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### 1

#### Interpretation - “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

### 2

#### No drilling authority in the Gulf now – plan gets access to large amounts of natural gas fast

Griles, Department of the Interior Deputy Secretary, 3

[Steven, “ENERGY PRODUCTION ON FEDERAL LANDS,” Hearing before the Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the US Senate, 2-27-03, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg86709/html/CHRG-108shrg86709.htm> , accessed 7-14-13]

Mr. Griles. America's public lands have an abundant ¶ opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and ¶ nonrenewable energy resources. Energy reserves contained on the ¶ Department of the Interior's onshore and offshore Federal lands ¶ are very important to meeting our current and future estimates ¶ of what it is going to take to continue to supply America's ¶ energy demand.¶ Estimates suggest that these lands contain approximately 68 ¶ percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent ¶ of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has ¶ developed a national energy policy that laid out a ¶ comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America's future. ¶ That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production ¶ of energy, both renewable and nonrenewable, to meet our ¶ dependence for energy.¶ For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion ¶ barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported ¶ and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed ¶ to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge ¶ to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration.¶ Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, ¶ similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-¶ containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to ¶ access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the ¶ tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ¶ ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to ¶ improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even ¶ in Alaska.¶ According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the ¶ largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. ¶ The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports ¶ from Iraq.¶ The National Energy Policy also encourages development of ¶ cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy ¶ sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, ¶ solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an ¶ alternate energy source.¶ To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land ¶ Management and the DOE's National Renewable Energy Lab last ¶ week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It ¶ identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public ¶ lands.¶ Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.\* ¶ This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for ¶ renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that ¶ we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with ¶ the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable ¶ resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into ¶ the land use planning that we are currently going, so that ¶ right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can ¶ be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity.¶ The Department completed the first of an energy inventory ¶ this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. ¶ Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically ¶ recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five ¶ oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out ¶ later this year.¶ Now this report, it is not--there are people who have ¶ different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be ¶ a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas ¶ potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as ¶ we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will ¶ help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and ¶ all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and ¶ develop oil and gas in a sound fashion.¶ Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that ¶ have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the ¶ United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. ¶ Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and ¶ offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal ¶ bed methane.¶ Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will ¶ authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. ¶ It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 ¶ years to get some of these in place. This planning process that ¶ Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows ¶ for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts ¶ are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact ¶ what will occur.¶ One of the areas which we believe that the Department of ¶ the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going ¶ to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the ¶ private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good ¶ neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be ¶ addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure ¶ that landowners have their surface rights and their values ¶ protected.¶ BLM is working to make the consultation process with the ¶ landowners, with the States and local governments and other ¶ Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must ¶ assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of ¶ their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, ¶ we can do that.¶ In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ¶ ten current resource management planning areas that contain the ¶ major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA ¶ study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward ¶ with consideration of development of the natural gas.¶ We are also working with the Western Governors' Association ¶ and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and ¶ designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like ¶ to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and ¶ put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the ¶ need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the ¶ public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to ¶ amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have ¶ future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ¶ ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It ¶ should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both ¶ pipelines and electric transmission.¶ Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental ¶ Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nation's energy and ¶ economic security.¶ The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked ¶ about so far is onshore.¶ Mr. Griles. That is correct.¶ The Chairman. You now will speak to offshore.¶ Mr. Griles. Yes, sir, I will.¶ Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in ¶ the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, ¶ scheduled sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, ¶ or put under moratoria, even though they were in the 5-year ¶ plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly ¶ in the Gulf, more risky.¶ We have approved a 5-year oil and gas leasing program in ¶ July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of ¶ Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in ¶ Alaska by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas ¶ contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 ¶ trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¶ We are also acting to raise energy production from these ¶ offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases ¶ for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are ¶ at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to ¶ produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that ¶ exploration. These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 ¶ feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion ¶ cubic feet of natural gas and can be developed quickly due to ¶ existing infrastructure and the shallow water.¶ We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows ¶ companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time ¶ to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. ¶ That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically ¶ clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets ¶ distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that ¶ hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to ¶ best drill. Vast resources of oil and natural gas lie, we hope, ¶ beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. ¶ But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images.¶ We are also working to create a process of reviewing and ¶ permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have ¶ sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals ¶ Management Service of the Department of the Interior clear ¶ authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The ¶ renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related ¶ projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as ¶ offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities.¶ We need this authority in order to be able to truly give ¶ the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy, so ¶ they can have certainty about where to go.

#### Supply disputes block exports now – creating sustainable supplies is key

Ebinger, senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, ‘12

(Charles, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for US Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” 5-2-12, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports/20120502_lng_exports>, accessed 10-22-12)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and ¶ sustainable domestic resource base to support it. ¶ Natural gas currently accounts for approximately ¶ 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.¶ 3¶ While ¶ it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas ¶ supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production ¶ increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; ¶ from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an ¶ annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).¶ 4¶ According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in ¶ 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By ¶ 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will ¶ account for 46 percent of total domestic natural ¶ gas production.¶ 5¶ Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of ¶ the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over ¶ potential exports hinges on the prospects for ¶ its sustained availability and development. For ¶ exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other ¶ unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses. ¶ There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of ¶ technically recoverable shale gas resources—the ¶ volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United ¶ States. These estimates vary from just under 700 ¶ trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 ¶ tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf ¶ of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for ¶ the shale gas resource alone would be enough to ¶ satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic ¶ demand¶ 6¶ The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total ¶ U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf.¶ 7¶ Based on the range of ¶ estimates below, shale gas could therefore account ¶ for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total ¶ technically recoverable natural gas resource in the ¶ United States. Sustainability of shale Gas Production¶ In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have ¶ an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and ¶ the demand for the equipment used for shale gas ¶ production. The productivity of shale gas wells has ¶ been a subject of much recent debate, with some ¶ industry observers suggesting that undeveloped ¶ wells may prove to be less productive than those ¶ developed to date. However, a prominent view ¶ among independent experts is that sustainability ¶ of shale gas production is not a cause for serious ¶ concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### US LNG exports cause a global transition from oil indexation to spot pricing

Hulbert 12 (Matthew Hulbert - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review, government consultant, Senior Research Fellow @ Netherlands Institute for International Relations, working on energy and political risk. Senior Energy Analyst at Datamonitor for global utilities. “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World,” 8/05/2012 http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world)

The same debate is raging in the US. Despite the phenomenal breakthroughs in American shale developments, the front runner of the revolution now risks becoming a victim of its own success in terms of Henry Hub prices dropping so low, that full cycle economics for US shale gas plays have become negative. Unless prices organically firm, or US producers learn the dark art of supply restraint, current output levels will be difficult to maintain or enhance for American consumers. Companies will fold; fields will be mothballed, with Chesapeake providing the best ‘poster boy’ example of how precarious shale gas economics have become. The quick fix option to get Henry Hub back at a sustainable $4-7/MMbtu level (and by far the most lucrative for some of the mid-cap players involved), is to sign up international LNG contracts. That’s exactly what’s being done, with some of the larger IOCs (Royal Dutch Shell, BP and ExxonMobil) also aggressively pushing for LNG exports to capitalise on huge spreads, not to mention preventing further write-downs on shale assets. It’s not like Chinese champions working on US plays would have any ideological opposition to such a prospect. In total, FERC has around 125bcm/y of LNG applications currently awaiting approval – even on a ‘bad day’ 40-50bcm exports should be very feasible by 2020. That would make the US the third largest LNG player in the world. It’s also going to be the crucial factor over the next five years to decide where gas markets are heading. America will be decisive for future pricing models, whether they shift to gas (rather than oil) fundamentals. US LNG could be the straw that breaks oil indexation back.

#### Spot pricing causes short term volatility --- Russia floods the market to crowd out producers and engages in collusion to drive up future prices

Hulbert 12 (Matthew Hulbert - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review, government consultant, Senior Research Fellow @ Netherlands Institute for International Relations, working on energy and political risk. Senior Energy Analyst at Datamonitor for global utilities. “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World,” 8/05/2012 http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world)

But it’s not all bad news for Russia. The first point is that most consumers (especially continental Europeans) are labouring under the illusion that spot markets mean cheap prices. What they miss, is that setting gas prices based on gas fundamentals has got nothing to do with being cheap – it’s purely about achieving a cost reflective price for whatever the markets (and fundamentals) suggest gas should be. Gas on gas competition might well have positive medium term effects on price given marginal costs of production are generally cheaper than oil. But there are never any guarantees. If anything, prices could initially be far more volatile than those associated with piped gas given the cyclical nature of the beast, not to mention adapting to new upstream investment regimes unable to fall back on the oil ‘certainties’ of old. But assuming these initial hurdles are jumped and gas markets are politically allowed to bed in, that’s where the real fun and games start. As much as consumers think they’ve taken the political sting out of gas producers tails, spot markets could actually give producers far more leverage to manipulate prices, either on a collective or bilateral basis. When you take a quick look at the map, it’s clear to see supply side dynamics are essentially oligopolistic in Europe, a position that Russia might decide to capitalise on. The question is whether Russia would have the nerve to go for it, or be able to take the ideological leap of faith needed to explore and exploit a potentially lucrative new world of gas benchmarks?

Much would depend on pricing pressures involved and how far convergence has got, but the lower prices go, the more compelling prospect supply side collusion would become. Warning shots along such lines have been repeatedly fired by the GECF (even if often behind closed doors) with Russia, Algeria, Iran and Venezuela all wanting to recalibrate markets back towards producer interests. Obviously someone would have to shoulder initial opportunity costs and absorb likely free riding, enforce quotas and restrict new market entry at the fringe. They would also need to find a swing producer, that many have long thought would be Qatar, but actually, flags up a huge opportunity for Russia here.

Instead of issuing empty threats to flood markets or decimate upstream investments, independent gas benchmarks might just provide Moscow with sufficient incentive to do what it should always have done: get to grips with the fact that US shale has made Russia a price taker in Europe (and Asia), and start developing LNG prospects to reclaim control of global gas fundamentals. Despite sitting on over 30% of global gas supplies, Russian LNG production accounts for less than 5% of global share. Moscow has let itself become a fringe player in a global gas world. A ridiculous statement when you consider Russia is the gas equivalent to Saudi Arabia for oil. Developing Shtokman, Sakhalin and indeed Bazhenov and Achimov fields will undoubtedly put some people’s nose out of joint, but given Russia’s own unconventional reserves are estimated to be ten times larger than the whole of Europe, it still has the time (and potential) to break anybody in the field on volume to dictate long term prices. If global gas benchmarks are the way of the future, then we should at least be aware that Russia has the potential to play a pivotal role as the swing LNG producer of the world. The initial 62 million tonnes of LNG Shtokman and Sakhalin should hold, tells us as much.

Not only could Russia lean far heavier on Qatar, Australia, Algeria, West African and burgeoning Latin American LNG production to align short term prices, it would set the stage for a serious approach towards a gas cartel as the logical conclusion of independent global gas prices. Worst of all, Russia’s swing status would be built on the shoulders of a well-supplied, but largely isolated US market. If the US goes native, Europe fails to develop indigenous supplies, and Asia soaks up excess supplies, then Russia can have lots of fun applying its own logic of ‘gas on gas’ competition. That should certainly give Europe something to think about at the wrong end of the Eurasian pipeline. But you never know, if Brussels asks the Chinese politely, the clever chaps in Beijing might have a plan C. Beijing LNG ‘freedom carriers’ making their way to Europe by 2025 might just be a better bet than hoping the US delivers on its global gas potential. Ironic times indeed.

#### Causes Russian resurgence and collapses the global economy

Fang et al 12 (Songying Fang - Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Political Science Rice University. Amy Myers Jaffe - Fellow in Energy Studies JamesA. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University. TedTemzelides, Ph.D., Prof of Economics. “New Alignments? The Geopolitics of Gas and Oil Cartels and the Changing Middle East,” January 2012, <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-GasOilCartels-012312.pdf>)

Ill this study, we investigate three related questions raised by the above observations. First, what is the likelihood that Russia will be successful in creating new coalitions in energy markets in the near future? Russia’s aggressive use of its own energy exports as a tool of statecraft and diplomatic leverage in recent years has reintroduced fears of an “energy weapon” that could be wielded in international discourse. It has been argued that tightening energy markets could raise the benefits and possible chances of success for an energy exporting country that, alone or in combination with others, is trying to wrest political concessions by threatening to cut off energy supplies. Such an event would present a challenge for the international economy, and it could even lead to military conflict.2

#### Russian resurgence causes global nuclear war

Blank 9 – Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,

The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171

Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,

But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

### 3

#### Commodification of resources forces enclosure and reliance on markets for livelihoods—that organizes society in ways that make livelihoods zero sum and causes extinction

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2004**

(Massimo, “Opposing fetishism by reclaiming our powers: The Social Forum movement, capitalist markets and the politics of alternatives”, International Social Science Journal Volume 56, Issue 182, Wiley)

There is not the space here to discuss the processes of market creation. Suffice to say that it is possible to theorise them in terms of “enclosures” (Caffentzis 1995, De Angelis 2004b). To put it simply, enclosures refer to those strategies promoted by economic and political elites that “commodify” things. In general commodification is to turn resources that are held in common among communities, or exchanged as gifts among its members or across members of different communities, or administrated and distributed by central institutions (Polanyi 1944), into things that are bought and sold on the market, commodities. The “things” turned into commodities often represent important resources necessary for communities to reproduce their livelihoods, and their “enclosure” represents at the same time the destruction of those communities and their increasing dependence on markets, which in today's context are increasingly linked to global commodity chains. The consolidation, development and deepening of capitalism in our lives heavily depends on enclosures. Indeed, as others and I have argued, enclosures are a continuous feature of the capitalist mode of production (Caffenzis 1995, De Angelis 2004b, Parelman, 2000) Today, enclosures, the commodification of resources upon which people depend for their livelihoods, take many names. They may involve the dispossession of thousands of farming communities from land and water resources following international bank funding of dam construction, as in the case of the dam project in the Narmada valley in India or the Plan Puebla Panama in Latin America. Or they may take the form of cuts in social spending on hospitals, medicines, and schools, or, especially in countries in the south, cuts in food subsidies so as to have money to pay interest on a mounting international debt. In all these cases, cuts, dispossessions and austerity, namely “enclosures”, are imposed for the sake of “efficiency”, and rationalisation and “global competitiveness”. Enclosures are therefore any strategy that push people to depend on markets for their livelihood. Enclosures only create a context for market social interaction to occur. If enclosures push people into increasing the degree of their dependence on markets for the reproduction of their livelihoods, then markets integrate their activities in a system that pits all against all. The increasing intensification of planetary interdependence brought about by global markets implies that any “node” of social production, at whatever scale – whether an individual on the labour market, a company in a particular industry, a city and country in competition to attract capital and investments vis-à-vis other cities and countries – faces an external force that forces it to adapt to certain standards of doing things, to adopt certain forms of social cooperation, in order to beat the competitor on pain of threat to its livelihood. But “beating the competitor” is also, at the same time, threatening the livelihoods of other communities we are competing with, to the extent that they also depend on markets to reproduce their own livelihoods. The more we depend on money and markets to satisfy our needs and follow our desires, the more we are exposed to a vicious circle of dependence that pits livelihoods against each other. Some of us win, and some of us lose, but in either case we are both involved in perpetrating the system that keeps us reproducing scarcity when in fact we could celebrate abundance. It must be noted that the competition that runs through the global social body is not similar to the competitive games we play with friends. When I play table football with my friends I aim at winning. But whether I win or lose, I end up sharing food and laughter with my friends, whether they lose or win. Competition in this realm is innocuous; it is a practice that might strengthen communities' playfulness instead of destroying it. But competition in the economy – whether “perfect” or “imperfect”, whether real or merely simulated (the latter being increasingly the case in public services where, in the absence of markets, government agencies simulate their dynamics by setting new benchmarks) – ultimately finds its very energy in its threat to livelihoods. It is a mode of social relation that is based on pitting livelihoods against each other. In so doing it continuously reproduces scarcity and community destruction. From the perspective of any “node”, this mode of articulation across the social body is disciplinary because, borrowing from Foucault's (1975) analysis of Bentham's Panopticon, or model prison, the market is also a mechanism in which norms are created through a social process that distributes rewards and punishments (see De Angelis 2002). By norms of production I am here referring to the variety of principles of allocation of resources and distribution associated with social human production, as well as ways of doing things, rhythms and forms of cooperation, that in capitalist markets are synthesised in prices. Norms of production (that is, ways of relating to one another) are answers to such fundamental questions as: what we shall produce, how we shall produce it, how much of it we shall produce, how long we should spend working to produce it, and who shall produce it – all very concrete questions that define process and relational questions concerning the reproduction of our social body and the ways in which we relate to each other and to nature. These questions are not answered by people themselves taking charge of their lives and relations among themselves; thus, equally, the norms of social production and of their relations to each other are not defined collectively. Instead they are defined by an abstract mechanism that we have created (actually, that states have created at sword-and gun-point: see Polanyi, 1944, and Marx, 1867, as classical accounts) and that we take as “natural” in the daily practices of our lives. It is the abstract process of disciplinary markets that articulates the social body in such a way as to constitute social norms of production, rather than individual social actors negotiating among themselves the norms of their free cooperation. In this market mechanism, individual actors must respond to existing heteronomous norms imposed by the blind mechanism of the market by meeting or beating the market benchmark (or the simulated market benchmark imposed by neo-liberalism's state bodies), an activity which in turn affects the market norm itself. In this continuous feedback mechanism, livelihoods are pitted against each other. When rewards and punishments are repeated in a system, norms are created. This is a process that the paladin of market freedom, Friedrich von Hayek, well understood, although he ignored the question of power and enclosure processes in explaining the emergence of capitalist markets. For Hayek, the abstract mechanism of the market is a spontaneously emerging system of freedom (De Angelis 2002).

#### Rejecting the affirmative is a prior action to policy action

### 4

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should ratify the Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico if and only if Mexico agrees to reforms for Pemex to allow overseas private sector investment.

#### This is distinct from the plan – the Trans boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement does not include any provision for foreign private investment

#### Counterplan gets investment in Pemex -- Nieto is pushing for reform but investors lack confidence in his ability to pass legislation—now is key

Martin et. al 6/20(Eric Marin, Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, and Helder Marinho. Eric Martin is a reporter for Bloomberg News in Mexico City, Carlos Manuel Rodriguez is a reporter for Bloomberg News in Mexico City, Helder Marinho is an editor for Bloomberg News in São Paulo. Bloomberg BusinessWeek: Global Economics. “Mexico's President Pushes Reforms for State Oil Company Pemex” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-20/mexicos-president-pushes-reforms-for-state-oil-company-pemex>)

Petróleos Mexicanos, known as Pemex, has long been the third rail of Mexican politics. The state-owned company, originally based on oil fields seized from foreign owners over 70 years ago, has produced sizable government revenue and union jobs for hundreds of thousands of Mexicans. Foreign investment has been largely restricted.¶ But now Pemex’s main asset, the giant Cantarell offshore field, is shrinking fast. The company says it needs to boost annual investment by 46 percent, to $37 billion, to tap undeveloped shale-gas deposits and deep-water reserves. Without some private capital and expertise from abroad, Mexico risks becoming an importer in the next decade. Many of Mexico’s politicians and policymakers have known this for years. Yet Mexican nationalism, resistance from the unions, and the sheer size of the task of transforming Pemex have stood in the way.¶ The planets may be aligning for a solution: Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto says he’s negotiating to get the political support he needs to break the state monopoly in oil and gas exploration and production this year in a bid to accelerate Mexico’s economic growth. In the model envisioned by Peña Nieto, Pemex would develop certain fields, while foreign and private companies would tap others. The oil and gas reserves in the ground would still be the property of Mexico. Peña Nieto declines to discuss many details of the proposal or whether it would include a change in the constitution, which limits how private companies can profit from the nation’s energy resources.¶ He has, however, been sending signals to international oil companies that he needs their help to arrest eight years of decline in Mexico’s crude output. “It’s obvious that Pemex doesn’t have the financial capacity to be in every single front of energy generation,” the 46-year-old president said in an interview in London on June 17, before he traveled to Northern Ireland for meetings with Group of Eight leaders. “Shale is one of the areas where there’s room for private companies, but not the only one.”¶ Peña Nieto says his administration will send the energy bill to Congress by September, when regular sessions resume. He’s relying on the Pact for Mexico, an alliance of the country’s top three political parties, which have vowed to work together to achieve major reforms. Peña Nieto’s own party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), doesn’t have enough votes on its own for a constitutional amendment.¶ “We’re approaching key deadlines,” Peña Nieto says. “I’m optimistic that this political climate of understanding and agreement will be maintained.” Yet investors have pushed down the price of Pemex bonds in the last month. They’re losing confidence in the president’s ability to achieve the needed changes amid signs that the Pact for Mexico is fraying. Corruption allegations against the PRI have already almost derailed the alliance. In April, the National Action Party, a member of the pact, released video and audio tapes allegedly showing officials from Peña Nieto’s party arranging to use government social programs to win support before local elections. The accord may end if Peña Nieto doesn’t prevent electoral irregularities in states where local contests will take place on July 7, said Jesús Zambrano, head of the Party of the Democratic Revolution, another member of the pact in May.¶ “If the Pacto por México dies, then what’s the plan?” asks Duncan Wood, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. “We don’t know what the plan is after that.”¶ Peña Nieto has also waited a long time to make his push for a new oil law. Delays in introducing an energy bill could threaten its depth and support, says Jeremy Martin, an oil specialist at the Institute of the Americas in La Jolla, Calif. “The longer things go, people start taking different directions, and then politicians, his team, start finding reasons why they shouldn’t do something big,” Martin says. In the fall legislative session, an oil bill may also have to compete with the annual budget,a major distraction.¶ Peña Nieto, who’s been president for seven months, says there’s political momentum to pass more reforms after the approval of new education and telecommunications laws that opened up both sectors to more competition. The education bill created an independent institute to evaluate schools and foster competition for jobs and promotions based on performance, a move that has sparked violent protests from teachers. The government also arrested the powerful head of the teachers’ union, Elba Esther Gordillo, on corruption charges, taking on a leader long considered to be untouchable. Her lawyers say she is innocent. In mid-June, Peña Nieto signed a law aimed at spurring more competition in telecommunications by threatening to break up companies that control a majority of the market. That’s a potential headache for billionaire Carlos Slim’s América Móvil (AMX), which has 70 percent of Mexico’s mobile phone subscribers, and Grupo Televisa (TV), which gets 70 percent of the nation’s broadcast television audience.¶ “Overall he’s done an excellent job,” says James Jones, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico when the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect in 1994. “He has the best political sensitivity and touch I’ve seen since President Salinas was able to marshal various factions of Mexico to pass Nafta.”¶ The bottom line: Mexico, facing a steady decline in oil output, needs foreign money to develop shale gas and deep-water reserves.

### 5

#### Debt ceiling deal will be reached- tough move politically for the GOP but they’ll blink

The Hill, 9-14-2013 <http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/322247-confident-democrats-want-separate-showdowns-on-shutdown-and-debt-limit>

Democrats, however, want to force the GOP to debate these issues successively.¶ “We’re not negotiating on the debt ceiling. We think we have the high ground in both of those fights,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide.¶ The Senate Democratic strategy over the next several weeks will be to stand pat and refuse to make any significant concessions in exchange for funding the government or raising the debt ceiling.¶ “If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. “They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets.”¶ Schumer said Republicans are on stronger political ground if there’s a government shutdown, but warned “even on that one, they’re on weak ground because the public sort of is finally smelling that these guys are for obstructing.”

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Debt freeze shatters the U.S. and global economies and causes food price spikes

Min 10 (David, Associate Director for Financial Markets Policy – Center for American Progress, “The Big Freeze”, 10-28, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big\_freeze.html)

A freeze on the debt ceiling could erode confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds in a number of ways, creating further and wider panic in financial markets. First, [by causing a disruption in the issuance of Treasury debt, as happened in 1995-96](http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96130.pdf), a freeze would cause investors to seek alternative financial investments, even perhaps causing a run on Treasurys. Such a run would cause the cost of U.S. debt to soar, putting even more stress on our budget, and the resulting enormous capital flows would likely be highly destabilizing to global financial markets, potentially creating more asset bubbles and busts throughout the world.¶ Second, the massive withdrawal of public spending that would occur would cause significant concern among institutional investors worldwide that the U.S. would swiftly enter a second, very deep, recession, raising concerns about the ability of the United States to repay its debt. Finally, the sheer recklessness of a debt freeze during these tenuous times would signal to already nervous investors that there was a significant amount of political risk, which could cause them to shy away from investing in the United States generally.¶ Taken together, these factors would almost certainly result in a significant increase in the interest rates we currently pay on our national debt, currently just above 2.5 percent for a 10-year Treasury note. If in the near term these rates moved even to 5.9 percent, the long-term rate predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, then our interest payments would increase by more than double, to nearly $600 billion a year. These rates could climb even higher, if investors began to price in a “default risk” into Treasurys—something that reckless actions by Congress could potentially spark—thus greatly exacerbating our budget problems.¶ The U.S. dollar, of course, is the world’s reserve currency in large part because of the depth and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bond market. If this market is severely disrupted, and investors lost confidence in U.S. Treasurys, then it is unclear where nervous investors might go next. A sharp and swift move by investors out of U.S. Treasury bonds could be highly destabilizing, straining the already delicate global economy.¶ Imagine, for example, if investors moved from sovereign debt into commodities, most of which are priced and traded in dollars. This could have the catastrophic impact of weakening the world’s largest economies while also raising the prices of the basic inputs (such as metals or food) that are necessary for economic growth.¶ In short, a freeze on the debt ceiling would cause our interest payments to spike, making our budget situation even more problematic, while potentially triggering greater global instability—perhaps even a global economic depression.

#### Prices spikes kill billions and cause global war

Brown 7 (Lester R., Director – Earth Policy Institute, 3-21, http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2007/Update65 .htm)

Urban food protests in response to rising food prices in low and middle income countries, such as Mexico, could lead to political instability that would add to the growing list of failed and failing states. At some point, spreading political instability could disrupt global economic progress. Against this backdrop, Washington is consumed with “ethanol euphoria.” President Bush in his State of the Union address set a production goal for 2017 of 35 billion gallons of alternative fuels, including grain-based and cellulosic ethanol, and liquefied coal.  Given the current difficulties in producing cellulosic ethanol at a competitive cost and given the mounting public opposition to liquefied coal, which is far more carbon-intensive than gasoline, most of the fuel to meet this goal might well have to come from grain. This could take most of the U.S. grain harvest, leaving little grain to meet U.S. needs, much less those of the hundred or so countries that import grain. The stage is now set for direct competition for grain between the 800 million people who own automobiles, and the world’s 2 billion poorest people. The risk is that millions of those on the lower rungs of the global economic ladder will start falling off as higher food prices drop their consumption below the survival level.

### Oil

#### Organized crime in Mexico makes Mexican oil production unstable – drug crime is a prerequisite to PEMEX reform

Morales 11 [Isidro PhD, PROFESSOR, MONTERREY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION, “ENERGY TRADE AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE MEXICO–U.S. BORDER”]

Last but not least, there are other externalities affecting the investment climate in both the gas and oil industries, apart from those linked to environmental concerns. Drug dealers and organized crime have already negatively impacted these industries. Abduction of oil workers in the Burgos basin has already been reported by the press. Workers have become hostages of kidnappers who demand money that will fund the activities of drug barons operating under rivalry and pressure (Watkins 2010, 31). If the federal government is unable to curb the activities of these organizations in such a key area, most probably private investors will be discouraged from participating as partners of Pemex, regardless of the incentives they might have in their contracts. Illegal and clandestine seizures of oil and gas have also been reported by Pemex and the Ministry of Defense. While in 2005 Pemex reported 136 illegal pipeline taps, in 2010 the figure grew to 668. Eighty percent of the illegal pipeline taps are located in the states of Veracruz, Estado de México, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas, territories dominated by organized crime organizations and drug barons (Jiménez 2011; Soto 2011). Illegal seizures include both crude oil and petroleum products that are sold at clandestine sites or through official outlets via a network of corrupt Pemex employees and retailers (Herrera 2011). Black markets for fuel are not only scattered around the country—illegal sales have also been reported in Guatemala and the United States (Watkins 2010, 31; Jiménez 2011). Oil theft represents around US$2.3 billion in annual losses to Pemex (El Universal, August 2, 2010), and in December 2010 provoked a major explosion just 60 kilometers east of Mexico City, killing 29 people (Alfaro 2010). If the U.S. and Mexican governments fail to cooperate in order to keep the illegal activities of organized crime at bay, pipelines and other critical infrastructure will remain vulnerable targets to be exploited by criminal organizations (Morales 2011). The answer is elusive. Setting aside the short- to mid-term evolution of oil prices, the major challenge that will confront the company in the remaining years of the current presidential administration is how, on the one hand, to redress the technological and organizational quandaries negatively affecting oil recovery and production in the Chicontepec fields and on the other hand, how to insulate the evolution of the overall energy sector from the mounting activities of organized crime. The closer President Calderón is to the end of his administration, the weaker will he be as he addresses those two major quandaries. Thus, in the years to come, Mexico’s energy sector will remain vulnerable to price fluctuations in international markets, to the unpredictable evolution of oil production in the Chicontepec fields, and to the mounting uncertainties unleashed by drug barons in Mexico, mainly in the northern region where nonassociated gas is being extracted. This explains why, for both the United States and Mexico, it is necessary to work out a formula of “shared-governance” and cooperation to insulate, if not resolve, the mutual concerns of the two countries regarding security at the border (violence and drug trafficking for the United States and arms trafficking and drug consumption in the United States for Mexico). Fortunately, Washington has already realized that Mexico’s security is linked to U.S. security—a shared concern it calls “intermestic.” The recognition of this interdependence either on the origin and outcome of illegal activities of organized crime is crucial in order to build up a new architecture of bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

#### No production decline – Mexico has plenty in reserves

Robert Campbell, 5-22-2012; Reuters Market Analyst, Mexico is no longer an oil basketcase: Campbell http://www.petroleumworld.com/storyt12052302.htm

The following may be taken as heresy by oil perma-bulls but let's get it out in the open: it's time to scrap, or at the very least rigorously question, the assumption that Mexican oil production will dramatically fall sometime this decade. A predicted sharp fall in Mexican oil output has long underpinned part of one of the bullish theses behind strong oil prices: non-OPEC crude oil output is weak and getting weaker. Of course, Mexico is not the only part of the non-OPEC supply picture. But it is a big player. The country remains one of the world's biggest oil producers and exporters. The decline of nearly 25 percent in Mexican crude oil production capacity between 2004 and 2008 was a watershed event for oil supplies. But the problem is that analysts still assume that similar declines must inevitably come in the future. A glance at market balances uniformly assume sharp declines in Mexican oil output over the next decade, projecting forward a rerun of the dramatic fall in production experienced by Mexico between 2006-08 onto the future. Consider the facts. Mexican crude oil production, while still a far cry from its peak, has been fairly stable, oscillating between 2.5 million and 2.6 million barrels per day since mid-2009. Total liquids production, which adds condensates and natural gas liquids to crude output, has edged down, to just over 2.9 million bpd, but is off only 40,000 bpd from 2010 levels. Yet forecasters still assume steep drops in Mexican output. For instance, the 2010 Annual Energy Outlook published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration forecast Mexican liquids production would be only 2.31 million bpd in 2012.The EIA's 2011 forecast revised these views, but still assumes a decline in Mexican liquids output. The reference case calls for 2012 production to fall to 2.7 million bpd, or 2.8 million bpd in the high oil price scenario. Yet looking forward in the 2011 EIA forecast, steep declines are still projected, with output falling below 2 million bpd by 2019. The 2012 forecast again revises its view of Mexican output higher, in some cases sharply, but the medium-term forecast still calls for steep declines. The EIA is not alone. Similar forecasts have been made (and revised) in recent years by the International Energy Agency and private oil market analysts. OUT OF INTENSIVE CARE At least for now, the narrative on Mexico remains the same. Whatever state oil monopoly Pemex has done to keep production flat for the last three years is really just a pause in the inevitable decline. Of course this is not to say that all is well in Mexico's oil industry. Pemex remains grossly overstaffed, inefficient, bureaucratic and subject to political interference. Proven oil reserves continue to decline, albeit at a far slower pace than a few years ago.

#### Partial privatization solves PEMEX reform

Joao Peixe 7-15-2012; writer for Oilprice.com Can Enrique Peña Nieto's Energy Reforms Make Mexico a Major Oil Exporter? http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Can-Enrique-Pea-Nietos-Energy-Reforms-Make-Mexico-a-Major-Oil-Exporter.html

All oil reserves are state property, and Mexico has huge potential, however, the only company, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), with the rights for exploration, processing, and selling of the oil, do not have the resources to maximise extraction. Since 2004 Mexican oil output has fallen by 25%, which is a problem as the government receives nearly a third of its revenue from the oil industry. Peña Nieto has decided to encourage growth in the sector by opening it up to foreign investors, specifically Brazil’s Petrobras. In an interview with the Financial Times back in 2011 he said that PEMEX “can achieve more, grow more and do more through alliances with the private sector.” In order to open the industry to private investors such as Petrobras, Peña Nieto must pass a reform agenda through the nation’s congress; a congress where his party does not hold a majority. This means that he will rely upon support from opposition parties to gain the necessary two-thirds vote that he needs to achieve his plans.

#### Ongoing PEMEX reform opens up shale and deepwater oil to exploration – that solves production issues

Eric Martin and Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, 7-13-2012; reporters for Bloomberg Businessweek in Mexico City, Mexico May Finally Get a Modern Oil Industry http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/mexico-may-finally-get-a-modern-oil-industry/

Opening up the oil sector may boost gross domestic product by as much as 0.8 percent a year, according to research firm Capital Economics. Combined with the discovery of significant amounts of shale gas in northern Mexico, tapping deepwater oil could create an era of low energy costs for the country. Inviting outsiders to invest in Pemex could also transform the psychology of business in Mexico. To change Pemex, Peña Nieto will have to challenge entrenched interests, from the unions to local officials, who have all benefited from Pemex’s largesse. If he succeeds he could tackle other monopolies and duopolies in power generation, telecom, and cable television that make life so expensive for Mexicans.

#### High oil prices overcome revenue shortfalls

Market News International 5-9-2011; High Oil Prices Lift Pemex Profits, Challenges Remain http://imarketnews.com/node/30466

MEXICO CITY (MNI) - State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) is reaping huge earnings due to rising world oil prices, but analysts and company officials agree that steep challenges remain due to the government's tax take, meeting promised production increases, money losing subsidiaries and attracting companies via its new contract model. Mexico's basket of oil sold at $110.86 late last week, up from $80.60 at the end of last year, and $71.45 in early May 2010. But the increase was largely caused by factors which have little to do with Mexico. Investors are stampeding into commodities as low interest rates allow them to borrow in developed economies and park the money in appreciating goods. Meanwhile, the Pemex quarterly report released last week showed production, at 2.57 million barrels per day actually fell 1% compared with the first quarter of 2010, although average exports rose 10% to 1.37 million bpd. Still, with prices on the rise, the company posted net earnings of 4.2 billion in the first quarter, up from 1 billion during the same period year earlier.

#### Alt cause to Mexico instability—migration barriers

**Littlefield 2009** (Edward, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "As Mexico’s Problems Mount: The Impact of the Economic Recession on Migration Patterns from Mexico")

As migration from, and remittances to, Mexico have decreased as a result of the current recession, the Mexican economy ominously worsens - Migration, remittances, and the national economy should be considered as integral components in the debate over whether Mexico deserves to be classified as a “failed state,” and what should be United States policy The Mexican economy and many of its national institutional structures may be on the brink of collapse. While drug war violence has dominated the recent news about the possible irreversible status as a society beyond remediation, the topic of immigration has been either marginalized or used to further promote fears that the conflict may spread to the United States. Drugs, national security, and economic recession have replaced immigration reform on the United States’ policy agenda. However, the current financial crisis, and its impact south of the border, is intricately linked to matters of immigration, security, and Mexico’s very cohesion.

#### No impact to heg

**Goldstein 2011**, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, “Thing Again: War,” Sept/Oct 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- **recent geopolitical history** suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have **waned in tandem** over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19th-century Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

#### No impact to Mexican instability

**Seelee and Shirt, 10** – **\***director of theMexicoInstitute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars AND \*\* fellow at the center and an associate professor at the University of San Diego (Andrew Selee, David Shirk, 3/27/10, " Five myths about Mexico's drug war ", Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032602226.html)

The country has certainly seen a big rise in drug violence, with cartels fighting for control of major narcotics shipment routes -- especially at the U.S. border and near major seaports and highways -- and branching into kidnapping, extortion and other illicit activities. Ciudad Juarez, in particular, has been the scene of major battles between two crime organizations and accounted for nearly a third of drug-linked deaths last year.

But the violence is not as widespread or as random as it may appear. Though civilians with no evident ties to the drug trade have been killed in the crossfire and occasionally targeted, drug-related deaths are concentrated among the traffickers. (Deaths among military and police personnel are an estimated 7 percent of the total.) A major reshuffling of leaders and alliances is occurring among the top organized crime groups, and, partly because of government efforts to disrupt their activities, violence has jumped as former allies battle each other. The bloodshed is also geographically concentrated in key trafficking corridors, notably in the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas.

While the violence underscores weaknesses in the government's ability to maintain security in parts of the country, organized crime is not threatening to take over the federal government. Mexico is not turning into a failed state.

#### No impact to Iran prolif.

Hibbs, 13 (Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – “Is a Nuclear Iran Inevitable ?” – The Atlantic – April 12th – http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)

You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it in terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do you think that we've reached the point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb, unless there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there?¶ No, I don't believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today, there have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear weapons capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no means a monolithic country.¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have brought them very far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right now it's up to Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's no consensus right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.

#### US-China relations are superficial – cooperation’s always fails, but issues don’t escalate

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Shortly after US President Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard sealed the bilateral defense deal in November 2011 under which 2500 US marines will be stationed in Australia came Obama's announcement on January 5 2012 of the new strategic defense guidance entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defence. The document claims that China's rise might have impact on the US economy and security, and that countries such as China and Iran continue to pursue asymmetric means of countering US power projection capabilities.1 Both the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense refuted these claims, arguing that not a shred of evidence exists to support such wild accusations.2 Many media reports nevertheless argue that competition between the United States and China amounts to a new Cold War.3 This article discusses characteristics and trends in Sino–US relations, and in this connection answers the specific question: How do the characteristics of Sino–US relations affect trends in their bilateral ties? How much longer can Sino–US relations continue to follow current trends? Where will strategic competition between China and the United States lead? Different Views of Trends in Sino–US Relations The conflict between China and the United States at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Talks gave rise to the mainstream view within US academic circles that Sino–US ties are worsening. Paul Pedrozo and Seth Cropsy argued that competition between China and the United States was a necessary outcome of China's naval modernization.4 Robert Kaplan, meanwhile, contended that China's growing military capacities and economic power made heightened tensions in Sino–US relations inevitable.5 Thomas Christensen holds that relations between the two countries will come under stress as China shifts towards a hard-line policy with respect to its sovereignty and territorial claims.6 While in 2010 US academics blamed China for the deterioration in Sino–US relations, Chinese scholars regarded the worsening of ties in 2011 as obviously a result of the Obama Administration's beefing-up of its pivot strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Scholars are nonetheless split on whether the pivot constitutes a strategy adjustment or a tactical adjustment. Those arguing the former predict long-term competition between China and the United States; those who see it as a tactical adjustment regard the deterioration in Sino–US ties as temporary, that is to say, Obama's pivot strategy in the Asia Pacific region is part of his 2012 electoral strategy that he will drop after the elections and revert to his 2009 policy towards China. We identify three distinct views regarding the future of Sino–US relations. Pessimists argue that Sino–US relations are entering a new Cold War period. Henry C. K. Liu suggests that a new Cold War is brewing between China and the United States, but that it is more geopolitically framed than ideologically based, albeit couched in residual ideological polemic.7 William Jones goes as far as to expect conflict between China and the United States to culminate in a third world war.8 Yongnian Zheng also considers that East Asia is headed towards a new Cold War dynamic that has prompted developments on the Korean Peninsula.9 Mearsheimer holds that it is not possible for China to rise peacefully. He argues that ‘if China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China's neighbours, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain China's power.’10 Lawrence S. Wittner even infers the possibility of nuclear war.11 Those more optimistic about the future of Sino–US relations are primarily Chinese scholars, who generally believe that it is possible for China and the United states to avoid a new Cold War. Wu Jianmin argues that China will not as a matter of national policy enact the role of a hegemon, but follow the historical trend of peace, development and cooperation and absolutely reject war, competition and conflict. Under no circumstances, therefore, will China enter into a new Cold War with the United States.12 Wang Jisi has long held that while China and the United States will not become allies, nor will a crisis in their ties arise of an extent amounting to Cold War.13 Wang argues that the structural contradictions that appeared between China and the United States in 2010 are attributable to the narrowing gap in their respective comparative capacities which, conversely, have driven them further apart in terms of mutual understanding. Major issues such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and the exchange rate have had escalating negative impact on Sino–US ties and created higher levels of strategic suspicion rather than mutual strategic trust.14 This implies that as long as the United States and China bolster strategic trust they can prevent their bilateral relationship from slipping into a Cold War scenario. As distinct from these pessimists and optimists, we, together with a number of colleagues, argue that United States’ pivot towards the Asia Pacific represents a strategy adjustment. Competition between China and the United States will consequently grow, but this does not meet the criteria for a Cold War.15 We characterize the United States and China as ‘superficial friends’, and argue that as such they have a highly volatile relationship, apparent in shifts between good and bad periods.16 As, at least for the meantime, China and the United States have no desire to abandon their strategy of superficial friendship, the conditions necessary for a Cold War are not present. For example, although Obama supports a new defense strategy whose focus is on containing China, he purposely avoided any mention of China at the time he announced this new policy at the Department of Defense.17 Moreover, four days after the announcement, Obama sent Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to China to seek Beijing's support of US sanctions against Iran.18 As China and the United States will not for the time being abandon their superficial friendship strategy, Sino–US relations will hence not teeter towards Cold War.

#### Studies prove no impact

Perumal, business reporter – Gulf Times, 9/14/’11

(Santhosh, <http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=458158&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28>)

Oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries as a 25% increase in oil prices causes their GDP (gross domestic product) to fall by about half of 1% or less, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper. “Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports,” the paper said. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies, but the magnitude has typically been small, said the paper, authored by Tobias N Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman. For a given level of world GDP, the paper found that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports.  “The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25% increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of 1%, spread over 2–3 years,” the authors said.

One likely explanation for this relatively modest impact is that part of the greater revenue accruing to oil exporters will be recycled in the form of imports or other international flows, thus contributing to keep up demand in oil-importing economies, the paper said. “The negative impact of oil price shocks on oil-importing countries is partly offset by concurrent increases in exports and other income flows,” it said.

#### No US-China War

**Moss 13** (Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true)

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war woud be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

### Biodiversity

#### Fishing overconsumption, and Cuba are alt-causes

Brenner ‘8

(Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, 3-14-2008, http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html)

The economic embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries.

This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons — owned by everyone and no one — has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.

Rich in biodiversity and habitats

The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known nesting beach of Kemp's Ridley, the world's most endangered sea turtle.

The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importance: water from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.

About one-third of the Gulf is a broad continental shelf, which provides a wealth of fisheries. Intensive fishing is the biggest factor interfering with the Gulf's environment, and is an area where the three governments should cooperate in managing this international resource.

#### Individual ecosystems are resilient

**Ridder 2008** – PhD, School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania (Ben, Biodiversity And Conservation, 17.4, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation”) \*ES = environmental services

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation:

Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192)

Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g., Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).

#### If they beat our resiliency claims, then legal remedies can’t solve oil spills – paradigm shift key

**Craig 11** [“Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: ¶ A Match Made in Hell”, Robin Kundis Craig, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs, Florida State University College of Law, 12/20/2011, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW]

176¶ The Deepwater Horizon Commission had several other ¶ recommendations for governance reforms, although it largely chose ¶ to hew close to existing law and policy, tinkering with existing ¶ structures rather than promoting a different and more precautionary ¶ philosophical approach.¶ 177¶ More important for purposes of this ¶ Article, however, is the Commission’s unquestioned assumption of ¶ the Gulf’s continuing ability to recover from massive oil spills ¶ (resilience in the first sense). In particular, its environmental ¶ recommendations seek to ensure, inter alia, that “[t]he environment ¶ and the economy of the Gulf region recovers as completely and as ¶ quickly as possible, not only from the direct impacts of the spill, but ¶ from the decades of degradation that proceeded it.”¶ 178¶ ¶ This is natural resources law’s first-sense resilience dependence in ¶ action—an unwarranted assumption that human actions are unlikely ¶ to push ecosystems over ecosystem thresholds into different ¶ structures and functions that, generally, will have significantly ¶ reduced value to the humans that depend on the current ecological ¶ state. As William C. Clark, Dixon D. Jones, and C.S. Holling have ¶ noted, “A system which is globally stable is admirable for blind trialand-error experimentation: it will always recover from any ¶ perturbation. It is this paradigm of an infinitely forgiving Nature that ¶ has been assumed implicitly in the past . . . .”¶ 179¶ Nevertheless, as a ¶ result of this first-sense resilience dependence, the laws and policies ¶ governing offshore oil drilling (and many other kinds of natural ¶ resource management) base their regulatory and liability regimes on ¶ the assumption that violators can in fact “make the public and the ¶ environment whole.”¶ 180¶ What would happen instead if we incorporated full resilience ¶ theory into our laws? As Brian Walker and David Salt have discussed ¶ at length, “Resilience thinking presents an approach to managing ¶ natural resources that embraces human and natural systems as ¶ complex systems continually adapting through cycles of change.”¶ 181¶ In addition to adopting a systems perspective on ecosystem ¶ management, resilience thinking fully incorporates the implications ¶ of resilience in the second sense (potential ecological regime shifts)— ¶ the recognition that “[s]ocio-ecological systems can exist in more ¶ than one kind of stable state. If a system changes too much, it ¶ crosses a threshold and begins behaving in a different way, with ¶ different feedbacks between its component parts and a different ¶ structure.”¶ 182¶ Resilience thinking therefore seeks not—as is true ¶ under current management paradigms—to tweak the operations of ¶ an ecosystem in order to optimize particular products or functions¶ 183¶ (for example, oil production in the Gulf). Rather, it seeks to more ¶ humbly recognize that “[t]he complexity of the many linkages and ¶ feedbacks that make up a socio-ecological system is such that we can ¶ never predict with certainty what the exact response will be to any ¶ intervention in the system.”¶ 184¶ In other words, resilience thinking ¶ acknowledges what is particularly true with respect to marine ¶ ecosystems: most of the time, we have only the most simplistic of ¶ understandings of what our actions do to the ecosystems that we ¶ both impact and depend upon.¶ 185¶ Operationalizing resilience thinking is not easy, especially given ¶ current natural resources management norms and paradigms. ¶ However, some of the ways in which it might make a difference to ¶ our current laws governing offshore oil drilling are: ¶  Comprehensive ecosystem surveys should precede resource ¶ development and exploitation rather than follow them. ¶ While resilience thinking teaches us that we will never¶ completely understand the complex functioning, ¶ interactions, and responses of ecosystems—for example, ¶ Clark, Jones, and Holling consider management ¶ “surprises” inevitable¶ 186¶ —that acknowledgement of ¶ human limitation should not become an excuse for ¶ operating completely blindly. Indeed, the process of ¶ learning, often embodied in the inclusion of adaptive ¶ management, is generally considered a critical component ¶ of resilience thinking and management.

#### Too many alt causes

**Pynn 7** (Larry, staff writer at The Vancouver Sun, “Global warming not biggest threat: expert,” The Vancouver Sun, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=6e2988da-31ab-4697-810d-7a008306d571&p=1)

"We all worry about climate change, as we should, but it doesn't mean we shouldn't worry about protecting habitat," says James Grant, a biology professor at Concordia University in Montreal and co-author of a new report on threats to endangered species in Canada. "The really immediate causes right now for many species are things like farming, urbanization and habitat loss caused by the direct things we do." Research by Grant and his pupils shows the biggest threat is habitat loss at 84 per cent, overexploitation 32 per cent, native species interactions 31 per cent, natural causes 27 per cent, pollution 26 per cent, and introduced species 22 per cent. On average, species are threatened by at least two of the six categories. Human activities representing the biggest source of habitat loss and pollution are not industrial resource extraction, but agriculture at 46 per cent and urbanization at 44 per cent. "Farming is huge," Grant said in an interview. "The Prairies are one of the most affected habitats in the world. We've turned them into wheat fields." The southern Okanagan-Similkameen is another example, home to about one-third of species at risk in B.C. as well as a thriving agricultural industry, including vineyards, and increased urban development.

#### Litany of alt causes

Bruno 10, associate professor UNC Chapel Hill, [John F., May 3, “[Biodiversity Loss Continues Unabated Despite International Efforts](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html)”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html>]

Betting on biodiversity loss is a pretty sure thing. The earth'splant and animal species are disappearing at a sobering rate due to pressures including habitat loss, climate change, pollution and over-harvesting. Despite a few success stories and steps in the right direction, we are falling far short of stemming these losses. [Biodiversity](http://www.unep.org/iyb/about_iyb.asp#biodiv) is the entire range of biological variety in the world, including the diversity of genotypes, species and ecosystems. It can be measured on levels from DNA molecules all the way up to broad taxonomic categories such as families and phyla. Monitoring the fate of any of these aspects of biodiversity at a global scale is a daunting task. Thus, we know little about the rates and patterns of biodiversity loss or the effectiveness of global mitigation plans such as the [2002 Convention on Biological Diversity.](http://www.iucn.org/iyb/iucn/convention_on_biological_diversity/)  [Dr. Stuart Butchart](http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/PressRelease.htm) of the [UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre](http://www.unep-wcmc.org/) and [BirdLife International](http://www.birdlife.org/)tackled the problem by assembling aninternational team of conservation scientists (that I was part of) to calculate trends in global biodiversity. The idea was to assemble several dozen indices that we had sound, long term data for including population trends for birds and other vertebrates and the loss of habitats such as forests, seagrass beds and coral reefs. As we recently reported in Science magazine, our analysis indicates that biodiversity has continued to decline over the past four decades with no detectable abatement for most indices. This is largely due to increased pressures resulting from human population growth, economic development and globalization but it also seems clear that our international response to the biodiversity crisis has been inadequate. Every aspect of biodiversity on earth is unique. The species that we have already driven extinct, from the [Dodo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodo) to the [Tasmanian Tiger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thylacine), can never be resurrected or replaced. As a field ecologist, I have been lucky to experience and work on some truly wondrous examples of the earth's biodiversity from the tide pools of the Pacific Northwest to rainforests in Costa Rica to alpine habitats in the Rocky Mountains. The downside of my otherwise fantastic job is that I witness the degradation of nature firsthand. The coral reefs of the Florida Keys of today bear little resemblance to the underwater jungles patrolled by large sharks that I snorkeled over as a kid 35 years ago. Over the last two decades I have observed and documented striking biodiversity losses even on isolated and seemingly untouched reefs.

# 2nc

## LNG DA

## 2nc Impact

### O/V

#### US-Russian nuclear war is the only existential risk

**FRUMKIN AND HELFAND 2012** (Howard Frumkin, MD, DrPH, School of Public Health, University of Washington; Ira Helfand, MD, Physicians for Social Responsibility, “A Prescription for Survival: Prevention of Nuclear War,” American Journal of Preventive Medicine, March, Science Direct)

The arsenals of India and Pakistan are of particular concern given their size—approximately 80 warheads each—and the ongoing tension between these two states. Recent studies have shown that if only 100 of the weapons in their combined arsenals were used in a war targeting population centers, 20 million people would die in the first few hours in the firestorms that would engulf the great cities of the subcontinent, and vast areas would be contaminated with deadly radioactive fallout. In addition, the firestorms would loft some 5 million tons of soot and dust into the upper atmosphere, dropping temperatures across the globe an average of 1.25° C and reducing precipitation worldwide, with both these effects lasting up to a decade. [16] and [17] There have been no detailed studies yet on the effect of this climate disruption on agriculture and human nutrition, but there is reason to fear that it could cause a global famine of historic proportions.

The increasing danger posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons has prompted a growing group of senior defense experts to call for urgent new steps to eliminate nuclear weapons. In January of 2007 Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn declared: “Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations.”18

**Still**, it is not the arsenals of these new nuclear powers that pose the greatest danger**. Ninety-five percent** of the nuclear weapons in the world today remain in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. Even under the New START Treaty, they are each allowed to keep 1550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, thousands of nondeployed weapons, and all of their nonstrategic warheads. A 2002 study showed that if only 300 of the weapons in the Russian arsenal were targeted at U.S. cities, 70 to 100 million people would die. In addition, the attack would destroy the communications and transportation networks and the rest of the social infrastructure on which modern societies depend. Over the following months, the majority of the population not killed in the initial attack would die of starvation, exposure, and disease. The U.S. counterattack on Russia would cause the same level of devastation there.19

As in the case of a regional nuclear war in South Asia, the direct effects of this large-scale nuclear war would be only a small part of the picture. If the full strategic arsenal allowed under New START were drawn into the conflict, the resulting firestorms in the U.S. and Russia would loft more than150 million tons of debris into the upper atmosphere. In a matter of **days**, temperatures would plummet across the globe by an average of 8° C. In the interior regions of North America and Eurasia, temperatures would fall as much as 30° C. In the temperate regions of the Northern Hemisphere there would not be a **single day** free of frost for 3 years. [20] and [21] Agriculture would stop, and ecosystems would collapse. The vast majority of the human race would starve to death, and it is possible that **homo sapiens could become extinct**.

#### Even if Russia doesn’t collapse, opportunistic aggression by China would escalate – causes extinction

AlexanderSharavin2001 Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally **be the only way out**, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

### Turns Heg

#### Turns heg

Zeyno Baran et al, Summer 2007. Senior Fellow and Director Center for Eurasian Studies, Hudson Institute. “U.S. – RUSSIAN RELATIONS : IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?” Hudson Institute Symposium on US-Russian Relations, www.hudson.org/files/pdf\_upload/Russia-Web%20(2).pdf

The West needs a stable Russia in order to maintain the global balance of power against China. In the event of Russia’s disintegration, her resources will go to China, not the West. The West cannot stop Russia’s slide into a systemic cri- sis, and can only help get out of it once it has begun. This is a challenge for the future. Currently, the West needs a “Cold War” only with Russia’s new masters, not with the Russian people. Russians are protesting against the politics of the Russian bureaucracy, and their protest should not be re-directed at the bureaucracy’s strategic partners in the West. If the West understands and accepts this, it needs to learn to acknowledge Russians’ rights to patriotism and to a normal level of freedom—not as a religious symbol, but as the only path to prosperity and justice. Russian “democrats” and “liberals” have forgotten these demands and rights, and therefore the terms “dem - o crat” and “liberal” are cursed in Russia. Official propa- ganda uses this to divert Russian citizens from asserting their interests and rights to fighting the West. The West needs to explain to Russia that these rights have been destroyed not by rivalry with the West, but solely by the avarice of the new Russian leaders. It is true that in the future, the issue of global competition will arise. Currently, however, there is only one key prob- lem—corruption (including, of course, corruption in the interests of the West) and a lack of bureaucratic integrity. After Russia experiences a systemic crisis the West must be able to say to Russians; “You see? We are for democracy, but not for “democrats,” for law, but not for lawyers, for prosperity, but not for prospering oligarchs.” All of these are things that the West could not say after the 1990s. Russia will be useful to the West if the West can side with Russia against China and global Islam in foreign policy and with the Russian people against the Russian bureaucracy in domestic policy. If the West attempts to transform Russia according to its own conceptualization of the correct societal order, or simply to seize Russian raw materials, intellect, and money, it will destroy Russia and pay dearly for the rela- tively small gain. **As a consequence** of doing so, **the West will experience large-scale, global systemic problems**.

### Oil Spikes - External

#### Russian expansionism causes oil spikes

**Mark N. Katz**, professor of government and politics at George Mason University; B.A. in international relations from the University of California at Riverside, M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Ph.D. in political science from M.I.T.; former positions: research fellow at Brookings Institution, Soviet analyst at the State Department, Rockefeller Foundation IR fellow, Kennan Institute research scholar, December **2008**. “IMPLICATIONS OF THE GEORGIAN CRISIS FOR ISRAEL, IRAN, AND THE WEST” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4. http://digilib.gmu.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/1920/5585/1/Meria\_katz\_Dec\_2008.pdf

Russia’s quick victory against Georgia gave rise to concerns about a newly aggressive Russia being both willing and able to assert itself militarily not only here, but elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and perhaps even beyond. Furthermore, the West’s inability to stop Russia from doing as it pleased in Georgia was seen as evidence of its being both unable and unwilling to prevent Russian expansion--and that this weak reaction would only encourage the Kremlin to engage in it again.11 Yet while President Bush declared that Moscow’s use of force against Georgia was “disproportionate,” it could be described as limited and discreet. What Russia did in this conflict was solidify its hold over two territories--Abkhazia and South Ossetia--that were already under its control. Further, this was a move that appears to have been supported by the Abkhaz and South Ossetians themselves.12 Although Russian troops also moved into Georgia proper where the local population definitely did not support them, they did not overrun the entire country or forcibly replace its government (though Moscow frequently expressed its desire for Saakashvili to resign). Moscow completed its troop withdrawal from Georgia proper on October 8, 2008, thus leaving the situation much as it was before the conflict: Tbilisi in control of Georgia proper and Moscow in control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.13 Even Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to these two governments in August 2008 can be seen as less significant than its having worked to set them up years earlier. Yet while all this may be true, Russia’s successful intervention in Georgia has far reaching implications. The United States and many European governments have become increasingly concerned that Russia will be able to extract concessions from Europe as a result of growing European dependence on natural gas imports from and through Russia. Western governments have sought to reduce this dependence on Russia through promoting pipeline routes that do not run through it. Azerbaijan possesses enormous quantities of oil and gas. During the Soviet era, pipelines from Azerbaijan ran north into Russia. At Western urging, pipelines have already been built running from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Black Sea coast (Baku-Supsa), and more importantly, from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan). If they can be built across the Caspian, pipelines from Turkmenistan and/or Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan could also allow Central Asian oil and gas to flow through Georgia to the West.14 Pipeline routes through Georgia are especially important to America and the West since they bypass not only Russia, but also Iran--which the United States has had hostile relations with ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and which many European governments have become increasingly uneasy about due to concerns that Tehran might be trying to acquire nuclear weapons. With the construction of pipelines running from Azerbaijan through Armenia to Turkey impossible so long as the Azeri-Armenian dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved, pipelines through Georgia are absolutely essential for Caspian Basin natural gas to reach Europe without running through Russia or Iran. What the August 2008 Russian military intervention in Georgia demonstrated is that Moscow can quickly and easily disrupt the flow of oil and gas through Georgia. Russian forces did not actually have to seize control of the pipelines to accomplish this since the pipeline operators themselves shut them down. What this showed is that while pipelines through Georgia may be vital to the West, they are also extremely vulnerable. Nor did Moscow appear particularly concerned that the West would consider Russian behavior in Georgia as threatening to European energy security concerns. If anything, the Kremlin seemed intent on conveying the message that it was Russia, not Georgia, that the West needed to have good relations with in order to ensure cooperation on energy as well as other issues of importance to the West. Indeed, Russian officials warned that it would be foolish for the West to impose sanctions against Moscow for what happened in Georgia since the West would lose more than Moscow would.15

#### Oil price spike collapses the global economy

Kenneth M. Pollack (Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. From 1995 to 1996 and 1999 to 2001, he served as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council) 2003 “ Securing the Gulf “

America's primary interest in the Persian Gulf lies in ensuring the free and stable flow of oil from the region to the world at large. This fact has nothing to do with the conspiracy theories leveled against the Bush administration during the run-up to the recent war. U.S. interests do not center on whether gas is $2 or $3 at the pump, or whether Exxon gets contracts instead of Lukoil or Total. Nor do they depend on the amount of oil that the United States itself imports from the Persian Gulf or anywhere else. The reason the United States has a legitimate and critical interest in seeing that Persian Gulf oil continues to flow copiously and relatively cheaply is simply that the global economy built over the last 50 years rests on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil, and if that foundation were removed, the global economy would collapse. Today, roughly 25 percent of the world's oil production comes from the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for roughly 15 percent -- a figure expected to increase rather than decrease in the future. The Persian Gulf region has as much as two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, and its oil is absurdly economical to produce, with a barrel from Saudi Arabia costing anywhere from a fifth to a tenth of the price of a barrel from Russia. Saudi Arabia is not only the world's largest oil producer and the holder of the world's largest oil reserves, but it also has a majority of the world's excess production capacity, which the Saudis use to stabilize and control the price of oil by increasing or decreasing production as needed. Because of the importance of both Saudi production and Saudi slack capacity, the sudden loss of the Saudi oil network would plyze the global economy, probably causing a global downturn at least as devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930s, if not worse. So the fact that the United States does not import most of its oil from the Persian Gulf is irrelevant: if Saudi oil production were to vanish, the price of oil in general would shoot through the ceiling, destroying the American economy along with everybody else's.

#### Economic crises causes nuclear war

Heinberg, Senior Fellow @ the Post Carbon Institute, 12 [Richard, Resilience, 12/4/ “Conflict and Change in the Era of Economic Decline: Part 2: War and peace in a shrinking economy”, <http://www.resilience.org/stories/2012-12-04/conflict-and-change-in-the-era-of-economic-decline-part-1-the-21st-century-landscape-of-conflict>, accessed: 7/17/13, ML]

When empires crumble, as they always do, the result is often a free-for-all among previous subject nations and potential rivals as they sort out power relations. The British Empire was a seeming exception to this rule: in that instance, the locus of military, political, and economic power simply migrated to an ally across the Atlantic. A similar graceful transfer seems unlikely in the case of the U.S., as economic decline during the 21st century will be global in scope. A better analogy to the current case might be the fall of Rome, which led to centuries of incursions by barbarians as well as uprisings in client states.¶ ¶ Disaster per se need not lead to violence, as Rebecca Solnit argues in her book A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster. She documents five disasters—the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; earthquakes in San Francisco and Mexico City; a giant ship explosion in Halifax, Canada; and 9/11—and shows that rioting, looting, rape, and murder were not automatic results. Instead, for the most part, people pulled together, shared what resources they had, cared for the victims, and in many instances found new sources of joy in everyday life.¶ However, the kinds of social stresses we are discussing now may differ from the disasters Solnit surveys, in that they comprise a “long emergency,” to borrow James Kunstler’s durable phrase. For every heartwarming anecdote about the convergence of rescuers and caregivers on a disaster site, there is a grim historic tale of resource competition turning normal people into monsters.¶ ¶ In the current context, a continuing source of concern must be the large number of nuclear weapons now scattered among nine nations. While these weapons primarily exist as a deterrent to military aggression, and while the end of the Cold War has arguably reduced the likelihood of a massive release of these weapons in an apocalyptic fury, it is still possible to imagine several scenarios in which a nuclear detonation could occur as a result of accident, aggression, pre-emption, or retaliation.¶ ¶ We are in a race—but it’s not just an arms race; indeed, it may end up being an arms race in reverse. In many nations around the globe the means to pay for armaments and war are starting to disappear; meanwhile, however, there is increasing incentive to engage in international conflict as a way of re-channeling the energies of jobless young males and of distracting the general populace, which might otherwise be in a revolutionary mood. We can only hope that historical momentum can maintain The Great Peace until industrial nations are sufficiently bankrupt that they cannot afford to mount foreign wars on any substantial scale.

### Bioweapons - External

#### Bioweapons will be used

Christopher Ruddy, Media Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, “Russia and China Prepare for War -- Part 5: Russia’s Recent Military Build-up,” NEWSMAX, March 15, 1999, http://archive.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/14/193145.

Nyquist states that in a war with the United States, Russia will heavily utilize their extensive biological and chemical weapons -- particularly during the initial strikes. These are comparatively cheap weapons of mass destruction, with a low "cost per kill.” Because America has a large population dispersed over a wide area, biological and chemical weapons are an effective means of mass extermination. Lunev concurs with much of what Nyquist says. In his book,*Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, he details how Russian GRU agents have been sent to the US to scout out the best way to employ such weapons.

### AT – No Impact

#### This makes war with the U.S. inevitable

Blank ‘7 (Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, “Russian Democracy, Revisited” Spring, <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php>) Bankey

Gvosdev defends his brand of realism as a moral policy based on prudential calculations that seek to maximize benefits and minimize losses. In other words, while Russia is admittedly far from an ideal state, we can live with it as it is. But is this policy towards Russia realistic in Gvosdev’s own terms? In fact, Russia’s foreign policy is fundamentally adversarial to America and to Western interests and ideals. Moreover, thanks to Russia’s domestic political structure, not only will this foreign policy trend expand if unchecked, it will almost certainly lead Russia into another war. Russia’s conduct in 2006 serves as a microcosm of this problem. Last year, Russia gratuitously provoked international crises by threatening Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia over energy. It showed neither the will nor the capacity to arrest or reverse proliferation in Iran or North Korea. It displayed its readiness to amputate Georgia by force and annex its former territories to Russia. It attempted to undermine the OSCE and block it from fulfilling its treaty-mandated functions of monitoring elections. It refused to negotiate seriously over energy and economics with the European Union. It recognized Hamas as a legitimate government, gave it aid, and sold it weapons. And it sold weapons to Iran, Venezuela, China and Syria, knowing full well that many of these arms will be transferred to terrorists. At home, meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin is widening state control over ever more sectors of the economy, including defense, metals, and the automotive industry. Foreign equity investment in energy and many other fields is increasingly excluded from Russia in favor of Kremlin-dominated monopoly. Russia is even seeking to convert the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into an oil and gas cartel that supports its own interests, rather than those of other producers. Possibly, the United States can abide such a Russia. But it is clear that America’s partners and allies, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the “post-Soviet space,” cannot long live with a government whose policies seem essentially driven by a unilateralist quest for unchecked power. Russia’s current objectives seem to be incompatible with any notion of world order based on the principles accepted by it and its partners in 1989-91. Russia evidently covets recognition as a great power or energy superpower free from all international constraints and obligations and answerable to nobody. As the political scientist Robert Legvold wrote back in 1997, Russia “craves status, not responsibility.”[1](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) It should come as no surprise that this irresponsibility still characterizes Russian diplomacy. After all, it is the hallmark of the Russian autocracy which Putin has restored with a vengeance. Autocracy logically entails empire, an autarchic and patrimonial concept of the Russian state that is owned by the Tsar, controlled by his servitors, and which survives only by expansion. Just as autocracy means that the Tsar is not bound by or responsible to any domestic institution or principle, it also means that in foreign policy, Russia does not feel obligated to honor its own prior treaties and agreements. The struggle to get Moscow to adhere to the 1999 OSCE Summit accords it itself signed—as well as its conduct during the Russo-Ukrainian energy crisis of 2006—fully confirms that point; whatever else happened in both cases, Moscow broke its own contract with the OSCE and with Kyiv. These are far from anomalies. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself said not long ago that Russia refuses to be bound by foreign standards, or conform to them.[2](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) He has also insisted that the West respect Russian interests in the CIS, but shows no reciprocal respect for the treaties Russia has signed and since violated. Nor does he say that Russia must respect the interests of CIS governments themselves.[3](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) By doing so, Lavrov has confirmed the warnings of analysts like Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who caution that Russia does not want to *belong* to a larger institutional grouping.[4](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) Under these conditions, as both Western and Russian firms are learning all too well, property rights are conditional—if not entirely absent. Property is the Tsar’s to control, and he or his agents grant rents to their subordinates in return for service, which tragically is generally inefficient, self- and rent-seeking, and utterly corrupt. Today, this formula is visible in Russia’s pervasive official corruption, widespread criminality, and the absence of any sense of national interests among the country’s new “boyar” class. Such a system also entails an autarchic economy hostile to foreign investment and influence. Democratic and civilian control of Russia’s multiple militaries likewise is absent, and critics of the regime or reformers are routinely killed or threatened by those forces. The most recent examples of this tragic phenomenon are the assassinations of former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and the attempted poisoning of former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. Russian and Western observers both recognize that the Tsarist model is back, albeit with some Soviet accretions. And true to this model, the Kremlin today operates largely by fiat and fear. Much of Vladimir Putin’s popularity clearly derives from the state monopoly over a large swath of the national media, growing fear of the police among ordinary Russians, and the sense of prosperity provided by seven years of (largely energy-based) economic growth. Absent the official cult of personality and with a free media, undoubtedly things would be rather different. All of which is to say that it is clear that, while the United States must engage with Russia, America cannot simply accept these deformities as the necessary price for doing business with Moscow. It is not simply a matter of “lecturing” Russia, as its elites have accused Washington of doing for decades. Genuine realism requires an engagement with Russia that respects its interests but which tells the truth and responds to its numerous violations of international obligations. Such realism also requires understanding that the reversion to Russian autocracy is not merely a matter of Russia’s sovereign choice, as Putin’s ideologues pretend. It is a threat to all of Russia’s neighbors because it inherently involves a quest for empire, since Moscow understands its full sovereignty to be attainable only if that of its neighbors is diminished. It is deeply ironic that Russia can pursue such policies today largely because of the West. In order to maintain its empire, Russia must offer all kinds of hidden and overt subsidies in energy, weapons, or other forms of economic and political currency. It can only afford to do so by charging its European energy customers full market price, even as it refuses to do the same at home. Likewise, for all its benefits, U.S. funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction enables Russia to spend ever more on its armed forces, which it otherwise could not afford to do. By itself, Russia cannot pay for the rising outlays on its armed forces, its ambitious goals for re-equipping them and converting them into a power projection force beyond its borders, or their current, bloated size. Under the circumstances, a realistic Western policy cannot abandon the borderlands to Moscow. If it has reason to believe that it enjoys freedom of action there, Moscow will promptly extend its dysfunctional political system to those lands, either directly or indirectly. In either case, it will create security vacuums which are ripe for conflict and which threaten both its own and European security. Russia’s inability to quell the Chechen uprising despite twelve years of utterly brutal warfare illustrates this quite clearly. Indeed, both wars with Chechnya (in 1994 and again in 1999) were launched to secure the domestic base of first the Yeltsin and then the incoming Putin regimes.[5](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) Since then, the fighting has engulfed the entire North Caucasus, putting Russia, thanks to its own misguided policies, at greater actual risk of terrorism. It is precisely to avoid Russian expansionism and support for rogue regimes and proliferation that it is necessary to press Russia to return to the spirit and letter of the treaties it has signed and which make up the constitutional basis of Europe’s and Eurasia’s legitimate order. We should not pressure Russia because it is insufficiently democratic, but rather because it has freely given its word to treaties and conventions that must be upheld if any kind of international order is to be preserved. Admittedly, this means that America must reorient its policies to stop seeking to extend or impose democracy. No matter how deeply held, the ideas of the current Administration enjoy no special legitimacy abroad, whereas international obligations do. Likewise, we must make clear that while the interests of the kleptocracy that passes for government in Russia are advanced by lawlessness and imperial predation, neither the interests of the Russian people nor the security of Eurasia is advanced by such policies. Quite the contrary; those policies entail long-term stagnation and war, not progress, peace, or security. Thus a realistic policy towards Russia necessarily means realigning the values which we promote. They should be those of international law and of enhanced security for both peoples and states, not untrammeled unilateralism or that might makes right. But such realism also means fearlessly proclaiming and acting upon the truth that Russian scholars themselves know and admit: Russia today remains a risk factor in world politics.[6](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php#footnotes) This is largely because its domestic political arrangements oblige Moscow to pursue a unilateral and neo-imperial policy fundamentally antithetical to the security of Eurasian states, including its own. Accountability is an important virtue for all states, but for Russia it is indispensable. Without it, the Kremlin could very well succumb to imperial temptation, at the cost of international catastrophe.

## Link

### THA

#### They pass the THA

#### THA passage opens the floodgates for investment in hydraulic fracking, massively increasing Mexican shale gas development

Mexico Institute 13

(The Mexico Institute seeks to improve understanding, communication, and cooperation between Mexico and the United States by promoting original research, encouraging public discussion, and proposing policy options for enhancing the bilateral relationship. A binational Advisory Board, chaired by José Antonio Fernández Carbajal and Roger W. Wallace, oversees the work of the Mexico Institute., “New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in US-Mexico Relations”, Pgs 45-46)

As noted above, the history of cooperation between the United States and Mexico on oil issues has been limited by the historical sensitivity of Mexico’s government and people to any hint of interference from the U.S. in what has traditionally been seen as a central element in the nation’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, recent years have shown a softening on this sensitivity, in part due to generational change, in part due to political change, and in part due to the success of negotiating a Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in 2012. That agreement laid out a framework for determining the management and exploitation of cross-border oil reserves, and was hailed as a positive development. It was At the same time as U.S. production has risen, Mexican oil has experienced a precipitous decline. Growing Potential for U.S.-Mexico Energy Cooperation quickly ratified in the Mexican Senate, but is has yet to be ratified in the United States, and so has not yet come into force. Before moving on to discuss new areas of coopera - tion, it is important that this existing agreement is ratified. It is widely expected that the government of Enrique Peña Nieto will present an energy reform initiative to the Mexican Congress in 2013. While it is still unknown how ambi - tious that reform proposal will be, it is thought that the government will present an initia - tive that will be aimed at opening the sector to greater levels of private participation in refining, petrochemicals and even in exploration and production. Such an opening will of course offer significant possibilities for foreign as well as Mexican firms, and will also open the door to new areas of technical and regulatory collaboration between the two countries. Mexico’s energy establishment, and increasingly it seems, the government, hope that private investment will occur in the unconventional hydrocarbons sector. For Mexico the most interesting plays in the future will be found in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, in the as yet untapped shale reserves that are found throughout the east of the country, and in the geologically-complex fields of Chicontepec, where Pemex has been consistently failing to meet production targets over the past four years. The application of cutting-edge technologies and techniques from U.S. firms would be beneficial in all three of these areas, and the experience of American firms in shale plays would provide them with an advantage in the event of an opening in that area. Of particular interest in this regard is the experience of U.S. firms in the hydraulic fracturing (fracking) business. The ability to extract shale oil and gas in areas that suf - fer from water shortages (such as Texas) will be crucial to developing shale resources in Mexico, particularly in the north of the country. In fact, existing knowledge of the geological characteristics of the Eagle Ford formation will also be crucial in exploiting its oil and gas reserves in Coahuila, where the formation extends. One Mexican company, Alfa, has already worked extensively with U.S. partners in the shale industry north of the border, and we can expect higher levels of private sector collaboration to develop.

### 2nc – Must Read

#### **Status quo oil indexed prices ensure Russia retains energy dominance – exports make global prices drop and ends reliance on Russia**

Kuhn and Umbach 11 5/10 Maximilian Kuhn, Dipl.-Pol., studied Political Science at the Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich and the Otto-Suh-Institute of the Free University of Berlin. He gained international experience at the Venice International University (VIU) and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow (HSE). He was a guest researcher at the Columbia University, the John Hopkins University as well as at the SFB 649 „Economic Risks“ of the Humboldt University. Moreover, he gained working experience with leading P.R. and P.A. agencies and as an energy consultant. Frank Umbach, Senior Associate for International Energy Security at the Centre for European Security Strategies. “Reliance on Russian Gas no More” http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/322/reliance-on-russian-gas-no-more

American unconventional gas has been a success story and a paradigm shift that has turned expectations upside-down. In essence, it has been a game changer for the emerging world gas market. The advantage of unconventional gas is that it is a domestic, national source of fuel supply enhancing the energy security of each country. Development of unconventional gas reserves brings foreign direct investment, creates new jobs and helps to diversify away from other imported fuels - or, as is the case in the US, helps the nation gain energy independence. In addition, natural gas is of growing importance to the European economies that will cause a rethink about energy security. Already, there is a growing realisation among European policy makers that natural gas in world energy markets will have wide-ranging and major geopolitical consequences. In addition, among the many policy options available, natural gas can be seen as the best transition fuel to a sustainable and renewable energy future. Therefore, gas is deemed to become one of the most important fuels of the decade. The extent of the natural gas resource base means that supplies are plentiful, the infrastructure transporting it to its consumers is in place, and it burns twice as clean as other fossil fuels – making it the cleanest of the fossil fuels and publicly accepted source of power generation. Combine this with the ever-increasing role of renewables for power generation and natural gas has the potential to become the major balancing energy source. But, the impact of the shale gas buzz is even greater. It has become the new elephant in the room, with global geopolitical implications that have caused a chain reaction. European gas prices are being renegotiated and revised. It has also caused an average of 15 per cent of Gazprom's supplies to be delinked from oil-indexation. And yet, the implications are greater still: relatively cheap and abundant gas, along with the carbon advantage of gas, makes nuclear and coal relatively more expensive than currently assumed. Switching from coal to gas means emissions can be reduced quickly at a very low cost. Indeed, making gas a major transition fuel through to 2030 - will help renewable energy efforts to reduce emissions in order to mitigate the impact of climate change. This chain of events also has the potential to remove Gazprom's European gas supply near-monopoly. In the fourth quarter of 2010, Russia's gas exports to Europe declined by 17 per cent owing to a market oversupply due to re-directed liquified natural gas cargoes and unseasonably warm weather. Unconventional gas has helped to shift the balance from a seller-dominated market to one dominated by buyers. Unconventional gas is nowadays the new policy option for European countries, giving buyers more leverage to renegotiate the high Russian oil-indexed gas price demands that are included in long-term contracts. Even without being produced in Europe, it puts a certain price cap on high Russian gas prices as it can become a potential source of diversification – particularly, if Russian gas prices are higher than the brake-even point for European unconventional gas. All this has the potential to make unconventional gas development economically feasible and, politically speaking, more appealing. Unconventional gas, and shale gas in particular, has become a negotiating tool in a changing gas market that is enhancing Europe's energy supply security by diversifying energy sources and enabling the prioritisation of a domestically located resource. Russia's options to respond are limited. Confronted with decreasing natural gas prices, Moscow's policies have become unintentionally the major enabler for unconventional gas developments in Europe. But, even if only a fraction of those unconventional gas resources become available for the European gas market, they still might be less expensive than the very high prices of the new Siberian gas fields of the Yamal Peninsula or Russia's Arctic offshore gas resources - like Shtokman - and offer another diversification source. Against this background, and the fear in Moscow of losing further markets shares in its most important export market for conventional gas and the geopolitical game - with Gazprom being the spear-point of foreign policy - it is hardly surprising that representatives of the Russian government try to downplay the importance of a shale gas. And they try to portray very negative implications of unconventional gas production in Europe - for its environment and the European Union's climate mitigation efforts.

### 2nc – Link Turns Case

#### US LNG exports destroy the Russian economy.

RT, 10/24/2012. Russia Today. “Russia increasingly worried about US ‘shale revolution’,” http://rt.com/business/news/russia-shale-gas-usa-110/.

Russia’s President Putin urged the country’s gas monopoly Gazprom to revise its export policy, as the “shale revolution” and the development of liquefied natural gas will seriously eat into the country’s export revenues. Experts agree that ‘alternative commodities’ have already started to reshape the market, with the US posing tough competition to Russia. “I ask Gazprom to report on the key principles of its export policy at the next meeting, and the Energy Ministry should present an adjusted general development scheme for the gas industry until 2030, as well as the Eastern Gas Program,” said President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the presidential commission for the fuel and energy sector on Tuesday. “Such new players [in the gas market] as the United States and Canada have already started to move. In the US, new technologies allow for profitable shale gas production…Politicians, experts and businesses are talking about a real "shale revolution," Putin added. “The US is a serious rival to Russia in a gas market,” as the country’s reserves of shale gas stand at 24trln cubic metres, compared to 30trln cubic metres of traditional gas reserves in Russia. Given that shale commodities are really booming, especially in the north of the US, the country can outpace Russia in the world energy market in another decade, Valery Nesterov, energy analyst at Sberbank Investment Research, told Business RT. For the US economy itself the shale oil and gas industry is a real locomotive, providing an additional 3.5mln jobs, according to Sberbank Investment Research expert. Should “a shale revolution” really take place, it’ll seriously reshape the world energy market, where traditional energy sources could be replaced by cheaper shale commodities. This will hit Russia’s budget hard, as oil and gas revenues provide for about 80% of the entire Russian budget. “That’s why it’s very important for Russia now to have official information and up—to—date data about extraction of shale gas in the US, which can be done by getting a report from the US Department of Energy,” RBC daily quotes its sources close to Russia’s Accounts Chamber as saying. Another new trend has also long been underway—the rising trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG), Putin said. "We are simply obligated to take these trends into consideration, to clearly imagine how the situation will develop not just in the next two to three years, but throughout the upcoming decade," Russian President concluded. “Active extraction of shale gas in the US and the analogous intentions in Europe could harm Russian exports because of the high competition from the suppliers of the alternative fuel,” sources from Russia’s Accounts Chamber told RBC daily. Gazprom told RBC it didn’t plan to develop any projects dealing with extraction of shale gas. In the mid-term Russia is due to remain the biggest gas exporter to Europe, with European countries remaining a key consumer of Russian gas, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said in October. The US gas exports will soon equal a third of that from Russia, with the Asian demand growing really fast. By 2035 the US could become the leader in the world gas market, pushing Russia into 2nd place, the IEA said in May this year. According to the Agency’s forecast, Russia could produce about 784bln cubic meters of gas, which will compare to the US figure of 821bln cubic metres. Another Asian giant—China—should come third, where extraction of gas is forecast to skyrocket 5 fold during the next 25 years. Australia, India, Indonesia, as well as Africa and the Middle East are also expected to come to the forefront of the world gas market. However, Europe is set to suffer as growing demand is expected to be coupled by shrinking extraction, the IEA concluded.

## AT – THA =/= Exports

#### Implementing THA opens up access to new offshore sites

Offshore, 6-28-13

[“US House passes GoM transboundary agreement with Mexico”, <http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2013/06/us-house-passes-gom-transboundary-agreement-with-mexico.html>, accessed 7-8-13]

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The US House of Representatives has passed the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act.

The act approves and implements an agreement signed in 2012 that governs development of shared oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Mexico along the US/Mexico maritime border.

The move opens 1.5 million acres (6,070 sq km) in the GoM with as much as 172 MMbbl of oil and 304 bcf (8.6 bcm) of natural gas, said Rep. Jeff Duncan, bill sponsor.

#### The plan opens up 1.5 million acres for offshore drilling

Dlouhy, FuelFix, 6-27-13

[Jennifer A., FuelFix, “House advances plan to unleash drilling on US-Mexico maritime border”,

<http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/06/27/gulfs-western-gap-could-see-new-oil-deals-but-theres-a-catch/>, accessed 7-8-13]

The House of Representatives advanced two items on the oil industry’s wish list Thursday, by passing legislation that would unleash drilling in the Western Gap area of the Gulf of Mexico and waive new financial reporting requirements on companies’ foreign dealmaking.

The legislation passed 256-171 would implement a one-year-old agreement between the United States and Mexico that sets the framework for oil and gas development along the two countries’ maritime boundary. Although Mexico ratified the deal in April 2012, Congress has not acted on it — despite oil companies’ zeal to develop the region.

That part of the measure has bipartisan support on Capitol Hill and the blessing of the White House**.** The Obama administrationinked the international pact in February 2012 andsaid in a statement of policy this week that implementing the agreement is key to unlocking nearly 1.5 million acres of the outer continental shelf for drilling.

## Oil Spills

### Defense

#### Status quo is solving - cooperation over hydrocarbon is already happening

Klapper 2012 [Bradley - a reporter on the State Department, "U.S., Mexico agree to cooperate on energy", Huffington Post, February 20, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/20/us-mexico-agree-to-cooper\_n\_1288976.html]

Clean Energy and Climate Change: President Obama and President Calderón reaffirmed the strong commitment of both the United States and Mexico to combat global climate change and create markets for clean energy technologies. President Obama applauded President Calderón’s leadership on the successful outcome of the climate negotiations in Cancún, including the creation of the Green Climate Fund, a new multilateral vehicle to deliver financing to address climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The United States strongly supports Mexico’s ongoing leadership in this area. The Presidents agreed to work together this year to implement the other major agreements reached in Cancún, including on transparency, technology, adaption, and forest preservation. The leaders welcomed the achievement of significant milestones under the Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change, including plans for cooperation on mapping of wind resources in Mexico, and wind turbine testing and design. Mexico and the United States continue to work together, with Canada, to complete by April 2012 a North American Carbon Storage Atlas under the North American Carbon Atlas Partnership (NACAP). President Calderón and President Obama noted progress on the Cross Border Electricity Task Force to promote a bilateral renewable energy market, increase grid reliability and resiliency, and make energy use more efficient in both countries. Transboundary Energy Negotiations: Today, President Obama and President Calderón reaffirmed the desire of the United States and of Mexico to conclude an agreement on transboundary reservoirs. In May 2010, the Presidents issued made a joint commitment to the safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety and environmental standards, and the two governments began work on a transboundary agreement. The two leaders have acknowledged the energy security benefits to both countries of responsible stewardship and development of these resources and the high level of significance of completing such an agreement for both countries. President Obama and President Calderón both reiterated their commitment to conclude these negotiations by the end of 2011.

## Prolif

### 2nc - generic

#### Prolif is slow and unlikely

**Hymans ‘12** [Jacques E. C. Hymans, PhD from Harvard, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, his most recent book is Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, “Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on Their Own-and Why Iran's Might, Too,” Foreign Affairs91. 3 (May/Jun 2012): 44-53, Proquest]

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies-Iran's political leaders-to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves. Nuclear dogs that have not barked "Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion. Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed-Iraq-had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years. International security experts have been unable to convincingly explain this remarkable trend. The first and most credible conventional explanation is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt) has prevented a cascade of new nuclear weapons states by creating a system of export controls, technology safeguards, and on-site inspections of nuclear facilities. The npt regime has certainly closed off the most straightforward pathways to the bomb. However, the npt became a formidable obstacle to would-be nuclear states only in the 1990s, when its export-control lists were expanded and Western states finally became serious about enforcing them and when international inspectors started acting less like tourists and more like detectives. Yet the proliferation slowdown started at least 20 years before the system was solidified. So the npt, useful though it may be, cannot alone account for this phenomenon. A second conventional explanation is that although the NPT regime may not have been very effective, American and Israeli bombs have been. Syria's nascent nuclear effort, for instance, was apparently dealt a major setback by an Israeli air raid on its secret reactor construction site in 2007. But the record of military strikes is mixed. Contrary to the popular myth of the success of Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osiraq reactor in Iraq, the strike actually spurred Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to move beyond vague intentions and commit strongly to a dedicated nuclear weapons project, which lasted until the 1990-91 Gulf War. Moreover, the bombs that the United States dropped on Iraq during that conflict mostly missed Saddam's nuclear sites. Finally, some analysts have asserted that nuclear weapons projects become inefficient due to political leaders' flagging levels of commitment. But these analysts are reversing cause and effect: leaders lose interest when their nuclear programs are not running well. And some nuclear weapons projects, such as France's, have performed well despite very tepid support from above. The imperfect correlation between the commitment of leaders and the quality of nuclear programs should not be surprising, for although commentators may speak casually of "Mao's bomb" or "Kim Jong Il's bomb," the real work has to be carried out by other people.

# 1nr

### Impacts

#### US Default causes military withdrawal and isolationism

Tamny, 10 John Tamny, Forbes Magazine, 5.24.10

[http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/22/default-united-states-economy-opinions-columnists- johntamny.html]

Though military spending is increasingly dwarfed by other federal programs, the austerity foisted on Washington might well lead to the closing of U.S. military bases globally so that other countries might start paying for their own defense. For the libertarians and liberals alike who desire a less interventionist military, spending limits wrought by a default may well lead our politicians in a more cautious direction when it comes to foreign invasion.

#### Hitting the debt ceiling crushes global influence- directly tied to the perception of economic strength

UPI, 9-17-2013 <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/09/17/RAND-US-strength-is-economic-strength/UPI-32041379430192/?spt=hs&or=tn>

The U.S. government could find itself with less influence in the international arena because of economic weakness, a report from RAND Corp. said.¶ President Obama lashed out at conservative members of the Republican Party this week for threatening to shut down the government unless the 2010 Affordable Care Act, better known as Obamacare, is repealed.¶ The U.S. government will go into default if it can't negotiate a way to avoid exceeding its $16.7 trillion debt limit in October, when the 2014 fiscal year begins.¶ A report published Monday by think tank RAND Corp. said the United States "still has the economic muscle" to shape part of the international agenda but its power could be diminished by debt.¶ "The principal basis for U.S. economic power is the size of the U.S. economy," C. Richard Neu, lead author of the report and a senior economist at RAND, said in a statement Monday.¶ RAND said U.S. influence at international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank is directly related to its economic strength. Nevertheless, Washington has managed to lead efforts in nuclear issues in Iran during the global economic meltdown, it said.¶ U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said Tuesday the U.S. government will lose focus "if some in Washington continue to create uncertainty about whether our political system can meet its basic responsibilities and avoid creating self-inflicted wounds to our economy."

#### PC Key to avoid prolonged standoff over debt ceiling that tanks economy

McGregor, 13 (Richard, Richard McGregor (born 1958) is a journalist, writer and author. He was the chief political correspondent, Japan correspondent and China correspondent for The Australian. He also worked for the International Herald Tribune, the BBC and the Far Eastern Economic Review. He has worked as a journalist in Taiwan, Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne.[1] He is the former bureau chief for the Financial Times. He has written The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers.[2] The book was published by Allen Lane from Penguin Press in the UK and HarperCollins in the US in June 2010.[3] McGregor has won the 2010 Society of Publishers in Asia (SOPA) Editorial Excellence Award [1] for reporting on the Xinjiang Riots[10] and the SOPA Award in 2008 for Editorial Intelligences.[1][11] Financial Times, 6/24,

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a66c240-dc0f-11e2-8853-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Z7YPAEJQ>

The debt ceiling debate will take place in a very different context this time, with the economy recovering and the US budget deficit falling rapidly after earlier deals on tax rises and spending cuts. “There is also a certain crisis fatigue,” said Stan Collender, a former congressional staffer, at Qorvis Communication, a Washington consultancy. The debt ceiling will probably be increased eventually, even if a prolonged stand-off has the potential to damage confidence in the economy. “This isn’t 2011: if Republicans provoke a debt ceiling confrontation over demands for massive, offsetting spending cuts, the business community is going to come unglued,” said John Lawrence, former chief of staff to Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic minority leader in the House. But the political capital needed to get the statutory debt ceiling raised has the potential to drain the energy and spirit of compromise that both sides will need to forge a majority coalition for immigration.

This outweighs any other internal

Swagel 9-4 [Phillip, professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from 2006 to 2009, “Fiscal Collisions Ahead,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/fiscal-collisions-ahead/>, ALB]\*we don’t support the ableist rhetoric of the evidence

A failure to act would harm the economy. Not lifting the debt ceiling in particular would be expected to have catastrophic economic effects. Interest rates could skyrocket if investors question the full faith and credit of the United States government, leading to a credit crunch that pummels business and consumer spending. The calamity might be avoided if the Treasury Department makes payments to bondholders to avoid a default, but even with this contingency plan (which the Treasury shows no sign of putting into place), the spectacle of a government that cannot finance its routine operations would doubtless translate into a severe negative impact on private confidence and spending.¶ A shutdown of nonessential government operations on Oct. 1 would mean an unintended reduction in spending that could retard [halt[ the recovery, but the larger consequence again would be indirect through a hit to confidence. With the government unable to attend to routine matters, it does not take much to imagine that American families and companies would halt plans to spend, invest and hire. This would repeat the natural instinct that contributed to the plunge in economic activity in the fall of 2008.¶ Fiscal uncertainty matters for monetary policy as well, because the Federal Reserve will hesitate to start unwinding its expansionary policy if a serious fiscal drag seems imminent.

### 2NC Will Pass

#### And- their 2AC ev is PC key warrants- most conclusive evidence says a deal will ultimately be reached

Alyssa Hertig, written for the Wisconsin Reporter, Define: Liberty and History News Network 9-15-2013 http://www.policymic.com/articles/63647/debt-ceiling-2013-we-will-raise-the-debt-ceiling-even-though-55-of-americans-don-t-want-to

It's debt-ceiling season again! In 2011 Congress raised the debt ceiling to $16.7 trillion, an increase of over $2 trillion. Based on projections from the U.S. Treasury, the federal government will hit the limit again in mid-October, much sooner than anticipated.¶ According to Jack Lew, secretary of the Treasury, Obama is unwilling to negotiate over a raise.¶ However, raising the debt ceiling is unpopular. Seventy percent of Americans oppose another raise in the debt ceiling, according to public opinion polls released by Reason-Rupe on Thursday. Even if this move would result in a default, 55% would still support not raising the debt ceiling. Furthermore: "If equal spending cuts accompany an increase in the debt ceiling, 45% say they'd support raising it and 46% would oppose. Thirty-five percent favor raising the debt ceiling in exchange for cutting off funding to the Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare, with 56% opposed."¶ Before the last debt ceiling raise in 2011, Gallup released a similar poll. Forty-two percent wanted their member of Congress to vote against the raise, 22% wanted their member of Congress to vote for the raise, 35% percent were not sure. It seems raising the debt ceiling has become less popular than ever — but o n the other hand, Congress has never failed to raise its debt ceiling.¶ The debt ceiling was first imposed in 1917 amid cries for accountability before President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into World War I. Before the debt-ceiling raise in 2011, James K. Galbraith summarized in Salon:¶ "The debt ceiling was first enacted in 1917. Why? The date tells all: we were about to enter the Great War. To fund that effort, the Wilson government needed to issue Liberty Bonds. This was controversial, and the debt ceiling was cover, passed to reassure the rubes that Congress would be “responsible” even while the country went to war. It was, from the beginning, an exercise in bad faith and has remained so every single second to the present day."¶ It has been raised dozens of times since its inception and 14 times since the turn of the century. It is a meaningless formality.¶ Despite the unpopularity of another raise and demands for a stricter budget (as the Reason-Rupe survey also demonstrates), we will see faux sparks fly between Democrats and Republicans in October, but ultimately the ceiling will be raised.

#### Time is tight but they’ll reach a deal

Fox News, 9-11-2013, “House pulls spending bill amid backlash as government shutdown looms,” <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/09/11/house-leaders-pull-temporary-spending-bill-after-conservative-backlash/>

House Republican leaders pulled their plan Wednesday to temporarily fund the federal government after rank-and-file party members said it sidestepped “defunding” ObamaCare. The action further narrowed Congress’ time to strike a budget deal before an Oct. 1 government shutdown. House Speaker John Boehner and his team pulled the plan, which could have gotten a full chamber vote as early as Thursday, after a conservative backlash led by the Tea Party movement and Heritage Action for America. The plan essentially called for the House to vote on defunding ObamaCare and the temporary spending bill, then send the package to the Democrat-controlled Senate, which almost certainly would have jettisoned the defund part and allowed the chambers to negotiate on a “clean” funding bill. “The Ruling Elite is up to it again,” the Tea Party Patriots group said Wednesday. “They want you to think they have voted for defunding ObamaCare. But it’s another shell game.” Meanwhile, Congress must also work on several other pressing issues, especially agreeing to increase the debt ceiling, which the government could hit as soon as mid-October, according to a recent Treasury Department assessment. Boehner defended his defund-spending plan Tuesday, saying his chamber has already voted 40 times to “defund, repeal and change” ObamaCare, so the Senate must now take up the fight. Although Boehner pulled the bill because he didn’t have the votes, sources tell Fox News the speaker has no intention of changing the plan and might revisit it next week -- after members realize its strengths. Meanwhile members from both parties appear optimistic about avoiding a partial government shutdown, despite the looming deadline and the potential for another internal House struggle. “We've got some time left,” Kentucky Republican Rep. Hal Rogers, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told Fox News. “It's not time to panic.” The postponement of a Capitol Hill vote on a military strike on Syria will indeed eliminate the related hearings and classified briefings that slowed work on other pending issues, including immigration reform, the Farm Bill and whether to limit the extent to which the National Security Agency can collect data on Americans in its efforts to thwart terrorism.

### Links

#### Uncertainty over the dispute resolution mechanism causes Congressional fights

Brown & Meacham 12 – Neil Brown and Carl Meacham, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Members, 12/21/12, “Oil, Mexico, and the Transboundary Agreement,” http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/oil-mexico-and-the-transboundary-agreement

The TBA contains numerous provisions in anticipation of disputes on allocation of resources under a unitization agreement and implementation of those agreements. Legal analysis of these provisions is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is apparent that lack of clarity on the legal status of the dispute resolution mechanisms should be of concern to the U.S. Congress. The Obama administration contends that the agreement’s arbitration mechanism is not intended to produce binding decisions, however, that is not specifically provided for in the text of the agreement and would be different from arbitration mechanisms in many other international agreements.

#### No turns---even a little opposition from Republicans is enough to gum up the works---outweighs broad support for the substance of the treaty

Phil Taylor 13, E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/

A nearly year-old agreement to allow the joint development of oil reservoirs straddling the U.S.-Mexico maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico stalled last month in the Senate, stranding a widely supported measure many argue would increase domestic energy security and improve the safety of offshore drilling. ¶ The agreement announced by government officials last February in Los Cabos, Mexico, creates a framework for U.S. offshore drilling companies and Mexico’s Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to jointly develop oil production in an area nearly the size of New Jersey that is outside both countries’ economic waters (Greenwire, Feb. 20, 2012). ¶ Resources in the area have been off limits to both countries under a treaty that runs through 2014. ¶ The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement last April, loosening a decades-long policy that forbids foreign oil companies from developing Mexican oil. ¶ But while the agreement is backed strongly by the U.S. Interior and State departments, major oil companies, and senators on both sides of the aisle, it failed to pass the chamber during the lame-duck session. ¶ Senators on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on Dec. 18 sent out a “hotline” request to attach the agreement as an amendment to H.R. 670, a Northern Mariana Islands lands bill, in hopes of passing it by unanimous consent, but a Republican senator objected, according to Senate sources (E&ENews PM, Dec. 19, 2012). ¶ The impasse derailed, for now, an agreement that many think could improve bilateral relations and spur much-needed reforms in Mexico’s energy sector.

#### Democrats backlash

Gary Gentile 12, Inside Energy, 4/30/12, “Salazar accuses House of living a 'fairy tale'; urges votes on 3 issues,” p. lexis

Interior Secretary Ken Salazar is blaming Congress, especially the Republican-controlled House, for failing to act on critical energy issues and creating a divide between what he called "the real energy world" and "the imagined, fairy tale world."¶ In sharply worded remarks last week, Salazar said political rhetoric was blocking progress on legislation that would reorganize his department's oversight of offshore and onshore energy development, approve a transboundary energy agreement with Mexico and boost the development of renewable energy.¶ The former Demoratic senator from Colorado directed his scorn at the House, without mentioning the Republicans by name. He criticized those who he said call for a "drill, drill, drill" policy and oppose President Barack Obama's proposal to end tax deductions for the oil and natural gas industry.¶ "The good news is that the imagined energy world is actually very small," Salazar said at a National Press Club luncheon in Washington. "I think you can find its edge, the end of it, when you walk out of the House of Representatives."¶ Salazar's remarks come as the House considers a number of energy bills as part of a strategy to make rising gasoline prices an issue in the November elections. The bills, none of which stand much chance in the Democrat-controlled Senate, include one aimed at forcing the approval of an oil pipeline between Canada and the US and others that would open new areas, including the Atlantic coast, to energy exploration.¶ A spokesman for Representative Doc Hastings, Republican-Washington, who chairs the House Natural Resources Committee, declined to comment on Salazar's remarks.¶ Salazar challenged Congress to act in three areas he called "low-hanging fruit."¶ He said that Congress has failed to codify in law the reorganization of the former Minerals Management Service in the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.¶ "It's inexcusable that Congress has yet to enact one piece of legislation to make drilling safer," Salazar said.¶ Second, Salazar scolded Congress for failing to ratify a transboundary agreement with Mexico that resolves disputes that could occur along the maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico. Salazar noted that Mexico's legislature has already ratified the agreement, but that Congress has not.

### 2NC WPR IL

#### And- our warpowers specific link-

#### WPR debates spillover and cause hostage-taking on debt ceiling- unwavering attention needed

Norm Ornstein, political scientist and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 9-1-2013 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns_and_shutdowns_syria_congress_obama?page=full>

 Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -- with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, with devastating consequences for American credibility and the international economy.¶ Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -- even probability -- of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.¶ A full and robust conversation about what to do in the face of Bashar al-Assad's unspeakably evil actions -- with powerful interventions by President Obama, Vice President Biden and Secretary of State Kerry -- might instead have a positive impact, in the same way that the deeply emotional extended congressional debate during the George H.W. Bush presidency about going into the first Iraq war was a high point for the legislative branch. This president might, in fact, prevail with bipartisan support in both houses. That might even provide a modest lubricant for movement to avoid the insanity of government shutdowns or a debt ceiling breach. But the risks of more damaging outcomes are uncomfortably high.

(optional)

#### And- our controversy aversion link

#### Debt ceiling without budget concessions is a tough vote for the GOP politically- that’s the Hill evidence- holding off on pressure now but GOP leadership is in a tricky spot

Politico, 9-15-2013 <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/house-gop-leadership-wants-debt-hike-focus-96818_Page2.html>

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is also in a tricky spot. McConnell has a Republican primary challenger in an already tough 2014 reelection campaign, and he is being pushed hard by the “defund Obamacare” wing of his own conference, including Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.). The Senate Conservatives Fund has launched a TV ad in Kentucky charging that McConnell is doing “nothing” to stop Obamacare.¶ McConnell and his allies have pushed back against the SCF ad, claiming the group’s drive for GOP purity on conservative issues helped Democrats win Senate seats in 2010 and 2012. Republicans also note that their own internal polling shows a solid majority of GOP voters don’t want to shut down the government over Obamacare.¶ Congressional Democrats are content to let Boehner, Cantor and McConnell squirm for now.¶ “All we have to do is sit back and wait,” said a top Democratic aide involved in the CR and debt ceiling fights. “Boehner and McConnell put themselves in this position; they have to get out of it now on their own. They pushed all these votes on [defunding or repealing] Obamacare. Now they have to reap what they sowed.”¶ Whatever House Republican leadership decides to do, outside conservative groups will have the House under a microscope. The SCF organized a robocall marathon last week, flooding dozens of House offices with phone calls lobbying against the Cantor CR. Other groups like the Club for Growth and Heritage Action have also vowed to continuing to pressure lawmakers to jump on the defund Obamacare bandwagon.

### PC Finite

#### PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized- newest ev

\*it is just really hard to use PC

Todd **Eberly** is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is teeberly@smcm.edu. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., **1-21**-2013 <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2>

As Barack Obama prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he faces the stark reality that little of what he hopes to accomplish in a second term will likely come to pass. Mr. Obama occupies an office that many assume to be all powerful, but like so many of his recent predecessors, the president knows better. He faces a political capital problem and a power trap.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, presidents have found the exercise of effective leadership a difficult task. To lead well, a president needs support — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. If presidents fail to satisfy these requirements, they face the prospect of inadequate political support or political capital to back their power assertions.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the two parties began ideologically divergent journeys that resulted in intense polarization in Congress, diminishing the possibility of bipartisan compromise. These changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. In recent years, presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

## Heg

### 1nc - Inev

**US heg resilient – multiple economic and political factors – plus no challengers**

**Ning, Deputy Director and Director of CCP Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, 13** [Yu, President of All China Lawyers Association, 1/10/13, ‘Hegemony bonus’ helps US remain dominant’, Global Times, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/754889.shtml>, accessed: 7/1/13, ML]

US **heg**emony **brought the superpower $7**,396.09 **billion** **worth of benefits** from the global system in 2011, according to a report by Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) released on Tuesday.¶ The report pointed out that **the US enjoys the biggest "hegemony bonus" in the world.**¶ **The** "hegemony **bonus**" in the report **refers to monopoly profits directly or indirectly gained by** **the** hegemonic **country through the global system** it dominates.¶ **The report** also **summarized** 10 **ways used by** **the US** **to gain** the "**heg**emony bonus," **including through the dollar hegemon**y, unfair **trade** and **benefiting from intellectual property rights**, to name just a few.¶ The figure was a result based on the model constructed by the CAS. The scientific nature and its accuracy need further proof, however the research cast some light on a globally acknowledged fact that the US has long dominated the international system, and the US hegemony, especially the dollar hegemony, brings the US considerable economic benefits.¶ Since the Bretton Woods Agreement, the world has been under the dollar hegemony for over 68 years. Former French President Charles de Gaulle famously referred to the US dollar's favored status as an "exorbitant privilege."¶ **Analysts wonder whether the current stagnant economy of the US will weaken its economic influence** worldwide, **but as** **long as the dollar remains the world currency, the US can still pay its bills** by printing more money.¶ Meanwhile, the US decline is a topic in discussion. A report by the US National Intelligence Council in December 2012 said there would be no hegemonic power in 2030 with China surging to become the biggest economy and the influence of Asian culture surpassing US and European culture.¶ **Through the** two **frustrated wars in the Middle East and the financial crisis, the US's global** **leadership has been affected** and its hegemony is also increasingly being challenged. **But the US won't easily resign itself to a declining status. It will strive to maintain heg**emony in its economy, military, technology and culture.¶ China's rise poses threats to the US, but **China has no intention of assuming the US's hegemonic power.**¶ **It's unlikely that some country will replace the US** within a short time. China and other countries should remain sober, but the US may create more disturbances in the region to maintain its old hegemony.

### 1nc - Empirics

#### Emperics prove no impact

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability.

First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present.

Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

### 1nc - Decline =/= War

**American hegemony does not solve all conflict**

**Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato institute, 13**

[Doug Bandow, special assistant to President Reagan, editor of political magazine *Inquiry*, 7-5-13, “Egypt and American Hubris,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/egypt-american-hubris-8692, 7-7-13, JZ]

**American foreign policy is a wreck. The presumption that Washington controls events around the globe has been exposed** to all **as an** embarrassing **illusion.**¶ **Egypt teeters on the brink,** again. **Syria worsens by the day**. **Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are dead**, with another intifada in the wind. **North Korea threatens to nuke the world**. **Violence grows in Nigeria**. The **Europeans** have gone from disillusioned to **angry with** President Barack **Obama**. **Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela reject U.S. leadership in Latin America**. Even **Iranian reformers support Iran’s nuclear program**. Zimbabwe’s vicious Robert Mugabe is likely to retain power in upcoming elections. Iraq is friendly with Iran and supporting Bashar al-Assad. The Afghan government remains corrupt, incompetent, and without legitimacy**.** Bahrain cracks down on democracy supporters with Washington’s acquiescence. **China and Russia resist U.S. priorities in Syria and elsewhere**. **Venezuela without Chavez looks like Venezuela with Chavez.**¶ **It wasn’t supposed to be this way. America was the unipower,** the hyperpower, the sole superpower, the essential nation. Washington was the benevolent hegemon.Only members of the axis of evil had something to fear from the United States.All the U.S. government had to do was exercise “leadership” and all would be well.¶ThatU.S. pride swelled with the end of the Cold War is hardly a surprise. **But what** unfortunately **emerged was** a **rabid arrogance**, the view that “what we say goes.” It was **the very hubris** about **which the ancient Greeks warned.**¶ Alas, **this** all **proved to be a world of illusion**, filled with smoke and mirrors. **On 9/11** a score of **angry** young **Muslims brought war to America**, destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon. A bunch of **ill-equipped and ignorant Afghan fundamentalists refused to admit that they were defeated, and more than a decade later still resist the United States backed by a multitude of allies** and a covey of local elites. The invasion of Iraq was met by IEDs instead of flowers, and created an ally in name only, with Baghdad ready to thwart U.S. military objectives when it saw fit.¶ **American pleading, threats, promises and sanctions had no effect on** the course of events in **North Korea.** Civil and military conflicts ebbed and flowed and political contests waxed and waned in Congo, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe with Washington **but** an ineffective bystander. Russia’s Vladimir **Putin ignored U.S. priorities both before and after the fabled “reset” in relations. China protected North Korea and bullied its other neighbors, despite diplomatic pleadings and military pivots.**¶As for succeeding events, where is the evidence that Morsi, Egypt’s generals and the Egyptian people sat around awaiting the opinion of U.S. policymakers**?** Washington’s support for the odious Mubarak left it with little credibility. **Maybe the generals can be bought with the promise of more military aid, but even they know that the U.S. cannot protect them if their soldiers refuse their orders**. Morsi’s fate was decided in Cairo, not Washington.¶ Americans understandably pine for a simpler world in which Washington is the center of the world and the U.S. orchestrates international events. Alas, that world never really existed. It certainly does not exist today.¶ Instead of embracing the illusion of Washington’s omniscience, **Washington officials should acknowledge the limitations on their power** and influence. They should reflect on events spinning out of control in Egypt. It’s time for the more “humble” foreign policy that candidate George W. Bush promised in what seems to be a lifetime ago.