan for Kashmir. Say hello to World War III Asia-style! That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth -- the very direction the White House now seems to prefer. If neo-cons like Kristol really care about Bush, they ought to relocate their common sense and get off his back. Bush has enough on his plate, trying to put Iraq back together. In the final analysis, neo-con insanity is more of a danger to the Bush presidency than China

### 1st contention

#### Risk Analysis solves VTL

Langford 3 (Ian, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia and University College London, AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO RISK PERCEPTION)

In contemporary western societies, asking questions such as “Why do we live?” and “What is the meaning of life?” are often seen as symbols of weakness, depression, self indulgence or an inability to simply get on with life. Yet, as Camus stated, these are the most urgent questions of all, and we are all beings seeking meaning, in whatever form (Heidegger, 1966). Life in technologically- oriented Western societies often provides comfort, excitement and stimulus, but fails to provide meaning (Giddens, 1991). On an individual level, the psychiatrist Carl Jung (1966) noted that approximately one-third of all his patients were suffering not from a specific neurosis, but the senselessness and aimlessness of their lives. Viktor Frankl (1969) found that 20 percent of neuroses in clinical practice are ‘noogenic’, i.e. deriving from a lack of meaning in life. Maddi (1967) defined existential neurosis as the chronic inability to believe in the truth, importance, usefulness or interest value of anything one does or can imagine doing. Hobbs (1962) noted that contemporary neuroses are characterized not so much by repression and conversion (lack of insight) but by lack of a sense of purpose and meaning. Risk can provide meaning. In a world where the direct and immediate threats of disease and dying are low, such as infection and war, but indirect and delayed threats are relatively high, such as cancer and unemployment, focusing on certain aspects of risk can give a purpose in life. Different individuals and social groups define this challenge in different ways, from individualistic striving for success to mass protest movements against environmental degradation.

#### Weigh consequences—moral absolutism *reproduces evil*.

Isaac 2 — Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, 2002 (“Ends, Means, and Politics,” *Dissent*, Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 35-36)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. [end page 35] This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Voting aff doesn’t necessitate absolute utilitarianism – there is a high threshold past which we should compromise morals to avoid catastrophic consequences

Moore – law prof, U San Diego – ‘97

Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing Blame, p. 719-722

Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontology Apart from the exceptions that the content of moral norms must have for them to be plausible, a third modification of absolutism is the softening of the ‘whatever the consequences’ aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect of absolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done. Despite my non­consequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the Kantian line. It just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified. There is a story in the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal to a contrary intuition.122 It is said that where the city is sur­rounded and threatened with destruction if it does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should perish rather than become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to allow the remainder to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the dark­ness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety. If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. 123 There is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their own to suffer that destruction rather than participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice them­selves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in order to prevent destruction of the city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case’24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it was a sea­man who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider Bernard Williams’s example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army as an example to others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far from choosing to ‘sink or swim’ together, the villagers beg you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved.125 In all such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a narcissistic preoccupation with your own ‘virtue’—that is, the ‘virtue’ you could have if the world were ideal and did not pre­sent you with such awful choices—if you choose to allow the greater number to perish. In such cases, I prefer Sartre’s version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler should take the guilt upon himself rather than allow his people to perish.’26One should feel guilty **in such cases,** but it is nobler to undertake such guilt than to shut one’s eyes to the horrendous consequences of not acting. I thus have some sympathy for the Landau Commission’s conclusion that ‘actual torture . . . would perhaps be justified in order to uncover a bomb about to explode in a building full of people’. If one does not know which building is going to explode, one does not have the consent of all concerned to ‘sink or swim’ together. On the contrary, one suspects that like Williams’s villagers, the occupants of the building, if they knew of their danger, would choose that one of their number (to say nothing of one of the ter­rorist group) be tortured or die to prevent the loss of all. In any case, the GSS interrogator must choose for others who will pay the costs for his decision if he decides not to act, a cost he does not have to bear; this situation is thus more like my variation of the Talmudic example than the original. Many think that the agent-relative view just sketched, allowing as it does consequences to override moral absolutes when those consequences are horrendous enough, collapses into a consequen­tialist morality after all. Glanville Williams, for example, in his discussion of the legal defence of necessity, recognizes the agent-relative view that ‘certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences’ and that ‘a good end never justifies bad means’. Williams nonetheless concludes that ‘in the last resort moral decisions must be made with reference to results’. Williams reaches this conclusion because, as Williams sees it, the agent-relative slogans just quoted reduce to the claim ‘that we ought to do what is right regardless of the consequences, as long as the consequences are not serious’. Contrary to Williams, there is no collapse of agent-relative views into consequentialism just because morality’s norms can be over­ridden by horrendous consequences.13’ A consequentialist is com­mitted by her moral theory to saying that torture of one person is justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the torture of two or more. The agent-relative view, even as here modified, is not com­mitted to this proposition. To justify torturing one innocent person requires that there be horrendous consequences attached to not tor­turing that person—the destruction of an entire city, or, perhaps, of a lifeboat or building full of people. On this view, in other words, there is a very high threshold of bad consequences that must be threatened before something as awful as torturing an innocent per­son can be justified. Almost all real-life decisions a GSS interroga­tor will face—and perhaps all decisions—will not reach that threshold of horrendous consequences justifying torture of the innocent. Short of such a threshold, the agent-relative view just sketched will operate as absolutely as absolutism in its ban on tor­turing the innocent.

#### All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.\*

#### Util accommodates rights

Shaw, 99 – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p.185-186)

One of the most widespread criticisms of utilitarianism is that it cannot take rights seriously enough. Generally speaking, rights take precedence over considerations of immediate utility. They limit or restrict direct appeals to welfare maximization. For example, to have a right to free speech means that one is free to speak one's mind even if doing so will fail to maximize happiness because others will dislike hearing what one has to say. The right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself entails that it would be wrong to force a criminal defendant to testify against himself even if the results of doing so would be good. If rights are moral claims that trump straightforward appeals to utility," then utilitarianism, the critics argue, cannot meaningfully respect rights because their theory subordinates them to the promotion of welfare. However, the criticism that utilitarianism cannot do right by rights ignores the extent to which utilitarianism can, as discussed in Chapter 5, accommodate the moral rules, principles, and norms other than welfare maximization that appear to constitute the warp and woof of our moral lives. To be sure, utilitarians look at rights in a different light than do . moral theorists who see them as self-evident or as having an independent deontic status grounded on non-utilitarian considerations. For utilitarians, it is not rights, but the promotion of welfare, that lies at the heart of morality. Bentham was consistently hostile to the idea of natural rights, in large measure because he believed that invoking natural rights was only a way of dressing up appeals to intuition in fancy rhetoric. In a similar vein, many utilitarians today believe that in both popular and philosophical discourse people are too quick to declare themselves possessors of all sorts of putative rights and that all too frequently these competing claims of rights only obscure the important, underlying moral issues.

#### And there’s no link to the citizen, non-citizen distinction – that’s a product of flawed ethics

Dworkin, 77 – Professor of Philosophy @ NYU (Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 274-275)

Utilitarian arguments of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base their claim, that constraints on liberty are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the fundamental right of equal concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that the member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other.

#### No tyranny of majority

Shaw, 99 – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p. 13)

Actions affect people to different degrees. Your playing the stereo loudly might bring slight pleasure to three of your neighbors, cause significant discomfort to two others who do not share your taste in music or are trying to concentrate on something else, and leave a sixth person indifferent The utilitarian theory is not that each individual votes on the basis of his or her happiness or unhappiness with the majority ruling, but that we add up the various pleasures or pains, however large or small, and go with the action that results in the greatest net amount of happiness. Because any action will affect some people more strongly than others, utilitarianism is not the same as majority rule. For example, in the United States today it would probably increase overall happiness to permit homosexuals to marry, even though the thought of their doing so makes many heterosexuals slightly uncomfortable. This is because such a policy would affect the happiness or unhappiness of the majority only slightly, if at all, while it would profoundly enhance the lives of a small percentage of people. Even if banning homosexual marriages makes most people happy, it doesn't bring about the most happiness.As quoted earlier, Bentham famously said that the utilitarian standard is the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Although often repeated, this formulation is misleading. The problem is that it erroneously implies that we should maximize two different things: the amount of happiness produced and the number of people made happy.' Correctly understood, utilitarianism tells us to do only one thing, maximize happiness. Doing what makes the most people happy usually produces the most happiness, but it may not - as the example of homosexual marriages illustrates. For utilitarianism, it is the total amount of happiness, not the number of people whose happiness is increased, that matters.

#### **There’s a distinction between public and personal policy – Governments must make utilitarian calculations**

Goodin 95 – Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University (Robert E., Cambridge University Press, “Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy” pg 63)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, at relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the utilitarian calculus – if they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

#### Extinction outweighs structural violence

Bostrum 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

#### Nuke war threat is real and o/w racism and invisible violence---their expansion of structural violence to an all-pervasive omnipresence makes preventing war impossible – also answers their value to life claim

Boulding 78

(Ken is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 Jun., 1978, pp. 342-354)

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most danger- ous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

#### Nuclear war must be prohibited absolutely

Kateb, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, ‘92 (George, “The Inner Ocean” p 111-112)

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous, an acknowledgment hat the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility-a genuine possibility-as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctiveness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to the earth's uninhabitability, to "nuclear winter," or to Schell's "republic of insects and grass." But the consideration of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or "theater" use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizable exchange or because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect on nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counted on to seek expression later. Other than full strategic uses are not confined, no matter how small the explosive power: each would be a cancerous transformation of the world. All nuclear roads lead to the possibility of extinction. It is true by definition, but let us make it explicit: the doctrine of no-use excludes any first or retaliatory or later use, whether sizable or not. No-use is the imperative derived from the possibility of extinction. By containing the possibility of extinction, any use is tantamount to a declaration of war against humanity. It is not merely a war crime or a single crime against humanity. Such a war is waged by the user of nuclear weapons against every human individual as individual (present and future), not as citizen of this or that country. It is not only a war against the country that is the target. To respond with nuclear weapons, where possible, only increases the chances of extinction and can never, therefore, be allowed. The use of nuclear weapons establishes the right of any person or group, acting officially or not, violently or not, to try to punish those responsible for the use. The aim of the punishment is to deter later uses and thus to try to reduce the possibility of extinction, if, by chance, the particular use in question did not directly lead to extinction. The form of the punishment cannot be specified. Of course the chaos ensuing from a sizable exchange could make punishment irrelevant. The important point, however, is to see that those who use nuclear weapons are qualitatively worse than criminals, and at the least forfeit their offices. John Locke, a principal individualist political theorist, says that in a state of nature every individual retains the right to punish transgressors or assist in the effort to punish them, whether or not one is a direct victim. Transgressors convert an otherwise tolerable condition into a state of nature which is a state of war in which all are threatened. Analogously, the use of nuclear weapons, by containing in an immediate or delayed manner the possibility of extinction, is in Locke's phrase "a trespass against the whole species" and places the users in a state of war with all people. And people, the accumulation of individuals, must be understood as of course always indefeasibly retaining the right of selfpreservation, and hence as morally allowed, perhaps enjoined, to take the appropriate preserving steps.

**Risk management is good---the inherent unpredictability of social events is all the more reason for creating optimal resiliency through scenario planning**

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Risk Management Rather than Forecast-and-Plan

**The answer is to change the question**, to **focus on risk management**, **as Gardner and Tetlock suggest**. **There is a set of events that could happen tomorrow**—Chicago could have an earthquake, there could be a run on Greek debt, the Administration could decide “Heavens, Dodd–Frank and Obamacare were huge mistakes, let’s fix them” (Okay, not the last one.) **Attached to each event, there is some probability that it could happen.**

**Now “forecasting”** as Gardner and Tetlock characterize it, **is an attempt to figure out which event really will happen**, whether the coin will land on heads or tails, **and then make a plan based on that knowledge. It’s a fool’s game**.

**Once we recognize that uncertainty will always remain**, **risk management rather than forecasting is much wiser**. **Just the step of naming the events that could happen is useful**. **Then, ask yourself, “if this event happens, let’s make sure we have a contingency plan so we’re not really screwed**.” Suppose you’re counting on diesel generators to keep cooling water flowing through a reactor. What if someone forgets to fill the tank?

**The good use of “forecasting” is to get a better handle on probabilities**, so we focus our risk management resources on the most important events. But **we must still pay attention to events**, **and buy insurance against them**, **based as much on the painfulness of the event as on its probability.** (Note to economics techies: what matters is the risk-neutral probability, probability weighted by marginal utility.) **So it’s not really the forecast that’s wrong, it’s what people do with it. If we all understood the essential unpredictability of the world**, especially of rare and very costly events, if we got rid of the habit of mind that asks for a forecast and then makes “plans” as if that were the only state of the world that could occur; **if we instead focused on laying out all the bad things that could happen and made sure we had insurance or contingency plans, both personal and public policies might be a lot better**.

### Framing

#### It’s possible to make accurate predictions about the world without complete knowledge -- expertise and reasoned arguments are sufficient justification for action.

**Foss 06**- Professor at the Copehagen Business School (Nicolai, "The limits to designed orders: Authority under 'distributed knowledge' conditions." Springer Science. 2006. Proquest.)

“Narrow authority” is the view of authority associated with Simon (1951). The argument that has just been summarized holds that such authority is fundamentally compromised by distributed knowledge. However, **it is not always the case that suppressing** distributed **knowledge is inefﬁcient**. For example, Hammond and Miller (1985: 1) argue that “. . .knowledge about any particular problem is seldom complete, and in a competitive or changing environmentthere may be advantages to making some decision, however imperfectly grounded on expertise, rather than none at all . . . In the absence of expert knowledge some chief executive is given authority to impose his own best judgment on the matter.” It is not entirely transparent what Hammond and Miller mean here, but a later treatment by Bolton and Farrell (1990) provides a clue. Bolton and Farrell wish to identify the determinants of centralization/ decentralization decisions. In order to isolate the costs and beneﬁts of centralized and decentralized decision-making in a speciﬁc setting, they study a coordination problem with private information in the setting of a natural monopoly market. The coordination problem concerns which ﬁrm should enter the market when costs are sunk and are private information. Under decentralization, which is represented as a Springer268 K. Foss, N. J. Foss two-period incomplete information game of timing (sink costs/enter or wait another period), each ﬁrm is uncertain about whether the other ﬁrm will enter. However, the incentive to enter depends on the height of a given ﬁrm’s cost, low-cost ﬁrms being less worried that their rival will enter (and vice versa). If costs are sufﬁciently dispersed, the optimal outcome prevails, that is, the lowest-cost producer enters and preempts the rival(s). However, if costs are equal or are high for both, inefﬁciencies may obtain, since ﬁrms will then enter simultaneously (inefﬁcient duplication) or will wait (inefﬁcient delay). Enter a central authority whose job is to nominate a ﬁrm for entry. In the spirit of Hayek, Bolton and Farrell assume that this central authority cannot possess knowledge about costs. In their model, s/he nominates the high cost producer half of the times, which is clearly inefﬁcient. However, this cost of centralization should be compared against the costs of decentralization (delay and duplication). Bolton and Farrell show that “. . . the less important the private information that the planner lacks and the more essential coordination is, the more attractive the central planning solution is” (1990: 805). Moreover, the decentralized solution performs poorly if urgency is important. Centralization is assumed to not involve delay and therefore is a good mechanism for dealing with emergencies, a conclusion they argue is consistent with the observed tendency of ﬁrms to rely on centralized authority in cases of emergencies. While Austrians may argue that the Bolton and Farrell set-up trivializes distributed knowledge, and exaggerates the beneﬁts of centralization (e.g., it is assumed to not involve delays), their model does provide a rationale for authority under distributed knowledge (given their assumptions), that is, it explains why authority may be preferred rather than some decentralized arrangement. Even the narrow understanding of authority in Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) may be rendered consistent with distributed knowledge using the Bolton and Farrell argument: Although the employer may be ignorant of the efﬁcient action, and perhaps of most of the employee action, he knows a subset of the employee’s action set, so he can always tell him to “do something!”, which in certain situations may be preferable to doing nothing. The example suggests the more general implication that some overlap of knowledge may be sufﬁcient to make coordination by means of authority work in the presence of distributed knowledge.

**Total rejection of security leaves us defenseless to those who still endorse security – that causes war**

**Doran 99,** (Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC,Charles, “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange” Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 139—52)

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per Se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of wars perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz’s most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.

**Threats are real and our disaster discourse mobilizes people to deal with them**

**Kurasawa 04**

(Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight <http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf>)

In addition**,** farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalismand religious fundamentalismthat had mostly been kept in check or bottled up duringthe Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary(or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopiannovels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their ownnightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action**,** spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### War still likely --- the world is more dangerous now than during the Cold War.

Paul Miller, 12/20/2011. Assistant professor of international security studies at the National Defense University, former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council and political analyst in the U.S. intelligence community, specializing in South Asia. “[How Dangerous is the World? Part IV](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/19/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_iv),” Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/19/how\_dangerous\_is\_the\_world\_part\_iv.

In my [previous](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_i_by_paul_miller) [three](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_ii) posts, I argued that the world today is more dangerous than it was during the Cold War because the threat from Russia and China is still present, on top of which we face new threats from new nuclear autocracies hostile to the United States, including North Korea, soon Iran, and possibly Pakistan.

In addition to the old-fashioned state-centric threats of hostile nuclear powers, the United States now faces a whole new category of threats that simply did not exist during the Cold War:  the threats that come when state failure meets globalization, when non-state actors can operate with impunity outside the write of any law but act with global reach because of new technology.  These are the threats that are the current fads of IR and security studies:  pirates, organized crime, drug cartels, human traffickers, WikiLeaks, hackers, the global Islamist "pansurgency," and, yes, terrorists.  (Throw in pandemic disease and ecological disaster and you get all the research funding you want.)

There is nothing new about the existence of many of these actors, of course.  Pirates and terrorists have existed for centuries.  However, their ability to present an immediate and large-scale threat to the United States is new, or at least greater than during the Cold War.  Travel and communication is easier and weapons technology is more lethal, state failure is more widespread (giving them more space to operate with impunity), while U.S. and allied border, port, and infrastructure security has not kept up.

I earlier argued that the faddish, new-fangled theories about non-state actors were overstated.  They are, but that doesn't mean they're completely wrong.  Osama bin Laden and Julian Assange clearly did massive and irrevocable harm to the United States in ways literally inconceivable for a non-state actor during the Cold War; the same may be true of the drug gangs in Mexico today.  Coupled with the United States' almost complete lack of homeland security, and there is a very real possibility of large-scale, massive, direct harm to the U.S. homeland from a globalized non-state actor.

The preeminent threat of this type is, of course, the global campaign by violent Islamist militants and terrorists to eject the "west" from "Muslim lands," overthrow secular governments and replace them with Islamic regimes, and establish the supremacy of their brand of Islam across the world.  (I agree here with David Kilcullen's [characterization](http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf) of the conflict as a global insurgency).  Violent Islamist movements have done most of their direct damage to people and states across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia.  But those attacks certainly don't make the world safer for the United States, nor would their victory in, for example, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.  And the movement has, of course, directly attacked the United States and our European allies.  Note that violent Islamist groups-whether al Qaida or Hamas or Hezbollah or al Shabaab or Lashkar-e Taiba-typically flourish in and around weak and failing states.

The only thing comparable to the global proliferation of Islamist insurgencies and terrorist movements over the last two decades was the Soviet Union's sponsorship of communist insurgencies around the world during the Cold War.  But the Islamist insurgencies are likely to be more resilient, harder to defeat, and more dangerous because they are decentralized, because their ideology is not linked to the fate of one particular regime, because globalization has made it easier for them to operate on a global scale, and because of the higher risk that Islamists will acquire and use weapons of mass destruction since they are not accountable to a deterable sponsoring power.

Even setting the threat from violent Islamism aside, a host of other non-state actors threaten the world order and make American leadership more costly.  In fact, the aggregate effect of state failure multiplied across scores of states across the world is so great that "failed states may eventually present a systemic risk to the liberal world order, of which the United States is the principal architect and beneficiary," as I argue in the [current issue of PRISM](http://www.ndu.edu/press/how-to-fix-failed-states.html).  State failure and the rise of non-state actors-a problem non-existent during the cold war-is a threat to American national security.

Conclusion

Essentially, the United States thus faces two great families of threats today:  first, the nuclear-armed authoritarian powers, of which there are at least twice as many as there were during the Cold War; second, the aggregate consequences of state failure and the rise of non-state actors in much of the world, which is a wholly new development since the Cold War.  On both counts, the world is more dangerous than it was before 1989.  Essentially take the Cold War, add in several more players with nukes, and then throw in radicalized Islam, rampant state failure, and the global economic recession, and you have today.

I recognize that the world doesn't feel as dangerous as it did during the Cold War.  During the Cold War we all knew about the threat and lived with a constant awareness-usually shoved to the back of ours minds to preserve our sanity-that we might die an instantaneous firey death at any moment.  We no longer feel that way.

Our feelings are wrong.  The Cold War engaged our emotions more because it was simple, easily understood, and, as an ideological contest, demanded we take sides and laid claim to our loyalties.  Today's environment is more complex and many-sided and so it is harder to feel the threat the same way we used to.  Nonetheless, the danger is real.

#### Complexity Theory is Not Grounded in Science and Lacks a Theoretical Foundation

Phelan, William G. Rohrer Professorial Chair in Entrepreneurship, 01

(Steven E., Director of the Center for Innovation & Entrepreneurship, Ph.D. in economics from La Trobe University, Australia; an M.B.A. in marketing from Monash University; and a B.S. in psychology from the University of Melbourne , “What Is Complexity Science, Really?” EMERGENCE, 3(1), 120–36 Copyright © 2001, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.)

The need for a special issue of Emergence on the question¶ “What is complexity science?” is disturbing on several levels. At one level, one could be forgiven for thinking that the**¶** voluminous literature generated in recent years on chaos and complexity theory must contain a clear exposition of the definition,**¶** mission, and scope of complexity science. That this exposition has not been forthcoming, or is the subject of controversy, is disconcerting. On¶ another level, the inability to differentiate science clearly from pseudoscience in complexity studies is also problematic. Allowing pseudoscience to penetrate a field of study lowers the credibility of that field**¶** with mainstream scientists and hinders the flow of resources for future**¶** development.¶ It is my contention that much of the work in complexity theory has¶ indeed been pseudo-science, that is, many writers in this field have used**¶** the symbols and methods of complexity science (either erroneously or¶ deliberately) to give the illusion of science even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility (Shermer, 1997). This proliferation of**¶** pseudo-science has, in turn, obscured the meaning and agenda of the**¶** science of complexity. The purpose of this article is twofold: to provide a¶ working definition of complexity science; and to use this definition to differentiate complexity science from complexity pseudo-science. This is a play in three acts. In the first section, I will undertake an examination of¶ science and the factors differentiating science from nonscience. In the¶ second section, I examine the relationship between complexity and¶ science, leading to a definition of complexity science. In the final section,¶ I offer a test for distinguishing between science and pseudo-science in¶ complexity studies and provide several examples of the latter. I also¶ describe why it is important for scientists working in the area vigorously¶ to reject pseudo-scientific theories.¶

#### Applying complexity theory leads to policy paralysis

HENDRICK ‘9 (Diane; Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,” June, <http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf>)

It is still relatively early days in the application of complexity theory to social sciences and there are doubts and criticisms, either about the applicability of the ideas or about the expectations generated for them. It is true that the translation of terms from natural science to social science is sometimes contested due to the significant differences in these domains, and that there are concerns that the meanings of terms may be distorted, thus making their use arbitrary or even misleading. Developing new, relevant definitions for the new domain applications, where the terms indicate a new idea or a new synthesis that takes our understanding forward, are required. In some cases, particular aspects of complexity theory are seen as of only limited applicability, for example, self-organisation (see Rosenau‘s argument above that it is only relevant in systems in which authority does not play a role). There are those who argue that much that is being touted as new is actually already known, whether from systems theory or from experience, and so complexity theory cannot be seen as adding value in that way. There are also concerns that the theory has not been worked out in sufficient detail, or with sufficient rigour, to make itself useful yet. Even that it encourages woolly thinking and imprecision. In terms of application in the field, it could be argued that it may lead to paralysis, in fear of all the unexpected things that could happen, and all the unintended consequences that could result, from a particular intervention. The proposed adaptability and sensitivity to emerging new situations may lead to difficulties in planning or, better expressed, must lead to a different conception of what constitutes planning, which is, in itself, challenging (or even threatening) for many fields. The criteria for funding projects or research may not fit comfortably with a complexity approach, and evaluation, already difficult especially in the field of conflict transformation, would require a re-conceptualisation. Pressure for results could act as a disincentive to change project design in the light of emergent processes. There may be the desire to maintain the illusion of control in order to retain the confidence of funders. On the other hand, there are fears that complexity may be used as an excuse for poor planning, and implementation, which is a valid concern for funders. In addition, there may be scepticism that the co-operation and co-ordination between different researchers or interveners, (let alone transdisciplinary undertakings) appropriate to working on complex problem domains, will not work due to differing mental models, competing interests and aims, competition for funding, prestige, etc. Such attempts appear, therefore, unrealistic or unfeasible.

#### Their Approach Lacks Support and Lacks a Model For Future Action – Only Predictive Analysis Based on Causal Chains Solves

Dr. Sebastian L. V. Gorka et al 12, Director of the Homeland Defense Fellows Program at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, teaches Irregular Warfare and US National Security at NDU and Georgetown, et al., Spring 2012, “The Complexity Trap,” Parameters, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher\_Geltzer\_Gorka.pdf

We live in a world of unprecedented complexity, or so we are told. President Obama’s words above echo an increasingly common narrative in the American foreign policy and national security establishments: the forces of globalization, rising nonstate actors, irregular conflict, and proliferating destructive technologies have made crafting sound national security strategy more elusive than ever before. 2 If “strategy is the art of creating power” by specifying the relationship among ends, ways, and means, 3 then the existence of unprecedented complexity would seem to make this art not only uniquely difficult today but also downright dangerous, inasmuch as choosing any particular course of action would preclude infinitely adaptive responses in the future. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates memorably described, the pre-9/11 challenges to American national security were “amateur night compared to the world today.” 4 And as former State Department Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter recently stated, there is a “universal awareness that we are living through a time of rapid and universal change,” one in which the assumptions of the twentieth century make little sense. 5 The “Mr. Y” article that occasioned her comments argued that, in contrast to the “closed system” of the twentieth century that could be controlled by mankind, we now live in an “open system” defined by its supremely complex and protean nature. 6 Unparalleled complexity, it seems, is the hallmark of our strategic age.¶ These invocations of complexity permeate today’s American national security documents and inform Washington’s post-Cold War and -9/11 strategic culture. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review begins its analysis with a description of the “complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by such farreaching and consequential shifts.” 7 In a similar vein, the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 argues that the international system is trending towards greater degrees of complexity as power is diffused and actors multiply. 8 The Director of National Intelligence’s Vision 2015 terms our time the “Era of Uncertainty,” one “in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing.” 9 Disturbingly, the younger generation of foreign policy and national security professionals seems to accept and embrace these statements declaiming a fundamental change in our world and our capacity to cope with it. The orientation for the multi-thousand-member group of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy calls “conquering complexity” the fundamental challenge for the millennial generation. Complexity, it appears, is all the rage. ¶ We challenge these declarations and assumptions—not simply because they are empirically unfounded but, far more importantly, because they negate the very art of strategy and make the realization of the American national interest impossible. We begin by showing the rather unsavory consequences of the current trend toward worshipping at complexity’s altar and thus becoming a member of the “Cult of Complexity.” Next, we question whether the world was ever quite as simple as today’s avowers of complexity suggest, thus revealing the notion of today’s unprecedented complexity to be descriptively false. We then underscore that this idea is dangerous, given the consequences of an addiction to complexity. Finally, we offer an escape from the complexity trap, with an emphasis on the need for prioritization in today’s admittedly distinctive international security environment. Throughout, we hope to underscore that today’s obsession with complexity results in a dangerous denial of the need to strategize.

#### Prefer the Specificity of Our Scenarios Over Their Blanket Skepticism

Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)

Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science, where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities they describe – atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on – are real, that they exist independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist independently of human experience. 38 Against this background, the Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to epistemic conditions and activities such as ‘reporting judgements’ and ‘assigning values’. On the other hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves ‘designating the states of affairs expressed and in virtue of which judgements are assigned the value “true’’’. In many respects the epistemic aspect must dominate; we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth has a ‘genuinely ontological’ use. 39 Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add, however, that it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they are real on the basis of their causal power – they have a constraining effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an ‘epistemological relativism’ according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate – we must distinguish between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental rationalism. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

#### Good fear of death is distinct from irrational fear – it allows us to reduce danger, live ethically, and prepare for a peaceful death on our own terms

Gyatso, badass Tibetan monk, BFF with the Dalai Lama, master of “real” meditation, internationally renowned Gelug scholar, future Kairos retreat leader, and teacher at the FPMT center Manjushri Institute in England, ’3 (Geshe Kelsang, “Fear of Death”, Tharpa Publications, www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm)

Generally, our fear of death is an unhealthy and unrealistic fear-we don't want to die, so we ignore the subject, deny it, or get morbidly obsessed by it and think that life is meaningless. However, right now we cannot do anything about dying, so there is no point fearing death itself. What kind of fear is useful? A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through Tantric spiritual practice, we can even attain a deathless body.

#### Rational fear is good – prevents nuclear war

Greenspan, Pioneer in the Area of Women’s Psychology, ‘3 (Miriam, “An Excerpt from Healing through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair by Miriam Greenspan,” www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp\_5513.html)

While it would be comforting to think that all phobias and fears are irrational, obviously this is not the case. The threats to survival in our era are numerous. Global warming, environmental pollution, nuclear and biochemical disasters, and terrorism are not individual but global threats. Butthis doesn’t mean they don’t affect us as individuals! In relation to these threats, it has become almost impossible to experience fear in the old individualized way that we once did when being chased by a wild boar. Our fears are rational, largely transpersonal, and overwhelming. They are also largely denied. In this unprecedented world context, fear is continually triggered and benumbed. Isolated in our own skins, without a community in which our fears can be shared, validated, and addressed, the authentic experience of fear in our time has become almost impossible. We can’t heal what we don’t feel. The alchemy of fear is out of reach until we can learn, like Jack, how to feel our fear. When we don’t know the contours of our fear, when we can’t experience it authentically or speak about it openly, we are more likely to be afflicted with anxieties and phobias, panic, obsessive-compulsion, psychosomatic ills, and all kinds of controlling, destructive, and violent behaviors. Those of us who don’t know how to feel our way through the real fears that haunt us; or who are not threatened by the immediate, in-your-face fears that plague millions of people on earth—fears of starvation, war, homelessness, disease, pervasive violence—have replaced the alarm of authentic fear with the host of “anxiety disorders” that have become epidemic in our time.

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### AT Perm Do the CP

**‘The’ means all parts**

#### Merriam-Websters 8 Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

**“USFG” is all three branches**

**US Legal, No Date** (US Legal Definitions, “United States Federal Government Law & Legal Definition”, <http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>) MaxL

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

### Politics

#### **Executive Agencies don’t link – they are free of political bias.**

Wolfe, Demand Media writer, 2013

(Michael, June 25,2013, Demand Media , “The Advantages of Independent Executive Agencies”, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-independent-executive-agencies-22575.html, 7/4/13,AS).

Lack of Bias¶ Perhaps the main advantage to these agencies is that they are intended to have a lack of bias in how they run. While the head of these agencies might be appointed by the president, the agencies are generally not staffed according to ideological litmus tests, unlike some government agencies. Therefore, these agencies are, theoretically, better able to make decisions free of political bias.¶ Autonomy¶ Unlike a number of government agencies, the independent executive agency enjoys at least some autonomy from the White House. This means the agency can be committed to carrying out the task it was assigned, not with making sure the president is elected or fulfilling orders passed down by the White House. This ensures the organization remains a public service organization, not a partisan one.¶ Stability¶ Because this type of agency is not staffed with political appointments, it means the agency does not necessarily have a large turnover when a new president is elected, and the agency will likely enjoy some stability between administrations. For example, a chairman of the Federal Reserve is often held over from a Democratic administration to a Republican one, and vice versa.¶ No Retribution¶ In addition to being able to make decisions free of inherent political bias, independent executive agencies do not function at the pleasure of the White House or Congress. This means that while both of these bodies can criticize the actions of the executive agencies, they cannot take direct action to punish these agencies for decisions they make. However, a legislator might call to reduce the agency's funding, which is controlled by Congress.

#### Recent executive order proves Obama can use XO’s to further economic engagement

USCOC 13 (United States Chamber of Commerce, May 01, 2012, U.S. Chamber Welcomes Executive Order on International Regulatory Cooperation, <http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2012/may/us-chamber-welcomes-executive-order-international-regulatory-cooperation>) TYBG

Sean Heather, vice president of the U.S. Chamber's Center for Global Regulatory Cooperation, issued the following statement welcoming today’s announcement by the Obama Administration of a new executive order on international regulatory cooperation: “Today’s executive order marks a paradigm shift for U.S. regulators by directing them to take the international implications of their work into account in a consistent and comprehensive way. “Fulfilling primary regulatory objectives such as health and safety is more complicated than ever due to the interconnected nature of the global economy. The result is that international cooperation is clearly in the interest of regulators and is now assuming a central role in framing good domestic regulatory policy. “This landmark executive order recognizes that good regulatory policy supports good trade policy. Dialogue between U.S. regulators and their foreign counterparts can avert unnecessary divergences in regulation that become 'behind the border' barriers to commerce and hinder the ability of U.S. companies to reach the 95% of the world’s consumers that live beyond our borders. “Some U.S. regulators have been moving in this direction in recent years, but not systematically and not always in a well coordinated fashion that supports our international economic policy objectives. This executive order provides a much needed political emphasis and sharpens the administration's focus on international regulatory cooperation in APEC, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and in bilateral regulatory dialogues with key trading partners such as Canada, Mexico, and the European Union. “Over the past four decades, almost every president has made important contributions to the body of administrative law that directs regulatory promulgation, but until today all of those contributions were domestic in nature. This executive order is the international riposte. We look forward to working with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs on further guidance in support of today’s executive order.” The Center for Global Regulatory Cooperation seeks to align trade, regulatory, and competition policy in support of open and competitive markets. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world’s largest business federation representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations.

### Solvency—General

#### Obama can push through virtually any executive order

Kumar 13 (Anita, McClatchy Newspapers, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants”, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.UdxwMD6gXFw>) TYBG

President Barack Obama came into office four years ago skeptical of pushing the power of the White House to the limit, especially if it appeared to be circumventing Congress. Now, as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his own agenda forward, particularly when a deeply fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way. He’s done it with a package of tools, some of which date to George Washington and some invented in the modern era of an increasingly powerful presidency. And he’s done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, invites criticisms that he’s bypassing the checks and balances of Congress and the courts, and whets the appetite of liberal activists who want him to do even more to advance their goals. While his decision to send drones to kill U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism has garnered a torrent of criticism, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider. He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn’t agree. He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago. He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional. He’s vowed to act on his own if Congress didn’t pass policies to prepare for climate change. Arguably more than any other president in modern history, he’s using executive actions, primarily orders, to bypass or pressure a Congress where the opposition Republicans can block any proposal.

### Solvency—Embargo

#### Obama can lift the embargo-travel ban proves

Heuvel, is the editor, publisher, and part-owner of the magazine The Nation, 6/13

(Katrina Vanden, is the editor, publisher, and part-owner of the magazine The Nation6/2/13, The Washington Post, “The US Should End the Cuban Embargo,” <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-02/opinions/40316090_1_embargo-limited-private-enterprise-odebrecht>, Accessed: 7/5/13, LPS.)

This month, 100 state-run produce markets and 26 other establishments are scheduled to become private cooperatives. The government says many more establishments will follow, beginning in 2014, as an alternative to small and medium-size state businesses in retail and food services, transportation, light manufacturing and construction, among other sectors.¶ Despite the embargo, José Martí International Airport displays the new vitality. Hundreds of Cuban Americans fly into see relatives, bringing everything from flat-screen TVs to consumer basics. Since President Obama lifted restrictions on family visits in 2009, remittances and material support from Cuban Americans play a growing role in the microeconomy of the island.¶ Whereas in the 1990s, Havana was willing to permit only limited private enterprise as an emergency measure, government officials now speculate openly about aiming toward 50 percent of Cuba’s GDP in private hands within five years. Of course, an expanding small business sector won’t resolve some central issues facing the island: access to large-scale credit and investment and the need to boost exports and address anemic productivity, not to mention the demands of an aging population.¶ In Havana, there is more talk about Brazil’s investment in renovating Mariel Harbor than about Edward Snowden. Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht had to resist threats by Florida’s state government to cut off any state contracts if it invested in Cuba. This enormous deep-water port is designed to handle trade with the United States and beyond in a post-embargo world, if the embargo is ever ended.¶ Cuba’s official media remains sclerotic, though there are spirited debates in a few online outlets. But the government appears to understand that the explosion of social media will transform communications and politics, and however tentatively, realizes it has little choice but to change if it is to engage a younger generation.

### A2: Backlash

#### No backlash – Congress doesn’t care about the president abusing his power.

Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, and Moe, Stanford University, 99 (William G. and Terry M, 1999, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,” *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 15, no. 1, p.144)

What is likely to happen in Congress, then, when presidents take unilateral action by issuing executive orders that shift the policy status quo? The answer¶ is that legislative responses (if there are any) will be rooted in constituency.¶ An executive order that promotes civil rights, for example, will tend to be¶ supported by legislators from urban or liberal constituencies, because it shifts¶ the status quo in their preferred direction, while members from conservative¶ constituencies will tend to oppose it. The fact that this executive order might¶ well be seen as usurping Congress's lawmaking powers, or that it has the effect of expanding presidential power, will for most legislators be quite beside the¶ point. Thus if Congress tries to take any action at all in responding to the¶ executive order, the battle lines will be determined by the order's effects on¶ legislative constituencies, not by its effects on Congress's power vis-a-vis the¶ president. Even when presidents arc clearly taking action to push out the¶ boundaries of their power. Congress will not tend to vote or respond on that¶ basis, and will not as a result, be able to defend or promote its institutional¶ power very effectively

#### Their evidence does not assume unilateral action that defuses legislative opposition.

Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, and Moe, Stanford University, 99 (William G. and Terry M, 1999, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,” *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 15, no. 1, p.145-6)

Presidents exercise two important kinds of agenda power in their relations¶ with Congress. The first is now part of the familiar, textbook description of¶ American politics: precisely because Congress is so fragmented, the president's policy proposals are the focal points for congressional action. The major issues¶ Congress deals with each year, as a result, are fundamentally shaped by what¶ presidents decide will be the salient concerns for the nation. While this kind¶ of agenda power is of great consequence, a second kind is probably more¶ important for the institutional balance of power, yet it is rarely recognized as¶ such. This is the agenda power that presidents exercise when they take unilateral action to alter the status quo. When they do this, they present Congress with¶ a fait accompli—a new, prcsidcntially made law—and Congress is then in the¶ position of having to respond or acquiesce.¶ Note the key differences between these forms of agenda control. Under the¶ first, presidential success ultimately requires an affirmative act by Congress,¶ and thus that Congress go through all the laborious steps necessary to produce¶ new legislation—which is politically very difficult, often highly conflictual,¶ typically very time consuming, and in the final analysis unlikely to happen¶ (more on this below). This is why modern presidents have incentives to shy away from the "legislative strategy" of presidential leadership (Nathan, 1983).¶ Even with all their resources, they can expect to have a hard time getting their¶ programs through Congress.¶ On the other hand, the second form of agenda control, rooted as it is in¶ unilateral action, gives the president what he wants immediately—a shift in¶ the status quo, and perhaps a new increment to his power—and depends for its¶ success on Congress's not being able to pass new (and veto-proof) legislation¶ that would overturn or change it. Such a requirement is much more readily met¶ for it is far easier, by many orders of magnitude, to block congressional action¶ than it is to engineer new legislation. And if this were not enough, the new status quo initiated by the president may in itself defuse legislative opposition and do away with the need to block at all. When a president unilaterally launches an¶ invasion of another country, for instance. Congress faces a drastically different¶ set of options than it did before the conflict started, and may find itself politically¶ compelled to support and provide funds for an exercise it never would have¶ agreed to beforehand. Needless to say, these advantages of agenda control give¶ modern presidents strong incentives to favor an "administrative strategy" of¶ leadership as opposed to a "legislative strategy" (Nathan. 1983).

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### 2NC Will Pass

#### And- their 2AC ev is PC key warrants- most conclusive evidence says a deal will ultimately be reached

Alyssa Hertig, written for the Wisconsin Reporter, Define: Liberty and History News Network 9-15-2013 http://www.policymic.com/articles/63647/debt-ceiling-2013-we-will-raise-the-debt-ceiling-even-though-55-of-americans-don-t-want-to

It's debt-ceiling season again! In 2011 Congress raised the debt ceiling to $16.7 trillion, an increase of over $2 trillion. Based on projections from the U.S. Treasury, the federal government will hit the limit again in mid-October, much sooner than anticipated.¶ According to Jack Lew, secretary of the Treasury, Obama is unwilling to negotiate over a raise.¶ However, raising the debt ceiling is unpopular. Seventy percent of Americans oppose another raise in the debt ceiling, according to public opinion polls released by Reason-Rupe on Thursday. Even if this move would result in a default, 55% would still support not raising the debt ceiling. Furthermore: "If equal spending cuts accompany an increase in the debt ceiling, 45% say they'd support raising it and 46% would oppose. Thirty-five percent favor raising the debt ceiling in exchange for cutting off funding to the Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare, with 56% opposed."¶ Before the last debt ceiling raise in 2011, Gallup released a similar poll. Forty-two percent wanted their member of Congress to vote against the raise, 22% wanted their member of Congress to vote for the raise, 35% percent were not sure. It seems raising the debt ceiling has become less popular than ever — but o n the other hand, Congress has never failed to raise its debt ceiling.¶ The debt ceiling was first imposed in 1917 amid cries for accountability before President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into World War I. Before the debt-ceiling raise in 2011, James K. Galbraith summarized in Salon:¶ "The debt ceiling was first enacted in 1917. Why? The date tells all: we were about to enter the Great War. To fund that effort, the Wilson government needed to issue Liberty Bonds. This was controversial, and the debt ceiling was cover, passed to reassure the rubes that Congress would be “responsible” even while the country went to war. It was, from the beginning, an exercise in bad faith and has remained so every single second to the present day."¶ It has been raised dozens of times since its inception and 14 times since the turn of the century. It is a meaningless formality.¶ Despite the unpopularity of another raise and demands for a stricter budget (as the Reason-Rupe survey also demonstrates), we will see faux sparks fly between Democrats and Republicans in October, but ultimately the ceiling will be raised.

#### Time is tight but they’ll reach a deal

Fox News, 9-11-2013, “House pulls spending bill amid backlash as government shutdown looms,” <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/09/11/house-leaders-pull-temporary-spending-bill-after-conservative-backlash/>

House Republican leaders pulled their plan Wednesday to temporarily fund the federal government after rank-and-file party members said it sidestepped “defunding” ObamaCare. The action further narrowed Congress’ time to strike a budget deal before an Oct. 1 government shutdown. House Speaker John Boehner and his team pulled the plan, which could have gotten a full chamber vote as early as Thursday, after a conservative backlash led by the Tea Party movement and Heritage Action for America. The plan essentially called for the House to vote on defunding ObamaCare and the temporary spending bill, then send the package to the Democrat-controlled Senate, which almost certainly would have jettisoned the defund part and allowed the chambers to negotiate on a “clean” funding bill. “The Ruling Elite is up to it again,” the Tea Party Patriots group said Wednesday. “They want you to think they have voted for defunding ObamaCare. But it’s another shell game.” Meanwhile, Congress must also work on several other pressing issues, especially agreeing to increase the debt ceiling, which the government could hit as soon as mid-October, according to a recent Treasury Department assessment. Boehner defended his defund-spending plan Tuesday, saying his chamber has already voted 40 times to “defund, repeal and change” ObamaCare, so the Senate must now take up the fight. Although Boehner pulled the bill because he didn’t have the votes, sources tell Fox News the speaker has no intention of changing the plan and might revisit it next week -- after members realize its strengths. Meanwhile members from both parties appear optimistic about avoiding a partial government shutdown, despite the looming deadline and the potential for another internal House struggle. “We've got some time left,” Kentucky Republican Rep. Hal Rogers, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told Fox News. “It's not time to panic.” The postponement of a Capitol Hill vote on a military strike on Syria will indeed eliminate the related hearings and classified briefings that slowed work on other pending issues, including immigration reform, the Farm Bill and whether to limit the extent to which the National Security Agency can collect data on Americans in its efforts to thwart terrorism.

#### GOP will cave on the health care demands

Alexander Bolton, 9-12-2013, "Reid 'really frightened' over potential for government shutdown ," The Hill, <http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/321923-reid-really-frightened-of-possible-government-shutdown-after-meeting-with-boehner>

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said he is scared of a possible government shutdown after meeting with Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) Thursday morning. “I’m really frightened,” he told reporters after a press conference to discuss the morning meeting he had with Boehner, Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.). “I think they’re looking like the House is having trouble controlling themselves,” he said. Earlier in the day, Reid declared that the lower chamber had been taken over by anarchists after an energy efficiency bill stalled on the Senate floor. “We’re diverted totally from what this bill is about. Why? Because the anarchists have taken over,” he said. “They’ve taken over the House and now they’ve taken over the Senate. Reid on Thursday delivered a blunt message to Boehner that he will not delay the 2010 Affordable Care Act in exchange for keeping the government open past the end of the month. Reid also made clear he will not grant Republicans any concessions in order to pass legislation to raise the debt limit. Reid told reporters that he will strip out any language defunding or delaying the new healthcare law included in House-passed legislation funding government beyond Sept. 30. “Go to something else, get away from ObamaCare. Send us something else,” he said. He plans to pass a “clean” stopgap spending measure to keep the government open through year’s end. Reid characterized Thursday morning’s bicameral leadership meeting as cordial and said he offered to help Boehner circumvent Tea Party-affiliated conservatives who are threatening a government shutdown. “I said to him, ‘What can I do to help?’,” Reid said. “It was not a yelling-at-each-other meeting. It was a very nice meeting we had. Hey listen, I like John Boehner.” Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking Senate Democratic leader, predicted House Republican leaders will fold before allowing the government to shut down. “I still think at the last minute they’ll have to blink,” Schumer said. “The fact that Boehner came up with his sort-of concoction shows that he knows that a government shutdown plays badly for him,” he added, referring to the stopgap spending measure House GOP leaders presented to their colleagues on Tuesday. “Should he go forward and let the Tea Party win on the government shutdown, then everyone will come down on him and say, ‘Why’d you allow them to do it?’.”

### Ptx link

Banana Ptx link

Cateora 11

(Philip, fellow at the Academy of International Business University of Colorado, "International Marketing", shr.receptidocs.ru/docs/2/1029/conv\_1/file1.pdf)

How did this **banana war** start? **The E**uropean **U**nion **imposed a quota and tariffs that favored imports** from former colonies in the Caribbean and Africa, distributed by European firms, **over Latin American bananas** distributed by U.S. firms. **Chiquita** Brands International and Dole Food Company, **contend**ing **that** the EU’s “illegal **trade barriers**” **were costing $520 million annually** in lost sales to Europe, asked the U.S. government for help. **The government agreed that unfair trade barriers were damaging their business, and 100 percent tariffs on selected European imports were levied.** Coincidentally, **Chiquita Brands’ annual political campaign contributions increased** from barely over $40,000 in 1991 to $1.3 million in 1998.¶ A settlement was finally reached that involved high tariffs on Latin America bananas and quotas (with no tariffs) on bananas from Europe’s former colonies. But **the bruising over banana¶ s continues**. Most recently, the issue has shifted to banana bending. That is, bananas from Latin America tend to be long and straight, while those from the non-tariff countries are short and bent. Because the latter are not preferred by the shippers or retailers (the bendier ones don’t stack as neatly and economically), the bananas from the former colonies are still not preferred. And new regulations have been adopted by the European Commission that mandate that bananas must be free from “abnormal curvature of the fingers.” So **the bendy banana producers are threatening to renege on the whole agreement**. **Everyone involved finds this prospect very unappealing**.¶ **No company, domestic or international, large or small, can conduct business without considering the influence of the political environment** within which it will operate. One of the most undeniable and crucial realities of international business is that both host and home governments are integral partners. A government reacts to its environment by initiating and pursuing policies deemed necessary to solve the problems created by its particular circumstances. Reflected in its policies and attitudes toward business are a government’s ideas of how best to promote the national interest, considering its own resources and political philosophy**. A government controls and restricts a company’s activities by encouraging and offering support or by discouraging and banning or restricting its activities**—depending on the pleasure of the government.¶ International law recognizes the sovereign right of a nation to grant or withhold permission to do business within its political boundaries and to control where its citizens conduct business. Thus **the political environment of countries is a critical concern for the international marketer**. This chapter examines some of the more salient political considerations in assessing global markets.

#### engagement in adversary countries drains finite capital – 5 reasons

* Recent empirics prove
* Perception of being “soft” on national security
* Engagement perceived as ineffective
* Perception of tradeoff with domestic priorities
* Key GOP leaders opposition

Kurtzer et al, 11 (Daniel, US Ambassador, Princeton Policy Workshop The 2010 Princeton Policy Workshop is composed of twelve graduate students at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Department of History. Working under the direction of Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel, the group examined the history and challenges of four case studies in the Middle East and then traveled to the region to gather relevant and diverse perspectives regarding U.S. foreign policy. The group developed recommendations to guide the Obama administration’s future decision making toward Syria and Hamas. In December 2010, the group presented its recommendations to the U.S. State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns. Over the course of this process, the group consulted over 70 current and former officials, diplomats, scholars, and civil society leaders in Syria, Israel, the West Bank and the United States, as well as representatives from the United Nations, the European Union, and other international stakeholders. This policy workshop report represents the conclusion of the 2010 Policy Workshop. Recommendations were reached by consensus among the participating students, January, <http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_fy10/WWS591d.pdf>)

In his first address to a joint session of Congress in February 2009, President Obama proclaimed that “a new era of engagement has begun,” asserting that America “cannot shun the negotiating table, nor ignore the foes or forces that could do us harm.” Nearly two years later, President Obama faces criticism both from those who argue that greater engagement with difficult actors has failed to yield results and must be abandoned, as well as from those who contend that such a policy has not fully been pursued and needs to be given an opportunity to succeed. Foreign Policy in Context: Domestic Political Constraints on Policy Flexibility There are many challenges to compelling Syria and Hamas to play cooperative rather than destabilizing roles, and U.S. domestic political constraints limit the Administration’s flexibility to quickly alter its approach in pursuing alternatives to sanctions and isolation as tools to generate behavior change. For example, the Administration has been unable to secure Senate confirmation for its nominee for Ambassador to Syria, and it had to invest significant political capital to gain a minor change to the laws that govern the funding of a potential Palestinian unity government that includes members of Hamas. This difficulty is not surprising. As with any “State Sponsor of Terrorism” or “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” once the United States ratchets up rhetoric and sanctions, it becomes politically perilous for an administration to suggest what may be perceived as a softer approach without significant and tangible concessions from the problematic actors. Specifically, because these states and groups often persist in speaking and acting provocatively as the United States considers its policy options, it is particularly difficult to make a compelling argument that engagement will be effective in changing behaviors for the better. Political sensitivities are heightened when Israel is involved due to the deep ties between the two countries, the strong support for Israel in the U.S. Congress and among the American people, the impact of our policy toward these entities on Israel’s security, and the effectiveness of pro-Israel advocacy groups. The political currents favoring policy inertia toward difficult actors, including Syria and Hamas, are further bolstered by the continued economic downturn, the prevailing opinion that more resources should be dedicated to solving domestic problems, the President’s limited political capital in the aftermath of Democratic losses in the midterm elections, and the highly skeptical view toward engagement of many Republicans who will rise to leadership positions in the U.S. House of Representatives.

#### That’s specifically true for hostile countries like (Cuba/Venezuela)

Dueck, 11

Colin Dueck,professor at the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, October 1, 2011

policy review » no. 169, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006>

Look at how Obama’s strategy of accommodation has played out in relation to four categories of foreign governments: 1) those essentially hostile to the United States, 2) those who pursue a mixture of strategic rivalry and cooperation, 3) genuine American allies, and 4) Arab governments of varying allegiance. The first category, of regimes basically hostile to the United States, includes the governments of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, to name only four of the most notable. Each of these governments has literally defined itself at a fundamental level by violent opposition to America. To think that a conciliatory tone, a preliminary concession, or a well-intentioned desire for better relations on the part of a U.S. president by itself will transform that hostility is simply naïve. In the case of Cuba, for example, the Obama administration began by lifting certain economic sanctions, in the hope of seeing some reciprocal concessions from the Castro brothers: political liberalization, an easing of anti-American hostility, anything at all of significance. No such concessions have been made. The case of Iran has already been discussed — Obama reached out to Tehran with great fanfare in 2009, and has received in effect a slap in the face. Both Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and North Korea’s Kim Jong Il are likewise just as hostile and provocative toward the United States today as they were when George W. Bush was America’s president. This is because the fundamental barrier to friendly U.S. relations with those regimes was never George W. Bush. The fundamental barrier to friendly relations with these regimes is the fact that they are bitterly hostile to the United States. The kinds of concessions that Washington would have to offer to win their genuine accommodation would be so sweeping, massive, and unacceptable, from the point of view of any likely U.S. president that they will not be made — and certainly not by Barack Obama. Any smaller concessions from Washington, therefore, are simply pocketed by a hostile regime, which continues along in its basic antipathy toward the United States. So who is supposed to be the target audience here? The true audience and for that matter the ultimate source of these various conciliatory policy initiatives is essentially a small, transnational, North Atlantic class of bien pensant opinion who already share Obama’s core policy priorities in any case. They have rewarded him with their support, as well as with the Nobel Peace Prize. Others internationally are less impressed. And in the meantime, we may have lost something, in terms of the ability to seriously prepare for certain looming security challenges. A primary and continuing emphasis on diplomatic engagement after Iran has repeatedly rebuffed the United States does not help us to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. A declared commitment to nuclear abolition does nothing to convince other nuclear powers to abandon their own arsenals, and may even be counterproductive in the sense that it deludes important segments of opinion into believing that such declarations actually help to keep the peace. Obama has said from the beginning that the purpose of his more conciliatory foreign policy approach was to bolster American standing in the world, but the definition of international standing has actually been highly self-referential in the direction of aforementioned transatlantic liberal opinion. In many cases overseas, from the perspective of other governments, Obama’s well-intentioned conciliatory gestures are read as a sign of weakness, and consequently undermine rather than bolster American standing. In one way, however, Obama has already achieved much of what he desired with his strategy of accommodation, and that is to re-orient American national resources and attention away from national security concerns and toward the expansion of domestic progressive reforms. He appears to sincerely believe that these liberal domestic initiatives in areas such as health care and finance will also bolster American economic power and competiveness. Actually they will do no such thing, since heavy-handed and constantly changing federal regulations tend to undermine investor confidence as well as long-term U.S. economic growth. But either way, Obama’s vision of a more expansive government role in American society is well on its way to being achieved, without from his point of view debilitating debates over major national security concerns. In that sense, especially if he is reelected in 2012, several of his major strategic priorities will have been accomplished. Any good strategy must incorporate the possibility of pushback or resistance from unexpected quarters. As they say in the U.S. military, the enemy gets a vote. So, for that matter, do other countries, whether friendly or not. When things do not go exactly according to plan, any decent strategy and any capable leader adapt. Indeed any decent foreign policy strategy begins with the recognition for backup plans, since inevitably things will not go exactly according to plan. Other countries rarely respond to our initial strategic moves in precisely the way we might wish. The question then becomes: What is plan B? Obama is tactically very flexible, but at the level of grand strategy he seems to have no backup plan. There is simply no recognition of the possibility that world politics might not operate on the post-Vietnam liberal assumptions he has imbibed and represented over the years. Obama’s critics often describe him as providing no strong foreign policy leadership. They underestimate him. Actually he has a very definite idea of where he wants to take the United States. His guiding foreign policy idea is that of international accommodation, sparked by American example. He pursues that overarching concept with great tactical pliability but without any sign of ideological or basic revision since coming into office. Yet empirically, in one case after another, the strategy is not working. This is a kind of leadership, to be sure, but leadership in the wrong direction. Obama believes that liberal domestic initiatives will bolster American economic power and competitiveness. How can the Obama administration adapt and adjust to the failures of its strategy of accommodation? It can admit that the attempted diplomatic engagement of Iran has failed, and shift toward a strategy of comprehensive pressure against that regime. It can make it abundantly clear to both the Taliban and al Qaeda that the United States will not walk away from Afghanistan, despite the beginning drawdown. It can start treating Russia as a geopolitical rival, which it is, rather than simply as a diplomatic partner. It can strengthen U.S. missile defenses as a form of insurance against nuclear proliferators. There is a long list of policy recommendations that can be made on specific regional and functional matters, but the prior and most important point is the need for a change in mentality. President Obama needs to stop working on the assumption that U.S. foreign policy concessions or gestures directed at the gallery of elite transatlantic opinion — whether on nuclear arms control, counterterrorism, or climate change — will somehow be reciprocated by specific foreign governments in the absence of some very hard bargaining. He needs to grasp that U.S. strategic disengagement from specific regional theaters, whether promised or underway, is taken as a sign of weakness in those regions and not simply as a sign of benevolent restraint. He needs to recognize that America’s international reputation consists not only of working toward his own definition of the moral high ground, but also very much of a reputation for strength, and specifically of a reputation for the willingness to use force. He needs to stop operating on the premise that past American foreign policy decisions are the ultimate source of much violent discord in the world today. He needs to be willing to divide the international system conceptually and operationally into friends and enemies, as they actually exist, and to support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Finally, he needs to admit the limited effect of his own personal charisma on the foreign policies of other governments. The president of the United States is not an international community organizer. If the conceptual framework that underpins Obama’s foreign policy strategy is altered, then better policies will flow on a wide range of specific issues. Obama needs to be willing to support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Admittedly, there is little chance that Obama will concede any of this. One of the things we know from historical example is that presidents tend to keep operating on their own inbuilt foreign policy assumptions, even as contrary evidence piles up. It usually takes either a dramatic external shock, or a new administration altogether, to bring about a major revaluation of existing assumptions. Curiously, this resistance to contrary evidence in foreign policy appears to be even truer of highly educated, self-confident, and intelligent people with core ideological convictions — a description that certainly fits President Obama. Obama is malleable on tactics, and he takes great care to project an aura of sensible calm, but in truth he is a conviction president powered by certain core ideological beliefs and vaulting policy ambitions. His characteristic response when these core beliefs and ambitions are truly tested by opponents or events is not to bend, but to bristle. He is therefore particularly unlikely to admit or even perceive that a foreign policy strategy based upon faulty assumptions of international accommodation is failing or has failed. Nor is it politically convenient for him to do so. More likely, he will continue along his chosen path, offering nothing more than tactical adjustments, until some truly dramatic event occurs which brings his whole foreign policy strategy into question — an Iranian nuclear test, for example.

### AT: PC Low – General

#### The plan is the straw that breaks the camel’s back- our ev assumes ALL recent failures

Lawrence 9/17/13

“Staying aloof to appearances could endanger both Democratic chances in 2014 and the president's legacy.” JILL LAWRENCE-National correspondent at National Journal. She was previously a columnist at Politics Daily, national political correspondent at USA Today and national political writer at the Associated Press., SEP 17 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/obama-says-he-s-not-worried-about-style-but-he-should-be/279743/

Indeed, the year's setbacks are accumulating and that is dangerous for Obama.¶ "At some point people make a collective decision and they don't listen to the president anymore. That's what happened to both Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush," Cannon says. "I don't think Obama has quite gone off the diving board yet in the way that Carter or Bush did … but he's close to the edge. He needs to have some successes and perceptions of success."¶ That is going to be difficult, given the near total lack of bipartisanship on Capitol Hill. In fact, Cannon's description of Reagan's successes -- every time a bipartisan bill passed, his poll numbers went up -- is reason enough for Republicans to keep blocking Obama at every turn. Style points could be one way to stave off irrelevance. "Had we rolled out something that was very smooth and disciplined and linear" on Syria, Washington would have "graded it well, even if it was a disastrous policy," Obama told ABC. But the two don't have to be mutually exclusive. A smooth, disciplined and linear approach to budget negotiations and the debt limit would be a step back from the edge of the Carter-Bush cliff, even if a clear win proves elusive.

#### Prolonged, politicized discussion crush the economy – credit rating, biz con, consumer spending

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[Kathleen, Special Writer-Economics for Dow Jones Newswires, “Reminder That Debt Ceiling Debate Still Looms,” Wall Street Journal, 6/11, <http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/06/11/reminder-that-debt-ceiling-debate-still-looms/>]

Investors are focused on how monetary policy will play out this summer. But on Monday rating agency Standard & Poor’s sent a reminder that fiscal policy could also shift the economic outlook this summer. Within its announcement that it was lifting its U.S. long-term debt-rating outlook to stable from negative, S&P gave high marks to the Federal Reserve, the private economy and the U.S. dollar. The rating agency then returned to a theme mentioned back in August 2011 when it shocked markets by cutting the rating of U.S. sovereign debt to AA+ (a rating affirmed in Monday’s release): increased partisanship in Washington has made it more difficult to resolve budget disagreements. The next big fiscal debate will come this summer when Congress must raise the government’s debt ceiling. Because Washington leaders avoided pushing the economy off the fiscal cliff early this year, the rating agency is hopeful the White House and Republican congressional leaders will find a way to play nice. “Although we expect some political posturing to coincide with raising the government’s debt ceiling, which now appears likely to occur near the Sept. 30 fiscal year-end, we assume with our outlook revision that the debate will not result in a sudden unplanned contraction in current spending–which could be disruptive — let alone [a pause in] debt service,” the S&P release said. Yet with recent episodes — such as the IRS scandal and the phone surveillance program — distracting the White House and emboldening GOP members of Congress, expectations of an easy agreement may be overly optimistic. Remember that the 2011 debt debacle rippled through the economy. Consumer sentiment plunged, and business uncertainty rose. With the recovery now finally firming up, a new source of volatility is not needed. Even if the ceiling is lifted, S&P is very clear that more fiscal progress needs to be done. “We see some risks that the recent improved fiscal performance, due in part to cyclical and to one-off factors, could lead to complacency,” the report said. “A deliberate relaxation of fiscal policy without countervailing measures to address the nation’s longer-term fiscal challenges could place renewed downward pressure on the rating.” In other words, fiscal squabbling and budget inaction could still mar the economic outlook — and the U.S. credit rating.

### Democracy

#### Prolonged debt ceiling negotiations trash American legitimacy and demo promo

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[Salvatore, senior lecturer in sociology and social policy (Sydney) and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, “The Debt Ceiling Debate That Wasn't,” Truthout, 5/21, <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/16504-the-debt-ceiling-debate-that-wasnt>]

The debt ceiling has been reached multiple times since the beginning of the global financial crisis, and another debt ceiling crisis is right around the corner. Except that there will be no crisis, because the country is Australia. Just like the United States, Australia has a debt ceiling. Australian borrowing bumps up against this ceiling on a regular basis. And just as in the United States, the debt ceiling is an absolute limit on government spending that cannot be transgressed even if the Australian parliament has passed a bill authorizing additional expenditures. But there the similarity ends. Australia has no debates over default, no dramatic government shutdowns, no sequestration and no fiscal cliffs. When the government reaches the debt ceiling, the ceiling is raised in an orderly manner. No one panics. Everyone gets paid. It used to work that way in the United States, too. The debt ceiling has only come to be politicized in recent years. This situation is ludicrous - and dangerous. Once the government has incurred a legal obligation, we should all expect the government to meet it. America's debt ceiling brinksmanship has made us a global laughingstock. In no other developed country do political parties threaten to push the government into default if they don't get their way. This kind of take-no-prisoners politics is more characteristic of third-world dictatorships than first-world democracies. The United States doesn't have to have a debt ceiling. At the next reauthorization (which by most accounts will be the 90th or so) Congress could simply abolish the ceiling. But Australia's experience shows this is unnecessary. If America's politicians could be as sober and mature as Australia's, we wouldn't have to worry about it. The Australians I know will be rolling in the aisles to hear their politicians described as "sober and mature." Australian politics is highly partisan, often very personal and nothing if not robust. But it is not self-destructive. America - and America's politicians - could learn some important lessons in democracy from looking overseas. America's own democracy is, perhaps, not the example it once was.

#### Extinction

**Diamond ’95** (Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

### 2NC Impact – Iraq

#### Debt freeze de-funds Iraqi military operations

Min 10 (David, Associate Director for Financial Markets Policy – Center for American Progress, “The Big Freeze”, 10-28, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big\_freeze.html)

By law, a statutory limit restricts the total amount of debt the federal government can accumulate. Only Congress can raise this limit. On the heels of the worst recession since the Great Depression, this “debt ceiling” is projected to be reached sometime early next year. Increasingly, conservatives are pledging to vote against any increases to the debt ceiling—even if this means shutting down the federal government. This reckless pledge would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. economy and the global financial markets, and would severely worsen the long-term budget situation to boot.¶ This conservative pledge has historical antecedents. In the fall of 1995, congressional Republicans refused to raise the debt ceiling for a period of about six months, until they reversed course in March 1996 in response to plummeting poll numbers. This original “debt ceiling crisis,” as it’s become known, was extraordinarily costly, roiling the financial markets and forcing two government shutdowns.¶ The consequences of refusing to raise the debt ceiling would be even more costly today, given the precarious state of the U.S. economy and global financial markets, and potentially could be disastrous. Unlike in 1995, when our economic outlook was good, we are currently fighting our way out of the Great Recession and coming off of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.¶ Nonetheless, [led by the advice of Newt Gingrich](http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/91857-gingrich-government-shutdown-could-happen-over-healthcare-battle), the former House Speaker who was the architect of the 1995-96 debt ceiling crisis, [many conservatives](http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/09/republicans-talk-about-government-shut-down-over-spending-white-house-pounces-on-promise-of-gridlock.html) are [clamoring](http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2010_09/025918.php) for a repeat of this past episode in recklessness.¶ The budgetary consequences of this conservative pledge would be catastrophic and far-reaching, forcing the immediate cessation of more than 40 percent of all federal government activities (excluding only interest payments on the national debt), including Social Security, military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, homeland security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance. This would not only threaten the safety and economic security of all Americans, but also have dire impacts for the economy and job growth.

#### World war three results

Corsi 7 (Jerome, "War with Iran is imminent," Phd in Poly Sci @ Harvard, author, + staff reporter @ World Net Daily, 1-8, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=53669)

**If a broader war breaks out in Iraq**, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will **only be a matter of time** before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. **The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war**, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons.

With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. **A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war**, much as World Wars I and II began.