# 1ac

#### Same as round 2

# 2ac

## T

### 2ac – t-economic engagement

#### The plan is immediate engagement over economics – we meet

Bierbrauer 13 – (“TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: THE USA AND CANADA”, EU Parliament, directly-elected European Union institution, May, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU\_6.4.7.html)//javi

The major economic issue for discussion may be the negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Both the European Parliament and the US Congress have expressed their interest in deepening transatlantic economic engagement with such an agreement.

#### We change the political behavior of the state necessarily- we include Mexico and that changes the behavior of Mexico

#### Counter interpretation – “Economic” engagement is limited to trade and financial transactions

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.

Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on humyn rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humynitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by mynipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Prefer our interpretation

#### Intent to define – only defines engagement their interpretation defines foreign policy and investment

#### Inclusive and exclusive – sets a clear brightline for predictable debates

#### Reasonability important when defining “engagement” — avoids an impossible definitional maze.

Drifte 3 — Reinhard Drifte, Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” *Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673, p. 5-6)

The complex nature of engagement policy

The misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words, have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult. Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations.

The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9

The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective:

1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers;

2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;

3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;

4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11

When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used; one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12

## Cheating CP

### 2ac – deal isn’t set

#### Deal isn’t set and focus on the process prevents EU involvement

Atlantic 9/18/13 – (“EU Negotiators Should Wake Up and Engage the Public in TTIP”, Atlantic-Community, <http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/eu-negotiators-should-wake-up-and-engage-the-public-in-ttip?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.atlantic-community.org%2Fyour-opinion%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_GES8xNFE98EL%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Daf-column-1-3%26p_p_col_pos%3D3%26p_p_col_count%3D8>)

As Brussels awakes from its 2-month summer hibernation, policymakers, parliamentarians and business representatives alike may discover that their US counterparts have continued outreach efforts to US stakeholders for consultation and support. With the second negotiation round of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) coming up, the EU's negotiating team risks looking like a paper tiger with a negotiating mandate that merely exists in theory and lacks input and public support from Member States, businesses and civil society organizations as well as trade unions and the public. This seriously undermines the EU's negotiation position and the European Commission should step up its game to consult, involve and mobilize the European side to work towards the best possible deal. Where the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Mr. Michael Froman, has actively engaged with the US business community in public discussions over the summer, the United States International Trade Committee (USITC) carries out several new sector-specific studies on the effects of TTIP and will soon embark on a small and medium enterprises (SME) road show throughout the country. The Commission seems less proactive. Yes, it has launched an informative website with orderly summarized widely available information and it has set up a twitter account (@EU\_TTIP\_TEAM). It diligently organized a debriefing session in the European Parliament and a civil society dialogue. I welcome all these efforts, but they look more like courtesy calls (to prevent another ACTA setback) and lack a sense of urgency and the enthusiasm to make the TTIP negotiations process a true European joint effort and success. The opportunities are manifold. Just as the Eurozone is climbing its way out of the recession and growth seems to pick up slowly, the Commission should use TTIP to provide those struggling businesses, whether multinationals, SME's or self-employed professionals, with a perspective of new growth and jobs. Surveys show citizens expect more growth to come from the global economy than from EU policies. TTIP is where the two meet. Why not have the Commission representations in all EU Member States, who for the last years have been associated with bookkeepers enforcing the EU 3% deficit rule, reach out to businesses to ask them which challenges and interests they have in transatlantic trade relations (or the EU's common commercial policy in general). The Commission should also use the expertise at universities in developing cutting-edge proposals on regulatory cooperation. Independent research should help inform the public and stakeholders alike. TTIP could be a true joint effort between citizens, businesses, politicians and the European institutions. This is a time where the EU has to deliver by cutting red tape through reaching a comprehensive, future proof trade deal with our largest trading partner. Such a deal should boost economic growth and employment. But instead, the Commission seems to lay low, avoiding public debates on issues that will be controversial. But that will come back as a boomerang. TTIP, like any trade agreement requires give and take, something Commissioner De Gucht has been telling the White House from the beginning. But that notion requires appreciation beyond technocrats as well. So instead of focusing on the process, which Brussels policymakers too often do, it is time to shift the discussion to substantial issues. Inviting businesses to come up with input, joint submissions with their US counterparts on technical regulatory issues or involving European researchers, start-ups and engineers to make sure we have an answer to the American machinery that will undoubtedly put its mark on the final deal. I will contribute to this process by hosting dedicated stakeholder meetings in the Parliament and also in the Member State I know best, The Netherlands. These meetings will tackle one issue at a time instead of framing the TTIP negotiations as one big fairy tale with only winners. We must be realistic. These are going to be increasingly tough negotiations in which the Commission's negotiators need all the input they can get to be ambitious in representing the EU´s common interest. Currently they risk taking public awareness and support for granted.

#### US certainty key to the future of the trade partnership – recent power transition

Thomson and Dyer 4/30/13 – FT's Mexico and Central America correspondent, Southern Cone correspondent, Colombia correspondent and was also assistant features editor in London; Beijing Bureau Chief in May 2008, Shanghai correspondent at the Financial Times (Adam and Geoff, “Obama’s Mexico visit to bolster trade ties”, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8dca376-b1b4-11e2-b324-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cinwaOxk)

“Obama’s visit is an important signal of support,” says Duncan Wood, director of the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute in Washington. “And it’s recognition of Mexico’s importance to the US.” Mr Obama’s trip to Mexico City – before heading to Costa Rica to meet Central American presidents on Friday – comes at a critical time for the 46-year-old Mexican leader, who took office five months ago. The visit lends weight to his administration and to his centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) just as he is trying to push through the most ambitious economic reform agenda Mexico has seen in 25 years, including the shake-up of two inefficient but highly politicised areas of the economy – the tax system and the energy sector. Longer term, though, Mr Obama’s trip is a chance to recast the bilateral relationship. For the past six years, the dominant theme has been Mexico’s growing insecurity problem. The expansion of powerful drugs cartels south of the Rio Grande, and the previous administration’s military-led assault to cut them down, has produced at least 70,000 murders since the start of 2007. Felipe Calderón, Mr Peña Nieto’s predecessor, placed the drugs war at the top of his administration’s agenda – and at the top of his demands from the US. When he spoke to a joint session of Congress in May 2010, he asked legislators to reinstate a ban on assault weapons to help stop them flowing into Mexico. Many Republicans, in particular, felt his petition was inappropriate. Since taking office in December, Mr Peña Nieto has worked hard to undo his country’s international association with the drugs trade. Instead, he has tried to promote Mexico’s new-found growth, increasing prowess as an exporting platform and, thanks to its plentiful but underexploited oil and gas reserves, potential as a regional source of energy. “Security will continue to be an important component of the bilateral relationship, but Peña Nieto and his cabinet have already posited that it won’t be the only or even the highest priority issue for discussion this week,” says Andrés Rozental, a former deputy foreign minister of Mexico. As well as discussing border security, the two presidents are expected to discuss how the two countries can partner internationally on trade, including Mexico’s participation in the talks surrounding the 12-member trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Some trade experts even suggest that Mexico should try to get in on the forthcoming trade negotiations between the US and the European Union with the idea of turning the talks into a Nafta-EU negotiation. Luis de la Calle, a Mexican former trade official who helped negotiate Nafta, admits that would be difficult to achieve. But he also believes that Latin America’s second-largest economy would have a lot to gain by trying. “Mexico must ask to get in,” he says. “If we do not, then we should insist Nafta partners adopt whatever new higher disciplines come from that agreement. If that fails, Mexico should adopt them unilaterally.” Carl Meachem, director of the Americas programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, says it might be possible for Mexico to be included as an observer in the US-EU trade talks. “It would be helpful not only to the US to be able to negotiate in a bloc,” he said, “but it would also catapult Mexico on to the world stage in a different way.”

#### Counterplan Still Links to Politics – The Vote Would Still Follow Party Lines

Jason Mycoff and Joseph Pika both are professors of political science @ Univ of Delaware 2006 Confrontation and Compromise: Presidential and Congressional Leadesrhip google books

Party leaders generally do not get personally involved in most legislation, instead allowing the committee system to produce legislation. In this case Senators Daschle and Lott and Representatives Hastert, Armey, and Gephardt were the critical players in deciding how the two chambers would consider homeland security legislation and how the bill would be written. In the House, Speaker Hastert created a special process that would give final authority over the bill to a Select Committee on Homeland Security chaired by Majority Leader Dick Armey with Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi as the ranking member. The other Republicans and Democrats serving on the committee were prominent members of their party and its leadership. Republican members included Majority Whip Delay; Representative Watts, the Republican conference chair; Representative Pryce, the vice chairman of the Republican conference; and Representative Portman, the chairman of the leadership. The other Democrats included Representative Frost, the Democratic caucus chair; Representative Menendez, the vice chairman of the Democratic caucus; and Representative DeLauro, the assistant to the minority leader. Although creating a bipartisan leadership group signaled the potential for a widely supported final product, the final vote was a party line vote with support from the Republicans and opposition from the Democrats. The House Select Committee on Homeland Security produced the final text of HR 5005 after the eleven authorizing committees mad amendments. By staffing this committee with members of the party leadership, the parties would be certain that the party line would be toed in final production of the bill.

### 2ac – China rise

#### TTIP checks China rise – bilateralism

Laidi 7/23/13 – (Zaki, “EU takes a bad trade gamble against US”, China Daily, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-07/23/content_16814600.htm>)//javi

Over the past half century, the EU, which represents only 7 percent of the global population, has managed to maintain an exceptionally strong trade position, despite the rise of emerging markets like China. So, while the US and Japan have seen their respective shares of global exports fall, the EU's share has remained stable, at around 20 percent. Indeed, EU trade power contrasts sharply with the perception of a weakened Europe. Most important, Europe was able to achieve it only by investing heavily in a multilateral trade system through the GATT and then the World Trade Organization. And yet, while the EU owes much to the multilateral trade system, since 2006, it, too, has shifted to bilateralism, scoring its biggest successes with free-trade agreements with Latin America and South Korea. An agreement with Canada is now within reach (though bilateral negotiations with India seem to have stalled, probably because the Indians do not believe that a free trade agreement would help them much). Officially, the EU considers a bilateral approach to trade to be perfectly compatible with a return to multilateralism. But the facts belie this. First, it is clear that bilateralism is growing as multilateralism wanes. Since 2008, when the WTO's Doha Round of global free-trade talks collapsed, the Europeans have proved unable to bring the US, China and India back to the multilateral negotiating table. More important, they evidently have given up trying. This is reflected in the EU's reluctance to press emerging countries to become parties to the WTO's multilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, as if it has accepted that this issue can be resolved only bilaterally. Moreover, since 2008, US trade policy has deliberately abandoned multilateralism in order to pursue containment of China via a two-pronged strategy: the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the TTIP. The reason for this change is simple: The US no longer has the power to set the rules of the global trade system, but it considers itself strong enough to work around them. The EU partly shares America's strategic objective here, because it, too, has grievances against emerging powers in terms of market access, compliance with intellectual property rights, access to government procurement and subsidies to state companies. But Europe must avoid alignment with this new and narrow US trade focus for several reasons.

Unchecked Chinese rise risks global nuclear war

C. Dale Walton 7, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

## Materialism

### 2ac – framework

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

#### We’re is self-correcting—prefer it

**Krebs 10** - Principal of Jesus College, Oxford (John, 2/8/2011, “We might err, but science is self-correcting”, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest\_contributors/article7018438.ece) MH

**This philosophy of science was formally instituted 350 years ago** in London by the small band of men, including Christopher Wren and Robert Boyle, who founded the Royal Society, the world’s oldest national academy of science. **Their motto**, Nullius in verba (“**Take nobody’s word for it”)** embodies the Royal Society’s founding principle of basing conclusions on observation and experiment rather than the voice of authority. **Scientists don’t have all the answers, but they do have a way of finding out, and the fact that our lights come on,** our computers compute and our mobile phones phone **are among the myriad daily reminders that the scientific way works**. You might retort that science and scientists often don’t live up to this ideal. And you would be right. **Scientists, like everyone else, have human frailties and are susceptible to fashion and orthodoxy**. Nevertheless, over time, **science is self-correcting because someone will have the courage to challenge the prevailing view and win the argument, provided he or she has sufficient evidence. There is**, of course, **no excuse for scientists who** over-egg or **massage their results**, or who underplay the uncertainties in their conclusions. **The prevailing view in many areas of science will include significant uncertainties** (as with climate change), so challenge is central to the progress of understanding. **The claim that Himalayan glaciers would melt in the next 30 years is an example of this self-correction. It was debunked from within the scientific community and not by outside commentators, it does not undermine the core conclusions about man-made global warming,** and the mistake that the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change made was to dismiss this challenge without studying the evidence. **Scepticism is fine but science is not a free-for-all.** Whether or not you accept the sceptics’ view should depend on careful weighing of the evidence. **Dr Wakefield had no good evidence to support his claim of a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. Equally, the Department of Health’s claim that the “MMR vaccine is perfectly safe” is wrong. No vaccine is perfectly safe, but not vaccinating your children exposes them to a far bigger risk than the tiny risk associated with the vaccine.** Given what I have said, it is not surprising that the interaction between science and government can be edgy. Ministers look to their expert advisers for clear-cut answers, a unanimous view, and preferably one that is politically convenient. Scientific advisers are prone to disappoint on all fronts. “I am sorry minister, but science is not clear-cut, what is more, different experts take a different view, and our best advice is to do X” (where X is not a vote winner). When I was asked to advise, in 1996, on whether or not to kill badgers as a way of controlling bovine tuberculosis, I said that without a proper experiment it is not possible to tell whether or not the policy would work. To its credit, the Ministry of Agriculture set up what was perhaps the largest ecological experiment ever carried out in this country. The result showed that killing is not a cost-effective policy, and disappointed farmers. Last year David Nutt, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs, was sacked by the Home Secretary for being too outspoken about the Government’s rejection of his committee’s advice on the classification of cannabis and Ecstasy. If ministers are going to reject expert advice, they should explain why. What they should definitely not do, as both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary did in this case, is to announce, before they have received the expert advice, that they have made up their mind. Equally, independent experts should not be gagged by ministers, even if their views are inconvenient. **Science, warts and all, is still the best way of finding out, and is absolutely vital in informing government policy.** That is why the Government must strongly reaffirm its commitment to freedom of expression for independent scientific advisers. At the same time, if scientists have a right to be heard, they have a responsibility to be scrupulously honest and not to claim more than is justified by the evidence.

### 2ac – globalization good – mexico

#### Neoliberal policies led to internal Mexican reform

Kim 1/30/13 – (Dongwoo, “Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico”, Constellations, http://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/constellations/article/view/18860/14650)

Carlos Salinas’ series of neoliberal economic policies culminated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada. Salinas was at first disinterested in forming a bilateral agreement with the United States.10 After all, the PRI had staunchly closed up the Mexican economy to the world for the last sixty years and gained popularity from its nationalist and defensive economic policies (especially against the United States), most notably the nationalization of the petroleum industry in late 1930s by president Lázaro Cárdenas. However, due to the “lukewarm” response from the world leaders during his European tour, which included a stop at the World Economic Forum in February of 1989, Salinas realized that the only way of drawing investors to Mexico was to “provide [them] with both cheap labor and privileged access to the U.S. market.”11 Salinas immediately approached the American government officials with the intention of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement, shortly thereafter the administration shifted policies for the preparation and successful negotiation of NAFTA. Carlos Salinas thus marketed NAFTA with fervor in and outside of Mexico and hastened the pace of the neoliberal reforms. Salinas wrote that he made efforts to “disseminate more information and confirm the active presence of key economic, labor, and business leaders in working groups” during the period of NAFTA negotiation.12 His administration privatized public corporations and implemented land reforms. Furthermore, Carlos Salinas marketed his neoliberal policies as means of modernizing the Mexican politics as well, thus associating neoliberalism with democracy. In November 1990, Salinas said both political and economic problems, which he described as “clouds,” were “dissipating.”13 Some even referred to Salinas’ reforms as “Salinastroika,” paralleling these to the radical introduction of socio-political transparency and freedom in the former Soviet Union.14 The Salinas administration thus provided hope that these neoliberal economic policies would continue as political reforms as well. Seemingly, Carlos Salinas’ reforms were successful; his policies did draw foreign investments, Mexico relieved itself of a significant amount of debt and its economy grew by 4.4% in 1993.15 Salinas administration earned the reputation as a “political juggernaut” for its political competency.16 The elections for federal senators and state governors held in 1991 reflected the surging popularity of the Salinas administration; the PRI candidates won 61 percent of the congressional votes, giving Salinas “the power to make laws without having to seek any support from the opposition.”17 Most importantly, Carlos Salinas’ leadership earned the respect and confidence of foreign investors. According to Dillon and Preston, President Clinton praised Salinas for giving Mexico “better leadership than ever in [Clinton’s] lifetime” and The Wall Street Journal “looked favorably on [his] reforms.”18 Salinas was thus deemed a progressive and modern leader by the “first world,” and many believed that Mexico was truly modernizing.

### 2ac – alt fails – movements fail

#### They don’t have a concrete alternative – kills activism

Bryant ‘12

(Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do *even if* all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, *and when we do*, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

### 2ac – neoliberalism sustainable

#### It’s sustainable—no political crises and self correcting

Stelzer 9 Irwin Stelzer is a business adviser and director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute, “Death of capitalism exaggerated,” http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26174260-5013479,00.html

A FUNNY thing happened on the way to the collapse of market capitalism in the face of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. It didn't. Indeed, in Germany voters relieved Chancellor Angela Merkel of the necessity of cohabiting with a left-wing party, allowing her to form a coalition with a party favouring lower taxes and free markets. And in Pittsburgh leaders representing more than 90 per cent of the world's GDP convened to figure out how to make markets work better, rather than to hoist the red flag. The workers are to be relieved, not of their chains but of credit-card terms that are excessively onerous, and helped to retain their private property - their homes. All of this is contrary to expectations. The communist spectre that Karl Marx confidently predicted would be haunting Europe is instead haunting Europe's left-wing parties, with even Vladimir Putin seeking to attract investment by re-privatising the firms he snatched. Which raises an interesting question: why haven't the economic turmoil and rising unemployment led workers to the barricades, instead of to their bankers to renegotiate their mortgages? It might be because Spain's leftish government has proved less able to cope with economic collapse than countries with more centrist governments. Or because Britain, with a leftish government, is now the sick man of Europe, its financial sector in intensive care, its recovery likely to be the slowest in Europe, its prime credit rating threatened. Or it might be because left-wing trade unions, greedily demanding their public-sector members be exempted from the pain they want others to share, have lost their credibility and ability to lead a leftward lurch. All of those factors contribute to the unexpected strength of the Right in a world in which a record number of families are being tossed out of their homes, and jobs have been disappearing by the million. But even more important in promoting reform over revolution are three factors: the existence of democratic institutions; the condition of the unemployed; and the set of policies developed to cope with the recession. Democratic institutions give the aggrieved an outlet for their discontent, and hope they can change conditions they deem unsatisfactory. Don't like the way George W. Bush has skewed income distribution? Toss the Republicans out and elect a man who promises to tax the rich more heavily. Don't like Gordon Brown's tax increases? Toss him out and hope the Tories mean it when they promise at least to try to lower taxes. Result: angry voters but no rioters, unless one counts the nutters who break windows at McDonald's or storm banks in the City. Contrast that with China, where the disaffected have no choice but to take to the streets. Result: an estimated 10,000 riots this year protesting against job losses, arbitrary taxes and corruption. A second factor explaining the Left's inability to profit from economic suffering is capitalism's ability to adapt, demonstrated in the Great Depression of the 1930s. While a gaggle of bankers and fiscal conservatives held out for the status quo, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his experimenters began to weave a social safety net. In Britain, William Beveridge produced a report setting the stage for a similar, indeed stronger, net. Continental countries recovering from World War II did the same. So unemployment no longer dooms a worker to close-to-starvation. Yes, civic institutions were able to soften the blow for the unemployed before the safety net was put in place, but they could not cope with pervasive protracted lay-offs. Also, during this and other recessions, when prices for many items are coming down, the real living standard of those in work actually improves. In the US, somewhere between 85 per cent and 90 per cent of workers have kept their jobs, and now see their living costs declining as rents and other prices come down. So the impetus to take to the streets is limited. Then there are the steps taken by capitalist governments to limit the depth and duration of the downturn. As the economies of most of the big industrial countries imploded, policy went through two phases. The first was triage - do what is necessary to prevent the financial system from collapse. Spend. Guarantee deposits to prevent runs on banks and money funds, bail out big banks, force relatively healthier institutions to take over sicker ones, mix all of this with rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers - the populist spoonful of sugar that made the bailouts go down with the voters - and stop the rot. Meanwhile, have the central banks dust off their dog-eared copies of Bagehot and inject lots of liquidity by whatever means comes to mind. John Maynard Keynes, meet Milton Friedman for a cordial handshake. Then came more permanent reform, another round of adapting capitalism to new realities, in this case the malfunctioning of the financial markets. Even Barack Obama's left-wing administration decided not to scupper the markets but instead to develop rules to relate bankers' pay more closely to long-term performance; to reduce the chance of implosions by increasing the capital banks must hold, cutting their profits and dividends, but leaving them in private hands; and to channel most stimulus spending through private-sector companies. This leaves the anti-market crowd little room for manoeuvre as voters seem satisfied with the changes to make capitalism and markets work better and more equitably. At least so far. There are exceptions. Australia moved a bit to the left in the last election, but more out of unhappiness with a tired incumbent's environmental and foreign policy. Americans chose Obama, but he had promised to govern from the centre before swinging left. And for all his rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers and other malefactors of great wealth, he sticks to reform of markets rather than their replacement, with healthcare a possible exception. Even in these countries, so far, so good for reformed capitalism. No substitutes accepted.

### 2ac – at: economies of suffering

#### Globalization has made distant suffering no longer distant – reducing the suffering is a moral imperative for a world ethic

Linklater, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, ‘7 (Andrew, “Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations” International Politics, Vol 44, p 19-36)

Conclusions A traditional problem for cosmopolitans is explaining how human beings can be expected to assume demanding global duties when the emotional distance between the members of different societies is so great. Communitarian critics of cosmopolitanism argue that relations between distant strangers are usually characterized by indifference or mild concern; the bonds of nationality or their equivalent are the key to deep solidarity. On this argument, cosmopolitans should be more troubled than they usually are by the evidence that national populations are not motivated to organize their lives around a universal ethic. But the gulf between human societies may not be so difficult to bridge. The most basic human vulnerabilities are much the same everywhere — or sufficiently alike that human beings who have no social ties with each other can sympathize with those who have lost, or are in danger of losing, the preconditions of a decent life; however, this is defined within their society. A sense of responsibility for endangering these universal pre-requisites can be developed from emotional dispositions regarding harm to others which are acquired in most societies through routine socialization processes. Guilt or shame because of actions that harm distant others — and moral unease because of indifference to terrible suffering — do not have to be invented ab initio; they are an extension of moral dispositions which are common to most societies although they are invariably more central in relations between members than in relations with distant human beings. One response to criticisms of cosmopolitanism is that the moral resources which are present in conventions against harm and in the attendant moral emotions make the extension of moral and political community possible. This emphasis on the immanence of universal obligation in everyday realities is the key to embodied cosmopolitanism. Globalization poses the intriguing question of whether societies with particularistic moralities that reflected their relative isolation from, and frequent rivalry with, one another can develop common ground about shared vulnerabilities through dialogic processes. Contemporary international law offers some encouragement on this point. The obstacles to substantial progress have been well documented, and they will continue to shape the tracks along which globalization travels. But it is not beyond the ingenuity of the human race to rise above increasingly problematical particularistic moralities, and to create global arrangements that have the primary task of implementing cosmopolitan obligations to reduce distant suffering.

#### Their chain of thought is stuck in pessimism- globalization improves the world

**Aisbett, Crawford School of Economics and Government lecturer, 2007**

(Emma, “Why Are the Critics So Convinced That Globalization Is Bad for the Poor?”, March, <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0113.pdf>)

**This paper has attempted to explain why criticisms of globalization’s impact on the poor continue to abound despite the general consensus that liberalization promotes growth and growth is good for the poor.** The explanation consisted of four parts. First, **many people view** the empirical evidence in favor of **globalization** skeptically because they see globalization **as a process through which power is concentrated** upward and away from the poor. In particular, they see transnational corporations as gaining a disproportionate amount of both political and market power. Critics of globalization are also ﬁrmly of the opinion that corporations will use their increased power in ways that beneﬁt themselves and harm the poor. Although these concerns are not without basis, **there are mediating factors that make it diﬃcult to conclude that globalization is increasing corporate power** **or that increased corporate power is necessarily bad for the poor.** On the ﬁrst point it is important to remember that **globalization exposes many previously powerful national corporations to outside competition**, **and requires greater transparency in government policymaking**. On the second point, it may be that **the eﬃciency beneﬁts of large corporations outweigh any losses from increased market power**. Thus, it would seem that there is room for more empirical research to determine whether the corporate globalization does indeed give the poor cause for concern. The **next part of the explanation focused on the multiplicity of meanings of the phrases “worsening poverty**” and “increasing inequality.” The discussion in regard to poverty followed on from Kanbur’s (2001) work, which identiﬁed four major diﬀerences between the concepts of poverty employed by globalization’s critics and proponents. These four dimensions are the total number of poor versus poverty incidence, monetary versus multidimensional measures, level of aggregation, and time horizon. I argued that although level of aggregation and time horizon do appear to be important distinctions, they are both emblematic of a more general concern that the poor should not be the ones to bear the adjustment costs of globalization. I then examined the implications of each of these diﬀerent concepts for the assessment of the progress of the last twenty years. **It was argued that invariably some groups of poor are adversely aﬀected by globalization**, **even when a much larger number of poor are made better oﬀ**. **Thus, concern for negatively aﬀected subgroups will always lead to a less favorable assessment of the impact of globalization**. **In the presence of strong population growth, looking at total number of poor rather than poverty incidence also leads to a predictably more pessimistic assessment**. However, the implications of including nonmonetary dimensions of poverty are less clear. Many people clearly believe that liberalization will lead to negative impacts on nonmonetary dimensions of poverty, but the empirical evidence on this is mixed. **In regard to inequality I argued that economic research generally applies measures of the shape of the income distribution, while many of the criticisms of globalization are based on polarization** and on changes in absolute inequality. The latter concept is related to the observation that the poor often do not have equal access to the opportunities presented by globalization (Birdsall 2003; Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004). Both **polarization** and absolute changes **in inequality** **tend to indicate rising inequality** **more often than the measures of inequality preferred by economists.** The next section showed that there remain important unresolved methodological issues in the calculation of even the most fundamental poverty and inequality measures. Foremost among these issues are the use of household survey data versus national accounts data to estimate average national incomes, and the method of comparing incomes across countries and over time. Both of these issues have major implications for our assessment of the last twenty years. Until we reach a consensus on them, there will be empirical support for both optimistic and pessimistic views of the period of globalization. Global trends over the last twenty years, however, are not the best facts on which to base claims about the beneﬁts or otherwise of globalization. **Thorough empirical work, which links speciﬁc policy measures to poverty outcomes, provides a far better basis. The empirical work to date has contributed to a broad acceptance that trade and FDI are growth promoting.** Yet much work remains to show which policies can reduce the adjustment costs borne by the poor and maximize the share of the beneﬁts they obtain from globalization. **Overall it seems that the diﬀerence of opinion between globalization’s supporters and critics can be largely explained by diﬀerences in prior views and priorities**, as well as current ambiguities in the empirical evidence. Rather than viewing criticism as a burden to be thrown oﬀ as quickly as possible, policymakers and researchers alike could do well to heed its message: “good” isn’t good enough. We owe it to the world’s poor to do better.

### 2ac- Space

#### Plan is key to Florida Econ

McGurgan 9/25- Kevin, Tampa Bay Times, (“Column: Free trade's boost for Florida”, September 25, 2013 http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-free-trades-boost-for-florida/2143880\\CLans)

Realizing this, the United States and the European Union, the group of trading nations of which the United Kingdom is a leading member, have negotiated a deal to reduce or remove as many barriers as possible. The first round of negotiations has already taken place, and we hope to reach agreement within the next 18 months. We are calling it the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP for short. The United States and the EU are the two largest economies in the world, with a combined value of around $30 trillion. U.S.-EU trade is worth $2.5 billion every day, one third of all world trade, and it's increasing all the time. A million jobs in the United States depend on trade with Britain alone. They tend to be good, well-paid jobs, with salaries above the U.S. average. So we always knew that the boost to our economies from freeing up trade was going to be large. What we didn't know, until recently, was how each individual state would benefit. Now the results are in. A September 2013 study by the British Embassy in Washington, Bertelsmann Foundation and the Atlantic Council finds that TTIP could add more than 740,000 jobs to the U.S. economy as a whole — that's the equivalent of the entire working population of West Virginia. The average American household would stand to gain around $865 every year as a result of lower prices and higher average wages. You can find the study, which was just released, online at www.gov.uk and tinyurl.com/tbtimes-UK. But what does this mean for Florida, already one of the most pro-free trade states in the union? Florida already exports $6.1 billion worth of goods and $9.3 billion worth of services to the EU. The predictions are good. The study projects that a U.S.-EU trade deal could add as many as 47,540 jobs to the Florida job market and boost Florida's exports to Europe by 26.9 percent. Many of those export gains will be realized in aerospace, transportation and chemicals, while the largest job increases should be seen in business and financial services. I believe that's good news for the Tampa Bay area and Florida as a whole. Tampa is already home to major British companies such as BAE Systems, British Airways World Cargo and the medical device company of Smith and Nephew. The strategic investments you are making in ports, infrastructure, workforce and research at quality universities such as the University of South Florida, aligned with this trade deal, will continue to make Tampa Bay an attractive and competitive place to invest in and do business with. Beyond the economics, the study also represents a key strategic opportunity for the United States and the EU. As a diplomat who has spent one-third of his career living in the United States, I believe that an ambitious game-changing agreement has the potential to send a powerful message to the rest of the world regarding the trans-Atlantic commitment to global rules and standards in international trade. These numbers show that free trade is not just an idea. It has real benefits, both for business and for hard-working people. And that's why Floridians, and all Americans, should be excited about this deal.

#### That’s key to effective space missions

Kinsey 12- Troy, Report for WCTV News Agency (“Florida's Space Industry Struggles to Survive” http://www.wctv.tv/news/headlines/Floridas\_Space\_Industry\_Struggles\_to\_Survive\_149179995.html\\CLans)

For 50 years, it's been a critical part of Florida's economy. But now our space industry is struggling to survive. The retirement of the shuttle program has left thousands of workers jobless. And, it's also called into question whether Florida's days as America's pre-eminent space state are over. After 30 years and more than 130 missions, the space shuttle program has disappeared into history. And now the talent, technology and patriotism that helped drive it may be in jeopardy of disappearing, too. Tim pickens works at dynetics, a NASA contractor in Huntsville, Alabama. He's committed to reviving Florida's space industry, not least because his company depends on it. Now that manned missions launching from Cape Canaveral are no more...He says it'll be up to a handful of private space flight companies to help inspire a national movement. "People are going to say, 'NASA, what's the vision? Where are we going?' and then, they need to be looking at air breathing technology, you know, hypersonics, and you know, 'how do i get my ride from New York to LA In 15 minutes?' Pickens says only the government can pioneer that kind of technology, and if enough people ask for it, Washington will pay for it. But, there's no guarantee manned launches will return to Florida. That's why Farrukh Alvi spearheads a research hub aimed at using space technology in other ways. "I suspect that Florida will not be the only one that's going to be launching things - Texas, New Mexico and others. But, you need to have a more diverse economy, so even if it's very successful, you do not want to just invest in there - you need to diversify." Areas like green energy and biotech - they could be a big part of america's economic future. And, in the end, blasting off from Texas and New Mexico may not be possible...Because of Florida.

#### Extinction is inevitable – laundry list – deep-space exploration key to solve

**Poston, 12**\*Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Michigan, leader of the Space Fission Power Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)\*

[David Poston, . 16 continuous years of experience in the field of space nuclear power and is currently the nuclear design lead for all LANL space reactor projects. Dr. Poston received a BS in Mechanical Engineering the University of Michigan, an MS in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University, an MS in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California at Berkeley, and a“Space Nuclear Power: Fission Reactors”, <http://spacenuke.blogspot.com/2012/02/space-fission-power-post-1-we-need-to.html>’]

Viability and Preservation.¶The all-or-nothing benefit of space exploration is the long-term survivalof the human race; although the extended timeframe of this benefit makes it very hard to quantify.We know that our life on Earth is finite, but the preservation benefit of sustained civilization outside of the Earth could range from enormous to miniscule depending on whether viability of human life on Earth ends in <1 thousand years or >1 billion years. There is a long list of potential calamities that could end human civilization, including asteroid/comet, super-virus, excess volcanism, socioeconomic collapse,environmental changes, weapons of mass destruction, ormaybe something we’ve never envisioned. Some of these initiating events can be mitigated or prevented as a result ofspace exploration; most notablythe ability to deflect or destroy a potential extinction causing asteroid or comet. The ability to deflect an asteroid could actually be developed within a decadeusing existing technology, the question is would we have enough warning time to successfully develop and deploy it. Space exploration could also uncover currentlyunknown threats, such as looming changes in the behavior of the sun, or maybe astronomical threats such as nearby black holes,supernovae, darkmatter, orsomething our current understanding of physics is not aware of.¶The ultimate defense against human extinctionwould be to establish permanent, self-sustaining colonies of humans beyond the Earth. The path to this type of existence does not require a huge leap in science and technology; most engineers agree that abundant, reliable energy (probably nuclear) isthe key to expanding into space. In the near term (decades) exploration could focus on where and how to develop sustainable communities away from the earth, includingquasi-sustainable outposts on the moon and Mars. In the mid-term (centuries) sustainable outposts could be created on Mars, Titan, asteroids, etc. that could beconsidered planetary lifeboats, as a safeguard against major calamities that could end human civilization. In the long term (millennia), the concept of the “planetary lifeboat” could transform to a “celestial Mayflower”, taking us to new worlds outside of our solar system. The benefits of this scenario are not limited to merely saving the human race.Even if humanity continues to thrive on Earth, there would be the possibility for a nearly unlimited number of humans to experience existence (in addition to the increased population that Earth could support by importing resources) and expand the extent of human condition (e.g. well-being, knowledge, and enlightenment). If new opportunities and experiences emerge, people will migrate to them, just as they did to the New World ~500 years ago.¶

## Politics

### \*\*\*\* READ THIS CARD IN THE 2AC

No aging crisis and no impact anyway

Teixeira 13 RUY TEIXEIRA, staff writer, The New Republic, February 8, 2013, " Do low fertility rates spell economic collapse?", http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112356/jonathan-lasts-what-expect-reviewed-ruy-texiera#

Forget the debt ceiling. Forget the fiscal cliff,” wrote Jonathan Last, “The root cause of most of our problems is our declining fertility rate.” This view, as recently expressed in The Wall Street Journal and at greater length in Last’s new book, What to Expect When No One’s Expecting, holds that a decline in fertility rates (the average number of children born per woman) means nothing less than the end of civilization as we know it. According to Last, fertility decline will inevitably lead to population shrinkage, which in turn will inevitably doom us to economic stagnation and social breakdown. In fact, he says, ongoing fertility decline has already saddled us with slow economic growth since the 1970s. If Last’s claims sound hysterical and overwrought, that is because they are. Let’s start with his dire predictions about population shrinkage. It is true that fertility is lower now, at 1.93 children per women, than the standard replacement rate of 2.1. But it’s also higher than it was in the mid-’70s, when it bottomed out at 1.74. Indeed, the fertility rate has mostly risen since that period, with the exception of several years in the mid-’90s and the years of the Great Recession. And population has not gone down—it is up over 50 percent since 1970. The Census Bureau does project that the fertility rate will diminish, but only by a modest .09 over the next 50 years. And while the fertility rate is likely to remain below the replacement rate for the next 50 years, the Census Bureau expects us to add another 100 million people by 2060 due to immigration and “demographic momentum.” (Despite sub-replacement fertility rates, a relatively large proportion of the population will be in prime reproductive years for decades to come.) So much for population collapse. Last is similarly off base in his projections for the rest of the world. He sees global population decline and then, of course, certain collapse—economic ruin, war, and disease, the whole Mad Max bit. The U.N. Population Division begs to differ. According to their 2010 projections, the countries with the lowest fertility rates today—typically, more developed countries—should see fertility rates rise somewhat over the century and converge with rates in less developed countries. World population should rise from about 7 billion today to 9.3 billion in the middle of the century and 10.1 billion by end of the century. This includes a slight rise, not decline, in the population of more developed countries. Last is not unaware of these projections but he dismisses them out of hand. Why? Because, well, they sound like “guesswork” and “wishful thinking” to him. Not that he has own projections of course—he’s just sure the official ones are wrong. So who are we to believe then? The Census Bureau, the U.N. Population Division and the consensus of professional demographers or Jonathan Last? Not a tough call, in my opinion. If Last’s claims about the impending population crash are fanciful, his claim that fertility decline will lead to economic collapse is completely ridiculous. Economic projections that incorporate the Census population projections show per capita income rising by 61 percent over the next thirty years. It is certainly possible the average American many not see their fair share of this rise in income, but that’s not a fertility problem, it’s an inequality problem.

#### CIR is DOA – Shutdown Drained His PC and Increased Congressional Partisanship

By Amie Parnes 10/18/13 05:30 AM ET Obama’s hollow debt victory http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/329219-obamas-hollow-debt-victory#ixzz2i5oBnwAU

President Obama’s victory over congressional Republicans is likely to have a short shelf life.¶ Even the president’s staunchest allies are skeptical that his triumph in the debt-ceiling battle has produced much capital for the White House to spend on priorities like immigration reform. ¶ “I don’t know that this changes anything,” one former senior administration official said. “I don’t think the president has new mojo from this.”¶ “What did they really do? They brought the country to the same place where we were a few weeks ago,” the former official said. “This isn’t like he passed healthcare. He ended a government shutdown and raised the debt limit. Those are routine items. It’s not like he campaigned on it.”¶ Obama took his second victory lap in two days Thursday on the heels of the bipartisan deal, chiding congressional Republicans for engaging in political brinksmanship with the economy on the day the government reopened after a 16-day shutdown.¶ He also blamed the GOP — as he has in recent days — for bringing the nation dangerously close to defaulting on the debt limit. ¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president, then argue for your position,” Obama said in the State Dining Room at the White House. “Go out there and win an election.”¶ “Push to change it,” the president said. “But don’t break it.”¶ While he rallied White House allies with the sentiment, he also angered Republicans, who felt it was a sucker punch.¶ “The president’s admonishment ignores his own shortcomings,” said one senior Republican adviser working on Capitol Hill. “The fact is, he shares equal blame for the shutdown. It’s not as if the stalemate was created overnight. The shutdown is fallout from Obama’s lack of outreach and his ineffective approach to being a leader.”¶ The GOP adviser — who acknowledged defeat in the fight — said Obama’s admonition was “entirely void of the substance of the debate and designed to demonize legitimate opposition.¶ “[It] totally ignored was the president’s own past opposition to raising the debt ceiling and the months leading to this episode when the White House could have been working with Congress to avoid such a crisis,” the adviser said.¶ Republican strategist Ron Bonjean said he didn’t expect relations between Obama and Republicans to improve.¶ “No one has political capital at this point to really accomplish major legislative initiatives by the end of this year,” Bonjean said. “It’s highly unlikely that any comprehensive immigration reform bill would be able to move through the House after such a bruising fight over the shutdown and the debt ceiling.”

### 2ac – cybersecurity add-on

#### Plan is key to cyber security cooperation and upgrades

Ukraine General Newswire, 13 – (8-31, “U.S., Baltic states reaffirm commitment to Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership talks” nexis)djm

The U.S., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening their relations by jointly expanding trade ties "in pursuit of economic prosperity, enhancing strategic cooperation to address global security challenges, and advancing democracy and humyn rights around the world." "Recognizing the benefits and risks of our increasing dependence on information technology and cyberspace, we will strengthen our engagement on cyber issues regionally and globally. We will seek to advance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure in the region through public/private cooperation," it says. "We will continue to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes. We will strive to advance our shared vision of internet freedom by engaging with other countries, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. Our efforts support a common goal: an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet that protects privacy and civil liberties, enables the free flow of information and ideas, and promotes the innovation essential to modern economies," the statement says.

#### Retaliation to cyber-attack escalates to global nuclear war

Lawson 9 (Sean - assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict, , 5/13/2009, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477 )

At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “cross-domain responses” to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that “The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision maker’s ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolveÃ¢â‚¬Â¦ Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4] Ã¯Â»Â¿Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: (U) Kinetic Actions. DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace. Kinetic actions can be either offensive or defensive and used in conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects. Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.” And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense policy documents. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7]

### 2ac – no link – TTIP

#### No link – trade doesn’t face opposition

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate.

### Impact Defense

**CIR creates a backlog – impossible to solve**

David **North 10**, former Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Labor and Center for Immigration Studies Fellow, April 7, 2010, “Would Legalization Backlogs Delay Other USCIS Applications? Probably,” Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/north/legalization-backlogs

An interesting question has arisen as a result of a congressional hearing: would a massive legalization program, as many advocates want, slow the processing of applications filed routinely by citizens and legal aliens wanting immigration benefits? The numbers are daunting. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) currently faces six million applications a year according to one news story. The estimates of the number of illegal aliens in the nation runs to 11 or 12 million. Could USCIS handle both these multi-million caseloads with its current paper-based systems? There are many complaints that the backlogs are currently too long on the normal collection of six million cases a year. The government's expert on such things, Frank W. Deffer, Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology in the Department of Homeland Security, told a congressional committee on March 23: "adding 12 million more people to the system would be the **mother of all backlogs**. Clearly to us the systems **could not handle it** now."

### Farm Bill Thumper – Food Stamps

#### Obama Pushing Using PC on the Food Stamps Provision of the Farm Bill

Nedra Pickler 10/17 2013 Obama: Focus on budget, immigration, farm bill http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/2013/10/17/3778131/obama-focus-on-budget-immigration.html#storylink=cpy

Likewise, the roughly $500 billion farm bill has been held up over a dispute between the two chambers, this time over food stamps. The House has endorsed up to $4 billion in annual cuts to the almost $80 billion-a-year Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, while the Senate farm bill would cut only $400 million a year. The White House has threatened to veto the House bill.Obama did not mention the rift over food stamps but said the House should accept the Senate version of the bill. "Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done," Obama said.

### Hirsch

#### Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key to their DA- more likely winners win

Michael Hirsch, 13 chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to [2012 Decoded](http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/contributors/michael-hirsh). Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

### AFF – Pc no work (general)

#### Ideological interests outweigh political capital

Drezner, 13 – is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a senior editor at The National Interest (Daniel, 10-2, “American Politics 101, R.I.P.”http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/02/american\_politics\_101\_rip)djm

The U.S. federal government continues to stay shut down, and analysts are beginning to realize that the current crisis will soon ensnare the debt-ceiling vote that must take place by Oct. 17. This is prompting a geyser of political analysis to explain why a legislature with a 10 percent approval rating has reached a position where the outcome is a gambit opposed by an overwhelming majority of Americans. As a political scientist, I'd humbly suggest that that standard Political Science 101 models are now pretty much bunk. The bread and butter of American politics is pluralism. Members of Congress want to get elected and re-elected. The way they do that is by pleasing their constituents. Traditionally, the way they did that was by pursuing a mix of policies that pleased the kind of organized, concentrated interests that bothered to go and vote. These policies usually included a slice of pork-barrel politics designed to target groups with a material stake in their representatives, and some symbolic politics designed to target groups with an ideological stake in their representatives. The funny thing is that this time around, the material interests on the GOP side appear to have zero influence over their party, as the Washington Post's Zachary Goldfarb reports: The decision to shut down the government because Democrats would not make major changes to President Obama’s health-care law underscored the fading influence of traditional business interests in the Republican Party — and the rising influence of more confrontational and conservative tea party groups that encouraged Republicans to embrace the shutdown strategy. “While I don’t think the Affordable Care Act is in the best interest of the country, I also don’t think it is in the best interest of the country to shut the government down,” said Harold L. Jackson, executive chairman of Buffalo Supply, a Colorado medical equipment company.… The experience of the Chamber of Commerce, one of Washington’s most powerful lobbying groups, may best illustrate the new tensions between Republicans and the business community. The chamber spent more than $60 million in 2010 and 2012, helping elect tea party Republicans and winning GOP control of the House. But while there have been signs of fraying in the relationship for several years, the GOP’s willingness to defy its strongest business supporters became clearest Tuesday with the shutdown. The Chamber had led more than a hundred business groups in urging Congress to keep the government open. “With the U.S. economy continuing to underperform, the federal government needs to maintain its normal operations,” a Chamber-sponsored letter said Monday, hours before the shutdown. “It is not in the best interest of the employers, employees or the American people to risk a government shutdown that will be economically disruptive and create even more uncertainties for the U.S. economy.” A Chamber spokeswoman played down the differences between Republicans and the trade group, saying businesses don’t back candidates based on a single issue. But other conservative groups were happy to highlight the new wedge dividing the Chamber and the GOP. So it would seem that groups like the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable have waning influence over GOP House members. In part, however, this also reflects the fact that those GOP House members have less that they can offer these interest groups. In an interview with Ezra Klein, National Review's outstanding congressional reporter Robert Costa explained a key dynamic within the House GOP caucus: What we're seeing is the collapse of institutional Republican power. It’s not so much about Boehner. It’s things like the end of earmarks. They move away from Tom DeLay and they think they're improving the House, but now they have nothing to offer their members. The outside groups don't always move votes directly but they create an atmosphere of fear among the members. And so many of these members now live in the conservative world of talk radio and tea party conventions and Fox News invitations. And so the conservative strategy of the moment, no matter how unrealistic it might be, catches fire. The members begin to believe they can achieve things in divided government that most objective observers would believe is impossible. Leaders are dealing with these expectations that wouldn't exist in a normal environment. Mark Schmitt makes a similar point in the New Republic: [T]he modern Republican Party is not strong. It’s something more like a loose association of independent forces, including Tea Party–backed members, those with their own sources of campaign money from ideological backers, many with seats so safe that they can happily ignore all their non-conservative constituents, and outside agents like Heritage Foundation President Jim DeMint, who BusinessWeek recently described as the de facto Speaker of the House. Many of its politicians have deliberately cut themselves off from all the incentives that traditionally moderate and stabilize politics—earmarks, constituent service (many offices say they won’t help constituents maneuver the ACA), and infrastructure spending. With safe seats, and hearing little dissent at home, they are able to do so. Cutting themselves off from the incentive to build and maintain a strong and viable party is part of the same story. What's remarkable is how quickly this transformation of the GOP has been. A decade ago, we were reading about ambitious initiatives like the "K Street Project," designed to ensure that powerful material interest groups strengthened ties with the Republican Party. Now it's the ideological interests that are ascendant -- and this poses enormous challenges to the American body politic. The thing about standard interest-group politics is that bargains could be struck. Any member of Congress or interest group that didn't like the contours of a deal could be assuaged with a tax loophole here or a public works project there. Now, taken to its extreme, this leads to an incredibly corrupt system of government. At a low level, however, this kind of corruption is the grease that allows governments to do things like pass budgets and honor its debts. Ideological interest groups are much harder to buy off, however. Their reason for existence is to push their ideas, and most of them will not accept half-measures. This leads to a situation where they benefit more from deadlock than from a bargain. Which is great for the Club for Growth … and lousy for the rest of the country. The fact that this transformation of the GOP's internal organization took place in under a decade suggests that it could also reverse course just as quickly. That said, it's becoming harder and harder to talk about what's happening in Washington as "politics as usual." Because the dynamics of American politics now look very different than they did even a decade ago.

### 2ac – Link Turn – Bipart

#### The plan is bipartisan- no backlash and different from other trade agreements

Schott and Cimino 13- Jeffrey J. is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, joined the Institute in 1983. Cathleen Cimino has been research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since 2012

To be sure, disagreements over these issues have confounded transatlantic officials for almost two decades. One of the reasons for past failures has been that negotiators tried to break down barriers in a piecemeal fashion. Attempts to achieve limited “mutual recognition” deals on specific products or sectors foundered because of strong resistance from independent regulatory agencies pressing their own agendas in response to political pressures. Trying to reach a more comprehensive deal offers the oportunity to garner sufficient political support to off set those political obstacles. Indeed, Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, emphasized this point in a recent Financial Times op-ed, noting that “any bilateral trade and investment agreement must be comprehensive and address the full range of barriers to US goods and services if it is to receive broad, bipartisan congressional support.” 4 One way to avoid past mistakes and indeed to overcome the understandable skepticism of many would be for the two sides to learn from the success of several recent comprehensive bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)—most notably the accords that the European Union and the United States each have with South Korea. These two agreements successfully liberalized trade and investment in goods and services in a manner that shows a path to success for the TTIP, which as we discuss below, is essentially what the HLWG has recommended. If the United States and the European Union follow this path, they could achieve a transatlantic accord in the next few years that both contributes to stronger economic growth and establishes a 21st century rulebook for trade that can provide a benchmark for new regional and multilateral trade agreements.