# 1NC

## 1NC – 1

#### Text: The United States federal government should give financial assistance necessary to fully implement Global Thermostat’s direct air carbon capture technology in sufficient quantities to reduce carbon dioxide concentrations to a safe level.

#### Carbon Engineering solves warming best – tech is there, costs are low, and no negative side-effects

Michael Specter, Science and Technology Analyst, 12 [“The Climate Fixers,” The New Yorker, 5/14, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/14/120514fa\_fact\_specter?currentPage=all]

Until recently, the costs of removing carbon from the atmosphere on that scale have been regarded by economists as prohibitive. CO2 needs to be heated in order to be separated out; using current technology, the expense would rival that of creating an entirely new energy system. Typically, power plants release CO2 into the atmosphere through exhaust systems referred to as flues. The most efficient way we have now to capture CO2 is to remove it from flue gas as the emissions escape. Over the past five years, several research groups—one of which includes David Keith’s company, Carbon Engineering, in Calgary—have developed new techniques to extract carbon from the atmosphere, at costs that may make it economically feasible on a larger scale.¶ Early this winter, I visited a demonstration project on the campus of S.R.I. International, the Menlo Park institution that is a combination think tank and technological incubator. The project, built by Global Thermostat, looked like a very high-tech elevator or an awfully expensive math problem. “When I called chemical engineers and said I want to do this on a planetary scale, they laughed,’’ Peter Eisenberger, Global Thermostat’s president, told me. In 1996, Eisenberger was appointed the founding director of the Earth Institute, at Columbia University, where he remains a professor of earth and environmental sciences. Before that, he spent a decade running the materials research institute at Princeton University, and nearly as much time at Exxon, in charge of research and development. He believes he has developed a system to capture CO2 from the atmosphere at low heat and potentially at low cost.¶ The trial project is essentially a five-story brick edifice specially constructed to function like a honeycomb. Global Thermostat coats the bricks with chemicals called amines to draw CO2 from the air and bind with it. The carbon dioxide is then separated with a proprietary method that uses low-temperature heat—something readily available for free, since it is a waste product of many power plants. “Using low-temperature heat changes the equation,’’ Eisenberger said. He is an excitable man with the enthusiasm of a graduate student and the manic gestures of an orchestra conductor. He went on to explain that the amine coating on the bricks binds the CO2 at the molecular level, and the amount it can capture depends on the surface area; honeycombs provide the most surface space possible per square metre.¶ There are two groups of honey-combs that sit on top of each other. As Eisenberger pointed out, “You can only absorb so much CO2 at once, so when the honeycomb is full it drops into a lower section.” Steam heats and releases the CO2—and the honeycomb rises again. (Currently, carbon dioxide is used commercially in carbonated beverages, brewing, and pneumatic drying systems for packaged food. It is also used in welding. Eisenberger argues that, ideally, carbon waste would be recycled to create an industrial form of photosynthesis, which would help reduce our dependence on fossil fuels.)¶ Unlike some other scientists engaged in geoengineering, Eisenberger is not bothered by the notion of tinkering with nature. “We have devised a system that introduces no additional threats into the environment,’’ he told me. “And the idea of interfering with benign nature is ridiculous. The Bambi view of nature is totally false. Nature is violent, amoral, and nihilistic. If you look at the history of this planet, you will see cycles of creation and destruction that would offend our morality as human beings. But somehow, because it’s ‘nature,’ it’s supposed to be fine.’’ Eisenberger founded and runs Global Thermostat with Graciela Chichilnisky, an Argentine economist who wrote the plan, adopted in 2005, for the international carbon market that emerged from the Kyoto Climate talks. Edgar Bronfman, Jr., an heir to the Seagram fortune, is Global Thermostat’s biggest investor. (The company is one of the finalists for Richard Branson’s Virgin Earth Challenge prize. In 2007, Branson offered a cash prize of twenty-five million dollars to anyone who could devise a process that would drain large quantities of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.)¶ “What is fascinating for me is the way the innovation process has changed,’’ Eisenberger said. “In the past, somebody would make a discovery in a laboratory and say, ‘What can I do with this?’ And now we ask, ‘What do we want to design?,’ because we believe there is powerful enough knowledge to do it. That is what my partner and I did.” The pilot, which began running last year, works on a very small scale, capturing about seven hundred tons of CO2 a year. (By comparison, an automobile puts out about six tons a year.) Eisenberger says that it is important to remember that it took more than a century to assemble the current energy system: coal and gas plants, factories, and the worldwide transportation network that has been responsible for depositing trillions of tons of CO2 into the atmosphere. “We are not going to get it all out of the atmosphere in twenty years,’’ he said. “It will take at least thirty years to do this, but if we start now that is plenty of time. You would just need a source of low-temperature heat—factories anywhere in the world are ideal.” He envisions a network of twenty thousand such devices scattered across the planet. Each would cost about a hundred million dollars—a two-trillion-dollar investment spread out over three decades.¶ “There is a strong history of the system refusing to accept something new,” Eisenberger said. “People say I am nuts. But it would be surprising if people didn’t call me crazy. Look at the history of innovation! If people don’t call you nuts, then you are doing something wrong.”

## 1NC – 2

#### Text: The European Union will negotiate a mediation-inclusive Bilateral Investment Treaty with Venezuela.

#### EU-Venezuela engagement is highly effective – builds relations better than the US

Chaves ‘7 Rodrigo Chaves, Venezuela’s former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs for Europe, “VENEZUELA AND EUROPE: TOWARDS A DIFFERENT KIND OF POLITICS,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 10/23/2007, http://www.coha.org/venezuela-and-europe-towards-a-different-kind-of-politics/#sthash.aHrNOKGh.dpuf

I think one has to understand the contexts within which the Bolivarian process has been developing. Principally, it has concentrated on Latin America and the Caribbean and that is where most of the effort has been directed. Secondly, one needs to understand that until 2004 we lived through a very complex and difficult period where the United States and countries such as Spain in Europe were directly involved in the conspiracies to destabilize Venezuela. Therefore, at the time, to think that Venezuela had a clearly defined policy towards the European Union is probably not the case. I think that beginning in 2004/2005 Venezuela began to overcome the aggressive conspiracy of the [April 2002] coup d’état, the business-owners strike, the [2002/2003] oil-strike, and it entered a new stage, a pro-revolutionary offensive where it began to move forward from a social, economic and cultural point of view, and in specific areas such as health, education, and employment generation. A real national development plan began to be created – irrigation system, roads, the construction of homes, the creation of human resources, and all the government ‘missions’ were created that deal specifically with each of the areas which had to be developed. It was intense work. And from that moment the Bolivarian process also projected itself outwards. It was probably from the moment that the domestic opposition was defeated in the country, and with the recovery of the Venezuelan peoples’ social conscience, a very aggressive international media campaign began, as another means of attacking the Venezuelan process, and the Latin American and Caribbean processes. Therefore one could focus on that latter period. Beginning in 2006 we created a work plan for Europe which includes plans for individual countries and for the European Union. I can tell you that today, at this moment, we can say that many spaces have opened up in every country and in the European Union itself. We have focused on bilateral relationships, trying to identify people within the European Union but who are active in their own countries and who mainly act politically in their country, for example the European Members of Parliament themselves.

#### Aid that’s perceived as geopolitically motivated strongly deters FDI---the effect’s conditional on whether it’s perceived as geostrategically motivated---turns the case

Ana Carolina Garriga 11, Professor of Political Studies at the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (Mexico), and Brian J. Phillips, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, June 2011, “Foreign Aid and Investment in Post-Conflict Societies,” online: http://www.cide.edu/publicaciones/status/dts/DTEP%20227.pdf

Does development aid attract FDI in post-conflict countries? This paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of FDI by explaining how international aid is a signal that can attract FDI. Post-conflict situations are arguably the least attractive environment for FDI because of the effects of conflict on the economic system and on political institutions. Furthermore, these states are relatively information-poor. Before investing in these countries, firms look at a variety of signals. We argue that the decision to send aid to a country signals the donors' trust of local authorities. This effect of aid has not yet been addressed. What matters is the presence of aid, whether or not the aid has actually accomplished the goals set forth by donors. We also argue that this impact of development aid is conditional on whether the aid can be viewed as geostrategic or not.2 Most aid should signal a better environment for FDI, but aid seen as geostrategic could deter investors. Our results provide support for our argument, suggesting that in post-conflict countries non-strategic aid attracts FDI, and that geostrategic aid offers a different kind of signal. This topic has important implications for the literatures on FDI and aid. Global FDI flows have increased substantially in the past few decades, and recent studies have attempted offer explanations for why some countries receive more FDI inflows than others.3 At the same time, a separate and substantial body of literature attempts to determine the effects of foreign aid on recipients.4 While most of the studies deal with aid's efficacy, our study shows there are important unintended consequences, regardless of whether aid works as intended. A few recent studies have shown various relationships between aid and FDI,5 but ours provides a new angle on the subject. This study contributes not only to the FDI and aid literatures separately, but in a broader sense by finding connections between these lines of research. Furthermore, our work contributes to studies of development in post-conflict countries. In line with recent efforts to integrate the field of international relations, the project brings together three areas of study that speak to each other, but are not often enough evaluated jointly. In addition to contributing to these bodies of literature, this study has substantial normative implications. Our sample, post-conflict countries, is especially worthy of researchers' attention. FDI is crucial for developing countries generally, as it not only provides considerable income flows, but also technology transfer6 and other benefits.7 These benefits can be particularly valuable to the states upon which we focus. These states -generally the most disadvantaged in the world- already likely suffered infrastructure damage from the conflict, and might be prone to lapse back into more conflict,8 so they are especially worth understanding. There is an additional normative and policy-relevant value to our study, beyond the fact that our sample of states merits attention. We argue that efforts to help these disadvantaged states through foreign aid can have substantial unintended consequences, in ways that the extant literature has yet to argue or show. This should encourage donor states to more carefully evaluate their aid allocation decisions. Aid has the potential to draw FDI, an important complement, but donor states that donate for geostrategic reasons can actually discourage foreign investment. This unintended consequence should be more carefully considered by donor states.

## 1NC – 3

#### Last night Obama reached a deal with Iran on nuclear weapons, but he needs capital to prevent congress from passing sanctions

Dennis, staff writer @ Roll Call, 11/23/13

(“Obama Faces Skeptical Congress as Iran Nuclear Deal Reached,”http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/obama-announces-iran-nuclear-deal/ DA: 11/23/13, dsg)

President Barack Obama has a sales job to do with Congress after he announced an interim deal Saturday night that will halt Iran’s nuclear program — although not dismantle it — in return for a partial rollback of sanctions. Obama said in a statement from the White House that the agreement would “cut off Iran’s most likely paths to a bomb” and said Iran must work toward a comprehensive solution over the next six months or the full sanctions would resume. “The burden is on Iran that its nuclear program will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes,” Obama said. He urged Congress to hold back on plans for a new round of sanctions, which lawmakers in both chambers have been pushing and could receive a vote after Thanksgiving. “We will comtinue to work closely with Congress,” he said. “However, now is not the time to move forward on new sanctions, because doing so would derail this promising first step, alienate us from our allies and risk unraveling the coalition that enabled our sanctions to be enforced in the first place.” Instant reaction from Republicans was skeptical. “Unless the agreement requires dismantling of the Iranian centrifuges, we really haven’t gained anything,” Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., tweeted. “Amazing what WH will do to distract attention from O-care,” tweeted Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, the No. 2 Republican in the Senate.

#### Congress hates Venezuela – Snowden scandal.

Aglaia Berlutti, 7/9-2013, witch by birth (no srsly doe), writer for the website Spanish Global Voices, “Venezuela's President Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden,” http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/07/09/venezuelas-president-offers-asylum-to-edward-snowden-and-controversy-erupts/

The president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, offered humanitarian asylum to Edward Snowden, former contractor at the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) who leaked classified information about mass surveillance programs in the United States and the Great Britain. Snowden, charged with espionage and property theft by the United States government, is currently on Russian territory, where he is attempting to avoid extradition to American soil. Maduro's offer comes at a complicated diplomatic moment: UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) demanded an apology from Europe due to the incident suffered by Evo Morales, during which various countries closed their airspace to the Bolivian leader based on suspicions that he was transporting Snowden. In events leading up to the military parade that celebrated 202 years since the signing of the Venezuelan declaration of independence on Friday, July 5, President Maduro stated [es] that, “As leader of the State and Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, I have decided to offer humanitarian asylum to the American young man, Snowden.” Maduro explained that Venezuela is offering the measure to Snowden to “protect him from the persecution that has been unleashed from the most powerful empire in the world against a young man who has told the truth”. A day later, the Venezuelan president confirmed his intention via Twitter (@NicolasMaduro) [es]: @NicolasMaduro: Ratifico el espíritu humanitario de conceder el asilo al joven estadounidense Snowden para protegerlo de la persecución mundial del imperio. @NicolasMaduro: I confirm the humanitarian spirit of granting asylum to Snowden, the young American, to protect him from the empire's global persecution. President Maduro had mentioned the possibility of welcoming Snowden on various occasions, but this is the first time he has done it openly and directly. Despite the controversy, the United States government declined to make comments regarding the Venezuelan president's offer. According to Reuters [es], the White house has not released an opinion on the issue and referred questions to the country's Department of Justice. Nevertheless, on Sunday, July 7, a group of U.S. Congress members established their position on Snowden's possible political asylum, stating that: “Whatever country offers asylum to Edward Snowden, who leaked data from the National Security Agency's (NSA) surveillance program, will set itself against the United States.” The announcement [es] appears to be a direct response to statements made by Venezuela and Bolivia to grant the humanitarian measure to the former U.S. contractor.

#### Negotiations failure triggers military strikes and regional proliferation-causes escalatory wars and collapses the economy.

Cordesman, CSIS, 2013

(Anthony, “Negotiating with Iran: The Strategic Case for Pragmatism and Real Progress”, 9-23, <http://csis.org/publication/negotiating-iran-strategic-case-pragmatism-and-real-progress>, ldg)

Nevertheless, it makes no sense at all to reject Hassan Rouhani’s opening or condemn the Obama Administration’s response. Iran’s nuclear programs have moved to the point where it is extremely doubtful that there will be another chance to begin what may be a long and difficult process for all nations involved, and an attempt at resolution is far better than any of the real world alternatives. As long as any negotiations that follow are realistic in terms of their content, and do not endorse indefinite delay in a U.S. response while Iran’s nuclear programs move forward, they offer what will be the last real hope of avoiding preventive strikes or a process of containment that would lock the region into an Iranian-Israeli nuclear arms race, a probable Saudi effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons, and a U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. The Uncertain Outcome of Preventive Strikes The United States, Iran, and all the other nations involved need to be far more pragmatic about what will happen if time does run out and Iran does go nuclear. Iran may well face a series of preventive strikes – triggered by Israel or planned by the United States – that will destroy far more than its nuclear facilities. This may or may not actually halt the Iranian nuclear effort. A limited set of Israeli preventive strikes could either force the United States to follow up, or create a situation in which Iran rejects all arms control and UN inspection and carries out a massive new disperse nuclear program or a crash basis. It could also drive Iran to lash out into a new wave of confrontation with the United States and Iran’s neighbors. A U.S.-led set of preventive strikes would be more successful, but the United States could only be sure of suppressing a meaningful Iran nuclear effort if it quickly re-strikes any known target it fails to destroy the first time, carries out constant surveillance of Iran, and repeatedly and thoroughly strikes at the targets created by any new Iranian initiatives. The United States would need regional support to do this and probably prolonged regional agreement to U.S. basing. At a minimum, the result would be years more of a regional arms race, military tension, and Iranian efforts to find ways to attack or pressure the Arab states, Israel, and United States. As the current conflict in Syria makes all too clear, no one can predict how much support the United States will really get from any of its allies, its own U.S. Congress, and no one can predict the limits to Iran’s reactions, ability to use third parties, and willingness to confront the United States and the region with new nuclear, missile, and asymmetric threats. The United States would face an almost certain challenge in the UN from Russia and China, and there is no way any U.S. action against Iran could be separated from Iran’s efforts in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon; Afghanistan, or any other issue where Iran could try to find some form of revenge. This is not an argument for not acting. The risk of a fully nuclear Iran is simply too great. It is a very strong argument for finding a good alternative if one can be negotiated on realistic terms. The Uncertain Outcome of Iran Nuclear Weapons and Containment: The Most Likely Outcome is a No Win Escalation Ladder Contest If there are no preventive strikes – or preventive strikes fail to halt Iran – what is now a largely quiet one-sided nuclear arms race would become far more threatening. At one level, this arms race would become one between Iran and any allies it could find and the United States and its Arab allies in or near the Gulf. A nuclear Iran could change the balance in terms of the credibility of U.S. and Arab willingness to engage against Iranian threats, intimidation, and use of its asymmetric forces. It would inevitably make Gulf petroleum exports the scene of an ongoing arms race and constant tension, and risk a clash that might escalate in untended ways. What is less apparent – and needs far more realistic attention in Iran and outside assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat – is the impact of Iran actually going nuclear. One or several crude nuclear devices do not create a nuclear force. Iran cannot produce enough capable nuclear forces for at least the next decade to pose more of an existential threat to Israel than Israel can pose to Iran. Israel would scarcely be passive, however, and Israel already has far more capable missiles than Iran. Israel also has thermonuclear weapons, rather than the early fission devices Iran will probably be limited to for at least the next half-decade. As a result Israel will pose more of an existentialist threat to an Iran as dependent on the survival of Tehran than Iran can pose to an Israel dependent on the survival of Tel Aviv. As the United States and former Soviet Union both learned during the Cold War, even Iranian parity or superiority would be meaningless. The problem with mutually assured destruction is that no state can ever win an existential strike contest. As for the rest of the Middle East, if Iran shows it is going nuclear to enhance its power and dominate the Gulf region – as may be Iran’s real motive – the resulting threat to world oil exports and the world economy is not likely to intimidate to any degree that will benefit Iran. It will push both the United States and Arab states into responding. The fact Iran succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons might increase the level of deterrence of a direct invasion, but would not lead the United States, or surrounding Arab states to passively accept the result. The United States already is transferring more than ten times the value of Iran’s total arms imports to its Gulf allies. Its ties to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman already give the United States and its Gulf allies the ability to devastatingly defeat Iran in any direct military confrontation. Iran can only vastly increase the scale of the resulting destruction that the United States and its allies inflict if Iran ever actually escalates to the use of nuclear weapons. But the United States, the Arab allies, Israel, and other regional states will suffer as well – along with the global economy – if the end result is a major interruption in the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.

#### Middle east war goes global and nuclear

Primakov 9 - Doctor of Economics, Professor, executive member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Head of the Center for Situational Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences

Yevgeny Primakov is President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. The Fundamental Conflict: The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations. Russia in Global Affairs Vol 7 No 3. 2009. http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/105702/ichaptersection\_singledocument/71a40dca-23cb-411d-9c5d-a7ce495e2522/en/12.pdf

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

## 1NC – 4

#### **Venezuela bilat high – Maduro didn’t change anything**

Xiaokun 7/19 – Li Xiaokun, Reporter for China Daily USA, (“Venezuela to maintain policies toward China”, 7/19/13, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-07/19/content_16799317.htm>, AW)

The new government of Venezuela will continue to prioritize its relations with China and expects to learn from China's development, Venezuelan Vice-President Jorge Arreaza said in Beijing on Thursday. Arreaza, who began an official five-day visit to China on Wednesday, made the remarks while meeting Vice-President Li Yuanchao at the Great Hall of the People. Observers said there is no need to worry about changes in Venezuela's China policies in the post-Chavez period. Frequent high-level visits showed that the two nations are trying to consolidate ties. "Apparently, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has adopted Chavez's policies on China," said Wu Baiyi, deputy head of the Institution of Latin American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "Besides, the Venezuelan economy's steady development and its oil exports are closely linked to China," he said. Li told Arreaza that the two nations should maintain closer high-level contacts, expand cooperation in the areas of energy, finance and agriculture, step up exchanges regarding experience in governance and deepen their strategic partnership. China and Venezuela forged a strategic partnership of common development in 2001. Li said the two nations should jointly develop a blueprint for the future development of bilateral links. Arreaza said his government will continue to prioritize its relations with China, adding that the country is ready to learn from China's experience in development and strengthen cooperation in all fields. The late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez visited China six times after he took office in 1999 and greatly encouraged boosting ties. Bilateral trade reached $23 billion in 2012. According to the Chinese embassy in Venezuela, China has provided more than $30 billion in financing to Venezuela to push forward nearly 300 projects of mutual cooperation. There have been concerns among Chinese investors that favorable policies on China might change under the new government. Maduro told a visiting high-ranking Chinese official after Chavez's funeral in March that the best way to pay tribute to the late leader was to keep deepening the strategic partnership with China. Beijing and Caracas have maintained frequent mutual visits of high-level officials since then. Li Yuanchao visited Venezuela for five days in May and met with key leaders including Maduro, Arreaza, and President of the Venezuelan National Assembly Diosdado Cabello. The Foreign Ministry said the visit was of great importance because the two countries had just completed a transition of leadership. Cabello paid a visit to China in July, several days before Arreaza's China trip. Cabello said ahead of the visit that Venezuela's relations with China were stable and that cooperation between the two nations would continue. He said Venezuela would like to be an important partner in China's energy imports. China is a major source of Venezuela's export income, he said. Cabello, who is also the first vice-president of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela, said the party will dispatch 50 party members to learn in China in September. He said such communication will help the development of the country and the party. Venezuelan Oil and Mining Minister Rafael Ramirez also came to Beijing in June. Ramirez told reporters that Venezuela exported 626,000 barrels of oil per day to China in the first four months of this year, 18 percent more than the same period last year. He said the figure is expected to reach 1 million barrels per day within two years. In 2005, the figure was only 49,000 barrels per day. "Chinese enterprises are expanding investment in Venezuela, a reflection of their confidence in the Venezuelan economy, and its relations with China," said Wu Baiyi. Wang Zhen, former Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, said many other political parties in Venezuela, including the opposition, also attach great importance to ties with Beijing.

#### Venezuela is zero sum for the U.S. and China

Dumbaugh 8 – specialist in Asian affairs for the Congressional Research Service, 8 [Kerry, 7-18-8, Congressional Research Service, “CRS Report for Congress”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34588.pdf, accessed 7-9-13]

Energy concerns also play a role in China’s Latin-American diplomacy, particularly in Venezuela, which now accounts for almost 15% of U.S. oil imports, and in Brazil, with which China announced a $10 billion energy deal in November 2004.65 As a consequence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s visit to Beijing in December 2004 and PRC Vice-President Zeng Qinghong’s visit to Venezuela in January 2005, the two countries reportedly signed a series of agreements that committed the China National Petroleum Corporation to spend over $400 million to develop Venezuelan oil and gas reserves.66 Given the current poor state of U.S.- Venezuelan relations under the Chavez government, some American observers worry that Venezuelan energy agreements with China ultimately may serve to divert oil from the United States.

#### Lack of US economic engagement spurs China’s growth.

Erikson & Chen ‘7 – (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

China’s economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America-par- ticularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas.9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean ex- ceeded $2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year.10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower with- out a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituen- cies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western inten- tions. 12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China-to the extent that this has actually occurred-is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about Chinas rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competi- tion posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China seeks to reassure the United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing has begun enlisting regional powers like Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur), which places certain constraints on member states' bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its avowals to Washington, China appears to be using its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective of stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Chinese econ decline tanks the world economy – causes nuclear conflict in Asia and draws in the US

Chen 01 [Shuxen, RAND Corp, “China the United States and The Global Economy”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/2006/MR1300.pdf]

Nevertheless, America’s main interests in China have been quite constant, namely peace, security, prosperity, and a healthy environment. Chinese interests in the United States have also been quite constant and largely compatible, notwithstanding sharp differences over Taiwan, strategic technology transfers, trade, and human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan’s relations with the mainland remain peaceful; in sustaining the growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive lives. What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America’s prosperity. China’s growing economy is a valuable market to many workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it could become much more valuable by opening its markets further. China also affects America’s security. It could either help to stabilize or destabilize currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia, where renewed warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America’s environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere and currently endangered species. China’s economic growth has slowed, while its social and environmental challenges have continued to mount. It faces difficult choices. The gains from economic liberalization have been waning. Painful institutional and political changes will be needed to sustain growth. Most immediately, political leaders will need to dismantle their counterproductive controls over the allocation of scarce capital, particularly through the state banking system. To restrain corruption, reform the tax system, and raise the revenues needed to pay for essential public works and services, China’s political leaders, lawmakers, regulators, and other officials will need to be made more openly and directly accountable to the people whose interests they claim to serve. Yet, China’s leadership, preoccupied with preserving its own power, lacks a convincing vision of China’s future. While we do not know whether China will rise to the challenge and prosper, or stagnate and falter, Americans have a great stake in China’s successful reform. That is why they have an interest in China’s acceding to the WTO, opening it to the global economy, and strengthening its compliance with international rules and norms. Even so, they expect potential conflicts of interests to recur. China would like the people of Taiwan to accept its view of Chinese sovereignty peacefully. But, when the people of Taiwan prepared to choose their next leader peacefully at the polls in 1996, and again in 2000, China asserted a right to impose its views on them forcefully, notwithstanding American insistence that it refrain from such violence. China also insists on its right to modernize its armed forces and to buy or sell strategic technologies, without disclosing how it does so and without conceding any allegations that it violated U.S. laws or its own treaty obligations. But Americans do not want it to acquire, deploy, or export strategic technologies that could be used against the United States or its allies in Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere. China’s self-perpetuating, one-party dictatorship also denies people’s right to political speech, religious assembly, and labor or other organizations outside of state and party control. Openly criticizing such strict constraints on human rights will continue to be an essential expression of American ideals. Until China strengthens its property laws to meet international market standards, disputes over the intellectual, financial, and tangible property rights of Americans in China will also persist, and could rapidly escalate or proliferate. Recent U.S. Presidents have made great efforts and had endless difficulties pursuing American interests in China. China was a source of troubles for President Clinton in 1998 and 1999. In particular, he seems to have let Chinese leaders expect more from him on Taiwan and the WTO than he was prepared to deliver. After announcing a new “strategic partnership” with China on his visit there in 1998, he neglected to reiterate America’s overriding interest in peace when he articulated the Chinese leadership’s “Three No’s” policy toward the recognition of two Chinas, support for Taiwan’s independence, and acceptance of applications by Taiwan to join international organiza tions, like the United Nation. At the time, this was reported to be the quid pro quo for letting President Clinton give a speech on Chinese TV, which was finally permitted without prior publicity when the viewing audience was predictably small. While the president’s recitation of the “Three No’s” did not alter U.S. commitments, critics saw it as taking the Chinese side in the crossstraits dispute and Taiwan’s President Lee took advantage of the ensuing controversy to assert special state-to-state relations between Taiwan and China. It is hard to know whether the cross-straits dialogue between the leaderships in Taiwan and China would have been renewed in the autumn of 1999, as planned, if President Clinton had not provoked President Lee into asserting Taiwan’s statehood. It is also too soon to say whether serious or lasting damage was done by his rejection of Premier Zhu’s unexpectedly bold and favorable offer in April 1999 for China’s accession to the WTO. The damage has been limited and partially repaired already from the president’s ill-advised hesitation to apologize for the unintended bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the Chinese leadership’s hasty and mistaken decision that it was a deliberate attack that justified nationalist reprisals by students stoning the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Whatever the ultimate verdicts may be on these episodes since the first meeting of the RAND-China Reform Forum conference in Beijing in June 1998, they illustrate the great stakes and instabilities in the vital relationship between the United States and China. CONCLUSION Great common interests and risks of serious conflicts between the United States and China will keep raising difficult new challenges. They will require new initiatives for mutually beneficial cooperation and continuous efforts to avoid potentially critical misunderstandings over unforeseeable events in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, the Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia, or elsewhere. Without doubt, sustaining China’s economic growth and reinforcing its institutional reforms though greater openness is a winning prescription for both the United States and China. To pursue this course amid unexpected difficulties, both countries will need to pay close attention to many issues, conduct frank dialogues, and participate in constructive statesmanship. Ups and downs in U.S.-Chinese relations will likely recur, but they need not be as volatile as they have been in recent years. Assuming that the future will mirror the past, substantial changes in our situations and needs vis-à-vis each other will be unpredictable, inevitable, and hard to fathom. This puts a large premium on ensuring that there are clear communications between Chinese and Americans who are willing and able to keep the relationship on an even keel.

#### Collapse of the Chinese government causes border conflict with Russia

Lo and Rothman 6 [Bobo Lo and Andy Rothman, May 2006, Asian Geopolitics, special report http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7057/is\_2\_9/ai\_n28498825/pg\_17/]

The second scenario for strategic conflict is predicated on a general collapse of law and order in China. With no effective central authority to contain the anarchy, millions of Chinese could cross the border into the Russian Far East. This would lead to tensions and clashes, at first sporadic and random, but subsequently escalating into interstate conflict.

#### Nuclear winter

Sharavin 01[Alexander, What the Papers Say, 10-3-01, The Third Threat]

Russia may face the “wonderful” prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia’s entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become less strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such “trifles” like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia’s armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the “Chechen” and the “Balkan” variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

## 1NC – Warming

#### Genuine engagement is impossible with Venezuela—only a risk of appeasement

Harper 10 (Liz, America’s Quarters, “Venezuela’s Formal Rejection of Ambassador-Designate Larry Palmer”, America’s Quarterly, 12/21, <http://americasquarterly.org/taxonomy/term/2741>)

On one side, you have those espousing "strategic engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest. You raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be “subversive," because you seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission. But, the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, is more like "appeasement," say people clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death by a thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chávez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby further eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chávez threatens more than human rights and democratic norms; the U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chávez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral?

#### Strong strategies are key to maintain international credible image of the US

Enold 09 (Scott A. Enold, Colonel, United States Air Force, “ROGUE STATES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY” 02-04-2009, Strategy research project)

To effectively engage rogue states who have proliferated nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or are attempting to proliferate them, the United States must develop and implement an effective policy designed to persuade, pursue and punish those governments and regimes. The United States government must possess extreme tactics and measures. Preemptive targeting must be available if rogue states or actors utilize nuclear terror tactics as they seek political gains or to be recognized as a key participant in the world balance of power. It is imperative that rogue states or actors cannot employ nuclear weapons. As rogue states acquire nuclear technology, the United States must develop a range of policies to apply constant pressure on these states. The United States must be prepared to demonstrate resiliency to attacks should they occur. The United States government must prepare its citizens to accept the fact terrorist acts will occur on the continent. The citizens must understand that every effort is made to protect the population. Actors exist who seek to harm citizens or provide evidence of weak resolve or weak policies inside the United States. In doing so, rouge states or actors seek to secure a foothold for a continued exploitation of the United States. Presently, the United States National Security Strategy does not lay out a direct policy demonstrating a complete and unconditional strategy to stop rogue state or actor nuclear weapon employment. There must be actionable and if necessary violent steps available to take against rogue states and actors. They must to be aware of and understand the harsh retaliation should they chose to utilize a nuclear option.

#### American consistency on threats and promises are key to U.S. credibility

**Etzioni 11** professor of international relations at George Washington University March-April Military Review “The Coming Test of U.S. Credibility” http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/03/credibility.pdf

THE RELATIVE POWER of the United States is declining—both because other nations are increasing their power and because the U. S. economic challenges and taxing overseas commitments are weakening it. In this context, the credibility of U.S. commitments and the perception that the United States will back up its threats and promises with appropriate action is growing in importance. In popular terms, high credibility allows a nation to get more mileage out of a relatively small amount of power, while low credibility leads to burning up much greater amounts of power. The Theory of Credibility One definition of power is the ability of A to make B follow a course of action that A prefers. The term “make” is highly relevant. When A convinces B of the merit of the course A prefers, and B voluntarily follows it, we can refer to this change of course as an application of “persuasive power” or “soft power.” However, most applications of power are based either on coercion (if you park in front of a fire hydrant, your car is towed) or economic incentives and disincentives (you are fined to the point where you would be disinclined to park there). In these applications of power, B maintains his original preferences but is either prevented from following them or is pained to a point where he will suspend resistance. Every time A calls on B to change course, A is tested twice. First, if B does not follow A’s call, A will fail to achieve its goals (Nazi Germany annexes Austria, despite protests by the United Kingdom and France). Second, A loses some credibility, making B less likely to heed A’s future demands (Nazi Germany becomes more likely to invade Poland). On the other hand, if B heeds A’s demand, A wins twice: it achieves its goal (e.g., the United States dismantles the regime of Saddam Hussein and establishes that there are no WMDs in Iraq), and it increases the likelihood that future demands will be heeded without power actually being exercised (e.g. Libya voluntarily dismantles its WMD program following the invasion of Iraq). In short, the higher a nation’s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power or by employing less of it when it must exercise its power. Political scientists have qualified this basic version of the power/credibility theory. In his detailed examination of three historical cases, Daryl G. Press shows that in each instance, the Bs made decisions based upon their perception of the current intentions and capabilities of A, rather than on the extent to which A followed up on previous threats. Thus, if A does not have the needed forces or if A’s interests in the issue at hand are marginal, its threats will not carry much weight no matter how “credible” A was in the past. For example, if the United States had announced that it would invade Burma unless it released opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest (she was eventually released in November 2010), such a threat would not have carried much weight—regardless of past U.S. actions—because the issue did not seem reason enough for the United States to invade Burma, and because the U.S. Army was largely committed elsewhere. Another political scientist, Kathleen Cunningham, has shown that the credibility of promises—as opposed to the credibility of threats—is much more difficult to maintain because the implementation of promises is often stretched over long periods of time. 1 The bulk of this essay focuses on dealing with threats, rather than promises. Declining U.S. Power and Credibility Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to the relative decline of U.S. power, but much less has been said of changes in U.S. credibility. While there has been some erosion in the relative power of the United States measured since 1945 or 1990), the swings in the level of its credibility have been much more pronounced. When the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam in 1973, its credibility suffered so much that many observers doubted whether the United States would ever deploy its military overseas unless it faced a much greater and direct threat than it faced in Southeast Asia. Additional setbacks over the next decades followed, including the failed rescue of American hostages in Iran during the last year of the Carter administration and President Reagan’s withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Lebanon after the October 1983 Hezbollah bombing of U.S. barracks in Beirut. The bombing killed 241 American servicemen, but it elicited no punitive response—the administration abandoned a plan to assault the training camp where Hezbollah had planned the attack. 2 Operation Desert Storm drastically increased U.S. military credibility. The United States and the UN demanded that Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait. When he refused, U.S. and Allied forces quickly overwhelmed his military with a low level of American causalities, contrary to expectations. Saddam’s forces were defeated with less than 400 American casualties. 3 The total cost of defeating Saddam was $61 billion—almost 90 percent of which was borne by U.S. allies. 4 When Serbia ignored the demands of the United States and other Western nations to withdraw its hostile forces and halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO forces defeated the Serbs with little effort, losing only two troops in a helicopter training accident. 5 U.S. credibility reached a high mark in 2003, when the United States, employing a much smaller force than in 1991, overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime swiftly and with a low level of American casualties, again despite expectations to the contrary. In the first phase of the war—up to 1 May 2003, when the Saddam regime was removed and no WMDs were found—there had been only 172 American casualties. 6 Only $56 billion had been appropriated for Iraq operations. 7 Those who hold that credibility matters little should pay mind to the side effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Libya did not merely stop developing WMDs or allow inspections, it allowed the United States to pack cargo In short, the higher a nation’s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power …4 March-April 2011  MILITARY REVIEW planes with several tons of nuclear equipment and airlift it from the country. 8 The country surrendered centrifuges, mustard gas tanks, and SCUD missiles. It sent 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Russia for blending down, destroyed chemical weapons, and has assisted the United States in cracking down on the global black market for nuclear arms technology. 9 The reasons are complex, and experts point out that Muammar al-Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, was under considerable domestic pressure to ease his country’s economic and political isolation. 10 Gaddafi also believed he was next in line for a forced regime change. In a private conversation with Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s prime minister, in 2003, Gaddafi is reported to have said, “I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.” 11 Iran’s best offer by far regarding its nuclear program occurred in 2003, at a time when U.S. credibility reached its apex. In a fax transmitted to the State Department through the Swiss ambassador, who confirmed that it had come from “key power centers” in Iran, Iran asked for “a broad dialogue with the United States.” The fax “suggested everything was on the table—including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.” 12 (The Bush administration, however, considered the Iranian regime to be on the verge of collapse at the time, and, according to reports, it “belittled the initiative.”) 13 Richard Haass, who at the time was serving as director of policy planning at the State Department, stated that the offer was spurned because “the bias [in the Bush administration] was toward a policy of regime change.” 14 Still, in 2004, Britain, France, and Germany secured a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran. 15 It lasted until 2006, when American credibility began to decline. 16 Also in 2004, Iran offered to make the “European Three” a guarantee that its nuclear program would be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” as long as the West would provide “firm commitments on security issues.” 17 In 2005, as U.S. difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan mounted and its level of casualties—as well as those of its allies and of the local populations—increased without a victory in sight, U.S. credibility was gradually undermined. Since 2005, more than 4,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died, and the direct cost of military operations in the country has exceeded $650 billion. 18 The same holds true in Afghanistan—only more strongly—already the longest war in which the United States has ever engaged, with rising casualties and costs. Both credibility-undermining developments were the result of a great expansion of the goals of the mission. In Iraq, the mission was initially to overthrow the regime and ensure that it has no WMDs. In Afghanistan, the mission was initially to eradicate Al-Qaeda. But in both countries, the mission morphed into the costly task of nation building—although other terms were used, such as reconstruction and COIN (counterinsurgency)— which includes building an effective and legitimate government composed of the native population. In popular terms, the United States won the wars but has been losing the peace. The distinction between the pure military phase (which was very successful in both countries) and the troubled nationbuilding phase that followed has eluded the Nation’s adversaries, who have focused on the fact that the United States seems to have great difficulties in making progress toward its expanded goals. Thus, even if the United States achieves its extended goals Saddam Hussein is seen in this image from video broadcast on Iraqi television, 2003. in these two nations, it will have done so only with great efforts and at high costs. And many observers are very doubtful that these nations will be turned into stable governments allied with the United States—let alone that they will be truly democratic. The fact that the United States is withdrawing from Iraq (and is on a timeline, however disputed, to begin withdrawal from Afghanistan)—regardless of whether its goals are fully accomplished—further feeds into the significant decline in its credibility. This stands out especially when compared to the credibility it enjoyed in 2003 and 2004. The fact that the United States has, on several occasions, made specific and very public demands of various countries, only to have these demands roundly ignored—without any consequences— has not added to its credibility. On several occasions, the United States demanded Israel extend the freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank and cease building in East Jerusalem. While one can question whether such a call for a total freeze was justified, especially as no concessions were demanded from the Palestinians, one cannot deny that, as Israel ignored these demands and faced no consequences, U.S. credibility was diminished. The same has occurred in Afghanistan. The United States voiced strong demands, only to be rebuffed very publicly by a government that would collapse were it not for American support. Moreover, the United States was forced to court President Hamid Karzai when he threatened to make peace on his own with the Taliban and was courted by Iran. A particularly telling example took place on 28 March 2010, when President Obama flew to Kabul and “delivered pointed criticism to Hamid Karzai” over pervasive corruption in the Afghan government. 19 Then-National Security Advisor James Jones voiced the president’s concerns, stating that Karzai “needs to be seized with how important” the issue of corruption is for American efforts in the country. 20 But Karzai was “angered and offended” by the visit.” 21 Only days later, he made a series of inflammatory remarks about Western interference in his country, accused foreigners of a “vast fraud” in the Afghan presidential election, and threatened to ally himself with the Taliban. 22 A few weeks after these statements, Karzai was in Washington as a guest of the White House, where he was wellreceived, and all seemed forgiven. The Next Test As I will show shortly, in recent years a large and growing number of U.S. allies and adversaries— especially in the Middle East—have questioned American commitment to back up its declared goals—that is, they question the Nation’s credibility. Hence, the way the United States conducts itself in the next test of its resolve will be unusually consequential for its position as a global power. I cannot emphasize enough that I am not arguing that the United States should seek a confrontation, let alone engage in a war, to show that it still has the capacity to back up its threats and promises by using conventional forces. (Few doubt U.S. power and ability to act as a nuclear power, but they also realize that nuclear power is ill-suited for many foreign policy goals.) However, I am suggesting that the ways in which the U.S. will respond to the next challenge to its power will have strong implications for its credibility—and for its need to employ power. One’s mind turns to two hot spots: North Korea and Iran. North Korea is an obvious testing ground for American resolve. While Iran is denying that it is developing a military nuclear program, North Korea flaunts its program. While Iran is using its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, to trouble U.S. allies in the Middle East, North Korea has openly attacked the U.S. ally South Korea, both by reportedly torpedoing a South Korean ship in March 2010, killing 46 sailors, and by shelling a South Korean island in November, killing two South Korean soldiers. While Iran is spewing over-the-top accusations against the West, its rhetoric is no match for North Korea’s bellicose statements and actions. In short, North Korea would seem to be the place where U.S. credibility is most being tested and will continue to be in the near future.

#### Nuclear war

Bosco 6 (David, a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine) July “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. Consider the following scenarios: Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored. But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang? Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II. True, China is a rapidly rising power -- an often destabilizing phenomenon in international relations -- but it appears inclined to focus on economic growth rather than military conquest (with the possible exception of Taiwan). Russia is resentful about its fall from superpower status, but it also seems reconciled to U.S. military dominance and more interested in tapping its massive oil and gas reserves than in rebuilding its decrepit military. Indeed, U.S. military superiority seems to be a key to global stability. Some theories of international relations predict that other major powers will eventually band together to challenge American might, but it's hard to find much evidence of such behavior. The United States, after all, invaded Iraq without U.N. approval and yet there was not even a hint that France, Russia or China would respond militarily. There is another factor working in favor of great-power caution: nuclear weapons. Europe's leaders on the eve of World War I can perhaps be forgiven for not understanding the carnage they were about to unleash. That generation grew up in a world of short wars that did limited damage. Leaders today should have no such illusions. The installation of emergency hot lines between national capitals was a recognition of the need for fast and clear communication in times of crisis. Diplomatic tools have advanced too. Sluggish though it may be, the U.N. Security Council regularly gathers the great powers' representatives in a room to hash out developing crises. So there is reason to hope that the major powers have little interest in playing with fire and the tools to stamp it out. But complacency is dangerous. The British economist Norman Angell once argued persuasively that deep economic links made conflict between the great powers obsolete. His book appeared in 1910 and was still in shops when Europe's armies poured across their borders in 1914.

#### No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve---no tipping point or “1% risk” args

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Warming is slow – and not real

Taylor ’11 (7/27- senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute (2011, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism,” Forbes, http://blogs.forbes.com/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-revewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict. When objective NASA satellite data, reported in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, show a “huge discrepancy” between alarmist climate models and real-world facts, climate scientists, the media and our elected officials would be wise to take notice. Whether or not they do so will tell us a great deal about how honest the purveyors of global warming alarmism truly are.

#### Resslient and no impact

Easterbrook ‘95 (Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation (Gregg, A Moment on Earth pg 25)

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### Impossible to cut emissions – no modeling or momentum

Mead 10 (Walter Russell, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Death of Global Warming, February 1, <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/02/01/the-death-of-global-warming/>)

The global warming movement as we have known it is dead. Its health had been in steady decline during the last year as the once robust hopes for a strong and legally binding treaty to be agreed upon at the Copenhagen Summit faded away. By the time that summit opened, campaigners were reduced to hoping for a ‘politically binding’ agreement to be agreed that would set the stage for the rapid adoption of the legally binding treaty. After the failure of the summit to agree to even that much, the movement went into a rapid decline. The movement died from two causes: bad science and bad politics. After years in which global warming activists had lectured everyone about the overwhelming nature of the scientific evidence, it turned out that the most prestigious agencies in the global warming movement were breaking laws, hiding data, and making inflated, bogus claims resting on, in some cases, no scientific basis at all. This latest story in the London Times is yet another shocker; the IPCC’s claims that the rainforests were going to disappear as a result of global warming are as bogus and fraudulent as its claims that the Himalayan glaciers would melt by 2035. It seems as if a scare story could grab a headline, the IPCC simply didn’t care about whether it was reality-based. With this in mind, ‘climategate’ — the scandal over hacked emails by prominent climate scientists — looks sinister rather than just unsavory. The British government has concluded that University of East Anglia, home of the research institute that provides the global warming with much of its key data, had violated Britain’s Freedom of Information Act when scientists refused to hand over data so that critics could check their calculations and methods. Breaking the law to hide key pieces of data isn’t just ‘science as usual,’ as the global warming movement’s embattled defenders gamely tried to argue. A cover-up like that suggests that you indeed have something to conceal. The urge to make the data better than it was didn’t just come out of nowhere. The global warmists were trapped into the necessity of hyping the threat by their realization that the actual evidence they had — which, let me emphasize, all hype aside, is serious, troubling and establishes in my mind the need for intensive additional research and investigation, as well as some prudential steps that would reduce CO2 emissions by enhancing fuel use efficiency and promoting alternative energy sources — was not sufficient to get the world’s governments to do what they thought needed to be done. Hyping the threat increasingly doesn’t look like an accident: it looks like it was a conscious political strategy. Now it has failed. Not everything that has come out of the IPCC and the East Anglia Climate Unit is false, but enough of their product is sufficiently tainted that these institutions can best serve the cause of fighting climate change by stepping out of the picture. New leadership might help, but everything these two agencies have done will now have to be re-checked by independent and objective sources. The global warming campaigners got into this mess because they had a deeply flawed political strategy. They were never able to develop a pragmatic approach that could reach its goals in the context of the existing international system. The global warming movement proposed a complex set of international agreements involving vast transfers of funds, intrusive regulations in national economies, and substantial changes to the domestic political economies of most countries on the planet. As it happened, the movement never got to the first step — it never got the world’s countries to agree to the necessary set of treaties, transfers and policies that would constitute, at least on paper, a program for achieving its key goals. Even if that first step had been reached, the second and third would almost surely not have been. The United States Congress is unlikely to pass the kind of legislation these agreements would require before the midterm elections, much less ratify a treaty. (It takes 67 senate votes to ratify a treaty and only 60 to overcome a filibuster.) After the midterms, with the Democrats expected to lose seats in both houses, the chance of passage would be even more remote — especially as polls show that global warming ranks at or near the bottom of most voters’ priorities. American public opinion supports ‘doing something’ about global warming, but not very much; support for specific measures and sacrifices will erode rapidly as commentators from Fox News and other conservative outlets endlessly hammer away. Without a commitment from the United States to pay its share of the $100 billion plus per year that poor countries wanted as their price for compliance, and without US participation in other aspects of the proposed global approach, the intricate global deals fall apart. Since the United States was never very likely to accept these agreements and ratify these treaties, and is even less prepared to do so in a recession with the Democrats in retreat, even “success” in Copenhagen would not have brought the global warming movement the kind of victory it sought — although it would have created a very sticky and painful political problem for the United States. But even if somehow, miraculously, the United States and all the other countries involved not only accepted the agreements but ratified them and wrote domestic legislation to incorporate them into law, it is extremely unlikely that all this activity would achieve the desired result. Countries would cheat, either because they chose to do so or because their domestic systems are so weak, so corrupt or so both that they simply wouldn’t be able to comply. Governments in countries like China and India aren’t going to stop pushing for all the economic growth they can get by any means that will work — and even if central governments decided to move on global warming, state and local authorities have agendas of their own. The examples of blatant cheating would inevitably affect compliance in other countries; it would also very likely erode what would in any case be an extremely fragile consensus in rich countries to keep forking over hundreds of billions of dollars to poor countries — many of whom would not be in anything like full compliance with their commitments. For better or worse, the global political system isn’t capable of producing the kind of result the global warming activists want. It’s like asking a jellyfish to climb a flight of stairs; you can poke and prod all you want, you can cajole and you can threaten. But you are asking for something that you just can’t get — and at the end of the day, you won’t get it. The grieving friends and relatives aren’t ready to pull the plug; in a typical, whistling-past-the-graveyard comment, the BBC first acknowledges that even if the current promises are kept, temperatures will rise above the target level of two degrees Celsius — but let’s not despair! The BBC quotes one of its own reporters: “BBC environment reporter Matt McGrath says the accord lacks teeth and does not include any clear targets on cutting emissions. But if most countries at least signal what they intend to do to cut their emissions, it will mark the first time that the UN has a comprehensive written collection of promised actions, he says.”

#### A. deep-sea floor checks.

SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE, October 19, ‘95, p. A10

Rough estimates for the number of species on the deep-sea floor have now soared to 10 million or even 100 million, hundreds of times larger than the old projections of 200,000 species for all types of marine life. The new figures also contrast starkly with the sum of the earth's plants, animals and microbes that scientists have so far named, about 1.4 million species in all. And they match the 10 million to 100 million that experts had projected as possible totals for the number of terrestrial species. "It's changing our whole view about biodiversity," said Dr. P. John D. Lambshead, a marine biologist at the Natural History Museum in London who studies the abundance of deep ocean species. "The quantity of life we've found is incredible," he added in an interview. "All sorts of ecologic theories that looked good, based on terrestrial models, suddenly fall apart. We're having to change all our ideas."

#### B. massive size of oceans checks snowball and ensures slow timeframe.

Bjørn Lomborg, Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST, ‘1 p. 189

But the oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant - the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion liters of water. The UN’s overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: “The open sea is still relatively clean. Low levels of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable, are biologically insignificant. Oil slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, a minor consequences to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.

#### C. Waste

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Year of the OceanReport, ‘98, PERSPECTIVES ON MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY TODAY, http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/yoto/meeting/mar\_env\_316.html

Direct discharges are defined here to include releases from vessels, discharges of municipal and industrial wastewater via pipelines, and dumping of waste materials, such as dredged material, into ocean waters. In the United States, there are more than 2,000 sewage treatment plants, municipalities, and industrial facilities discharging effluents into estuarine and coastal waters. Approximately 2.3 trillion gallons of effluent are discharged into marine waters from sewage treatment facilities annually. While most of this sewage meets secondary treatment standards prior to disposal, nutrients and pathogens from such discharges can contribute to the degradation of local marine ecosystems creating "dead zones"6 and forcing the closure of shellfish beds and swimming areas. Nutrient loading can be significant causes of degradation to coral reefs and other coastal ecosystems.

## 1NC – FDI

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?¶ We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.¶ Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.¶ Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.¶ An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?¶ First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)¶ Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."¶ Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.¶ Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. ¶ We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

#### **Say no – plan is perceived as sabotage**

Aljazeera 9/8 – Aljazeera News, (“Maduro accuses US of sabotage plot”, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/09/20139861558854685.html>, AW)

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has claimed the White House is plotting the "collapse" of his government next month by sabotaging food, electricity and fuel supplies.¶ "I have data about a meeting at the White House, the full names of those who attended. I know what plans they made for the total collapse" of the country, Maduro said on Saturday during a ceremony in northern Aragua state.¶ "They think that Venezuela will collapse in October, so long as they plan for it by sabotaging the people's food, electricity, fuel and refineries."¶ In recent months, the Venezuelan government has made several allegations about conspiracies against it and plots to kill Maduro, who even stated that Washington wanted to kill him at the same time that it carried out a possible attack on Syria.¶ Maduro's predecessor, the late Hugo Chavez, also made claims about several plots to kill him.¶ On Tuesday, Maduro claimed the Venezuelan opposition had sabotaged the electrical power grid after a massive blackout left 70 percent of the country without power for at least four hours.¶ "The empire will fall before Venezuela, which won't collapse, by sabotage or anything," Maduro told supporters, using a euphemism for the United States.

#### **Domestic instability magnifies all ‘say no’ warrants**

AP 11/6, Associated Press, (“Venezuela tightens control of foreign exchange”, <http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-11-06/venezuela-tightens-control-of-foreign-exchange>, AW)

President Nicolas Maduro is tightening control of Venezuela's foreign exchange system and intensifying the pursuit of currency speculators that the government accuses of waging an "economic war" against his rule.

As mounting shortages and galloping inflation undermine Maduro's leadership, the president took to the airwaves Wednesday to announce a slew of measures he said are designed to protect Venezuelans from "parasitic bourgeoisie" speculators.

Foremost among the measures is the creation of a centralized agency to administer the nation's dollars so that the hard currency is used to purchase needed imports and not wind up in the illegal black market.

Maduro also ordered the military to join civilian price inspectors in going after merchants that the government alleges are gouging consumers and hoarding toilet paper, shoes and other basic goods that have become harder to find in recent weeks. The central bank's scarcity index reached 20 percent in August, close to a record.

"Get your papers in order, get your shop in order," Maduro said in a rambling three-hour speech, during which he also attacked popular eBay-like retailer MercadoLibre.com for setting prices artificially high. "If you're looting the people it doesn't matter what your name is, the law will find you." Maduro's speech was widely anticipated after Venezuela's currency plunged to a record low 58 bolivars per dollar on the black market this week — nine times the official rate of 6.3 per dollar. The president said Tuesday that he and his advisers worked past midnight to prepare the economic package. However, the measures disappointed many analysts, who said only a maxi-devaluation of the bolivar and the dismantling of decade-old exchange controls can curb the currency's free-fall. Any tough economic measures are likely to be postponed until after municipal elections on Dec. 8, they said.

Maduro's approval rating has slipped by about 10 points since his election in April, to 41 percent at the start of last month, according to the latest poll by local firm Datanalisis.

The decline in support has emboldened the opposition, which is trying to frame next month's vote for mayors in more than 300 cities as a referendum on Maduro's rule.

#### No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40

None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

#### Resilient – hold them to a high threshold for war

Economist, Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/’11

(<http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7>)

The US economy, by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to 2009 lows. That said, the economy has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US real GDP expanded by a relatively robust 2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is impressive given that real incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.) Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the 2008-09 slump, personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again in evidence: retail sales in September were at a seven-month high, and sales at chain stores have been strong. Business investment has been even more buoyant: it expanded in the third quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since March. This has been made possible, in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies in the S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate in Washington, a sovereign debt downgrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capital markets. This reinforces our view that the US economy, although weak, is not in danger of falling into a recession (absent a shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour market—the unemployment rate has been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months—and by a moribund housing market.

#### Trade disputes don’t escalate – solidified international norms

Ikenson 12[March 5th, Daniel, [Daniel Ikenson](http://www.cato.org/people/daniel-ikenson) is director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,

 <http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war>]

An emerging narrative in 2012 is that a proliferation of protectionist, treaty-violating, or otherwise illiberal Chinese policies is to blame for worsening U.S.-China relations. China trade experts from across the ideological and political spectra have lent credibility to that story. Business groups that once counseled against U.S. government actions that might be perceived by the Chinese as provocative have changed their tunes. The term "trade war" is no longer taboo.¶ The media have portrayed the United States as a victim of underhanded Chinese practices, including currency manipulation, dumping, subsidization, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, discriminatory "indigenous innovation" policies, export restrictions, industrial espionage, and other ad hoc impediments to U.S. investment and exports. ¶ Indeed, it is beyond doubt that certain Chinese policies have been provocative, discriminatory, protectionist, and, in some cases, violative of the agreed rules of international trade. But there is more to the story than that. U.S. policies, politics, and attitudes have contributed to rising tensions, as have rabble-rousing politicians and a confrontation-thirsty media. If the public's passions are going to be inflamed with talk of a trade war, prudence demands that the war's nature be properly characterized and its causes identified and accurately depicted.¶ Those agitating for tough policy actions should put down their battle bugles and consider that trade wars are never won. Instead, such wars claim victims indiscriminately and leave significant damage in their wake. Even if one concludes that China's list of offenses is collectively more egregious than that of the United States, the most sensible course of action — for the American public (if not campaigning politicians) — is one that avoids mutually destructive actions and finds measures to reduce frictions with China.¶ Nature of the U.S.-China Trade War¶ It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world's largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion. But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms**.** Rather, both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade "skirmishes" have been prosecuted in a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not respect for — the rules-based system of trade. And that suggests that the kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible.1

#### Trade doesn’t solve conflict—best quantitative studies

Pevehouse ‘4 ( political science professor at U Wisconsin (Jon, The Journal of Politics, 66.1, “Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict”, JSTOR)

Conclusions Although the results presented here are certainly not the final answer to the question of trade's influence on political relations, the evidence does suggest that a complex relationship exists between these two concepts. These complexities are suggested by the finding that trade may both increase the probability of conflict, yet restrain the frequency of that conflict. This observation is consistent with both realist and liberal theories concerning the political effects of interdependence. Unfortunately, each side of this debate has centered on only part of the empirical story. The evidence garnered here also suggests that trade may not have a strong influence on the prospects for cooperative political relations-an argument championed by some commercial liberals. All of these findings were made possible by reconsidering the nature of the competing claims of interdependence theory as well as reconsidering the measurement of the dependent variable of international conflict. Moving away from the MIDS data allows one to more accurately test some observable implications of interdependence theory. Obviously, the move away from the MIDS data is certainly not without drawbacks. Both events data sets are far more limited in their temporal coverage than the MIDS, and some have criticized the overall quality of the events data. Nonetheless, events data do appear to be useful in testing the impact of trade on political relations. From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that while increasing global trade can be a mechanism for lessening conflict, this is only part of the picture. Trade can create hostilities between states and while these tensions may not flower into widespread and violent military conflict, they can be a source of concern. These hostilities, however, should be viewed in their proper context--on the whole, higher trade dependence does lower conflict. It is not a panacea for the vagaries of nor is it a blight on interstate relations.

# Block

## 2NC – Disad

### 2NC – A2: Not Zero Sum

#### EVEN IF they win true engagement isn’t zero sum – it’s perceived as zero-sum – that shuts China out

Watson 07 – [Cynthia A. Watson, Professor of Strategy at National War College, Washington, D.C. ENTER THE DRAGON? China’s Presence in Latin America, 2007, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf>]

Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past ﬁve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reﬂects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin America–U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net beneﬁt for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States beneﬁ t from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conﬂ icts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signiﬁ cant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors.

### 2NC – Venezuela Oil

#### US oil engagement in Venezuela crowds out China.

Ziegler ‘6 (Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Louisville, and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development. “THE ENERGY FACTOR IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2006. <http://louisville.edu/democracydevelopment/research/current-publications/the-energy-factor-in-china2019s-foreign-policy.html>)-mikee

ENERGY AND DIPLOMACY China’s limited supplies of oil and natural gas have played an important role in broadening that country’s interests beyond the East Asian region.[16] China’s state-run oil companies, supported by the government, have pursued a strategy of buying energy properties around the world in an attempt to secure oil and gas supplies. Chinese foreign policy has focused on developing bilateral ties with important selected countries, but it is increasingly willing to work through multilateral institutions with other oil consuming nations. As a major energy consumer and importer, China shares America’s goals of ensuring reliable energy supplies at moderate supplies. Of course, Beijing is competing with the United States and other energy importers for these finite resources. Moreover, China’s pursuit of energy security frequently clashes with U.S. national security interests, as Beijing courts oil-rich countries regarded as pariahs by Washington, such as Sudan, Venezuela, Burma, and Iran.

### 2NC – Venezuela Oil

#### **Government meetings and future plans prove**

PLNA 5/17 – Presna Latina News Agency, Posted on Energy Tribune, (“Venezuela, China Strengthen Cooperation in Oil Sector”, http://www.energytribune.com/76932/venezuela-china-strengthen-cooperation-in-oil-sector#sthash.3hZjr95H.dpbs, AW)

China’s Vice President Li Yuanchao and Venezuelan Minister of Oil and Mining Rafael Ramirez today ratified their will to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the hydrocarbons field. In statements made from an oil extraction deposit of Sinovensa joint venture, in the Orinoco Oil Belt (OOB), the Chinese vice president said that the goal is to jointly produce 40 million tons of oil annually in the coming years. The Chinese government is willing to back the investment projects and also work in other aspects, such as the protection of the environment and the local population, said the visitor during a visit to oil extraction areas. According to Ramirez, the next step in that sense will be to decide about a $4 billion USD funding to bring the Sinovensa or the OOB Carabobo division production to about 330,000 barrels of oil daily. The also president of Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (Pdvsa) said that this agreement should be signed in his next visit to China. Sinovensa, whose 60 percent belongs to Pdvsa and the rest to China National Petroleum Company, increased its production from about 20,000 barrels of oil daily in 2005 to 140,000 barrels of oil in the present day. Ramirez also talked about the goal of extracting about 400,000 barrels of oil daily by 2017 in another of the Chinese-Venezuelan companies, Petrourica, located in Junin 4 bloc

## 2NC – CP

### 2NC – Solvency

#### Global Thermostat solves – low-grade heat technology is revolutionary

Marianne Lavelle, Energy Journalist, 11 [“Out of Thin Air: The Quest to Capture Carbon Dioxide,” National Geographic, August 11, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2011/08/110811-quest-to-capture-carbon-dioxide/]

Turning Down the Heat¶ Two other Columbia University professors who have been working separately from Lackner's group, Peter Eisenberger and Graciela Chichilnisky, also are focused on sieve-like sorbents as a means for extracting CO2 from air.¶ They say their company, Global Thermostat (GT), uses proprietary sorbents that can capture carbon at substantially less cost and with less energy use than scientists have previously assumed. They say this has been confirmed by outside scientists with leading industrial gas and analytical firms who have produced confidential reports on their process. Chichilnisky and Eisenberger say they offered APS committee access to their experimental data, but the panel declined.¶ To look at the not-yet-published, commercially sensitive data, the panelists would have had to agree to confidentiality. "As a matter of policy the Committee sought to avoid learning any of their ideas that could not be made public," the panel's report explained.¶ But Chichilnisky and Eisenberger have explained publicly what they say is an important fact when assessing the cost of their technology: It requires only low-grade heat of less than 212°F (100°C)—the boiling point of water—to do capture CO2. So GT can use the residual heat at any industrial process plant. "Anything that generates heat as part of power is ideal candidate for us to cogenerate with," Eisenberger says. So GT's technology could be located at an ordinary power planet, not for the purpose of absorbing CO2 from the flue gas but to make use of the facility's heat.¶ Eisenberger and Chichilnisky say GT overcomes the issue that has bedeviled efforts to capture CO2 from the flue gas of coal plants with sorbents—the "parasitic load" problem, or the fact that the extra energy it takes to capture carbon would reduce the efficiency of the coal plant. Chichilnisky says GT's process design, in which residual heat is the main source of energy, is key to lowering costs, since such low heat is inexpensive or even free.¶ "There is enough residual heat in a coal power plant to capture twice as much carbon as the plant emits," she says. "This way Global Thermostat can turn a fossil fuel plant into a carbon sink that reduces atmospheric carbon—namely, a carbon-negative power plant. The more energy plants of this type that you produce, the more you clean the atmosphere."¶ A GT demonstration plant opened last fall at the facilities of the research institute SRI International in Menlo Park, California, is currently is absorbing 700 tons of CO2 per year—about the amount emitted by burning 77,160 gallons (292,080 liters) of gasoline. GT also is working on developing a biorefinery with an algae-based biofuel start-up company, Algae Systems. The CO2 sequestered by Global Thermostat's process could be fed to algae to produce renewable jet fuel, diesel fuel, and biochar (a charcoal created from biomass). GT and Algae Systems are planning joint plants in Japan and India. GT is also developing a plant that aims to take carbon from air and mix it with hydrogen separated from water to produce hydrocarbon fuel in a process the scientists say would be both cost-efficient and renewable.

### 2NC – Overview

#### The technology’s inevitable in the long run – they don’t have any offense

NYT 08 [Matthew Wald, “For Carbon Emissions, a Goal of Less Than Zero,” New York Times, March 26, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/business/businessspecial2/26negative.html?pagewanted=all]

IF the world is going to sharply reduce the amount of carbon dioxide pumped into the atmosphere by midcentury, then many businesses will have to go carbon neutral, bringing their net emissions of the greenhouse gas to zero.¶ But some could go even further by removing more CO2 than they produce. Instead of carbon neutral, how about carbon negative?¶ In academic and industrial labs worldwide, researchers are working on technologies to reach that goal. Success could create the ultimate green business — for example, one that produces fuel whose emissions are more than offset by carbon dioxide stored during production. The businesses would be successful if, as anticipated, Congress puts a tax on emissions or starts a trading plan that makes carbon credits valuable.¶ For some experts, it’s not a question of whether businesses will go carbon negative but when.¶ Carbon-negative technologies of some sort will be essential, said Daniel M. Kammen, director of the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley. The world is facing the certainty of massive emissions for decades to come from plants already running, he said, adding that atmospheric concentrations must be stabilized. “We’ve got such a carbon overshoot looming in the future that this is going to have to happen,” he said.¶ The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change said that an 80 percent cut in carbon dioxide emissions was necessary to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. But capturing the gas from coal plant smokestacks or switching to fuels that produce less of it when burned goes only so far.¶ “The great problem is actually removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere,” said Geir Vollsaeter, an environment expert and former general manager of carbon dioxide at Shell International, a subsidiary of the oil giant.¶ While much engineering work would have to be done to make a business carbon negative, the outlines are clear.¶ Take the concept of building a coal plant that captures and stores carbon dioxide. Such a plant could have zero emissions, because the coal would be turned into gas and processed to produce hydrogen and carbon dioxide. The hydrogen, a pollution-free fuel, would be burned, and the CO2 pumped underground for permanent storage.¶ But Robert Williams, a research scientist at Princeton University, said that not only coal could be gasified; you could also make the same fuel by starting with plant matter or other biomass.¶ And then, he said, “if you put any CO2 underground that is derived from biomass, that’s negative CO2 emissions.” That is because plants or trees — the raw material for the fuel —pull carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as they grow, and the gasification and storage takes that carbon out of circulation.¶ Mr. Williams said the more likely route would be to gasify a mixture of coal and biomass to keep the process carbon neutral. But the balance depends on the cost of separation and storage versus what kind of tax or other fee Congress might put on emissions.¶ More audacious is a plan by two professors at Columbia University to suck carbon dioxide out of the air, using waste heat from a solar plant, which has no smokestack.¶ Peter M. Eisenberger, a professor of earth and environmental sciences whose résumé includes positions at Exxon and other major companies, and Graciela Chichilnisky, an economist and mathematician, have proposed a “global thermostat strategy,” which would adapt a chemical process for capturing carbon dioxide from smokestacks.¶ Ordinarily, the process requires a large amount of energy. But the professors noted that McMahan L. Gray, a scientist at an Energy Department laboratory, has modified the process so that the relatively small amount of waste heat from a solar-generating plant could do the job. They estimate that they could remove about five pounds of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced. (A coal plant emits about two pounds when it makes that much electricity.)¶ “If you want to solve the global warming problem, you can’t do that by staying even,” Dr. Eisenberger said.

#### But the time window is short - The counterplan is the only way to prevent extinction

Greene et al 10 [Chuck Greene, Director of the Ocean Resources and Ecosystems Program and a professor in the Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Cornell University, Bruce Monger Senior research associate in the Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at Cornell University, and Mark Huntley Chief technology and science officer of Cellana; cofounder of HR BioPetroleum, “Geoengineering: The Inescapable Truth of Getting to 350,” The Solutions Journal, Vol 1, Issue 5, Oct 2010, pp 57-66, http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/771]

With global industrialization over the past two centuries, modern society has achieved an unprecedented level of prosperity. Much of the technology underpinning that prosperity has relied on the availability of inexpensive fossil fuels. The true costs of society’s dependence on fossil fuels have become apparent only recently, with steadily increasing recognition that their use is altering Earth’s climate and potentially risking dangerous and even catastrophic changes to the planet’s climate system. Unfortunately, many of the standard economic models that have been used to evaluate various energy and climate policy options have tended to discount future costs21 and thus have promoted a continuation of business as usual. The prospect of irreversible climate change has shifted that paradigm—economists can no longer justify energy policies that reap the benefits of present-day fossil fuel use while passing on the environmental and financial costs to future generations.22,23 It is time to implement an integrated global energy and climate action plan that is sustainable and provides future generations with some semblance of the climatic stability modern society inherited from previous generations.¶ Development of such an integrated global energy and climate action plan will be the grand challenge of the twenty-first century. Although the scale of this challenge is enormous, the basic technologies for achieving it already exist. Pacala and Socolow outlined an approach for stabilizing CO2 emissions during the first half of the twenty-first century based on the concept of stabilization wedges.24 This approach will move society in the right direction; however, stabilizing CO2 emissions at current or even 1990 rates will not be sufficient. Getting to 350 ppm by the latter part of the century will require society to eliminate net CO2 emissions and actually become carbon negative. While ambitious, this goal can be achieved through air capture and storage at a cost that “compares favorably with the cost estimates for mitigation.”18¶ Making the conservative assumption that the addition of bioenergy technology can bring the cost of air capture and storage down to at least as low as $100 per ton of carbon,12 the cumulative expense for removing CO2 equivalent to 855 GtC—the amount of carbon we will need to store—by the end of the century would be about $85.5 trillion. While such an expense is far from trivial, it corresponds to less than 1 percent of global GDP for the remainder of the century (assuming a 2.5 percent growth rate in GDP for the remainder of the century).18 For comparative purposes, $85.5 trillion is similar to estimates by the IPCC and the Stern Review for the cumulative mitigation expenses required to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm.25,26 To put these cumulative expenses into perspective, the Stern Review points out that reducing global GDP by 1 percent over the remainder of the century is equivalent to reducing the annual growth rate of global GDP from 2.5 percent to 2.49 percent.¶ The bottom line, from an economics perspective, is that air capture with bioenergy and storage can help stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 350 ppm by the end of the century and at a cost that is affordable. If there are other approaches for which the same claims can be made, then we are unaware of them. Promoting development of this technology does not mean we are suggesting a reduction in aggressive mitigation efforts. In fact, those mitigation efforts will remain as important as before in reducing CO2 emissions and slowing down climate change during the several decades that it will take to deploy this technology on a global scale. In addition, it is important to recognize that the space available for storing CO2 in geological repositories is finite. Thus, storage space may ultimately set the limit on carbon dioxide removal. Finally, society has a very narrow window of time to formulate and implement its global energy and climate action plan before the damage to our climate system is irreversible. While solar radiation management may buy the next generation some extra time for implementing such a plan, the current generation must devise it and develop the political willpower to move it forward. The fate of human civilization in Earth’s evolution hangs in the balance.

#### Not even renewables are sufficient to solve – plan fails, cp doesn’t

Marianne Lavelle, Energy Journalist, 11 [“Out of Thin Air: The Quest to Capture Carbon Dioxide,” National Geographic, August 11, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2011/08/110811-quest-to-capture-carbon-dioxide/]

Technologies like carbon-free renewable energy are essential, but insufficient, in the view of Eisenberger and Chichilnisky. "It is too late to just reduce the growth of carbon emissions by building renewable power plants," says Chichilnisky. "There is a $55 trillion fossil fuel energy infrastructure to be replaced, and the process is bound to be slow. The concentration of CO2 is already too high, and the carbon keeps accumulating, so now we need to actually capture and reduce the carbon that is already in the atmosphere."¶ The APS panel agrees that CO2 levels have grown unacceptably high. The committee took pains to warn policymakers not to delay to address the greenhouse gas problem in hopes that technology would come to the rescue. "This report provides no support for arguments in favor of procrastination in dealing with climate change that are based on the imminent availability of [direct air capture] as a compensating strategy," it said.

### 2NC – AT: Link to PTX

#### **Popular – empirics — CP is inexpensive and feasible – circumvents GoP fears**

Snyder 09, Jim, Writer for The Hill, (“Legislators seek role for coal in carbon-constrained world”, 3/10/09, <http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/3959-legislators-seek-role-for-coal-in-carbon-constrained-world>, AW)

The Energy and Commerce Energy and Environment subcommittee reviewed the future of coal in a two-plus hour hearing on Tuesday.

Although Democrats and Republicans broadly agreed that Congress should spend billions of dollars more, in addition to $3.4 billion in an economic stimulus package for clean coal development, to support carbon dioxide capture and storage, they disagreed on whether a carbon cap was needed as an extra incentive.

Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey (D-Mass.) said a climate change bill would be the stick and “robust financial incentives” would be the carrot to push carbon capture technologies to full-scale development. A cap would require utilities to reduce their emissions or face massive fines.

“To create jobs and unleash the private sector’s vast resources and ingenuity, we need regulatory drivers and strong incentives,” Markey said.

## 2NC – CP

### 2NC – Addon

US-Indian relations low but will never collapse

**Padukone 12** (Neil Padukone is the Felow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution, 6/19/2012, "Natural Allies?", pragati.nationalinterest.in/2012/06/natural-allies/)

In the late 1990s, the United States and India embarked on a partnership based largely on three strategic issues: markets, counter-terrorism, and balancing China. With the opening of India’s economy in 1991, the United States saw India’s billion-strong population as a massive market for its businesses. In the wake of 9/11, Washington came to see India’s travails against Islamist militants in Kashmir and Afghanistan through the lens of its War on Terror and increased counter-terrorism cooperation with New Delhi. And as India’s and China’s strategic spaces began to overlap, managing China’s rise became a common concern for both New Delhi and Washington. With that in mind, the United States and India reversed decades of enmity and, through the 2006 nuclear deal, embarked upon a symbolic commitment to what heads of state of both countries have called a “natural alliance.” Yet with all the fanfare- particularly after U.S. President Barack Obama voiced his support for a permanent Indian seat on the UN Security Council in his 2010 Lok Sabha speech- bilateral ties have recently been marked by considerable drift: India has not fallen in line on the issue of Iran, Washington is only slowly coming around on Pakistani militancy, the countries’ UN voting records do not mesh, and trade disagreements abound. Questions have been raised over why U.S.-India relations have cooled, or whether they were over hyped in the first place. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “strategic pivot” toward Asia is one way to shore up relations and realign the Indo-U.S. partnership. India’s geostrategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean- along with its naval expansion toward the southern Indian Ocean and its Port Blair naval base at the Andaman Islands- enable New Delhi to manage China’s presence in the region. Indeed, India and America’s navies have been more coordinated than any other bureaucracy since 2000. But the implications of this shared Beijing-centric orientation will only come about in the medium-term. One dimension of these ties, the sale of defence technologies, is another place where India has not yet delivered: the recent Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition failed to award contracts to American companies. And in the middle of a global recession in which all countries are hunkering down, and domestic inflation and unemployment- not to mention concerns over doing business in India, such as retroactive taxation and tax avoidance measures- have grown, economic reforms that would further open India’s markets have slowed. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Kolkata was largely an effort to encourage India to increase the speed of its market liberalisation, particularly in the retail sector. This may be a prospect for the future, but is doubtful today given India’s economic slowdown and the attendant drop in employment. Yet perhaps the main reason for this strategic drift is that America’s key concern in South Asia these days is Afghanistan. President Obama delivered on his campaign promise to refocus efforts on the war in that country, and from 2009, his administration’s “AfPak” strategy took a regional perspective that originally sought to bring India into the equation. The thinking behind this, as Amitai Etzioni writes, is that “for Pakistanis, conflict (with India) poses an ominous existential challenge that drives their behaviour on all things,” including “their approach to the West and the war in Afghanistan… If the India-Pakistan confrontation could be settled, chances for progress on other fronts would be greatly enhanced.” The implication was that Washington ought to hyphenate India and Pakistan, to see the two as part of the same regional tussle, and try to settle the Kashmir dispute in order to make progress in Afghanistan. This was something New Delhi vehemently opposed and in fact, it sought de-hyphenation from Pakistan – engagement with New Delhi and Islamabad on separate and unconnected tracks. So when the office of the late US Special Adviser on Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke sought to include India and Kashmir in its purview, New Delhi successfully lobbied against it. This effort served one of India’s aims, insofar as it keeps Kashmir out of America’s area of direct intervention. Yet it also takes India, its assets, and its clout out of the broader Afghan resolution. Among these assets is the Indian-constructed Chabahar Road that connects Iran’s eastern Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman to western Afghanistan. The road ends Pakistan’s monopoly on seaborne trade to Afghanistan, which has long allowed Islamabad’s pernicious dominance of Kabul’s economic and political life. In light of America’s confrontation with Iran and efforts to sanction the latter’s energy sector, however, Washington opposes India’s use of Chabahar, particularly to import Iranian oil and natural gas. Indeed another goal of Secretary Clinton’s visit was to try to shore up India’s support for sanctions against Iran- to which end India is reducing its dependence on Iranian energy as it awaits an exemption on sanctions from the US State Department. But when New Delhi recently used its Chabahar road to send 100,000 tons of wheat to Kabul, its full potential vis-à-vis Afghanistan became evident. And this food aid was on top of India’s additional commitments to Afghanistan: constructing the Zaranj-Delaram highway in western Afghanistan that connects Chabahar to the Afghan ring road, the development of the Ayni Air base in Tajikistan (originally designed to treat wounded Afghan soldiers), building Afghanistan’s parliament building, exploring the Hajigak iron mine, and even commitments to train the Afghan National Police and Army- all of which amount to pledges of over $1 billion since 2001. Washington has been wary of encouraging India’s presence in Afghanistan citing Islamabad’s fear of encirclement. But, even without American attention, a refutation of Pakistan’s “India Threat” narrative is already underway. In order to remain focused on strategic horizons beyond South Asia, India is reorienting its defence apparatus away from Pakistan and towards China and the southern Indian Ocean; even the Ayni Base and Chabahar Road can be seen as elements of this strategic shift beyond the subcontinent. Together with Pakistan’s focus on the Durand Line and events within its own borders, political breathing space between Islamabad and New Delhi has opened up. India-Pakistan talks have already produced a number of important breakthroughs that portend better bilateral days to come: the granting of Most-Favoured Nation status, enhanced trade measures, as well as discussions on the specific parameters of a Kashmir peace based on economic integration. Specifically regarding the Indo-Pak dynamic in Afghanistan, things are less zero-sum than they appear. Important as the Chabahar route is, the combination of road, sea, and even rail links still comes with massive transport costs for India-Afghanistan trade. As S Verma, chairman of Steel Authority of India and the head of a consortium of Indian industries engaged in Afghanistan’s Hajigak iron mine, put it, “over the longer term,” transporting Afghan minerals over Pakistani territory “will be a productive investment. Not just for us, but others in the region including Pakistan. There are license fees, logistics, and so forth.” Meanwhile, Kaustav Chakrabarti of the Observer Research Foundation has suggested “deploying joint Indo-Pak nation building teams” in Afghanistan that include advisors, military trainers, bureaucrats, developments experts, medical crews and NGOs. These teams would “provide additional resources, bridge political polarities, foster cooperation between India and Pakistan and devise means to verify each other’s role, and ultimately, present a long-term mechanism,” guaranteed by India and Pakistan’s geographic proximity, “to ensure Afghanistan’s neutrality.” He cites as a precedent the collaboration between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in “UN peacekeeping missions in hot spots like Somalia.” Full realisation of any Indo-Pak promise will require more space, and time, between the two countries. The interim period, meanwhile, may indeed take a cooling period between the United States and India, who are unlikely to become allies in the fullest sense due to differing tactical approaches. But the strategic fundamentals of the Indo-American rapport- balancing China, expanding trade, and stabilising South Asia- remain intact.

#### No Indo-Pak war

Mutti 9— Master’s degree in International Studies with a focus on South Asia, U Washington. BA in History, Knox College. over a decade of expertise covering on South Asia geopolitics, Contributing Editor to Demockracy journal (James, 1/5, Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent, http://demockracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/)

Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.” As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war. Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war: 1. For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes. The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so. 2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries. 3. Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat to Pakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not. Groups based in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have orchestrated frequent deadly suicide bombings and clashes with the Pakistani military, including the attack that killed ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The battle that the Pakistani government faces now is not against its traditional enemy India, but against militants bent on destroying the Pakistani state and creating a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan. In order to deal with this threat, it must strengthen the structures of a democratic, inclusive political system that can also address domestic problems and inequalities. On the other hand, the threat of Pakistani based terrorists to India is significant. However, suicide bombings and attacks are also carried out by Indian Islamic militants, and vast swaths of rural India are under the de facto control of the Maoist guerrillas known as the Naxalites. Hindu fundamentalists pose a serious threat to the safety of many Muslim and Christian Indians and to the idea of India as a diverse, secular, democratic society. Separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and in parts of the northeast have dragged on for years. And like Pakistan, India faces significant challenges in addressing sharp social and economic inequalities. Additionally, Indian political parties, especially the ruling Congress Party and others that rely on the support of India’s massive Muslim population to win elections, are certainly wary about inflaming public opinion against Pakistan (and Muslims). This fear could lead the investigation into the Mumbai attacks to fizzle out with no resolution, as many other such inquiries have. 4. The international attention to this attack – somewhat difficult to explain in my opinion given the general complacency and utter apathy in much of the western world about previous terrorist attacks in places like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – is a final obstacle to an armed conflict. Not only does it put both countries under a microscope in terms of how they respond to the terrible events, it also means that they will feel international pressure to resolve the situation without resorting to war. India and Pakistan have been warned by the US, Russia, and others not to let the situation end in war. India has been actively recruiting Pakistan’s closest allies – China and Saudi Arabia – to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, and the US has been in the forefront of pressing Pakistan for action. Iran too has expressed solidarity with India in the face of the attacks and is using its regional influence to bring more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

### 2NC – FDI Turn

#### Negative effect is overwhelms positive effects of the plan – EU solves

Ana Carolina Garriga 11, Professor of Political Studies at the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (Mexico), and Brian J. Phillips, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, June 2011, “Foreign Aid and Investment in Post-Conflict Societies,” online: http://www.cide.edu/publicaciones/status/dts/DTEP%20227.pdf

This article has examined how foreign aid provides an important signal to investors, affecting FDI flows into post-conflict developing countries. We argued that post-conflict situations are uniquely low-information environments, and therefore investors look for signals to indicate the potential return on their investment. Aid functions as a signal because it suggests some level of trust of the recipient government, on the part of the donor government. However, we also argued that U.S. aid, due to its especially geostrategic nature, could function in a different way than aid from other countries.

Our empirical results, analyzing developing countries and post-conflict developing countries between 1970 and 2008, provided support for our argument. First, FDI in post-conflict situations does not respond to the same determinants as FDI in developing countries. Whereas a series of economic factors (such as market size, economic development, trade and capital openness) are associated with FDI in developing countries generally, they do not seem to drive investors' decisions in post-conflict countries.

Second, we showed that development aid affects FDI in post-conflict countries, but that the direction of the effect is conditional upon whether the aid came from the United States or from other countries. Aid from countries outside the United States appears to be a positive signal in post-conflict countries, as our argument suggests. This finding is robust to different model specifications, and it is substantively important. The positive association between aid and FDI is almost immediate, suggesting that aid's signaling effect takes place before and independently from whether development aid has accomplished its intended purpose. In other words, aid can bring unintended benefits in post-conflict countries.

However, U.S. aid seems to function as a warning sign, and not a security guarantee that safeguards or attracts investments. We describe it as a warning sign because of the U.S. tendency to aid countries not because of their economic potential or need, but instead for geostrategic reasons. We are somewhat cautious when interpreting the U.S. aid finding, however, because the statistical significance of U.S. aid is relatively low. Regardless, the substantial difference between the effect of U.S. and non-U.S. aid on FDI is consistent with our theory about aid as a signal, and the importance of whether or not it can be seen as geostrategic.

#### US is seen as self-interested

Nina Bandelj, 2006, Department of Sociology University of California Irvine, “National Identity and Economic Exchange How Cultural Conceptions of Nationality Matter in Foreign Direct Investment Transactions\*”, Council for European Studies, <http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/files/papers/Bandelj.pdf>

The story took an interesting twist because less than a year later a third of Slovan was acquired by a German multinational. Could it be that the conceptions of “American” vs. “German” capital were important for people’s willingness to engage in FDI? For a top manager who led the opposition movement against the American investor, it was clear that the differences are significant: “The American mentality is to completely focus on profit, as opposed to the mentality of, let’s say, Germans. If we compare, how quickly a firm can be opened, closed, how quickly you can be dismissed with a smile. Such an approach, this 100 percent focus on profitability and self-sufficiency… Such narrow-mindedness also has a lot of negative effects. If we consider these threats, which were present with the acceptance of the American capital, and on the other side, the German capital, these threats were much smaller with the Germans. The German mentality is different. There are long term alliances, partnerships, open relations, search for a common ground which satisfies both partners. These differences in mentalities, national characteristics, surely influence the amount of risk. Because the American capital, simply, if it doesn’t reach the required profit margin, it moves on. There is no sentimentality. But it is a question whether this is an optimal approach. I am not sure… again, I absolutely support the market and the rules of the market, but still there are different possible alternatives.”7

#### Social-sciences prove

Nina Bandelj, 2006, Department of Sociology University of California Irvine, “National Identity and Economic Exchange How Cultural Conceptions of Nationality Matter in Foreign Direct Investment Transactions\*”, Council for European Studies, <http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/files/papers/Bandelj.pdf>

Does Nationality Have a Causal Effect on Economic Action? Skeptical observers may see the above illustrations as interesting but they may wonder whether national identity and cultural conceptions of nationality have a causal effect on economic action. Do actors really behave differently in economic transactions because of their and others’ nationality? The influence of national affiliations on determining the economic preferences may be considered ineffective for those who bet on profit-maximizing as the only real efficiency enhancing mechanisms. However, even these skeptics would have to consent that actors are not irrational if they are guided by nationality concerns. As long as they put a higher premium on maximizing their values as opposed to profits, the means-ends logic of rational behavior stays intact: the economic actors are exercising value rationality and their economic preference is causally related to their national affiliations. However, it may be harder to persuade skeptics that people’s nationality based typifications, such as distinctions between “American capital” and “German capital,” or Slovenian disliking of Italians, have a direct influence on economic action. They sound like post-festum rationalizations. After all, people are rational and while they may hold some nationality-based conceptions, they should not let those get in the way of utility maximizing. Well, this may be the case if FDI efforts were simple and straightforward: an investor weighing costs and benefits of alternatives decides on a specific investment, and then - without any social interaction - realizing this investment. In reality, investment decisions are neither as straightforward, nor as unilateral, nor free of uncertainty. By definition, FDI transactions are relational processes, which involve two parties to an exchange. Hence, it is unlikely that hosts are simply going to accept the investor’s offer. As case evidence shows, hosts are active participants in this economic process, and their involvement shapes the final outcome (Bandelj 2003). The complications will also arise because an FDI transaction is a social process, which involves ongoing interaction and negotiation between parties from different national contexts. As social processes, FDI exchanges always involve a certain degree of uncertainty because a particular investment effort is never an exact repetition of a previous exchange. Even for firms with plenty of foreign investment experience, each new investment attempt creates new challenges and novel interactions. To deal with the uncertainty, actors will engage in “the meaning business,” trying to make sense of an unfamiliar situation. In so doing, they will categorize those whom they engage on the basis of existing typifications (mental structures), including nationality-based conceptions.9 Moreover, as DiMaggio (1993: 126-127) emphasized, under conditions of uncertainty, economic agents would rely on “sympathy as an assessment criterion… Sympathy is constructed in part out of categories (like us/not like us) and in part out of ongoing interactions in which participants form strong impressions (confidence, distrust).” From this perspective, evaluating the other on the basis of his or her national origin will contribute - or not - to sympathy, and overall positive (or negative) affect, which will influence transaction outcomes. As experimental evidence from psychology and neuroscience (Damasio 1994, 1999, Slovic et al. 2004) shows affect matters importantly in estimating risk: positive affect will lead to estimation of risk as lower than in cases where such affect is absent. Concretely, this would mean that negative evaluations of other nationals may lead the partners in the transaction to estimate risks of the transactions as higher than they actually are. For instance, this would induce some hosts to reject a particular investment effort coming from an investor whose nationality they evaluate negatively. On the other hand, investors may perceive locations in countries where they dislike the nationals as more risky, and pass them over for those locations where they evaluate the nationals positively, because affect will make them evaluate those locations as mistakenly less risky.10 In practice, cultural effects cannot be as easily distinguished from other social influences. As much research in economic sociology has shown, economic transactions are not embedded only in culture, but also in politics, networks and institutions (for review see Smelser and Swedberg 2005). Therefore, in most cases interaction-generated impressions/emotions would constitute additional “evidence” – next to existing personal interests, influences through social ties, and/or political pressures, in helping actors consolidate their interests and thus influence economic decision making. Alternatively, strong cultural conceptions can help actors garner more political support for their position, which would then lead to a particular final decision. All this suggest that in teasing out the causal effects of nationality-based affiliations and conceptions, analysts would need to investigate how cultural conceptions overlap (or not) with other social forces: how they facilitate or constrain political processes and play (or not) into the existing social relations. For instance, in gauging how national affiliations matter in determining economic goals, it is hard to disentangle the extent to which those affinities derive from a pure cultural sense of national identity, or from a commitment generated because of affiliate ties to particular nationals, or a combination of both. Overall, it is likely that positive emotional energies will be higher if cultural conceptions are also grounded in actual social relations and also have political valence. Hence, we can make the following hypothesis: cultural conceptions of nationality will be more influential in those exchange situations where they align with existing social and political structures than in those where they are in dissonance with these structures.

# Case

## Relations

### 1AR – Warming – No Impact

#### Their ev is overly hyperbolic – reject it

Allegre et al 12 (Claude Allegre, former director of the Institute for the Study of the Earth, University of Paris; J. Scott Armstrong, cofounder of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting; Jan Breslow, head of the Laboratory of Biochemical Genetics and Metabolism, Rockefeller University; Roger Cohen, fellow, American Physical Society; Edward David, member, National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences; William Happer, professor of physics, Princeton; Michael Kelly, professor of technology, University of Cambridge, U.K.; William Kininmonth, former head of climate research at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology; Richard Lindzen, professor of atmospheric sciences, MIT; James McGrath, professor of chemistry, Virginia Technical University; Rodney Nichols, former president and CEO of the New York Academy of Sciences; Burt Rutan, aerospace engineer, designer of Voyager and SpaceShipOne; Harrison H. Schmitt, Apollo 17 astronaut and former U.S. senator; Nir Shaviv, professor of astrophysics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Henk Tennekes, former director, Royal Dutch Meteorological Service; Antonio Zichichi, president of the World Federation of Scientists, Geneva, “No Need to Panic About Global Warming”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj)

Editor's Note: The following has been signed by the 16 scientists listed at the end of the article: A candidate for public office in any contemporary democracy may have to consider what, if anything, to do about "global warming."

Candidates should understand that the oft-repeated claim that nearly all scientists demand that something dramatic be done to stop global warming is not true. In fact, a large and growing number of distinguished scientists and engineers do not agree that drastic actions on global warming are needed. In September, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ivar Giaever, a supporter of President Obama in the last election, publicly resigned from the American Physical Society (APS) with a letter that begins: "I did not renew [my membership] because I cannot live with the [APS policy] statement: 'The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring. If no mitigating actions are taken, significant disruptions in the Earth's physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health are likely to occur. We must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases beginning now.' In the APS it is OK to discuss whether the mass of the proton changes over time and how a multi-universe behaves, but the evidence of global warming is incontrovertible?" In spite of a multidecade international campaign to enforce the message that increasing amounts of the "pollutant" carbon dioxide will destroy civilization, large numbers of scientists, many very prominent, share the opinions of Dr. Giaever. And the number of scientific "heretics" is growing with each passing year. The reason is a collection of stubborn scientific facts. Perhaps the most inconvenient fact is the lack of global warming for well over 10 years now. This is known to the warming establishment, as one can see from the 2009 "Climategate" email of climate scientist Kevin Trenberth: "The fact is that we can't account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't." But the warming is only missing if one believes computer models where so-called feedbacks involving water vapor and clouds greatly amplify the small effect of CO2. The lack of warming for more than a decade—indeed, the smaller-than-predicted warming over the 22 years since the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began issuing projections—suggests that computer models have greatly exaggerated how much warming additional CO2 can cause. Faced with this embarrassment, those promoting alarm have shifted their drumbeat from warming to weather extremes, to enable anything unusual that happens in our chaotic climate to be ascribed to CO2. The fact is that CO2 is not a pollutant. CO2 is a colorless and odorless gas, exhaled at high concentrations by each of us, and a key component of the biosphere's life cycle. Plants do so much better with more CO2 that greenhouse operators often increase the CO2 concentrations by factors of three or four to get better growth. This is no surprise since plants and animals evolved when CO2 concentrations were about 10 times larger than they are today. Better plant varieties, chemical fertilizers and agricultural management contributed to the great increase in agricultural yields of the past century, but part of the increase almost certainly came from additional CO2 in the atmosphere. Enlarge Image Corbis Although the number of publicly dissenting scientists is growing, many young scientists furtively say that while they also have serious doubts about the global-warming message, they are afraid to speak up for fear of not being promoted—or worse. They have good reason to worry. In 2003, Dr. Chris de Freitas, the editor of the journal Climate Research, dared to publish a peer-reviewed article with the politically incorrect (but factually correct) conclusion that the recent warming is not unusual in the context of climate changes over the past thousand years. The international warming establishment quickly mounted a determined campaign to have Dr. de Freitas removed from his editorial job and fired from his university position. Fortunately, Dr. de Freitas was able to keep his university job. This is not the way science is supposed to work, but we have seen it before—for example, in the frightening period when Trofim Lysenko hijacked biology in the Soviet Union. Soviet biologists who revealed that they believed in genes, which Lysenko maintained were a bourgeois fiction, were fired from their jobs. Many were sent to the gulag and some were condemned to death. Why is there so much passion about global warming, and why has the issue become so vexing that the American Physical Society, from which Dr. Giaever resigned a few months ago, refused the seemingly reasonable request by many of its members to remove the word "incontrovertible" from its description of a scientific issue? There are several reasons, but a good place to start is the old question "cui bono?" Or the modern update, "Follow the money." Alarmism over climate is of great benefit to many, providing government funding for academic research and a reason for government bureaucracies to grow. Alarmism also offers an excuse for governments to raise taxes, taxpayer-funded subsidies for businesses that understand how to work the political system, and a lure for big donations to charitable foundations promising to save the planet. Lysenko and his team lived very well, and they fiercely defended their dogma and the privileges it brought them. Speaking for many scientists and engineers who have looked carefully and independently at the science of climate, we have a message to any candidate for public office: There is no compelling scientific argument for drastic action to "decarbonize" the world's economy. Even if one accepts the inflated climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive greenhouse-gas control policies are not justified economically. A recent study of a wide variety of policy options by Yale economist William Nordhaus showed that nearly the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is achieved for a policy that allows 50 more years of economic growth unimpeded by greenhouse gas controls. This would be especially beneficial to the less-developed parts of the world that would like to share some of the same advantages of material well-being, health and life expectancy that the fully developed parts of the world enjoy now. Many other policy responses would have a negative return on investment. And it is likely that more CO2 and the modest warming that may come with it will be an overall benefit to the planet. If elected officials feel compelled to "do something" about climate, we recommend supporting the excellent scientists who are increasing our understanding of climate with well-designed instruments on satellites, in the oceans and on land, and in the analysis of observational data. The better we understand climate, the better we can cope with its ever-changing nature, which has complicated human life throughout history. However, much of the huge private and government investment in climate is badly in need of critical review. Every candidate should support rational measures to protect and improve our environment, but it makes no sense at all to back expensive programs that divert resources from real needs and are based on alarming but untenable claims of "incontrovertible" evidence.

## Investment

### 2AC – Econ – War

#### Their ev is overly hyperbolic – mistakes correlation with causality

Barnett 9, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

### 1AR – Econ – A2 - Royal

#### Concludes aff

Royal ‘10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer)

CONCLUSION The logic of ECST supports arguments for greater economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict. This chapter does not argue against the utility of signalling theory. It does, however, suggest that when considering the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises, ECST logic is dubious as an organising principle for security policymakers. The discussion pulls together some distinct areas of research that have not yet featured prominently in the ECST literature. Studies associating economic interdependence, economic crises and the potential for external conﬂict indicate that global interdependence is not necessarily a conﬂict suppressing process and may be conﬂict-enhancing at certain points. Furthermore, the conditions created by economic crises decrease the willingness of states to send economic costly signals, even though such signals may be most effective during an economic crisis. These two points warrant further consideration in the debate over ECST and, more broadly, theories linking interdependence and peace. The debate takes on particular importance for policymakers when considering the increasingly important US-China relationship and the long-term prospects for peace in the Asia-Paciﬁc. Recent US policy towards China, such as the ‘responsible stakeholder’ approach, assumes that greater interdependence with China should decrease the likelihood for conﬂict. Some have even suggested that the economic relationship is necessary to ensure strategic competition does not lead to major war (see, e.g., Kastner, 2006). If US or Chinese policymakers do indeed intend to rely on economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict, much more study is required to understand how and when interdependence impacts the security and the defence behaviour of states. This chapter contributes some thoughts to that larger debate. NOTES I. Notable counterarguments include Barbieri (1996). Gowa (I994), and Levy and Ali I998 . 2.‘ Ofﬁ<):ial statements have focused on this explanation as well. See, for example, Bernanke (2009). 3. For a dissenting study. see Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). 4. Note that Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) argue that states will have a greater incentive to arm against those with which it is interdependent to hedge against coercion. This argument could be extended to include protectionism in extreme cases. Creseenzi (2005) both challenges and agrees with Copeland’s theory by suggesting that a more important indicator is the exit costs involved in terminating an economic relationship. which could be a function of the availability of alternatives. 5. There is also substantial research to indicate that periods of strong economic growth are also positively correlated with a rise in the likelihood of conﬂict. Pollins (2008) and Pollins and Schweller (I999) provide excellent insights into this body of literature.

### 1AR – Free Trade

#### Trade only pacifies some constituencies—it can’t solve in the countries with the biggest impacts

GOLDSTONE 2007 (P.R., PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, AlterNet, September 25, http://www.alternet.org/audits/62848/?page=entire)

American policymakers should beware claims of globalization's axiomatic pacifying effects. Trade creates vested interests in peace, but these interests affect policy only to the extent they wield political clout. In many of the states whose behavior we most wish to alter, such sectors -- internationalist, export-oriented, reliant on global markets -- lack a privileged place at the political table. Until and unless these groups gain a greater voice within their own political system, attem pts to rely on the presumed constraining effects of global trade carry substantially greater risk than commonly thought. A few examples tell much. Quasi-democratic Russia is a state whose principal exposure to global markets lies in oil, a commodity whose considerable strategic coercive power the Putin regime freely invokes. The oil sector has effectively merged with the state, making Russia's deepening ties to the global economy a would-be weapon rather than an avenue of restraint. Russian economic liberalization without political liberalization is unlikely to pay the strong cooperative dividends many expect. China will prove perhaps the ultimate test of the Pax Mercatoria. The increasing international Chinese presence in the oil and raw materials extraction sectors would seem to bode ill, given such sectors' consistent history elsewhere of urging state use of threats and force to secure these interests. Much will come down to the relative political influence of export-oriented sectors heavily reliant on foreign direct investment and easy access to the vast Western market versus the political power of their sectoral opposites: uncompetitive state-owned enterprises, energy and mineral complexes with important holdings in the global periphery, and a Chinese military that increasingly has become a de facto multi-sectoral economic-industrial conglomerate. Actions to bolster the former groups at the expense of the latter would be effort well spent. At home, as even advanced sectors feel the competitive pressures of globalization, public support for internationalism and global engagement will face severe challenges. As more sectors undergo structural transformation, the natural coalitional constituency for committed global activist policy will erode; containing the gathering backlash will require considerable leadership. Trade can indeed be a palliative; too often, however, we seem to think of economic interdependence as a panacea; the danger is that in particular instances it may prove no more than a placebo.

## 1NR – Overview

#### The impact is nuclear conflict—it would escalate

London 10 (Herbert, president of Hudson Institute, June 28, 2010, http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east)

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange.

## 1NR – Uniqueness

#### Efforts to increase sanctions are coming-Obama’s capital is key to stop it

**NIAC 11-10-13**

(National Iranian American Council, “Major Progress in Iran Nuclear Talks”, <http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9995>, ldg)

"The United States and Iran made major leaps forward in nuclear negotiations over the past three days, overcoming thirty-four years of mutual enmity and preparing to sign a historic agreement that would prevent an unnecessary war and freeze Iran's nuclear program. Secretary of State John Kerry, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, High Representative Catherine Ashton, and many other negotiators deserve tremendous credit for bringing the P5+1 and Iran to the brink of a deal." "Unfortunately, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius appears to have arrived in Geneva intent on playing spoiler, raising unnecessary objections and stalling an interim deal that would have resulted in key concessions from each side. This intransigence is particularly unfortunate because the window for diplomacy is limited, as both the United States and Iran have reiterated, and France sinking a deal - albeit temporarily - provides an opening for hard liners in Congress and Iran to sabotage diplomatic progress. Both President Obama and Iranian President Rouhani are maximizing their political capital to attain a deal - if they are unable to do so, Foreign Minister Fabius and French President Francois Hollande will have to take at least a large share of responsibility for the consequences: an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program and war." "In the U.S. Congress, there are threats to move forward with sanctions as early as this week, either through the National Defense Authorization Act or the Banking Committee. Moving forward would unravel the delicate diplomatic process and risk collapsing the international sanctions regime at the same time without a single Iranian concession. Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nv), Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) Sen. Tim Johnson ( D-SD), and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) must do everything in their power to block sanctions from moving forward to enable the President and P5+1 to overcome French obstruction and strike a deal. It is imperative that moderates in the U.S. and Iran prevail, and it will take the continued strong support of the American and Iranian people for compromise and negotiation to succeed."

#### Negotiations are still strong-Obama’s ability to build support is key

**Rothkopf, Foreign Policy editor at large, 11-12-13**

(David, “This Deal Won’t Seal Itself”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/12/this_deal_won_t_seal_itself_obama_nuclear_talks_iran>, ldg)

In addition to the U.S.-Iranian "he said-he said" debate, there is also the whispered belief among some -- in both the Middle East and in Washington, acknowledged by at least one person with whom I spoke inside the administration -- that the last minute changes in language and the subsequent "rift" between the United States and France was too politically convenient. Both Paris and Washington were starting to feel the heat from allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel, and though France feared an economic squeeze on the big deals it has pending with the Saudis, the Americans could see organized opposition forming on Capitol Hill. The concern was that this opposition would not only result in the rejection of any deal reached with Iran but may even compromise a new push for tougher sanctions even as the administration was negotiating dialing them back. Such a rejection to the initiative would be absolutely devastating to the president, creating echoes of his failed effort to get Congressional support for his proposed very limited intervention in Syria to degrade their chemical weapons stores. In other words, it doesn't really matter who threw the monkey wrench. There was work to be done on this deal both in terms of strengthening its terms but also in garnering the necessary support before signatures were actually set to paper. Even given the Geneva agreement's goal of producing a temporary freeze in Iran's nuclear program while a more permanent deal could be struck, legitimate questions linger over whether the near-term deal could achieve that goal if it did not effectively freeze enrichment efforts and shut down work at an Iranian reactor capable of producing plutonium. Further, the Obama team still has a great deal of work to do -- some of which is being done this week by Secretary Kerry and Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman as they meet with allies in the Middle East -- building support for the deal. This will be tough to do on Capitol Hill and in Saudi Arabia given that at, the moment, both environments seethe with distrust for President Obama. No, even the Iranians should be happy with the delay... and not just for the cynical reason that any delay buys them the time they want and need to advance their nuclear weapons program. They also very much want sanctions relief, and to get it, they need the deal to win support from the U.S. Congress. Given the efforts of multiple forces to block the deal, this will mean the Obama administration and the president himself will have to systematically engage opponents in a way they seldom do on anything. Winning support on Capitol Hill and with the American people for such a deal is potentially the president's next big domestic political test. Failure on this after the failure to win support for his Syria efforts, the blowback from the NSA scandal, and his unsteady and confusing Egypt policies would be a big setback for the president during his second term, a period in which chief executives often turn to foreign policy to shape their legacies.

Obama is using his capital to stop secondary sanctions now

Roll Call 11/21/13

 (“Reid Vows to Take Up Iran Sanctions Bill,” http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/reid-vows-to-take-up-iran-sanctions-bill/)

One of the outstanding issues in the defense authorization debate had been how to deal with Iran sanctions, but Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., took a significant step Thursday to resolve the issue by vowing to move a stand-alone bill after Thanksgiving recess. Senators of both parties, but especially Republicans more hawkish on foreign policy, have been advocating for increased sanctions on Iran in response to the Middle Eastern nation’s nuclear weapons program. The Obama administration has been urging Congress to hold off on further action until negotiations between Western powers and Iran had been completed, but Reid appears prepared to take up new legislation. Doing so might help ease the process for the National Defense Authorization Act, which has been delayed by disagreements over amendments, of which more than 400 have been offered. “The Senate must be prepared to move forward with a new bipartisan Iran sanctions bill, when the Senate returns after Thanksgiving recess. And I am committed to do so,” Reid said to open the floor Thursday, before addressing why he has decided to invoke the “nuclear option” to eliminate filibusters of most nominees. “A number of Senators have offered their own amendments on Iran in the defense authorization bill, and I know that other senators also have their own sanctions bills. I will support a bill that would broaden the scope of our current petroleum sanctions, place limitations on trade with strategic sectors of the Iranian economy that support its nuclear ambitions, as well as pursue those who divert goods to Iran. “While I support the administration’s diplomatic effort, I believe we need to leave our legislative options open to act on a new, bipartisan sanctions bill in December, shortly after we return,” Reid said.

Obama has delayed it so far---but still need capital

Bloomberg 11/19 (“Obama Asks Senators for Time on Iran on Eve of Talks,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-19/obama-asks-senators-for-time-on-iran-on-eve-of-talks.html)

President Barack Obama may have temporarily headed off congressional action to impose new sanctions on Iran on the eve of the next round of negotiations in Geneva.

Republican Senator Bob Corker said after leaving a two-hour White House meeting today that the Senate probably won’t address proposals for additional sanctions against Iran until next month.

Obama sought today’s meeting with Senate leadership and the top lawmakers on the Banking, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees to appeal for time to let negotiations among world powers and Iran proceed.

The president asked for “a period of time” to let negotiators in Geneva work, Corker, of Tennessee, the ranking Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee, told reporters. While said he wanted time to consider Obama’s presentation, the Senators left the meeting with a better understanding of “what’s on the table, what the deal is.”

The meeting also included Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Adviser Susan Rice. White House press secretary Jay Carney said the U.S. will continue to enforce sanctions already in place and that Obama was seeking flexibility to reach an agreement.

The negotiations also have come under criticism from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He said over the weekend that any easing “would endanger the whole sanctions regime that took years to make.”

Negotiations Resume

Talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany are set to resume tomorrow. The U.S. and the other nations are trying to prevent Iran, holder of the world’s fourth-largest proven oil reserves, from building a nuclear weapon.

The Persian Gulf nation of 80 million people says its nuclear work is peaceful and wants the trade curbs that have squeezed its economy to be loosened.

The proposal being negotiated would cap the quality and quantity of Iran’s enriched uranium and the centrifuges used to make it. It also would pause the construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak, according to diplomats informed about the negotiations. The U.S. in return would ease sanctions on petrochemicals, gold, autos and civilian aircraft parts, and Iran would be permitted access to about $3 billion in frozen assets, according to the diplomats, who asked not to be named discussing the closed-door talks.

The Obama administration wants lawmakers to hold off on enacting new sanctions “to see if these negotiations can move forward,” Carney said.

#### Obama has won some leverage but that is not sufficient---still a fight

CSM 11/19 (“As more Iran talks loom, Obama presses senators to hold off on new sanctions,” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1119/As-more-Iran-talks-loom-Obama-presses-senators-to-hold-off-on-new-sanctions-video)

At the White House meeting, Obama stressed to senators that any sanctions relief would be “limited, temporary, and reversible” and that the bulk of sanctions would continue to be enforced during the six months of negotiating a permanent solution. Obama also emphasized to senators that reports claiming that Iran would receive as much as $50 billion of economic relief under a partial plan are “inaccurate,” according to the White House. Yet even if Obama won some points – and some space – with Tuesday’s meeting, it remains far from clear that Congress will hold off on additional sanctions while any comprehensive agreement is negotiated with Iran, as Obama has asked. Already a bipartisan group of senators – some of whom attended Tuesday’s meeting – are warning the administration that the proposed interim plan offers Iran too much while getting too little in return. “We feel strongly that any easing of sanctions along the lines that the [group of world powers] is reportedly considering should require Iran to roll back its nuclear program more significantly than now envisioned,” the senators said in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry. The lawmakers’ letter carried an undertone of suspicion that the administration may be so anxious for a diplomatic solution with Iran that it could accept a deal that gives Tehran too much for too little in return. Despite Obama’s hard sell Tuesday, such concerns have been bolstered by the French, with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius calling the proposed interim plan a “sucker’s deal.” And Hollande set France apart from the pack by telling his Israeli hosts this week that among the six powers there were some – he didn’t name whom – “that the mere signing of an agreement was an achievement for them.”

## 1NR – Link

#### Maduro is seen as a Castro puppet- sparks backlash

Sullivan 4-9 (Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, April 9th, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf>)

Some observers have criticized the Obama Administration for making overtures to engage with Maduro, contending that U.S. policy should focus on attempting to ensure that the upcoming election is free and fair. A Washington Post editorial from early March 2013 contended that “further wooing of Mr. Maduro should wait until he survives the scrum in his own party, wins a free vote and demonstrates that he is more than a Castro puppet.”19 While it is likely that any improvement in relations will remain on hold during the election process, some analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to remember that taking sides in Venezuela’s internal politics can be counter-productive. According to Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson Center: “Supporting broad principles such as internal dialogue to overcome polarization for the rule of law is not the same as promoting a particular political outcome, an approach that is destined to only backfire.”20 Other analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to recognize the level of popular support in Venezuela for President Chávez. While there was considerable controversy over past elections in which Chávez’s campaign unfairly utilized state resources and broadcast media, the margins of his electoral victories in four elections over the years left no doubt that he had won those elections. His death, at least in the short to medium term, could deepen popular support for the PSUV. In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and democracy concerns, but on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters. With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.

#### Republicans backlash

Ros-Lehtinen 13 (Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Republican, is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. “ROS-LEHTINEN: Venezuela after Chavez: What comes next?”, March 14th, 2013, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-what-comes-next/>)

Last year, it was reported that the Obama administration was seeking to exchange ambassadors in an attempt to normalize relations between the countries. The U.S. State Department’s approach was extremely premature, and it, unfortunately, legitimized Mr. Maduro without even questioning whether the Venezuelan Constitution was being upheld. The Obama administration continued to send mixed messages and to undermine the opposition by sending a delegation to attend Chavez’s funeral services last week, alongside enemies of the United States, such as Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Words matter, but actions matter more, and this decision not only sends mixed signals to the people of Venezuela, but reiterates the failed policy of attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations. It is in our best interest if political and economic reforms come to Venezuela, but all signs currently point to the contrary. As the leader of the Chavista movement, Mr. Maduro could potentially be worse for the Venezuelan people and for U.S. national security interests. Mr. Maduro still controls all branches of government, stifles free speech and was indoctrinated with socialist ideology. He has traveled to Tehran and has strong ties with Iran, supports the Assad regime in Syria and has become a lap dog for Cuba’s Castro brothers.

**Plan’s unpopular for a laundry list of reasons, and it’s a flip flop for Obama**

Sullivan 1/10 – Specialist in Latin American Affairs (Mark P., 01/10/13, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf>)

U.S. Policy The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign oil to the United States, but there has been significant friction with the Chávez government. For several years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military arms purchases (largely from Russia), its relations with Cuba and Iran, its efforts to export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries, and the use of Venezuelan territory by Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Declining Venezuelan cooperation on antidrug and antiterrorism efforts also has been a U.S. concern. Since 2005, Venezuela has been designated annually (by President Bush and President Obama) as a country that has failed to adhere to its international anti-drug obligations. Since 2006, the Department of State has prohibited the sale of defense articles and services to Venezuela because of lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts.

**Flip-flops wreck political capital**

**Cohen 97** Jeffrey E. Cohen, professor of political science at Fordham University, 1997(Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy Making, p. 123)

A president cannot, without good reason, alter his policy stance. And even if he has good reason to change his policy position on an issue, he may have to bear some costs from doing so. The public and other political elites may view him as waffling, indecisive, weak, uncommitted, and/or duplicitous. This seems very much to be one of the major charges against Bill Clinton’s presidency. After abandoning his campaign promise of a middle-class tax cut because of budget deficit pressures, Clinton reoffered a tax cut in the wake of the devastating 1994 midterm elections, in which his party lost control of Congress. From being publicly cool toward the North American Free Trade pact during his presidential election campaign, he became an ardent promoter of that policy once in the Oval Office. From these, and many other occasions, Clinton has developed an image of a waffling politician, one who is forever changing his mind, perennially trying to stake out the most popular position with the public and not necessarily a president who is able to lead.

## 1NR – PC Real

#### PC is real—proven by presidents being able to pass unpopular legislation—the only way it passed is with a presidential push

#### Your evidence oversimplifies political capital- it’s not just about personality and likeability- it’s about the structural advantages of the presidency

Light 99 – Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service (Paul, the President’s Agenda, p. 24-25)

Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout – they all mean the same thing. The most basic and most important of all presidential resources is capital. Though the internal resources time, information, expertise, and energy all have an impact on the domestic agenda, the President is severely limited without capital. And capital is directly linked to the congressional parties. While there is little question that bargaining skills can affect both the composition and the success of the domestic agenda, without the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or charm can make a difference. Though bargaining is an important tool of presidential power, it does not take place in a neutral environment. Presidents bring certain advantages and disadvantages to the table.

## 1NR – Thumper

#### Obama isn’t popular but congress is even more hated; if their evidence doesn’t say X issue makes congress stronger relative to Obama they can’t thump the DA

Brownstein, Editorial Director @ the national journal, 11/18

(“Poll: Obama Down but Congress Is Down Further,”http://www.nationaljournal.com/next-economy/poll-obama-down-but-congress-is-down-further-20131118, DA: 11/23/13, dsg)

The bottom has fallen out for everyone in the nation's political leadership.

That's the message from the latest Allstate/National Journal Heartland Monitor Poll, which shows that after a government shutdown, near-default on the federal debt, the calamitous debut of President Obama's health care plan, and continued sluggishness in the economy, Americans aren't feeling much holiday cheer about the country's direction or anyone setting it.

Just 38 percent of those polled said they approved of Obama's job performance, with 55 percent disapproving. That's the lowest approval, and highest disapproval, the Heartland Monitor poll has recorded for Obama in the 19 times it has measured his standing since April 2009. The latest numbers continue a slide for Obama that had taken his approval rating from 54 percent immediately after his reelection last November to 40 percent in September.

Americans are even more dubious about Congress. Just 9 percent of those polled (down from 21 percent last November) approved of its performance. Fully 84 percent disapproved. Almost nine-in-10 of those who disapproved of Obama's performance also gave Congress a thumbs-down; 56 percent of those who disapproved of Congress also flunked Obama.

#### Nonsense---Reid did the nuclear option and he is also the one pushing for sanctions; that means it didn’t drain Obama’s capital

Hot Air, Online News, 11/21/13

 (“Reid vows to take up Iranian sanctions while Iran bemoans “trust issues” in Geneva,” http://hotair.com/archives/2013/11/21/reid-vows-to-take-up-iranian-sanctions-while-iran-bemoans-trust-issues-in-geneva/)

Just before detonating the other “nuclear” matter that rocked the Senate earlier today, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid vowed to move forward with a standalone bill on a new package of Iranian sanctions after the Thanksgiving recess. The White House and President Obama personally have been furiously lobbying key senators to hold off on implementing more sanctions; it sounds like they agreed to ride out the current continuation of ‘negotiations’ going down in Geneva this week, but bets are off after that. Via Roll Call: “The Senate must be prepared to move forward with a new bipartisan Iran sanctions bill, when the Senate returns after Thanksgiving recess. And I am committed to do so,” Reid said to open the floor Thursday, before addressing why he has decided to invoke the “nuclear option” to eliminate filibusters of most nominees. “A number of Senators have offered their own amendments on Iran in the defense authorization bill, and I know that other senators also have their own sanctions bills. I will support a bill that would broaden the scope of our current petroleum sanctions, place limitations on trade with strategic sectors of the Iranian economy that support its nuclear ambitions, as well as pursue those who divert goods to Iran. “While I support the administration’s diplomatic effort, I believe we need to leave our legislative options open to act on a new, bipartisan sanctions bill in December, shortly after we return,” Reid said.

#### PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized- newest ev

Todd **Eberly** is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is teeberly@smcm.edu. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., **1-21**-2013 <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2>

As Barack Obama prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he faces the stark reality that little of what he hopes to accomplish in a second term will likely come to pass. Mr. Obama occupies an office that many assume to be all powerful, but like so many of his recent predecessors, the president knows better. He faces a political capital problem and a power trap.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, presidents have found the exercise of effective leadership a difficult task. To lead well, a president needs support — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. If presidents fail to satisfy these requirements, they face the prospect of inadequate political support or political capital to back their power assertions.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the two parties began ideologically divergent journeys that resulted in intense polarization in Congress, diminishing the possibility of bipartisan compromise. These changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. In recent years, presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

#### Uniquely true of second term presidents

Bert Atkinson Jr., Independent Review Journal, 3-12-2031 <http://www.ijreview.com/2013/03/41467-love-affair-ending-obamas-political-capital-declining/>

The second term is notoriously tough for two term candidates. Clinton had a little snafu on his …hands during his second term that led to impeachment, and George W. Bush was demonized time and time again.¶ Now, it could be that Barack Obama is facing a similar fate…¶ If President Barack Obama had piled up political capital with his impressive re-election, it’s largely gone.¶ His approval rating has dropped to the lowest level in more than a year, with more voters now turning thumbs down on his performance than thumbs up, according to a new McClatchy-Marist poll. The measure of how much people like him also has dropped.¶ He’s still vastly more popular than Congress, particularly congressional Republicans. But in the biggest political clash of the year – over the federal budget and how to curb deficits – voters split 44 percent to 42 percent between preferring Congress or Obama.¶ What? There’s no Mitt Romney to be held up against?¶ Blame Congressional Republicans all you want, but in 50 years when children are reading American history books about the infamous fiscal cliff/debt ceiling/sequestration debacles of 2013, they will certainly not remember names like Mitch McConnell or John Boehner; they will absolutely read about President Obama and how all of this happened under his lack of leadership.¶ “This may be the downside of him coming out of the box stronger in the second term,” Miringoff said. “People are now looking for him to lead us out of this stalemate, provide more leadership. People see him as a strong figure and in the driver’s seat. During the election, it was him versus Romney. Now it’s him versus people’s expectations for the country.”¶ Expectations: Obama will have a tough time meeting them. I know the mainstream media has been in the tank for Obama for a half-decade now, but they still answer to ratings. If I had to take a guess, I would say that there will be more negative news stemming from the growing discontent of his ability to follow through on his promises. I’m not saying we’re about to see MSNBC go all Fox News on the guy, but the broken promises and evolutions and flip-flops can only go on for so long before people start catching on. Let’s just say that if Obama is still sending a thrill up your leg at this point, you’ve got some issues. (Looking at you, Chris Matthews.)