## 1ac

Same 1ac as before

## 2ac

### Heg Sustainable

#### Heg is sustainable and high — their authors misunderstand geopolitics — no challengers.

Kagan 12 [Robert, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe Brookings, “New Year, Old Foreign Policy Problems,” <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0105_international_relations_kagan>]

Meanwhile, the much-discussed “rise of the rest” has been overhyped. U.S. business leaders, and their pals in the punditocracy, have been mesmerized by these emerging markets. But emerging markets do not equate to emerging great powers. Russia is no longer “rising.” Brazil’s role in the world is underwhelming. Turkey’s impact has yet to be demonstrated. India has not decided what it wants to be. Even China, though unquestionably a major player, has not yet taken on a great power’s role. For the United States, Europe remains the key ally in shoring up the norms and principles of a liberal world order. Should Europe fall, the blow to U.S. interests would be staggering. America matters: Reports of U.S. decline are extraordinarily premature. The country remains the central player in all regions of the world. Washington may not be able to have its way on all issues or provide solutions for all the world’s problems. But, then, it never could. Many today have nostalgia for an era of U.S. predominance that never existed. But in the coming months, whether the issue is Iran, Syria or Asian security, regional players will continue to look to the United States. No other nation or group of nations comes close to enjoying America’s global web of alliances. None wields more political influence in international forums. And unless and until the United States renders itself weak by unnecessary defense budget cuts, there will be no substitute for it as a provider of security and defender of an open political and economic order. Perhaps 2012 will be the year Americans gain a renewed understanding of that enduring reality.

The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation—Effective decision making and TESTING of their ethic requires you to evaluate their material manifestation—The alternative is voting for an FYI without a mechanism to resolve their link arguments

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

**And we’re key to decision-making – talking about big impacts and making tough decisions on a big scale tests cost-benefit in its most extreme forms and makes it easier for us to make smaller decisions in our lives**

**Debating about war powers is important – makes checks on excessive presidential authority effect – college students are key**

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

### 2AC Security K

The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

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**Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K**

Tara **McCormack 10**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### No impact – security is self-reflective and speech act of debate leads to reflexivity

**Roe, 12** (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

For the Copenhagen School, securitization represents a panic politics: we must do something now, as our very survival is at stake. In such a scenario, it is hardly surprising that Aradau and Huysmans both see the possibilities for debate and deliberation as being minimal: normal procedures must be circumvented, otherwise it might all be too late. The speed of decisionmaking and the accompanying silence on the part of those outside the relevant elite are made all the more salient by the so-called internalist (Stritzel, 2007) or philosophical (Balzacq, 2011) view of securitization, whereby the security speech act possesses its own performative power. The internalist reading is characteristic of Wæver’s (1995) earlier work on securitization and accords with the notion of performativity. Performativity corresponds to John L. Austin’s illocutionary act. Here, uttering security is more than just describing something: it is performing an action that creates new realities (Balzacq, 2005: 177, 2011: 20; Stritzel, 2007: 361). The security speech act thus has the power to enable emergency measures and to (re)order sociopolitical relations (friend/enemy, us/them). In other words, security is a self-referential practice. The internalist reading of securitization closely resembles the Schmittian conception of the political inasmuch as both are decisionist: the securitizing actor, like Schmitt’s sovereign, defines what is exceptional. The silence that arguably marks the internalist reading therefore reflects the lack of oversight to which the securitizing actor is subject, while, with regard to speed, there is a distinct sense of automaticity in the moment when a political issue is rapidly transformed into a matter of security by virtue of its very utterance as such. This is problematized, however, by the so-called externalist (Stritzel, 2007) or sociological (Balzacq, 2011**) view, which emphasizes instead the intersubjectivity of the securitization process.** With the externalist reading, the authority to speak and the power of the speech act itself are subject to the context in which security is uttered. Most importantly, **the framing of something as a security issue is not the sole preserve of the securitizing actor but must also be accepted by a relevant audience**. As Buzan et al. (1998: 25) make clear, presenting something as an existential threat is merely a ‘securitizing move’, as ‘the issue is [successfully] **securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such’**. Accordingly, with its emphasis on the intersubjective establishment of threat, **the externalist rendering of securitization makes problematic Wæver’s earlier assertion of security as a self-referential practice**. And this conceptual tension is reflected in the specific debate over the nature of the speech act itself. For both Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel, Wæver/the Copenhagen School thus present securitization as both an illocutionary act and a perlocutionary act – that is, they discuss what is done in saying security, as well as what is done by saying security. Perlocutionary acts are external to the performative aspect of the speech act and thereby correspond not to the utterance itself but to its effects: did the securitizing actor manage to convince the relevant audience. Balzacq (2005: 177–8) sums up the situation thus: either we argue that securitization is a self-referential practice, in which case we forsake perlocution with the related acquiescence of the audience … or we hold fast to the creed that using the conception of security also produces a perlocutionary effect, in which case we abandon self-referentiality. He goes on: I suspect instead that the CS [Copenhagen School] leans towards the first option…. [A]lthough the CS appeals to an audience, its framework ignores the audience, which suggests that the CS opts for an illocutionary view of security yielding a ‘magical efficiency’ rather than a fully-fledged model encompassing perlocution as well (Balzacq, 2005: 177–8).9 It is indeed the case that the Copenhagen School has underconceptualized the role of the audience.10 This is something of which Wæver (2003) himself is well aware. But, it is debatable whether the Copenhagen School favours an internalist reading of the securitization concept. Although Wæver is keen to stress the importance of the ‘moment’ of the speech act, and thus retain its illocutionary force, he nevertheless also leans towards the importance of the relationship between securitizing actor and audience. Wæver warns of viewing securitization as a ‘unilateral performance’ – that undertaken only by the sovereign – and thus its equivalence to a ‘Schmittian anti-democratic decisionism’. Rather: We [members of the Copenhagen School] preserve the event-ness of the speech act and the performative moment, but locate it in-between the actors…. This might look like perlocution because it includes something after the speaker’s first action, but if the speech act is viewed as a larger whole including audience, it is more appropriate to see securitization as what is done in the (collective) act, rather than dissolving the move into one component of a larger complex social explanation of processes (Wæver, 2007: 4). The important point here is how the security speech act moves away from a Schmittian to an Arendtian conception of politics, ‘because the theory places power in-between humans … and insists on securityness being a quality not of threats but of their handling, that is, the theory places power not with “things” external to a community but internal to it’ (Wæver, 2011: 468). For Wæver, securitization thus **takes place in a context where there is space for open politics**: actors and audiences together agree as to what constitutes security and what does not. This is not to say that agreement is necessarily reached on an equal basis, as actors often possess, and indeed employ, the resources to cajole and bully audiences into acquiescing to their depiction of events. But, it is to say that some kind of agreement is nevertheless required. Indeed, the potential for securitization to avoid its Schmittian connotations in this way is also recognized by Williams. For Williams, the importance of the audience relates to a ‘discursive ethics’ that goes against the decisionist account of securitization. **The security speech act entails the possibility of dialogue and thereby also the potential for the transformation of security** (Williams, 2003: 522–3). And although Williams (2003: 524) seems somewhat sceptical as to the extent to which securitizations are subject to such ‘discursive legitimation’ – also noting how security issues often ‘operate in the realm of secrecy, of “national security”, of decision’ – he nonetheless makes clear the potential for securitizations to be ‘pulled back’ into the public realm, ‘particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat, or both’.

**If we win one non-unique it complicates alternative solvency**

Stein 13 – Professor of Political Science and IR @ U of Toronto

Jance, “THREAT PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,” The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2 nd ed. Edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy

Bayesian models of rational processing assume the updating of prior beliefs in response to new information, but evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that these processes are more conservative than rational models suggests, weighed down by prior beliefs and initial estimates. The implications for threat perception are considerable; once an estimate of threat is generated, it anchors subsequent rates of revision so that revision is slower and less responsive to diagnostic information. Threat perceptions consequently become embedded and resistant to change.

**Our system doesn’t cause war – empirically, transition to the alternative does**

**Yoon 03** – Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea (Young-Kwan, “Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8)

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to

**Total rejection of security leaves us defenseless to those who still endorse security – that causes war**

**Doran 99,** (Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC,Charles, “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange” Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 139—52)

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per Se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of wars perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz’s most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.

**Threats are real and our disaster discourse mobilizes people to deal with them**

**Kurasawa 04**

(Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight <http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf>)

In addition**,** farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalismand religious fundamentalismthat had mostly been kept in check or bottled up duringthe Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary(or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopiannovels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their ownnightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action**,** spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### Fear over extinction is a rational fear that incites action – prevents inevitable catastrophe and solves paralysis

Wink, Professor Emeritus of Biblical Interpretation at Auburn Theological Seminary, ‘1 (Walter, October 17, “Apocalypse Now?” Christian Century, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_28_118/ai_79514992>)

Positive apocalyptic, by contrast, calls on our every power to avert what seems inevitable. "Nothing can save us that is possible," the poet W. H. Auden intoned over the madness of the nuclear crisis; "we who must die demand a miracle." And the miracle we got came about because people like the physician Helen Caldicott refused to accept nuclear annihilation. But she did it by forcing her hearers to visualize the consequences of their inaction. Imagination, says Anders, is the sole organ capable of conveying a truth so overwhelming that we cannot take it in. Hence the bizarre imagery that always accompanies apocalyptic. Optimists want to believe that reason will save us. They want to prevent us from becoming really afraid. The anti-apocalyptist, on the contrary, insists that it is our capacity to fear which is too small and which does not correspond to the magnitude of the present danger. Therefore, says Anders, the anti-apocalyptist attempts to increase our capacity to fear. "Don't fear fear, have the courage to be frightened, and to frighten others too. Frighten thy neighbor as thyself." This is no ordinary fear, however; it is a fearless fear, since it dares at last to face the real magnitude of the danger. And it is a loving fear, since it embraces fear in order to save the generations to come. That is why everything the anti-apocalyptist says is said in order not to become true.If we do not stubbornly keep in mind how probable the disaster is and if we do not act accordingly, we will not be able to prevent the warnings from becoming true. There is nothing more frightening than to be right. And if some amongst you, paralyzed by the gloomy likelihood of the catastrophe, should already have lost their courage, they, too, still have the chance to prove their love of man by heeding the cynical maxim: "Let's go on working as though we had the right to hope. Our despair is none of our business."

#### Anti-nuclear rhetoric is key to convincing leaders to change their opinions

Babst, retired government scientist and Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's Accidental Nuclear War Studies program, Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and Aldridge, former aerospace engineer, now leads the Pacific Life Research Center, ’97 (Dean, David, and Bob, November, “The self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons: a dangerous and costly mental block” Canadian Business and Current Affairs, Vol 29 No 97 p 11-19)

There is worldwide reluctance to think about the self-destructive consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. Though understandable, this reluctance is dangerous and costly. It prevents public discourse and political engagement by citizens of the nuclear-weapons states concerning one of the most important issues of our time. The lack of public attention in nuclear-weapons states tothe self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons has allowed humankind to place itself in danger of annihilation, and to spend some $8 trillion over the course of the nuclear age doing so. Denial of the dangers or likelihood of nuclear-weapons use has created a dangerous mental block that must be overcome. We owe it to ourselves and to our posterity to break through this mental block and directly confront the dangers of annihiliaton, including self-annihilation, inherent in reliance on nuclear arsenals. We reasoned that if the citizens in nuclear-weapons states understood that the use of a hundred or so nuclear weapons could turn the world into an unbearable place in which to live, they would take a less complacent view of maintaining nuclear arsenals. We believed that an awareness of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear arsenals would lead to a general understanding that nuclear weapons are a source of insecurity rather than security. This understanding, we reasoned, would lead to a desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. We discovered, however, that virtually nothing was being published on the subject of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The fact that an issue as important as this one was not even being discussed in the mass media alerted us to the existence of widespread public denial regarding this issue. We also realized that the issue of nuclear arsenals and their use was not even entering into public debate during elections in the nuclear-weapons states. As we looked into this situation further, we found many other indications of public denial of the suicidal dangers of nuclear arsenals. We have listed some of these indications below.

#### Neoliberalism isn’t the root cause of violence

**Roberts and Sparke 03** (Susan, Professor of Geography – University of Kentucky, and Matthew, Professor of Geography – University of Washington, “Neoliberal Geopolitics,” Antipode, 35(5), p. 886-897)

Barnett’s work is our main example in this paper of a more widespread form of neoliberal geopolitics implicated in the war-making. This geopolitical world vision, we argue, is closely connected to neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration. Yet, linked as it was to an extreme form of American unilateralism, we further want to highlight how the neoliberal geopolitics of the war planners illustrated the contradictory dependency of multilateral neoliberal deregulation on enforced re-regulation and, in particular, on the deadly and far from multilateral re-regulation represented by the “regime change” that has now been enforced on Iraq. Such re-regulation underlines the intellectual importance of studying how neoliberal marketization dynamics are hybridized and supplemented by various extra-economic forces.2 Rather than making neoliberalism into a **totalizing economic master narrative**, we therefore suggest that it is vital to examine its inter-articulation with certain dangerous supplements, including, not least of all, the violence of American military force. We are not arguing that the war is completely explainable in terms of neoliberalism, nor that neoliberalism is reducible to American imperialism. Instead, the point is to explore how a certain globalist and economistic view of the world, one associated with neoliberalism, did service in legitimating the war while simultaneously finessing America’s all too obvious departure from the “end of the nation-state” storyline. [Continues] As we said at the start, we do not want to claim too much for neoliberalism. It cannot explain everything, least of all the diverse brutalities of what happened in Iraq. Moreover, in connecting neoliberal norms to the vagaries of geopolitics, we risk **corrupting the analytical purchase of neoliberalism** on more clearly socioeconomic developments. By the same token, we also risk obscuring the emergence of certain nonmilitarist geoeconomic visions of global and local space that have gone hand in hand with neoliberal globalization (see Sparke 1998, 2002; Sparke and Lawson 2003). But insofar as the specific vision of neoliberal geopolitics brought many neoliberals to support the war (including, perhaps, Britain’s Tony Blair as well as Americans such as Friedman), insofar as it helped thereby also to facilitate the planning and overarching coordination of the violence, and insofar as the war showed how the extension of neoliberal practices on a global scale has come to depend on violent interventions by the US, it seems vital to reflect on the inter-articulations.

**The aff isn’t forecasting, it’s risk management---the inherent unpredictability of social events is all the more reason for creating optimal resiliency through scenario planning**

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Risk Management Rather than Forecast-and-Plan

**The answer is to change the question**, to **focus on risk management**, **as Gardner and Tetlock suggest**. **There is a set of events that could happen tomorrow**—Chicago could have an earthquake, there could be a run on Greek debt, the Administration could decide “Heavens, Dodd–Frank and Obamacare were huge mistakes, let’s fix them” (Okay, not the last one.) **Attached to each event, there is some probability that it could happen.**

**Now “forecasting”** as Gardner and Tetlock characterize it, **is an attempt to figure out which event really will happen**, whether the coin will land on heads or tails, **and then make a plan based on that knowledge. It’s a fool’s game**.

**Once we recognize that uncertainty will always remain**, **risk management rather than forecasting is much wiser**. **Just the step of naming the events that could happen is useful**. **Then, ask yourself, “if this event happens, let’s make sure we have a contingency plan so we’re not really screwed**.” Suppose you’re counting on diesel generators to keep cooling water flowing through a reactor. What if someone forgets to fill the tank?

**The good use of “forecasting” is to get a better handle on probabilities**, so we focus our risk management resources on the most important events. But **we must still pay attention to events**, **and buy insurance against them**, **based as much on the painfulness of the event as on its probability.** (Note to economics techies: what matters is the risk-neutral probability, probability weighted by marginal utility.) **So it’s not really the forecast that’s wrong, it’s what people do with it. If we all understood the essential unpredictability of the world**, especially of rare and very costly events, if we got rid of the habit of mind that asks for a forecast and then makes “plans” as if that were the only state of the world that could occur; **if we instead focused on laying out all the bad things that could happen and made sure we had insurance or contingency plans, both personal and public policies might be a lot better**.

#### It’s possible to make accurate predictions about the world without complete knowledge -- expertise and reasoned arguments are sufficient justification for action.

**Foss 06**- Professor at the Copehagen Business School (Nicolai, "The limits to designed orders: Authority under 'distributed knowledge' conditions." Springer Science. 2006. Proquest.)

“Narrow authority” is the view of authority associated with Simon (1951). The argument that has just been summarized holds that such authority is fundamentally compromised by distributed knowledge. However, **it is not always the case that suppressing** distributed **knowledge is inefﬁcient**. For example, Hammond and Miller (1985: 1) argue that “. . .knowledge about any particular problem is seldom complete, and in a competitive or changing environmentthere may be advantages to making some decision, however imperfectly grounded on expertise, rather than none at all . . . In the absence of expert knowledge some chief executive is given authority to impose his own best judgment on the matter.” It is not entirely transparent what Hammond and Miller mean here, but a later treatment by Bolton and Farrell (1990) provides a clue. Bolton and Farrell wish to identify the determinants of centralization/ decentralization decisions. In order to isolate the costs and beneﬁts of centralized and decentralized decision-making in a speciﬁc setting, they study a coordination problem with private information in the setting of a natural monopoly market. The coordination problem concerns which ﬁrm should enter the market when costs are sunk and are private information. Under decentralization, which is represented as a Springer268 K. Foss, N. J. Foss two-period incomplete information game of timing (sink costs/enter or wait another period), each ﬁrm is uncertain about whether the other ﬁrm will enter. However, the incentive to enter depends on the height of a given ﬁrm’s cost, low-cost ﬁrms being less worried that their rival will enter (and vice versa). If costs are sufﬁciently dispersed, the optimal outcome prevails, that is, the lowest-cost producer enters and preempts the rival(s). However, if costs are equal or are high for both, inefﬁciencies may obtain, since ﬁrms will then enter simultaneously (inefﬁcient duplication) or will wait (inefﬁcient delay). Enter a central authority whose job is to nominate a ﬁrm for entry. In the spirit of Hayek, Bolton and Farrell assume that this central authority cannot possess knowledge about costs. In their model, s/he nominates the high cost producer half of the times, which is clearly inefﬁcient. However, this cost of centralization should be compared against the costs of decentralization (delay and duplication). Bolton and Farrell show that “. . . the less important the private information that the planner lacks and the more essential coordination is, the more attractive the central planning solution is” (1990: 805). Moreover, the decentralized solution performs poorly if urgency is important. Centralization is assumed to not involve delay and therefore is a good mechanism for dealing with emergencies, a conclusion they argue is consistent with the observed tendency of ﬁrms to rely on centralized authority in cases of emergencies. While Austrians may argue that the Bolton and Farrell set-up trivializes distributed knowledge, and exaggerates the beneﬁts of centralization (e.g., it is assumed to not involve delays), their model does provide a rationale for authority under distributed knowledge (given their assumptions), that is, it explains why authority may be preferred rather than some decentralized arrangement. Even the narrow understanding of authority in Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) may be rendered consistent with distributed knowledge using the Bolton and Farrell argument: Although the employer may be ignorant of the efﬁcient action, and perhaps of most of the employee action, he knows a subset of the employee’s action set, so he can always tell him to “do something!”, which in certain situations may be preferable to doing nothing. The example suggests the more general implication that some overlap of knowledge may be sufﬁcient to make coordination by means of authority work in the presence of distributed knowledge.

#### Positivist epistemology is best – we can objectively analyze and describe truths about the state of the world, this solves their kritik

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The idea of building knowledge—that humans can observe and think about the world in such a way that they learn things that they did not know before and are able to understand and explain processes—is at the center of all inquiry. This natural tendency has gone hand in hand with those who have questioned whether what we think we know is actually true and who have demanded that we defend the rules by which we believe knowledge is acquired. Despite this epistemological skepticism the quest goes on and on, even though those who want to display their sophistication may put key concepts, like "reality" or "cause" or "truth" in quotes or use intellectual euphemisms, like "utility" or "adequacy." Today, within international relations (IR) inquiry, the debate over knowledge—its possibility, its nature, even its desirability—is informed by much of the postmodern and postpositivist movements within the social sciences and the humanities (see Foucault 1972, 1980; Vasquez 1995; Hellmann 2003). Constructivism has emerged as an alternative intellectual pillar of mainstream international relations theory to take its place alongside its competitors—realism and liberalism—to claim its role as a productive approach to inquiry. Although, like realism and liberalism, constructivism is better seen as a paradigm that encompasses a number of specific theoretical formulations, it nonetheless has a core set of assumptions and theoretical perspectives that shape its approach and provide guidance to its practitioners. Among the most central in terms of its epistemological assumptions is the idea that "reality" is constructed by concepts, ideas, and knowledge and not the other way around, namely, that the observation or study of "reality" gives rise to knowledge. Within constructivism this assumption is then used to push inquiry into new directions (see, for example, Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996; and earlier, Berger and Luckman 1966). Realism and liberalism, despite their differences, have maintained the more positivist assumption that the empirical world can be analytically separated from the ideas and concepts we use to observe and study it, so that the former can be used to test the adequacy (indeed accuracy) of the latter. With the proper tools and appropriate criteria and methods—in particular the use of science (although traditionalists and quantitative scholars differ sharply on the meaning and limits of the scientific approach)—knowledge is not only possible but can accumulate in ways anticipated and promised by the Enlightenment—a project that postmodernists, of course, reject out of hand (Foucault 1980). For the most part, postmodernist alternatives have been more influenced by philosophy and the humanities, in general, than mainstream social sciences. Nevertheless, to the extent that constructivism has been primarily an epistemic stance, it is not surprising that attempts have been made to reformulate positivist IR

#### Good fear of death is distinct from irrational fear – it allows us to reduce danger, live ethically, and prepare for a peaceful death on our own terms

Gyatso, badass Tibetan monk, BFF with the Dalai Lama, master of “real” meditation, internationally renowned Gelug scholar, future Kairos retreat leader, and teacher at the FPMT center Manjushri Institute in England, ’3 (Geshe Kelsang, “Fear of Death”, Tharpa Publications, www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm)

Generally, our fear of death is an unhealthy and unrealistic fear-we don't want to die, so we ignore the subject, deny it, or get morbidly obsessed by it and think that life is meaningless. However, right now we cannot do anything about dying, so there is no point fearing death itself. What kind of fear is useful? A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through Tantric spiritual practice, we can even attain a deathless body.

#### Rational fear is good – prevents nuclear war

Greenspan, Pioneer in the Area of Women’s Psychology, ‘3 (Miriam, “An Excerpt from Healing through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair by Miriam Greenspan,” www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp\_5513.html)

While it would be comforting to think that all phobias and fears are irrational, obviously this is not the case. The threats to survival in our era are numerous. Global warming, environmental pollution, nuclear and biochemical disasters, and terrorism are not individual but global threats. Butthis doesn’t mean they don’t affect us as individuals! In relation to these threats, it has become almost impossible to experience fear in the old individualized way that we once did when being chased by a wild boar. Our fears are rational, largely transpersonal, and overwhelming. They are also largely denied. In this unprecedented world context, fear is continually triggered and benumbed. Isolated in our own skins, without a community in which our fears can be shared, validated, and addressed, the authentic experience of fear in our time has become almost impossible. We can’t heal what we don’t feel. The alchemy of fear is out of reach until we can learn, like Jack, how to feel our fear. When we don’t know the contours of our fear, when we can’t experience it authentically or speak about it openly, we are more likely to be afflicted with anxieties and phobias, panic, obsessive-compulsion, psychosomatic ills, and all kinds of controlling, destructive, and violent behaviors. Those of us who don’t know how to feel our way through the real fears that haunt us; or who are not threatened by the immediate, in-your-face fears that plague millions of people on earth—fears of starvation, war, homelessness, disease, pervasive violence—have replaced the alarm of authentic fear with the host of “anxiety disorders” that have become epidemic in our time.

#### **Increased trade benefits all levels of Mexican Society — increases *quality of life* and *takes away power* from the repressive government.**

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It is time to conclude that NAFTA--the North American Free Trade Agreement--is a success. It is nearly seven years since the ratification of NAFTA, nearly seven years since then-Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen argued and President Clinton decided that NAFTA should be the second major initiative of his administration. The major argument for NAFTA was that it was the best thing the United States could do to raise the chances for Mexico to become democratic and prosperous, and that the United States had both a strong interest and a neighborly duty to try to help Mexican political and economic development. By that yardstick NAFTA has been a clear success. NAFTA has helped Mexico economically. Over the past five years real GDP has grown at 5.5 percent per year. Even including the sharp shock of the 1995 peso crisis, Mexican real GDP has grown at 3.8 percent per year since the ratification of NAFTA. The urban unemployment rate that was 6 percent in 1992 and rose to 8.5 percent in 1995 is now less than 4 percent. The Mexican boom has been led by the manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications sectors. Most of all, the Mexican boom has been led by exports: next year Mexico's real exports will be more than three times as large as they were at the ratification of NAFTA, and as a share of GDP exports have grown from a little more than 10 to 17 percent. It is here--in the growing volume of exports and in the building-up of export industries--that NAFTA has made the difference. Four-fifths of Mexico's exports go to the United States. More than two-thirds of Mexico's imports come from the United States. NAFTA guarantees Mexican producers tariff- and quota-free access to the American market. Without this guarantee, a smaller number of Mexican exporters would dare try to develop the strong links with the market north of the Rio Grande that have enabled them to sell their exports. Without this guarantee, few--either in Mexico or from overseas--would have dared to invest in the manufacturing capacity that has allowed Mexico to satisfy United States demand. Without NAFTA's guarantee of tariff- and quota-free access to the American market, we would not have seen the rise in trade within industries between Mexico and the U.S. over the past half decade. Rising intra-industry trade means that Mexico and the U.S. are moving toward a greater degree of specialization and a finer division of labor in important industries like autos--where labor-intensive portions are more and more done in Mexico--and textiles--where the U.S. increasingly does high-tech spinning and weaving and Mexico increasingly does lower-tech cutting and sewing. As economists Mary Burfisher, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder put it, NAFTA has nurtured the growth of productivity through "Smithian" efficiency gains that result from "widen[ing] the exent of the market" and capturing "increasing returns to finer specialization." Without NAFTA, would Mexican domestic savings have doubled as a share of GDP since the early 1990s? Surely not. Without NAFTA, would the number of telephone lines in Mexico have doubled in the 1990s? Probably not. Moreover, Mexican exports are by no means low-tech labor- and primary product-intensive goods. More than 20 percent of all Mexican exports are capital goods. More than 70 percent of Mexican manufacturing exports are metal products. Without NAFTA, would U.S. big three auto producers have invested in the Mexican auto industry, and would Mexican exports of autos and auto parts to the U.S. have grown from $10 to $30 billion a year? Surely not. More important, NAFTA has helped Mexico politically. Strong economic growth makes political reform much, much easier: reslicing a growing pie is possible under many circumstances where reslicing a static pie is not. AIncreasing economic integration brings with it pressures for increasing political integration as well: the liquidation of the statist-corporatist PRI order, and a shift toward democratic institutions that are more like those of the industrial democracies that Mexico hopes to join (and to which mexico hopes that NAFTA will serve as a passport of admission). The result has been the first peaceful transfer of power in Mexico in more than a lifetime, with the election to the Mexican presidency of Vicente Fox Queseda. Economist Dani Rodrik describes political democracy as a powerful meta-institution for building the political and economic institutions needed for success: thus Mexico's future looks much brighter now than it did back in the late 1980s when the dominant PRI regularly stole elections and held a hammerlock on Mexico's government.

**Securitization is crucial to politicization and breaks down antagonism- their theory is wrong and their alt is worse**

**Trombetta ‘8** (Maria Julia Trombetta, (Delft University of Technology, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures) 3/19/08 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Trombetta-the\_securitization\_of\_the\_environment\_and\_the\_transformation\_of\_security.pdf

On the one hand, an approach that considers the discursive formation of security issues provides a new perspective to analyse the environmental security discourse and its transformative potential. First, it allows for an investigation of the political process behind the selection of threats, exploring why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent than others. The focus shifts from the threats to the collectivities, identities and interests that deserve to be protected and the means to be employed. Second, securitization suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant role in defining and transforming political communities, their interests and identities, since the process creates new ideas about who deserve to be protected and by whom. Finally, as Behnke points out, **securitization can open the space for a “genuinely political” constitutive and formative struggle through which political structures are contested and reestablished**.(Behnke 2000: 91) Securitization allows for the **breaking and transforming of rules** that are no longer acceptable, **including the practices associated with an antagonistic logic of security**. On the other hand, securitization is problematic because of the set of practices it is supposed to bring about. For the CopS security “carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape.”(Wæver 1995: 47) While securitizing an issue is a political choice, the practices it brings about are not. Accordingly, transforming an issue into a security issue is not always an improvement. In the case of the environment, the warning seems clear: “When considering securitizing moves such as ‘environmental security’...one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 29) The School shares the normative suggestion that “[a] society whose security is premised upon a logic of war should be re-shaped, re-ordered, simply changed.”(Aradau 2001: introduction) For the CopS this does not mean to transform the practices and logic of security, because, as it will be shown below, for the School, this is impossible. The CopS suggests avoiding the transformation of issues into security issues. It is necessary “to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on.”(Wæver 1995: 55, quoting Jahn). This transformation, for the CopS, is “desecuritization”, and the School has introduced a distinction between politicization - “meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resources allocation s”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) - and securitization - “meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) The slogan is: “less security, more politics!”(Wæver 1995: 56) Nevertheless, there are two major problems behind this suggestion. First, if securitization is normatively problematic, **desecuritization can be even more problematic**. It can lead to a **depoliticization and marginalisation of urgent and serious issues**, **while leaving unchallenged the practices associated with security**. In the case of the environment, many appeals to security are aimed at both soliciting action and transforming what counts as security and the way of providing it. Second, within the School’s framework, desecuritization cannot be possible. Securitization in fact can be inescapable, the unwanted result of discussing whether or not the environment is a security issue. As Huysmans has noticed, the performative, constitutive approach suggested by the speech act theory implies that even talking and researching about security can contribute to the securitization of an issue, even if that (and the practices associated with it) is not the desired result. “The normative dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs and so forth.”(Huysmans 2002: 43) When the understanding of security is the problematic one described by the CopS, research itself can become a danger. This captures a paradox that characterizes the debate about environmental security. As Jon Barnett has showed in The Meaning of Environmental Security (2001) the securitization of the environment can have perverse effects and several attempts to transform environmental problems into security issues have resulted in a spreading of the national security paradigm and the enemy logic, even if the intentions behind them were different. Barnett has argued that “environmental security is not about the environment, it is about security; as a concept, it is at its most meaningless and malign”(2001: 83) in this way, he seems to accept the ineluctability of the security mindset or logic evoked by securitization. However, his suggestion of promoting a “human centered” understanding of security, in which environmental security is not about (national) security but about people and their needs, within the securitization logic, cannot escape the trap he has described. Why, in fact, should the sort of his claim be different from that of similar ones? 2. The fixity of Security practices These dilemmas, however, are based on the idea that security practices are inescapable and unchangeable and the theory of securitization, as elaborated by the CopS, has contributed to suggest so. The CopS has achieved the result of making a specific, negative understanding of security – which has characterised the dominant Realist discourse within IR - appear as “natural” and unchangeable since all the attempts to transform it appear to reinforce its logic. To challenge this perverse mechanism it is necessary to unpack securitization further. First, it will be shown that securitization is not analytically accurate, the environment representing a relevant case. Second, the assumptions behind this problematic fixity will be explored. The CopS explores the specificity of the environmental sector in Security: A Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998) (Security hereafter), the theoretical book where the CopS illustrates the theory of securitization and analyses the dynamics of securitization within five relevant sectors. For each sector the School identifies the actors or objects (referent objects) that are threatened, specifies the relevant threats and the agents that promote or facilitate securitization.11[11] The environmental sector is rather different from the others and the transformative intent that is associated with the appeal to environmental security is more evident.12[12] Amongst the peculiarities of the environmental sector described by the School, three deserve a specific analysis for their implications: First, the presence of two agendas - a scientific and a political one; second, the multiplicity of actors; third, the politicization/securitization relationship. They will be analysed in turn “One of the most striking features of the environmental sector,” it is argued in Security, “is the existence of two different agendas: a scientific agenda and a political agenda.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) The scientific one refers mainly to natural science and non-governmental activities. The “scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat,”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde admit that “the extent to which scientific argument structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) Quoting Rosenau, they suggest that “the demand for scientific proof is a broader emerging characteristic in the international system.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) This 11[11] So for instance in the military sector the referent object is usually the state and the threats are mainly military ones, while in the societal sector the referent objects are collective identities “that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 22-3) 12[12] This is the case even if the School adopts a conservative strategy that appears from the choice of the referent object (or what is threatened). In the first works of the School, the referent object within the environmental sector was the biosphere: “Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” (Buzan 1991: 19) In Security the School narrows down this perspective and identifies the level of civilization (with all the contradictions that contribute to environmental problems) as the main referent object. This move favours a conservative perspective which considers the securitization of the environment as a way to preserve the status quo and the security strategies on which it is based. Despite this, the description of the environmental sector captures the specificity of the sector and reveals the tensions within the overall framework. questions the “self referentiality” of the speech act security. Are some threats more “real” than others thanks to scientific proof? Can considerations developed to characterize reflective behaviours be applied to natural systems? Even if dealing with these issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to note that the appeal to an external discourse has serious implications. First, it questions the possibility and opportunity of desecuritization. Is it possible and what does it mean to “desecuritize” an issue which is on the scientific agenda? If scientific research outlines the dangerousness of an environmental problem, how is it possible to provide security? Second, it suggests that security and the practices associated with it can vary from one sector to another and thus from one context to another. The second peculiarity of the environmental sector is the presence of many actors. This contrasts with Wæver’s suggestion that “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.”(Wæver 1995: 57) The multiplicity of actors is largely justified by the School with the relative novelty of the securitization of the environment. “The discourses, power struggles, and securitizing moves in the other sectors are reflected by and have sedimented over time in concrete types of organizations - notably states...nations (identity configurations), and the UN system,”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) however, this is not the case with the environment: “It is as yet undetermined what kinds of political structures environmental concerns will generate.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71). In this way a tension appears since the attempts to securitize the environment are described as having a transforming potential, requiring and calling for new institutions. Within the environmental sector securitization moves seem to have a transformative intent that contrasts with the conservative one, that characterizes other sectors. The third peculiarity is that **many securitizing moves result in politicization. This is problematic for the School, which argues that “transcending a security problem by politicising it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms**.”(Wæver 1995: 56) For the School, once the enemy logic has been inscribed in a context, it is very difficult to return to an open debate. Nevertheless the various politicizations of environmental issues that followed the appeal to security – those the CopS dismissed as failed securitizations - seem to reinforce the argument, suggested by Edkins, that there is a tendency to politicize issues through their securitization. (Edkins 1999: 11) **This represents another signal that securitization**, within the environmental sector, **can take a different form, and that the problematic aspects of evoking security are not so evident.** Securitization theory, for the CopS, is meant to be descriptive, however the environmental sector suggests that some of its aspects prevent it from providing an adequate instrument for analysis. To understand why this occurs, it is necessary to explore in more detail the conceptualization of security by Wæver, who has introduced securitization within the School and is the strongest opponent of any attempt to securitize the environment.

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**Collapse is worse for all their impacts---causes extinction of every other species and then humans**

**Monbiot, visiting Environmental Policy professorship at Oxford, 2009**

(George, “Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?”, 8-17, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change>)

**The** interesting **question**, and the one that probably divides us, **is** this: **to what extent should we welcome the** likely **collapse of industrial civilisation?** Or more precisely: **to what extent do we believe that** some **good may come of it?** I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that **the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous**: the **breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive**; **mass starvation; war**. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that **what is likely to come out on the other side will be** **worse than our current settlement.** Here are three observations: 1 **Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over**; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes. From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that **our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive**. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint.

#### The world isn’t perfect, but it’s structurally improving

Dash 13 Co-Founder and Managing Director at Activate, a new kind of strategy consultancy that advises companies about the opportunities at the intersection of technology and media co-founder and CEO of ThinkUp, which shows you how to be better at using your social networks, publisher, editor and owner of Dashes.com, my personal blog where I've been publishing continuously since 1999, entrepreneur, writer and geek living in New York City (Anil Dash, 4 February 2013, “THE WORLD IS GETTING BETTER. QUICKLY.,” http://dashes.com/anil/2013/02/the-world-is-getting-better-quickly.html)

The world is getting better, faster, than we could ever have imagined. For those of us who are fortunate enough to live in wealthy communities or countries, we have a common set of reference points we use to describe the world's most intractable, upsetting, unimaginable injustices. Often, we only mention these horrible realities in minimizing our own woes: "Well, that's annoying, but it's hardly as bad as children starving in Africa." Or "Yeah, this is important, but it's not like it's the cure for AIDS." Or the omnipresent description of any issue as a "First World Problem". But let's, for once, look at the actual data around developing world problems. Not our condescending, world-away displays of emotion, or our slacktivist tendencies to see a retweet as meaningful action, but the actual numbers and metrics about how progress is happening for the world's poorest people. Though metrics and measurements are always fraught and flawed, Gates' single biggest emphasis was the idea that measurable progress and metrics are necessary for any meaningful improvements to happen in the lives of the world's poor. So how are we doing? THE WORLD HAS CHANGED The results are astounding. Even if we caveat that every measurement is imprecise, that billionaire philanthropists are going to favor data that strengthens their points, and that some of the most significant problems are difficult to attach metrics to, it's inarguable that the past two decades have seen the greatest leap forward in the lives of the global poor in the history of humanity. Some highlights: Children are 1/3 less likely to die before age five than they were in 1990. The global childhood mortality rate for kids under 5 has dropped from 88 in 1000 in 1990 to 57 in 1000 in 2010. The global infant mortality rate for kids dying before age one has plunged from 61 in 1000 to 40 in 1000. Now, any child dying is of course one child too many, but this is astounding progress to have made in just twenty years. In the past 30 years, the percentage of children who receive key immunizations such as the DTP vaccine has quadrupled. The percentage of people in the world living on less than $1.25 per day has been cut in half since 1990, ahead of the schedule of the Millennium Development Goals which hoped to reach this target by 2015. The number of deaths to tuberculosis has been cut 40% in the past twenty years. The consumption of ozone-depleting substances has been cut 85% globally in the last thirty years. The percentage of urban dwellers living in slums globally has been cut from 46.2% to 32.7% in the last twenty years. And there's more progress in hunger and contraception, in sustainability and education, against AIDS and illiteracy. After reading the Gates annual letter and following up by reviewing the UN's ugly-but-data-rich Millennium Development Goals statistics site, I was surprised by how much progress has been made in the years since I've been an adult, and just how little I've heard about the big picture despite the fact that I'd like to keep informed about such things. I'm not a pollyanna — there's a lot of work to be done. But I can personally attest to the profound effect that basic improvements like clean drinking water can have in people's lives. Today, we often use the world's biggest problems as metaphors for impossibility. But the evidence shows that, actually, we're really good at solving even the most intimidating challenges in the world. What we're lacking is the ability to communicate effectively about how we make progress, so that we can galvanize even more investment of resources, time and effort to tackling the problems we have left.

#### Reject their academic interrogation-it is ahistorical and essentializes social relations. This means their alternative and framework should be rejected.

**Barnett, Open University social sciences faculty, 2005**

(Clive, “The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism”, Geoforum, 36.1, ScienceDirect)

3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistanceor contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, Journal of Social Policy 33 (2004), pp. 27–48.Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of “democracy” (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of “neoliberalism” have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of “individualized collective-action” (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of “neoliberal hegemony”: environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political actionthat does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of “neoliberalism” are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of “neoliberalism” frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of “neoliberalism” reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of “neoliberalism” invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of “neoliberalism”. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify “the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale” (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of “getting-at” ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how “hegemonic” projects of “neoliberalism” win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault’s ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the “freedom to be formed and normed”. Over time, Foucault’s own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

#### Totalizing critique of economic rationality doesn’t contextualize to the U.S.-Mexico — perm is best *method* and *policy*.

Purcell and Nevins 5 — Mark Purcell, Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Design and Planning at the University of Washington, holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of California-Los Angeles, and Joseph Nevins, Associate Professor of Geography and Chair of Earth Science and Geography at Vassar College, holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of California-Los Angeles, 2005 (“Pushing the boundary: state restructuring, state theory, and the case of U.S.–Mexico border enforcement in the 1990s,” *Political Geography*, Volume 24, Issue 2, Available Online at http://faculty.washington.edu/mpurcell/pushingboundary.pdf, Accessed 08-05-2013, p. 230)

The current analysis of the state in critical political-economic state theory is not in a position to think comprehensively about the imperatives that aﬀect the state and shape state restructuring. Given the conventions of its research practice and discourse, it will regularly miss the important role of state-citizen relations, and it will overlook in particular the non-economic aspects of those relations. We argue that this limitation is due primarily to traditional research practice, but that practice is rooted in the theoretical project of critical state theory. Because state theory is concerned theoretically to understand the role the state plays in accumulation and in legitimizing capitalist social relations, in practice it has tended to analyze the state and state change only with respect to these imperatives. But as the case of the U.S.–Mexico boundary shows, the imperatives that aﬀect the state are not limited to accumulation and the legitimacy of capitalist social relations. Clearly a complete analysis of the state must go beyond these two imperatives. We would suggest that although the theoretical project of critical state theory has led in practice to a limitation that has weakened its analysis of the state, this need not be the case. In fact, the theoretical project of critical state theory is far better served by a more inclusive research approach to the state that takes into account a greater range of imperatives that inﬂuence state restructuring. This expanded approach—one that takes seriously the importance of state-citizen relations, among other imperatives—will produce a more complete analysis of the state and state restructuring. A better understanding of the state will allow a better understanding of the role it plays in regulating capitalist society.

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#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction.

#### Their criticism of spectatorship is reactionary - it produces a false dichotomy between duped spectators and political actors, ignoring that we are all spectators and that spectatorship is a form of action

Ramos et al, 2009 (Manuel, University of London, Costica Bradatan, Texas Tech, and Fabienne Collignon, University of Glasgow, “We Are All Spectators,” review of Jacques Ranciere’s “Emancipated spectator,” Parallax, vol. 15, no. 3)

Spectatorship constitutes the new focus in Jacques Ranciere’s continuous interrogation of the ground that supports our understanding of the efficacy of the arts ‘to change something in the world we live in’ (p.29). In Le spectateur e´mancipe´1 he calls into question the recurrent production of pitiable spectators in the Western critical tradition and its contemporary mutations. The book is particularly engaging in its fierce stance against practices of intellectual paternalism in art and philosophy. Ranciere repeatedly portrays numerous authors as pathologists who presuppose that the spectacle ‘weakens the heads of the children of the people’ (p.52), or that too many images ‘soften the brains of the multitude’ (p.105). The emphasis on the pseudo-medical veneer of cultural expertise stresses that what is at stake in this book is not a mere affair of intellectual condescension but the complete incapacitation of the spectators. The five conference papers composing this volume effectively dismantle the all too often characterization of the spectator as a malade of passivity and ignorance in order to vehemently affirm that spectatorship is a capacity of all and anyone. An heir of Foucault, Ranciere builds an expeditious genealogy that associates the work of disparate authors whose common premise is the spectator’s idiocy. The resonance of this genealogy of stultification is amplified by the re-activation of Ranciere’s investigation of pedagogical relations in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1987). This pivotal book in Ranciere’s re-conceptualization of emancipation examined the practice of Joseph Jacotot, who at the beginning of the nineteenth century developed a pedagogy not aimed at the instruction of the people but their emancipation. Jacotot refused to accept the instruction model because it repeatedly produces a hierarchical distance between the teacher and the student; instead he developed a methodology based on the equality of all intelligences. The parallelism Ranciere draws between Jacotot’s conclusions and the case of the spectator persistently galvanizes the anti-mastery brio of this book. But rather than a parallelism, Ranciere recognizes the very same process of stultification at work in the ways various philosophers and cultural revolutionaries indoctrinated and continue to indoctrinate the spectator. Ranciere, with undisciplined ardour, identifies the hierarchical distance between actors and spectators with a historical consensus produced by the work of stultifying pedagogues from Plato to Nicolas Bourriaud. If the instruction of the spectator dates back to Plato, it seems reasonable for Ranciere to declare it is high time to situate spectatorship on different grounds (p.54). However, Ranciere is chiefly concerned here with the current version of the instructional consensus and with what he recognizes as its particularly powerful stultifying effects. Post-critical thought (chapter 2) and different practices calling for a re-politicization of the arts (chapters 3 and 4) continue to entertain today a paternalistic relation with spectatorship. Ranciere regards this malaise as evidence of the persistence of the modernist model of critique and its determination to restore to health the ‘fragile brains of the people’ (p.54). But he also introduces a discontinuity between modernity and our present, and this difference is the key to understand the urgent pathos of these pages. Authors from the modern critical tradition such as Bertolt Brecht or Guy Debord got it wrong, and yet their horizon was the emancipation of the spectator. Since the winter, as Fe´ lix Guattari called the 1980s, the consensus to overturn the modernist paradigm disconnected the critique of capitalist spectatorship from any process of emancipation. Ranciere is vociferous against the disenchanted and apocalyptic subtraction of capability operated by what he calls ‘leftist melancholia’ (p.43). Theories of notorious authors such as Jean Baudrillard or Peter Sloterdijk are disgraced without ceremony as ‘tools against any process or even any dream of emancipation’ (p.38). In this sense, post-critical consensus has redoubled the incapacity of the spectators: we are not only seduced into passivity and ignorance by the capitalist spectacle but our experiments and desires are doomed to end up ‘swallowed in the belly of the monster’ (p.40). Le spectateur e´mancipe´ argues that to verify the capacity of art to resist the voracity of consensus it is crucial to re-conceptualize the political efficacy of spectatorship. Political art most often regulates the agency of the spectator according to the hierarchical opposition of doing and looking. The current will to re-politicize the arts is not an exception; its modus operandi is footed on the hierarchy between ‘active intelligence’ and ‘material passivity’ (p.69). Ranciere perceives a ‘strange schizophrenia’ in contemporary art: artists denounce the impasses of critique and post-critique and yet they continue to massively validate their consensual rationale of political action (p.57). The two usual suspects are targeted in this book: the critique of representation and the ethical immediacy between art and life. Both models are genealogically reconstructed as pedagogies of efficacy presupposing that spectators are ignorant of what they are really looking at and/or they are passive because they are only looking at. For Ranciere the current mobilization of concepts such as participation or community most often confirms the distribution of capacities and incapacities between actors and spectators. Different art practices, relational and other, seek to directly produce social relations in order to erase the distance between the spectator and the real world. Ranciere rightly insists that there is no evil distance that needs to be abolished between the spectator and the reality of political action. Ranciere, always ready to remove the act of looking an image from ‘the trial atmosphere it is so often immersed in’ (p.104), affirms spectatorship as an action that intervenes to confirm or modify the consensual order. Pedagogies of action are not only fallacious; for Ranciere to produce one model of efficacy is always a critical error. In Le spectateur e´mancipe´ political efficacy is constructed as an incalculable relation between the spectators and a political subjectivation. There is no model to be founded on the activation of spectatorship because, quite simply, we are all spectators. With unfussy statements such as ‘spectatorship is our normal situation’ (p.23), rather than through meticulous argumentation, Ranciere displaces the omnipotent logic of instruction inherent to countless edifying pedagogies to postulate spectatorship as a condition of all. Following his usual production of vacant names, Ranciere evacuates any specificity from the term spectatorship to problematize its capacity to designate one identifiable audience. The name-without-a-specific-content spectator becomes an operator performing in different configurations the gap between an identification and anonymity. Thus spectators become in these pages alternatively readers, viewers or consumers, but also poets, authors, translators. From the film La socie´te´ du spectacle to the photographs of Sophie Ristelhueber, from the documentary films of Rithy Panh to Madame Bovary, from the installation The Sound of Silence by Alfredo Jaar to media images, the book gathers contrasting voices across disciplinary boundaries to attest to the emancipation of the spectators. This indisciplinarity is not a virtuoso amplification of the scope of the book; it works to stage different theatrical manoeuvres to address different stakes of our spectatorship. Each chapter is best understood as a singular intervention pursuing the implications of the axiom we are all spectators for a re-conceptualization of critical art and in particular for the relation actor/spectator. The emancipated spectator of the title is not celebrated in this book as an active creator. In contrast to an author like Michel de Certeau who rejoiced in productive everyday tactics (‘the ways of operating of the weak’2), Ranciere understands the transformation of the consumer into a producer as a validation of the dominant hierarchy between action and passivity. In the chapter entitled ‘The Misadventures of Critical Thinking’ Ranciere points out that strategies of reversal like de Certeau’s continue to thrive among the critical intelligentsia and continue to be useless. Thus he understands the photographs of Josephine Meckseper or the work of Bernard Stiegler as the futile propositions from an up-to-date ‘inverted activism’ (p.42).3 The emancipation at stake in this book is not about turning the passive spectator into an active participant. It is about constructing another ground of efficacy through the disarticulation of the order equating the actor with activity, living reality, self-possession and the spectator with passivity, illusion and alienation. For Ranciere this hierarchical order is untenable because actors are always and already immersed in spectatorship. Actors and spectators actively engage with images and words through a ‘poetic work of translation’ (p.16). The distance between the actor, the spectator and the spectacle is not the evidence of a process of alienation but ‘the pathway that endlessly abolishes any fixation and hierarchy of positions’ (p.17). With welcomed polemical impetus Ranciere transforms the evil litany of interpretation, representation and mediation into a series of crucial components in the process of our emancipation as spectators. Spectatorship is thus constructed as a common, active, anonymous distancing that allows different re-distributions of capacities and incapacities between proper and improper bodies. Le spectateur e´mancipe´ re-formulates the critical capacity of numerous films, photographs and texts to verify that they produce effects inasmuch as they do not tell us what to do. Ranciere performs himself this anti-authoritarian stance with a conflictive equilibrium between a doctrinal style of writing and the declaration that the equalitarian ground of his oeuvre is a ‘foolish assumption’ (p.54). But the engagement against postures of mastery in these pages does not simply resonate in an anarchist vacuum that negates the hierarchy between authors and moronic spectators, readers or consumers. Very differently the cinema of Pedro Costa or a photograph by Walker Evans are interpreted as the ‘work of a spectator addressed to other spectators’ (p.91). Ranciere advocates a critical art that disqualifies its instructional authority and confirms an anonymous capacity of all to re-organize the set of distances and proximities of a consensual order. Spectatorship is re-worked as the cultural counterpart of the empty name people, i.e. an anonymous we that ruins any definitive formula to regulate cause and effects between art and political efficacy. The insistence on the un-decidability of the relation between spectators and a specific political subjectivation is not a sophisticated allegory of the state of the world or a cunning strategy of suspension. It works as an affirmative call to the readers of these pages to re-distribute again the grounds from where we read, write or look.

## AT - Kappeler

#### Kappeler concedes we can engage the state without ceding individual advocacy – it’s not an either/or choice

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg.8)

Moreover, personal behavior is no alternative to ‘political action’; t**here is no question of either/or.** My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of violence and the forms of everyday behavior which we consider ‘normal’ but which betray our own will to violence- the connection, in other words, between our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques. Precisely because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to ‘political issues’ or to ‘personal behavior’, the question of the politics of personal behavior has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique.

## 1ar – aff good

#### Statistics prove heg is effective

**Owen 11** [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

#### The world is getting better now because heg is peaceful

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Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.