# 1NC

### 1NC – EU CP – Mexico

#### Text—The European Union will offer to create an Automatic Exchange of Information and Trade Transparency Units with Mexico

#### EU solves – engagement with Mexico is successful and allows for Europe engagement with Latin America at large

Secchi 08 Carl, spring-xx-20, Professor Senior, Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management @ Bocconi University, “Latin America is Europe’s next big missed business opportunity,” http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home\_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21072/language/en-US/Default.aspx

Brazil and Mexico are the key Latin American countries. The EU’s association agreement with Mexico is 10 years old, but it doesn’t yet have a strategic partnership with Brazil. This is partly because of the never-ending negotiation process with Mercosur, the troubled Latin American customs union that is still incomplete. The EU is currently negotiating trade liberalisation deals with all of Latin America’s regional blocs; as well as Mercosur, these are the Caribbean Community, the Central America Common Market and the Andean Community. The EU therefore needs to urge its Latin American partners towards further integration. If they were to adopt a common “rule of origin” for their products this would be an incentive to further liberalise their international trade, and thus increase it. Full trade liberalisation in Latin America, although difficult to achieve, must be made central to the European strategy. Greater trade openness would be beneficial for economic growth. But even if tariffs and quotas are progressively reduced, trade flows may remain low if other trade costs remain high. EU co-operation should be directed to lowering trade costs. The crucial issue is market access. Most Latin American countries still get poor results from their export efforts towards Europe, the exceptions being raw materials and energy sources. After the establishment of the EU-Chile free trade area, Chilean exports to the EU were substantially increased. But in the case of EU-Mexico trade liberalisation, the growth of imports from the EU has exceeded the growth of exports to Europe, resulting in a widening Mexican trade deficit with the EU. Ever since the 1999 Rio summit, the European Union has proclaimed that Latin America is a vital strategic political and economic partner. But a huge gap has remained between its words and its actions. An abrupt change in the European approach is now needed if a strategic bi-regional partnership is to be created. The European Commission apparently understands this. Although the EU does not have a strategic partnership with Brazil, its intention is to push ahead with one as fast as possible. In mid-2007 the Commission confirmed that it will be revisiting the EU’s 10-year dialogue with Mercosur, with the aim of giving new impetus to the negotiations. But there is also a keen awareness that the EU’s hope for a special relationship with Brazil must not be allowed to hinder regional integration in South America, or worsen asymmetries and imbalances within the bloc. If Latin America is to become more important as a strategic partner for the EU in the global economy, and as a more attractive market for European companies, European institutions must become more open to the needs of countries in the region. The new start by the EU, focused on the two most important players, Brazil and Mexico, could prove a promising one, because of the “pull” effect it might have on the other countries. However, this must be accompanied by measures to keep all Latin American countries on board. Otherwise, Latin America may well prove to be Europe’s next missed business opportunity.

### 1NC – Security

The 1AC’s Orthodox IR’s atomistic approach to global problems makes extinction inevitable

* Discourse uses a selection bias and is seen in a historical context that makes seem true – this causes a global reaction and trend towards violence
* Orthodox IR fails to solve the problems of the 1AC because they re-create the drive for security and the order that already exists
* Their vision of international relations believes that violence can be a rational decision sometimes which is not the case – this allows for acceptance which makes violence possible
* Their solutions only address the symptoms not the root causes of violence which means they can never solve – only continue the harm
* EVEN IF their crisis scenarios are true it is still a reason to vote negative – it proves the current order founded on their IR theory is unsustainable – try or die for moving away
* Securitization forces a militarized response to solutions that could be solved by other means – this neglects social justice and is a positive peace disad

Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105

Reject the affirmatives securitized discourse – rejection of securitized rhetoric is necessary to foster change

* Deconstruction of epistemology is a prior question – elites have created the current world order which shapes our knowledge production, discourse, and understanding of the world – because all actions depend on our understanding it must be correct for other actions to be considered correct – this makes alt solvency irrelevant because we will never know the truth until we reject their vision of the world
* Citizen Action is important at the level of the speech act – even if it doesn’t create a movement calling out bad discourse can prevent it in the future
* No inevitability claims – the US didn’t always securitize and there is not a reason it needs to if people change
* The state fails – it militarizes all solutions and will co-opt the alternative empirical historical examples prove
* Alt solves – the red scare, and the withdrawl of Vietnam shows how grassroots pressure can force action

LAL 08, (Prerna P. Lal, J.D. in law, freelance writer, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” POSC 4910: Senior Seminar, <http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf> , KENTUCKY)

Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performativity contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory ininternational relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority:War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Otheracross the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is thedisappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France andGermany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community,which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India andPakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the“war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to eachother have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest thatwith each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe.On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations.Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.

### 1NC – Politics

#### No government shutdown in the squo – republicans are being pressured by Obama

ABC News 9/26 [John Parkinson and Jeff Zeleny, “Despite Showdown, Boehner Doesn’t Expect Government Shutdown,” 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/despite-showdown-boehner-doesnt-expect-government-shutdown/]

As the Senate finalizes making its imprint on a stop-gap government spending bill, House Republicans today continued to press Democrats for partisan changes to the legislation that could ultimately lead to the first government shutdown in nearly 20 years.¶ While the Senate’s tweaks to the House-passed continuing resolution won a full endorsement from the White House today, House Speaker John Boehner told reporters he does not intend to accept the bill as amended by the Senate.¶ “The American people don’t want the president’s health care bill, and they don’t want the government to shut down,” Boehner, R-Ohio, said. “Republicans are listening. We passed a bill last week that would do just what the American people have asked. It’s time for the Senate to listen and pass the bill that we’ve sent over there.”¶ **Given the political risks that come with a prolonged political ping pong match**, Boehner was questioned whether he concedes that the government is headed for a shutdown next week.¶ “No, I do not,” he insisted. “No, I do not expect that to happen.”¶ Asked whether he is prepared to accept a clean continuing resolution from the Senate in order to avoid a government shutdown, Boehner hinted that more changes are coming from the House.¶ **“I made it clear now for months and months and months, we have no interest in seeing a government shutdown**, but we’ve got to address the spending problem that we have in this town,” Boehner said. “There will be options available to us. There are not going to be any speculation about what we’re going to do or not do until the Senate passes their bill.”¶ While Republicans maintain that their next move has not been decided, **GOP insiders say the options being privately discussed are plentiful.**¶ With just four days remaining until the government runs out of funding Oct. 1, some Republicans are said to be pushing for a short-term continuing resolution – even as brief as one week – to enable lawmakers to pursue a bipartisan agreement.¶ Another option that could be gaining favor as the House GOP’s next move on the continuing resolution: delaying the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act for one year. That plan was initially discussed as a leading preference for the GOP’s game plan on the debt limit, but with the Senate finishing its first crack at the continuing resolution a few days earlier than first expected, some House Republicans continue to press for Obamacare’s destruction.¶ Rep. Paul Ryan, chairman of the Budget Committee, however, believes the bigger budget fight and any discussion over whether to delay the Affordable Care Act should come on the debt limit debate. The former running mate of Mitt Romney said he believes the House will send an altered bill back to the Senate, but would act quickly enough to keep the government funded.¶ “We’re in a good place. We’re unified and feel like we have a good strategy,” Ryan, R-Wis., told ABC News following a meeting with the House Republican Conference. “No one is interested in shutting the government down. We don’t see what is accomplished with that.”¶ Rep. Mo Brooks said House **Republicans do not want to be pushed into a corner by Senate Democrats on the budget resolution**. He said Democrats should bear the blame for any potential government shutdown.¶ “We’ve agreed on funding 99 percent of the federal government. Let’s fund that 99 percent and then fight over the remaining 1 percent,” Brooks, R-Ala., told ABC News. “But Harry **Reid and** Barack **Obama insist on a scenario that results in a government shutdown if they don’t get everything that they demand**.”¶ Rep. Sean Duffy, who was critical of Sen. Ted Cruz a week ago, said the Texas Republican “fought a good fight” during his 21-hour marathon speech in the Senate this week.¶ “I thought he did a great job,” Duffy, R-Wis., said. “But the bottom line is, Do we really think the president is going to go along with defunding Obamacare? I don’t think he will, but there are some issues that we can do, like delay or opt-out for states.”¶ Current government funding runs out at the end of the day on Sept. 30. The House could act as soon as Saturday to send the continuing resolution back to the Democrat-led Senate, **leaving a** precarious amount of time **for the upper chamber to decide whether to send the legislation on to the president. I**f Democrats reject the House’s next move, the prospects of a government shutdown become even more likely than any fiscal battle Congress has faced the past three years.¶ “I’ll personally be surprised if we have a government shutdown,” Brooks added. “And if we do, I’ll be extraordinarily surprised if it lasts anything beyond hours or days as opposed to weeks or months.”

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Obama singularly focused on the fiscal crisis—his political capital will resolve it before shutdown and default

Jonathan Allen, Politico, 9/19/13, GOP battles boost President Obama, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other.

And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve.

If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit.

For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal.

**Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats** — both **liberal** and **conservative**, executive and congressional — **are virtually 100 percent united**,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).

Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect.

The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law.

“I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.”

While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, **it is a return to the narrative arc** that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened.

And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning.

The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made.

The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills.

#### That spills-over to government shutdown and US default—that kills the economy and US credibility

Norm Ornstein, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, **with** devastating consequences for American credibility **and the** international economy.

Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. **Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require** the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

#### Extinction

Kemp 10 Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### 1NC – Disad

#### **China-Mexico bilateral relations increasing**

The Economist 6/6 – The Economist Magazine, (“Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?”, Article Written for The Economist, 6/6/13, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3>, AW)

In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China’s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast.

#### Economic integration with Mexico hurts China

Mares and Canovas 10 – [David R. Mares & Gustavo Vega Cánovas, the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (San Diego), the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington DC), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (Tijuana), and El Colegio de México (Mexico City).The U.S.-Mexico Relationship: Towards a New Era?, 2010, <http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11635.pdf>]

This chapter begins by briefly characterizing the most recent period of US-Mexico relations, the NAFTA era since 1994. We trace the origins, purposes, and the impact of NAFTA in the two economies and societies. A second section lays out the parameters of a new era in the bilateral relationship, paying particular attention to the challenges to both countries raised by the processes of globalization and democratization. Globalization’s impact on the relationship is best captured in the rise of China and consequent displacement of Mexico in trade relations with the US. Democratization complicates policy responses but improves the likelihood that policy will have some consistency over time. The inadequate manner in which the two countries have responded up to now to these challenges is highlighted. A third section discusses the essence of any appropriate response to these challenges: economic integration. The failure of integration at a regional level is discussed, but we note that Mexico’s long border with the US means that the options open to Brazil, Argentina and Chile in diversifying their economic relations simply are not viable for Mexico. A fourth section evaluates the current relationship and offers suggestions to improve the two countries’ abilities to respond effectively to today’s challenges. Whether Mexico or the US like it or not, they are destined to walk together if they want to be successful in this globalized economy. The conclusion speculates on whether the countries will move towards a more collaborative or distant relationship, thus helping to set the context for the in-depth discussions in subsequent chapters

#### Lack of US economic engagement spurs China’s growth.

Erikson & Chen 7 – (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

China’s economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America-par- ticularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas.9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean ex- ceeded $2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year.10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower with- out a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituen- cies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western inten- tions. 12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China-to the extent that this has actually occurred-is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about Chinas rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competi- tion posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China seeks to reassure the United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing has begun enlisting regional powers like Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur), which places certain constraints on member states' bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its avowals to Washington, China appears to be using its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective of stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

#### CCP Collapse causes nuclear and biological warfare

Renxing 5 (San, Epic Times Staff Member, The CCP’s Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War, 8/5/5, The Epoch Times,<http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30975.html>)

As *The Epoch Times*’ *Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party* spreads ever wider in China, the truth it speaks is awakening Chinese people to the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and inspiring them to cancel their Party memberships. With the number of people quitting the Party growing rapidly by the day, the Communist Party sees that the end is near. In a show of strength to save itself from demise, the CCP has brought out a sinister plan that it has been preparing for years, a last-ditch gamble to extend its life. This plan is laid out in two speeches written by Chi Haotian, Minster of Defense and vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, and posted on the Internet. The background surrounding the speeches is still shrouded in mystery. The titles of the two speeches are “[War Is Approaching Us](http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-4/30974.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)” [[1]](http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30975.html#1) and “[War Is Not Far from Us and Is the Midwife of the Chinese Century](http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-4/30974.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank).” The two, judging from their similar contexts and consistent theme, are indeed sister articles. These speeches describe in a comprehensive, systematic, and detailed way the CCP’s nearly 20 years of fear and helplessness over its doomed fate, and its desperate fight to extend its life. In particular, the speeches lay uncharacteristically bare what is really on the CCP’s mind and hide nothing from the public—a rare confession from the CCP that can help people understand its evil nature. If one truly understands what is said in this confession, one will immediately catch on to the CCP’s way of thinking. In short, the speeches are worth reading, and I would like to comment on them. I. A Gangster Gambles with the World as His Stake, and the Lives of People in this Global Village Become Worthless What, then, is the gist of this wild, last-ditch gamble? To put it in a few words: A cornered beast is fighting desperately to survive in a battle with humanity. If you don’t believe me, read some passages directly from the speeches. 1) “We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack [on the US], the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the U.S. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the U.S., China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities. Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone!” 2) “In any event, we, the CCP, will never step down from the stage of history! We’d rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history!!! Isn’t there a ‘nuclear bondage’ theory? It means that since the nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate our Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are finished, China will be finished, and the world will be finished.” 3) “It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else!” Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. *That* is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that they will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: That of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

#### Collapse of the Chinese government causes border conflict with Russia

Lo and Rothman 6 [Bobo Lo and Andy Rothman, May 2006, Asian Geopolitics, special report http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7057/is\_2\_9/ai\_n28498825/pg\_17/]

The second scenario for strategic conflict is predicated on a general collapse of law and order in China. With no effective central authority to contain the anarchy, millions of Chinese could cross the border into the Russian Far East. This would lead to tensions and clashes, at first sporadic and random, but subsequently escalating into interstate conflict.

#### Nuclear winter

Sharavin 01[Alexander, What the Papers Say, 10-3-01, The Third Threat]

Russia may face the “wonderful” prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia’s entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become less strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such “trifles” like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia’s armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the “Chechen” and the “Balkan” variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

### 1NC – International Tax Regime

#### Mexico is a flagrant violator of human rights—Moral duty to shun

HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (“Mexico,” 2013 World Report, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/mexico?page=1, Accessed 07-22-2013)

Mexican security forces have committed widespread human rights violations in efforts to combat powerful organized crime groups, including killings, disappearances, and torture. Almost none of these abuses are adequately investigated, exacerbating a climate of violence and impunity in many parts of the country.¶ In an historic decision in August 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of military jurisdiction to prosecute a human rights violation was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, most abuses by military personnel continue to be prosecuted in military courts, which lack independence and impartiality.¶ Criminal groups and members of security forces continue to threaten or attack human rights defenders and journalists. The government has failed to provide these vulnerable groups with adequate protection or investigate the crimes committed against them. In April, Mexico passed legislation to create a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists, but protocols to evaluate risk and assign protection are still being designed.

#### No conflicts resulted from the recession – disproves the impact

Barnett 9—senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role.

#### History is decided

Ferguson 6— Laurence A. Tisch prof of History at Harvard. William Ziegler of Business Administration at Harvard. MA and D.Phil from Glasgow and Oxford (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the\_next\_war\_of\_the\_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### Robust studies prove

Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis---as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth---bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

#### Econ collapse saps resources from military aggression

Bennett 2k – PolSci Prof, Penn State (Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ebsco)

Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a “guns versus butter” world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended becausethe Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

#### Their authors lie about the data

Blattman 11 (Chris, Assistant Professor of Political Science & Economics at Yale. http://chrisblattman.com/2011/11/28/the-publication-bias-problem-and-the-redemption-of-blattman/)

At long last, regressions were run and… no result. No relationship between price shocks and conflict, even in the most generous scenarios. I shrugged and thought, “Well, so much for that.” My committee said, “Huh, what about that child soldiering project we told you not to do?” And off I went on my career as micro-conflict man. In the meantime, lots of papers that did see an impact of economic shocks on conflict or instability did get published. The conventional wisdom grew: Rising incomes made the state more attractive to rebels as a prize, and falling incomes made it easier to recruit rebels. No matter that these two ideas ran in apparently opposite directions. Meanwhile, I met other academics that had run the same regression as me. Famous ones you have probably heard of. Their reaction was the same as mine: “Oh, I found that result,” several said, “but I’m worried there’s nothing there because my data have problems, and the specification wasn’t quite right. So I left it out of the paper. I’ve been meaning to get back to that.” Let’s follow a simple decision rule: run your regressions with inevitably imperfect data and models. If you get the theoretically predicted result (any of them), publish. If not, wait and look into your data and empirical strategy more. The result? As in the natural sciences, most published research findings are probably false.

#### Econ decline makes leaders cautious not aggressive

Boehmer 2007 – political science professor at the University of Texas (Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, WEA)

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second frosnt when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

#### Their internal link chain is ridiculous—their impact ev is about the US—

#### Mexico won’t go to war with decline—disproves their royal impact

#### Mexico is a humans rights violator—moral duty to shun

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?¶ We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.¶ Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.¶ Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.¶ An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?¶ First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)¶ Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."¶ Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.¶ Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. ¶ We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

#### Their ev is about Cuban IFF’s which they can’t solve—no solvency

#### Even a small nuclear war creates nuclear winter – turns all of their impacts and is comparative on timeframe probability and magnitude—this outweighs poverty

Harrell 9 (Eben Harrell, writer for the Time Magazine, text taken from article titled “The Nuclear Risk: How Long Will Our Luck Hold?” published February 20th, 2009. Text found at [http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1880702,00.html]) In the 1980s, climate scientists in Russia and the U.S. theorized that all-out nuclear war between the superpowers would result in a "nuclear winter," as smoke from the atomic explosions blackened the sky and sent summer temperatures plummeting below freezing — killing crops and eventually starving all those who survived the initial explosions. Now that the risks of an all-out U.S.-Russian exchange have diminished, scientists are looking at the climactic effects of regional nuclear war — and the predictions are still sobering. Alan Robock, a Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University who participated in the original nuclear winter research, recently completed a study on the results of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. He spoke with TIME from his office in New Brunswick, New Jersey. (See pictures from the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks.) Tensions between India and Pakistan have been high recently. If they escalated to all-out nuclear war, what would be the effect to the global climate? We looked at a scenario in which each country used 50 Hiroshima-sized weapons, which they are believed to have in their arsenals. That's enough firepower to kill around 20 million people on the ground. We were surprised that the amount of smoke produced by these explosions would block out sunlight, cool the planet, and produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. Your study predicts mass cooling. With all the heat and radioactivity of the explosions, why wouldn't nuclear war warm the planet? It has nothing to do with the radioactivity of the explosions — although that would be devastating to nearby populations. The explosions would set off massive fires, which would produce plumes of black smoke. The sun would heat the smoke and lift it into the stratosphere — that's the layer above the troposphere, where we live — where there is no rain to clear it out. It would be blown across the globe and block the sun. The effect would not be a nuclear winter, but it would be colder than the little ice age [in the 17th and 18th centuries] and the change would happen very rapidly — over the course of a few weeks. Would you be able to see the smoke? The sky would not be blue. It would be grey. And what would the results be for humanity? We calculated that there would be a shortening of the growing season in the mid-latitudes — that includes Europe and America in the Northern Hemisphere — by a couple of weeks. The growing season is defined as the period between the last frost in spring and first frost in the fall. Some crops that need the whole growing season would not reach fruition and there would be no yield. Others would grow more slowly and produce a small yield. In addition there would be less precipitation and it would be darker, also damaging yield. You compound that with [the shutdown of] the current global network of food trading — countries would likely stop shipping food and focus on feeding their own populations — and it's a big crisis. We don't have the resources to do detailed analyses on the impacts of crops in different farming regimes but this suggests it could be a very serious problem. How confident are you that your modeling is correct? We used ModelE, designed by NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and one of the models used to produce the results of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The model does an excellent job of simulating climate change that resulted from volcanic eruptions in the past. That gave us confidence. What's more, a group repeated the calculations for the Pakistan-India scenario with a different model at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo., and the results almost exactly agreed. Their research showed how the smoke from the fires would open up holes in the ozone, which would cause even more problems for humanity. We'd like other people to test the calculations with their models, but we're pretty confident that they'll get the same answer. So we get a clue of the climatic effects of nuclear war from volcanic eruptions? Yes. 1816 was known as the "year without summer." It followed the Tambora Volcano eruption in Indonesia in 1815. It was sudden climate change on a similar scale, and it resulted in a severe famine in Europe, food riots and mass emigrations. Volcanic aerosols have a lifetime of about a year in the stratosphere. The lifetime of soot from nuclear fires is about five years. It's obviously much harder for a society to recover from such an extended cooling. Some scientists, most notably Freeman Dyson of The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, have stirred controversy by arguing that nuclear weapons are a more urgent environmental threat than global warming. Do you agree? Yes. If India and Pakistan engaged in nuclear war, they would use about 0.3% of the global nuclear stockpile. And still the effects on the climate would be dramatic. Our calculations on nuclear winter from the early 1980s have been confirmed by modern climate models. And fundamentally the situation hasn't changed — even with reduced stockpiles there still exists enough weapons to cause nuclear winter. That's something that maybe people don't realize. I think we have to solve the problem of the existence of all these weapons before we have the luxury of worrying about global warming

#### Can’t solve globally AEI’s they don’t access global spillover

#### Can’t solve global poverty—other countries have poverty—hold them to a high threshold to solve

### 1NC – Mexican Stability

#### no impact to terrorism—they wont get the bomb

Fettweis 10 Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College.

(Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” [\_\_Survival\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713659919), Volume [\_\_52\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713659919~tab%3Dissueslist~branches%3D52#v52), Issue [\_\_2\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg920313969) April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld) KENTUCKY

Even terrorists equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be incapable of causing damage so cataclysmic that it would prove fatal to modern states. Though the prospect of terrorists obtaining and using such weapons is one of the most consistently terrifying scenarios of the new era, it is also highly unlikely and not nearly as dangerous as sometimes portrayed. As the well-funded, well-staffed Aum Shinrikyo cult found out in the 1990s, workable forms of weapons of mass destruction are hard to purchase, harder still to synthesise without state help, and challenging to use effectively. The Japanese group managed to kill a dozen people on the Tokyo subway system at rush hour. While tragic, the attack was hardly the stuff of apocalyptic nightmares. Super-weapons are simply not easy for even the most sophisticated non-state actors to use.[31](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0031) If terrorists were able to overcome the substantial obstacles and use the most destructive weapons in a densely populated area, the outcome would of course be terrible for those unfortunate enough to be nearby. But we should not operate under the illusion that doomsday would arrive. Modern industrialised countries can cope with disasters, both natural and man-made. As unpleasant as such events would be, they do not represent existential threats.

#### Can’t solve global terror- if we solve the border terrorists will attack other places

#### No impact

Simon and Stevenson, 10 - \* senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations AND \*\* professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Naval War College (Steven and Jonathan, “Focus on thwarting 'simpler' attacks,” 5/4, http://www.statesman.com/opinion/simon-stevenson-focus-on-thwarting-simpler-attacks-669676.html)

But the attempt to bring a less destructive terrorist technique to bear in New York may put the lie to that explanation. While we have not seen a single attack as horrific as the collapse of the twin towers, al Qaeda and its followers have killed far more people — Americans and other nationalities — using various forms of improvised explosive devices in war zones and ostensibly peaceful locales. Some 65 percent of the military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan have been from improvised explosive devices, the Army Times reported last year. Many of them, like the Times Square device, are activated by or packed in vehicles; several of al Qaeda's most devastating attacks since 2001 — such as bombings that killed 202 people, mainly tourists, in Bali in 2002 — involved such devices. Terrorist tactics spread by virtue of success. Consider the number of airline hijackings in the 1960s and 1970s. These days, vehicle-borne IEDs are suited to urban spaces, in which cars are commonplace and inconspicuous and dense populations mean relatively high numbers of casualties. These points would not be lost on jihadist leaders and aspiring acolytes, who tend to be students of their craft. While many questions remain about the bombing attempt — though U.S. officials have deemed it terrorist activity, and a key leader of the Taliban in Pakistan has claimed credit — we do know that al Qaeda is pragmatic and adaptive. However precious al Qaeda may deem the "stun value" of the next big attack on America, the effectiveness of U.S. actions to thwart such an incident was eventually likely to compel it to downgrade expectations. Now, perhaps, al Qaeda has. The attempted Christmas bombing on a U.S. airliner was certainly a less complex and ambitious operation than Sept. 11 — or, for that matter, the 2004 Madrid attacks, the 2005 London subway bombings or the 2006 Heathrow plot. Even if the core group has not given up on the grand apocalyptic attack, anti-terrorist activity in Pakistan has compelled it to devolve operational authority to regional affiliates and homegrown terrorist aspirants who are free — if not encouraged — to use less operationally demanding methods. And that sort of urban warfare was long ago introduced and developed in places such as Belfast and Bilbao, then refined and expanded in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the advent of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and "sticky bombs," which are smaller and more precise than car bombs and may be harder to detect. It would be a mistake for al Qaeda's targets to regard that tactical adjustment as any kind of victory. Old techniques such as car and bus bombs, though not as massively lethal as the new ones — such as turning a hijacked airplane into a guided missile, or detonating a "dirty bomb" or even a small atomic device — would signify mainly that jihadists are starting to consider more frequent terrorist attacks that are far easier to execute and get away with. That kind of approach won favor with Northern Ireland's Provisional Irish Republican Army in its drive to unite Ireland, and with the Basque separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain. These groups, which evolved into highly capable and professional organizations, challenged civil order and palsied society for decades, claiming roughly 2,200 and 1,000 lives, respectively.

#### And case doesn’t solve—alt causes to terror—not just money laundering—they don’t account for those

#### Bioweapons won’t spread or cause epidemics

Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

#### Impacts are denied from every time Mexican economy has collapese

#### Border security will solve the plan

#### No internal link to same terrorist groups

# 2NC

## K

## 2NC – Impact Calc

#### Complexity means plan solvency = zero weigh also even if they solve make violence inevitable

Nassim Nicholas Taleb, is Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University’s Polytechnic Institute and the author of The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Mark Blythis Professor of International Political Economy at Brown University, 2011, “The Black Swan of Cairo How Suppressing Volatility Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous”, PDF, KENTUCKY

Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007–8, when the global ﬁnancial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The critical issue in both cases is the artiﬁcial suppres- sion of volatility—the ups and downs of life—in the name of stability. It is both mis- guided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability “tail risks” to disappear from policymakers’ ﬁelds of observation. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what happens when highly constrained systems explode. Complex systems that have artiﬁcially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting ﬂuctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artiﬁcially con- strained systems become prone to “Black Swans”—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers. Such environments eventually experi- ence massive blowups, catching everyone oª-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems. Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic crisis of 2007–8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world. The policy implications are identical: to make systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open— ﬂuctuat nec mergitur(it ﬂuctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of “fail small” and “fail fast”), the U.S. gov- ernment should stop supporting dictato- rial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be visible; the same is true in politics. SEDUCED BY STABILITY Both the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the current political crisis in the Middle East are grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence, and unpredictability. Policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States have long promoted policies aimed at eliminating ﬂuctuation— no more booms and busts in the economy, no more “Iranian surprises” in foreign policy. These policies have almost always produced undesirable outcomes. For example, the U.S. banking system became very fragile following a succession of pro- gressively larger bailouts and government interventions, particularly after the 1983 rescue of major banks (ironically, by the same Reagan administration that trum- peted free markets). In the United States, promoting these bad policies has been a bipartisan eªort throughout. Republicans have been good at fragilizing large corpora- tions through bailouts, and Democrats have been good at fragilizing the government. At the same time, the ﬁnancial system as a whole exhibited little volatility; it kept get- ting weaker while providing policymakers with the illusion of stability, illustrated most notably when Ben Bernanke, who was then a member of the Board of Gover- nors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared the era of “the great moderation” in 2004. Putatively independent central bankers fell into the same trap. During the 1990s, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan wanted to iron out the economic cycle’s booms and busts, and he sought to control economic swings with interest-rate reductions at the slightest sign of a downward tick in the economic data. Furthermore, he adapted his eco- nomic policy to guarantee bank rescues, with implicit promises of a backstop—the now infamous “Greenspan put.” These policies proved to have grave delayed side effects. Washington stabilized the market with bailouts and by allowing certain com- panies to grow “too big to fail.” Because policymakers believed it was better to do something than to do nothing, they felt obligated to heal the economy rather than wait and see if it healed on its own. The foreign policy equivalent is to support the incumbent no matter what. And just as banks took wild risks thanks to Greenspan’s implicit insurance policy, client governments such as Hosni Mubarak’s in Egypt for years engaged in overt plunder thanks to similarly reliable U.S. support. Those who seek to prevent volatility on the grounds that any and all bumps in the road must be avoided paradoxically increase the probability that a tail risk will cause a major explosion. Consider as a thought experiment a man placed in an artiﬁcially sterilized environment for a decade and then invited to take a ride on a crowded subway; he would be expected to die quickly. Likewise, preventing small forest ﬁres can cause larger forest ﬁres to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price con- trols are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and extremely costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the beneﬁts accrued. The risks of a dictatorship, no matter how seemingly stable, are no diªerent, in the long run, from those of an artiﬁcially controlled price. Such attempts to institutionally engineer the world come in two types: those that conform to the world as it is and those that attempt to reform the world. The nature of humans, quite reasonably, is to in- tervene in an eªort to alter their world and the outcomes it produces. But government interventions are laden with unintended— and unforeseen—consequences, particularly in complex systems, so humans must work with nature by tolerating systems that absorb human imperfections rather than seek to change them. Take, for example, the recent celebrated documentary on the ﬁnancial crisis, Inside Job, which blames the crisis on the malfea- sance and dishonesty of bankers and the incompetence of regulators. Although it is morally satisfying, the ﬁlm naively over- looks the fact that humans have always been dishonest and regulators have always been behind the curve. The only diªerence this time around was the unprecedented magnitude of the hidden risks and a mis- understanding of the statistical properties of the system. What is needed is a system that can prevent the harm done to citizens by the dishonesty of business elites; the limited competence of forecasters, economists, and statisticians; and the imperfections of regulation, not one that aims to eliminate these ﬂaws. Humans must try to resist the illusion of control: just as foreign policy should be intelligence-proof (it should minimize its reliance on the competence of information-gathering organizations and the predictions of “experts” in what are inherently unpredictable domains), the economy should be regulator-proof, given that some regulations simply make the system itself more fragile. Due to the complexity of markets, intricate regulations simply serve to generate fees for lawyers and proﬁts for sophisticated derivatives traders who can build complicated ﬁnancial products that skirt those regulations. DON’T BE A TURKEY The life of a turkey before Thanksgiving is illustrative: the turkey is fed for 1,000 days and every day seems to conﬁrm that the farmer cares for it—until the last day, when conﬁdence is maximal. The “turkey problem” occurs when a naive analysis of stability is derived from the absence of past variations. Likewise, conﬁdence in stability was maximal at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. The turkey problem for humans is the result of mistaking one environment for another. Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components, which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misun- derstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error. U.S. President Barack Obama may blame an intelligence failure for the gov- ernment’s not foreseeing the revolution in Egypt (just as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter blamed an intelligence failure for his administration’s not fore- seeing the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but it is the suppressed risk in the statis- tical tails that matters—not the failure to see the last grain of sand. As a result of complicated interdependence and conta- gion eªects, in all man-made complex systems, a small number of possible events dominate, namely, Black Swans. Engineering, architecture, astronomy, most of physics, and much of common science are linear domains. The complex domain is the realm of the social world, epidemics, and economics. Crucially, the linear domain delivers mild variations without large shocks, whereas the complex domain delivers massive jumps and gaps. Complex systems are misunderstood, mostly because humans’ sophistication, obtained over the history of human knowl- edge in the linear domain, does not transfer properly to the complex domain. Humans can predict a solar eclipse and the trajectory of a space vessel, but not the stock market or Egyptian political events. All man-made complex systems have commonalities and even universalities. Sadly, deceptive calm (followed by Black Swan surprises) seems to be one of those properties. THE ERROR OF PREDICTION As with a crumbling sand pile, it would be foolish to attribute the collapse of a fragile bridge to the last truck that crossed it, and even more foolish to try to predict in advance which truck might bring it down. The system is responsible, not the compo- nents. But after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–8, many people thought that predict- ing the subprime meltdown would have helped. It would not have, since it was a symptom of the crisis, not its underlying cause. Likewise, Obama’s blaming “bad in- telligence” for his administration’s failure to predict the crisis in Egypt is symptomatic of both the misunderstanding of complex systems and the bad policies involved. Obama’s mistake illustrates the illusion of local causal chains—that is, confusing catalysts for causes and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which eªect. The ﬁnal episode of the upheaval in Egypt was unpredictable for all observers, especially those involved. As such, blam- ing the ciais as foolish as funding it to forecast such events. Governments are wasting billions of dollars on attempting to predict events that are produced by interdependent systems and are therefore not statistically understandable at the individual level. As Mark Abdollahian of Sentia Group, one of the contractors who sell predictive analytics to the U.S. government, noted regarding Egypt, policymakers should “think of this like Las Vegas. In blackjack, if you can do four percent better than the average, you’re making real money.” But the analogy is spurious. There is no “four percent better” on Egypt. This is not just money wasted but the construction of a false conﬁdence based on an erroneous focus. It is telling that the intelligence analysts made the same mistake as the risk-management systems that failed to predict the economic crisis—and oªered the exact same excuses when they failed. Political and economic “tail events” are unpredictable, and their probabilities are not scientiﬁcally measurable. No matter how many dollars are spent on research, predicting revolutions is not the same as counting cards; humans will never be able to turn politics into the tractable random- ness of blackjack. Most explanations being oªered for the current turmoil in the Middle East follow the “catalysts as causes” confusion. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt were initially attributed to rising commodity prices, not to stiﬂing and unpopular dictatorships. But Bahrain and Libya are countries with high gdps that can aªord to import grain and other commodities. Again, the focus is wrong even if the logic is comforting. It is the system and its fragility, not events, that must be studied—what physicists call “percolation theory,” in which the proper- ties of the terrain are studied rather than those of a single element of the terrain. When dealing with a system that is inherently unpredictable, what should be done? Diªerentiating between two types of countries is useful. In the ﬁrst, changes in government do not lead to meaningful diªerences in political outcomes (since political tensions are out in the open). In the second type, changes in govern- ment lead to both drastic and deeply unpredictable changes. Consider that Italy, with its much- maligned “cabinet instability,” is economi- cally and politically stable despite having had more than 60 governments since World War II (indeed, one may say Italy’s stability is because of these switches of government). Similarly, in spite of consis- tently bad press, Lebanon is a relatively safe bet in terms of how far governments can jump from equilibrium; in spite of all the noise, shifting alliances, and street protests, changes in government there tend to be comparatively mild. For exam- ple, a shift in the ruling coalition from Christian parties to Hezbollah is not such a consequential jump in terms of the country’s economic and political stability. Switching equilibrium, with control of the government changing from one party to another, in such systems acts as a shock absorber. Since a single party cannot have total and more than temporary control, the possibility of a large jump in the regime type is constrained. In contrast, consider Iran and Iraq. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Sad- dam Hussein both constrained volatility by any means necessary. In Iran, when the shah was toppled, the shift of power to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a huge, unforeseeable jump. After the fact, analysts could construct convincing accounts about how killing Iranian Communists, driving the left into exile, demobilizing the demo- cratic opposition, and driving all dissent into the mosque had made Khomeini’s rise inevitable. In Iraq, the United States removed the lid and was actually surprised to ﬁnd that the regime did not jump from hyperconstraint to something like France. But this was impossible to predict ahead of time due to the nature of the system itself. What can be said, however, is that the more constrained the volatility, the bigger the regime jump is likely to be. From the French Revolution to the triumph of the Bolsheviks, history is replete with such examples, and yet somehow humans remain unable to process what they mean. THE FEAR OF RANDOMNESS Humans fear randomness—a healthy ancestral trait inherited from a diªerent environment. Whereas in the past, which was a more linear world, this trait enhanced ﬁtness and increased chances of survival, it can have the reverse eªect in today’s complex world, making volatility take the shape of nasty Black Swans hiding behind deceptive periods of “great moderation.” This is not to say that any and all volatility should be embraced. Insurance should not be banned, for example. But alongside the “catalysts as causes” confusion sit two mental biases: the illusion of control and the action bias (the illusion that doing something is always better than doing nothing). This leads to the desire to impose man-made solutions. Greenspan’s actions were harmful, but it would have been hard to justify inaction in a democracy where the incentive is to always promise a better outcome than the other guy, regard- less of the actual, delayed cost. Variation is information. When there is no variation, there is no information. This explains the cia’s failure to predict the Egyptian revolution and, a generation before, the Iranian Revolution—in both cases, the revolutionaries themselves did not have a clear idea of their relative strength with respect to the regime they were hoping to topple. So rather than sub- sidize and praise as a “force for stability” every tin-pot potentate on the planet, the U.S. government should encourage countries to let information ﬂow upward through the transparency that comes with political agitation. It should not fear ﬂuc- tuations per se, since allowing them to be in the open, as Italy and Lebanon both show in diªerent ways, creates the stability of small jumps. As Seneca wrote in De clementia, “Repeated punishment, while it crushes the hatred of a few, stirs the hatred of all . . . just as trees that have been trimmed throw out again countless branches.” The imposition of peace through repeated punishment lies at the heart of many seemingly intractable conﬂicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. Further- more, dealing with seemingly reliable high-level officials rather than the people themselves prevents any peace treaty signed from being robust. The Romans were wise enough to know that only a free man under Roman law could be trusted to engage in a contract; by extension, only a free people can be trusted to abide by a treaty. Treaties that are negotiated with the consent of a broad swath of the populations on both sides of a conﬂict tend to survive. Just as no central bank is powerful enough to dictate stability, no superpower can be powerful enough to guarantee solid peace alone. U.S. policy toward the Middle East has historically, and especially since 9/11, been unduly focused on the repression of any and all political ﬂuctuations in the name of preventing “Islamic fundamentalism”— a trope that Mubarak repeated until his last moments in power and that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddaﬁ continues to emphasize today, blaming Osama bin Laden for what has befallen him. This is wrong. The West and its autocratic Arab allies have strengthened Islamic funda- mentalists by forcing them underground, and even more so by killing them. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it, “A little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom.” With freedom comes some unpredictable ﬂuctuation. This is one of life’s packages: there is no freedom without noise—and no stability without volatility.∂

## 2NC – Framework

#### Education – the roll of the scholar is to question methodology first – securitized methodology is unethical (because it prevents solvency of structural violence by constructing military threats that must be addressed)

Shampa Biswas 7 Prof of Politics @ Whitman “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

## China

### 2NC – A2 Triangular Relationship

#### **EVEN IF they win a triangular relationship ­– we still control a tradeoff and crowd-out link**

Fergusson 12 – (Robbie, China In The International Arena – University of Glasgow, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/>, AW)

The U.S has some reason to be concerned by the economic implications of China’s resource drive in Latin America because “while the United States has traditionally looked to Latin America as its source of numerous raw materials and a market for its finished products, China is fast replacing the United States in these roles.” [37] The United States has no intention of being usurped in its role as chief beneficiary of the regions energy resources, but “for every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America, there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S” [38] It is of course extremely premature to be using words such as usurped as China’s involvement in the region is at a very early stage and its energy interests are not overly well defined, but already, “China’s total consumption of the five basic commodities – grain, meat, oil, coal and steel – has already surpassed that of the USA in all but oil,” [39] leading many analysts such as Hutton to wonder how the global supply of energy can cope with the emergence of such a hungry economy without conflict over increasingly scarce resources. [40] The development of China and its interests in the region is therefore key. Roett & Paz argue that “what matters most… for Sino-Latin American energy relations is not where China is today but how it compares with its position in the world at the start of the twenty-first century and where it is likely to be in 2030.” [41] Due to the triangular relationship between China, the U.S, and Latin America, any shift of the equilibrium towards China cannot fail to impact upon the United States. Bajpaee moots the idea: While not a zero-sum game, growing inter-linkages and interdependence between China and Latin America is likely to come at the cost of the United States’ relations with its neighbours, which will only undermine U.S ability to access the region’s energy resources. This will force the U.S to rely on energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East. [42] However, the future of Sino-American relations with regard to energy relations is not purely China’s responsibility – America has a part to play too. Zweig suggests that “if the U.S responds negatively to Chinese efforts to secure resources or improve China’s ‘energy security’, the U.S will not be creating incentives that encourage China to behave responsibly. Energy disagreements, then, may indeed become a source of a new cold war.” [43] It must surely be in both sides best interests to avoid such a scenario.

## ITR

#### Squo Solves

Lawton, 12 – Former Canadian policy analyst who worked on anti-money laundering initiatives (Christopher, “U.S. Should Expand Automatic Exchange Of Tax Information To Mexico”, January 31, 2012, Financial Transparency Coalition, http://www.financialtransparency.org/2012/01/31/u-s-should-expand-automatic-exchange-of-tax-information-to-mexico/)//AE

While Mexico and the U.S. do exchange tax information on a case-by-case basis in instances of suspected tax evasion, moving to automatic exchange would greatly simplify the exchange process, and would curtail unreported cross-border interest income by citizens of both countries.

#### ≠ solve multilat

**Grinberg, 13 -** Associate Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, former attorney at the Office of International Tax Counsel at the U.S. Dept. of Treasury, where he worked on FATCA from its inception (Itai, Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-031, “Will FATCA Open the Door to Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries,” June 20, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2256587)

For these countries, a uniform multilateral automatic information exchange system could positively affect their ability to address offshore tax evasion and, further, could serve to improve the structure of their domestic information reporting and withholding regimes more generally.

### Econ

### Poverty

#### Cap flight inev

Corchado, 12 - Mexico bureau chief @ Dallas Morning News (Alfredo, “Exclusive: Mexico pays heavy price for tax evasion, report finds”, 29 January 2012, Dallas Morning News, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/nationworld/mexico/20120128-exclusive-mexico-pays-heavy-price-for-tax-evasion-report-finds.ece)//AE

More than half of the money illicitly flowing out of Mexico ends up in U.S. banks**,** followed by tax havens in the Caribbean and Europe

#### No solve global poverty or to a sufficient level —

≠ ! poverty

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

# Mexico

#### Tons of alt causes

Targeted News Service, 12 (“Mexico Hemorrhages US$872 Billion to Crime, Corruption, Tax Evasion from 1970-2010,” Targeted News Service, January 29, 2012, pageLexis)//JW

Drug traffickers, like kleptocrats, terrorists and tax dodgers, all gain from anonymous shell companies, tax haven secrecy, and nefarious trade mispricing tactics.

#### Terrorism inevitable

Ken Timmerman 10, Newsmax correspondent, “FBI Director Mueller: Al-Qaida Still Wants Nuclear Bomb,” 3/18, [http://newsmax.com/Newsfront/mueller-fbi-alqaida-nuclear/2010/03/18/id/353169](http://newsmax.com/Newsfront/mueller-fbi-alqaida-nuclear/2010/03/18/id/353169%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)

#### Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could, and probably already have, infiltrated the United States, just laying in wait to attack at an appropriately vulnerable time.

#### Hezbollah in Latin America scenarios are stupid

Ramsey 12 – American University School of International Service, Geoffrey Ramsey, 1-3-2012, “Hezbollah in Latin America: An Over-Hyped Threat?” BA from American University's School of International Service (2010) and a MA from AU's Latin American Studies program, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0113/Hezbollah-in-Latin-America-an-over-hyped-threat>, 7-10-13, JS)

These incidents have added fuel to the debate in the US over the Lebanese group’s level of support in the region, which some believe poses a major security threat. Concern over this issue has been growing in recent months, likely in response to a House subcommittee hearing held in July, which saw testimony from several witnesses who claimed the group represents an immediate risk to hemispheric security. Since then, politicians in Washington have continued to hold up Hezbollah influence as one of the biggest dangers in Latin America. In September, Michelle Bachman raised eyebrows when she spoke out against normalizing relations with Cuba due to Hezbollah “missile sites” on the island. The subject even briefly became part of the presidential campaign in the country, when three leading Republican candidates voiced concern over Hezbollah support networks in the region in the November 22 CNN GOP foreign policy debate. Texas Governor Rick Perry even called for a “21st-century Monroe Doctrine” to be applied to the region, as a means of preventing the group from spreading their influence. This is not just a concern among politicians. In October the influential American Enterprise Institute (AEI) released a report which argues that the Lebanese group is “using the Western Hemisphere as a staging ground, fundraising center, and operational base to wage asymmetric warfare against the United States.” The report, entitled “The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America,” is coauthored by former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega and Foreign Policy’s Jose R. Cardena. In addition to deepening their ties to organized crime, the two claim that Hezbollah has developed friendly relationships with President Hugo Chavez and “other anti-American governments in the region.” It may be true that Hezbollah has a significant degree of support in the region, primarily among Lebanese immigrants who fled the country in response to the bloody Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s. Latin America was a popular destination for these refugees, and sizable Lebanese immigrant communities exist in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. But Hezbollah’s most notorious support base lies in the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, where it is believed that the group has connections with local gangs who engage in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, counterfeiting, and money laundering. However, this support is largely financial, and Hezbollah is not believed to actively direct criminal enterprises in the region. Instead, the group likely obtains donations from individuals who are sympathetic to the cause of spreading Islamic revolution. Despite the amount of attention they received in the press, the charges against Joumaa and Harb reflect this. Neither is accused of being a member of Hezbollah, only of cooperating with it on some level. Aside from seeking financing, there appears to be very little reason for Hezbollah to involve itself heavily in organized crime in Latin America, much less to direct criminal activities. However, there is scarce evidence for allegations that the group is developing its political connections in the region. The AEI paper cites the improved relationship between Chavez’s Venezuela and Iran, which provides covert support for Hezbollah. Because Chavez is deepening ties to Iran, Noriega and Cardena argue, he is opening up his country to the Islamic militia by proxy. However, the Venezuela-Iran connection is likely not so nefarious. Both nations are founding members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with similar economic interests, a point which Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stressed in his recent visit to the country.

### Bioterrorism

#### Bioterror risk is low—dispersal problems, tech barriers, risk of back spread—experts agree — prefer their ev theirs ———— Ken Timmerman 10, Newsmax correspondent

John Mueller, Professor, Political Science, Ohio State University, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, 2009, p. 21-22.

For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto the attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties—as an aerosol that can be inhaled—requires a delivery system whose development "would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist" Even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions." After assessing, and stressing, the difficulties a nonstate entity would find in obtaining, handling, growing, storing, processing, and dispersing lethal pathogens effectively, biological weapons expert Milton Leitenberg compares his conclusions with glib pronouncements in the press about how biological attacks can be pulled off by anyone with "a little training and a few glass jars," or how it would be "about as difficult as producing beer." He sardonically concludes, "The less the commentator seems to know about biological warfare the easier he seems to think the task is.""

### No Impact

#### Meds and containment solve

Economist, 11/22/’10

(<http://www.economist.com/node/17493456>)

Fortunately, globalisation will also speed the flow of health data. In 2011 the growing field of digital epidemiology will attract more students, health officials and resources than ever before. People in viral hotspots around the world will report suspicious human and animal deaths (often a warning sign of a coming plague) by mobile phones. These data will be posted to the web, instantly enriching the data that came from traditional surveillance systems and electronic medical records. Organisations like Google.org will scour search patterns around the world, expanding their search-based predictions of influenza to other infectious diseases. Still more creative early-detection systems will begin to pull together illness information present in social-networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, allowing us to see changing disease patterns before they make the morning news. Novel laboratory approaches to the discovery of new viruses will emerge. The long-awaited era of single-molecule DNA sequencing will begin in earnest with new machines from companies like Pacific Biosciences, and with a bit of luck this will improve the speed at which we can recognise unknown bugs. At the cutting edge, new studies of virus evolution and chips housing tiny cell cultures will improve our capacity to sort through the viral chatter and determine if a newly identified outbreak has the potential to spread globally or is likely to fade away. The discovery of new viruses will make the move from universities to laboratories around the world, helping to facilitate international scientific collaboration and decrease fears of biopiracy. Towards a global immune system In 2011 you may be among those who will watch “Contagion”, a forthcoming movie about a frightening fictional pandemic. But whether you are a head of state wary of the political and economic costs of a disease catastrophe, a CEO concerned by supply-chain and staff disruption associated with the next pandemic or a citizen worried about your family, in 2011 you will have access to better, more accurate and rapidly available data on actual outbreaks. In the increasingly popular Silicon Valley model, organisations like ours will mash up multiple data sources—combining lab results in far-flung viral listening-posts with international news feeds, text messages, social-networking and search patterns to create a new form of epidemic intelligence. The past ten years have seen noteworthy progress in the development of truly global systems. In the world of outbreaks, 2011 will mark the beginning of the development of a worldwide immune system that will detect and respond to biological threats before they go global. Although this will take years to build fully, if successful it could make pandemic anniversaries a thing of the past.

# 1NR

**Economic collapse causes more poverty**

Friedman 6 (Benjamin, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University, “THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH,” February 6, http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/friedman/files/The%20Moral%20Consequences%20of%20Economic%20Growth.pdf)

I believe this thinking is seriously, in some circum- stances dangerously, incomplete. The value of a rising standard of living lies not just in the concrete improve- ments it brings to how individuals live but in how it shapes the social, political and, ultimately, the moral character of a people. Economic growth—meaning a rising standard of liv- ing for the clear majority of citizens—more often than not fosters greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, commitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy. Ever since the Enlightenment, Western thinking has regarded each of these tendencies positively, and in explicitly moral terms. Even societies that have already made great advances in these very dimensions, for example, most of today’s Western democracies, are more likely to make still further progress when their living standards rise. But when living standards stagnate or decline, most societies make little if any progress toward any of these goals, and in all too many instances they plainly retrogress. Many countries with highly developed economies, including the United States, have experienced alternating eras of economic growth and stagnation in which their demo- cratic values have strengthened or weakened accord- ingly.

**Obviously turns economy—we control a larger timeframe**

**Growth solves terrorism**

**Schaefer, 1** – Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Center for International Trade and Economics at the Heritage Foundation (Brett D, 12/6. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1508, “Expand Freedom to Counter Terrorism.” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/12/expand-freedom-to-counter-terrorism>)

The **governments of those countries must be held responsible for policies that undermine or oppose freedom, stifle economic growth, and help create the circumstances under which terrorism flourishes**. America's battle in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda terrorist network is merely the first skirmish in a long war. **If** **the war on terrorism is to be won, and if this victory is to be sustainable, America must focus on encouraging the governments of developing countries to embrace economic liberty in order to counter the poverty and desperation upon which terrorist groups depend.**

**Economic decline causes nuclear terrorism**

Bremmer 9(Ian, President of the Eurasia Group, sr. fellow @ World Policy Institute, “Call: Global Recession = More Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, March 4, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/04/the\_global\_recession\_heightens\_terrorist\_risks)

The security deterioration of the past year in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects exactly the opposite phenomenon. In the region along both sides of their shared border, local tribal leaders have yet to express much interest in helping Pakistani and NATO soldiers target local or foreign militants. For those with the power to either protect or betray the senior al-Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in the region, NATO and Pakistani authorities have yet to find either sweet enough carrots or sharp enough sticks to shift allegiances.   The slowdown threatens to slow the progress of a number of developing countries. Most states don't provide ground as fertile for militancy as places like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But as more people lose their jobs, their homes, and opportunities for prosperity -- in emerging market countries or even within minority communities inside developed states -- it becomes easier for localmilitants to find volunteers.  This is why the growing risk of attack from suicide bombers and well-trained gunmen in Pakistan creates risks that extend beyond South Asia. This is a country that is home to lawless regions where local and international militants thrive, nuclear weapons and material, a history of nuclear smuggling, a cash-starved government, and a deteriorating economy. Pakistan is far from the only country in which terrorism threatens to spill across borders. But there's a reason why the security threats flowing back and forth across the Afghan-Pakistani border rank so highly on Eurasia Group's list of top political risks for 2009 -- and why they remain near the top of the Obama administration's security agenda.

### 2NC – Uniqueness

Republicans can be persuaded without defunding Obamacare

WP 9/26 [Ed O'Keefe, Rosalind S. Helderman and Lori Montgomery, “Shutdown grows more likely as House digs in,” 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/house-republicans-reject-senate-spending-bill-explore-strategy-to-avoid-shutdown/2013/09/26/7b585a18-26b8-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852\_story.html]

“With October 1 four days away from submission to Obamacare, I think now is the right time to protect everybody and not wait until later,” said Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), a key conservative advocate for undoing the health-care law.¶ The House GOP proposal to raise the debt ceiling would delay implementation of the health-care law for one year, it would establish a timetable for tax reform, squeeze $120 billion from federal health programs over the next decade — in part by tightening medical malpractice laws — and cut federal civil service pensions.¶ The measure also would approve construction of the Keystone XL oil pipeline and advance other GOP economic goals, including increasing offshore oil drilling, blocking federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and restricting most forms of federal industry regulation.¶ About the only major piece of the Republican agenda missing from the bill is a ban on late-term abortions — and some lawmakers who oppose abortion were arguing to add that, GOP aides said.¶ By stuffing the bill with so many appealing provisions, GOP leaders hoped to persuade at least 217 Republicans to support its sole negative aspect: raising the $16.7 trillion federal debt limit through Dec. 31, 2014 — an increase worth about $1.1 trillion, by independent estimates.¶ Rep. Pete Sessions (R-Tex.), a key leadership lieutenant, said he was “**very confident**” that **rank-and-file Republicans would support the debt-limit package**.

gop likely to lose the debt fight now

Dan Balz, wapo, 9/21/13, Fight over spending, debt and health law has risks for Republicans and Obama, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fight-over-spending-debt-and-health-law-has-risks-for-republicans-and-obama/2013/09/21/b5a86b92-22e2-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890\_story.html

Two big issues are now before the country. One puts Republicans at great risk. The other will provide a stiff test for President Obama and his administration. Together they are likely to shape the political climate for 2014 and already are influencing the contest for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, as well. The first issue is the drama over spending and debt, which will play out in two acts over the next month. This battle escalated dramatically Friday when House Republicans, yielding to the most strident wing of their party, approved a measure to fund the government past Oct. 1 while defunding the Affordable Care Act. The action in the House sets up a confrontation with the White House and congressional Democrats that could lead to a partial shutdown of the government. Republicans have no hope of winning the battle to defund Obamacare as long as this president is in office. The Senate will reject the House bill and, in any case, the president would veto anything like it that reaches his desk. A related part of the GOP strategy will unfold soon, as House Republicans try to tie a provision to delay implementation of the health-care law to the measure raising the debt ceiling before the government runs out of borrowing authority. The president, still burned by the wreckage of debt-ceiling negotiations two years ago, has said he will not negotiate over the ceiling this fall. He reiterated that in a phone call with House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) on Friday. The strategy to tie defunding of Obamacare to the government-funding bill has divided Republicans, producing an extraordinary spectacle of intraparty second-guessing and pointed criticism. The debate highlights a fundamental schism within the Republican Party. Can Republicans cater to their conservative base and still find ways to expand their appeal across the electorate in order to win back the White House in the future? Are the two mutually compatible or mutually exclusive? There are reasons Republicans feel emboldened to go after Obama’s health-care law. Three years after he signed the measure, the president has clearly failed in the public relations effort to win support for the Affordable Care Act. The latest Washington Post-ABC News poll shows that a majority of Americans say that they oppose the law—52 percent, compared with 42 percent who favor it. Among Republicans, 78 percent oppose it, and 68 percent of Republicans oppose it strongly. Overall, Democrats like the act, although 31 percent of them do not. Among independents, 54 percent are opposed. Those findings, which are consistent with polls from other organizations, have encouraged Republicans to carry on the fight to defund or delay the law with ever more determination, even if they are likely to lose this battle. They hope to energize voters in 2014 as they did in 2010. But the poll also offers evidence of the risks Republicans are taking as they set out on a path that could lead to partial shutdown of the government to force the issue of Obamacare funding. In the Post-ABC poll, only a quarter of Americans favor shutting down parts of the federal government to achieve that goal. The poll also highlights GOP divisions on this strategy: Only half of all Republicans are willing to shut down the government to block the law. No one can predict just how this battle will end, but it is already apparent that whatever the outcome, there will be recriminations within the Republican coalition. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the darling of many tea party activists, came under sharp criticism a few days ago from tea party Republicans in the House for saying the obvious, that there probably aren’t enough votes in the Senate to defund Obamacare.

Obama positioning himself to win the fiscal debates

Harold Maass, 9/20/13, The GOP is saving Obama, theweek.com/article/index/249965/the-gop-is-saving-obama#

President Obama has been taking plenty of lumps from his fellow Democrats recently. Liberals in the party have blocked his former aide Larry Summers, whom Obama reportedly wanted to put in charge of the Federal Reserve, and defected when he was trying to rally support in Congress for authorizing military strikes against Syria.

Some political analysts concluded that the defections were weakening Obama just as he headed into high-stakes showdowns with the GOP over two budgetary matters: A stopgap spending measure to keep the government from shutting down on Oct. 1; and raising the borrowing limit to keep the nation from a potentially calamitous default on some of its debts.

Republicans, however, have plenty of problems of their own. House GOP leaders clashed openly with Tea Party conservatives over whether to try to use the spending battle to defund ObamaCare, even if that means shutting down the government, or even plunging the country into default. The hardcore fiscal conservatives got their way, embarrassing — and, some say, weakening — House GOP leaders who were determined to avoid any chance of a shutdown.

The result? The GOP is locked in an ugly intraparty brawl that is serving as "a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control" of its message after Obama's recent string of setbacks, says Jonathan Allen at Politico.

John Dickerson at Slate agrees. Just when everyone was musing about the "sorry state" of Obama's presidency, he says, Republicans are "snatching defeat from the jaws of victory" by pushing the nation to the brink of an entirely avoidable disaster, and helping Obama make the argument that they were the problem, all along. Dickerson asks:

House Republicans must feel sorry for the president — why else would they take pressure off his administration by staging their own party crackup? [Slate]

Obama well positioned for fiscal fights—prices in past fights

John Dickerson, Slate, 9/19/13, The GOP’s Suicide Squeeze, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/09/the\_republican\_party\_obamacare\_and\_the\_government\_shutdown\_the\_gop\_s\_suicide.single.html

Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. That's the way several Republican members of Congress and their aides characterized the political predicament they find themselves in today. President Obama has had a rough few weeks. His plans for Syria were sloppy and uncertain. He sought Congress’s support—after his aides privately told members he wouldn’t rope them into a decision—even while he told them there was no urgency and they could enjoy their Labor Day break. Then Larry Summers, his preferred nominee to lead the Federal Reserve, was undermined by Democrats and had to pull his name from consideration. The president got snippy about all the criticism, which invited a round of stories and columns about the sorry state of his presidency.

House Republicans must feel sorry for the president—why else would they take pressure off his administration by staging their own party crackup? House Republican leaders, under threat from their most conservative members, have offered a plan to keep the government operating through December that is conditioned on defunding Obama's unpopular health care plan. The worry among a large group of Republicans is that the gambit will lead to a government shutdown, which will be a political disaster for the party, weaken their leverage in the budget fights, and upend the worthy goal of dismantling Obamacare. “People are not going to blame the president for shutting down the government," says Republican Sen. Ron Johnson of Wisconsin. "The White House and Democrats have the upper hand here."

### 2NC – Winners Win

#### Wins don’t spill over- bruising effort doesn’t generate capital-

Michael Hirsch, Daily Beast, 1-19-2010 <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/19/the-politics-of-hubris.html>

There was nothing new about this, of course. It falls into the age-old annals of hubris, the same excess of pride that got Achilles and Agamemnon in trouble with the gods. Obama apparently did buy into the idea that he was a Man of Destiny and, being one, possessed bottomless supplies of political capital. But he really had no more political capital than any first-year president, and he was straining his reserves just dealing with the stimulus and financial reform, much less fixing Afghanistan.¶ I first became worried about this bridge-too-far problem last year while covering financial reform on the Hill, when various congressional staffers told me their bosses didn't really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room—and from their brains, the aides said. Obama and his team seemed barely focused on transforming the financial system—except now, belatedly—and left a lot of the infighting to regulators like Gary Gensler, the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Obama had spoken admiringly of Ronald Reagan as a transformational president. And yet at what would seem to be a similar historical inflection point—what should have been the end of Reaganite free-market fundamentalism and a laserlike scourging of Wall Street—Obama seemed to put this once-in-a-lifetime task on a back burner.¶ It is only now, a year later, when he has a terrific fight on his hands over health care, that Obama is talking about seriously breaking up the structure of Wall Street. The big-bank lobby will dig in big time of course, and seek to buy everyone it can on Capitol Hill, which means that the president will need even more political capital that he no longer has.¶ Just as bad, when the president did do health care—whatever version of it squeaks through now—he seemed to be getting such a meager result for so bruising an effort that it will be a long time before anyone has the stomach to set it right legislatively.

#### PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized- newest ev

Todd **Eberly** is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is teeberly@smcm.edu. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., **1-21**-2013 <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2>

As Barack Obama prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he faces the stark reality that little of what he hopes to accomplish in a second term will likely come to pass. Mr. Obama occupies an office that many assume to be all powerful, but like so many of his recent predecessors, the president knows better. He faces a political capital problem and a power trap.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, presidents have found the exercise of effective leadership a difficult task. To lead well, a president needs support — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. If presidents fail to satisfy these requirements, they face the prospect of inadequate political support or political capital to back their power assertions.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the two parties began ideologically divergent journeys that resulted in intense polarization in Congress, diminishing the possibility of bipartisan compromise. These changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. In recent years, presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

#### Uniquely true of second term presidents

Bert Atkinson Jr., Independent Review Journal, 3-12-2031 <http://www.ijreview.com/2013/03/41467-love-affair-ending-obamas-political-capital-declining/>

The second term is notoriously tough for two term candidates. Clinton had a little snafu on his …hands during his second term that led to impeachment, and George W. Bush was demonized time and time again.¶ Now, it could be that Barack Obama is facing a similar fate…¶ If President Barack Obama had piled up political capital with his impressive re-election, it’s largely gone.¶ His approval rating has dropped to the lowest level in more than a year, with more voters now turning thumbs down on his performance than thumbs up, according to a new McClatchy-Marist poll. The measure of how much people like him also has dropped.¶ He’s still vastly more popular than Congress, particularly congressional Republicans. But in the biggest political clash of the year – over the federal budget and how to curb deficits – voters split 44 percent to 42 percent between preferring Congress or Obama.¶ What? There’s no Mitt Romney to be held up against?¶ Blame Congressional Republicans all you want, but in 50 years when children are reading American history books about the infamous fiscal cliff/debt ceiling/sequestration debacles of 2013, they will certainly not remember names like Mitch McConnell or John Boehner; they will absolutely read about President Obama and how all of this happened under his lack of leadership.¶ “This may be the downside of him coming out of the box stronger in the second term,” Miringoff said. “People are now looking for him to lead us out of this stalemate, provide more leadership. People see him as a strong figure and in the driver’s seat. During the election, it was him versus Romney. Now it’s him versus people’s expectations for the country.”¶ Expectations: Obama will have a tough time meeting them. I know the mainstream media has been in the tank for Obama for a half-decade now, but they still answer to ratings. If I had to take a guess, I would say that there will be more negative news stemming from the growing discontent of his ability to follow through on his promises. I’m not saying we’re about to see MSNBC go all Fox News on the guy, but the broken promises and evolutions and flip-flops can only go on for so long before people start catching on. Let’s just say that if Obama is still sending a thrill up your leg at this point, you’ve got some issues. (Looking at you, Chris Matthews.)