# 1NC

## 1NC – Procedural

#### Engagement” requires direct talks with the target government

Crocker 9 – Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Terms of Engagement”, New York Times, 9-13, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=0

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon.

The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes.

Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement.

So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

## 1NC – Disad (1)

#### **Relations high – empirically partners – recent meeting proves**

Aljazeera 12 – Aljazeera News, (“Cuba seeks strong trade ties with China”, Article Written for Aljazeera, 7/7/12, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/2012775380851346.html>, AW)

Cuba has signed a series of economic agreements with China coinciding with a visit to Beijing by leader Raul Castro. The four-day visit, which began on Thursday, has offered Castro a first-hand look at Chinese economic reforms. The pacts inked on Thursday include a grant and interest-free loan to the Cuban government for economic and technological co-operation. They also inculde a credit line to support Cuban health care and other public services, but further details were not given. The signings followed talks in which Castro told Hu Jintao, China's president, that relations between the two nations were deepening and broadening. The trip is Castro's first to China since taking over from his brother in 2008. Cuba watchers have speculated he would study China's mix of socialism and market liberalisation of which he spoke approvingly during a 1997 visit. Asked what Cuba could learn, Liu Weimin, the foreign ministry spokesman, said China was eager to share its experiences. "We consider that mutual communications benefit helping countries adopt a suitable model for economic and social development depending on concrete local conditions," Liu told reporters at a briefing. Cuba is China's biggest commercial partner in the Caribbean. Beijing helped prop up the Cuban economy after the withdrawal of Russian aid in the 1990s. Bilateral trade totalled $1.8bn in 2010. Though both communist nations, China has opened broadly to private business and has thrived economically while Cuba remains largely poor.

#### Cuba trade reverses Chinese bilateral dominance

Luko 11 – (James – Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European Research, the Smithsonian Institute and two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defence, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped”, 6/29, <http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html>)

The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United States- CUBA. Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]

#### Lack of US economic engagement spurs China’s growth.

Erikson & Chen ‘7 – (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

China’s economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America-par- ticularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas.9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean ex- ceeded $2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year.10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower with- out a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituen- cies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western inten- tions. 12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China-to the extent that this has actually occurred-is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about Chinas rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competi- tion posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China seeks to reassure the United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing has begun enlisting regional powers like Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur), which places certain constraints on member states' bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its avowals to Washington, China appears to be using its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective of stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

#### CCP Collapse causes nuclear and biological warfare

Renxing 5 (San, Epic Times Staff Member, The CCP’s Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War, 8/5/5, The Epoch Times,<http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30975.html>)

As *The Epoch Times*’ *Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party* spreads ever wider in China, the truth it speaks is awakening Chinese people to the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and inspiring them to cancel their Party memberships. With the number of people quitting the Party growing rapidly by the day, the Communist Party sees that the end is near. In a show of strength to save itself from demise, the CCP has brought out a sinister plan that it has been preparing for years, a last-ditch gamble to extend its life. This plan is laid out in two speeches written by Chi Haotian, Minster of Defense and vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, and posted on the Internet. The background surrounding the speeches is still shrouded in mystery. The titles of the two speeches are “[War Is Approaching Us](http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-4/30974.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)” [[1]](http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30975.html#1) and “[War Is Not Far from Us and Is the Midwife of the Chinese Century](http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-4/30974.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank).” The two, judging from their similar contexts and consistent theme, are indeed sister articles. These speeches describe in a comprehensive, systematic, and detailed way the CCP’s nearly 20 years of fear and helplessness over its doomed fate, and its desperate fight to extend its life. In particular, the speeches lay uncharacteristically bare what is really on the CCP’s mind and hide nothing from the public—a rare confession from the CCP that can help people understand its evil nature. If one truly understands what is said in this confession, one will immediately catch on to the CCP’s way of thinking. In short, the speeches are worth reading, and I would like to comment on them. I. A Gangster Gambles with the World as His Stake, and the Lives of People in this Global Village Become Worthless What, then, is the gist of this wild, last-ditch gamble? To put it in a few words: A cornered beast is fighting desperately to survive in a battle with humanity. If you don’t believe me, read some passages directly from the speeches. 1) “We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack [on the US], the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the U.S. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the U.S., China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities. Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone!” 2) “In any event, we, the CCP, will never step down from the stage of history! We’d rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history!!! Isn’t there a ‘nuclear bondage’ theory? It means that since the nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate our Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are finished, China will be finished, and the world will be finished.” 3) “It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else!” Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. *That* is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that they will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: That of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

#### Collapse of the Chinese government causes border conflict with Russia

Lo and Rothman 6 [Bobo Lo and Andy Rothman, May 2006, Asian Geopolitics, special report http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7057/is\_2\_9/ai\_n28498825/pg\_17/]

The second scenario for strategic conflict is predicated on a general collapse of law and order in China. With no effective central authority to contain the anarchy, millions of Chinese could cross the border into the Russian Far East. This would lead to tensions and clashes, at first sporadic and random, but subsequently escalating into interstate conflict.

#### Nuclear winter

Sharavin 01[Alexander, What the Papers Say, 10-3-01, The Third Threat]

Russia may face the “wonderful” prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia’s entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become less strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such “trifles” like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia’s armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the “Chechen” and the “Balkan” variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

## 1NC – Disad (2)

#### Russian Economy will not collapse – stable now

Adomanis 8/27 – (2013, Mark Contributor for Forbes Magazine, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/27/do-you-think-russias-economy-is-doomed-the-bond-market-doesnt-agree/) rss

Earlier this year I wrote [several articles](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/01/07/why-russias-economy-isnt-going-to-collapse/) pushing back against some [particularly alarmist](http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/12/30/the-end-of-putinomics.html) interpretations of Russia’s economy. After predicting Russia’s imminent implosion no less than 6 or 7 different times over the past decade I’m genuinely amazed that Owen Matthews wasn’t a little more gunshy in saying that 2013 was definitely the year in which everything would come crashing down around the Kremlin’s ears, but you really do not need to search very long or hard to find people who are [extremely disdainful](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/is-russia-already-in-recession-.html) of Russia’s economic performance and of the “obliviousness” and general stupidity of its policy makers.¶ It’s true that Russia’s economy is [slowing down](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/19/russias-economy-really-is-slowing-down-unemployment-ticked-up-in-q2-2013/) and its also true that the authorities [don’t have any easy choices](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-russia-gdp-forecast-idUSBRE97P0C620130826): monetary easing will likely spark inflation, and the state’s ability to engage in fiscal pump-priming is highly constrained. Growth over the next few years will be decidedly sub-par when compared to the 2000 boom years and even to the modest 2010-12 bounce back from the Great Recession.¶ However, if Russia really was rapidly approaching an economic dead-end, if there was increasingly recognition that its model was not going to survive, you would expect to see the Russian government’s borrowing costs go up. Yes Russia’s stock of government debt is not particularly large (at only around 10% of GDP) but if the market came to an understanding that the economic situation was going to get a lot worse in the not too distant future then investors would demand higher returns. Demand for Russian debt would go down, and the interest rates on that debt would go up. Economics 101.¶ And that’s exactly what happened during the worst days of the 2008-09 crisis: Russia’s borrowing costs skyrocketed from around 7% to almost 11% because there were serious, and perfectly understandable, doubts about Russia’s ability to weather the economic storm.¶ Since the crisis ended, however, the interest rates on long-term Russian government securities haven’t done much – they’ve bounced around within a relatively narrow range and are at about the same level now that they were back in 2006. This would seem, to me at least, to reflect market expectations of business as usual: not overly-rapid economic growth, but certainly not some sort of spectacular collapse.¶ Is it possible that the bond market is wrong? Sure. It’s possible that the market is wrong just as it is possible that Putin will be overthrown before the end of the year or that I will win the lottery. Almost anything is possible. But it certainly does not seem likely that the bond market would be so studiously immune to a mounting economic catastrophe. What that chart says to me is that things will continue in pretty much same vein, and that there aren’t going to be any big changes one way or another.¶ Russia’s economy might not be performing particularly well at the moment, but there’s very little evidence that it’s going to come screeching to a halt. So if like many Westerners you’re eagerly waiting for Putin to be ousted by a crippling economic crisis, you’re going to be waiting for a long time.

#### Lifting the embargo decreases oil prices

**Cala, 13 –** (Andres Cala, author on energy security. July 7, 2011. “Drill, Cuba, Drill.” http://www.energytribune.com/8204/drill-cuba-drill#sthash.4mplZhlX.dpbs)//SDL

The US should be cheering, not just because any significant oil find will contribute directly and immediately to American energy security. Assuming lifting the embargo is still too politically risky (and it shouldn’t be), Congress should seize the imminent arrival of the rig, the Norwegian designed Scarabeo 9, to relax the embargo on the communist island to allow US energy companies to partake in Cuban exploration and production.¶ Forget the fact that being communist or anti-democratic is no deterrent to American energy industry elsewhere. The US already imports almost 10 percent of its oil from Cuba’s closest ally Venezuela. Should the US now also penalize all companies investing there, including American ones?¶ It makes no sense to thwart Cuban efforts to increase oil output perhaps in as little as three years, especially considering oil prices that will remain stubbornly high because demand growth is rising faster than supply growth.

#### Oil prices key to Russia’s economy – over half of government revenue

**Schuman, 12 –** (Michael Schuman, Associated Press Staff Writer for Times. July 5, 2012. “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices,” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/)//SDL

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself.¶ Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues.¶ What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago.¶ Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

#### Russian economic decline causes nuclear war

Filger 9 (Sheldon, Author – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

**In Russia**, historically, **economic** health **and** political **stability are intertwined** to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that **desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations**. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

## 1NC – Disad (3)

#### Lifting the embargo signals US weakness and strengthens the regime

Brookes 9 (Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” April 16, 2009, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o>)

Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Strong strategies are key to maintain international credible image of the US

Enold 09 (Scott A. Enold, Colonel, United States Air Force, “ROGUE STATES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY” 02-04-2009, Strategy research project)

To effectively engage rogue states who have proliferated nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or are attempting to proliferate them, the United States must develop and implement an effective policy designed to persuade, pursue and punish those governments and regimes. The United States government must possess extreme tactics and measures. Preemptive targeting must be available if rogue states or actors utilize nuclear terror tactics as they seek political gains or to be recognized as a key participant in the world balance of power. It is imperative that rogue states or actors cannot employ nuclear weapons. As rogue states acquire nuclear technology, the United States must develop a range of policies to apply constant pressure on these states. The United States must be prepared to demonstrate resiliency to attacks should they occur. The United States government must prepare its citizens to accept the fact terrorist acts will occur on the continent. The citizens must understand that every effort is made to protect the population. Actors exist who seek to harm citizens or provide evidence of weak resolve or weak policies inside the United States. In doing so, rouge states or actors seek to secure a foothold for a continued exploitation of the United States. Presently, the United States National Security Strategy does not lay out a direct policy demonstrating a complete and unconditional strategy to stop rogue state or actor nuclear weapon employment. There must be actionable and if necessary violent steps available to take against rogue states and actors. They must to be aware of and understand the harsh retaliation should they chose to utilize a nuclear option.

#### That avoids US-Sino conflict – tons of flashpoints

Dobbins 12 (James Dobbins, American diplomat who served as United States Ambassador to the European Union and as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Member of the American Academy of Diplomacy “War with China” August 1 2012) CA

While the risk of conflict with China cannot be ignored, neither should it be exaggerated. Any number of other conflicts are more likely, some in places we cannot even vaguely foresee at present. These more likely conflicts will be with opponents quite different from China and will call for capabilities quite dissimilar from those required to deal with a real peer competitor. Individually, these contingencies will be less consequential than a conflict with China, but collectively they will shape the international environment in which both countries interact, and will fundamentally influence Chinese perceptions of American power and determination. Coping successfully with these smaller challenges may be one of the best ways to ensure that the United States and China never have to fight the larger conflict.

#### Any conflict goes nuclear

McDaniel 7 (Aby McDaniel, “United States vs China - Consequences of a Nuclear War” The Internationalist http://www.abytheliberal.com/world-politics/united-states-vs-china-consequences-of-a-nuclear-war) CA

A nuclear war between China and United States will likely be a US first strike on China. Due to its smaller arsenal and limited number of ICBMs, China would not risk a first strike on the US mainland. Hence, we will assume a US first strike and what follows. In the advent of a US first strike on China, the targets are more likely to be Chinese ICBM silos, as the US would first attempt to eliminate chances of retaliation as much as possible. A US attack on China’s ICBM silos would kill at least 1.5 million to 20 million civilians depending on the type and the number of warheads used. Assuming that most of its land based silos have been destroyed, China’s choice of retaliatory strike would be its submarine based SLBMs. Assuming that 12 JL-2 SLBMs with MIRV warheads are launched from two Jin class submarines, at least 20 of the largest American cities could be targeted. This would result in extermination of 25 million to 100 million civilians, which would be more devastating on the US than the first strike would be on China.

If we take more realistic standards, a nuclear war between China and USA would result in much higher casualties for both sides, due to real world lack of considerations. One would most likely obliterate the other or worse, both countries would be destroyed before a truce or victory call could be reached. It is more likely that Americans would suffer the most because of their lower population and lack of creature comforts (that they are habituated to). The Chinese on the other hand, would have more suvivours because of their much larger population, which is also much more adapted to adversity and wars than the American people.

## 1NC – Counterplan

Text –**The European Union will increase economic engagement with the Republic of Cuba.**

#### **US engagement fails because it’s** perceived to be openly adversarial---the counterplan creates multilateral solutions to democratizes Cuba

Erikson 9 (Daniel P. Erikson is senior associate for U.S. policy and director of Caribbean programs at the Inter-American Dialogue and author of The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution. Paul Wander of the Inter-American Dialogue provided research and editorial assistance for this paper. “Europe’s Cuba Problem: The Limits of Constructive Engagement,” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2102)

The major challenge of EU policy remains how best to manage its conflicting conditional and constructive engagement strategies. In fact, although EU policy towards Cuba is commonly described as ‘constructive engagement’, it is perhaps more accurately termed ‘conditional engagement’ because it does include certain political and human rights conditions. EU policy has been good at promoting change in countries that want to become members of the European Union, but it has not developed the same leverage with states that have no chance of becoming EU member states. Additionally, whereas Cuba had few economic alternatives to Europe in 1996, today in has a wide array of important partners including China, Venezuela, Russia and Brazil. Finally, Cuba is still a marginal issue for most European governments, and the Cuban regime will always be in a position to outmaneuver the EU. This asymmetry makes a conditional policy problematic. EU policy is thus caught between conditional engagement that has had scant impact and engagement without conditions, an approach that would leave the EU vulnerable to criticism that its Cuba policy has no significant human rights component. One potential way to break the impasse would be to formulate an alternative approach based on several guiding principles for EU member states—such as encouraging democratic reform and economic engagement while maintaining links with the current government—but with an emphasis on countries experimenting with different policy approaches on a national level beyond the EU Common Position. This would allow each individual member country to pursue its own policies according to its national interests and comparative advantages. While every European government will take its own position bilaterally, there can be some ‘unity in diversity’; an umbrella set of principles that can guide the work of the EU countries. European governments should continue to press Cuba on issues related to democracy and human rights, including addressing their concerns in meetings with Cuban officials. EU embassies can be seen as a safe haven for dissidents and the EU can retain contacts with these groups and other opposition groups such as the church. However, the EU does well to avoid supporting these groups financially, in part because this undermines their legitimacy in Cuba and attracts the attention of state security, thereby multiplying their problems. Economic engagement is another bedrock principle for Europe. Through two-way trade, investment, and tourism, the EU can create incentives for gradual change. But the EU should move beyond these pillars of economic engagement. Through European lending institutions and joint ventures, the EU is well-positioned to advise and encourage the process of ‘enterprise perfecting’ that Raúl Castro has made a public goal. Additionally, communication and cooperation with European states with strong public service sectors could be beneficial to both parties. Europe has lauded the achievements of Cuban healthcare and education while acknowledging that public oversight in these sectors often limits efficiency and creates shortages of supplies and personnel. While Europe might not be fertile ground for a Barrio Adentro programme like the one that has placed about 25,000 Cuban doctors abroad in Venezuela, the EU social democracy model might be one that is more appealing to the Cubans than the prevalent US socio-economic model. At the moment, the EU has relatively high-level contacts with and access to Cuban government officials. This is the primary advantage of the European position and this level of communication should be maintained if not expanded. The EU could seize the opportunity to reach out to Raúl following Fidel’s death. Raúl may be inclined to work with European governments. The EU is particularly well-positioned to engage and influence the new government, because, unlike the United States, it is not perceived to be openly adversarial. However, the European role in a future democratic transition in Cuba will be limited by the fact that any political or economic change in Cuba will need to be managed first and foremost by the Cubans themselves. Internationally, the United States remains the dominant actor for reasons of political and economic weight, proximity, and history, and few European countries (except perhaps Spain) have either the interest or the capacity to play a major role. Still, some sort of multilateral guidelines would be useful for countries as they search for effective policies during the transition period in Cuba. A coordinated effort from Europe would also have more weight in influencing the new Cuban leadership. In order to build a consensus that utilizes the leverage of collective action on the part of all 27 member states but does not compromise the core beliefs of each, the EU could act in the following areas: 1. Establish a high-level non-governmental forum for multilateral dialogue. The wide range of international stakeholders engaged with Cuba—including foreign governments, international development agencies, Cuban diaspora groups, and NGOs—would benefit from a more regular forum for communication. It is clear that the sensitivity of the Cuban issue for the governments of Europe means that official governmental channels are ill-suited to generate constructive dialogue. International and multilateral institutions are similarly constrained—either because Cuba is not a member, as is the case with the Organization of the American States and the main multilateral development banks—or because Cuba’s official participation would make frank discussion difficult, as is true in the context of the UN or the Ibero-American Summit process. 2. Work with Latin America’s progressive democrats to re-engage with Cuba. Over the past decade, a number of Latin America’s historically left-wing parties have won power and carved out a moderate, democratic approach to governance in the region. While Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez has emerged as the most visible symbol of the Latin American left, the reality is that progressive leaders with democratic values and moderate economic policies have won power in Brazil and Chile and other democratic left-wing parties are active throughout South and Central America. Many of these leaders favour strong ties with Washington and have gently pressured Cuba to reform politically. However, many of these leaders have essentially ceded the issue of Cuba to the region’s left-wing populist leaders with tense ties with the United States, such as Venezuela and Bolivia. The hemisphere’s political template today presents an opportunity for Latin America’s moderate countries to become more active in bringing Cuba into the democratic community of states. One starting point would be to assemble a group of 10-12 current and former Latin American officials with unquestionable democratic credentials at home and a reasonable level of access to the Cuban government, who could meet with high-level Cubans from all sectors of society and assess the thinking of the current Cuban leadership and suggest possible ways forward. 3. Replace the European Common Position with an approach that better suits the diverse interests and comparative advantages of the member countries. The European Union’s Common Position has outlived its usefulness and has hindered EU member states from developing a more flexible approach tailored to strengths and interests of each nation. It may be more helpful for EU members to agree to a narrow set of guiding principles, such as support for expanding political and civil liberties, the importance of dialogue, and continued economic engagement, rather than attempt to have a single policy of conditional engagement with the regime. Certain European governments can work to identify people in middle-to-senior management in the Cuban Government who might be open to change, especially in the economic sphere. Other governments may be better suited to work with non-governmental institutions such as the church or emerging non-state actors. A recast strategy by the European Union would allow it to harness its diversity as a strength in approaching Cuba, rather than a weakness that results in a watered-down approach to Cuba. 4. Encourage the integration of Cuba into the global economic and political system. Cuba has grown accustomed to operating with diplomatic skill and aplomb within multilateral institutions like the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement and has garnered political capital within those orders as a traditionally shunned entity. But Cuban absence in other crucial bodies, such as the OAS, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank, hinders Cuba’s integration into the core institutions of the international community and misses a key opportunity to engage Cuba multilaterally on core political and economic questions. The EU can develop dialogue mechanisms to explore ways to better integrate Cuba into critical institutions and leverage these resources to advance the quality of life for the Cuban people. 5. Provide technical expertise, advice and financing to help Cuba evolve into a politically and economically more open society. The newest members of the EU have made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy over the past two decades, and these experiences carry important lessons for Cuba’s eventual democratization. In the final analysis, Cuba’s post-Fidel transition is likely to be difficult, and the country will face an array of serious problems. Washington has long been at odds with European governments on how to deal with Cuba. US concerns regarding suppression of political and civil liberties in Cuba are shared across Europe, as is US support for democratic politics in Cuba. Still, there is deep unease with Washington’s punitive and restrictive policies, and its desire to shape events in Cuba. While the Obama Administration has given hope to those who seek improved US-Cuba relations, it will not be easy to shift the US strategy away from isolation towards broader engagement with Cuba. However, the modest proposals described above may help to facilitate a more constructive multilateral approach to Cuba’s future.

## 1NC – Kritik

#### The affirmative’s move to deregulate trade with Cuba by removing sanctions on cuba produces a field of atomized, competitive political and social relations that reinforce neoliberal governmentality.

Read ‘9 (Jason, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine, “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity,” Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 25-36, February 2009, AM)

For Antonio Negri there is a direct relationship between real subsumption as a transformation of the capitalist mode of production and neoliberalism as a trans-formation of the presentation of capitalism. It is not simply that neoliberalism works to efface the fundamental division between worker and capitalist, between wages and capital, through the production of neo-liberal subjectivity. After all this opposi-tion, this antagonism has preexisted neoliberalism by centuries. Neoliberalism is a discourse and practice that is aimed to curtail the powers of labor that are distri-buted across all of society—at the exact moment in which all of social existence be-comes labor, or potential labor, neoliberalism constructs the image of a society of ca-pitalists, of entrepreneurs. As production moves from the closed space of the factory to become distributed across all of social space, encompassing all spheres of cultural and social existence, neoliberalism presents an image of society as a market, effacing production altogether.18 This underscores the difference between neoliberalism as a form of power and the disciplinary power at work in the closed spaces of the factory. If disciplinary power worked by confining and fixing bodies to the production appa-ratuses, neoliberal power works by dispersing bodies and individuals through pri-vatization and isolation. Deregulation, the central term and political strategy of neo-liberalism, is not the absence of governing, or regulating, but a form of governing through isolation and dispersion.19 As more and more wealth is produced by the col-lective social powers of society, neoliberalism presents us with an image of society made up of self-interested individuals. For Negri, neoliberalism and the idea of hu-man capital is a misrepresentation of the productive powers of society. “The only problem is that extreme liberalization of the economy reveals its opposite, namely that the social and productive environment is not made up of atomized individu-als…the real environment is made up of collective individuals.”20 In Negri’s analysis, the relation between neoliberalism and real subsumption takes on the characteristics of a Manichean opposition. We are all workers or we are all capitalists: either view society as an extension of labor across all social spheres, from the factory to the school to the home, and across all aspects of human existence, from the work of the hands to the mind, or view society as a logic of competition and investment that en-compasses all human relationships. While Negri’s presentation has an advantage over Foucault’s lectures in that it grasps the historical formation of neoliberalism against the backdrop of a specific transformation of capital, in some sense following Foucault’s tendency to present disciplinary power and biopower against the back-drop of specific changes in the economic organization of society, it does so by almost casting neoliberalism as an ideology in the pejorative sense of the term. It would ap-pear that for Negri real subsumption is the truth of society, and neoliberalism is only a misrepresentation of that truth. As Thomas Lemke has argued, Foucault’s idea of governmentality, is argued against such a division that posits actual material reality on one side and its ideological misrepresentation on the other. A governmentality is a particular mentality, a particular manner of governing, that is actualized in habits, perceptions, and subjectivity. Governmentality situates actions and conceptions on the same plane of immanence.21 Which is to say, that any criticism of neoliberalism as governmentality must not focus on its errors, on its myopic conception of social existence, but on its particular production of truth. For Foucault, we have to take se-riously the manner in which the fundamental understanding of individuals as go-verned by interest and competition is not just an ideology that can be refused and debunked, but is an intimate part of how our lives and subjectivity are structured. Despite Negri’s tendency to lapse back into an opposition between labor and ideology, his object raises important questions echoed by other critics of neoliberal-ism. What is lost in neoliberalism is the critical distance opened up between different spheres and representations of subjectivity, not only the difference between work and the market, as in Marxism, but also the difference between the citizen and the economic subject, as in classical liberalism. All of these differences are effaced as one relation; that of economic self-interest, or competition, replaces the multiple spaces and relations of worker, citizen, and economic subject of consumption. To put the problem in Foucault’s terms, what has disappeared in neoliberalism is the tactical polyvalence of discourse; everything is framed in terms of interests, freedoms and risks.22 As Wendy Brown argues, one can survey the quotidian effects or practices of governmentality in the manner in which individualized/market based solutions ap-pear in lieu of collective political solutions: gated communities for concerns about security and safety; bottled water for concerns about water purity; and private schools (or vouchers) for failing public schools, all of which offer the opportunity for individuals to opt out rather than address political problems.23 Privatization is not just neoliberalism’s strategy for dealing with the public sector, what David Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, but a consistent element of its particular form of governmentality, its ethos, everything becomes privatized, institutions, structures, issues, and problems that used to constitute the public.24 It is privatization all the way down. For Brown, neoliberalism entails a massive de-democratization, as terms such as the public good, rights and debate, no longer have any meaning. “The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her or himself among various social, po-litical, and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options.”25 Thus, while it is possible to argue that neoliberalism is a more flexi-ble, an open form of power as opposed to the closed spaces of disciplines, a form of power that operates on freedoms, on a constitutive multiplicity, it is in some sense all the more closed in that as a form of governmentality, as a political rationality, it is without an outside**.** It does not encounter any tension with a competing logic of worker or citizen, with a different articulation of subjectivity. States, corporations, individuals are all governed by the same logic, that of interest and competition.

#### The plan locks in a neoliberal approach to energy and social relations---fossil fuels create an unsustainable market model that causes social and ecological crisis the alternative is to vote negative to align yourself against neoliberalism

Tim Di Muzio 12, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research, University of Helsinki, 2012, “The crisis of petro-market civilization: the past as prologue?,” in Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, ed. Gill, p. 83-85

Current trends, then, are patently unsustainable. However, the scale of the social transformation needed to move towards a post-carbon pattern of social reproduction is enormous, and demands nothing less than bold global, national and local community participation and leadership. I would like to suggest here that, although civil society organizations and policy-makers recognize the severity of the task, the solutions currently being proposed are issued from neoliberal governmental discourses that may exacerbate the looming crisis of social reproduction. Neoliberal governmentality is a method and strategy of rule that prioritizes the anarchy of private enterprise, economic growth, market mechanisms and individual responsibility over long-term democratic public planning for sustainable forms of social reproduction. A recent study has suggested how entrenched and widespread neoliberal policies are, while others have elaborated on and refined Michel Foucault’s initial investigation of neoliberal governmentality (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). My own purpose here is not to assess these interventions but, rather, to offer a brief conceptualization of neoliberal governmentality and then to show how this mode of rule approaches some of the challenges mentioned above. The politico-strategic rationality that animates neoliberal mentalities of rule starts from the notion that human beings are individual rational actors who pursue their interests by making cost–benefit calculations. For neoliberals, it is impossible for public policymakers to know the individual interests of each person, let alone the sum total of these interests. This leads neoliberals to argue that complex societies should be coordinated by price signals in the market, since these are the most effective and efficient conveyors of information. Moreover, as markets are the primary conveyors of information and allocators of goods and services, they should not be limited by spatial or political boundaries, since this would distort information and constrain human possibilities. In this rendition of human purpose, there can be no shared, collective or planned vision for a political community to achieve other than preparing for market competition. For neoliberals, to do so would be anathema, because it would imply that some individual or group is imposing its own will on everyone else. However, this starting point is not grounded in an empirically verifiable human nature or ontology for neoliberals; it is a norm or state to be achieved by actively creating the productive constraints that will provide the guidelines and rules for shaping human behaviour, so that it increasingly resembles the behaviour of an imagined Homo economicus abstracted from natural limits. In other words, neoliberals are not against planning, as they want to arrange liberty artificially so that individuals can compete to pursue their own ends; however, they are against particular forms of planning that would have individuals directed towards some specific end not of their choosing. What this means is that the utopian goal of neoliberal governmentality is a political community of entrepreneurial firms and individuals that should largely govern themselves according to their interests, defined as financial or material gain. In doing so, these activities are presumed to generate economic growth. However, this politico-strategic rationality is not just directed at creating the conditions of existence for calculating individuals. The government itself is supposed to be subjected to the same market criteria or imperatives. Policies are to be assessed and audited based on their ability to foster private enterprise. Government programmes are to be evaluated for their costs and what they return to the political community, and against the possibility that market forces would be better allocators of publicly provided goods and services. For this reason, some of the main tactics and techniques employed by neoliberal governors include commodification, privatization, deregulation, ‘responsibilizing’ individuals and creating incentives for firms. What this means in the context of the looming crisis of social reproduction is that market mechanisms and the consumer and investment choices of individuals and firms will be responsible for meeting the challenges of a post-carbon world order (Bernstein 2002; Conca 2000; Levy and Newell 2002; Mansfield 2004). For example, in place of a coordinated government programme designed to prepare populations for the end of a highly energy-intensive consumerist lifestyle and drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, individual responsibility is promoted. These include attempts at reducing personal consumption, conserving energy, recycling waste, buying green organic products, retrofitting houses for energy efficiency, promoting the use of reusable shopping bags, green reskilling and encouraging home gardening, just to mention a few initiatives. At the level of the firm, incentives are currently directed at promoting a corporate-led green capitalism while at the same time continuing to promote the discovery and extraction of fossil fuels for energy use. Policies to encourage green capitalism include mandating greater fuel efficiency and hybrid cars, funding the research and development of carbon-sequestration and green technologies to control pollution and liberalizing energy markets and making them more competitive. A look at some leading energy policies from the United States and the European Union shows that they also include incentives for firms to exploit renewable energy opportunities in solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, hydroelectric and tidal power, with some claims that renewables should make up a certain percentage of the total primary mix by a given date (White House 2010). For instance, on this last point, the European Union’s energy policy aims to have 20 per cent of its primary energy come from renewable sources by 2020 (European Commission 2010). Another leading policy response to global warming has been the promotion of cap and trade systems that allow corporations to pollute up to a point and thereafter purchase permits for additional pollution (Bond 2008). In other words, neoliberals undoubtedly recognize that a form of social reproduction reliant on fossil fuels and ecological degradation poses significant challenges. The question is this: are neoliberal policies that privilege individual responsibility, private enterprise and market mechanisms capable of preparing world society for a post-carbon-dependent social order within a timeframe that avoids serious crises?

##  Advantage 1

#### No endless intervention or genocide

David Mathieson and, Associate Fellow at FRIDE. He holds a doctorate from the University of London, Richard Youngs 6, Co-ordinator of the Democratisation programme at FRIDE, and lecturer at the University of Warwick, “Democracy Promotion and the European Left: Ambivalence Confused?”, December, working paper 29 at FRIDE

Equally important, leftist analysts and politicians on the other (pro-Iraq invasion) side of the debate must also de-link their views on Iraq from the broader democracy agenda. A fixation with justifying the Iraq invasion from a progressive point of view is also in danger of obscuring a clearer vision on more proactive democracy promotion.29 This ‘democracy by force’ debate is a diversion. One analyst points out that this debate has dragged the European left into rallying forcefully behind the ‘imperialism’ judged to lie behind a small number of interventions, but to ignore the far larger number of cases around the world where the West has by its inaction and silence been complicit with autocracy.30 There is no prospect of a far-reaching ‘doctrine of democratic intervention’. Debate at the multilateral level has long settled on the view that an absence of democracy cannot in itself justify military intervention in a particular country. At least for the present, no state appears likely to challenge this. The morality of military intervention is of course a crucial issue for international ethics; but, the core business of democracy promotion is essentially about civilian strategies. It is here where the left must engage and have something more creative and productive to say. More than any other foreign policy issue of modern times, Iraq has split the European left. Some important points have been made, not least those around the validity of international law and the efficacy of using armies for regime change. But the debate has also been damaging and confused. When not actively disagreeing with each other some on the left have appeared simply to be talking at cross-purposes. Tony Blair’s speeches abound with references linking democracy with firmness whilst Zapatero constantly stresses the need for democracy through non-prescriptive dialogue. The European left risks regressing to an unsatisfactory binary distinction between ‘intervention’ and ‘doing nothing’ in non-democratic countries. Ironically, while it lambasts US military power, the left itself appears to have slid back towards a Westphalian view of international relations, reversing the evolution in its own internal debates during the 1990s.

#### Desecuritization is not emancipatory---it’s worse for every tangible impact they isolate

Nunes 7 – Joao Reis Nunes, Marie Curie Fellow and Ph. D. Candidate in International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth, September 2007, “Politics, Security, Critical Theory: A Contribution to Current Debates on Security,” online: <http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Nunes-joaonunes-politicssecuritycriticaltheory.pdf>

Yet, not all of the proponents of CSS would agree that security is something that needs to be ‘unmade’. In Fact, one of the theoreticalapproaches cited by the manifesto as an important inspiration—the Welsh School – has consistently argued that security is something that needs to be archived, promoted, and not replaced by something else. The manifesto has solved this contradiction by arguing that, in the Welsh School, security is ‘distinguished from order and power and redefinged as inclusive of individuals’ (2006:456). This is a fairly accurate view of the Welsh School’s understanding of the value of security; however, a deeper investigation of security-politics nexus implicit in this approach is needed, so that the debate is able to conceive viable theoretical alternatives to the predominant views described above. Security and politics in the Welsh School Several questions spring to mind when one faces the work of the Welsh School from the standpoint of other critical approaches. One of the most pressing is: why security? Why focus on such a loaded and manifestly dangerous term, a term that has been so often instrumentalized with the objective of justifying highly questionable practices? Can it be that the different critical approaches are talking about the same things, but with different names? Take the focus of the Welsh School on emancipation, for example (Booth 1991 and 1999a, Wyn Jones 2005): can it be placed on the same level of desecuritization, as Aradau (2004) has suggested? To use the words of the c.a.s.e. manifesto, can the politics of normality (desecuritization) and the politics of normativity (emancipation) be seen as two alternative or complementary pathways to ‘unmaking security’? It is consensual to argue that both of these strands definitely wish to ‘unmake security’, if by security one means an exceptionalist domain of violent and exclusionary practices. However, there are reasons as to why the Welsh School does not wish to get rid of the term ‘security’ – and that is why desecuritization cannot lead to emancipation. For the Welsh School, security in itself has an important normative value that needs to be maintained. This understanding of the value of security is intrinsically connected with an account of security-politics nexus that is at odds with the understandings that have achieved particular importance in the field. It must be said that the Welsh School has not engaged systematically with its own theoretical assumptions regarding the security-politics nexus. This reluctance results from a particularly pragmatic approach to the ‘realities’ of security. Booth defined traditional approaches as a form of self-deception, an ‘escape from the real’ (1995:105), and even a ‘theology’ and a set of ‘rites’ (1999b:45). As a consequence, CSS must aim at ‘engag[ing] comprehensively with the real’ (2004:8), that is, it must take into account the ‘real lives in real places in that real world which academic international relations realists disregard’ (1995:123). This comprehensive engagement is connected with a normative commitment to confront the materiality of what Booth terms ‘human wrongs’, ‘facts’ that dominate politics in a global scale and that can be said to constitute the ‘subject-matter’ of security studies: ‘The subject-matter consists of flesh (which is fed or famished) and blood (which is wet and messy, and hot or cold), and people living lives comfortably and securely, or enduring them against the wall, like a dog’ (1995:105). The crude emotion present in this description of what security studies ‘is all about’ must not be mistaken for poetic idealism: Booth has been quite consistent in his efforts to pin down security studies to a particular materiality, thereby eschewing a purely discursive critique of security. Williams (1999) has noted that the version of CSS put forward by Booth claims to be “better’ than others because of its improved ‘realism’, that is, its ability to engage with the factuality of human wrongs. This is why Booth, to the obvious disappointment of other critical security theorists who wish to put into question notions of reality and reason, consistently describes his approach as more realistic and rational that the others14. [CSS=Critical Security Studies]

#### The AFF has it backwards: opposing the embargo means supporting the regime

Suchlicki ’13 – (Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications: Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the United States”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would probably restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.

#### Castro influence is the problem, not the embargo – turns the case

Jorge 2k – (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

It follows, from all of the above, that a lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources, mainly in the form of credit lines extended by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and also by private banking and other financial institutions. This financial influx would serve to strengthen his 40-year stranglehold on the Cuban people. Furthermore, to those who believe that greater contacts between the United States and Cuba would further the cause of democratization, it should be pointed out that such hopes definitely have not been validated by the experience of Marxist societies from the inception of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, which followed the stage of War Communism, up to the last efforts at reforming socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In these countries, trade, foreign investment, and loans led hermetic lives of their own, oblivious to and unaffected by the rest of society. There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the Cuban experience. As a matter of fact, it could be realistically argued that the opposite has happened. As the Cuban regime succeeds in solidifying itself, as a result of the legitimacy conferred upon it by other nations and by an augmented flow of resources, its repressive proclivities have increased in parallel fashion. Trade and investment with totalitarian states have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. Castro’s regime is certainly no exception to the rule and, in fact, categorically confirms it. Only pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he subsequently has either partly rescinded or revoked altogether. Cuba has established for all to see a system of apartheid — which is openly and vigorously enforced — between foreigners and Cuban nationals.

## Advantage 2

Util’s the only moral framework

**Murray 97** (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. Of Wales-Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 110)

Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his [OR HER] own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he [OR SHE] will say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9 The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing tha/t:the political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only [HER OR] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.12 This led Morgenthau to argue, in terms of the concern to reject doctrines which advocate that the end justifies the means, that the impossibility of the logic underlying this doctrine 'leads to the negation of absolute ethical judgements altogether'.13

No risk of genocide

**O’Kane, 9**7 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

Util best accounts for minorities

**Shaw, 99** – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p. 13)

Actions affect people to different degrees. Your playing the stereo loudly might bring slight pleasure to three of your neighbors, cause significant discomfort to two others who do not share your taste in music or are trying to concentrate on something else, and leave a sixth person indifferent The utilitarian theory is not that each individual votes on the basis of his or her happiness or unhappiness with the majority ruling, but that we add up the various pleasures or pains, however large or small, and go with the action that results in the greatest net amount of happiness. Because any action will affect some people more strongly than others, utilitarianism is not the same as majority rule. For example, in the United States today it would probably increase overall happiness to permit homosexuals to marry, even though the thought of their doing so makes many heterosexuals slightly uncomfortable. This is because such a policy would affect the happiness or unhappiness of the majority only slightly, if at all, while it would profoundly enhance the lives of a small percentage of people. Even if banning homosexual marriages makes most people happy, it doesn't bring about the most happiness.As quoted earlier, Bentham famously said that the utilitarian standard is the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Although often repeated, this formulation is misleading. The problem is that it erroneously implies that we should maximize two different things: the amount of happiness produced and the number of people made happy.' Correctly understood, utilitarianism tells us to do only one thing, maximize happiness. Doing what makes the most people happy usually produces the most happiness, but it may not - as the example of homosexual marriages illustrates. For utilitarianism, it is the total amount of happiness, not the number of people whose happiness is increased, that matters.

Util doesn’t compromise any group – no scenario

**Shaw, 99** – Professor of Philosophy @ San Jose State

(William H, Contemporary Ethics, p. 233)

Critics of utilitarianism such as Rawls worry that furthering the longrun well-being of society might somehow or other necessitate crushing the life prospects of some group. If no alternative set of institutions would prove as beneficial to society as a whole, then utilitarianism would have to license as just the sacrifice of this group's basic interests. As we saw in Chapter 4, however, this is one of the bogeyman stories that opponents of utilitarianism like to make up. There is no credible or realistic scenario in which a socioeconomic system built on the systematic frustration of the basic interests of some group would maximize net social well-being in the long run. This is, of course, an assertion of fact, not of logic, but it is nevertheless an important truth about the human condition.

#### No discourse args

Kocher, 00 – Robert L., author, engineer working in the area of solid-state physics, and has done graduate study in clinical psychology (“Discourse on Reality and Sanity Part 1: What is Reality?” The Laissez Faire City Times, Vol. 4, No. 46, 11/13/00, http://web.archive.org/web/20040805084149/http://freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/reality\_sanity1.htm)

The human senses seem remarkably able to discern a consistent and lawful reality. In the normal human being, mind and perception become so intimately connected as to produce a sense of unity with the world around us. This connection and sense of unity can be psychologically broken or regressed to primitive non-integrated levels through psychological trauma or regression, or through organic physical malfunction. For those who are in a normal functioning condition, behold, reality is all around you if you have courage to face it. Can I prove proof exists? No, I cannot. Not in the purely verbal world. Can I prove reality exists? No, not in the purely verbal world. Some things are too basic to be proven and must be accepted in day to day life. But in the purely verbal world, all things become philosophically doubtful when traced down to their primary premise, and that premise is then questioned. The World of Words While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibility and latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of human experience are very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world of consistent human experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. Philosophy is much like particle physics. Earlier in the 20th century the fundamental components of physical existence were considered to be the proton, the neutron, and the electron. As science developed atom smashers, and then more powerful atom smashers, these particles could be hit together and broken pieces of these components were found which might be assumed to be possible building blocks of the three primary particles. Well then, what are those building blocks made of? As more elaborate smashers are built and more discerning detection equipment is developed, perhaps still more kind of fragments or subparticles will be found. At some point in the process we will conclude that there is a material of some kind making up matter that just IS. It simply exists. Suppose the ultimate particle is found. The conclusion will be that it simply exists. There is no other conclusion possible or available.

#### No root cause or serial policy failure – must enegage in specific policies

Moore, 04 [John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle”, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis Law]

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite setof motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1329520437445&returnToKey=20_T13973620735&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.647208.6119287203#n158) Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.

#### Arguing that a current government policy is bad is not roleplaying – it’s engaging the question of political purpose – that’s uniquely good

Harris ‘13

Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

#### Inevitability doesn’t justify extinction in the short term – future generations are intrinsically valuable and might solve the impacts anyway

Jason Matheny, Department of Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. ‘7. Risk Analysis, Volume 27, Number 5, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction.” <http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html>

An extinction event today could cause the loss of thousands of generations. This matters to the extent we value future lives. Society places some value on future lives when it accepts the costs of long-term environmental policies or hazardous waste storage. Individuals place some value on future lives when they adopt measures, such as screening for genetic diseases, to ensure the health of children who do not yet exist. Disagreement, then, does not center on whether future lives matter, but on how much they matter.6 Valuing future lives less than current ones (“intergenerational discounting”) has been justified by arguments about time preference, growth in consumption, uncertainty about future existence, and opportunity costs. I will argue that none of these justifications applies to the benefits of delaying human extinction. Under time preference, a good enjoyed in the future is worth less, intrinsically, than a good enjoyed now. The typical justification for time preference is descriptive—most people make decisions that suggest that they value current goods more than future ones. However, it may be that people’s time preference applies only to instrumental goods, like money, whose value predictably decreases in time. In fact, it would be difficult to design an experiment in which time preference for an intrinsic good (like happiness), rather than an instrumental good (like money), is separated from the other forms of discounting discussed below. But even supposing individuals exhibit time preference within their own lives, it is not clear how this would ethically justify discounting across different lives and generations (Frederick, 2006; Schelling, 2000). In practice, discounting the value of future lives would lead to results few of us would accept as being ethical. For instance, if we discounted lives at a 5% annual rate, a life today would have greater intrinsic value than a billion lives 400 years hence (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Broome (1994) suggests most economists and philosophers recognize that this preference for ourselves over our descendents is unjustifiable and agree that ethical impartiality requires setting the intergenerational discount rate to zero. After all, if we reject spatial discounting and assign equal value to contemporary human lives, whatever their physical distance from us, we have similar reasons to reject temporal discounting, and assign equal value to human lives, whatever their temporal distance from us. I Parfit (1984), Cowen (1992), and Blackorby et al. (1995) have similarly argued that time preference across generations is not ethically defensible.7 There could still be other reasons to discount future generations. A common justification for discounting economic goods is that their abundance generally increases with time. Because there is diminishing marginal utility from consumption, future generations may gain less satisfaction from a dollar than we will (Schelling, 2000). This principle makes sense for intergenerational transfers of most economic goods but not for intergenerational transfers of existence. There is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed. There is no reason to believe existence matters less to a person 1,000 years hence than it does to a person 10 years hence. Discounting could be justified by our uncertainty about future generations’ existence. If we knew for certain that we would all die in 10 years, it would not make sense for us to spend money on asteroid defense. It would make more sense to live it up, until we become extinct. A discount scheme would be justified that devalued (to zero) anything beyond 10 years. Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 261–262) defend discounting on these grounds—we are uncertain about humanity’s long-term survival, so planning too far ahead is imprudent.8 Discounting is an approximate way to account for our uncertainty about survival (Ponthiere, 2003). But it is unnecessary—an analysis of extinction risk should equate the value of averting extinction at any given time with the expected value of humanity’s future from that moment forward, which includes the probabilities of extinction in all subsequent periods (Ng, 2005). If we discounted the expected value of humanity’s future, we would count future extinction risks twice—once in the discount rate and once in the undiscounted expected value—and underestimate the value of reducing current risks. In any case, Dasgupta and Heal’s argument does not justify traditional discounting at a constant rate, as the probability of human extinction is unlikely to be uniform in time.9 Because of nuclear and biological weapons, the probability of human extinction could be higher today than it was a century ago; and if humanity colonizes other planets, the probability of human extinction could be lower then than it is today. Even Rees’s (2003) pessimistic 50-50 odds on human extinction by 2100 would be equivalent to an annual discount rate under 1% for this century. (If we are 100% certain of a good’s existence in 2007 but only 50% certain of a good’s existence in 2100, then the expected value of the good decreases by 50% over 94 years, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.75%.) As Ng (1989) has pointed out, a constant annual discount rate of 1% implies that we are more than 99.99% certain of not surviving the next 1,000 years. Such pessimism seems unwarranted. A last argument for intergenerational discounting is from opportunity costs: without discounting, we would always invest our money rather than spend it now on important projects (Broome, 1994). For instance, if we invest our money now in a stock market with an average5%real annual return, in a century we will have 130 times more money to spend on extinction countermeasures (assuming we survive the century). This reasoning could be extended indefinitely (as long as we survive). This could be an argument for investing in stocks rather than extinction countermeasures if: the rate of return on capital is exogenous to the rate of social savings, the average rate of return on capital is higher than the rate of technological change in extinction countermeasures, and the marginal cost effectiveness of extinction countermeasures does not decrease at a rate equal to or greater than the return on capital. First, the assumption of exogeneity can be rejected. Funding extinction countermeasures would require spending large sums; if, instead, we invested those sums in the stock market, they would affect the average market rate of return (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Second, some spending on countermeasures, such as research on biodefense, has its own rate of return, since learning tends to accelerate as a knowledge base expands. This rate could be higher than the average rate of return on capital. Third, if the probability of human extinction significantly decreases after space colonization, there may be a small window of reducible risk: the period of maximum marginal cost effectiveness may be limited to the next few centuries. Discounting would be a crude way of accounting for opportunity costs, as cost effectiveness is probably not constant. A more precise approach would identify the optimal invest-and-spend path based on estimates of current and future extinction risks, the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, and market returns. In summary, there are good reasons not to discount the benefits of extinction countermeasures. Time preference is not justifiable in intergenerational problems, there is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed, and uncertainties about human existence should be represented by expected values. I thus assume that the value of future lives cannot be discounted. Since this position is controversial, I later show how acceptance of discounting would affect our conclusions.

# Block

#### Ontology is inevitable and not first

Gathman 9 <http://limitedinc.blogspot.com/2009/10/dialectics-of-diddling.html> Professional editor, translator, publishes pieces in salon.com and Austin Chronicle

IT – and I will interrupt the continuity of this post in the very first sentence to say that I, at least, refuse to identify the semi-autonomous heteronym, Infinite Thought, with the semi-autonomous philosopher, Nina, so this is about IT – recently wrote a post that makes an oblique but telling point against the current fashion for returning to things as they are via some kind of speculative realist ontology. As she notes, this gesture seems to go along with a taste for a politics that is so catastrophic as to be an excuse for no politics. “proliferating ontologies is simply not the point - further, what use is it if it simply becomes a race to the bottom to prove that every entity is as meaningless as every other (besides, the Atomists did it better). Confronting 'what is' has to mean accepting a certain break between the natural and the artificial, even if this break is itself artificial. Ontology is play-science for philosophers; I'm pretty much convinced when Badiou argues that mathematics has better ways of conceiving it than philosophy does and that, besides, ontology is not the point. What happens, or what does not happen, should be what concerns us: philosophers sometimes pride themselves on their ignorance of world affairs, again like watered-down Heideggarians, no matter how hostile they think they are to him, pretending that all that history and politics stuff is so, like, ontic, we're working on something much more important here.” Being the Derridean type, I expect that any attempt to create another, better ontology will produce the kinds of double binds that Derrida so expertly fished out of phenomenology. There have been a lot of replies to I.T.'s post. I thought the most interesting one was by Speculative Heresy, because he makes it clear that Speculative Realism is a return to a distinction that was popular among the analytic philosophers in the 50s, where a value neutral view of philosophy as a technique supposedly precluded the relevance of any political conclusions from conceptual analysis, and at worst blocked the advance of philosophy as a science. Here, the part of the natural is played by the question, which apparently asks itself in the void: “Which is to say that philosophy and politics are born of two different questions: ‘what is it?’ and ‘what to do?’ The latter, political, question need never concern itself with the former question.” IT rightly sees this reverence for the question in itself, and its supposedly fortunate alignment with the disciplines we all know and love, with their different mailboxes in the university, as a very Heideggerian gesture. And, as an empirical fact of intellectual history, it is very curious to think that a discipline is “born” from a syntactical unit peculiar to certain languages. Again, we run into a very old thematic, in which the question giving "birth" is entangled in the parallel series of logos and the body, in which each becomes a privileged metaphor for the other. There's nothing more political than this.

#### Death is real and even isn’t suffering from it is bad – reject the team for reading lanza – with suicide prevalent in society arguments about death being an escape have a real impacts that must be rejected

Myers 09 – P. Z., biologist and associate professor at the University of Minnesota, Morris, The Dead are Dead, <http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/12/the_dead_are_dead.php>

I have heard that first argument so many times, and it is facile and dishonest. We are not just "energy". We are a pattern of energy and matter, a very specific and precise arrangement of molecules in movement. That can be destroyed. When you've built a pretty sand castle and the tide comes in and washes it away, the grains of sand are still all there, but what you've lost is the arrangement that you worked to generate, and which you appreciated. Reducing a complex functional order to nothing but the constituent parts is an insult to the work. If I were to walk into the Louvre and set fire to the Mona Lisa, and afterwards take a drive down to Chartres and blow up the cathedral, would anyone defend my actions by saying, "well, science says matter and energy cannot be created or destroyed, therefore, Rabid Myers did no harm, and we'll all just enjoy viewing the ashes and rubble from now on"? No. That's crazy talk. We also wouldn't be arguing that the painting and the architecture have transcended this universe to enter another, nor would such a pointless claim ameliorate our loss in this universe. The rest of his argument is quantum gobbledy-gook. The behavior of subatomic particles is not a good guide to what to expect of the behavior of large bodies. A photon may have no rest mass, but I can't use this fact to justify my grand new weight loss plan; quantum tunnelling does not imply that I can ignore doors when I amble about my house. People are not particles! We are the product of the aggregate behavior of the many particles that constitute our bodies, and you cannot ignore the importance of these higher-order relationships when talking about our fate. The rational atheist view is simpler, clearer, and I think, more true. Lanza's sister is dead, and so is mine; that means the features of their independent existence that were so precious to us, that made them interesting, thinking, behaving human beings, have ceased to exist. The 20-watts of energy are dissipating as heat, and can't be brought back. They are lost to us, and someday we will end, too. We should feel grief. Pretending that they have 'transcended' into some novel quantum mechanical state in which their consciousness persists, or that they are shaking hands with some anthropomorphic spiritual myth in never-never land, does a disservice to ourselves. The pain is real. Don't deny it. Use it to look at the ones you love who still live and see what you can do to make our existence now a little better, and perhaps a little more conducive to keeping our energies patterned usefully a little longer.

#### Nuclear war turns this

Peter Beckman, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, et al, The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, 2K, p. 296-297 Individual death is not the only death that affects the way people live. Since hu­mans are social beings who define themselves naturally as parts of families, societies, kin­ship groups, religions, nations, and humanity as a whole, how they view themselves will depend largely on whether they anticipate the continuing existence of these social entities. In the prenuclear age, the individual obviously dies, but the social unit, the na­tion, the family, the species, was understood as outliving death. But in the nuclear age, we must anticipate nuclear death as a collective experience, what Norman Cousins called “irrational death”—death of a new kind, a nondiscriminating death without warning, death en masse. ‘While all deaths are individual, in the mass deaths of the twentieth century, be they at Auschwitz or at Hiroshima and Na­gasaki, the individual is lost in a faceless, mindless, random destruction. Writer Norman Mailer described the transformation as follows: For the first time in civilized history, perhaps for the first time in all history, we have been forced to live with the suppressed knowledge that the smallest facets of our per­sonality or the most minor projections of our ideas ... might be doomed to die as a ci­pher in some vast statistical operation in which our teeth would be counted, and our hair would be saved, but our death itself unknown, unhonored and unrewarded, a death which could not follow with dignity as a possible consequence to serious actions we have chosen, but rather a death in a gas chamber or a radioactive city; and so ... in the midst of civilization ... our psyche was subjected itself to the intolerable anxi­ety that death being causeless, life was causeless as well, and time deprived of cause and effect had come to a stop. If the type of death we anticipate is important because it affects how we view ourselves in the world, then the pervasive fear of nuclear annihilation does not necessarily tell us anything about death per se, but rather it reveals something about the perception hu­mans have of their place and worth in the world. Nuclear weapons challenge a basic belief in the importance of the individual. They challenge possibly the most central tenet of the Judeo-Christian world view: Each in­dividual is unique and important and created in the image of God. If you save one life it is like saving the entire world, the Talmud teaches. “God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten son,” John says. Now, we are haunted with the image of human beings as objects, as matter, to be burned, radiated, turned into ashes or vapor.

#### Security isn’t fundamental – the alt causes conservative backlash and threats real

Nunes, 12 [Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications]

Conclusion This article advanced three main arguments. First, the commitment to politicization that constitutes the cornerstone of critical security studies has been detrimentally affected by a tendency to conceive security as having an undesirable logic. This happens at a time when critique is blunted by the proliferation of the ‘critical’ label and by the successes of critical security studies in highlighting the problems with predominant ways of thinking and doing security. Next, it was argued that security as emancipation can potentially provide a platform for reclaiming the political in critical security studies. By taking insecurity as its starting point, by conceiving theory as a form of praxis and by mobilizing immanent critique, this approach promises to address the current blind spots of politicization. Finally, the article provided a revision of security as emancipation that addresses the shortcomings of the versions provided by Booth and Wyn Jones. Two themes are central to this revised version: recognition of the political relations and structures underpinning the reality of security, and engagement with the multifaceted nature of power as determination of action, government and domination. This article has suggested that a re-engagement with – as well as reconsideration of – security as emancipation is crucial for addressing the current impasse in critical security studies. As in previous moments in the development of this field, there is much to gain from dialogue between approaches. However, this discussion also suggests that it is perhaps time to abandon the idea of a division of labour between the deconstructive and reconstructive sides of critical security studies. This was at the heart of the Copenhagen School’s reluctance to consider at length the transformative potential of its work.14 It was also accepted by Booth, for whom deconstructing security is runs the risk of becoming a conservative stance that diverts attention from the ‘real’ condition of insecurity. In contrast with this division of labour, this article has begun to show the fruitfulness of a cumulative vision of critique. Indeed, the reconsideration of security as emancipation proposed here points towards a notion of critique that is committed to deconstruction but also unashamedly reconstructive. It brings together insights that for too long have been kept apart in the critical literature, and introduces other insights that so far have been insufficiently considered: that security has no fundamental logic; that a detailed analysis of its assumptions and effects can be achieved by problematizing its reality and by working with a broad notion of power; that one can make judgments about the desirability of security arrangements by considering structures and relations of vulnerability and disadvantage; and that, on the basis of this, it is possible to identify potential for transformation and devise strategies to achieve it. The conjunction of these insights can help realize the promise of the critical security literature and provide critique with a renewed strength and sense of purpose.

#### Alt turns agency—recreates problems of securitization

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In chapters 1–3 of this work I argued that there were theoretical limits to critical and emancipatory security theories. In chapters 4–6 I argued that the dominant theoretical and analytical approaches to the Yugoslav break-up and wars took a critical and emancipatory approach to the conflict and how security policy should be. I argued that there were both theoretical limits to these approaches and political limits in terms of the policy prescription of critical approaches. These theoretical approaches posited abstract rights and groups, **failing to engage with the political implications on the ground**. At the same time, I argued that in fact international policy was much closer to that advocated by critical and cosmopolitan theorists than ‘traditional’ or pluralist security policy and that far from being an answer to conflict, this policy served to **undermine local political settlements** and placed the EC in the position of sovereignty. This illustrates that there are political limitations to cosmopolitan policies as advocated by critical and emancipatory theorists. Such policies **undermined existing political frameworks and ultimately the power of people in such situations to exercise any meaningful control over their lives**. In this penultimate chapter I return again to considering the limits to critical security theory more generally in the contemporary security context. I have argued that critical and emancipatory security theory has rested on a trenchant critique of the pluralist security framework. Critical theorists argue that this security framework is both anachronistic and immoral. Critical security theorists argue that their theory should focus on the powerless and excluded and be for the purposes of emancipation. As the state and state-based forms of political organisation are argued to be oppressive and exclusionary, for critical security theorists it is in future developments in the international realm, whether new forms of international organisation or transnational groups or networks, that the agent of emancipation will be found. Yet the context in which critical security theorists are writing is one, as we have seen in chapter 2, in which developments in international and national policy discourse are framed in terms that **cannot be understood in terms of the Cold War pluralist security framework**. Rather, as we have seen in chapter 3, one of the most striking aspects of the contemporary international security problematic seems to be a shift away from, and problematisation of, the old security framework in both international and national security policy discourse. Here, the old pluralist security framework with its underlying commitments of non-intervention and sovereign equality is held to be both anachronistic and immoral. In this chapter I turn to look at some significant aspects of contemporary international security policy and policy discourse in more detail, in particular I will look at the post-Cold War human security framework and briefly at recent military interventions. I will argue that here we can see the political limits to these policies in terms of an orientation of policy around individual rights and freedom at an abstract level, in the absence of a political constituency to **give content** **to those rights and freedoms**. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **allowing international institutions and powerful states a more interventionist role**. This **entrenches international inequality** and allows for a shift towards a hierarchical international order. Rather than empowering, this becomes a situation in which people **are disempowered**, **made wards of court rather than citizens**. Here also we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches that advocate a transformation of world order into a cosmopolitan order and a shift away from state sovereignty.

#### Empiricism is useful, despite complexity

Sil 2k—pol sci, U Penn (Rudra, Beyond Boundaries, ed Sil and Doherty, 148-9,)

The differences among the ontologies of various positivists at one end, and the different degrees of subjectivism among various interpretive theorists at the other end, both suggest that moving a little further away from each extreme might get us closer to a "middle ground" on the issue of an objective/subjective ontology of social reality. This "middle ground" may be best exemplified in Max Weber's position on the problem of subjectivity. Although there are contending perspectives on where the "real" Weber came down on this question, 13 Weber is clear that his empirical analysis is not intended to support analytic laws or even provide exhaustive causal explanations of all aspects of a social phenomenon. In his famous essay, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in addition to placing quotation marks around the word ''objectivity," he states that "as far back as we may go into the gray mist of the far-off past, the reality to which the laws apply always remains equally individual, equally undeducible from laws." Weber goes on to note that his method of classification through "ideal-types" are designed not to objectively capture general laws, but only to generate a better understanding of an "infinitely complex" reality through the "analytic accentuation" of certain aspects on the basis of the investigator's own interests.14 In another essay on "Basic Sociological Terms," Weber argues that subjectivity does not rule out the possibility of a systematic investigation into certain aspects of a phenomena because " 'recapturing an experience' is . . . not an absolute precondition for its interpretation."15 It is easy to interpret these statements as indicative that Weber was ambivalent in addressing the problem of subjectivity, and yet the ambivalence itself might be indicative of a pragmatic intermediate position that is no less compelling than the more definitive positions staked out by positivists and relativists. Clearly, Weber is hardly being a radical subjectivist or relativist when he argues that interpretation does not presuppose "recapturing" an experience or when he constructs "ideal types" to categorize social phenomena; at the same time, he is cautious about inferring too much from social patterns or regularities given that these regularities are abstracted from a complex reality by individual social scientists primarily on the basis of what is of interest to them. Taking the lead from this interpretation of Weber's ontology, we can identify an approximate "center" on the problem of objective/subjective reality in social analysis reflected in the following proposition: While social reality is subjectively experienced and socially constructed, it is sufficiently "intersubjective" to permit the investigator opportunities to extract a generalizable "interpretive understanding" of the meanings that individuals attach to actions and subjective experiences in different historical and cultural contexts. Such an "intersubjective" ontology, while hardly unique to Weberians, leaves the door open to a wider variety of social analysis and enables all but the most extreme objectivists and subjectivists to communicate with one another in attempting to better grasp aspects of social reality.

**US/Russia war would lead to extinction**

**Helfand and Pastore 2009** [Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility.

March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

#### **DA solves case – results in removal of embargo**

Nash 5/24 – Paul Nash, Writer for The Diplomatic Courier, (“HOW THE CHINESE ARE HELPING TO TRANSFORM CUBA, AGAIN”, 5/24/13, <http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/192-how-the-chinese-are-helping-to-transform-cuba-again>, AW)

China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela, and Cuba is China’s largest trading partner in the Caribbean, with bilateral trade now standing at around $2 billion. Beijing wants to help Cuba push through market-oriented economic reforms, knowing from its own experience over the past three decades that private sector entrepreneurial activity can stimulate foreign investment, build national capital and promote domestic consumption. To this end, China has granted Cuba numerous long-term low or interest-free loans to support development and maintain financial and social stability through the reform process. It has also undertaken significant technology transfers and entered into joint ventures in farming, light industry, and tourism. Cuba has started the reform process focussed on its biggest export industries. It has, for example, begun restructuring its ailing sugar industry by abolishing the sugar ministry and creating Azcuba, a state holding company consisting of 13 provincial sugar companies that operate 56 sugar mills and 850 sugarcane farms. Azcuba signed foreign investment agreements with companies from Brazil and Britain in 2012 to modernize harvesting equipment and build biomass energy plants. Cuba exports about 400,000 tonnes of sugar annually to China, more than half the amount it produces for domestic consumption. China’s interest in Cuba is, of course, inseparable from the Caribbean’s natural resources and those of Latin America more broadly. The Sino-Cuban economic fraternity, from Beijing’s viewpoint, is largely pragmatic rather than idealistic. Beijing has demonstrated that it will conduct business with left-leaning governments like Venezuela and Ecuador as readily as with right-leaning governments like Chile and Colombia. The Sino-Cuban partnership may represent a lost opportunity for the United States in promoting liberal democracy in the Western Hemisphere. But it may also represent a path to normalized relations if China can help Cuba’s economy reform such that it, like Vietnam’s, no longer justifies the continuation of a decades-old U.S. trade embargo on the basis that Cuba’s economy is “dominated or controlled by international communism.”

#### Ending U.S. securitization of China would heighten allied fears of Beijing

Johnathan Holslag, Research Fund Flanders fellow at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, July 2009, “Embracing Chinese Global Security Ambitions,” The Washington Quarterly, 32:3

At the same time, Washington needs to be attentive to concerns of countries such as Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea. Distrust of China’s modernizing armed forces is mounting, and they will see closer cooperation with the United States being done at the expense of their own strategic interests. The Indian military has already reacted negatively to Washington’s support for the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Japan fears that allowing China’s military to expand its clout in the Western Pacific threatens its own maritime corridors and might embolden Beijing to exert military pressure in the East China Sea dispute. Even Moscow is now prioritizing refurbishing its military presence in the Russian Far East. Easing one security dilemma might thus foster another. Washington needs to engage all four regional powers simultaneously. Unlike counterbalancing, by using Taiwan as a forward fortress and fostering new alliances to contain China, inclusive balancing implies working with all the main players of the Asian system so that the multipolar order imposes sufficient costs to thwart military adventurism. Transcending different political systems, inclusive balancing seeks to give each player the scope to develop, resist military revisionism, address non-traditional threats, and protect an open trade system. Only such a posture will permit Washington to foster truly strategic military cooperation with China and to avoid the high costs of traditional containment and confrontation while also reassuring its traditional allies.

#### Our predictions are accurate

Bryan Caplan, Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University, 12-26-2005, EconLog, http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/12/tackling\_tetloc\_1.html

Philip Tetlock, one of my favorite social scientists, is making waves with his new book, Expert Political Judgment. Tetlock spent two decades asking hundreds of political experts to make predictions about hundreds of issues. With all this data under his belt, he then asks and tries to answer a bunch of Big Questions, including "Do experts on average have a greater-than-chance ability to predict the future?," and "What kinds of experts have the greatest forecasting ability?" This book is literally awesome - to understand Tetlock's project and see how well he follows through fills me with awe. And that's tough for me to admit, because it would be easy to interpret Tetlock's work as a great refutation of my own. Most of my research highlights the systematic belief differences between economists and the general public, and defends the simple. "The experts are right, the public is wrong," interpretation of the facts. But Tetlock finds that the average expert is an embarassingly bad forecaster. In fact, experts barely beat what Tetlock calls the "chimp" stategy of random guessing. Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. Tetlock's sample suffers from severe selection bias. He deliberately asked relatively difficult and controversial questions. As his methodological appendix explains, questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me too often with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who? The implicit answer is "Dumb according to the typical expert in the field." What Tetlock really shows is that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached a solid consensus. This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to highjack it: "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what Tetlock really shows is that experts can raise their credibility if they stop overreaching.

#### China is a real threat that must be securitized against

Blumenthal et al 11 ( Dan Blumenthal is a current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries. “Avoiding Armageddon with China” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/06/avoiding\_armageddon\_with\_china?wpisrc=obinsite ,KENTUCKY)

The balancing and hedging strategy should involve options to avoid what Traub rightfully describes as "Armageddon." We call for a myriad of conventional options short of striking the nuclear-armed PRC, in the hope that such a strategy enhances deterrence in the first place and avoids Armageddon should deterrence fail. The strategy aims to slow escalation rather than quicken it. The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one -- is like a unicorn; it is a make believe creature that still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas, China has not fulfilled this U.S. "prophesy of friendship." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and intimidate Japan. Traub asks whether our allies and partners will be willing to participate in an "anti-Chinese coalition," as he describes it. As the paper says, all allies, partners, and potential partners are already modernizing their militaries in response to China. And they will continue to do so regardless of whether the U.S. pursues what Traub would see as an "anti-China" strategy. Even laid-back Australia has plans to double its submarine fleet -- it is not doing so to defend against Fiji. The paper argues that it is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the region's security can help avoid a regional nuclear arms race, for example. The United States can be a force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by training, and equipping our allies and friends. This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing so, we fear, would lead to Armageddon.

#### Only a risk of neg offense – aff is non-unique

Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post. NYT 5-11-99

NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has revealed the fallacy at the core of the Clinton Administration's China policy. While Administration officials continue to yearn for a "strategic partnership" with Beijing, China's leaders make no effort to conceal the fact they consider the United States an enemy -- or, more precisely, the enemy. How else can one interpret the Chinese Government's response to the bombing? Instead of trying to contain the damage to diplomatic relations, as any friendly nation would have after such an obvious if tragic mistake, the Chinese Government used its vast propaganda machine to whip up anti-American hysteria. The Government bused student protesters to the American Embassy, and the police cordoned off parts of Beijing to make access to the compound easier. State-run media refused to print repeated apologies from NATO and the United States. Instead of accepting NATO's explanations, in fact, the Chinese Government has persisted in claiming that NATO intentionally hit the embassy, which has only further inflamed protesters who have no other information. The result is that Ambassador James Sasser and other embassy employees are self-described hostages and in peril. This anti-American campaign in China did not begin with the bombing. For weeks Chinese citizens have been barraged by Government propaganda -- complete with old films from the Korean War -- depicting the United States and its allies as vicious aggressors against an innocent and helpless Serbia. All this fits within the broader anti-American line Beijing has been spouting for years: that the United States is an imperialist aggressor, bent on world domination, and at China's expense. Why have Chinese leaders chosen to use the bombing to mobilize anti-American hatred? Perhaps they are trying to distract attention from the 10-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Perhaps, having been caught red-handed stealing American nuclear secrets, they want to turn the tables and put the United States on the defensive. Perhaps they believe that bullying and brinksmanship are good tactics to use with an Administration that seems bent on "engagement" at any cost. And given the lack of indignation expressed so far by White House officials in the face of China's behavior, they may be right. But none of these explanations preclude another possibility. Perhaps Beijing is just revealing what it really thinks about the United States. Six years ago, a report prepared by top Chinese foreign and military specialists declared that the United States was China's "international archenemy." When its military conducts war games, the primary adversary is the United States. When Chinese leaders map out their ambitions -- taking control of Taiwan and becoming the dominant power in East Asia -- they see the United States as the main obstacle. They are right. So far, the United States has insisted on remaining the leading power in East Asia. The Chinese believe their ambitions clash directly with the vital interests of the United States. They're right about that, too. Would that we in the United States were as clear-sighted. The Administration believes that if we don't treat China as an enemy, it won't become one. Those who recommend a tougher approach, those who call for containing China's ambitions, are usually accused of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. But what if the prophecy has already been fulfilled? When the smoke clears from this latest and most revealing crisis, sober Americans may want to start taking the emerging confrontation as seriously as the Chinese do.

#### Latin American trade is a zero sum game – perception and bandwagoning

Kreps and Flores-Macias 13 (Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Gustavo A. Flores-Macías, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. “No Strings Attached? Evaluating China’s Trade Relations Abroad.” The Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/>

To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this “gravitational effect” has a sound economic basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudan’s trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with China’s foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of “new colonialism” as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely. A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period in which China’s trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which China’s growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad. Oil and copper import growth rates have recently been 10 times higher than average import growth rates for the rest of the world.

#### Lifting the embargo stops Chinese trade advantage.

FFM ’12 (Free Free Markets, “Cuban Embargo and China,” September 22, 2012, <http://www.freeourfreemarkets.org/2012/09/cuban-embargo-and-china.html>)

“In a separate local television interview, Mr. Ryan also explained how he had come to change his mind and since 2007 has supported the embargo.", Ryan Criticizes Obama’s Cuba Policy and Explains His Shift on the Issue, New York Times, September 22, 2012 Sometimes we conduct our foreign policy like it is still 1980. I understand the current Obama administration also supports the continued enforcement of the embargo. Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Ryan are wrong. Who have we hurt with such a policy? Certainly not the Castro's. We hurt the ordinary citizen of Cuba who are not enemies. Further, at the same time we are increasing the presence of the United States in the Pacific rim much to the dismay of China. If I was in a leadership position in China I would quietly tell the President that I am not happy with the United States flexing its muscles so close to China's borders and, oh by the way, we have decided to increase trade with Cuba. If we don't start supporting Cuba more, China will. The Cuban people are our friends as are the people of Haiti.

#### EVEN IF they win true engagement isn’t zero sum – it’s perceived as zero-sum – that shuts China out

Watson 07 – [Cynthia A. Watson, Professor of Strategy at National War College, Washington, D.C. ENTER THE DRAGON? China’s Presence in Latin America, 2007, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf>]

Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past ﬁve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reﬂects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin America–U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net beneﬁt for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States beneﬁ t from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conﬂ icts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signiﬁ cant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors